
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
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REPORTS

FROM

COMMITTEES:

EIGHT VOLUMES.

—*(1.)*—

ARMY (SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT);
ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES);
MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS;

Session

5 February —— *21 August* 1867.

VOL. VII.

1867.

REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES:

1867.

EIGHT VOLUMES:—CONTENTS OF THE

FIRST VOLUME.

N.B.—*THE* Figures *at the* beginning of the line, *correspond with the* N° *at the foot of each* Report; *and the* Figures *at the* end of the line, *refer to the* MS. Paging *of the Volumes arranged for The House of Commons.*

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REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT);

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
26 *July* 1867.

Monday, 6th May 1867.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed "to inquire into the System of Retirement from the three non-purchase corps of Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Royal Marines."

Tuesday, 14th May 1867.

Select Committee nominated of,—

Mr. Childers.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Sir John Hay.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Otway.
Major Jervis.	Colonel North.
Mr. Grenfell.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Mr. Evans.
Major O'Reilly.	Mr. De Grey.
Colonel Sturt.	

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Friday, 26th July 1867.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to Report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the SYSTEM of RETIREMENT from the three non-purchase Corps of ROYAL ARTILLERY, ROYAL ENGINEERS, and ROYAL MARINES:——HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:—

Present System of Retirement.—(Artillery and Engineers.)

1. THE present system of full pay retirement from the Ordnance Corps was established in 1854, after the report of the "Commissioners on Promotion in the Army." That Commission was of opinion that the mode provided by the then existing warrants for relieving the upper ranks of the two corps, of officers who had become unequal to the duties required of them, had proved to be a "total failure;" and it recommended that the arrangements in force under which a limited number of officers, of and below the rank of lieutenant colonel, could be retired annually, should be greatly modified, and that the future provision for this purpose should be fixed at a gross sum of 48,000 *l.* a year.

2. The warrant of the 3rd November 1854, carried into effect this recommendation. Under that warrant (which, with slight modifications, is at the present time in force) 32,000 *l.* a year has been available for the retirement of Artillery, and 16,000 *l.* for that of Engineer officers. These sums have been temporarily increased during the present year; but so far as the Artillery are concerned, not in proportion to the augmentation of the corps since 1854. The regulations under which these grants are applied, appear to be identical in the two corps. The grants are charged in the first place with the retirements anterior to the warrant. The balance (and any sum falling in by the death of an officer retired under the old system) is applied to the payment of annuities on retirement, with generally a step in rank, of 600 *l.* to major generals or regimental colonels; of 400 *l.* to regimental lieutenant colonels, with the brevet rank of colonel; or of sums equivalent to their regimental pay to officers of lower rank. No officer can claim to be retired until he has served 30 years, except under very special circumstances, which do not appear to have arisen since 1854. 18. 82. 79. 20. 85. 21, 22.

3. Retirement under these regulations is virtually limited to major generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels. The practice observed in carrying out the system is somewhat remarkable. Lists are kept at the Horse Guards of the officers of each rank who have applied to be retired. When, through the death of a retired officer, a balance of more than 600 *l.* a year is available, the senior major general or regimental colonel on the list is retired; when the balance is less than 600 *l.* but exceeds 400 *l.*, the senior brevet colonel; when below 400 *l.*, the senior officer of lower rank (if there be such on the list) whose regimental pay is less than the amount in hand. 95. 25. 27. 33. 99. 90.

Present System of Retirement.—(Marines.)

4. The present system of retirement from the Marines is regulated by an Order in Council, which came into operation in 1858. Under it, any officer of 30 years' standing may retire on the pay of his rank; and this, in the case of a colonel commandant, exceeds 700 *l.* a year. If an officer is 60 years of age, or 775.

146. 784. 142. 150. if he is unfit for duty, whatever may be his length of service, he may be compelled by the Admiralty to retire. £. 35,000 a year is the nominal limit of full-pay retirements from the Marines; but, after satisfying the claims of all applicants whom the Admiralty have thought right to retire, this grant has hitherto been more than sufficient by about 4,000 *l.* a year.

Other Provisions.

5. But in addition to these grants of 32,000 *l.*, 16,000*l.*, and 35,000 *l.* a year, other provisions are made for the virtual retirement of officers unfit, through age or infirmity, for active service, or desirous on other grounds to leave the corps. Under the warrant of 1854, six officers of Artillery and three officers of Engineers may annually retire on permanent half-pay. Under the warrant of last year every officer is entitled to retire on half-pay after 25 years' service. 109. 630. 1653. Further, the Army Reserve Fund has at various times been available to buy out officers of Artillery or Engineers; the present rates of purchase being 4,500 *l.* for a lieutenant colonel's commission, and a sum calculated at 100 *l.* for every year's service, for a captain's commission.

Operation of the present Systems.—(Artillery and Engineers.)

6. Your Committee are of opinion that the system, or rather the combination of contrivances, under which officers are retired from the Artillery and 179. 965. 1105. 1264. 1453. 1528. 1672. 1840. 100. Engineers, is unsatisfactory. It is complicated, uncertain in its operation, based upon no clear principle, and inadequate for its purpose. The objects of any system of retirement, from corps requiring great scientific and military attainments, should be to secure to the officer an adequate and certain provision when no longer fit for active service, and on the other hand to secure to the administration the means of keeping each rank in an efficient state, and of getting rid of worn-out officers. If these objects be obtained, sufficient flow of promotion may be anticipated. But in all these respects the present arrangements work badly. 182. 1841. That they are complicated is evident. That they are uncertain 1106. 1265. will be admitted on a consideration of the differences between the ages of the senior officers of each rank in the two corps, and of the numbers retired in different 455. 953. 1842. years. Regulations cannot be said to be based on any clear principle which make retirement depend on the accidental amount of the balance on a fixed fund, and 49. 52. 181. 328. 366. the operation of which appears to be to retire junior officers rather than their seniors, however unfit the latter may be for service. That they are inadequate, all the witnesses whom your Committee have examined maintain; and, even 462. if their operation should not be in this respect hurtful in the Artillery for a few years to come, there can be no doubt, from the evidence of General 446. 449. 563. 672. Lefroy, that under them at a future date, promotion in that corps will be entirely paralysed. Besides, they make no provision for the addition to the establishment occasioned by the amalgamation of the Royal and Indian corps.

Right Principles to be applied.

7. The principles which should, in the opinion of your Committee, govern an improved system of retirement, are—

189. (*a.*) A limit of age for compulsory retirement from active duties.

1870. (*b.*) A graduated rate of retired pay, which every officer should be entitled to claim after a given number of years' service.

(*c.*) Facilities for compounding the retired pay of officers for a sum of money down.

8. If the principle be admitted of a maximum age, on attaining which, an officer should no longer be eligible for regimental duties, your Committee are of 190. 206. 1909. opinion that the limit should be the same as that in force for captains in the Navy, 417. 744. 848. 1806. and partially in the Army, namely, 60 years. But, as many colonels in these corps, and nearly all officers of higher rank, are treated already as if on a retired list, your Committee do not think it necessary that any officer should be compelled, on account of age, absolutely to retire from the Army; but they propose that 1856. at 60, such officers should be placed on a separate or reserved list, retaining their

their prospect of succession to the higher grades of the service. The removal of an officer to this separate list would give a step through the corps.

9. What should be the minimum service after which an officer of these corps should be entitled to retire, what the commencing rate of retired pay, and in what manner it should be graduated, are questions of some nicety, which your Committee have carefully considered. To one difficulty they attach little weight. The purchase system must so materially affect any regulations for retirement from the corps in which it prevails, that proposals for the Ordnance corps could not, with fairness, be quoted as precedents for the other branches of the service. But your Committee do not see any reason for materially shortening the time of service after which the right to retire now accrues; although they think that it should be fixed at 22 years, considering that the officer will have been a cadet for two or three years. The scale of retired pay or pension which they would suggest, has for its minimum and maximum limits 250 *l.* and 600 *l.* a year; and they think that it should be so graduated as to give an officer after 30 years' service little or no inducement to remain in the corps solely on account of any prospect of better retirement at a greater age. At 50 an officer should practically have to make his election between seeking the higher commands in the corps, or (if his qualifications or circumstances unfit him for them) retiring from the service. 1535. 881.

10. This object would be promoted if, on retirement, an officer were enabled to obtain, from a department of the Government, the equivalent, in an immediate payment, of his annuity. For after the age of 50, the "present value" of an annuity diminishes so rapidly as to render it easy to graduate the scale of pension in such a manner as to make the equivalent composition in each year nearly the same. 1852.

11. On other grounds the power of compounding pensions of this kind would appear to be advantageous to the service. And your Committee, having examined Sir Alexander Spearman, the Comptroller, and Mr. Finlaison, the Actuary of the National Debt Office, are satisfied, that from a financial point of view no difficulties need be anticipated in the details of the measure, if the regulations suggested by those witnesses should be established. 1964. 1971. 2002.

12. Proposals have been made on several occasions, for compounding the pensions of other officers, and especially in the Naval Service; and if the experiment should be successful when tried on the small scale necessary for the Ordnance corps, it might be extended to other services.

Other Proposals.

13. Several other plans have been proposed to, or considered by, your Committee.

14. It has been suggested that a bonus system should be established, and that officers should be bought out of the service by means of a fund created by the subscriptions of their brother officers. To this, as introducing an objectionable purchase system into these corps, your Committee are opposed. 526. 1862. 618.

15. It has also been suggested that, in addition to a reduced rate of pension, a small bonus should be given, from a limited annual Vote of Parliament, to an officer on his retirement. This would be unnecessary if means for compounding retired pay were established. 535.

16. Proposals to re-arrange the rates of pay, to diminish the number of subaltern officers, to reduce the captains' list, increasing that of the lieutenant colonels, to increase the establishment of general officers, and to introduce the substantive rank of major, have been advocated as tending to improve the flow of promotion and so to affect retirement. Your Committee, however, have not considered these questions to be strictly within the reference to them; and, whatever advantages any of the schemes may have, they think that the future system of retirement should be simple and self-acting, not complicated by connection with other arrangements, which should stand or fall by their own merits. 1500. 1574. 1897. 656. 1505. 587. 605. 1448. 1454. 348. 1826. 464.

 17. One

581. 626. 1136. 1191. 1352. 1583. 1723. 1866.

17. One question has, however, been raised, which is so intimately connected with retirement (as influencing the age or length of service at which the right to retire should commence) that your Committee recommend it to the serious consideration of the military authorities. It is the unanimous opinion of the witnesses who have given evidence on the subject, that the age of admission to the Academy is too high.

Recommendations in Detail.

18. The following are, in detail, the recommendations of your Committee:

(*a.*) That the present system of retirement, on annuities of 600 *l.* or 400 *l.* a year, or on permanent half-pay after 25 years' service, and the practice of purchasing commissions by means of the Army Reserve Fund, be discontinued.

1932.

480. 1469. 1683. 431. 1027. 256. 1890.

(*b.*) That at the age of 60 every colonel of Artillery or Engineers be placed on a reserved list, and while on that list, be considered ineligible for ordinary regimental duties, but eligible for staff or special employments, if selected by the military authorities. That an officer so removed should receive the pay of a major general, and retain his right of succession to the Major Generals' establishment and to the command of a battalion.

192. 1117.

(*c.*) That every colonel, on removal to the reserved list, should have the option of retiring from the army on 600 *l.* a year, with a step in honorary rank.

662. 1560.

(*d.*) That every officer, after completing 22 years' service, should have the absolute right to retire, with a step of honorary rank, and with an annuity according to the following scale, irrespective of pensions for wounds or distinguished service:

1492.

Number of Years' Service.	Annuity.	Probable Age.	Probable Value of Annuity.
	£.		£.
22	250 increasing by 25 *l.* annually to	42	3,270
25	325	45	4,080
28	400	48	4,780
30	450 increasing by 15 *l.* annually to	50	5,050
35	525	55	5,400
40	600	60	5,510

1713. 1836. 1955.

(*e.*) That provision be made by Parliament to enable an officer to compound (through the agency of the National Debt Office) his annuity for its "present value," regard being had to his age and the state of his health, and the computation of value being made at 5 per cent. interest.

(The fourth column in the above table shows the values of the proposed annuities on the assumption that the life is good, and that the officer obtained his commission at 20 years of age.)

1977.

(*f.*) That no commutation of pension be allowed except on the retirement of the officer.

(*g.*) That no officer be retired on half-pay except for wounds or ill-health, and that officers rendered unfit for service by ill-health, be allowed to continue on the half-pay list, whatever their length of service may have been, power being retained to bring them back to their former place in the corps when pronounced fit for duty.

529. 1371. 1603. 1815. 1863.

(Your Committee would refer to the evidence given by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, with respect to officers placed on temporary half-pay.)

1924. 1933.

(*h.*) That

(*h.*) That it should be in the discretion of the military authorities to employ or not any officer who shall have acquired the right to retire on a pension. 1871. 1893.

(*i.*) That retirement from the Marines should be governed by similar regulations, the maximum annuity being 600 *l.*, except in the case of an existing colonel commandant, whose annuity may be 700 *l.* a year. 868.

19. It will be necessary, in future arrangements with the Government of India, to provide for the due proportion of the cost of the retirements of Artillery and Engineer officers being defrayed from Indian revenues. 993. 1501.

20. In conclusion, your Committee would direct attention to the evidence of Sir Alexander Spearman and Mr. Finlaison, as to the machinery and conditions requisite for properly commuting these annuities at the National Debt Office. Whether the purchase of an annuity should, in the same manner as the sale of an annuity, be accompanied by a reduction *pro tanto* of the National Debt, is a financial question upon which your Committee express no opinion. This would be effected if the instalments of the annuity received by the National Debt Office were invested in Government stocks, to be cancelled when the annuity ceased. 1976. 1982. 1997. 2000. 2003-2011.

26 July 1867.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Friday, 17*th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Childers.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. De Grey.	Mr. Pack-Beresford.
Major Jervis.	Mr. Evans.
Sir John Hay.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Trevelyan.	

Mr. CHILDERS was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Monday next, at Two o'clock.

Monday, 20*th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Mr. De Grey.	Mr. Evans.
Colonel Sturt.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Grenfell.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Trevelyan.	Major Jervis.
Mr. Otway.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel North.
Sir John Hay.	

Colonel *Gambier*, Lieut. Colonel Hon. *H. Fane Keane*, and Major General *Langley*, severally Examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, 3rd June, at One o'clock.

Monday, 3*rd June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Mr. Grenfell.	Major O'Reilly.
Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel North.
Major Jervis.	Colonel Sturt.
Sir John Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. De Grey.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Evans.	Mr. Otway.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	

Captain *Douglas Galton* and Brigadier General *Lefroy*, severally Examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, 17th June, at One o'clock.

Monday, 17*th June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Major Jervis.	Sir John Hay.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Mr. De Grey.
Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Sturt.	Mr. Otway.
Colonel North.	Marquis of Hartington.

Brigadier General *Lefroy* and Colonel *Gambier*, further Examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.

Thursday, 20*th June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Captain Vivian.
Major O'Reilly.	Mr. Evans.
Colonel Sturt.	Colonel North.
Sir John Hay.	Mr. Otway.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Major Jervis.
Mr. Grenfell.	

Admiral Sir *Sydney Dacres*, Examined.

Brigadier General *Lefroy*, Colonel *Gambier*, and Colonel Hon. *H. Fane Keane*, further Examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, 24th June, at One o'clock.

Monday, 24*th June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Colonel Percy Herbert.	Major Jervis.
Mr. De Grey.	Colonel Sturt.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Otway.	Sir John Hay.
Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel North.
Major O'Reilly.	Marquis of Hartington.

General Sir *J. F. Burgoyne*, Examined.

Colonel Hon. *H. Fane Keane*, further Examined.

Major General *Dickson*, and Colonel *Adye*, severally Examined.

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.

Thursday, 27th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Colonel Percy Herbert.	Colonel North.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Evans.	Sir J. Hay.
Colonel Sturt.	Major Jervis.
Mr. De Grey.	Mr. Pack-Beresford.

Lieutenant Colonel *Biddulph* and Lieutenant Colonel *Charles Ewart*, Examined.

Major General *Langley*, further Examined.

[Adjourned *sine die*.

Monday, 15th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Colonel Percy Herbert.	Mr. Otway.
Colonel Sturt.	Mr. Evans.
Major Jervis.	Colonel North.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Marquis of Hartington.

His Royal Highness the Duke of *Cambridge* (attending by permission of the House of Lords), Sir *Alexander Spearman*, and Mr. *Alexander Glen Finlaison*, severally Examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 26th July, at Two o'clock.

Friday, 26th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. CHILDERS in the Chair.

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Mr. De Grey.
Major O'Reilly.	Sir John Hay.
Major Jervis.	Marquis of Hartington.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel North.	Mr. Otway.

The Committee deliberated.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman, read the first time, as follows:

"*Present System of Retirement—(Artillery and Engineers).*

"1. The present system of full pay retirement from the Ordnance Corps was established in 1854, after the report of the 'Commissioners on Promotion in the Army.' That Commission was of opinion that the mode provided by the then existing warrants for relieving the upper ranks of the two corps of officers, who had become unequal to the duties required of them, had proved to be a 'total failure;' and it recommended that the arrangements then in force, under which a limited number of officers, of and below the rank of lieutenant colonel, could be retired annually, should be greatly modified, and that the future provision for this purpose should be fixed at a gross sum of 48,000 *l.* a year.

"2. The

"2. The warrant of the 3rd November 1854 carried into effect this recommendation. Under that warrant (which, with slight modifications, is at the present time in force) 32,000 *l.* a year is available for the retirement of artillery, and 16,000 *l.* for that of engineer officers. The regulations under which these grants are applied appear to be identical in the two corps. The grants are charged in the first place with the retirements anterior to the warrant. The balance (and any sum falling in by the death of an officer retired under the ld system) is applied to the payment of annuities on retirement, with generally a step in rank, of 600 *l.* to major generals or regimental colonels; of 400 *l.* to regimental lieutenant colonels, with the brevet rank of colonel; or of sums equivalent to their regimental pay to officers of lower rank. No officer can claim to be retired until he has served 30 years, except under very special circumstances, which do not appear to have arisen since 1854.

"3. Retirement under these regulations is virtually limited to major generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels. The practice observed in carrying out the system is somewhat remarkable. Lists are kept at the Horse Guards of the officers of each rank who have applied to be retired. When, through the death of a retired officer, a balance of more than 600 *l.* a year is available, the senior major general or regimental colonel on the list is retired; when the balance is less than 600 *l.*, but exceeds 400 *l.*, the senior brevet colonel; when below 400 *l.*, the senior officer of lower rank (if there be such on the list) whose regimental pay is less than the amount in hand.

"*Present System of Retirement.*—(*Marines.*)

"4. The present system of retirements from the Marines is regulated by an Order in Council, which came into operation in 1858. Under it, any officer of 30 years' standing may retire on the pay of his rank; and this, in the case of a colonel commandant, exceeds 700 *l.* a year. If an officer is 60 years of age, or if he is unfit for duty, whatever may be his length of service, he may be compelled by the Admiralty to retire. £. 35,000 a year is the nominal limit of full-pay retirements from the Marines; but, after satisfying the claims of all applicants entitled to retire, this grant has, on the average, been more than sufficient by 4,000 *l.* a year.

"*Other Provisions.*

"5. But in addition to these grants of 32,000 *l.*, 16,000 *l.*, and 35,000 *l.* a year, other provisions are made for the virtual retirement of officers unfit, through age or infirmity, for active service, or desirous on other grounds to leave the corps. Under the warrant of 1854, six officers of Artillery and three officers of Engineers may annually retire on permanent half-pay. Under the warrant of last year every officer is entitled to retire on half-pay after 25 years' service. Further, the Army Reserve Fund has at various times been available to buy out officers of Artillery or Engineers desiring to retire; the present rates of purchase being 4,500 *l.* for a lieutenant colonel's commission, and a sum calculated at 100 *l.* for every year's service, for a captain's commission.

"*Operation of the Present Systems.*

"6. Your Committee are of opinion that the system, or rather the combination of contrivances, under which officers are retired from the Artillery and Engineers, is unsatisfactory. It is complicated, uncertain in its operation, based upon no clear principle, and inadequate for its purpose. The objects of any system of retirement from corps requiring great scientific and military accomplishments, should be to secure to the officer an adequate and certain provision when no longer fit for active service, and on the other hand to secure to the administration the means of getting rid of inefficient servants. If these objects be obtained, the complaint of insufficient flow of promotion will never be heard. But in all these respects the present arrangements work badly. That they are complicated is evident. That they are uncertain will be admitted on a consideration of the differences between the ages of the senior officers of each rank in the two corps, and of the numbers retired in different years. Regulations cannot be said to be based on any clear principles, which make retirement depend on the accidental amount of the balance on a fixed fund, and the operation of which appears to be to retire junior officers rather than their seniors, however unfit the latter may be for service. That they are inadequate, all the witnesses whom we have examined maintain; and, even if their operation should not be in this respect hurtful in the Artillery for a few years to come, there can be no doubt, from the evidence of General Lefroy, that under them, at a future date, promotion in that corps will be entirely paralysed. Besides, they make no provision for the addition to the establishment occasioned by the amalgamation of the Royal and Indian corps.

"*Right Principles to be applied.*

"7. The principles which should, in the opinion of your Committee, govern an improved system of retirement, are—

"(*a.*) A limit of age for compulsory retirement from active duties.

"(*b.*) A graduated rate of retired pay, which every officer should be entitled to claim after a given number of years' service.

"(*c.*) Facilities for compounding the retired pay of officers in sound health, for a sum of money down.

"8. If the principle be admitted of a maximum age, on attaining which an officer should no longer be eligible for active duties, your Committee are of opinion that the limit should be the same as that in force in the Navy, and partially in the Line, namely, 60 years. But, as many colonels in this corps, and nearly all officers of higher rank, are treated already as if on a retired list, your Committee do not think it necessary that any officer should be compelled, on account of age, absolutely to retire from the Army; but they propose that at 60, such officers should be placed on a separate or reserved list, retaining their prospect of succession to the higher grades of the service. The removal of an officer to this separate list would give a step through the corps.

"9. What should be the minimum service after which an officer of these corps should be entitled to retire, what the commencing rate of retired pay, and in what manner it should be graduated, are questions of some nicety, which your Committee have carefully considered. To one difficulty they attach little weight. The purchase system must so materially affect any regulations for retirement from the corps in which it prevails, that proposals for the Ordnance corps could not, with fairness, be quoted as precedents for the other branches of the service. But your Committee do not see any reason for materially shortening the time of service after which the right to retire now accrues; although they think that it might include the two or three years spent at the academy. The scale of retired pay or pension which they would suggest, has for its minimum and maximum limits 250 *l.* and 600 *l.* a year; and they think that it should be so graduated as to give an officer after 30 years' service little or no inducement to remain in the corps solely on account of any prospect of better retirement at a greater age. At 50 an officer should have to make his election between seeking the higher commands in the corps, or (if his qualifications or circumstances unfit him for them) retiring from the service.

"10. This object would be promoted if, on retirement, an officer were enabled to obtain, from a department of the Government, the equivalent, in an immediate payment, of his annuity. For after the age of 50, the 'present value' of an annuity diminishes so rapidly as to render it easy to graduate the scale of pensions in such a manner as to make the equivalent composition in each year nearly the same.

"11. On other grounds the power of compounding pensions of this kind would appear to be advantageous to the service. And your Committee, having examined Sir Alexander Spearman, the Comptroller, and Mr. Finlaison, the Actuary of the National Debt Office, are satisfied that, from a financial point of view, no difficulties need be anticipated in the details of the measure, if the regulations suggested by those witnesses should be established.

"12. Proposals have been made on several occasions for compounding the pensions of other officers, and especially in the Naval Service; and if the experiment should be successful when tried on the small scale necessary for the Ordnance corps, it might be extended to other services.

"*Other Proposals.*

"13. Several other plans have been proposed to, or considered by, your Committee.

"14. It has been suggested that a bonus system should be established, and that officers should be bought out of the service by means of a fund created by the subscriptions of their brother officers. To this, as introducing a vicious purchase system into these corps, your Committee strongly object.

"15. It has also been suggested that, in addition to a reduced rate of pension, a small bonus should be given, from a limited annual Vote of Parliament, to an officer on his retirement. This would be unnecessary if means for compounding retired pay were established.

"16. Proposals to re-arrange the rates of pay, to diminish the number of subaltern officers, to reduce the captains' list, increasing that of the lieutenant colonels, to increase the establishment of general officers, and to introduce the substantive rank of major, have been advocated as tending to improve the flow of promotion and so to affect retirement. Your Committee, however, have not considered these questions to be strictly within the reference to them; and, whatever advantages any of the schemes may have, they think that the future system of retirement should be simple and self-acting, not complicated by connection with other arrangements, which should stand or fall by their own merits.

"17. One question has, however, been raised, which is so intimately connected with retirement (as influencing the age or length of service at which the right to retire should commence) that your Committee recommend it to the serious consideration of the military authorities. It is the unanimous opinion of the witnesses who have given evidence on the subject, that the age of admission to the Academy is too high.

"*Recommendations*

" Recommendations in Detail.

" 18. The following are, in detail, the recommendations of your Committee:

"(*a.*) That the present system of retirement, on annuities of 600 *l.* or 400 *l.* a year, or on permanent half-pay after 25 years' service, and the practice of purchasing commissions by means of the Army Reserve Fund, be discontinued.

"(*b.*) That at the age of 60 every colonel of Artillery or Engineers be placed on a reserved list, and while on that list, be considered ineligible for ordinary regimental duties, but eligible for certain staff employments, if selected by the Commander in Chief. That an officer so removed should receive the pay of a Major General, retain his right of succession to the Major General's establishment and to the command of a battalion.

"(*c.*) That every colonel, on removal to the reserved list, should have the option of retiring from the army on 600 *l.* a year, with a step in honorary rank.

"(*d.*) That every officer, after completing 22 years' service, should have the absolute right to retire, with a step of honorary rank, and with an annuity according to the following scale:

Number of Years' Service.	Annuity.	Probable Age.	Probable Value of Annuity.
	£.		£.
22	250 increasing by 25 *l.* annually to	42	3,270
25	325	45	4,080
28	400	48	4,780
30	450 increasing by 15 *l.* annually to	50	5,050
35	525	55	5,400
40	600	60	5,510

"(*e.*) That provision be made by Parliament to enable an officer to compound (through the agency of the National Debt Office) his annuity for its 'present value,' regard being had to his age and the state of his health, and the computation of value being made at 5 per cent. interest.

"(The fourth column in the above table shows the values of the proposed annuities on the assumption that the life is good, and that the officer obtained his commission at 20 years of age.)

"(*f.*) That no commutation of pension be allowed except on the retirement of the officer.

"(*g.*) That no officer be retired on half-pay except for wounds or ill-health, and that officers permanently rendered unfit for service by ill-health, be allowed to continue on the half-pay list, whatever their length of service may have been, power being retained to bring them back to their former place in the corps when pronounced fit for duty.

"(*h.*) That it should be in the discretion of the military authorities to employ or not any officer who, after a certain length of service, shall have acquired the right to retire on an adequate pension.

"(*i.*) That retirement from the Marines should be governed by similar regulations, the maximum annuity being 600 *l.*

" 19. It will be necessary, in future arrangements with the Government of India, to provide for the due proportion of the cost of the retirements of Artillery and Engineer officers being defrayed from Indian revenues.

" 20. In conclusion, your Committee would direct attention to the evidence of Sir Alexander Spearman and Mr. Finlaison, as to the machinery and conditions requisite for properly commuting these annuities at the National Debt Office. Whether the purchase of an annuity should, in the same manner as the sale of an annuity, be accompanied by a reduction *pro tanto* of the National Debt, is a financial question upon which your Committee express no opinion. This would be affected if the instalments of the annuity received by the National Debt Office were invested in Government stocks, to be cancelled when the annuity ceased."

Question, That the Draft Report proposed by the Chairman, be now read a second time, paragraph by paragraph—put, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 1, *agreed to.*

Paragraph 2, amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 3, *agreed to.*

Paragraphs 4 and 5, amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 6.—Amendment proposed, in line 5, after the word "corps" to insert the words "in which promotion is regulated strictly by seniority, and requiring considerable scientific and military accomplishments, should be in the first place, by supplementing the ordinary casualties of the service to insure such a flow of promotion throughout the corps, as will secure thorough efficiency in every rank; to secure to every officer an adequate retirement, and to afford to the administration the means of getting rid of inefficient servants"—(Mr. *Beresford*).—Question, That those words be there inserted—put, and *negatived.*—Paragraph amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 7, amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 8, amendment made.

Another amendment proposed, in line 3 to omit the words, "should be the same as that in force"—(Captain *Vivian*).—Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 4.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Beresford.
Sir John Hay.	Mr. De Grey.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Major Jervis.
Colonel North.	Captain Vivian.
Major O'Reilly.	

Paragraph, amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 9.—Amendment proposed in line 12, to leave out 600 *l.* in order to insert 700 *l.*—(Mr. *Beresford*)—instead thereof.—Question put, That 600 *l.* stand part of the paragraph.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 5.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Beresford.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Mr. De Grey.
Major O'Reilly.	Sir J. Hay.
Captain Vivian.	Major Jervis.
	Colonel North.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this vote be rescinded, and that 600 *l.* stand part of the paragraph"—(Colonel *North*).—Question put, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph, amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraph 10, *agreed to.*

Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, *agreed to.*

Paragraph 14, amended, and *agreed to.*

Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, *agreed to.*

Paragraph 18, Section (*b.*)—Amendment proposed in line 1, to leave out the words "at the age of 60," in order to insert the words "after 40 years service"—(Mr. *Beresford*)—instead thereof.—Question, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph—put, and *agreed to.*

Section (*d.*)—Amendment proposed, in second column of proposed scale, to leave out the words, "increasing by 25 *l.* annually to," in order to insert the words, "increasing to 600 *l.* by annual instalments of 30 *l.*"—(Mr. *Beresford*)—instead thereof.—Question, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the scale—put, and *agreed to.*

Section (*h.*)—Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "after a certain length of service"

vice"—(Colonel *Percy Herbert*).—Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the section.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.	Noes, 6.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Beresford.
Major Jervis.	Sir J. Hay.
Captain Vivian.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
	Colonel North.
	Mr. Otway.
	Major O'Reilly.

Section (*i.*)—Amendment proposed, at end of section to add the words, "except in the case of an existing Colonel Commandant whose annuity may be 700 *l.* a year"—(Sir *J. Hay*).—Question, That those words be there added.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 4.
Mr. Beresford.	Marquis of Hartington.
Sir John Hay.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Major Jervis.	Major O'Reilly.
Colonel North.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Otway.	

Paragraph 18, as amended, *agreed to.*

Paragraphs 19 and 20, *agreed to.*

Question, That this Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to the House—put, and *agreed to.*

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix.

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Childers.	Major Jervis.
Mr. De Grey.	Colonel North.
Mr. Evans.	Mr. Otway.
Mr. Grenfell.	Colonel Sturt.
Sir John Hay.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Marquis of Hartington.	Captain Vivian.

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel GLOUCESTER GAMBIER, C.B., R.A., called in; and Examined.

Colonel *G. Gambier*, C.B., R.A.

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1. *Chairman.*] ARE you Deputy Adjutant General of the Artillery at the Horse Guards?—Yes.

2. Do you put in a statement showing the ages of the six senior officers in each rank of the Artillery, from colonel downwards, at five decennial periods, beginning at 1826?—I do. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*)

3. Do you also put in a similar return of the length of the service of those officers?—Yes. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*)

4. The general features of those Returns are, I think, these: that the senior officers of the rank of colonel, in 1826, averaged from 52 to 60 years of age; in 1836 they averaged about 63 years of age; in 1846, from 65 to 70 years of age; in 1856, from 55 to 62 years of age; and, in 1866, from 53 to 55 years of age?—Yes.

5. In the same way the ages of the lieutenant colonels averaged about 49 years of age in 1826; from 56 to 59 years of age in 1836; from 60 to 63 years of age in 1846; from 53 to 56 years of age in 1856; and about 48 years of age last year?—Yes.

6. Were the ages of the senior captains about 46 years in 1826; from 51 to 54 years in 1836; about 55 years in 1846; from 38 to 40 years in 1856; and from 39 to 40 years in 1866?—Yes.

7. Were the ages of the second captains about 39 years in 1826; from 44 to 46 years in 1836; from 42 to 45 years in 1846; from 28 to 35 years in 1856; and are they about 32 years now?—Yes.

8. And were the ages of the lieutenants from 35 to 37 years in 1826; from 39 to 42 years in 1836; from 29 to 31 years in 1846; from 22 to 25 years in 1856; and are they about 31 years now?—Yes.

9. The rank of second lieutenant came to an end in 1855, did it not?—Yes.

10. Then the general effect of those papers is, that during the last 10 years the ages of the senior colonels, of the senior lieutenant colonels, of the senior captains, and of the senior second captains, have fallen off considerably, while the ages of the senior lieutenants have increased?—Yes.

11. Do you also put in a paper showing the service of the senior officers of each rank?—Yes. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*)

12. With respect to the ages; the ages of all the officers are known in your corps, I think; and have been known since the year 1826?—They have been known since 1826.

13. There is no calculation as to probable age, but it is actual age?—It is actual age.

14. Can you put in a statement showing the establishment of officers of each rank at each of those periods, and the date and extent of the several augmentations and reductions?—Certainly.

15. Will you be good enough to do so as soon as possible?—I will.

16. Do you put in also a paper showing the system of retirement of officers of the Royal Artillery on retired full pay?—I do. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*) That paper which I have put in, is simply taken from the warrants.

17. Does that paper state the different warrants affecting retirement between the year 1831 and the present time?—Yes; I should only have referred to the dates of the several warrants, but I thought

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I thought perhaps the Committee might like to see how each separate warrant affected the Royal Artillery.

18. Will you state, in a few words, what is the system of retirement which is now in force?—The present system is that there is a sum of 32,000 *l.* a year, which was granted as a retiring fund in 1854. That took in all the old retirements of the previous warrants from the year 1840. This sum of 32,000 *l.* is divided into 600 *l.* a-year retirements for officers who have arrived at the rank of regimental colonels, with 30 years' service.

19. Then the system of retirement at present is, that all the full-pay retirements are provided for out of the 32,000 *l.* a year, and that the sum available is increasing as the old retirements before the year 1854 fall in?—The 32,000 *l.* a year never increases, but the available balance increases as officers already on full pay die off.

20. Does the 32,000 *l.* provide for the old retirements before 1854?—From the year 1840.

21. And the balance is available in the shape of 600 *l.* a year retirements to full colonels of Artillery of 30 years' service?—Yes.

22. Are those the only retirements which come out of the 32,000 *l.* a year; is there no sum of 400 *l.* a year?—There is a sum of 400 *l.* a year to a lieutenant colonel if he has served 30 years, and has arrived at the rank of brevet colonel, provided there is no candidate, for 600 *l.* a year. There might be from various retirements falling in, say, 461 *l.*; and a brevet colonel, if he applies, would receive the 400 *l.* a year retirement, because there was not 600 *l.* a year available for a senior colonel; but the senior colonel would have the choice, on the list of candidates.

23. When the old retirements, between 1840 and 1854, have died out, will the whole of the 32,000 *l.* a year, be applicable to the 600 *l.* a year and the 400 *l.* a year retirements?—Yes.

24. Is there any fixed proportion between the 400 *l.* a year retirements, and the 600 *l.* a year retirements; the retirements offered to the regimental colonel, and the retirements offered to the regimental lieutenant colonel?—There is not.

25. Then is the process this; that the 600 *l.* a year is offered, in the first instance, to each colonel until one accepts it, when there is a sufficient amount?—The process is that, if there is any officer's name down who wishes to retire upon 600 *l.* a year, the senior whose name is down is offered it.

26. That officer may be either a major general on the establishment, or a colonel, may he not?—He is a major general on the establishment or a full colonel.

27. Then under what circumstances can a lieutenant colonel, who is a colonel in the army, have the offer of 400 *l.* a year?—If there is, we will say, the sum of 491 *l.* available, if he puts his name in as wishing to retire at 400 *l.* a year, he would be allowed to retire upon the 400 *l.* a year, because the 600 *l.* a year was not available for one of the full colonels on the regimental list.

28. The offers, therefore, of 400 *l.* a year retirement to lieutenant colonels in the corps, depend upon the fact of there being a then existing balance of less than 600 *l.*?—Exactly; a small balance of less than 600 *l.*

29. So that if there should be a succession of small balances of less than 600 *l.*, the retirements would be offered to lieutenant colonels in succession, although there might be full colonels who were anxious to take it?—It is not offered to them; it is not sent to the regiment either in the full colonels' case, nor in the case of lieutenant colonels. If they have registered their names as wishing to retire on 400 *l.* a year, or on 600 *l.* a year, the senior is taken.

30. And after they have put down their names, have they every opportunity of withdrawing?—They may withdraw if the Commander-in-Chief permits it.

31. Then it is an offer, is it not?—Directly they have put their names down, and an available balance of 400 *l.* exists, the name of the senior applicant is sent in to retire upon that sum.

32. Then, on the other hand, supposing that there should be ever so many lieutenant-colonels whose names are down for 400 *l.* a year retirement, if there should not happen to be a broken amount, the colonels will get the 600 *l.* a year?—Certainly.

33. Therefore, the retirement of lieutenant-colonels, under the present system, depends wholly, does it not, upon the accident of there being a broken amount of money available?—Quite so.

34. Are those the only circumstances under which any part of the 32,000 *l.* a year is applicable to retirements?—Yes.

35. Can no officer below the rank of lieutenant-colonel, under any circumstances, get full pay retirement out of that fund?—A captain who is pronounced unfit from wounds or ill-health, receives the full pay of his rank which would come out of that fund.

36. But he would be retired on full-pay, and that pay would come out of the vote, would it not?—The full-pay retirement of a captain or lieutenant-colonel comes out of the 32,000 *l.* if his retirement is from ill-health, or wounds, certified by a medical board.

37. Are there any such officers charged at present upon the fund, so far as you know?—From wounds and ill-health, I think not.

38. Let me ask you this specially again; supposing that a full colonel has applied for retirement, but that the sum available at the time is not sufficient, you do not hold that in hand, and wait for another falling in, but you apply that at once to the retirement of a lieutenant-colonel, if there is 400 *l.* a year for it?—If there is an applicant on the list.

39. So that, supposing the balance on the fund to-day should be 450 *l.* a year, and that you had a dozen full colonels who had applied for their retirement, you would apply that 450 *l.* a year to the retirement of a lieutenant-colonel at 400 *l.* a year, if one should have applied?—If he is an applicant.

40. And you would not keep it in hand for a colonel's retirement?—No.

41. It appears from the Return which was laid upon the table in March, that of the officers who have retired from the rank of colonel during the last three years, only one was above the twentieth in numerical order in the list, all the others varying from the twenty-third to the twenty-eighth, except Colonel Dick, who was thirteenth on the list; is that so?—Yes.

42. Can you state to the Committee what is the cause that retirements are only accepted so low down in the list of colonels?—I think that the cause is that when they get up the list, they naturally prefer waiting for their promotion, to succeed

succeed to what they have always looked forward to, which is 1,000 *l.* a year as colonel commandant of a brigade.

43. How many colonels commandant of battalion are there?—Seventeen.

44. How many major-generals on the establishment are there?—Fifteen, who are not colonels commandant.

45. Before reaching the rank of colonel commandant, an officer has to pass through the establishment of major-generals, has he not?—He has.

46. While he is on the major-general's establishment, what is his pay?—£. 478 a year.

47. So that an officer runs the chance of 478 *l.* a year for a certain number of years, with a prospect of 1,000 *l.* a year afterwards, against an immediate 600 *l.* a year?—Yes; but besides during his passage to be a major-general, he can hold the command of a brigade, as also colonel on the staff in certain places, and when he has passed to the rank of major-general, there are four or five major-generals who are employed on particular services, the allowances for which amount to about 1,000 *l.* a year; therefore he has these prospects to look forward to, before he reaches the 1,000 *l.* a year.

48. Then is it the case that the prospects which you have mentioned are so good, compared with the 600 *l.* a year, that the senior colonels elect generally not to take the retirement?—I should say that they naturally prefer remaining in the service if they are high upon the list, because they are so much nearer this 1,000 *l.* a year, which they wish to arrive at.

49. Then is the result of that that the recent retirements have been taken by men considerably younger than the colonels at the head of the list?—There are circumstances which would oblige officers who are higher up on the list than those who have taken it, to take it; that is to say, if the Commander-in-Chief calls upon them to take the command of a brigade, and if they are incompetent from ill-health to take the command of it, they would retire upon the 600 *l.* a year.

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50. Do you think that that is generally the cause why officers take the retirements?—I do not. I am only stating that that adds to the causes. There are sometimes officers higher up the list who take it.

51. But you think that though sometimes the cause is what you describe, it is generally because the advantages of retirement are not so good as the advantages of holding on?—I think so.

52. But whatever the cause may be, the effect of the present system is, that younger men than men at the top of the list are the men who take the retirements?—Yes.

53. Do you also put in a return showing the strength of each retired list during the five decennial periods?—I do.—(*The same was delivered in*, vide *Appendix.*)

54. Will you furnish the Committee also with a list of the numbers who have retired in each of the 40 years?—Certainly.

55. Could you add to that the ages and the length of service of each of the officers who have retired from the rank of colonel in each year?—Yes.

56. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The establishment of artillery general officers, then, is 17 colonels of battalions and 15 on the unattached list?—Yes.

57. Are those colonels of battalions necessarily general officers?—All of them.

58. Has it not occurred that they have been colonels?—It has in one or two instances.

59. Mr. *Beresford.*] They are the same as any general officer appointed to the command of a regiment, are they not?—Yes.

Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable HUSSEY FANE KEANE, R.E., called in; and Examined.

60. *Chairman.*] YOU are Deputy Adjutant General of the Engineers at the Horse Guards?—I am.

61. Do you put in a return of the age and service of the six senior officers in each rank of the Engineers from colonel downwards?—From the year 1826, in each of the five decennial periods. (*The same was delivered in*, vide *Appendix.*)

62. The general effect of your return is this, is it not, that in the year 1826 the senior colonels averaged, in age, from 49 to 52; in 1836, from 56 to 61; in 1846, from 59 to 62; in 1856, from 62 to 65; and in 1866, from 61 to 64?—That is correct.

63. Then the age of the senior colonels of Engineers has almost steadily increased since the year 1826 up to the present time, has it not?—Yes.

64. With respect to the lieutenant-colonels, the age, in the year 1826, was from 42 to 45; in 1836, from 52 to 54; in 1846, from 55 to 60; in 1856, about 60; and in 1866, from 49 to 51?—Yes.

65. Will you explain to the Committee how it is that, while the age of senior colonels has steadily increased, or at least seems to have been stationary within the last few years, the ages of the senior lieutenant colonels of Engineers are so much less now than they were 10 or 20 years ago?—It is partly from augmentation, and partly from the junior colonels having retired under the Warrant of 1854 upon the 600 *l.*

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66. Coming to the captains, the ages seem to have been, in 1826, about 40; in 1836, from 45 to 48; in 1846, from 52 to 55; in 1856, from 40 to 41; and in 1866, from 41 to 44?—The same remark would apply to the captains, because, of course, as the lieutenant-colonels are younger the captains are younger.

67. Then the Warrant of 1854 made a very sweeping reduction in the ages of both lieutenant-colonels and of captains, did it not?—I think so.

68. The ages of the lieutenants appear to have been about 33 in 1826; from 39 to 41 in 1836; from 28 to 31 in 1846; from 25 to 27 in 1856; and from 25 to 28 at the present time?—Yes; that would be, of course, increased as you went lower down in the rank.

69. The difference between age and service is pretty uniform throughout, is it not?—It is.

70. But I notice that the difference of the senior colonels at the present time is rather greater than that of any other rank; the difference appears to be 23 and 24 years, whereas the differences elsewhere are from 17 to 20 years; is there any special reason to account for that?—I do not know that there is any special reason.

71. Mr. *Beresford.*] Were not those officers retained some time after they had passed their final

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final examination?—Yes, that might account for it; at the time when those full colonels, who are at the head of the list now, got their commissions, it was just after the war, and a great number of cadets from Woolwich were placed upon temporary half-pay; some of them elected to go into the Line, but sometimes they were as long as four or five years on half-pay before being absorbed into the corps.

72. They did not get their commissions until they were 23 or 24 years of age?—They were not gazetted; they were given something to go away, and employed themselves, in fact, in any other way.

73. *Chairman.*] Will you tell the Committee the exact definition of the term "service" in your corps; does all service count, except when an officer is on permanent half pay?—All service counts, even supernumerary service, and seconded service.

74. How long is service allowed to count when an officer is on sick half-pay?—He is allowed to remain counting his service for one year on full pay, and then, on the strength of a certificate from a Medical Board which then reports upon him, he is placed upon temporary half-pay, if he is found to be unfit for service.

75. And when he is on temporary half-pay, his service does not count?—When he is on temporary half-pay his service does not count.

76. But when an officer is seconded, his service does count, does it not, however long that may be?—Yes; but there are arrangements by which it does not go beyond 10 years or 12 years; 10 years is the rule, and 12 years is the utmost limit.

77. Do you put in also a return of the establishment of officers at each of the decennial periods, and the date of augmentation?—I do. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*)

78. Have you put in any paper with respect to the system of retirements which is in force?—I think that among the papers which I have put in will be found a paper showing the effect of the system.

79. Is your system of retirement the same as in the Artillery?—Precisely the same. We are governed by the same warrant.

80. Except that the numbers are not the same?—Our money is not the same, and, therefore, the numbers are not the same.

81. The numbers were not the same previously to the year 1854, and are not the same now?—No.

82. Your money is how much now?—It is 16,000 *l.*

83. Is it applied under precisely the same rules as the 32,000 *l.* of the Artillery?—Under precisely the same general rules. The whole of the full pay of both corps is taken out of this fund, and the half-pay is borne by the public.

84. You mean that the whole of the full-pay retirement is taken out of the vote which includes the 16,000 *l.* a year, whereas the whole of the half-pay retirement is taken out of the annual fund?—The whole of the half-pay retirement is taken out of the annual fund.

85. Your 16,000 *l.* is charged with a certain number of old retirements, is it not?—Yes.

86. The retirements before the year 1840 are voted separately, are they not?—Entirely so.

87. But the retirements between the years 1840 and 1854 still come out of your 16,000 *l.*?—They were taken up and charged against that fund.

88. Do you corroborate Colonel Gambier's description of the circumstances under which a lieutenant-colonel can get his 400 *l.* a year retirement?—Yes, it is precisely the same.

89. It is a pure accident, is it not, whether or not there happens to be an available balance of between 400 *l.* and 600 *l.*?—Exactly.

90. If the balance is under 400 *l.*, nobody gets his retirement?—If a regimental lieutenant colonel by a Medical Board, of less than 30 years' service, applied, then, if it was 365 *l.*, he would get it.

91. Then there is a third retirement besides the 600 *l.* a year and the 400 *l.* a year, of 365 *l.* a year?—There is a third retirement of 365 *l.* by a Medical Board.

92. Under what circumstances is that retirement?—That is on a Medical Board reporting that a lieutenant colonel is inefficient for general service.

93. How many years' service is necessary for that?—A regimental lieutenant colonel of any length of service under 30 years, on recommendation of a Medical Board, can claim 365 *l.* a-year.

94. And this 365 *l.* a year may be granted under the present Warrant, and is charged upon the 16,000 *l.*?—Yes.

95. As a matter of fact, is there one instance of that kind at present in your corps?—There are two, which you will find in the Estimates.

96. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who regulates the retirement of those officers; is it regulated by the Commander in Chief, or is it granted by the Commander in Chief with a recommendation, and allowed by the Secretary of State for War?—It could only be allowed by him.

97. Each retirement has to be sanctioned by the Secretary of State for War on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief?—Yes; at the same time that the recommendation goes forward a statement of the fund accompanies it, so that the Secretary of State for War sees whether there is any available balance of the 16,000 *l.* to cover the application.

98. And a statement of the officer's service is also sent, is it not?—A statement of the officer's services and of the circumstances under which he is recommended for full pay.

99. Still, the rule being that, if there is a balance of between 365 *l.* and 400 *l.*, and if there is an applicant for the 20 *s.* a day retirement, he would get it; and if the balance exceeds 400 *l.*, and is less than 600 *l.*, it would be given to the first lieutenant-colonel for retirement; but if it exceeds 600 *l.* it is given to the first colonel for retirement; is that so?—Yes; seniority rules through all those retirements.

100. But whether the next retirement is given to a lieutenant-colonel or to a colonel, depends upon the mere chance of the casual balance at the moment?—Quite so.

101. *Chairman.*] You have put in a return of the number of officers of each rank on the retired list; can you give the actual number of officers retired in each of the 40 years, with the date, age, and service of each of the colonels?—I will do so.

102. The half-pay vote with you is entirely distinct from the 16,000 *l.*, is it not?—Entirely.

103. And the retirement of officers who have the absolute right of half-pay retirement after 25 years' service, comes out of the half-pay vote?—Yes.

104. And

104. And the limited number of half-pay retirements which you are able to give every year also comes out of the half-pay vote, does it not?—Yes.

105. Do you remember what those numbers are in your corps?—

106. Are those half-pay retirements at the same rate as the ordinary half-pay retirements?—Yes.

107. Mr. *Otway.*] Is the number of half-pay retirements limited?—It is not.

108. *Chairman.*] The number that you may retire under the Warrant of 1854 is limited, is it not?—Yes; so many a year may be put on half-pay upon application.

109. Is that in addition to the retirements to which all officers of 25 years' service are absolutely entitled?—That question of every officer having a right to half-pay at the end of 25 years, is completely new to our two corps.

110. It is in force, is it not?—It is in force.

111. It only dates since the Warrant of this year, I believe?—Since the 3rd of February 1866.

112. Could you put in a return of the number of all the half-pay retirements during any period that the Committee wished?—Certainly.

113. Mr. *Beresford.*] There was a second half-pay list established under a distinct warrant, was there not, in former years?—I think not; I find the same number allowed to be retired established in all the warrants.

114. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Could you put in a return of the number of officers of your corps who have retired on half-pay in each of the last 20 years, and the total number on half-pay at the end of each year?—Yes.

115. Mr. *Beresford.*] Was there not a full-pay retired list before the year 1841?—Yes; one for the Ordnance Corps, dated 23rd December 1831. The Warrant of 1841 really embodied the decision of 1840.

116. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Some officers have been allowed to retire from your corps by the sale of commissions, have they not?—Yes.

117. They have not purchased those commissions, have they?—No.

118. No officer in the Engineers has ever purchased a commission, I believe?—No.

119. But some officers have been allowed by the Secretary of State for War to retire by the sale of their commissions?—Yes.

120. Has that occurred to any extent?—No; there have been only three or four instances, I think.

121. Can you send in a return of those officers and of the circumstances under which such sales were permitted?—I will do so.

122. Mr. *Grenfell.*] How was the money supplied; who paid the money?—I have not an idea; it comes from the Reserved Fund.

123. *Chairman.*] Were those commissions purchased out of any public fund?—Yes.

124. What was that fund called?—The Reserved Fund.

125. That Reserved Fund is not contributed to by your corps, is it?—No.

126. It is the Reserved Fund contributed out of the Line and the Cavalry, is it not?—I am not aware how it is contributed.

127. Can you give a nominal list of the commissions that are so sold?—Yes, I will do so.

128. Should you have any difficulty in giving the particulars of the present colonels to whom you have referred as not having got their commissions, or as having been put upon half-pay after they left the academy?—No.

129. Can you give their age when they entered the academy, and the time they remained there, and the time between their leaving the academy and getting their commissions?—I think I could do so.

130. You can give the full particulars of those sales of commissions, can you not, including the amount paid?—The amount paid is the regimental price of the commission.

131. And can you give the particulars of the officer's service, and the reasons in each case?—Yes.

Lieut. Col. Hon. *H. F. Keane,* R.E.

20 May 1867.

Colonel Gloucester Gambier, c.b., r.a., called in; and further Examined.

132. We have heard from Colonel Keane, that between the years 1820 and 1826, a certain number of Engineers after leaving the academy did not get their commissions for some years; did that apply also to your corps?—I cannot answer that question, but I think there were some that did not.

133. Could you refresh your mind upon that point, and give the Committee exact information upon it on another occasion?—Certainly.

134. Mr. *Otway.*] Have any officers in your corps been allowed to sell their commissions?—Yes.

135. *Chairman.*] Can you furnish the Committee with the same return that Colonel Keane is going to furnish, as to the number of half-pay retirements within the last 20 years?—Yes.

Colonel *G. Gambier,* c.b., r.a.

Major General George Colt Langley, r.m., called in; and Examined.

136. *Chairman.*] You are Deputy Adjutant General of the Marines at the Admiralty, are you not?—I am.

137. Do you put in a return of the ages and length of service of the six senior officers in each rank of the Marines from colonel downwards, in the five decennial periods since 1826?—I do. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*)

138. Can you give the ages in the earlier of those decennial periods?—No; I have no record of the ages at my office, further back than the year 1846.

139. Can you give, also, a return of the establishment of the Marines at each of those five periods, and the date and extent of the several augmentations and reductions since?—Yes. (*The same was delivered in,* vide *Appendix.*)

140. Can you also hand in a statement of the system of retirement in force during each year since 1826?—I have drawn out this paper from the

Major Gen. *G. C. Langley,* R.M.

Major Gen. *G. C. Langley*, R.M.

20 May 1867.

the Orders in Council which relate to it (*handing in the same*).

141. Then, without going through the past system, what is the present system of retirement in the Marines?—The present system is, that there is a fixed sum allowed for retirement of all ranks.

142. How much is that, at present?—£.35,000.

143. That does not include the half-pay, does it?—No.

144. But 35,000 *l.* is allowed for the full-pay retirement of the whole corps?—Yes.

145. Under what system is that applied?—Upon the application of officers for long and meritorious services, and impaired health. e

146. But taking the case of a colonel in th first instance. What are the rules under which a colonel is entitled to apply for his retirement; after how many years' service; is there any limit of service?—It is not limited to any particular length of service. A lieutenant colonel of 30 years' service is allotted 1*l.* a day; and a lieutenant colonel of shorter service retires on his regimental pay.

147. But supposing that a certain amount of money is available out of the 35,000 *l.* a year, to whom is retirement offered, or who gets the retirement in the first instance?—It is not customary to offer retirement.

148. Then, in what turn are retirements given?—They are not given in any particular turn; they are given either to officers who have made application, or who may have been recommended for retirement.

149. But officers of each rank apply for retirement, do they not?—Yes.

150. Supposing that there are a certain number of colonels, and a certain number of lieutenant colonels, who have applied for retirement, in what order do they get it; do you exhaust the list of colonels before you come to the lieutenant colonels?—We have never run our money at all close, and always have a balance in hand, and therefore have not been obliged to retain any junior officers until their seniors are provided for.

151. Then, practically, the sum available for retirement in the Marines has never been exhausted?—No.

152. Have all the officers of all ranks, who have applied for retirement, been able to get it?—There is no retirement with regard to subalterns, but all officers of the rank of captain and upwards can retire.

153. Then what are the rules; what limit is there?—The Admiralty made a rule not to give it to an officer under 21 years' service. That is according to the rules established by the Army Warrant of 1854.

154. Then a captain of 21 years' service can get his retirement now on application; is the fund in hand sufficient for that?—Yes; he might, if his health were impaired, after 21 years' service.

155. Is there any age at which he is entitled to his retirement without the condition of impaired health?—There is no prescribed age at which he can claim retirement.

156. How is that with respect to the lieutenant-colonels; is there any age at which a lieutenant-colonel is entitled to his full-pay retirement without a medical certificate?—No age has been prescribed at which he can claim retirement.

157. What is the amount of a captain's retirement?—His regimental pay, 11 *s.* 7 *d.* a day.

158. And what is a lieutenant-colonel's?—Seventeen shillings a day, unless he has attained 30 years' service, and then it is 1 *l.* a day.

159. And what is a colonel's pay?—A second commandant's is allowed a retirement of 1 *l.* 5 *s.* a day.

160. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Does a brevet-major get the same as a captain?—He gets his regimental pay, 13 *s.* 7 *d.* a day.

161. *Chairman.*] Could you put in more distinctly the exact Admiralty rules under which the retirement is now governed?—That is established by an Order in Council. I have the Order in Council with me.

162. Can you add that to the return which you have put in?—Yes.

163. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is not an officer of 30 years full-pay service allowed to retire upon full-pay without a medical certificate, as is the case in the army?—There is no survey held upon an officer of that length of service. If he applies for retirement, it has generally been granted to him.

164. But without any medical certificate?—Yes.

165. Sir *John Hay.*] The colonels commandant and the lieutenant-colonels commandant in the Marines are not general officers, are they, as they are in the other corps?—They are not.

166. You have no selling out?—No; not for a number of years.

167. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Have you ever had anything of the kind?—Yes; about the year 1826.

168. Mr. *Beresford.*] Is any portion of the 35,000 *l.* applied to half-pay?—No; but that includes all the retirements prior to 1840, as well as subsequent to that date.

169. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are your officers allowed to retire upon half-pay absolutely, after 25 years' service, as is now allowed in the army?—No; they only retire on half-pay from ill-health.

170. They are not able to claim half-pay by right?—They are not able to exchange to half-pay, or to claim half-pay.

Monday, 3rd June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Childers.	Major Jervis.
Mr. De Grey.	Colonel North.
Mr. Evans.	Major O'Reilly.
Mr. Grenfell.	Mr. Otway.
Marquis of Hartington.	Colonel Sturt.
Sir John Hay.	Captain Vivian.

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain DOUGLAS GALTON, R.E., called in; and Examined.

Captain *D. Galton*, R.E.

3 June 1867.

171. *Chairman.*] You are Assistant Under Secretary of State in the War Office?—I am.

172. You were an Engineer officer?—Yes.

173. And you acted as Chairman, or Senior Member of the Committee which sat in August 1865, on the Retirement of Officers of Artillery and Engineers, and again in August 1866?—The Committee was re-assembled at that date to report upon a Treasury letter.

174. You are in a position therefore to give the Committee full information upon the whole question?—I am.

175. The Committee, I believe, which sat in 1865 were unanimously of opinion that the present system of retirement was unsatisfactory?—Their opinion was that it was not sufficient.

176. And their recommendation, I believe, was simply that a certain addition should be made to the 40,000*l.* a-year?—Yes.

177. That addition was recommended, I believe, without any regard to the prospective increase of the two corps from the Indian establishment?—We omitted that from the calculation purposely. We thought that when the services were practically amalgamated some new arrangement must be come to; that some addition would have to be made on behalf of the Indian officers.

178. In fixing the addition, you suggested, did you not, that you did not at all propose to touch the system under which those retirements are granted?—Yes.

179. Is it your opinion that that system, not referring to the amount, is a satisfactory one?—I should prefer some system of compulsory retirement after a certain age.

180. Will you be good enough to describe what you consider to be the working of the present system, and in what respects you think it is faulty?—I will describe first what the present system is. By the present system we provide annually 32,000*l.* a-year for the Artillery, and 16,000*l.* for the Engineers, which is apportioned to the officers who retire on full pay.

181. Will you just mention in what general respects you think the system capable of amendment, or what faults you can find in it?—The main fault is that it does not make a sufficient provision. It allows officers at a great age to remain at the head of the respective ranks; that is to say, the colonels of Engineers are men of considerable age, and many of the lieutenant colonels have had much longer service than lieutenant colonels in the line; and the same with regard to captains and subalterns also. That has taken place under the present system, although we have had considerable augmentations made to both corps, especially to the Artillery, during the last 10 or 15 years.

182. That might be apparently cured by an increase in the amount of the allowance, but you go beyond that, do you not, and think that the rule of retirement should be fixed, instead of fluctuating with the number of vacancies, and the amount of money available?—Under the present system it is a chance whether the officers are old or not, but if you had a system of compulsory retirement according to age, you would be quite certain of men of a proper age being always at the head of the different ranks in the corps.

183. There is, to a certain extent, a system of compulsory retirement in the line, is there not?—Yes, after 60 years of age; but I do not think it has been applied very stringently.

184. The rule, I believe, is subject to the discretion in each case of the Commander in Chief?—Exactly, it is very difficult not to leave some discretionary power with the Commander in Chief; you might have, in one case for example, a man of 60 or 65 years of age, very active, and fully competent to do all the work, whereas in another case you would have a man who was entirely worn out.

185. Then, you are of opinion that it would be practicable to introduce a system of compulsory retirement, or qualified compulsory retirement, in both the Engineers and the Artillery at a certain age?—I think it must be compulsory almost if you introduce it as a rule, and that you would give great cause for complaint if you allowed any relaxation to take place. In the army medical service there is an arrangement by which a surgeon-major is obliged to retire on certain fixed allowances after 55 years of age, if he has not by that time obtained the rank of of deputy inspector general of hospitals.

186. In the medical service both of the army and the navy there are fixed ages at which officers of fixed ranks have to retire?—Yes.

187. Was that system enforced to its full extent before the warrant of last year was issued?—It was in force before the warrant of last year; since the warrant of 1858.

188. And the warrant of last year put the two services practically upon the same footing?—Yes.

189. You

Captain *D. Galton*, R.E.

3 June 1867.

189. You think that with respect to combatant officers, it would be practicable to apply the same principle?—I think so.

190. That principle is applied, is it not, in the navy?—Yes, I believe it is to a certain extent; I think as to the promotions to the rank of admiral.

191. You would propose, in the first instance, that a colonel of Engineers or Artillery should, after a certain age, be compulsorily retired?—I should apply it to the different ranks, but first to the colonels.

192. You would give a colonel a step in rank on retirement?—Yes; I should have no objection to that.

193. You would give him no option of retaining his position or going on to his battalion?—No; I would give him no option whatever.

194. Nor would you give any option to the Commander in Chief to retain his services, if he thought necessary?—No.

195. Coming lower down, would you apply the same rule to lieutenant colonels?—Yes.

196. Whether they were colonels in the army or not?—I should apply it, I think, entirely to all regimental colonels.

197. That is to say, at a certain age they should be compulsorily retired at a certain fixed rate?—Yes.

198. Would you go lower down than that; lower than the rank of lieutenant colonels?—I think it is desirable to go down to captains.

199. On the same principle?—Yes.

200. Do you consider that such a system as that, standing alone, would, supposing the ages were satisfactorily settled, ensure a proper flow of promotion in the corps?—I do not look at it in that way; I look at it in this way: all you want to secure is that the officers shall not be too old for their duties. I do not think that one has to look at it in any other light.

201. You do not look at it in a far-away point of view; that a satisfactory flow of promotion brings good officers into the corps?—I think that you would get good officers into the corps, in the way I have suggested, as you do now; no doubt promotion does that also, but when promotion has been slow it has not impeded it.

202. Your main reason for advocating this system is that it gets rid of comparatively inefficient officers, and secures comparatively efficient ones?—Exactly so; it secures promotion for comparatively efficient officers.

203. And incidentally, as creating a proper flow of promotion, it would popularise the corps?—Yes.

204. With regard to ages; at what age do you think it would be proper to retire a colonel of Engineers or Artillery?—I do not think you could retire a colonel under, I suppose, about 60 or 62 years of age. An inspector general of hospitals is compelled to retire at 65, I think; but then he ranks with a major general, and his duties would be more those of a major general.

205. Would you retire a major general on the establishment at any age so as to intercept his succeeding to the command of a battalion?—No; I do not think that the command of a battalion is an active duty; it is rather a reward for service. An inspector general of hospitals is an efficient officer, doing active duty, and it is considered that he would not be qualified to perform his duties after the age of 65; but he has a rank higher than that of a colonel.

206. You would retire all colonels at the age of 60?—Yes.

207. What rate of retirement do you consider would be fair to such officers?—The pay of a major general.

208. Do you mean the pay on the establishment?—I mean 478 *l.*

209. That is the present pay of a major general of Artillery or Engineers?—Yes; and I would give them a step of rank.

210. You would in that way get rid of the 600 *l.* a year retirements which are now had?—Yes.

211. You would retire every colonel of Artillery and Engineers, at 60 years of age, on a major general's pay on the establishment?—Yes.

212. At what age would you retire a lieutenant colonel?—About 58, I think.

213. Do you think that so small a difference as between 58 and 60 would work well?—He must be either 55 or 58.

214. At what rate of pay would you retire him?—I would give him the full pay of a colonel and a step of rank.

215. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Supposing he had brevet rank?—I would retire him without a step of rank, if his rank was brevet rank. I should give him a step of rank from the rank he held in the corps, the regimental rank.

216. *Chairman.*] Would that be any advantage to him?—No.

217. You would give it to him on the same day that you retired him?—Yes.

218. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Under the present system five years' service as lieutenant colonel makes a man a *bonâ fide* colonel in the army?—Then he would only get the benefit of the pay.

219. *Chairman.*] Coming still lower down, at what age would you compulsorily retire a captain?—At 50.

220. And you would give him, I suppose, in the same way the full pay of a lieutenant colonel?—Yes.

221. Do you consider that this arrangement would, in a financial point of view, cause much increased expenditure to the country?—I think where the greater increase would take place would be in the colonel's rank. I think that a good many colonels would probably be retired; but I do not believe that there would be much retirement in the other ranks; I have not made any calculation.

222. I suppose you could make an estimate of that, and furnish it to the Committee?—Yes.

223. Do you think that such an arrangement as that, bearing in mind that a colonel's retirement is 600 *l.* a year, would be satisfactory to the two corps?—The present retirements are limited in number, that is, the 600 *l.* a year retirements. I do not know that I would disturb them; I should be inclined to supplement the present system by this further one.

224. Then, you would retain the present 600 *l.* a year retirement, and introduce this system of compulsory retirement in addition?—Yes.

225. On what principle would you retain the 600 *l.* a year?—Simply on the principle that you have given it to the corps, and that it would create dissatisfaction to remove it.

226. By what machinery would you retain it; would you allow officers below the ages you have named for compulsory retirement to take the 600 *l.*

600*l.* a year?—I would allow the senior officer to accept it; that would be according to seniority.

227. You would then put an officer in the position of having to speculate whether accepting the 600*l.* a year at present would be better for him than waiting for a year or two longer, and then getting only 475*l.*?—Exactly so; it would be a question whether his chances of promotion in the ordinary way were better than his taking the 600*l.* a year.

228. If the compulsory system of retirement would be good for the country, and the present arrangements are unsatisfactory, why should you retain the latter?—It is a question, I think, whether they would be unsatisfactory; I do not know that they would be.

229. What I mean is this; if the country gains an advantage by retiring every officer compulsorily at a certain age, and the result is to clear the corps of inefficient officers, why should you retain in addition to that a system of lottery under which an officer may get something more?—I would only have it retained for the sake of the corps.

230. Would it not be better for the corps to lay down an absolute rule, and fix the rate of retirement at a higher figure?—Perhaps they would prefer it; but I doubt whether you could, without a largely increased expenditure, fix it at a much higher figure.

231. Could there be any object in retaining two different systems of retirement from the same rank, if one system could be made to work satisfactorily?—No, I think not.

232. Could you institute a comparison between a scheme by which you should retain only one system of compulsory retirement at a certain age, with a somewhat higher rate of pay than at present, and the double system you have just referred to?—Yes, I think I shall be able to do so.

233. As the command of a battalion is purely an honorary duty, and involves no active duty, is there any reason why some officers should become major generals by succession, and that some should not?—No, not if you were to give the rank as a reward, there is no reason why.

234. Would it not be therefore advisable, if possible, to promote officers at a certain age to the rank of major general, leaving the succession as it is now?—Yes; I should almost think it might be better to promote them all from one list, and leave it to the Commander in Chief to select for the command of battalions those officers whom he considered the most deserving, making a promotion by merit.

235. And not giving any seniority right?—No; I should prefer making it a matter of reward.

236. That would involve, would it not, a considerable increase in the major generals' pay?—No; you would have the same number of battalions then that you have now.

237. Would not the senior officers of the corps be dissatisfied if they did not succeed by right to the command of battallions, and only received the 475*l.*?—The present system has become very much, or at all events to some extent, one of merit, for they promote to the command of battalions now from the army rank, and not from the position in the corps.

238. Is it not rather this, that they go to the major generals' establishment by army rank?—They go to the major generals' establishment by army rank.

239. Being on that establishment they retain their position up to the command of a battalion, do they not?—The army rank is what gives them the command of a battalion.

240. Once a major general, an officer succeeds in his turn to the command of a battalion, does he not?—I will take it in the case of the Artillery. An officer attained the rank of lieutenant general, although he had not held higher rank than that of a colonel, after many officers had, I think, become major generals.

241. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is it not the case that officers succeed to the rank of major general according to the brevet army rank which they hold?—Yes.

242. From that list they are selected by the Commander in Chief for the honorary command of battalions?—I think so.

243. *Chairman.*] Without reference to their rank as major generals?—No; without reference to their artillery rank.

244. (To Major General *Gambier*).] Will you be good enough to state how that is?—They take it by army rank. The Commander in Chief now selects them by army rank.

245. Is it the case when an officer is once on the major generals' establishment, that he succeeds to a battalion in the order in which he stands?—He succeeds in the order in which he stands on the major generals' establishment, which is by army rank.

246. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is that as a matter of course, or is a selection made by the Commander in Chief?—It is the rule which the Commander in Chief has now established.

247. Major *Jervis* (to Captain *Galton*).] An Artillery officer having obtained brevet rank in the army, and having got to the top of the list of colonels in the army, goes on to the list of major generals; that is, on to the list of major generals belonging to the Artillery?—At the present time there are two lists; one is a list of officers who have attained the rank by brevet rank, and the other a list of officers who have attained it by regimental rank, and the Commander in Chief has adopted the plan at present of selecting the senior officers on the brevet army rank for the command of battalions, and not the regimental rank.

248. *Chairman.*] Then my original question was, I think, correct, that major generals succeed to the command of battalions in the order in which they stand on the major generals' list of the corps to which they belong?—Yes, by army rank.

249. And they succeed from the rank of colonel to that of major general, according to their seniority as colonels in the army?—Yes.

250. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The appointment to the honorary command of a battalion is a matter of selection by the Commander in Chief, is it not?—Certainly.

251. *Chairman* (to Major General *Gambier*).] Does the Commander in Chief ever deviate from the seniority in the corps?—He has not done so since I have been major general.

252. It is in his power to do so, is it not?—Yes.

253. But it is not his practice?—No.

254. (To Captain *Galton*).] Your opinion, then, upon the whole would be, that all colonels in the two corps of Artillery and Engineers should be promoted to the rank of major general either at a maximum age, or in the ordinary course of promotion by succession?—Yes.

255. That they should all, as major generals, whether

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whether retired on account of age or promoted in the usual course, receive the same rate of pay?—Yes.

256. And that they should succeed to the command of battalions according to their rank as colonels?—Yes.

257. That all colonels of the age of 60 should be compulsorily retired or promoted to the establishment of major generals at a fixed rate of pay somewhat in excess of the present pay on the major generals' establishment?—Yes.

258. Then that all lieutenant colonels at the age of 55 should be retired, and put upon the list of retired colonels?—Yes.

259. And that all captains of the age of 50 should be retired, and be placed on the list of retired lieutenant colonels?—Yes.

260. Retired lieutenant colonels and retired captains having no further improvement in position to look forward to?—Yes.

261. Do you think that such a system as that would be the best that could be adopted?—I think it would secure you officers at an efficient age in each branch of the service.

262. Would you supplement that by anything more than 25 years' optional half-pay retirement?—I may say that I have heard mentioned a proposal of Colonel Herbert's, which I thought was a very good one, but which I have not yet much considered; it struck me, however, as one that might be of great use, viz., that officers should be allowed, after a certain number of years' service, to receive a lump sum of money, and retire from the army altogether. I think that that would work with great advantage where you wanted to clear the way as between the lieutenants and the colonels.

263. Do you think that compulsory retirement from the top would not effect that clearance?—I think it would be a great advantage for the lower ranks to have a clearance of that sort; the power of retirement, and an inducement to retire after a certain term of service, with a lump sum.

264. Do you think that the amount of money to be made applicable to such retirements should be a fixed one and annual?—Clearly, and that it should lapse if it were not claimed.

265. Would you offer it to the senior officers of each rank?—I should allow those officers to have it who applied. I suppose it would be well known who would apply, and if the officers were entitled to it, I would allow the senior officers who applied for it to retire.

266. With such a supplement, and with an absolute right to retire on half-pay after 25 years, you think that such a plan as you have suggested would be a satisfactory system of retirement for the two corps?—Yes, I have no doubt of it.

267. Is there not at the present time a sum of 400*l.* a year given, under certain circumstances, as a retirement to a lieutenant colonel with the rank of colonel in the army?—There are retirements on 400*l.* a year given now.

268. Those depend, do they not, on the accident of there being available out of the fund a sufficient amount?—Yes, it is an entire chance.

269. Your objection to lotteries in this matter would extend to that system, I suppose?—Yes; I should much prefer the system of giving a lump sum, if I could, to allow an officer to go out.

270. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The scheme which you have sketched out of compulsory retirement, I believe you have not yet considered in its details?—I have not.

271. Would there, in your opinion, be any great advantage in retiring colonels and lieutenant colonels at different ages, or are the duties of lieutenant colonels of a very much more active nature than those of colonels of brigades of Artillery; is not nearly as much activity required in the one case as in the other?—That is a question which I should hardly like to answer. I think the question is, what, in time of war, are the relative duties, and whether the duties of a lieutenant colonel are not much more active in a time of war. In a time of peace there is not any great difference.

272. I presume that if the ages were fixed for colonels at 60, and lieutenant colonels at 58, you would rather have lieutenant colonels at 58?—The honourable Chairman suggested 55; lieutenant colonels at 55.

273. Are there no lieutenant colonels at 55 years of age?—Not in the Artillery. I do not know about the Engineers.

274. In the case of the Engineers, might not the ordinary duties of a lieutenant colonel of Engineers be very well performed by an officer who was 55 years of age?—Yes.

275. And any Engineer officer on active service must be specially selected for the duty, must he not?—No doubt.

276. And there would be an opportunity of selecting the officer?—Yes; but still I think every officer of rank ought to be capable of undertaking active service.

277. As a matter of economy to the State, would it not be desirable to allow officers to serve up to a greater age than 55, although in the exceptional case of active service, it might be desirable to have younger men in that rank?—Then it would be fixing the retirement at rather a greater age.

278. Would it not be better to fix the age at which it was considered an officer ought to retire absolutely on the ground of age, irrespectively of his rank, and applying that to all ranks?—I think that that argument might apply with some force to colonels and to lieutenant colonels, but not to captains. With regard to fixing the age for captains, I think their duties are much more active, or they ought to be, than those of colonels and lieutenant colonels.

279. I have been assuming that a captain would never attain the age, if you provided for the compulsory retirement of leutenant colonels and colonels at the age at which you would propose to retire them compulsorily in those ranks?—The argument for an increase of the retirement to the Artillery and Engineers is, that all these ranks will attain to a very considerable age before they get promotion.

280. At what age do you consider it probable that captains of Artillery and Engineers would arrive?—If the present system of promotion went on, and if there was no augmentation to the Artillery in future, I think you would find that the captains would be 50 years of age; at least, the seniority captains.

281. *Chairman.*] Although all the colonels were retired at 60?—No.

282. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I am taking that as part of your plan, that that would be done, and if so, would it ever happen that the captains would attain the age of 50 in that rank?—I think it would very rarely happen.

283. It

283. It would of course simplify the matter if there was one age for retirement, and that that was made absolute?—Yes; there is a difference now between the average age of lieutenant colonels of Artillery and the average age of captains of Artillery of 12 years.

284. *Chairman.*] Is there not a difference now of 16 years between the senior colonel and the senior captain of Artillery?—I am not aware. I have not seen the papers.

285. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I suppose that compulsory retirement, if made absolute, would be distateful to the officers?—No doubt.

286. And if you, without sacrificing the efficiency of the service, could make it acceptable to them, it would be desirable, would it not, as removing a ground for discontent?—No doubt of it.

287. Supposing you were to make the system of retirement compulsory as to the ranks of colonel and lieutenant colonel, but left them to attain the rank of major general in the ordinary course of things, Her Majesty having power to employ them on the staff as major generals, would that, do you think, tend to remove a feeling of discontent on the part of the officers who were compulsorily retired, that they should be removed from the active duties of the profession, and be placed on a retired list as to pay; that their places should be filled up by fresh appointments in the corps, but that they should remain on the Army List, and rise in succession to the rank of major general, the same as anybody else?—Then they would retain their position, as it were, in italics in the Army List, and succeed to the rank of major general in the ordinary course.

288. Not in italics, as they would be colonels just the same as the colonels on retired full pay are at present?—But supposing the senior colonel of Engineers was 58, and the junior man was 60, and was retired, he would still retain his relative position for the rank of major general with the colonel of 58, as senior in the corps.

289. Just so.——

290. *Chairman.*] Your last proposal was, that colonels of 60 years of age should, instead of being retired, be promoted to the rank of major general?—Yes; I meant, where they were promoted to a separate list to be made major generals, but that they should succeed to the command of battalions, according to their rank as colonels.

291. That is to say, to promote from the colonel's list to the major general's list in two orders, those at the top of the list on a vacancy occurring, and those of 60 years of age when they reach that age, but having reached the major general's list, that they should succeed to the command of battalions in their original rank as colonels?—Yes.

292. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] My plan was this, that an officer having arrived at the age of 60, or whatever the age fixed upon was, should be removed from the corps of Artillery or Engineers; that he should retain on the Army List the same position as a colonel on half-pay, and obtain all further promotion in the same way as officers on the half-pay list, being liable to be employed on the staff at Her Majesty's pleasure; are there any objections to that plan as regards the efficiency of the corps, and would it not have the effect of softening off the compulsory retirement to the officers of the corps?—It would, I should think, soften off the compulsory retirement to some extent, and it would, perhaps, be less disliked than my plan.

293. Do you think there would be any material sacrifice of efficiency?—I think not.

294. Referring to the system of giving a bonus for retirement, and not binding myself to the details, suppose that a sum, varying from 800 *l.* to 1,800 *l.* or 2,000 *l.*, was offered to officers whose services varied from 10 to 12, 12 to 15, 15 to 18, and 18 to 20 years, do you think that it would be accepted by officers in the Artillery and Engineers?—I think there are many officers who would accept it, and be very glad to take a lump sum and retire.

295. Officers with from 12 to 15, and from 15 to 18 years' service?—Yes.

296. You think that from many circumstances, either from being married, or getting tired of the service, they would be glad to retire, and that many of them would retire who now hang on?—I think that a certain number of them would retire; I do not say that a large number would.

297. It would keep up a flow of promotion through the corps, would it not?—Yes; including the lower ranks.

298. I think you stated that that flow of promotion would be exceedingly beneficial to the corps?—No doubt of it.

299. Supposing that a sum of 10,000 *l.* per annum was employed in the Artillery in that way, and a proportionate sum in the Engineers, might not that be an effectual way of arriving at what we all desire to see, viz., young officers of a lesser age in the higher ranks of the profession?—Yes; it would operate, I think, to take off officers of about 20 years' service.

300. Would it not have the effect of enabling other officers at an earlier period to reach the rank of lieutenant colonel or full colonel?—Yes. On the other hand, it would tend more, I think, to bring young officers to the ranks of lieutenants and captains.

301. But still, by taking the captains off above, they would attain the rank of lieutenant colonel at an earlier period?—Yes, clearly.

302. You think, then, both in the interests of the corps and the public service, that a scheme of that kind is well worth consideration?—I think it is; and I am not certain that it might not be beneficial to extend it to the higher ranks, and allow officers to compound for a lump sum, and retire altogether with the rank of colonel.

303. Whether the Government paid 50,000 *l.* a-year in bonuses, or whether they paid 50,000 *l.* a-year in the shape of annuities or retired allowances, it would be the same thing?—No, not the same thing. I think it would be a much better thing to pay it in the shape of bonuses.

304. *Chairman.*] If you offered to the senior officers of each rank that they should have their pay capitalised, and you also filled up their vacancies, you would increase the charge to the State, would you not?—Yes; but I meant in the rank of lieutenant colonel, if you could offer some inducement to some of them to retire.

305. If you offered to the two senior lieutenant colonels, for instance, a sum of money down, instead of their pay, and filled up their vacancies, you would increase the charge to the State; but if you only offered it to two lieutenant colonels who had retired on whole or half-pay, that would not increase the charge to the State?—No; if you made officers retire at a certain age, it would be worth

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worth your while to pay such a sum, and to capitalise what you are paying them rather than pay them the full allowance for the rest of their lives.

306. Therefore, with respect to lieutenant colonels whom you would retire at a certain age, such an arrangement would cost the country nothing; but lower down the scale, with respect to captains, for instance, who would not be retired at a certain age, if you offered them a bonus and a certain amount to the two senior officers, you would to that extent increase the charge?—Yes, clearly; the proposal that Colonel Herbert made was to increase the charge on the State.

307. Your extension of it to lieutenant colonels is not exactly on the same footing?—No.

308. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] My proposal was to apply a portion of that which is now the retiring allowance in the Engineers and the Artillery (48,000 *l.*, or whatever the sum was thought proper to be) as the retiring allowance for those corps?—Yes.

309. Then, if we follow out this plan, the Engineers and Artillery would be in this position: there would be compulsory retirement at the age of 57 or 60 from the rank of colonel, and there would be a right of retirement on half-pay after 25 years' service, which is common to those two corps with the rest of the army, and there would be a portion of the retiring allowance voted by Parliament applied as bonuses to induce officers of from 12 to 20 years' service to retire?—Yes.

310. Those three things together would probably create a more equable flow of promotion in all the ranks of the service than any one of them by itself would create?—Yes.

311. Will you state your opinion as to whether it would be the best application of the public funds, in the three ways which have been mentioned?—I think it would secure efficiency in the corps; but, without having made any calculation as to how it would work out, I cannot say whether it would be the best plan.

312. Your impression is favourable to it?—Yes.

313. Mr. *Evans.*] Would you give the captains, if they were obliged to retire at 50, a step in rank as well as the lieutenant colonels?—Certainly.

314. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Referring to your recommendation with regard to retirement after a certain age, it is frequently the case, I think, in the Artillery and Engineers, that officers senior in regimental rank are younger in age than some below them?—Yes, I suppose so.

315. If you give an officer retiring a step of rank, you would make him supersede (in the army) those senior to him on the regimental list?—Yes, you would in that way; but then I propose that promotion to the command of a battalion should be according to the rank of the colonel.

316. That is contrary, I think, to the system which is now adopted; army rank is the rule, I believe, at present?—Yes, but this would be a special retired rank.

317. *Chairman.*] And succession to a battalion would be according to the army rank of the colonel?—Yes.

318. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] By promoting an officer as you have suggested, you would frequently have an officer who was junior to another in a regiment, senior to him as major general?—Then he would be on the Retired List.

319. I understand you to recommend that officers on the compulsory retired list should be promoted to battalions?—Yes, but according to the rank they hold as colonels.

320. You would have two different lists?—Yes, as they have now.

321. With reference to your recommendation as to lieutenant colonels being retired at a certain age, would it not be very hard upon the senior one to be put on the Retired List, when a few days even on the Colonels' List would make him eligible for a battalion?—Of course there are always in carrying out every rule hard cases at the boundaries, but at the same time I do not see how you can avoid them; there are always some individuals who suffer very much from it, or at all events think they do, from just falling within the limit; but I do not see how you can avoid that.

322. Would not voluntary retirement at an age somewhat less, act more fairly?—How are you to obtain it?

323. If officers arrived at the age fixed, would they not be glad to avail themselves of voluntary retirement?—It seems to me, that it is desirable to fix some principle upon which the retirement should take place, and the only principle one can arrive at, I think, is that officers of a certain age are as a rule less qualified to perform the duties of their rank; therefore, that, in my opinion, is the best rule to lay down in this case; I think that compulsory retirement is a wise rule to adopt at a certain age.

324. I can understand the system as applied to the upper ranks, but in the lower ranks it appears to me that if you establish a system of compulsory retirement, with the view to making a regiment efficient, you never can have inefficient officers in the junior ranks?—That is to say, that it would be unnecessary to retire the lower ranks, if compulsory retirement was made the rule in the upper ranks.

325. Yes?—It is so difficult to calculate what would really take place.

326. Have you not found both in the Artillery and the Engineers, that when officers have attained nearly to the ages you have mentioned, they are very glad to take the full pay retirement?—Our promotion hitherto has been so entirely dependent upon the augmentations, both in the Artillery and Engineers.

327. Going back to the time when the money was first allotted, and when the ages of officers were very great in the respective ranks, I believe there was no difficulty as to voluntary retirement?—No; but the ages were very considerable then, and the report of the Commissioners shewed a very considerable length of service.

328. *Chairman.*] Is it not the case that last year, although the senior colonels of Engineers were 64 and 63 years of age respectively, no one took the retirement down to the 14th and 15th on the list?—I believe so.

329. And they were only 53?—I believe so; but you will get much better information on that point from Colonel Keane.

330. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Referring to the sum of money that is now granted, would it, in your opinion, be better to allot a certain part to each rank, or to let it go on as at present as a lottery?—I would rather have compulsory retirement

ment at a certain age in the case of the lieutenant-colonels and the captains; certainly for the captains, I think it would be better; and if it so happened that the compulsory retirement at 60 of the colonels cleared the lower ranks, it would never have to be resorted to; but if it came to pass that you had very aged captains in your service, it would be desirable, I think, to have some means of freeing the service from them.

331. Do you contemplate retaining the money which is at present granted, in addition to the rule as to compulsory retirement? — Yes; I thought that it might be desirable to retain that. I am not very anxious about it. I would rather have one scheme, if possible, although more as a means of preventing officers from thinking it too great a hardship.

332. Major *Jervis.*] Do you think that it is advisable to make the question of retirement one of age instead of length of service?—Certainly.

333. There have been great alterations made as to the age at which young men have entered the Artillery and Engineers during the last 30 or 40 years. At one time they entered at the age of 16 or 17; now they may enter at 25, and do you not think that your plan would bear very hard upon some who would thereby not be able to reach the higher ranks as compared with others?—It is possible that it might do so; but I have been looking at retirements on account of age in this light, that after a man has attained a certain age, he cannot be efficient for the duties which he has to perform.

334. But some men are more fit at certain ages for the performance of their duties than others, and referring to a return which lies before me I see that the senior colonel of Artillery is only 55, and has served for 37 years and seven months, while the senior colonel of Engineers is 64, and has only served 40 years and three months; that is to say, that the colonel of Artillery, though nine years younger, is within three years of the same amount of service. It would be rather hard, in such a case if it was made a mere question of age?—The colonels of Engineers were officers who came in just after the war, when there was a great stagnation of promotion.

335. Take the present junior general officers of Artillery, many of them obtained their commissions at the age of 17; but if a man does not obtain his commission until he is 23, he will lose all chance, will he not, of becoming a general officer at all?—Yes; no doubt there is a hardship, whatever the limit of age may be that is fixed; but with regard to efficiency, a man would not be more efficient at the age of 60 because he joined the Artillery at 25 than if he joined it at 20.

336. As it was no fault of his that he did not enter the academy earlier, it would be very hard, would it not, that he and others should find they were completely debarred from ever reaching the rank of a general officer?—It would be hard upon some individuals.

337. Do you think they would take the slightest interest in their profession if that was the case?—I have no doubt that they all take an interest in their profession.

338. But if they see that there is no chance of reaching the higher ranks, do you think they will still take an interest in it?—What you have suggested might occur in some cases, but it would not, I think, occur in the majority of cases.

339. What has been the average time within which a man, from the time he has entered the service, even with the most rapid promotion, has attained the rank of major general?—I do not think that I can tell you that; some, perhaps, after 39 years' service.

340. Taking the present ages of the cadets, what service would they all have to go through before they could reach that rank, even supposing they had rapid promotion?—If you take off every colonel at the age of 60, you will increase the stream of promotion very rapidly.

341. Would there be any stream of promotion at the present time?—Of course not at the present time, as none of the colonels are more than 56 years of age, and, therefore, the service at the present time does not require any flow of promotion to increase its efficiency; but in five years hence, when those colonels have reached the age of 60, they would then be removed, and you would have a great flow of promotion.

342. You do not think that at the present time the senior subalterns and second captains of the corps require any further stimulus, with regard to promotion, than they have now?—They will get it in a few years hence. The senior lieutenants of Artillery are officers of 10 years' service.

343. Take a senior lieutenant of Artillery, and apply your plan of retirement at 60; when will he ever get his first captaincy?—In about four or five years hence.

344. Colonel *North.*] The first 77 lieutenants of Royal Artillery are in their 10th and 11th years of service?—Yes; but the colonels of Artillery are now 56 years of age, and the senior colonel in four or five years would arrive at the age of 60, and then he would go on to the Seconded List.

345. Colonel *Jervis.*] Taking the ages of the colonels of Artillery at the present time, I think your plan of retirement at 60 would give about 47 steps in 10 years?—I cannot say exactly how that is.

346. The senior subaltern of Artillery would therefore not get up half the list of second captains during 10 years, and numbers of the men under him are exactly the same age?—Then Colonel Herbert's system of bonuses would come in.

347. You are not desirous of looking forward to a system by which captains are to be 50 years of age?—No; I do not think that would be an advantage to the service.

348. Sir *John Hay.*] Is not one of the difficulties in the way of promotion in the junior ranks of the Engineers the fact of there being no rank of major?—No; I never heard that raised as an objection.

349. Are you aware of the comparison which may be made between the number of field officers in the English Engineers and in the French Engineers?—I could not give you a comparative statement.

350. I have the comparison before me; and it appears that of 460 officers in the French Engineers, 150, or about one-third, are field officers; whereas of 366 officers in the English Engineers only one-sixth, or 56, are field officers?—Yes.

351. Would it not appear that a greater number of field officers would cause quicker promotion in the junior grades, and therefore greater efficiency?—I have no doubt that it would cause quicker promotion, but I do not know whether an extra number of field officers is required for the wants of the service, I should doubt it. It might

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might possibly be better to have a larger number of captains, and a smaller number of lieutenants.

352. The proportions stated in the paper before me are in the French Engineers, 26 colonels, 26 lieutenant colonels, 108 chèfs de battalion or majors, 150 capitaînes de 1 classe, 150 capitaînes de 2 classe et lieutenants, as against 16 colonels, 40 lieutenant colonels, 64 first captains, 64 second captains, and 182 lieutenants, making, as I said before, 56 field officers only out of 366, or between one-sixth and one-seventh; whereas in the French Engineers there are 150 field officers, or one-third of the whole number?—Yes, the numbers of the Engineers do not quite correspond with ours. I have 18 colonels, and 43 lieutenant colonels.

353. What I desired to have was your opinion whether an increase in the number of field officers relatively, without increasing the aggregate number of the officers, would not be advantageous in causing a more rapid flow of promotion, and without causing any great additional charge to the country?—It would be an increase of charge to the country of course. If a larger number of lieutenant colonels are required for the wants of the service, then I should quite agree to their being appointed; it is a mere question. I should have doubted whether it was necessary.

354. My proposition was this, to create the rank of major, which is a field officer's rank in the corps of Engineers, and to give it to the first captains of Engineers, which would not, I think, entail much more expense, if it were unaccompanied by any increase of pay, but merely the allowances necessary for a field officer?—The Engineers have no duties to perform that require the rank of major.

355. Could not the duties of first captain be performed by a major?—Yes, of course.

356. Is it not the fact that seniority corps labour under great disadvantages in being often commanded by a field officer, junior to themselves, in the line?—I cannot speak to that point.

357. Has it not been found to be a disadvantage in active service?—I have not been aware of it.

358. I have before me a copy of Lord Raglan's Minute, dated 12th July 1854, on the application for an allowance of 50 *l.* to each subaltern of Engineers, for the purchase of a horse, and pay for a second servant, in which it is stated, "The situation of the subaltern officer of Engineers is undoubtedly peculiar. He has various duties to perform, always important, very frequently onerous, as well as involving responsibility to an extent unknown to any officer of his relative rank in any other branch of the service. To discharge these duties in an adequate manner, he must be not only mounted, but efficiently so; and under all these circumstances, as the Treasury has left it for my consideration to determine whether the position of the officer of Royal Engineers be such as to justify an exception to the general rule, in favour of the subalterns of that corps, I shall take upon myself to order that 50 *l.* be allowed to each of the latter for the purchase and equipment of the horse with which he is obliged to provide himself. I shall also authorise the grant of pay for a second servant to the captains and subalterns of the Royal Engineers;" have you seen that?—No, I have not seen it. An officer of Engineers would require, if he was a captain, just as much as if he was a major.

359. The portion of the order to which I would call your attention is with reference to the disadvantage under which the Engineer officer labours as to his comparative rank?—Exactly so.

360. With regard to the question you were discussing just now, on the subject of retirement, would it, in your opinion, be desirable to retire officers from the higher ranks only?—My suggestion is, to retire officers at certain ages from the three ranks, or from two.

361. Is it not the case that there are great groups of lives of nearly equal value, although the officers have a different standing in point of rank?—Yes.

362. Major *O'Reilly.*] The honourable Member for Harwich has suggested that hardships might arise, from your proposal of compulsory retirement at a fixed age, in consequence of the difference of age at entry. In making your recommendation, I presume you look to the good of the service, and not to the hardships that may fall upon individuals?—Exactly so.

363. I suppose that in your view the opposite argument, would be an illustration of the old proverb, that "hard cases make bad laws"?—Yes.

364. This question was also put to you, whether voluntary retirement would not be more agreeable to officers, and more desirable, if it worked efficiently. Is it not the fact that your reason for proposing compulsory retirement, is because voluntary retirement does not work sufficiently well?—It does not work sufficiently now, I believe.

365. As a matter of course, if voluntary retirement worked well, compulsory retirement would never come into action?—No.

366. Is it not an objection to the present 600 *l.* and 400 *l.* retirements, that they do not take away the oldest officers; but on the contrary, very often take the younger ones?—Yes, it is so very frequently.

367. Is not that a decided disadvantage?—Yes; which compulsory retirement on account of age would obviate.

368. In that case, is it not desirable to make the retirement always work at the top of the list, so as to take away the oldest officers?—Probably it would, and to have one system only, that of compulsory retirement on account of age.

369. How do you think the capitalisation plan would work at the top of the list; that is to say, paying a lump sum?—I think that a great many officers would be glad to accept a lump sum.

370. At the top of the list how would you propose to regulate it, so that it should not increase the charge by increasing the number of those who retired without taking a lump sum?—I think you must make the sum depend upon the age of the men, and buy up the annuity.

371. In case the rule was for the compulsory retirement of every man at 60, and if there were a certain number of retirements like the 600 *l.* optional, and you purchased out one man, and let in another to fill up his place, that would lead to an increased charge, would it not?—It would be no increased charge if the person who was compulsorily retired at 60 was allowed to commute that annual payment for retirement into a lump sum. If everybody retired at the age of 60, and one of them was allowed to receive a lump sum instead of his annual payments, it would cause no increase of charge on the State. If those who were allowed to retire voluntarily were allowed to commute, and then a fresh person

son was allowed to retire voluntarily, then it would create an excess of charge on the State.

372. You can only contemplate the system working satisfactorily in the case of compulsory retirement?—Yes.

373. It will not fit into the other plan?—No.

374. A proposal was made, as I understood, that all colonels at the age of 60 should be put on to a non-active list, and then be promoted by seniority to the rank of major-general?—Yes; that, as I understood, was the proposal of Colonel Herbert.

375. Would not that leave them open to being employed up to any age?—Colonel Herbert, I think, intended that they should be employed on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, should think it desirable, after they had been placed on that Retired List, but not to be employed in their ordinary regimental vocation.

376. Is there any limit now as to age for employment on the Staff?—I believe none.

377. You mentioned, in answer to a question by the Chairman, that you thought all colonels should succeed by seniority; that is to say, if upon your plan they retired compulsorily at the age of 60, with the rank of major general, they should succeed to the honorary command of battalions; I presume you mean that to apply just as far as it does now; not that you think it necessary that succession to the honorary command of a battalion should necessarily be by seniority?—Yes, exactly; I expressed the idea that it would be desirable that all those appointments should be by merit.

378. Your answer to that question does not imply any opinion as to the general principle of promotion?—No.

379. Do you think it more desirable that the command of a battalion should be given by sale or by merit?—By merit.

380. I understand the principle of a lump sum as applied to compulsory retirement to be that it is simply the change of a lump sum calculated by an actuary for the value of an annuity?—Yes.

381. On what principle should we determine the sum which Parliament should apply to the purchasing out of officers junior to those to whom that would apply?—Of course Parliament would have to vote each year the amount to be applied to it. I have really not thought out what the principle would be; Colonel Percy Herbert suggested that it would amount to about 10,000 *l.* a-year, I think.

382. Would it not in fact be an application on the part of Parliament of the purchase system to the non-purchase corps?—Not exactly, because the purchase system is that you allow officers to purchase into a corps; this is merely commuting their allowance to get rid of them; it is just the opposite, I think.

383. What is it that you are commuting?—It is commuting the annuity.

384. No; it is not the annuity, you commute, the annuity in the case of compulsory superannuation?—Yes; you are giving the officer a bonus to retire.

385. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You are buying him out?—You are buying him out no doubt.

386. Major *O'Reilly.*] You are not commuting his future pay, because you are making him a present of the service which that pay was to purchase?—Yes; the pay for your service is made up of two items: first the pay you receive every every day, and next the prospect which you have of future retirement; and you are commuting the prospect of future retirement for a lump sum.

387. You would not propose that the calculation should be the present value of the future retirement; that would be very small would it not, in the case of a captain for instance?—Yes; you must of course give such sums as would induce the officers to take them if you want them to go.

388. You cannot suggest any principle upon which the amount to be devoted to that purpose should be determined?—No, I cannot; I have not considered it enough. I only heard it suggested a short time ago, and I really have not thought it over since.

389. Do you think that it is very difficult to work it out to any principle as applied to the junior ranks; is it not simply proposing to devote a certain sum of money out of the bounty of Parliament to get rid of a certain number of officers that another number may be promoted?—In order to get younger officers in your lower ranks.

390. It was suggested that the ages for compulsory retirement in the different ranks need not be fixed very low; that it might be fixed at rather an advanced age, because the ordinary duties of such officers in the junior ranks in time of peace might be performed by men of rather advanced age, and that for active service the officers would have to be selected. Has it not been the fact, that at the outbreak of every war it has been found a great disadvantage to have a large number of officers of advanced age whom the authorities were obliged to supersede by a difficult exercise of discretion, telling them that they were too old for active service, though the officers thought themselves quite young enough, and though the rules of the service did not prevent their taking active service?—It has happened, I think, at the outbreak of wars; in the Crimean war, I think, it happened.

391. Is it not, therefore, better that the age of compulsory retirement should be founded on the ordinary requirements of the service, both in peace and war?—On the requirements of the service in time of war mainly, I should say.

392. Mr. *De Grey.*] I think you stated in the earlier part of your evidence that you thought it would be difficult to have a compulsory system of retirement without some discretionary power, and you afterwards said that you would leave no option with the Commander in Chief to retain such officers as attained the age at which you proposed that they should retire. Can you suggest any discretionary power which would be practicable?—No; I am inclined to think that if you leave a discretionary power you open the door to very great difficulties.

393. Do you not think that if you left no discretionary power, it might happen that some distinguished officer who was at the time, perhaps, in command of his regiment doing active service, might attain the age at which you propose that he should retire when he was really, perhaps, one of the best officers in the army, and if that did occur, would it not be a very bad thing for the service and for the country that such an officer should be compelled to retire?—That is one of those hard cases which make bad law, I suppose, but I think you would find another officer to succeed him, perhaps nearly as good.

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394. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You might employ him on the staff?—Yes; he might be employed upon the staff.

395. Major *O'Reilly.*] Are you not aware that it is a rule in most services where there is a compulsory age retirement, that it does not apply to officers in active service, that is to say, an officer of the age of 60 in command of a battalion is not required to retire until the end of the war in which he is employed in active service?—I was not aware that that was so.

396. Mr. *De Grey.*] If that had not been the case, of course the hardship would have been upon the country as well as upon the officer?—Yes.

397. *Chairman.*] Ought there, in your opinion, to be any difference between the age for retirement in the Artillery and in the Engineers; is there any difference in the duties of the two corps which should point to any difference of age?—No; I think not. I think both officers ought to be sufficiently active as colonels to do their duties. I do not think that there is any difference; if anything, the colonels of Engineers might be a little older, but I should think it would be much better that they should not.

398. You were asked whether length of service would not be a better rule than age; might not that be worked in this way: that there should be a certain limit of age at which an officer should be compelled to retire unless the limit of service had arrived first; for instance, if 60 was the age fixed, might it not stand that an officer should retire at 60, or after 38 years' service, which ever came first?—Yes, it might be done in that way; but I think you must make a substantive limit of age.

399. With an alternative of service, where a man has joined very young and may be considered to have worked himself out?—Yes; but you must not give up the age. I think if, on the other hand, he had not had the full service: for instance, if he had only had 35 years' service when he became 60 years of age, he ought not to be permitted to remain till he was 63.

400. The limit of age should be absolute?—Yes.

401. But you would add to it a limit of service at which an officer should retire, if the limit of age had not been reached?—I do not see the reason for that, because the ground upon which one would suggest a limit of age is, that upon the average a man at a certain age is unfit for the active duties of his profession, and I do not see that the amount of service would necessarily affect it.

402. You do not think that an officer, having joined at the age of 17, is more worn out at 60 than one who joined at 22?—I should not think so unless he has had very active service; in some cases he might be much more worn out.

403. You would offer, if I understood you rightly, a bonus to the senior officer of each rank, on the system of purchasing out?—Yes; if the system was adopted I should allow those officers who were seniors, who applied for it, to have it.

404. And you do not fear, that the effect of it might be to induce very good officers to retire?—I have no doubt that good officers would retire, as well as others, very often. I dare say an officer, who thought he could have some advantages in civil life, would be very willing to retire, but still his retirement would allow others to go on. I think, the more go out the more come in. I do not think there is any disadvantage in it on the whole.

405. You would not fix your bonus so as to induce an officer to go out, but so as to allow him to go out if he was sick of the service?—Yes; I should fix it lower than what would be an inducement to him certainly. I should fix it at something which would only act as an inducement, provided he was very anxious to leave the service at the same time.

406. You have been asked several questions as to the difficulty which would arise in retiring colonels at the age of 60, who might be junior in rank to other colonels who would not be retired for a year or two afterwards; might not that be met by promoting them, as it were, above a line in the list of colonels, but without absolutely excluding them from employment, when they were above that line?—I think Colonel Percy Herbert's suggestion met that very well; that they should be placed upon a by-list, as it were, and be allowed to be employed upon the staff and be promoted to the rank of major general in the ordinary list of the corps.

407. That they should all be promoted to the rank of major general from the original list as colonels?—Yes.

408. And having reached the major general's list, they should all have equal rights and expectations?—Yes.

409. You would then, if such a system were in force, continue a limited part of the major general's list to be filled up by ordinary promotions on death vacancies; would you make those who are promoted from the age list, if I may use the word, that is, the list above the line, supernumerary to the major general's establishment?—The point you take is very much the same, I think, as what happens with seconded officers.

410. According to your plan, the establishment of major generals would be fixed, and not varying?—Rather according to the modifications which Colonel Percy Herbert suggested in it, I think I should say. According to that plan, the the list of major generals would be a fixed one, and then colonels would be promoted on to it, either from the substantive list of colonels, or from the retired list according as their seniority entitled them to the promotion.

411. According to their seniority as colonels in the army?—Yes; according to their seniority as colonels in the army.

412. According, in fact, to the rule which governs promotion to the major generals' list now from the list of substantive colonels?—Yes, exactly. I think that plan suggested by Colonel Percy Herbert would obviate a great many difficulties in the suggestions which were originally made.

413. You were asked, whether voluntary retirement does not practically do as much as compulsory retirement would do, but is it not the whole difficulty of the case that the colonels at the head of the list will not accept voluntary retirement?—The practical fact is, that we have colonels of 64 and 65 at the head of the list now who will not accept it.

414. Their reason being, that they prefer a present 450 *l.* a-year, and a future 1,000 *l.* a-year, to a present 600 *l.*?—Yes, exactly; what you term the present gambling.

415. And also the present prospect of their continuing to be employed as colonels, and to receive

ceive the pay and allowance of colonels?—Yes; in the Engineers that operates very strongly.

416. As a matter of fact, it is not incumbent upon the Commander in Chief to employ all the colonels, is it?—No.

417. There are a certain number of colonels who, though on full pay, are really unemployed?—Yes.

418. Mr. *Pack Beresford.*] The Chairman alluded to a colonel's pay, as being 450 *l.* a-year; in fact, colonels of Engineers when they are employed, are getting a very largely increased amount of pay, are they not?—Yes, they are very much better paid than that; as a rule, the pay of the principal appointments at home is about 1,000 *l.* a year.

419. That fully accounts for their not being willing to retire upon 600 *l.* a year?—Yes.

420. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Can you state the pay of a full colonel of Artillery?—No, I could not now.

421. Major *Jervis.*] You say you wish officers to retire at 60 years of age, or thereabouts because they are then unfit for their work?—I said, that it would be desirable for them to retire at a limit of age, because there is a point at which they are unfit for work, and that the limit should be fixed according to the average.

422. Which limit you think would be about 60?—Yes.

423. Do you think the duties of a colonel commanding a district are more severe than those of a major general commanding Artillery in the field, or are they anything to be compared to them?—I would rather not give an opinion upon that point.

424. Why, then, do you say that a colonel commanding a district is to be considered unfit to command a district above the age of 60, while a major-general commanding Artillery in the field may be considered fit for that service after that age?—I take the case of a colonel commanding Artillery in the field; he may be fit for duty at 60, but I think the age fixed for retirement should be fixed with reference to the age at which an officer would be fit to go into the field.

425. Therefore, your proposal would be that all officers of Artillery whatever should be permanently retired from the service at the age of 60?—At 60, or whatever the limit of age fixed may be.

426. Whatever is the age that is fixed upon, no general officer should be employed after that age?—No colonel should be.

427. And no general officer?—I did not say that.

428. If a colonel of Artillery is not fit for his duties at that age, how would you deal with general officers of greater age who might be employed in the field?—I should assume that the duties of a general officer in the field would not be so severe as the duties of a colonel commanding a siege train.

429. Surely the duties of a general officer commanding either a siege train or a force in the field would be much more severe than those of a colonel of Artillery commanding a district in time of peace. If I understand you rightly, your proposal is that at a certain limit of age the officers should retire altogether from the service with or without a step in rank?—The fact is, my proposal has been somewhat altered. The late questions which have been put to me have been in reference to a rather different scheme from that which I at first suggested. The second scheme which I have been answering upon for some time has been that which Colonel Percy Herbert suggested; it is, that officers should not have a step in rank, but be put upon a separate list.

430. That is to say, that an officer on attaining a certain age as colonel should go upon a separate list, not retiring from the service, but going on according to his army seniority of colonel to promotion as major general?—Yes.

431. But all the while remaining in the army for employment, if the Commander in Chief thought fit to employ him?—Merely for staff employment. You must not have an unlimited list of colonels. It would be impossible to allow that an officer who had gone on to this retired list should then be employed as a substantive colonel of Artillery afterwards, otherwise you must curtail one of your other appointments; you must not make a promotion into his place, because the object of this change is not to give promotion, but to secure efficient duty colonels; and therefore if one of these colonels is still to be employed as a duty colonel, you must not employ anybody in his place.

432. Captain *Vivian.*] Do I not rightly understand you to say that an officer who retires as a colonel compulsorily at 60, is to be put upon the retired list, there to wait his turn to become a major general?—Yes.

433. And then in his turn, as major general, but not as a colonel, he is eligible for staff employment?—Yes.

434. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] That is more as a means of softening the compulsory retirement off to his feelings, than with a view to his being likely to be selected at an age of more than 60 for active employment in the field?—Yes.

435. Captain *Vivian.*] You do not propose that from the time when his name is erased from the regimental roster, until he becomes a major general, he should be eligible for any employment?—No. As I understand the suggestion, he would go upon the retired list until he became a major general.

436. Major *Jervis.*] With reference to your answers to Major O'Reilly upon the subject of voluntary retirement, do you not think that if voluntary retirement was made more to the purpose, that is to say, so as to induce men to retire at a time of life when they could look for work elsewhere, they would take it much more willingly that they do now?—I have really so little knowledge or experience upon the subject, that I should much prefer your asking some one else.

437. It is not a case so much of military knowledge, as of general knowledge of the world; if an officer at a certain time of life could retire upon an allowance which would enable him, together with other work which he might get, to keep himself properly he might be inclined to go, but after a man has reached a certain age he has no prospect of work but by remaining with his regiment?—Yes, that sounds certainly a much more likely mode of getting officers to retire; that was Colonel Percy Herbert's proposal, I think, of buying them out.

438. *Chairman.*] To go back, I think I understood you to say that you would prefer one system to two, if it could be made satisfactory to the corps?—Yes.

439. That is to say that you would prefer that every officer at 60, should have the same amount of pay when he is upon this intermediate list,

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and that when he is a major general he should have the same amount of pay, rather than that there should be a continuation of the exceptional amount of special retirement?—Yes, I would much prefer that it should be done upon a fixed principle.

440. But you think that the amount of that pay requires careful consideration?—Yes.

Brigadier General JOHN HENRY LEFROY, R.A., was called in; and Examined.

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441. *Chairman.*] WHAT appointment do you hold at present?—I am at present President of the Ordnance Select Committee.

442. How many years have you been in the Artillery?—I have been in Her Majesty's service 32 years.

443. You have given a good deal of attention to the subject of the improvement of the system of promotion and retirement in the Artillery and Engineers, have you not?—I have considered the question very much in reference to the Artillery; I have not studied the statistics of the corps of Engineers with the same detail, but of course what applies to the one corps applies in a great degree to the other also.

444. What do you consider to be the imperfections of the present system of retirement from the Artillery?—I should be glad, with your permission to draw a distinction in replying to that question, between the condition of the Artillery at the present moment, which is purely exceptional, and as I think requires exceptional treatment, and the condition of the Artillery as it may be 25 years hence if we have no war, and the current flows as it does at present; as at present constituted the great defect of the Artillery is, that the outlet at the top is quite insufficient to produce a healthy current of promotion, and there is no outlet worth talking of anywhere else, owing to the exceptional condition of the officers of the various ranks, particularly the first captains, the second captains, and the lieutenants, being so much younger as a body, than they have been at any former period, these officers are not entitled to retire upon either half pay or full pay; casualties from death occur but very rarely among them, and in fact they are not upon the whole desirous of retiring at the present moment, being for the most part men in the vigour of life.

445. That state of things, however, I mean the present state of the ages of the ranks, from first captain downwards, you expect upon an actuary's calculation to alter very much within the next few years, do you not?—Not materially within the next few years, it will not alter very much in less than 20 years. The ranks will all grow old together, but not so old as to involve physical inefficiency.

446. Do I understand you as meaning by that, that there has been a serious change in the relative numbers of the different ranks of the corps?—There has been a change in the relative numbers as far as concerns the subalterns, owing to the vacancies in the late Indian artilleries since November 1860 being filled up by appointments to the general list; but the change has arisen chiefly from what I must call the jumble of ages that prevails from the lower part of the rank of second captain all through the rank of subaltern, arising from measures that were adopted about the time of the Crimean War, from 1855 to 1860, with respect to the age of admission to the Royal Military Academy. Wholesale admissions at that time raised young men in shoals. I will give a rather striking illustration of that; there are 292 officers at the present moment, whose ages are from 23 to 25. These officers, of course, will all grow old together; 30 years' hence their ages will be from 53 to 55. The natural course of death among those officers will not reduce the number so low as 200; there will consequently then be, we will say, 200 officers of 52 or 53. Such a group of men of the same age cannot possibly be provided for in the natural gradation of rank. They will, as I anticipate, fill the rank of lieutenant colonel and half fill the rank of captain. We shall have all our lieutenant colonels and a large number of our captains, men of considerably past 50, because many of these officers have begun their military career four or five years later in life than was the system when I joined the army myself. I can give an instance to the Committee of a group of officers who are within about two years of promotion to the rank of captain now, and who will be promoted about the age of 28. There is another group of six officers who obtained their commissions seven years later, who are actually older, and who cannot possibly be under 40 when they reach the same rank of captain. That is a remarkable illustration of the singular state of things which prevails from exceptional circumstances in the Artillery at the present time.

447. There has been, I presume, since the last war a gradual raising of the age at which commissions are obtained?—It was not a very gradual one, and it is accompanied with great inequalities. It was the policy of the Government at one time to absorb the East India Company's Academy at Addiscombe. In order to do that, they were obliged to give commissions to cadets of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich rather earlier than they would otherwise have done, and there are instances, or at least there is one instance, of a young man obtaining a commission under the age of 16, and there are several instances of their obtaining them under 17. On the other hand, after that, gentlemen were allowed to offer themselves for commissions by direct competition without going into the academy at all. Some of these gentlemen were young men of 23 or 24 years of age, causing in some instances, as I mentioned to you just now, a diffference of 350 places, equivalent to at least 12 or 14 years of promotion between men of the same age; that is, at the present time, the difference of standing will represent a still greater difference of rank some years hence.

448. The practical result is that, as you say, there are about 290 young men in that corps who are within two years of the same age; whereas, properly speaking, there ought to be, I suppose, nine or 10 years between those extremes?—Quite so.

449. And though that grievance has not reached any great magnitude at the present moment, it must reach a very considerable magnitude some day?—Quite so.

450. When we shall have probably some 200 men all reaching the age of 60 within two years of each other?—Not so many reaching the age of 60; there will be fully as many as that reaching the age of 50; in fact, there should be 217 living at 53, and 191 at 60.

451. We

451. We shall have, upon an actuary's calculation, about 200 officers reaching the age of 50 within a short time of each other?—Yes.

452. When they have reached any age which is fixed for compulsory retirement, if such a system is adopted, the grievance will be at an end, will it not?—There will then be a wholesale deportation, which will cause a great and sudden lift for somebody, but it will be costly to the country.

453. That cannot be until something like 40 years hence?—In about 35 or 36 years.

454. Meanwhile you will have in the Artillery this continual grievance arising from an enormous number of officers being about the same age?—Yes, unless measures are adopted for thinning them out now.

455. Apart from that, which arises from an exceptional and peculiar state of things, is there any weak point in what I may call the normal state of retirement, from the Artillery to which you wish to call attention?—Yes, I think the present system is one which does not create a steady flow of promotion, which is far more important as regards its moral effects, and the efficiency of the service, than spasmodic promotion now and then, or getting several steps by a run of death. The sudden death of a colonel, for instance, gives four steps, and that of a captain two steps. Now in some instances it is far more important that you should get two vacancies in the rank of first captain, and promote twice two second captains and lieutenants than that you should get one vacancy in the rank of colonel, and promote one officer from each lower grade. All the present promotion takes place at the top of the list, and that I consider to be disadvantageous in its effects upon the officers, and also disadvantageous to the public.

456. You think that instead of the present system of retirement which is practically, though not exclusively, limited to the rank of colonel, there should be a systematised retirement from the lower ranks?—Yes.

457. Taking the actual retirement from the rank of colonel first, do you consider that that is now established upon a satisfactory basis?—I think, speaking as a colonel myself, that nothing can be more satisfactory than what we have at the present moment. We are entitled to claim retirement at a comparatively early age, and the retirement we can claim is a very liberal one. The number of officers for whom retirements exist is limited of course, the amount of the fund is not large enough for an unlimited retirement, or, looking at the age of those already upon the retired list, to keep up any perceptible movement; only about one per annum on the 600 *l.* a-year scale can be expected for a good many years to come.

458. You mean that, looking at the ages of the senior colonels in your corps, the operation of the fund has been to keep the ages down very well?—There have been other causes, but it has contributed very substantially to that effect.

459. But, looking at the same state of things in your sister corps, you see a very different result?—Yes, there is a very broad distinction between the two; a colonel of Engineers, as Captain Galton informed us, is in the receipt of a handsome scale of pay and allowances; his duties are not of a very arduous character in time of peace, and he has every inducement to remain where he is, as he is better off.

460. But the operation of the fund, so far as it is a chance, has failed with them, though it has succeeded with you?—In the case of the Engineers, the 600 *l.* a-year you offer them is less than they are in receipt of while in active employment; in our case, the 600 *l.* a-year you offer us is rather more than we are in receipt of.

461. How do you reconcile that with this fact, that during the last three years none of the first 24 colonels on your list have taken the retirement?—Because they see a prospect of succeeding to a battalion at an earlier period than has been the case for very many years; we have the remanets of the Peninsular War; a class of officers at the head of the list taking the rank of colonels of battalion, and senior retired general officers, who are very far advanced in years indeed, and until those lives drop the promotion will be comparatively rapid to those places at the head of the list. When they have dropped and are replaced by men much younger than themselves, there will be a great check upon that promotion.

462. So far as your own rank is concerned of colonel of Artillery, you are in a very satisfactory state as to age, and the prospects are so good that, even with the fund in its present condition, its advantages are declined by two-thirds of the colonels on the list?—Yes; I am not able to speak as to the number who have declined it, but certainly it is the case that the retirements have been lately accepted by the juniors and not by the seniors.

463. The men who now take it are men of 48 and 49, instead of men of 60 and 62, who are taking it in the Engineers?—Yes, that is a perfectly temporary state of things; it has had two or three alternations in my own experience, and will, no doubt, change again in the course of two or three years.

464. Do you think that a system is satisfactory which is liable to such alternations and chance s as that?—No; I think if by any regulation you can equalise matters, it will be far better to do so. These things result from augmentations, the effects of wars, and things of that kind. I do not think that any artificial treatment would entirely prevent inequalities of this kind, but they should be reduced as far as possible.

465. With respect to retirement from the top of the list, would you apply any fixed rule either of age or length of service?—I think it would be of advantage to have a fixed rule for retirement from the top of the list, from the rank of colonel.

466. You heard Captain Galton's evidence, did you not?—Yes.

467. Do you concur generally with the view he takes upon that subject?—Yes, as regards the rank of colonel only.

468. You think that instead of the haphazard system which exists now, the retirement depending upon the chance of there being a certain amount of money available out of the 32,000 *l.* a-year, it should be regulated by some rule of age, so as to cause a steady flow of promotion?—I think so. I may mention that it is a subject of very general regret, I think, in the Artillery, that the operation of the warrant of 1841, by which four lieutenant colonels and four captains were permitted to retire annually, has been superseded by a subsequent warrant. That flow, while it lasted, was something upon which everybody could count. Every one was certain of getting at least those eight steps annually. The subsequent warrant of 1854 or 1855, I think it was, by which this was done away with, we consider to have been a loss to us.

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469. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What warrant was it that gave those steps?—The warrant of 1841 gave eight steps; it allowed four lieutenant colonels and four captains to retire.

470. *Chairman.*] So that you would prefer a fixed number of steps a-year to the chances of vacancies upon a fixed amount of money, but you would prefer a fixed limit of age to either of the other plans?—I think the two plans may go together. I do not see that there is anything inconsistent in having a limit of age at the top of the list, and offering four retirements, or any other proportionate number per annum, if officers are desirous of taking them.

471. Major *O'Reilly.*] You mean in addition?—In addition certainly.

472. *Chairman.*] When you say that the two would go together, you omit the calculation of what it would cost?—Yes.

473. Assuming a liberal Parliament and an unrestraining Treasury, you would like to see the two go together?—I do not think that the expense would be very great. The retirement of so many lieutenant colonels and captains is not so very costly an affair.

474. Did you hear Captain Galton's suggestion with respect to the intermediate position of a *quasi* retired colonel, and his coming in his order upon the establishment of general officers, and succeeding to battalions; do you concur in the plan that he chalked out?—I am not quite sure that I understood it correctly. My impression of the proposal was that there was to be, as at present, a fixed establishment of general officers; they need not all be major generals; to which succession should fall by army seniority; and besides that, there was to be an unlimited number of unattached and supernumerary major generals, to which succession should fall by age.

475. No; you missed his answer to me. I understand his plan to be this: that there should be a fixed establishment of general officers, and that the succession to that establishment should come either from the colonels in active service or from the colonels on this retired list in the order of their army rank as colonels, and, of course, that the colonels, until they got upon the establishment of major generals, should not have the honorary rank?—Provided the retirement of colonels is a full-pay retirement, I should think that scheme a very good one.

476. Captain Galton's proposal was that colonels at 60 should be retired upon full pay, and that they should only remain upon this intermediate *quasi* retired list, until they come back to the establishment of general officers in their former turn upon the colonel's list?—The only consequence, as regards the prospects of individual officers in the Artillery, would be that there would be a much longer succession between each individual and the command of a battalion. All the officers who are now upon the retired list would, under that scheme, be on the effective list, and they would succeed to battalions in turn, so that the succession to a battalion would become a thing of very remote prospect to anybody except those who were fortunate enough to get army rank early. I do not think that would affect the grades below colonel much, and the public service would not in point of efficiency be at all affected by it.

477. Then, practically, you mean that the chance of succeeding to the command of a battalion would be something less than it is at present, though the certainty of getting upon the full-pay retired list of colonels would be greater than at present?—Yes; an officer would get up to the full-pay retired list better, but his chances of succeeding to a battalion would be almost *nil*. I mean, except in extreme old age, nobody would get it at all.

478. You have no remark, then, to make upon the first part of the scheme proposed by Captain Galton, so far as it affects the rank of colonel, and the prospects of the officers of retiring; coming down below that, what is your proposal with respect to retiring from the corps?—I have not made definitively any proposal. I am opposed to having a fixed age of retirement, either from the rank of captain or from that of lieutenant colonel. Among other reasons, because it will have the effect of depriving a man who has been unfortunate in his earlier career of the opportunity of retrieving himself by more rapid promotion in the higher ranks. It very often happens that a man who has been for a very long time a captain or a subaltern gets very quickly through the rank of lieutenant colonel, and at the end of the race is not much worse off than he would have been if he had not been unfortunate before. The case of Sir Richard Dacres is a good illustration; he was 34 years reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel, but then he was a major general in little over three years. I should be sorry to see that chance taken away by forcing officers to retire from the rank of lieutenant colonel or of captain at an arbitrary limit of age. I think the administration should say to a gentleman, "You are worn out, you must retire," if they found such to be the fact. It should be optional with them to do so, with a view to preserving the efficiency of the service. I think that a greater inducement should be held out to officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and captain to retire than is held out at present, and I would do that by making the scale of retirement contingent upon length of service, and not upon rank, as it is in the Indian Service and in the Civil Service.

479. Do you mean length of service as opposed to rank, but not as opposed to age?—I think length of service is the only element which can be taken into account, and in ordinary times, when the current of first appointments has not been much disturbed, the differences of age are not material. The ages of the officers of the same length of service do not differ above a year or two from the average.

480. Then for the retirements from the rank of colonel you would be satisfied with a limit of age?—Yes.

481. But for retirements below the rank of colonel, which would be retirements altogether from the corps, you wish to introduce a more liberal system than exists at present, and you think it should be dependent on length of service?—Yes.

482. What sort of conditions would you attach to such a system?—I think such a scale as this would be very proper; an officer at the end of 20 years' service should have the option of retiring, if he desired it, upon 200 *l.* or 150 *l.* a year.

483. Major *O'Reilly.*] Irrespective of what rank he has attained?—Yes; he would always be a captain, I hope, but we have had subalterns of that length of service; that scale should go on augmenting by about 10 *l.* or 20 *l.* a-year

(I have

(I have not gone minutely into those details) for each further year of service.

484. *Chairman.*] After 20 years of service, every officer in the two corps should have the option of retiring with a step in rank, or without?—I am not very much in favour of creating honorary rank.

485. Then without a step in rank, he should have the option of retiring and leaving the corps altogether upon an annuity, beginning with 200 *l.* a-year, and rising by some annual increment?—Yes, exactly. I would also hold out an arrangement for converting that, as Captain Galton proposed, into a bonus sum, paid down to enable him to settle in a colony, or turn his capital to some fresh pursuit.

486. When he has accepted the 200 *l.* a-year, or whatever the sum might be, he is out of the list, and he gives a step of promotion?—Yes.

487. He having left, you would then, without loss to the State, allow his annuity to be commuted for the payment of a bonus?—Yes.

488. That, as you are aware, might be done without its appearing in the estimates at all, by the medium of the National Debt Commissioners?—Yes; quite so.

489. Is that the only provision for retirement you would make below the rank of colonel?—There must be the same provision as at present for retirement in the case of wounds or sickness contracted in the service, and so on; and the scale should be such, that at the end of 30 years' service it should rise to at least 350 *l.* or 400 *l.* a-year, about the same as at present, and I think that officers should have the option of retiring absolutely from a claim or prospect of succeeding to a battalion upon a higher rate. If an officer gives up that claim or prospect, he should have a certain addition in respect of it.

490. Do you mean that a colonel, instead of succeeding to the major generals' establishment, might, on retirement, also be entitled to take a sum of money down?—Yes, quite so, just as has been permitted in numerous cases to lieutenant colonels.

491. Would not that be a distinct addition to the public charge, because that would create a vacancy?—Whether it would create a vacancy or not will depend upon whether the number of officers on the retired list is to be limited or not. If not limited, it creates no vacancy, and will merely be the purchasing up of an annuity by the Government: now any system of compulsory retirement on attaining a fixed age is inconsistent with a limit. In the year 1889, for example, about 27 officers, less those who may meanwhile retire, will all reach 60 together, and about the year 1902 there will be 68 or 69 men doing so, subject to the same reservation; viz., the survivors of 95 who were commissioned in 1864 at the age of 21.

492. Would you commit yourself to such a proposal as that without further consideration?—I speak a little in the dark as to the extent to which Parliament would be willing to provide retirements for the sake of keeping so important a branch of the service as the Artillery in a state of efficiency. I assume that the thing must be done somehow, cost what it may.

493. Having provided satisfactorily with reference to the top of the list, would it be necessary also to provide an additional burden in the shape of buying those people out?—No, I do not think it would be considered necessary.

494. To recapitulate your evidence, you think that Captain Galton's scheme with respect to the rank of colonel, modified slightly as you suggest, with a fixed bonus, calculated on an intermediate rate of pay, which every officer, after 20 years' service, should have a right to claim, in addition to a proper provision for wounded and inefficient officers, would practically keep the corps in an efficient state?—I think it would.

495. Would such a scheme provide for the exceptional difficulty which you pointed out, arising from the fact of there happening to be at present at the bottom of the list 290 officers nearly of the same age?—It will relieve it some years hence, but in the meanwhile the evil is a threatening one, and when it comes to be realised it will be a very serious one. No doubt, when those officers have matured 20 years' service, and see indifferent prospects before them, they will be ready to retire in large numbers; but I think it would be better for the country to induce them to retire now, when it can be done at a lower rate.

496. What special remedy do you propose to deal with the exceptional difficulty of there being those 290 officers nearly of the same age?—The present rule is, that no officer is entitled to retire under 25 years' service, except in case of wounds or sickness, and the retirement he is then entitled to is half-pay. I think it is waiting a great deal too long to give the half-pay after 25 years' service only. The half-pay scale is a perfectly arbitrary figure; there is no virtue in the figure itself. I think that there should be a proportion precisely like that adopted in the Civil Service retirement, and that an officer should be entitled to claim it after about 15 years' service. I think that 15 years is really a long enough service, and that he should be allowed to go then, of course receiving less, in proportion to his shorter service.

497. Your suggestion is, that after 20 years' service an officer should be allowed to retire on 200 *l.* a-year?—Yes, as an ultimate arrangement; but I do not desire to commit myself to the exact amount of 200 *l.*, which is rather high.

498. And with reference to the peculiar difficulty of the corps at the present moment, you would cut down the required length of service to 15 years, diminishing the amount received in proportion?—Yes, in order to thin out these large classes of officers of the same age, who stand in one another's way.

499. The difficulty as to those officers will not come into operation for nearly 10 years, will it?—Not as affecting the efficiency of the corps; but it already affects those officers as regards their own cheerful zeal, having regard to the prospects before them. I should say from my intercourse with them, that the second captains are very much discouraged at the prospects before them.

500. Are any of those officers who are so nearly of the same age second captains yet?—No, those I speak of are at the bottom of the list as yet; however, the remark applies in a slightly different degree to second captains as well.

501. Do you not think that the prospects of the second captains would be much more cheerful if they knew that at a certain age there was a perfect certainty of full pay and retirement?—I think they would, certainly.

502. However inconvenient the state of the corps may be in consequence of that great equality of age you have mentioned, yet the fact of a certainty of retirement would get over the

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personal difficulties?—I think the men would serve vastly more cheerfully in the junior grades, if they knew that it was only a temporary misfortune.

503. So that your proposal with respect to the 290 officers is a proposal for the benefit of the public, rather than for the consolation of the officers themselves?—Yes, it is a proposal for the benefit of the public. The truth is, that the individuals whom I have in my eye now are young officers of three or four years' standing, and the idea of retirement of course has not entered into their heads; they are all quite happy with their present duties.

504. Have you ever calculated or formed any opinion as to what would be the cost of carrying out the scheme you have described to us?—No, I have not ventured to go into that calculation. I think it would not be difficult to arrive at some conclusion which would be pretty near the mark, but I have not ventured to go into it. I have always been in hopes that if any system of retirement by payment of lump sums comes into operation, the objection to private contributions for bonus subscriptions by officers would be diminished, and we should be able to avail ourselves of the readiness there is in all ranks of the army on the part of officers to invest their private means for their own advancement.

505. Your proposal does not increase the public charge as regards the lump sum; it is a mere exchange of an annuity for a lump sum?—Yes.

506. But so far as it consists in a very liberal optional retirement at an early age giving a vacancy, it is, of course, a matter of very considerable expense, though you have not at all calculated what it would come to?—The voluntary element enters so very largely into it that it is very difficult to arrive at any figure with respect to it. I considered, having regard to the Indian regulations under which an officer is permitted to retire on full pay after 22 years' service in India, and analysing the lists and inquiring among the officers themselves, and looking at the degree in which retirement had taken place, that about 5 per cent. of the officers entitled to accept it, might be expected to accept it every year; that was my notion.

507. In arriving at any calculation of cost, we should have to compare that five per cent. and the cost of the superior retirement from the rank of colonel with the present 32,000 *l.* a-year?—Yes.

508. And a certain part of the half-pay retirement?—Yes; much of the half-pay retirement would be saved.

509. We should have to compare the five per cent retirement and the 60 years of age compulsory retirement on the one side, with the 32,000 *l.* a-year, and a proportion of the half-pay retirement on the other side?—Yes.

510. Do you think that if you had assistance from the War Office, you could easily take out a calculation of that kind?—If I might be permitted to consult Mr. Finlaison, or some accountant.

511. Or a clerk out of the Accountant General's Department?—Yes; with the assistance of a few clerks. The figures are rather heavy when you come to do it largely.

512. Is there any other suggestion with respect to retirement from your corps you would wish to make to the Committee?—No; the points which your questions have touched upon, I think, cover all that occurred to me in reference to retirement from the Artillery.

513. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You say that there are 290 officers in the Artillery nearly of the same age now, and you talk of there being 200 of about the same age when they get to the age of 50?—Yes.

514. And you said that that was a very exceptional case?—Yes.

515. It is one which in some degree may be always looked for when there is any considerable augmentation of the corps, is it not?—It would not have occurred but for the alteration of the rules of admission to the Royal Military Academy and the age of first commissions.

516. At the time of an augmentation of the corps, or at the time of a war like the Russian war, there must always be a large number of officers entering in a very short time, must there not?—Yes, you may have a number of 50 or 60 or something of that kind, but this large number arises from officers of the same age not being of about the same standing; they are selected out of officers of very different standings.

517. You said that in the case of the Artillery, the operation of the fund had been good, and that the ages of the colonels now are tolerably satisfactory as regards efficiency?—That has not been so much from the operation of the fund that has contributed towards it, it arises from what I mentioned just now, the extreme gap of years there was between the remaining officers who were commissioned in the early part of the present century, and those who got their commissions at or about the year 1825.

518. Is not it the fact that the age of the colonels is much younger than the normal state of the corps, owing to the large augmentation in the last 15 years?—Undoubtedly the augmentations in the last 15 years, have run officers rapidly through the junior ranks, and enabled them to succeed to colonelcies younger than was ever known before.

519. If there had not been those augmentations, the action of the fund would not have been sufficient to achieve anything like the youth, if I may use the expression, of the present colonels?—Certainly not, practically the fund would have done under any circumstances exactly what it has done; there is a certain sum always filled up, and neither a greater nor a smaller number of retirements would have taken place had it not been for the admissions; it has withdrawn some of the older colonels, and one or two of the older major generals, but it is only within the last two or three years that that retirement has been taken in the case of relatively young officers.

520. As regards intermediate retirement, such as you suggest after 15 or 20 years' service, of course, to whatever extent the Government withdrew officers, by such an inducement as that they would reduce ths expenditure for the compulsory retirement at the head of the list?—That would be the case, of course.

521. Colonel *North.*] The requirement of 35 years' service to retire is peculiar to your corps, is it not?—No, it is the Army Warrant; 25 years is the time, not 35.

522. Does that apply to the whole army, because, I think, in the line, an officer even who has not purchased is allowed to retire after 21 years?—No, after 25 years.

523. Major *Jervis.*] It used to be 21, and now it is made 25?—Yes.

Monday, 17th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack-Beresford.
Mr. Childers.
Mr. De Grey.
Marquis of Hartington.
Sir John Hay.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Major Jervis.
Colonel North.
Mr. Otway.
Colonel Sturt.
Mr. Trevelyan.

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Brigadier General JOHN HENRY LEFROY, R.A., F.R.S., further Examined.

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524. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I BELIEVE you have considered the question of promotion in the Royal Artillery from various points of view?—Yes, I have done so.

525. And you have thought of different plans which might alleviate the stagnation of promotion?—Yes.

526. Has your attention been drawn to a plan of applying what may be called the bonus system; the application of sums of money to facilitate the retirement of officers of from 15 to 20 years' service?—Yes; it appears to me that, constituted as the list now is, there is no possibility of bringing forward the younger officers of the regiment to the higher grades of the service before they are incapacitated by age, except by inducing a number of them to retire early. There is at present no provision for early retirement; no officer can claim a retirement before he has reached 25 years' service, and then he can only get half pay; whereas, if he waits five years longer, he will get full pay, and therefore he will seldom go at 25 years' service. But if you wait until the officers get 25 and 30 years' services in large groups, the whole regimental list will grow old together, and in my opinion be in a very inefficient state. I have, therefore, proposed that officers should be permitted to retire at an earlier period, say at present as early as 15 years' service, and that to induce them to do so, their juniors should be permitted to contribute to a fund for the payment of bonuses to them; they would, of course, be chargeable upon the half-pay list when retired, supposing that system to continue; but this would afford an inducement for them to retire. That is a plan which I have laid before the officers of the regiment in my private capacity, and about 330 of the lieutenants and captains of the regiment have expressed their willingness to contribute to such a fund.

527. I do not quite understand your scheme; do I understand that you propose that officers of 15 years' service should be allowed to retire upon half pay?—My own proposal is, that the half pay scale of retirement should be re-considered, and a different scale submitted; but I propose that officers of 15 years' service should be permitted to retire upon some scale.

528. Then, supposing that in lieu of any half pay retirement, lump sums of money were given, would that be equally attractive, or more attractive, do you think?—I think a great number of the younger men would be willing to commute their annuities into sums of money which they could apply to other pursuits. I think that among the older men there would not be quite so great a disposition to do so; but in any case I apprehend an annuity must be the basis of the scheme, and therefore whether it is granted in the form of an annuity, and then that annuity purchased up by the State, or whether it is granted in the form of a bonus fund, in the first instance, makes little difference.

529. There is this difference between an annuity granted by the State generally to officers on retiring, and a bonus, that the annuity is granted as half pay is, as a retaining fee for the services of that officer when called upon, whereas in the case of a bonus sum, of course the State would give up all claim to the services of the officer; that being the case, would it, in your opinion, be cheaper to the State to give a bonus sum than the half pay; in fact, would not a fewer number of years' purchase of the annuity be accepted by an officer if he knew that the State gave up all claim for his services?—In the artillery service there is practically no such thing as bringing a man back; it being a seniority corps, a man cannot be brought back into his proper place. You cannot bring him back to the bottom of his list, which is done in the line. When a man is brought back from half pay to full pay in the line, he stands at the bottom of a very small list, consisting of eight or 10 names at the outside, and he calculates the chances of that. But you could not bring a man back to the end of 200 names, as it would be in the case of a captain in the artillery. No such thing as bringing a man back from the half pay list to the full pay list exists in the artillery, except in cases where temporary half pay has been granted for sickness, then it is limited to two years, and the man comes back to the place in the list he quitted. If he was 20th from the top, he comes back to the 20th from the top, that is the only form in which officers are or can be brought back from

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half pay to full pay in the artillery. In that respect we differ from the rest of the army.

530. *Chairman.*] Is the time for which temporary half pay is granted two years?—Two years is the present limit.

531. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I suppose that time can be extended under special circumstances?—There is no power to extend it at present. I do not mean to say there never could be such a power, but natural causes would prevent its being extended much beyond two years.

532. With regard to the slowness of the promotion in the artillery, the first or one of the main things to be considered is, that officers who have regimental command in the higher ranks shall not be too old for efficiency?—Yes.

533. Then there is a second question to be considered, I apprehend, upon which I want your opinion, namely, whether it is not almost equally important that officers should attain the rank of first captain and lieutenant colonel at a reasonable age?—I think the most important step is that from captain to lieutenant colonel. If the captains of artillery are much past the age of physical efficiency and vigour, they are no longer the captains of artillery who have done the work in our former wars; our captains of artillery are pre-eminently the combatant rank of the service. A battery of artillery is in many operations the unit of force, and the command of it is the most active command that a man can hold; it is therefore absolutely necessary that the man holding it should be in full possession of his vigour. I think, therefore, that it is of very great importance that captains of artillery should not serve in that grade beyond 45, 46, or 47 years of age. It is a matter of judgment where to draw the line. I have a plan here which I propose to lay before the Committee, if you permit me to do so, in which I have, for the sake of being as moderate as possible (as such an inquiry requires), drawn the limit of age at 47, but that is going rather high.

534. At present there is a sum of 32,000 *l.* a year allotted for retirements in the Royal Artillery?—Yes.

535. Supposing that it is considered that that is an insufficient sum for the present size of the corps, and that Parliament is induced to increase it by any round sum, say to bring it up to 40,000 *l.* or 45,000 *l.*, would it in your opinion be most advantageous for the interests of the corps, to apply the whole of it as it is applied at present, to induce the retirement of old officers at the top of the tree, by giving them annuities of 600 *l.* or 400 *l.* a year, or would it be desirable to apply a certain portion of that sum in that way, retaining a portion of it to be applied as bonuses to induce the retirement of officers of from 15 to 20 years' service?—I should be very much in favour of retaining a portion of it to apply as bonuses, because the state of the case is this; that you must get a number of officers to retire, and to get a number of officers to retire out of a given sum of money, it must be divided into comparatively small sums, for which you can only expect a junior to retire, not a senior.

536. I apprehend that, taking, for the sake of argument, the basis of 9,000 *l.* for the portion to be allotted in bonuses, it would give just 15 annuities of 600 *l.* a year, would it not?—Yes.

537. I am not an actuary, but perhaps you can tell me how long we may assume that those annuities will be drawn; would 10 years be the average?—A good deal longer than that, at the age of which officers are now retiring. The lives of the youngest officers who have recently retired from the corps were worth about 22 years' purchase, and you may safely say that few of the individuals likely to retire if such an augmentation were made as you refer to, would have less than 20 years prospect of life.

538. Then I may safely assume, that 15 years would be the proper time?—Fifteen years would be quite within the mark.

539. Then, when the whole of that 9,000 *l.* a year was applied, we could only calculate, on the average, on one annuity falling in per annum?—Yes; one out of that number; there are 26 upon the list already.

540. One annuity in 15 years would fall in for the allotment of that 9,000 *l.*?—Yes, I think so.

541. Then, supposing that we allotted that 9,000 *l.* as a bonus to officers having from 14 to 20 years' service, and offered lump sums varying from 1,000 *l.* or 1,200 *l.* up to 2,000 *l.*, we might easily divide that sum so as to furnish about six bonuses, might we not?—Yes, I think so.

542. It would be 1,500 *l.* on the average?—Yes.

543. Supposing they were accepted by officers, that would give you six steps in the regiment of officers varying from about 15 to 20 years' service?—Yes.

544. You would have to balance that against the one annuity which was due from the other application of the fund?—Yes.

545. Will you state to the Committee, if that is a fair calculation, what in your opinion would be the result of it as to the respective advantage and disadvantage to the corps?—I think the calculation is perfectly correct in principle, but the sum you name, 1,500 *l.*, would not be a sufficient inducement to any officer to retire, except those who were near the lower limit; you would not get officers approaching 25 years' service to take that sum, unless you permitted an augmentation to be made to it, by the private contributions of the officers. But, in principle, I am persuaded that the sum might be so applied, or a portion of it might be so applied, and that the juniors who are the people to be most considered at the present time, would get many more steps for the money than they now do when it is laid out in annuities.

546. Can you give an opinion as to what would be the advantage to the country in the efficiency of the service, and also in economy to the country?—I think it right to state that no such sum as you have named will meet the case. The case is a far more serious one than is generally supposed. There are at the present moment about 107 officers who (or at least the survivors of them) will all reach the age of 60 together, and there ought to be 68 or 69 of them who will reach that age; if you retire those officers all in the lump at 60 years of age, and replace them by another set of men, also all of the same age, what will happen 40 years hence? The second batch of officers will then all be reaching 60 years of age together, and you will have to repeat the operation. No retirement of that sort will meet the case. The number of officers who are rapidly completing comparatively long terms of service, and who find themselves in the junior ranks at an age beyond that at which they should be there, is so large that no such sum as

9,000 *l.*, or even 19,000 *l.*, will meet the case; it must be a considerably larger sum.

547. Per annum?—It will come up by degrees (not at first) to a much larger sum. If you are speaking of capital, it must be a much larger sum per annum at the best, but the annuity charge must be increased to more than that sum to remove them. I can give you the number of officers who in the year 1885 will have passed 35 years service; I mean the officers who will be living then.

548. Before you come to that, will you mention what is the age and length of service of the officers who compose that very large group at the present time?—The officers who compose that group are those who have at present from 16 to 22 years' service; that is, the survivors of those.

549. Do you suppose that a lump sum of 2,000 *l.* would not induce a certain number of officers of 20 years' service to retire every year?—Yes, I think 2,000 *l.* would generally do so; not at present, because the officers of 20 years' service have at present, I think, a better prospect before them; but it is the officers who are below that who are the most to be considered, who have those comparatively young men before them. The relative value of a position on the list of course varies a good deal according to circumstances; at present the officers of 20 and 22 years' service are not very badly placed upon the list, but the officers of 20 years' service will be badly placed upon the list 20 years hence, and then you will have this accepted.

550. At the present time would officers of 15 years' service take 1,500 *l.* to retire?—I do not think they would, because the officers of 15 years' service are captains, and 1,500 *l.* is hardly a representation of the value of the position of Second Captain of Artillery; the value of that position would capitalise into a much larger sum; but there are, no doubt, some small number of individuals who will take that sum; that will always be so.

551. Then if there were six or seven such bonuses offered, do you not think that there would be individuals in the corps always ready to take them from extraneous circumstances?—Yes; I think there would, to that number.

552. Who would otherwise hang on in the corps, and clog the list?—Yes, quite so; I think it would be so to that number.

553. You are aware that 100 *l.* for each year's service is the sum that is allowed by the Secretary of State to an officer in the line who retires from the service by the sale of his commission, if he has not purchased any of his steps? — Yes, quite so.

554. So that 100 *l.* a year would, perhaps, not form an unfair basis upon which to calculate the bonus to an officer who retires in this case?—Yes; there is I think this consideration, that the officers composing the artillery embrace the army as a profession for life in a larger proportion than those who go into other branches of the service; they do not think of quitting it.

555. Have they any means of quitting it?—At present they have not.

556. They are enlisted for life?—Yes, they are enlisted for life; I think they would not be quite so ready to accept that sum as officers of the line may be found to be.

557. But there are always a number of officers in every branch of the service who, either from marrying, or from private reasons, or from having got into scrapes, or not wishing to continue in the service, would be glad to go, if there was any door open for them without absolute ruin, are there not?—Quite so; there is a retirement going on at all times, at the rate of something less than 1 per cent. per annum from causes of that kind; it is going on now among the juniors.

558. And a moderate bonus would probably get another 1 per cent. or so to go?—No doubt it would.

559. Which would have a material effect in the course of 10 years upon the promotion of the juniors?—Yes; it would have a material effect, but not a sufficient effect.

560. At this present time?—Yes.

561. As a general rule, would it have a sufficient effect?—No, I think not; I think it may be shown that the number of officers who must be retired to secure the promotion of captains to the rank of lieutenant colonel, by the time they are about 48 years of age, would be larger than would be furnished by such a retirement as that. It would contribute towards it, but I do not think it would contribute enough.

562. Then it would be a step in the right direction?—Quite a step in the right direction.

563. You were going to say something with reference to that group of officers attaining 35 years' service together, I think?—I understood it to be the wish of the Chairman the last time I was examined, that I should be prepared to make some sort of statement of the expense of a scheme of retirement such as I advocated in the last evidence I gave; and, therefore, I have drawn up an estimate of the kind, in which I have gone very fully into all the figures. Here is a table of officers composing the Royal Artillery over 15 years' service at the present moment, and who will compose each year's service from 15, 16, 17, and 18 years, up to 40 years in each successive year, supposing none of them to die or retire. There are very few retirements after 15 years' service, other than what we are now providing for. Therefore these vacancies are the principal ones to be considered. I have here also another table showing the number that may be expected to survive in each successive year, after making the proper deduction for deaths (*producing two tables*). Now, to give the Committee an idea of what these numbers will be, perhaps you will permit me to read the figures for the year 1885, which is a tolerably distant year. In the year 1885 there will be 40 officers who will have completed 20 years' service; 81 officers who will have completed 21 years' service; 43 who will have completed 22 years' service; 39, 23 years; 56, 24 years; 61, 25 years; 48, 26 years; 17, 27 years; 46, 28 years; 39, 29 years; 58, 30 years; 45, 31 years; 13, 32 years; 21, 33 years; 17, 34 years; 23, 35 years; 17, 36 years; 11, 37 years; 27, 38 years; 17, 39 years; 9, 40 years; and 74 who will have completed more than 40 years' service. Such is the scale of the figures to be considered.

564. Will you give the total between 30 and 40 years' service?—The total is 210, betwen 30 and 40 years' service, and 74 above it; we may look at it in this way: then there are 66 officers in the effective list above the rank of lieutenant colonel; that includes the commandants, the retired generals, and the colonels; consequently, in order that any individual may stand 66th from the top there must be the difference between these figures got rid of somehow or other; they

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are all above him now, and will all remain above him, so far as death alone removes them. In order that any individual may stand 66th in the year 1885, there must be the difference between these two figures, that is, about 210 or 220 removed by retirement; but when you go a little lower to the captains the groups are still larger; there are but 142 officers above the rank of captain, consequently in order that the last individual of 27 years' service may only have 142 officers standing above him in the year 1885, there are the very large number of 270 or 280 officers who must be removed in some way or other; that is the light in which the thing presents itself to me, and which I believe to be a perfectly fair one. I do not presume to say that these figures are anything more than an estimate, but they are based upon the most recent life tables. I have worked out the result for the years 1875, 1880 and 1885, and it appears that, supposing the suggested amount of promotion to have been barely attained in 1880, it will require about 31 retirements per annum for the next five years, to maintain it until 1885.

565. Does that 31 retirements include the whole of the retirements?—Yes; for those five years.

566. What do you take as the average number under the present arrangements; how many of the 31 are provided for already?—I have worked this out entirely irrespective of the present provision, and taken credit for the falling in of the present sum. There is a sum of 32,000 *l.*, which will gradually fall in, of course, and there is a further sum of about 9,000 *l.* on the half-pay list, which will gradually fall in. Taking credit for all those sums, and assuming that a scale of retirement is offered to officers commencing at 100 *l.* a year after 15 years' service, or its equivalent in capital; and terminating at 600 *l.* a year, after 40 years' service, the present limit (only we get it before 40 years' service), the cost will be between 70,000 *l.* and 80,000 *l.* a year; but that is the cost looking upon them as annuities; if you buy up your annuities, if you convert 100 *l.*, for instance, into 1,700 *l.*, you have 100 *l.* less next year, and in future years; but you have 1,700 *l.* to pay this year, and, therefore, the sum to be provided somehow or other, is a larger sum than it would be otherwise.

567. Would not you induce a man to retire more easily, by giving him a lump sum, than by giving him 100 *l.* a year. I mean, would not something less than 17 years' purchase suffice?—My idea is that the basis must always be an annuity, and that you will then capitalise that annuity.

568. Would you not be able to capitalise it at something less than it is worth, and yet make it a sufficient inducement?—It depends upon the bargain which the Government is able to drive with its officers. I apprehend that public opinion would scarcely permit the Government to offer its officers, who may be supposed to have deserved well of the country, less than the fair capitalised value of the annuities they are supposed to receive.

569. Supposing the Government say to an officer, We will not offer you an annuity, but we will offer you 1,500 *l.* instead of what you ask for, namely, 100 *l.* a year, which we will not give you; if they were to offer on the one hand annuities of 100 *l.* which were inconvertible, and on the other hand 1,500 *l.*, would not the 1,500 *l.* be the more attractive of the two?—If you offered a man 1,500 *l.*, I think it very probable that he would take it. I think, myself, that you ought to offer the full price; if you calculate his retirement to be at 100 *l.* a year, which is just half way between the half pay of a captain and that of a lieutenant, I think you should offer him the full value of the 100 *l.*, which is 1,700 *l.*, not 1,500 *l.*

570. But still the Government might say that they were not prepared to give the 100 *l.* a year?—Take it at what you please, but capitalise it fairly; make it 90 *l.*, then the sum would be about 1,500 *l.*, the very sum you name.

571. *Chairman.*] At what average age do you say that an annuity of 100 *l.* is equal to 1,700 *l.*?—At 35. For this purpose, I assume that the officers obtain their first commissions at 20; at present they obtain them at 21 generally, but a great number of those serving on the list got their commissions earlier; I have taken that as the average. The table I have referred to is Mr. Tidd Pratt's; it is capitalised at 1,700 *l.*

572. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] At any rate the result of your conclusions is this, it is necessary to deal with the officers in the body of the list, in order to prevent a very great stagnation of promotion, and inefficiency to the corps of artillery a few years hence?—Yes, quite so.

573. It has been suggested that it will be injurious to the corps to offer these inducements to officers at an efficient age to retire; that is to say, that there are very good captains of artillery who would be induced to take a bonus, and retire, and that you could not very well spare their services; do you think that that is a valid objection to the scheme?—No, I do not.

574. You think that there is as good fish in the sea as ever came out of it?—Yes, I think there is as good fish in the sea as ever came out of it, and for the most part the men who would take it would not be the most active, ambitious, and valuable officers, but officers who had various family ties, and other things which made their services less valuable.

575. It is a good thing for the tone of the service to induce such men to leave it, is it not; it encourages a zealous and martial tone in the service?—I should be very sorry to say that there are not extremely good men amongst the married men and men with families.

576. I referred to those who wish to leave the service?—The men who wish to leave the service, are those who have the sort of encumbrances I am now principally thinking of.

577. And of course it is a great encouragement to other officers to be zealous, in order to obtain rapid promotion?—Quite so; I do not know whether this is strictly relevant to your inquiry, but it may be worth reflection, that unless officers see a prospect of obtaining the superior ranks in a moderate period of time, there is a great tendency, undoubtedly, for them to marry in the junior ranks, and encumber the service in various ways which every military man knows is the invariable consequence of having an undue proportion of married officers.

578. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] As to the age at which the officers get their commissions now, it is several years older than it was in your time, say some 30 years ago, is not it?—On the average, it is four years older. I have here a memorandum of the ages at which the last 225 officers have obtained

obtained their commissions, which perhaps you will permit me to read; out of that number, there was only one in his 19th year; there were 24 in their 20th year; 85 in their 21st year; 85 in their 22nd year; 25 in their 23rd year, and 5 in their 24th year; the average is about 21, or a little over.

579. Do you recollect when the alteration took place?—The alteration was in full effect in 1860, but it occurred spasmodically before that. There was a great mixture of age before that; there were some officers who received their commissions at 17, and some were even older before that, than they have been since. There were some officers, you will recollect, then commissioned by direct commissions, without being at the Royal Military Academy at all, and others who were only there a very short time. but the turning point was about the year 1860.

580. Is the object to be attained by this, to enable young officers to pass a more stringent course of examination?—I believe that is the principal reason that has induced them to raise the age, or the cause which has led to that result. The examination is now such, that a lad, unless he has very uncommon abilities, cannot pass it without two or three years more preparation than would have been necessary in former days, and therefore those who enter the Academy are now, with a few exceptions, in their 18th or 19th year; in their 19th year very often, and they remain in the Academy for two or three years, so that they get up to their 22nd year when they leave. In my time, the limit of age was 16; the majority of cadets entered at 14, and the majority of commissions were obtained at or before the age of 18; in some rare instances, of course a good deal earlier.

581. Do you consider that the theoretical examination which officers had to pass at the time you speak of, when the limit was 16, was one that would not be sufficient at the present day?—I think that the examination as it was 30 years ago, put into the regiment officers who are in every way calculated for the public service. Undoubtedly their attainments, their mathematical attainments more particularly, were very considerably below what they are now, but I do not consider it necessary that any very large proportion of the officers of the regiment should have those advanced attainments, and if provision were made that those who would be inclined by taste to do so, should cultivate them after they got into the service, obtaining their commissions earlier, I believe you would always have quite a sufficient number of officers qualified for the positions in which those attainments were required. I consider that the late age at which officers now obtain their first commissions will be a source of very serious future embarrassment, and that it is very important to reduce it.

582. Great facilities are now given by the scientific establishment at Woolwich for officers who are inclined to carry on their studies to do so?—Yes, that is a recent thing; but it is now working in a very satisfactory manner.

583. You think, then, that the advanced theoretical examination does not balance the objections of the advanced age of cadets in a corps such as the Artillery, a seniority corps?—I think that the advanced age will a few years hence tell much more against the public service than the advanced attainments will tell in favour of it.

584. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are there any increased difficulties in managing the academy in consequence of the advanced age of the cadets?—I am not very well qualified to speak upon that point; but I think there are not; I do not hear of it.

585. Mr. *Pack Beresford.*] There is a fixed establishment of general officers in the Artillery, is there not?—Yes.

586. That is based, I suppose, upon the general proportion of the officers of Artillery and Engineers to the rest of the army?—It was based upon that proportion in 1854; but the Artillery has undergone considerable augmentation since, and the proportion of general officers has not been augmented since that time.

587. The addition of a few general officers would be, of course, a very great advantage to the corps?—It would be a very considerable advantage.

588. There is another thing which has been altered lately, I believe; the system of seconding officers who are employed in the higher ranks of the whole branch of the Artillery?—There have been a great many changes with regard to seconding officers; formerly officers were very rarely seconded. About the time of the Crimean War they were all seconded. I mean those detached from their military duties; since that, the whole of the colonels who were seconded have been re-absorbed; but the lieutenant colonels and captains remain seconded. The word "seconded" is not literally correct; they remain on the supernumerary list, which is a different thing.

589. In the Indian Branch, that is, the old Indian corps, the system of having a supernumerary list for officers employed is still in force, is it not?—It is; and it has operated very much indeed to the advantage of the Indian corps.

590. And I presume to the disadvantage of the other branch of the corps, as far as promotion goes?—To the disadvantage in this way that, as we form one regiment an officer of the old Royal Artillery, who is, we will suppose, lieutenant-colonel, and senior as a lieutenant-colonel, to another officer in the Indian service sees that officer get the regimental rank of colonel by virtue of seconding above him, and henceforward hold a higher regimental grade, but it does not interfere with his promotion, because they are promoted on different lists.

591. They are promoted on different lists; but it tells eventually on the rank of the officers, one of whom gets rank earlier than the other?—Yes; it tells upon the relative rank of the two men; it does not retard the one, but it gives the other a lift above him.

592. You stated at the last sitting of the Committee that in the case of engineer officers the 600 *l.* a year you offer them is less than they are in receipt of while in active employment; now, are not colonels of artillery who are employed also in receipt of a considerably larger sum than 600 *l.* a year?—A good many of them are; they get a command pay of 6 *s.* a day; and the ordinary military advantages of servants and horses, and so forth, count of course for something.

593. The senior colonels, I suppose, are those principally employed?—Yes, as a rule it is the senior colonels; there are exceptions.

594. It is, therefore, the less likely that the retirements would be taken by the seniors than by the junior ones, irrespective of the prospect of a battalion?—Quite so; that is one of the

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reasons why the seniors have not been so anxious to take it generally.

595. Major *Jervis.*] I did not quite understand whether your proposal with reference to the bonus question related to the present exceptional condition of the corps, and is therefore temporary, or whether you look more to the future?—The bonus which I propose to offer to officers from private contributions is with reference principally to the present exceptional state of things; but that will last out the lifetime of many officers, and therefore it is hardly to be called a temporary state of things; it will last out the lifetime of all but the very juniors in the regiment.

596. Colonel Percy Herbert spoke of the sum that would be necessary to induce officers to retire after 15 years' service; from your experience in the War Office and elsewhere, you hardly think, I presume, that the country would provide a sum sufficient to carry that out; and, therefore, if it was carried out, it would require an addition to that extent to the sum subscribed for bonuses by the officers?—I think there is great readiness on the part of a large body of officers to contribute something to their own advancement. If a man puts his son into a purchasing branch of the service, he expects to contribute from his private fortune, or in some way, at the rate of about 100 *l.* a year to purchase his successive steps. He buys his commission to begin with, and the payments on the successive steps amount to about 100 *l.* a year all through. That is not paid by the young man himself; it is paid by his friends for his advancement in life, and I believe that the friends of the greater number of the officers in the artillery would be also quite willing to pay, not so much as that, but something for their advancement in life. I may mention, as a fact bearing upon this question, that a very large number of the junior officers of the regiment have spontaneously, in consequence of the proposal which I originated in this pamphlet, entered into an agreement among themselves to pay, if they are allowed, over and above the sum. They have agreed to pay 10 *l.* each a year. More than 100 of them have done that. That will be 1,000 *l.* a year raised at once. With that 1,000 *l.* a year they calculate to be able to buy one step, so that a man, in the period of his service as a subaltern, would buy 15 or 16 steps, which might accelerate the period of his promotion nearly a year, or in the higher grades more than that. The officers see their advantage in it, and are willing to do it.

597. *Chairman.*] Do you say that those officers have agreed to pay 10 *l.* more than you suggested?—What I suggested was that an officer should give up the difference between his previous pay and the pay of each successive step he got; supposing the promotion were from captain to lieutenant colonel, I propose that he should pay the difference between the pays of a captain and of a lieutenant colonel for one year, and that the payment should be spread over two years, half being paid the first year of promotion, and half the next year.

598. How much would that be in each year?—It would be 73 *l.* in the case of a captain, but that would be 37 *l.* a year for two successive years. He would benefit by his promotion to the extent of the other 37 *l.*

599. Compared with the 100 *l.* a year which you say in the line has to be contributed by an officer's friends in order to purchase his steps, how much do you think, under your scheme, would be subscribed by the officers themselves annually on the average?—I do not think that they could be expected upon the scale of pay and allowances they receive to contribute a larger sum than 10 *l.* a year in any grade each, and I think it is rather too much for the subalterns, but it is entirely their own proposal and assessment.

600. £.10 a year altogether?—Each individual would pay 10 *l.* a year.

601. You said just now that you had been told that they were willing to pay 10 *l.* more than you propose?—They are different things; the one is an annual payment, and the other is a payment to be made once for all on obtaining a step in promotion.

602. Spreading it over the service of an officer from the time of his entering the service up to his reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel, how much would the annual contribution come to according to your scale?—According to my scale the total sum is 388 *l.*, up to the rank of colonel inclusive. It is 239 *l.* to lieutenant colonel, that is about 9 *l.* a year, spread over 27 years or so.

603. Major *Jervis.*] Do you think that for that you would get anything in the shape of promotion worth considering?—Yes; I think you would get a considerable number of steps in that way, but whether there would be sufficient steps so obtained to maintain the efficiency of the corps, is a question which I think nothing but experience can decide. The only way would be to permit the plan to be tried for 10 years, or some other long period, and then look at it again.

604. Do you propose that there should be additional steps purchased out of this money, or that there should be bonuses added from it to any bonus which the Government might give to induce men to go?—If the Government took a portion of the sum annually voted for retirements, and divided it into bonuses, then I think the sum contributed should augment those bonuses. If the Government gave 10,000 *l.*, I think we should be permitted to raise 3,000 *l.* or 4,000 *l.* more among ourselves. But if Parliament votes annuities and the Commissioners of the National Debt buy up those annuities in the ordinary way as a matter of which Parliament takes no cognizance at all, then the bonuses would naturally go to the men below 14 years' service not provided for by that scheme. The younger the man is who retires, the better for those who are below him.

605. Do you know what the number of general officers ought to be taking the basis of 1854, and taking the addition to the regiment since then?—It should be 39.

606. Instead of 32?—Yes, instead of 32.

607. Mr. *Trevelyan,*] When you have once established the system of bonuses by law, have you any hold over the officers; are you able to prevent them, if the corps is divided up, for instance, paying in a particular regiment very much more than the regulation bonus?—I think if it were recognised by law, they could be easily prevented from doing so.

608. It never has been prevented, has it, in any system in which bonuses or purchase were allowed; in the Indian army, for instance?—I believe in the Indian army there was no fixed tariff, but they practically settled down to something like a uniform sum, and I do not think there was any bargaining permitted beyond that sum. I think the sum was 4,000 *l.* for a lieutenant colonel, and I do not think they offered a

lieutenant

lieutenant colonel more than that. I do not speak with much knowledge of the subject, but I have made inquiry amongst Indian officers about it.

609. In order to offer anything like that sum to a lieutenant colonel of artillery, the subscription among the officers would have to be very much more than 10 *l.* each, would it not?—Yes; but I do not think of offering him anything like that. A man requires a larger or smaller sum in proportion to the pay and allowance which he is giving up, which, in the case of the Indian army were high. And upon the Indian system the private bonus was in addition to the public provision.

610. You think the Government could keep the system of purchase and bonuses under their control?—I think it would be possible to do so entirely.

611. Major *Jervis.*] Do you not think that the system recently adopted of not seconding colonels in the British Royal Artillery, while they do in the Indian Royal Artillery, has created much dissatisfaction throughout the service?—A great many officers personally affected by it have expressed themselves very strongly to me about it; it is felt to be a disadvantage to the men themselves, and to give a very unequal advantage to others. I will illustrate it by a particular case, but without mentioning names. I could quote the case of an officer who was a captain in India at the time when another officer of distinguished Crimean service, and a lieutenant colonel, held a high staff appointment, who has since, by the operation of this seconding, obtained the regimental rank of colonel over his head. I will call the cases A. and B. B.'s promotion does not in the slightest degree affect A.'s; he will get it just as soon, in time; but in the meanwhile, B. is for the rest of his service above him in the Artillery, whereas he has hitherto for the last 30 years been below him in the Artillery.

612. Is there any reason why the supernumerary system should be put a stop to in the Artillery?—Nothing except the economy of the Treasury. There is a constant struggle going on between the Treasury, the Horse Guards, and the War Department, as to whether officers holding certain appointments should be supernumeraries or not. Everybody is glad to get an officer made a supernumerary at the time; it is an increase of his pay to the annual charge, but it comes to be absorbed at last, and the promotion is then checked.

613. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In the case you mentioned, were the officers both Royal Artillery officers proper, or was one an Indian officer?—One was an Indian, and the other a Royal Artillery officer.

614. It is a question of Indian arrangements then, which you are speaking of?—Yes, the case I referred to was to illustrate this; the system of seconding officers holding staff appointments has been discontinued in the old Royal Artillery service, but it has been revived in the Indian service; consequently officers have been promoted from the rank of lieutenant colonel to that of colonel to fill vacancies created by seconding, giving them a step of regimental rank over those in the old service who were lieutenant colonels before them.

615. Is not it the case that officers have been in like manner promoted to the rank of major general, over colonels to whom they were junior in the service previously?—That is strictly in accordance with the Royal warrant, the rank of major general has been obtained in army succession; there has been a recent instance of that; a very distinguished officer has lately leaped over the heads of several of his seniors in that way.

616. Is not his promotion consequent upon the promotion in the Bengal army, or in the Bombay army which he belonged to?—No; the officer I referred to is an officer of the Royal Artillery, Major General Dickson; but the Indian promotion to the rank of major general is upon the general list, not upon the regimental list at all.

617. Major *Jervis.*] Since the English Artillery and the Indian Artillery have been combined, to a certain extent, doing regimental service together, does it not tell sometimes very hardly in the case of an Indian officer coming home to England, or to an English officer going out to India, if they are promoted upon two different systems; in the one case a man is able to get his full colonelcy by those before him being put upon the supernumerary list, and in the other case he is not; of late we have had several cases of that kind; the full colonels not having been seconded, lieutenant colonels below them have lost steps by the colonels not being made supernumerary; and, therefore, the lieutenant colonels who, had they got their promotion, might under the other system have retired, at present have been unable to do so?—Yes, there are several officers now holding appointments (I myself am one of them) for which they would have been seconded a few years ago; I think my being seconded would have promoted this very officer I referred to just now; at all events, mine and others would have done so.

618. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] Would it not be a very serious blow to a young officer who has entered the service upon the supposition that he could live upon his pay, to find that he had to pay 10 *l.*, or even more, a year for a very small amount of promotion?—It was not part of my own proposal to make the payment compulsory; there are exceptional cases, but I do not think that they are numerous, of officers living upon their pay. I believe there are very few such cases indeed; those officers who do so live, for the most part seek service in India, where their pay enables them to live. But my proposal was that it should be voluntary; I apprehend that if it were made compulsory it would be looked upon in a very short time as a deduction or income tax from the officer's pay taken by the country, and there would be a clamour to relieve him of it, and so it would cease to be a voluntary management, which is all that I advocate, and I propose also that it should be under such regulations as would prevent it abuse.

619. Do you not think that in the Artillery, where the officers are generally very intelligent and able to compare their position with that of officers in other countries, they would expect that the State would provide reasonable promotion, and would not throw any burden upon the officers themselves?—I think the officers themselves, for the most part, acknowledge that the State cannot do all that is required; it is a fine line for the State to draw to say whether a man is efficient as a captain at 45 or 50; I think if it came to that point, the State would say they would take their chance of a man being efficient and keep him, but an individual officer wants his step, and for that purpose wishes to get an officer above him to retire at 45; the State has borne the charge of the augmentation by which we have benefited, but I do not think that the State can be reasonably expected to do, or that

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it will do everything that the personal interests of its officers, and ultimately even its own interests may require to avert their remote consesequences, and therefore I wish to see officers permitted to help themselves, as they will, in my opinion, do if they are allowed.

620. Mr. *Otway.*] With regard to the bonus, I understand that you wish not to make it a compulsory contribution upon the officers?—Yes.

621. Do you not think that that would be likely to produce a bad feeling in the corps; for instance, you are no doubt aware that in the Line where there has been a system of giving so much to a captain; for example, beyond the army regulation, if an officer fails from his means to contribute that customary sum, he is very badly looked upon by the other officers; he stops the promotion. A voluntary contribution is one of two things; it is either compelling officers to contribute that which perhaps they cannot afford, or if they fail to do it, it is placing them in a very invidious position with reference to their brother officers?—That precise case can never arise in the Artillery. If the officer at the head of the list in the Line refuses to pay more than the Regulation price, he does stop the promotion, or oblige the other man to take less than he considers himself entitled to; but in the Artillery, the only result of an individual or 100 individuals refusing to contribute would be that the whole sum would be less than it would have been otherwise; but no individual could be said to be stopping the promotion in that way. I think the moral force of the regiment would be sufficient to make officers who are able to do it contribute. An officer's circumstances are always pretty well known to his friends and brother officers, and in the cases of officers burdened with large families, or with little or nothing to look to beyond their pay, there would be no disposition to press hardly upon them; they would be permitted to share in the advantages of the other men without contributing.

622. You think that that would be the general feeling?—Yes; I know that that has been laid down as the basis of the proposal made by the young officers, that they shall contribute as they can, and if any man benefits without contributing, they do not object to it.

623. Do not the officers in the Artillery contribute anything now to induce a man to retire. Take the case of a senior captain about to obtain a lieutenant colonelcy, is it customary in the corps for him to give anything to an officer above him to retire that he may get a step, and obtain an improved position?—No; there is no approach to such an arrangement in the Artillery.

624. Is it not even done under the rose?—No.

625. The age at which officers enter now is 20, is it not?—It is 21, or slightly over.

626. That you consider too old?—I consider it at least three years too advanced an age.

627. Are you aware of the ages at which the Artillery officers in France and other countries obtain their commissions?—The age of admission to the Ecole Polytechnique is from 17 to 20. They have the rank of sous lieutenant élive at 19, and of lieutenant en second at 21. Perhaps I may add here that in the French army the age of compulsory retirement for regimental officers ranges from 52 to 60 years. The large proportion of men raised from the ranks leads to instances of advanced age in the junior ranks, and the rule is, lieutenants at 52; captains, 53; chef de bataillon, 56; lieutenant colonel, 58; colonel, 60 years of age. The same for the artillery as for the other arms.

628. I did not observe that you made any allowance in your calculations for officers retiring on half pay, yet there are several instances of that, are there not?—The half pay list is not a very heavy one; it is composed principally of the officers who retired about 30 years ago; they are all very advanced lives; and a small proportion of officers who on grounds of disability have been permitted to retire, though of less than 30 years' service, more recently; but the proportion of officers who take half pay is all included in the one per cent. I mentioned just now. It does not afford any great relief in the lower ranks.

629. I know an instance myself of a lieutenant colonel of Artillery retiring, on half-pay, I think, at the age of 38 or 39. The officer I allude to is Colonel Inglefield; he is now receiving half pay; he is about a contemporary of mine?—Yes; it was on grounds of ill health, and he may have retired when 21 years was the limit; at present it is 25.

630. Colonel *North.*] With reference to the sale of commissions, is there the same regulation applying to the Artillery with respect to the 100 *l.* a year sanctioned by the Secretary of State for War as applies to the Line; for instance, would a lieutenant colonel of Artillery get 4,500 *l.* the same as a lieutenant colonel in the Line would get?—There is no system of sale in the Artillery, but lieutenant colonels are sometimes, as a matter of indulgence, permitted to retire on the full price, 4,700 *l.* I think it is. That is not the case with any rank below that. I do not remember any case of a captain receiving the value of his commission, and the number of lieutenant colonels who do so is very small.

631. There are, according to the return before us, nine captains of Artillery who have done so, besides the lieutenant colonels, but there are no sums put down against them. As I understand, there are no means of creating a vacancy in the Artillery except by putting an officer on half pay who has been seriously wounded or something of that kind, under 25 years' service?—No; none whatever. He may, under certain circumstances, have full pay after 21 years; that is provided for in the warrant of 1854; but those are quite exceptional cases.

632. Colonel *Sturt.*] The system you propose is in reality a sort of voluntary purchase system in the corps, is it not?—No; I think there is a very broad distinction between the system I propose and the purchase system. The purchase system enables an individual, by his own money, to buy over the heads of other men, and therein consists the invidious working of it. There is a constant tendency to raise the price of commissions, owing to the eagerness of the officers, if they are possessed of money, to get on. The system I propose would not advance any individual except by advancing those before him. Each individual would contribute, but the order of succession would go exactly as at present, only the promotion would be obtained earlier.

633. No man could go over another man's head?—No man could go over another man's head.

634. If the officers of artillery are satisfied that your proposal would tend to their advantage, what is there to prevent their adopting it?—The officers of artillery are a very large body. I have

have obtained the assents of over 300, but those are not all; some have expressed dissent; there are differences of opinion. What prevents their taking advantage of it is that it is one of those arrangements which I think cannot, under ordinary military discipline, be worked without the concurrence of the authorities; at all events, I should not propose myself that it should be carried out without the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War and his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.

635. You would have an Act of Parliament to legalise it?—Not to legalise it; to recognise it. I am satisfied that it is better that anything which exists should be recognised than that it should exist *sub rosa.*

636. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Is there any regulation now against the giving of any sum for the purpose of getting promotion?—No; there is no regulation against it; but there is no organisation for doing it. The difficulties in the Artillery would be greater than in smaller bodies from the immense number of officers who have to concur in it.

637. Would it be contrary to regulation for an officer to give an officer senior to him a sum of money to retire?—No; there is no regulation which it would infringe so far as I know, but it is an arrangement which would simply never pay.

638. With reference to the age of officers entering the army, what inducements do you think could be given to officers after they have obtained their commissions to prosecute a further advance in mathematical studies?—By providing a class of beneficial appointments to be held by officers of artillery, limited to those who qualified themselves, having in fact, a staff system for those appointments, analogous to what prevails for the staff appointments of the army.

639. What class of appointments would those be?—Such appointments as the heads of manufacturing departments in the Royal Arsenal, and elsewhere, the inspectorships of warlike stores, and a considerable number of appointments which in every service are held by artillery officers with special attainments. I could easily enumerate them; they are rather numerous appointments; they are all Civil appointments under the War Department.

640. Do you think they would be sufficiently numerous appointments to induce a large number of officers to go on with a severe course of mathematical studies?—Yes, I think they would; I think there are a large number of officers whose natural taste and ability induces them to cultivate these studies, and that has always been the case. I think, if the appointments were given fairly and honestly to those who were best qualified, there would never be a want of competitors for them, and you might raise the standard as much as you liked; it might be necessary, however, to raise the pay too, if the standard was raised very high.

641. In the present state of artillery science, is not a very considerable amount of mathematical knowledge desirable, even for an officer who does not aspire to any of those appointments; that is to say, for the officers who will be principally engaged in regimental duty?—No, not a considerable amount; not more than any young man could be reasonably expected to acquire by the time he is 18; it is indispensable that there should be in such a body as the artillery, or in such a service as the artillery, a proportion of officers of high mathematical attainments, equal to those whom the continental artilleries present in large numbers; but individuals of this class will always present themselves if sufficient encouragements are given. It is not necessary for the ordinary service that an officer should have anything that may be called high mathematical attainments; he should have a certain knowledge of mathematics.

642. You think that now the whole regiment is educated up to a standard that is necessary for only very few?—I think that the endeavour to do so, whether it is successful or not, leads indirectly, to the sacrifice of other things quite as valuable in a military body.

643. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] As to the education, have you not found, taking the officers as a body, that a considerable number of them selected mathematics for themselves, pursued their studies in it, and advanced to very considerable scientific acquirements under the old rule that was applied at the time you got your commission yourself?—I am afraid I cannot say that any considerable number did. Individuals of course always did so, but not in sufficient number, in my opinion, because there was positively no stimulus or encouragement 30 years ago whatever, in that direction, but the case is different now; there is a good deal of encouragement.

644. *Chairman.*] You have stated, I think, to-day, that in addition to that dead level of 290 officers which you described to us in your former evidence, there is another dead level of about 110 officers?—Yes.

645. Of about on the average, 20 years service?—No, the 292 is the group of officers who are 25, 24, and 23 years of age at present. There is not at present any large group at 20 years' service or thereabouts, but there will be in 1875.

646. The others you described to-day, I think you gave us as between 15 and 25 years service?—Yes. Colonel Percy Herbert asked me how I made out the number of officers who will have passed 30 years service in 1885; they amount to 104. There are so many officers who will be of from 30 to 34 years service at that time, and those are the officers who are now from 9 to 13 years' service.

647. So that according to your present statement, there are two dead levels in the corps?—There are a good many more.

648. You have described two specially; one a dead level of about 290 officers, and another a dead level of about 110 officers?—Yes; but the latter was taken quite arbitrarily, several other groups of three years would have done as well to illustrate my meaning. The former, the 290 officers, is the great level.

649. And it is in consequence of those dead levels, that you think some special and exceptional provision for retirement should be made?—Yes.

650. When those dead levels are got rid of, and when officers all get their commissions at about the same age that special provision would not according to you, be necessary?—It is difficult to look so very far ahead.

651. To put it in another way, if it were not for those two dead levels, you would not require to introduce into your proposed system all the means of retirement which you now propose?—No, I do not think that the scale and system of

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retirement which I have proposed will be permanently necessary, but I am afraid it will be necessary through the remainder of this century; that is until the officers who obtained their commissions about the time of the Crimean war are all exhausted. If you will permit me, I will mention to you another dead level; there will be 320 officers living in the year 1885 who will have from 20 to 25 years' service.

652. Your way, however, of dealing with the corps, supposing these two exceptional difficulties did not exist, would be in the first instance to follow some such plan as Captain Galton proposed, namely, a maximum of age at which all colonels should go off the fixed list?—Yes.

653. You think that below that, some provision ought to be made as a rule irrespective of those exceptions for helping the flow of promotion, beyond the retirements which are necessary to get rid of inefficient officers?—Yes.

654. But if the numbers of the different ranks of officers were otherwise fixed, would it be necessary to provide for more than getting rid of inefficient officers?—You mean, if a limit were laid down for each rank.

655. You think that in order to promote the flow of promotion, and to prevent blocks, particularly in promotion from the rank of captain to that of lieutenant-colonel, it is advisable to retire more men than it is necessary to retire, merely on account of inefficiency?—Yes.

656. If the number of lieutenant-colonels was greater, and the number of captains less, that necessity would not exist, I presume?—Not to the same extent.

657. You would not, in a perfectly organised corps, wish to retire perfectly efficient men, merely to give steps to the men below them?—No.

658. Therefore, if in a perfectly organised corps, divided properly with respect to its different ranks, all that is necessary is to provide for the retirement of inefficient men, would it not be an alternative to your plan to consider whether the number in each of those ranks ought not to be amended?—Any increase to the proportion of the superior ranks would of course materially improve the advantages of the ranks below them, but no one fixed arrangement, I apprehend, can meet the circumstances of a large body like the artillery, which is subject to the fluctuations of alternate conditions of peace and war. A war may upset the best scheme in the world, by obliging you to augment the number of officers by a couple of hundred men all of the same age, in a very short time. These measures of retirement are an indirect after-consequence of that state of things, and as often as that is repeated, at a period of 30 years afterwards something of the same kind will have to be done again.

659. That I provided for by asking you to eliminate for the moment all idea of the 290 and 110, which were caused really by circumstances something like what you described; but supposing the corps normally to be sound, do you think it would be advisable to retire efficient men, merely to promote those below them?—It would be better to retire the inefficient men; that is to say, it would be better to have a compulsory retirement at the top of the list, and remove those at the top, but so long as officers get into positions upon the regimental establishment which they hold for 20 or 30 years (we have at the present moment an officer who has held the rank of colonel commandant for 20 years, and there is no such thing as retiring a colonel commandant until death retires him), and so long as you have no means of retiring, those whom I may term the inefficient men, you must advance the juniors by removing comparatively efficient men.

660. The rank of colonel commandant is an honorary rank, where efficiency is hardly in question; but assuming that you have a system by which at a certain age everybody is got out of the way as far as the flow of promotion is concerned, and under which inefficient officers can be removed out of the way at any age, do you think you can justify in theory a further removal of efficient men merely to clear the way for those below them?—Yes; I think if one efficient man is replaced by another efficient man, the country suffers no loss, and he will, under this system, be replaced by a more efficient man, by somebody younger than himself, it may be a necessity of the service. Stated broadly in that way it looks, perhaps, extravagant to retire efficient men, but you are not diminishing the efficiency of the corps by so doing, you are, on the contrary, improving it; I believe that the system of retirement from the top so as to give the same number of steps as would be given according to the view I have supported (and it must be made somehow or other to give the same *number* of steps) by retiring either at the top or from the colonels alone, would cost more than a system of retirement graduated all down the list. I have endeavoured to calculate it, and it works out a larger figure for the retirement at the top of the list than if they are taken at the lower points. There are so many arbitrary assumptions about the ages at which men would accept the retirement that one cannot rely much upon the result, but that is the result I have come to; I could show it; here is a case in point; I wanted to get 94 retirements, and I assumed that they were divided equally over 20 years; I took six men at 15 years' service, six men at 16 years' service, six men at 17 years' service, and six men at 18 years' service, and then five men for the rest. The sum total of the retirements comes to 21,000 *l.* Now, if instead of doing that, I suppose that nobody retires under 25 years' service, and a portion of them retire at 30 years' service. I have made up the same number by taking 20 captains on half-pay, and 10 lieutenant colonels on majors' half-pay, and 20 lieutenant colonels on half-pay, and 44 lieutenant colonels on full pay, and that comes to 24,000 *l.*, that is actually greater than the previous sum.

661. Putting aside for the moment the question which will cost most about which I will not dispute your figures, do you think that the principle can be justified in a highly educated corps like the artillery of inducing efficient men to retire in order to give other efficient men below them a step instead of so paying and promoting your officers as to enable efficient men to reach the point which they deserve?—No doubt the latter plan would be the preferable one, but I do not think there is any violation of principle in the other plan. The whole arrangement is a means to an end; that end is the maximum of efficiency in that branch of the army; if, to effect that efficiency, officers are obliged to be retired, I see no violation of principle in it provided the service benefits by it, which would be the case.

662. You do not think that it would be an inconvenient precedent in the arrangements of the service

service, that the Government should deliberately lay down these rules, having as one of its objects to get rid of men who were avowedly efficient?—Pardon me, that is not the avowed object, the avowed object is to bring officers forward by spreading the area of retirement over a greater portion of the scale; at present the area of retirement for half-pay stops at 25 years' service, and for full pay at 30 years' service, and beyond that there is no retirement at all. In order to get a greater number of officers to retire, we spread our area of retirement down to 15 years' service, and the result is to pension some efficient men undoubtedly. Such is the case now in the Indian service, when an officer is permitted to retire after 22 years' service on full pay, counting his service as a cadet. A large number of officers take advantage of that; they are in many cases perfectly efficient men, no doubt, but it is necessary for the good of the service to permit them to go, opening the door to other younger and more efficient men to succeed them.

663. You consider then that that rule in the Indian service was made, not with reference to the hardship of the service in that climate, but with reference to increasing the flow of promotion?—Yes, I should think so. The flow of promotion in the Indian service has been kept a great deal in advance of the flow of promotion in the Royal service, by their early retirements, and their bonuses, but still it has at times stagnated, and led to precisely the same kind of complaints that we have had amongst ourselves.

664. You said, I think, that in order to bring a subaltern to not more than 27 years' service in 1885, it would be necessary that between now and then 272 officers should retire?—Yes, some such number.

665. You meant retire or die, of course?—No, I have already deducted all the deaths that can be fairly reckoned upon in that interval. I have made use of the tables published by Dr. Farr for male lives in healthy districts in England, and a per-centage may perhaps be taken off that for the conditions of military service, but the military profession is not an unhealthy one, and the lives are picked lives. On the whole I think it is fair to take that table as the basis, and all the deaths that can be legitimately expected have been already deducted in that table.

666. Have you calculated how many officers would go off out of those 272, if the maximum age for a colonel was taken at 57, or 60?—Yes, I will read what I have written. There will be 72 surviving officers who will complete 40 years service in or before 1885 (I read 74 just now; the figures are nearly the same); of whom 32 are provided for on the regimental establishment; that is 17 commandants, and 15 colonels; 8 of them I assume to have retired in a former section, leaving 32 men to retire. Therefore, at that time, in order to bring those officers up, we must have had 40 retirements. There will then be 104 who will complete 34 years of service, and 239 who will have completed 27 years of service. There will be 176 altogether, who will have passed the limit assumed for service in the rank of lieutenant colonel (that is 34 years service); of whom 110 must make vacancies by retirement if the junior is to reach the rank of colonel at 34 years service, there being only 66 above the rank of colonel.

667. My question is this: your subaltern of 27 years service will be a man of about 48?—Yes.

668. Between the ages of 48 and 60 how many officers will there be according to your calculation; how many will be left allowing for deaths?—Three hundred and forty-three. The number between 28 years service and 34 years service, both inclusive, for 1885, is 239. The number between 35 years service and 40 years, both inclusive, is 104. The total 343.

669. But how many of those will be under 60 years of age?—Those 343 are all under 60 years of age; there are 74 above 60 years of age; I have taken them from 40 years service to 28 years service.

670. Do I rightly understand you to say, that allowing for deaths and allowing for those retirements which are practically compulsory, there will be left 340 officers between the ages of 48 and 60 in 1885?—No, not allowing for retirements; I have here allowed only for deaths. Then I have calculated thus: such being the remaining lives, if an individual at 54 years of age is to be within 66 of the top of the list, how many must make way for him; and if an individual at 48 years of age is to be within 144 of the top of the list, how many must make way for him. That gives the total number of retirements that are necessary.

671. But that is a computation upon the basis of the existing system without retirements, not upon the basis of a system under which at a certain age, either 57 or 60, everybody goes off the list. What I wanted you to tell the Committee, was this, in the year 1855, according to your computation, how many men will there be between the ages of 48, and either 57 or 60, who will not have died meanwhile?—Allow me to explain that in what we are now discussing, I have been endeavouring to arrive at the charge to the country; in the year 1855, of such a system of retirement as will give the promotion we desire, there being no colonel beyond the age of 60, no lieutenant colonel beyond the age of 54, and no captain beyond the age of 48. I have endeavoured to see the cost to the country if that system were in operation at that time. For the purpose of cost it makes no difference whether a man retires that year or the year before, or at any former period; his expense is carried on, therefore I have not taken out the retirements in particular years, that could be easily done.

672. That is not what I mean; I wanted to know, according to your computation in the year 1885, how many officers there will be between 37 and 29 years' service, allowing for deaths, and the few inevitable retirements?—Allowing for deaths only, and not allowing anything for retirements, there will be 343 officers living of between 28 and 40 years' service.

673. Of between 28 and 37 years' service, how many will there be?—I take off 53 only; that would leave 290.

674. Then that gives an average of 30 officers of the same year living?—In some instances there will be many more than 30; one of the groups is 58. That will be the number of men who have at present 12 years service that ought to be living in 1885, when they will have 30 years service.

675. The average would be 30 officers of the same year, would it not?—Yes, about that.

676. What is at present the average number of colonels of the same year's standing?—Four; there are four officers of 37 years' service. At present the officers stand thus: of 30 years' ser-

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vice, 5; 31 years, 7; 32 years, 5; 33 years, 8; 34 years, 3; 35 years, 1; 36 years, 4; 37 years, 4; 38 years, 4; 39 years, 6; of 40 years there happen to be none, and over 40 years up to 72 years, there are 25.

677. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is that the service of officers actually serving?—That is the service of officers on the active list at the present moment.

678. *Chairman.*] Then your calculation is that from some abnormal reasons, while the average number of colonels of each year is only about five at present, in 1885 the average number of colonels of each year will be about 30?—If they are colonels. The average number of officers of each year will be as high as that.

679. The average number of officers of the service of the present colonels will be about 30?—Yes, I will show you how this is arrived at: take the highest figure in this list, 58; there are in the current year, 1867, 69 officers of 12 years' service at the present moment; but of those 69 officers, there ought to be 58 remaining in the year 1885, and so on, of every other figure which is here.

680. Then you are in fact arguing upon an exceptional state of things arising mainly from the great increase in the force during the Crimean war?—No, at the top of the list it does not arise from that. At the top of the list it arises from there having been very few first commissions given in the Artillery between the years 1818 and 1826. There is a positive jump of five years of age between two officers who stand next on the list now. Under ordinary circumstances, we should, if there had not been enormous reductions after the last war, have had many more of those groups of officers so situated. It is not the result of the Crimean war, but it is the result of the Peninsular war at present.

681. I spoke of those who would come at the top of the list in 1885?—Even these are all pre-Crimean officers; the Crimean war only dates back 12 years, and these are officers of 17, 18, and 19 years' service.

682. You quoted, I think, officers of 12 years' service just now?—It was in reference to an earlier group; to those who will attain 30 years service in 1885. They will only be lieutenant colonels at best.

683. How many first commissions are given now on the average?—Last year there were 51; the year before 47, and the year before that 95.

684. Does that include the Indian officers?—Yes; they are all added to the general list; they go to supply the Indian list hereafter.

685. How many of these would come as a charge upon the Imperial fund?—Sixty per cent. is a fair proportion for the Imperial fund, counting by the batteries maintained in India, and elsewhere, for the Imperial fund, and forty per cent. for the Indian Fund.

686. Then, according to that, the average number of first commissions, the result of which will come at a future day as an Imperial charge, is about 30 a year?—I think it is more than that; in the three years I have given you, the total is 193, that is an average of 64 a year.

687. Sixty per cent. of that would be a little under 40?—Yes.

688. Out of 40 officers who get first commissions, how many remain for 37 years in the service?—Here are 25 officers who have completed 15 years' service, out of whom we only lose by death up to the year 1885, three.

689. I mean from the first, out of 40 officers who get first commissions, what proportion remain 37 years in the service?—I will take the group between the present senior colonel and the junior colonel. There were originally 123 places between these officers. There are now 34; it appears that 7 per cent. of these officers died or retired as subalterns, 3 per cent. as second captains, 29 per cent. as first captains, and 14 per cent. as lieutenant colonels, so that ultimately 51 per cent. reach the rank of lieutenant colonel, and only 39 per cent. (48 individuals) reached the rank of colonel. They did so in about 30 years' service; and in the usual course of things the ensuing seven years would not reduce their numbers by more than 9 or 10 per cent., so that 30 per cent. will be about an answer to that question. We may, however, take another group. There were originally, 172 officers between the senior and the junior lieutenant colonel; there are now 76. It appears that 15 per cent. died or retired as subalterns, 32 per cent. as second captains, 48 per cent. as first captains; leaving 89 individuals, or 52 per cent., who reached the rank of lieutenant colonel, which they did in about 20 years. These proportions differ but little from those above, and appear to show that under favourable conditions of promotion almost exactly half the officers who enter the Artillery reach the rank of lieutenant colonel, and rather more than a third that of colonel. The number who attain precisely 37 years' service, I could not state without a good deal of trouble. It is worth observing that the number of deaths which has occurred in each of those groups is within two of the number which ought to have occurred according to Dr. Farr's tables, in one case two more, in the other two less. The actual total number is 69, and the calculated number is 69.

690. Do you think that one in three officers remains 37 years?—It is about that number, I think, but probably rather less, between 25 and 30 per cent.

691. At any rate you will have to provide as a permanent scheme for the sufficient promotion and retirement of that per-centage upon 40 annually?—Yes, supposing 64 to continue to be the average number of first commissions given annually.

692. That, of course, will therefore be something very much less than the exceptional number you have quoted for 1885?—I think I am a little at cross purposes with you; I am not so much dealing with abstract causes, or the normal condition, as with what is the matter of fact with the lives that will really exist.

693. The object of my question is this: according to your calculation, allowing for deaths, a certain number of officers will have to be retired by the year 1885, to get the senior captain down to 27 years' service?—Yes; quite so.

694. Take the average number of first commissions granted to officers, who through their service will be a charge upon the Imperial funds; take the per-centage of those who will reach 37 years' service, according to the experience of the corps, and tell me the proportion between that number and the average that you have estimated?—I take then 60 first commissions a-year, which has been the average number since the amalgamation. I assume that 30 per cent. of them will complete 37 years' service. That is 18 individuals,

18 individuals, and if we charge the Imperial funds with six-tenths of the amount of their retirement at that period, it comes to 11 retirements annually. According to my calculation on the actual lives in being, the number that will each year come up to 37 years' service from 1881 to 1885, both inclusive, averages 17; but it will increase largely after that period, and in the year 1892 exceed 50.

695. Reverting to the bonus, you proposed that the bonus system should be optional, and you think that the moral force of opinion in the corps would induce all who could pay to pay?—Yes.

696. Would not the effect of its not being compulsory upon all be that those who did not pay would get the advantage of those who did?—Those who do not pay will have their promotion accelerated by the contributions of those who do; but the main source of the sore feeling attending the purchase system, that is, one man passing over another man's head, will not exist; and I think that as long as officers feel that they do personally derive benefit from their contributions to an amount which they consider fairly equivalent to such contributions, they will not object to their poorer comrades participating also in the benefit.

697. Do you not think that this will be the thin end of the wedge for introducing the purchase system into the corps?—I think it is essentially different from the purchase system. I should be the last to propose the purchase system. I cannot myself see that this would be attended with anything but unmixed good to the country and the service; no man gets promotion who would not get it otherwise; but he gets it sooner in proportion to the amount of contribution, and if he is worthy of the promotion at all, the sooner he gets it the better.

698. To recapitulate your evidence, you agree with Captain Galton that after a certain age, or a certain age modified by a certain length of service, every colonel should be *quasi* retired to a supernumerary list, from which he, in common with the major generals promoted from the colonel's list, should reach in his turn a battalion?—Yes.

699. You think that he might have an option of having something more if he waived his chance of a battalion?—Yes.

700. You think that below that, according to the number of years' service, commencing with 20 as the lowest as a permanent arrangement, all officers should be allowed to retire upon a certain rate of retired pay, not the present rate either of full pay or half pay?—Yes.

701. You think as an exceptional arrangement with reference to these dead levels in the service, that 20 years might be brought down to 15 years?—Yes.

702. You think it would be convenient that those who were retired upon this annual rate of pay, should be able, through the National Debt office, to commute their annuity into a lump payment, and then you think that that system should be supplemented by a system of bonuses, by which an additional number of officers should be able, by the contributions of their brother officers, to retire?—Yes.

703. You believe that all those steps are necessary, and you think that they would be beneficial to the service?—Yes, that is a very correct summary of my evidence.

704. You also think that to carry out the system efficiently, the age at which first commissions are granted should be reduced?—I do. I would add also, that I think it deserves serious consideration whether, at the present time, the establishment of subaltern officers might not also be reduced, by not filling up all the vacancies as they occur, so as to produce a natural diminution a few years hence.

705. Without reducing any?—I would simply allow vacancies to remain as we have done at various times before; we have not always had our establishment full.

706. Mr. *Otway.*] Since the system of competition has been introduced into the Artillery, has what is called the tone of the regiment in any way deteriorated; do you consider that the officers are in all respects equal to what they were formerly?—I should say that they are in all respects equal to what they used to be, and that the tone has not deteriorated in the slightest degree.

707. Major *Jervis.*] Has not that resulted from the severe examinations they have to pass?—I think that the examinations are so severe that a considerable degree of steadiness, and energy, and diligence is necessary to enable a young man to get into the service at all.

708. Would you therefore advise the age to be reduced, by which you would not get in young men of the same class, or would you allow them to count their time at the Academy towards retirement, as they used to do at Addiscombe?—I think it would be better to allow them to count their time at the Academy towards retirement, because there is great difficulty in keeping down the standard of competitive examinations. The high standard of competitive examinations naturally rises from the desire of youths to get in, and unless you are going to limit the number of competitors, you must take the test of the competition between themselves. I do not see how the age is to be reduced under the open system of competition; I should like to reconsider the question a little, but I think the system which you propose, of allowing the time at the Academy to count, is the preferable one.

709. As the question is a very serious one, would you reconsider that point?—I will. (*Witness afterwards replied as follows.*) The principle of open competition does not require the range in point of age to be as wide as it is at present: viz., from 16 to 19. If admission were restricted to the ages from 16 to 18, and service after 19 allowed to count, we should get younger officers, and they would be under no greater disadvantage in respect to the time of life at which they could hereafter claim retirement, than if they had been actually commissioned at 19; nor would this lower the standard at all. Taking at random the examination for admission to the Royal Military Academy of January 1866, it appears that of the successful competitors,

5	were returned as	16,	*i. e.*,	in their	17th	year
17	„	„	17	„	„	18th	„
15	„	„	18	„	„	19th	„

and the juniors are mostly in the first half of the list. I should be sorry to see the lower limit of age reduced to 15, being persuaded that it would only give a further stimulus to cramming, to the great danger of the health and physical vigour of the young men, and with a deterioration of their after powers.

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710. *Chairman.*] HAVE you considered the present system of retirement in the Royal Artillery?—Yes.

711. In what respects do you consider that it is deficient?—I consider that there are not sufficient means of retirement or inducements to retire, to provide promotion for the number of officers there are in the corps; and if I may be allowed to add a remark to make that clear, I would give you the figures showing what a cadet entering the service now has to look forward to, taken only from the last five years, because if you go beyond five years, you get into the times when there were additions made to the regiment which you could not reckon upon for the future. Therefore, taking it during the last five years, in the rank of lieutenant there have been 30 steps per annum; that is the average for the last five years, which, with the number of the establishment of lieutenants, makes him exactly 14½ years before he would arrive at the rank of second captain.

712. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you say that there have been 30 steps on the average during the last five years altogether?—It gives you 30 steps per annum in the rank of lieutenant for the last five years. With regard to the rank of second captain, it takes 11½ years to go through the rank of second captain. With regard to the rank of first captain (this will corroborate a good deal of what General Lefroy said about the ranks of first and second captain), it takes 19 years to get through the rank of first captain, and in the rank of lieutenant colonel it takes 12½ years, and in the rank of full colonel to major general it takes 12 years also. That makes 69½ years as the whole total of service which a youngster coming into the regiment has to look forward to, with the present rate of promotion (it is taken only from the last five years of course), deaths, retirements and everything, including the operation of this 32,000 *l.* a year which there has been; it takes 69½ years' service before he arrives at the rank of major general.

713. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Was the first 14 years?—The first is 14½ years; that you can easily calculate, because the establishment consists of 432 lieutenants, and there were 30 vacancies per annum. 432 divided by 30, gives you exactly 14½ years. In the rank of second captain it is 11½ years.

714. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Do you take the same rate?—No, I take in each rank during the five years all the vacancies that have occurred. In the rank of first captain it is 19 years, from lieutenant colonel to colonel it is 12 years, and from colonel to major general 12 years, making the total I stated of 69½ years.

715. *Chairman.*] So that, although at the present time the senior colonels are only of 37 years' standing, the rate of promotion, according to the last five years, would make a difference of 32 years more?—Yes, certainly.

716. And raise it up to 69 years?—Yes; the reason of that is of course apparent: it is owing to all the additions to the regiment in the wars which there have been during that time. Whether you may look forward to that in future or not is another thing; but now our regiment is quite up to its full establishment, which it was not if you go some years back; that has given a great amount of promotion, both in the upper ranks and in the lower ranks.

717. You have allowed for that, I suppose, in the computation you have made?—We were very low down at first, even before the war took place. When the augmentations were made, owing to the Duke of Wellington's letter, in consequence of the Artillery being so low, some additions were made; but that you could not reckon upon again.

718. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The statement of promotion for the last five years is the actual promotion in each rank, the actual average length of service of each officer upon attaining each rank during the last five years?—It is the actual promotions that have taken place by deaths, retirements, and every means of promotion in each rank that has occurred, which is all that a young officer coming into the regiment can look forward to at the present moment.

719. Of course any young officer coming into the service at the present moment upon that list, would look forward to a greater promotion than that actually?—Taking a young officer coming into the regiment as a lieutenant now, he could not possibly, under the present system, reckon upon being a second captain under 14½ years.

720. But if he were so long in that rank, he would make the more progress in the 14 years next ensuing; of course the promotion would be quicker in the higher ranks if it were so slow in the lower; it is impossible to suppose that all the officers will live to 69 years' service?—This statement has been taken according to what has occurred in each rank.

721. Is not it the case that, when the promotion is slow for a certain time, say for 14 or 15 years, there is a rush in the ensuing 14 or 15 years, and again an ebb afterwards?—That rush has only been from the additions to the regiment, or from a war.

722. I would draw your attention to the increased death-rate which must be calculated upon if the promotion continues according to the table?—I do not think the death-rate would increase; I think five years is too small a period to take for the upper ranks; you could not take it for more years, because there have been all those promotions.

723. I wish you to explain to the Committee why you think it probable that many officers will live out 70 years of service?—I do not say that they will; I only say that that is the prospect of the juniors at present.

724. Major *Jervis.*] What you mean to say is this, that taking all the promotion there has been in the last five years, a man cannot expect, under 69 years' of service, to be a major-general?—Exactly.

725. *Chairman.*] Is it your opinion that any extension of the present system of retirement will meet the difficulties of the case?—I think it would under a different administration of it.

726. The Committee of which you were a member recommended that to the 32,000 *l.* a year allotted to the Artillery, a certain addition should be made?—Yes.

727. And I think you added that this would for the time meet the requirements of the corps; do

do you believe that any addition, and if so, what addition, would permanently meet the requirements of the corps?—I think it would be so very large an addition that would be necessary to meet the requirements of it under these conditions, that no Parliament would ever be justified in voting such a sum.

728. Then you think that, practically, the present system would involve so large an expense that it cannot hold?—I think so, under the present actual conditions.

729. What meaning do you exactly attach to those last words?—The actual conditions are that the requirement is tied up almost to the full colonels. I would extend it, as I have heard recommended in evidence here, to a certain degree down through the other ranks.

730. Then you mean that a system which practically applies the whole of the retirement to optional sums of 600 *l.* a year granted to full colonels, that is colonels in the corps, could only succeed, if carried to an extravagant extent?—I think so, certainly.

731. But you are not to-day in a position to state to the Committee what change you would make in the general system of retirement of the corps—No, I am not.

732. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Supposing the rate of promotion lasted for any long term of years, the average age of the officers would be materially increased, would it not?—It would be immensely increased.

733. Therefore I presume that the average death-rate, and consequent promotion, could be also increased?—Yes, it would be still greater.

734. Which would invalidate the result of this calculation?—In the upper ranks, in the higher ranks, it would be so.

735. Major *Jervis.*] In the lower ranks they would simply be longer than they are now?—Yes.

736. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] In time of war the officers in the Artillery are much more increased in proportion than the officers in the Line, are they not?—We do not increase the officers to each battery; they are on the war establishment now.

737. If you take the whole of the Artillery service, and the whole of the Line, the officers of the Artillery are increased in number in time of war much more than those of the Line, are they not?—You mean that the country requires a larger force of Artillery; that would entirely depend upon circumstances.

738. It has been so in the late wars, has it not?—Yes, because we were at such a low establishment.

739. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] The Artillery was at an exceptionally low establishment before the late war?—Yes, quite so.

740. I mean before Lord Hardinge's time?—Yes.

Thursday, 20th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Major Jervis.
Mr. Childers.	Colonel North.
Mr. Evans.	Major O'Reilly.
Mr. Grenfell.	Mr. Otway.
Sir John Hay.	Colonel Sturt.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Captain Vivian.

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Vice Admiral Sir SIDNEY COLPOYS DACRES, K.C.B., and Major General GEORGE COLT LANGLEY, called in; and Examined.

Vice Admiral Sir *S. C. Dacres*, K.C.B., and Major Gen. *G. C. Langley*.

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741. *Chairman* (to Admiral *Dacres*).] YOU are one of the Lords of the Admiralty, I believe?—Yes.

742. And you are the Lord in whose department the business connected with the Marines is transacted?—Yes.

743. Will you be good enough to state to the Committee, what is the process of retiring officers of the Marines?—It is entirely worked on the 12th article of the Order in Council, which is, that a selection shall be made by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for long and meritorious service and impaired health; but I must add as a rider to that, that of course it is very often worked in this way; when we find people are inefficient they get a hint to go under the 10th article, which I think is a very important one indeed. It is this, "that the commands of divisions may be given without reference to seniority to officers holding the rank of colonel, whose services and qualifications best justify their selection."

744. Then, what are the ranks of officers who are considered to be in active service in the Marines?—Nobody above a colonel commandant.

745. A colonel commandant is not a general officer, is he?—No.

746. There are no general officers in active service, except, I suppose, the inspector general?—The inspector general, and occasionally the deputy adjutant general, who at present (General Langley) is a general. We have no service to employ a general, but there are generals as you are aware; we have 13, I think.

747. Then those general officers who do not hold the rank of inspector general, or exceptionally, as is the case now of deputy adjutant general, may be held to be part of the retired body of officers of the Marines?—No, I do not think they are retired, because they are on full pay. There are five colonels of divisions who get 900 *l.* a year; they are not retired at all.

748. Their pay is charged upon the retired vote, is not it?—No.

749. Are you confident of that?—I think so.

750. Then, setting aside that establishment of 13 general officers of Marines, the next officers on active service are the colonels commandant and the colonels second commandant, are they not?—There are not 13 officers on 900 *l.* a year; there are only five out of the 13 selected for that.

751. To go back to the former question, how many general officers are there on the establishment out of whom the inspector general, and occasionally the deputy adjutant general may be selected?—There are 13.

752. They receive what rate of pay?—Five of them receive 900 *l.* a year, and I am not quite certain what the others receive; I believe it is the full pay of their last rank.

753. (To General *Langley*.) But those officers generally, I think, are borne on the retired vote, are they not?—No; they are unattached.

754. But they are borne upon the vote, for the retired officers?—No, they are not included in the number of retired officers.—(Admiral *Dacres*.) The money does not come out of the 35,000 *l.*, if you mean that.

755. (To General *Langley*.) I did not mean that; is not the pay of those general officers all borne upon the non-effective votes?—In the Navy Estimates it is.

756. Although that is so, they are practically in the same position as generals on the establishment of the army, are they not?—Exactly.

757. Then after those 13 general officers come the colonels commandant, and the colonels second commandant?—Yes; certainly.

758. Who are borne upon Vote No. I.?—Yes.

759. Below those, what is the next rank?—The lieutenant colonels.

760. (To Admiral *Dacres*.) Will you now explain to the Committee how retirements from those ranks take place?—By their voluntarily applying for it, or, as I said before, sometimes there has been a little pressure applied, and they have gone in that way; that is likewise voluntary.

761. The whole of the retired officers, who now number altogether 92, according to page 109 of the Estimates, are retired under the 10th and 12th sections of the Order in Council?—Yes; under the 12th section.

762. Then, is there a list of colonels who have made applications for retirement?—Nobody has made an application, or at least I think there has only

only been one since I have been in the Admiralty, which is within a twelvemonth.

763. But when you retire under the 12th section of the Order in Council, is there no list to refer to?—No, not the slightest; it is just this, that a person who is incapable, from age or anything else retires; but if you look at the list you will find that our senior colonel commandant is only 53 years of age; he is now going to take General Langley's place; the next man to him is 51; the next 52; the next 49; the next 44, and the next 45. We could not retire officers of that age; it would be a wicked thing upon the public to be retiring officers of that age.

764. Then, as I understand you, you have not exhausted all the money available for retirement?—No; nothing like it.

765. And any officer who can prove that his case is a satisfactory one for retirement can get it at the present time?—Most decidedly; the Admiralty take full cognisance of everybody who is retired; the case is brought before them, and perfectly argued about, by me chiefly, but everybody listens, and if they object, of course the man is not retired. There are very often, or I ought rather to say there have been cases in which captains of 16 and 17 years' service have applied to be allowed to retire, but they have been refused because they have no right to be retired in such a case when their age is about 36.

766. Assuming that the case is a fit one for retirement in the opinion of the Admiralty, you have at the present moment plenty of money to do it?—Plenty of money to do it, and a very great wish to do it.

767. Then, commencing with the sums which are paid at present for retirement to those officers, I notice that there is one lieutenant general retired upon 2 *l.* 5 *s.* a day?—Yes.

768. And 14 major generals retired upon above 700 *l.* a year?—Yes.

769. Thirteen on 702 *l.*, and one on 730 *l.*?—Yes.

770. How are those sums arrived at?—Major General Wesley was the officer who, I think, by particular order, and for very long service, received the 2 *l.* 5 *s.* a day; it was by Order in Council; he had been of very long service, and had been for a length of time deputy adjutant general, and by a special Order in Council he got that retirement.

771. Captain *Vivian.*] What age was he?—I shall be able to tell you, I dare say; I know he is a very old man; I will fill in his age.

772. *Chairman.*] The ordinary retirement appears to be 702 *l.* 12 *s.* 6 *d.* a year, or 1 *l.* 18 *s.* 6 *d.* a day; under what is that?—Under the full pay of their last rank.

773. What was the last rank in the case of these 13 retired major generals?—They were nearly all colonels commandant.

774. The full pay of a colonel commandant is 1 *l.* 18 *s.* 6 *d.* a day?—Yes.

775. So that at the present time any colonel commandant, who is eligible for retirement, can get a retirement of rather more than 700 *l.* a year?—Yes.

776. Is there any limit of years' service?—No, not the slightest; only of course nobody would think of retiring a person that was thoroughly fit for the service. With all due deference to what has been done before my time, some of those major generals I never should have retired, and never would have proposed to retire such men. I do not want to bring that forward, but I mention it as an exemplification of what I mean.

777. As a matter of fact, the present regulations admit of any colonel commandant who, in the opinion of the Admiralty is eligible for retirement, retiring upon 700 *l.* a year?—Yes.

778. And the sum allotted to you is sufficient for that purpose?—Yes.

779. I see below, that there are some retired major generals upon sums averaging between 450 *l.* and 310 *l.* a year; from what ranks were those retired?—Those were second commandants; and in the case of the lesser sums, lieutenant colonels, because you retire upon two different ranks. A second commandant retires upon 1 *l.* 5 *s.* per day (I think that is the amount), and a lieutenant colonel retires upon 1 *l.* a day, after 30 years' service.

780. I see there are two cases of retired major generals on 1 *l.* and 17 *s.* a day respectively?—Those could only have been lieutenant colonels with brevet rank.

781. Then is the retirement of a lieutenant colonel limited to 30 years' service?—No; because this part of the Order would allow of his retirement, otherwise it says, "and those of shorter service, and officers of inferior rank on their regimental pay."

782. What paragraph is that?—It is the 14th paragraph: "Lieutenant colonels of not less than 30 years' service will be permitted to retire upon 20 *s.* a day, and those of shorter service and officers of inferior rank, on their regimental pay," which is 17 *s.* a day for a lieutenant colonel, and a captain would have 11 *s.* 7 *d.*; I think that is the amount.

783. So that no lieutenant colonel can be retired upon his 1 *l.* a day, unless he has had 30 years' service?—No; certainly not.

784. But under 30 years' service, any officer can be retired upon his existing pay, if, in the opinion of the Admiralty, he is a proper officer to retire?—Quite so.

785. Is that the explanation of all the retirements which now exist?—That is the way it is worked. I cannot speak for any particular instances that may have taken place some time ago, but that is the principle upon which it is worked now, and I believe that that principle has been always attended to.

786. So that the rule practically is this: from the rank of colonel commandant downwards, any officer may retire upon his existing pay, without limit of age, if in the opinion of the Admiralty, he is a proper officer to be retired?—Yes; of course the officer must always bring forward some reason.

787. I say if, in the opinion of the Admiralty, he is a proper officer to be retired?—Certainly; that is exactly it.

788. And in addition to that, all officers commanding divisions are obliged to retire on attaining 60 years of age?—Yes; I think it is the operation of those two articles, 10 and 17, that has had the effect of making our officers so young as they are, and I would strongly recommend them to the attention of everybody.

789. The sum, however, of 35,000 *l.* which has been allotted to the Marines, has been found more than enough to provide for this system of retirement?—It has been, most decidedly.

790. I think you said that every officer on retirement under this system receives a step in rank?—He does.

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791. Does he never receive more than one step in rank?—No, I think not.

792. So that although some of those retired major generals were retired from the rank of lieutenant colonel, they probably held the rank of colonel in the army?—Yes, of brevet colonel; of colonel in the army.

793. Going back for a moment to the general officers of whom we spoke before; perhaps on reference to the Estimates, you would correct your answer as to whether they are considered to be on the retired list?—Yes; this is right in the Estimates no doubt; they are on unattached pay.

794. But although they are voted on the retired list, and in the non-effective part of the Navy Estimates, all the general officers on what is called unattached pay are liable to be called out into service again?—Certainly.

795. And as a matter of fact the selection for inspector general, and occasionally for deputy adjutant general comes out of that list?—Yes.

796. Is it your opinion that the present system of retirement from the Marines, is satisfactory?—So far it has been very satisfactory, but, looking at the list of the ages of the present captains, I do not think it will remain satisfactory long, because you see the captains at the top of the list are now getting to the ages of 44, 45, 42 and so on, and therefore I think that some plan must be adopted to encourage the retirements of lieutenant colonels and captains.

797. You say that the ages of the captains are now advancing?—Yes.

798. And you fear that the system will soon in that respect become unsatisfactory?—I think so now, and I have thought very seriously about it, and spoken to the Board about it.

799. How long has the present system been in force?—Since the year 1854.

800. That is 13 years?—No, I think it was begun in 1858. (General *Langley.*) It was in 1854. (Admiral *Dacres.*) But the last Order in Council was in 1858.

801. Did the system established by that Order in Council of 1858 make any considerable change in the previous system?—Yes, the previous system of 1854 was not found adequate at all; I think that was the one allowing a certain number of officers to retire; General Langley says it was the one previous; it was the Order in Council of 1836, which allowed a fixed number of officers to retire.

802. So that since 1854, practically, the present system has been in force?—Yes.

803. That is for 13 years?—Yes.

804. Is not it the case that the ages of the senior captains of marines have been very much reduced since 1854?—Not very much from the age of 46 to about 43½.

805. I think the average age is given in 1856 at 48?—Yes.

806. Whereas it is now 43?—It is 43 now; many of them are 45 and 44, as you will see if you look a little lower down.

807. The average age is two or three years less than it was in 1856?—Certainly, that is a very great improvement.

808. But you have reason to believe that the improvement is likely to turn the other way?—Yes.

809. For what reason?—In consequence of very young men at the top of the list; no colonel commandant will be obliged to retire now for seven years.

810. And you do not think that the temptation offered by the present rate of retirement of 700 *l.* a year, will induce any of those officers to retire?—No, I do not, because they have the hope of the higher pay as a general, which is very handsome pay.

811. What is that pay?—It is 900 *l.* a year.

812. The pay of a major general on unattached pay is the same rate, is not it, as the pay of a retired major general?—Yes, exactly.

813. So that an officer retiring from the rank of colonel commandant steps at once into the same pay that he would get if he succeeded to the establishment of general officers?—Yes.

814. But you do not consider that that advantage will be sufficient to induce the senior colonels commandant to retire?—No.

815. Since 1858 or 1854, has there been any augmentation in the marines?—There has been a large augmentation, particularly in the artillery branch, as you are aware.

816. Has that augmentation been out of proportion in the ranks of captain, and below the rank of captain, to the augmentation in the number of field officers?—Yes, it has, I think. This paper (*producing a Paper*) will show it has risen 4,000 since 1854.

817. I see that the augmentation in the number of field officers has increased about 16 per cent.; it has increased from 26 to 30 since 1856?—Yes.

818. And the ranks below field officers have increased in the same time 46, namely, from 401 to 447?—Yes, I cannot say that exactly; but I am quite sure you have the correct figures there.

819. Has that augmentation in the lower ranks been greater in proportion than the augmentation in the higher ranks?—No, I do not think it has.

820. If so, how would that augmentation tend to increase the age of the captains?—I do not think I said that it did increase it; I should think it would not; I should think the contrary.

821. So far, then, as the augmentation is concerned, that has not had any effect on the increased age?—No, I think not.

822. To what, then, do you attribute the tendency to increase in the age of the captains, except the accident that there are young colonels at the head of the list?—Nothing. I think there is nothing else but that, that I can attribute it to. The best proof of it is, the numbers that have gone out lately; they are very small.

823. Will not that in process of time correct itself?—No, I do not think it will, unless you give a larger sum to the lieutenant colonels to retire. I think the retirements of a second commandant, and of a lieutenant colonel, are neither of them sufficient.

824. Then what remedy do you suggest for the present state of things?—To give those officers a greater inducement to retire.

825. To give colonels commandant a greater inducement to retire?—With regard to the commandants, I think the limit of age of 60 will retire them; but the others, I think, ought to be induced to go before that.

826. A colonel second commandant is now retired upon 25 *s.* a day, is he not?—Yes.

827. After how many years' service?—He must have 30 years' service before you retire him.

828. A lieutenant colonel is entitled, I think, after

after 30 years' service, to 1 *l.* a day, is he not?—Yes, a lieutenant colonel is.

829. And a colonel second commandant is entitled, after 30 years' service, to 25 *s.* a day?—Yes.

830. What increase do you propose to give to them?—I think, after 30 years' service, 300 *l.* a year is very little to give a man; you ought to give him at least 400 *l.* a year.

831. Would not he get 365 *l.*, if he were a lieutenant colonel?—Yes; but I think that increase would make an important difference; that would put him on an equality with the officers of the Artillery and Engineers.

832. If he was a colonel second commandant he would get 456 *l.* already, would he not?—Yes. I should raise the amount, because I propose to give a lieutenant colonel 400 *l.* a year after 30 years, and a second commandant a slight increase too. I think that 400 *l.* a year is exceedingly little for him, after 30 years' service.

833. And in your opinion that change would be sufficient?—It might induce them not to wait on for the chance of becoming one of those generals of division, as you choose to call them.

834. Captain *Vivian.*] It would only be an increase of 35 *l.* a year in the case of a lieutenant colonel?—Even that would make the difference; he would be a long while waiting if he did not take it. We find in the navy that people often take a retirement like that when their health is impaired, or anything of that sort; you must recollect that they are none of them rich people in either service; very much the contrary.

835. *Chairman.*] Is it your deliberate opinion that at the present time something ought to be done to increase the flow of promotion in the Marines?—Looking forward, I think it is. I do not think we ought to wait till we come to a block. I think at present the Marines are remarkably well off, but I believe in three or four years you will find that they will not be so. I come to that conclusion from looking at the age of the seniors on the list; here is a colonel commandant 44 years of age, he will be there for 16 years to come; nothing will induce that man to go unless he breaks down.

836. Then the gist of your evidence is this, that the public has been so liberal in past times to the Marines, that their senior officers have become so young that now there is very little chance of their retiring?—Yes; I perfectly agree that they are young men now.

837. And that to cure this, it is necessary to make some provision to prevent the officers of lower rank being too old for their rank?—Yes; the provision I would make would be this; I would not increase the money that is granted in the least, because I think the money they have got would do it.

838. Sir *John Hay.*] Is it the fact that the proportion of field officers in the Marines is small as compared with other corps, or that it is insufficient to promote a fair flow of promotion?—The present working of it has shown that it works very well; of course I should be the very last person to recommend any more field officers of Marines, for we do not regularly employ them in any foreign service. If you sent them abroad very often, and they were made uncomfortable, and were obliged to be invalided, sometimes it would do very well; but as long as the Admiralty keep them at home they like it very well, and they will never leave it; but as the field officers are few in number, the general officers should be retained to obtain a proper provision for the corps.

839. *Chairman.*] The Marines, in fact, are in that respect a very different corps from the Artillery and Engineers, namely, that there is very little employment indeed abroad, above the rank of captain?—Lieutenant colonels are occasionally so employed, but generally speaking the fact is as you say.

840. Is there any employment for lieutenant colonels abroad?—Yes; they have been employed in China and Japan; they have always taken their fair share of it; they are sent wherever they are wanted; we always take every opportunity of sending them when we can.

841. In time of war?—Whenever there is a battalion sent, we always send them, and there has occasionally been a colonel embarked in the flag ships on foreign stations.

842. At present there is no employment for the field officers abroad, is there?—No; at present I think there is none; the last was in Japan, where there were four.—(General *Langley.*) There were three in Japan.—(Admiral *Dacres.*) I think this paper would be a very good thing to give you; it answers that very question (*producing a Paper*).

843. Can you give the Committee any particulars as to the position of the field officers who have been exceptionally employed in time of war?—Yes; this paper gives it; here are instances of lieutenant colonels commanding. In the Crimea there were six regimental field officers besides brevet field officers; in China there were seven from 1857 to 1860; in Mexico, that is the Mexican expedition, from 1861 to 1862, there were two; and in Japan, from 1864 to 1865, there were three.

844. But in time of peace, and especially at the present time, when we are completely at peace, there is no employment whatever abroad for field officers of Marines?—No; none whatever.

845. And there is no employment whatever for general officers of Marines except the one inspector general, and occasionally the deputy adjutant general?—Exactly; but there is no reason why they should not be employed.

846. You cannot, therefore, I presume, in your opinion, put the Marines in that respect on the same footing as the Artillery and Engineers?—They might be all put upon the same footing with reference to employment as generals, few in either branch being employed.

847. You must class together for purposes of comparison all the general officers of Marines, whether retired or unattached, with all the retired general officers of Artillery or Engineers to obtain a fair comparison as to the effect of retirement?—No; unattached generals of Marines can only be compared with unattached generals of Artillery and Engineers, and retired generals, in like manner.

848. The general officers of Marines who are called on the unattached list are practically retired?—I think so practically, but they are eligible for employment and desirous of it; but I think it is fair for me to state that it works of course badly for the promotion of the Marines, in consequence of what I stated in my previous answer that they never have anything to disturb them, and therefore of course are perfectly content to remain as they are till they go to their graves.

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849. But in arranging any scheme which will promote a satisfactory flow of retirement, you must consider that all general officers, whether on the unattached list or on the retired list, go on these lists as a means of retirement really?—Yes, and as a reward for their past service; but they have no wish to be considered retired.

850. Then, if so, do you think that the number of officers in that position compared with the number of officers of the Artillery and Engineers is satisfactory?—I know so very little about the working of the Artillery and Engineers that I really cannot compare them. I only know that a certain number of generals are requisite in the Marines, in order to make a few vacancies for colonel commandants.

851. But has it not been the fact that from the large number of general officers of Marines who are thus practically retired, you have got the senior colonels very much younger than the senior colonels in the other corps?—Yes; and likewise from retiring them if we do not think they are fit. That, I think, is a more important point than the other, because I know that many are obliged to go under Section No. 10 of the Order in Council.

852. Whether they are retired under Section No. 10 or under Section No. 12, the practical effect has been this: that you have a very large number of generals of Marines who are practically retired, and that that has produced an unusually young age in the senior colonels?—Yes; I think that 13 generals is a very good proportion.

853. Then would not the result of your evidence in that respect be this: that if, on the one hand, it were necessary to take care that the senior captains do not become too old; on the other hand, it may be necessary to take care that the retirement from the rank of colonel is not too liberal?—We must go back a little. We know that a great stagnation in the Marine corps arose from the want of those generals, and that for years the oldest officers in the army comparatively were at the top of our captains' and lieutenants' lists, and that those regulations were framed to prevent the same thing taking place again.

854. But if there were proper means devised for ensuring that the senior captains should not be too old, would you see any objection to establishing, as to the retirement from the rank of colonel of Marines, what has been suggested as to the retirement from the rank of colonel of Artillery and Engineers; namely, that it should depend upon a certain age being attained?—We do retire ours at a certain age; they actually go; every one of ours is retired at 60.

855. Does anybody reach the age of 60 to be retired under that rule?—Yes; there are two generals so retired.

856. In what year were these generals retired?—In 1859.

857. Then there were two officers in 1859 who were retired as being 60 years of age?—Yes.

858. But, except in those two instances, the 60 years of age retirement has practically not come into operation?—Certainly it has not.

859. And the scale of retirement in the Marines is so liberal that, although an officer is compelled to be retired at 60 years of age, yet no officer has during the last eight years been compulsorily retired under that rule?—It is so; in fact, the retirement is exceedingly liberal.

860. Then to revert to my former question; if such a system was established as would insure the promotion of captains at a proper age, would you object to the retirement from the rank of colonel being limited to officers who had reached the age of 60?—I think I should, most decidedly; because I think it would be placing a very large body of men, and a very valuable body of men, under great disadvantages. You must recollect that there are nearly 16,000 men in the corps, and a proportionate number of officers whose promotion it would stop. Very few of them could ever get to that rank at all, and every man looks to being an admiral or a general, though many of them do not arrive at it.

861. Do you think that, assuming that provision is made for retiring inefficient men under that age, the age of 60 is too great an age for a colonel of Marines?—No, I do not; having reference to the fact that they are always weeded out before they get up to that age. I think some officers at 60 are very inefficient; but I think that our plan of always considering that point before a man becomes a commandant, prevents an inefficient man becoming one.

862. So that, practically, if you could weed out the inefficient men, you would not mind the age of 60 being the limit for the retirement from the rank of colonel commandant?—Not at all.

863. What provision would you make for weeding out the inefficient men sooner?—None, but telling them that I should not appoint them to a division when their turn came.

864. Would you compel them to retire sooner, then?—I would tell them in plain terms, "You are coming to the command of one of the divisions; you are not fit for it; I must put somebody over you."

865. Would you apply the same rule to colonels second commandant?—I should apply to anybody I did not think efficient.

866. So that your plan would be this: if when it came to the turn of an officer to be appointed second colonel commandant, or if when it came to his turn to be appointed first colonel commandant, you could compel him to retire on the full pay of his rank, you would then be satisfied with not retiring officers of the rank of colonel commandant until they reached the age of 60?—I would.

867. That would be a considerable economy upon the present plan, would it not?—I think it would.

868. With reference to the rate of retirement, do you see any reason why the retirement from the Artillery and the Engineers should be 600 *l.* a year, and that from the Marines 700 *l.*—I am dissatisfied with a lieutenant colonel of Marines getting only 350 *l.* a year, and a lieutenant colonel of Artillery, 400 *l.* a year. All those things ought to be set right; you can hardly compare the one with the other, but I think that a man after 30 years' service ought to have a little more than 350 *l.* a year.

869. Then you would see no objection to putting the rates of retirement for the three corps upon the same footing?—I am not quite up to that; I do not know enough of the circumstances to say so; I do not know how it would work at all; I am not acquainted with the working of the Artillery or Engineers; I only know that they are very likely to come to a block very soon, looking at the ages of the officers.

870. At the top of the tree the prospects of the Artillery and Engineers are a little better than those

those of the Marines, I think; they get 1,000 *l.* a year instead of 900 *l.*?—Yes.

871. Next to that below how is it?—Our major generals get 700 *l.* a year, I think.

872. Whereas theirs only get 600 *l.* or 480 *l.*?—Yes, ours are very much better off.

873. And if the three corps were put upon the same footing, though you do not pledge yourself to the detail, you think it would be fair?—I think it would be much fairer; as I say, I know nothing about the working of it, but I believe it would be fairer.

874. Reverting to the other part of your proposal; how would you ensure that your captains should not be too old?—I think that officers ought to be allowed to retire on an augmenting scale after 20 years; instead of that, whatever number of years a captain has served he is only allowed the full pay of his rank, which is 11 *s.* 7 *d.* a day, or 210 *l.* a year. What I should like would be for it to rise upon an augmenting scale after 20 years, and then a man who had served 25 years might be induced to retire, with an addition to that 210 *l.* a year, and of course an officer of 30 years' service would get still more.

875. That is to say that an officer of 20, of 25, or of 30 years' service, should be allowed to retire on a special rate of retired pay, whatever his rank in the corps or in the army might be?—Exactly; that is what I propose to bring forward to the Board; I should have done it now, unless this Committee had been going on with their inquiry. They of course will have a much better power of recommendation than I have.

876. Then, to sum up your evidence, you think generally, that at the top the retirement should be, without going into detail, something similar to that of the other corps, and should be compulsory at 60 years of age?—Yes.

877. And below that, that officers should be retired, at their own option after 20, 25, or 30 years' service on special rates of retired pay?—Yes.

878. And that when an officer came to his turn to be made a second commandant, or a colonel commandant, the Admiralty should be empowered to compel him to retire?—Yes, if inefficient, I think that would be a very good provision; I am sure they would not do it unjustly; they are so particular about it.

879. And you think, with these modifications, a very satisfactory system of retirement might be established in the Marines?—With the addition of an increase of retirement for lieutenant colonels also.

880. Besides the three rates of retired pay, after 20, 25, and 30 years' service?—No.

881. If the three rates of retired pay, after 20, 25, and 30 years' service were satisfactorily fixed; if those were optional to officers, with the power in the Admiralty to put them compulsorily in force when it came to the turn of an officer to be second commandant or colonel commandant, and if there were a compulsory retirement at the age of 60, you think the scheme would work well?—Yes; but I do not think that 350 *l.* a year is enough for an officer after 30 years' service. I should like to see a fairer division, in fact.

882. You give your answer subject to a revision of the rates of retirement, after 20, 25, and 30 years' service?—Yes, exactly.

883. Is it your opinion that the officers so retired should get a step in rank as they do now?—No.

884. You do not think that necessary?—No; I think it is a mistake which we have made, through every profession we have got.

885. Is it your opinion that an officer so retired should be enabled to commute his annuity for a fixed sum?—Yes, certainly; if you could capitalise it, I think you should do so.

886. Are you aware that there is no difficulty in arranging that through the National Debt Office?—Yes, perfectly.

887. You think, that as without any additional charge upon the public the annual sum an officer would receive could be commuted to a fixed sum, that should be done?—Yes; it would be a much greater inducement.

888. You are aware that, in that case, you would under no circumstances have any hold upon the officer for further service?—Perfectly; but I should be delighted to do it.

889. As things are now, you have, in case of war, a claim upon the services of retired officers, have you not?—Yes.

890. But you would waive that claim?—Yes, certainly; I think as they would never be employed, it would be much better to waive that claim.

891. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In your evidence, you have spoken two or three times of retiring officers under the 10th Article; perhaps you will be good enough to explain what you mean, because, on turning to the 10th Article, it appears that there is no reference whatever to retirement in it?—This is the 10th Article: "The commands of divisions may be given, without reference to seniority, to officers holding the rank of colonel, whose services and qualifications best justify their selection."

892. I think the way in which that is worked was not clear to the Committee from your answer; perhaps you will explain it?—What I mean is, that I think it would be a very strong inducement to any officer finding himself passed over, to retire.

893. *Chairman.*] And it is so at the present time?—It is; of course it does work so.

894. And you would make it compulsory, instead of its being a mere inducement?—Certainly. I think it is a very powerful engine in our hands even at present.

895. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who makes the appointments to commandants?—They are submitted by the deputy adjutant general to me first, and then by me to the Board of Admiralty.

896. They are made by the Board?—Yes.

897. The Board of Admiralty changes very frequently, does not it?—Yes, very often.

898. And probably the Board generally have a very small knowledge, personally, of the officers recommended to them?—I do not think I could say that; I think I know nearly every Marine officer in the service, I would say almost as well as I do my own. I have served a very great deal with them, and know them. I do not believe there is a single commandant whom I have not served with.

899. You feel that you are quite competent to judge of their merits?—I think so; I do indeed; it may be a presumptuous thing to say, but I feel sure that I know their characters pretty well.

900. I suppose the recommendation of the deputy adjutant general goes for a good deal?—An immense deal.

901. So that virtually it comes to this, that the deputy adjutant general has pretty nearly the

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appointments in his hands?—The deputy adjutant general is here, and will tell you that he and I do not always agree upon that point either. Of course I pay the greatest attention to his representations.

902. It is pure selection that is practised?—Purely; but that does not make much actual difference.

903. But not many?—No; there are some who have retired from that reason.

904. Captain *Vivian.*] Not from having been absolutely passed over, but from having had a hint that they would be passed over?—Yes, I think that is the reason of it.

905. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I should like to ask how the last three officers appointed as commandants stood on the list when they were appointed?—Every one of these appointments was according to seniority.

906. They were the seniors?—Every one of them.

907. I observe in the Navy Estimates that there are lieutenant generals on different rates of pay in this unattached list. There is a lieutenant general of Marine Artillery receiving 730 *l.* a year, and there are three lieutenant generals of marine Light Infantry who receive each 900 *l.* a year; can you explain the difference of pay in the same rank?—I think it is the colonels of divisions who receive 900 *l.* a year.

908. *Chairman.*] Those colonels of divisions receiving 900 *l.* a year answers to the colonels commanding regiments in the army?—Yes, or the colonels of battalions; they receive 100 *l.* a year less than in the Artillery.

909. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] At the present time the colonels of divisions and the field officers of the Marines generally are sufficiently young for the efficiency of the service, are they not?—They are, the oldest is 53.

910. Therefore, looking at the list for the next 10 or 12 years, you are not likely to have many men too old for their duty?—No, certainly not, I do not know that I can say so long as that, but for some time.

911. I see by a return which has been handed in by the deputy adjutant general of Marines that the lieutenant colonels of Marines have increased by augmentation from eight in the year 1836 to 20 in the year 1866?—It must have been from the increased numbers of the force, I suppose; but you will see that the rank of major was abolished at that time.

912. I presume that augmentation has had something to do with the comparative youth of the officers at the present time?—Yes, I think so.

913. And you said that you looked forward to a great choke on account of a great many of the captains being about the age of 42?—Now they are getting to 44, and in about five or six years, with all these young colonels, there will be a very great choke.

914. The best way of meeting that, I think you said, was to apply some retirement to the lieutenant colonels and captains?—Yes, exactly.

915. You think that the present funds would be sufficient for the purpose if you were allowed to allot them in a different way from the present?—That is my opinion, but I am not a very good judge of that.

916. *Chairman.*] Would you have a fixed fund, or would you have the amount depending solely upon whether there were officers entitled under the rules?—Our own fund has had such a surplus of late that I am thoroughly contented with it. If we found we wanted more we should have to apply for it; I will hand in a paper upon that subject (*handing in the same*, vide *Appendix*). With that paper before me, of course I am quite content with the money we have got, and I think that that would meet the case.

917. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are those surplus sums mentioned in this return repaid to the Exchequer?—No, we do not take any sum; we are allowed to go up to a certain sum, and of course if we do not come up to it we do not draw it.

918. You think that the amount that is authorised by Parliament would be sufficient to meet the object you have in view?—Yes, I think so.

919. Captain *Vivian.*] With regard to this promotion by selection, the system amounts to its being a promotion by selection in the Marines, does not it?—No, I think not; it is only a power of not going by seniority.

920. It practically comes to that; that it is promotion by selection, does it not?—The power is in our hands, not to go by seniority.

921. Do you find that if you convey to an officer what you call that slight pressure, namely, that he is not to get a command, he generally retires upon that?—I think so; it is quite a private arrangement. General Langley does not acknowledge that pressure. (General *Langley.*) I never conveyed any intimation of that kind to any officer.

922. (To Admiral *Dacres.*) So that you have, to a certain extent, the control of the list in your own hands?—Certainly we have the control, that is what I mean, and I should not scruple to use it; General Langley thinks that it is not exerted. I only know that I keep it before me, and I should exert it in an instant if necessary. If he said to me that there was an officer who was not fit to command a division, I should immediately send to him to say that I should take the next.

923. Is that a power which has been frequently used?—It has hardly ever been used. I do not believe anybody has been passed over. (General *Langley.*) That is quite the fact.

924. (To Admiral *Dacres.*) Not absolutely passed over?—No.

925. I suppose many have retired on a hint that they would be passed over?—I think so; I do not speak of my own knowledge, but I think they have.

926. Therefore, the slight pressure of which you speak, is often applied?—Not often, but it has been applied; I could tell you the number of officers who have gone in that way.

927. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I suppose if anybody complained, he would be referred to the Board?—I think not at all. I think nobody would be passed over without he was thoroughly conscious that from ill-health or some reason of that sort, that he would have to go.

928. They never have complained?—There have been occasional complaints.

929. Captain *Vivian.*] Would it be physical incapacity which would be the only reason for passing him over?—Physical or mental incapacity, I should say. It is exactly the same regulation that the commander in chief of the army has; he has a similar power.

930. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is it exercised in

in any instance in the army?—I never heard of one.

931. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] The fact of an old officer being at the top of the list, and being compelled to retire by the gentle pressure you speak of, would make a very considerable pecuniary difference to him, as compared with his position should he be allowed to get his promotion, and then take a voluntary retirement in the senior rank, would it not?—I do not think that it would ever be done to an old officer; he could not be very old; he could not be 60, or else he would be obliged to retire. Every man must go at 60.

932. He might retire voluntarily if he was a colonel commandant, without taking the command of a division, might he not?—He might.

933. And then he would get the 700*l.* a year?—Yes.

934. Whereas, if he retired as the senior officer in the rank below the colonel commandant, he would only get the amount of his pay annually?—He would get 450*l.* a year as a second commandant.

935. Major *O'Reilly.*] Am I right in understanding that what you would propose with regard to retirement, is first that all officers should be compelled to retire at 60?—Yes.

936. Secondly, that there should be a power in the Board to compel any officer who was unfit from ill-health, or other causes, to retire?—Yes.

937. And, thirdly, that lieutenant colonels and captains should be allowed to retire, if they liked, at certain fixed rates, proportioned to their length of service?—I should keep the same compelling powers in the one case as in the other.

938. But even supposing you do not want to compel them, in addition to the other retirement, you think the lieutenant colonels and captains should be allowed to retire before reaching the age of 60, if they pleased?—Yes; in addition to the other retirements I have spoken of.

939. When would you begin to give them the power of retiring; after 20 years' service?—Yes; that is the fact at present, I believe; or, rather, it is after 21 years now. I should make it 20 years.

940. You would allow any officer, after 20 years' service, to retire in the first instance on the full pay of his rank?—Yes.

941. And then with an increased pay for more years' service than that?—Yes.

942. So that, if there was a captain of 20 years' service, you would allow him at once to retire upon the full pay of his rank, and a captain of 25 years' service you would allow to retire upon something more than the full pay of a captain?—Yes, on an augmented scale.

943. Have you considered what you propose that that augmented scale should be?—No, I have not.

944. Have you considered at all what would be the dead weight to the army of allowing all captains of 20 years' service to retire on the full pay of their rank?—No; I think you misapprehend my proposal.

945. Am I right in understanding you to propose that all lieutenant colonels and captains of 20 years' service should have the power to retire if they wished, on the full pay of their rank?—Certainly not. I said I should be content with the present sum of money; if you allowed them all to retire in that way, it would require three times the sum, I should think; but there are no applicants at present, but a larger retirement allowance might act as an inducement.

946. On what principle would you calculate the sum of money you would propose to devote to allowing such officers of 20 years' service to retire, without being unfit for service?—As long as the fund would last they would retire. As soon as there was no money they could not retire. They would be able to retire as the vacancies occurred in this 35,000*l.*

947. Sir *John Hay.*] You would regulate the number who would be permitted to accept that retirement, according to the necessities of the corps for promotion?—You must bring something else in, I suppose, if the necessities arose; this sum would not go very far.

948. Major *O'Reilly.*] Do you propose that the provision for officers compelled to retire at 60 years of age, and for officers compelled to retire from ill-health or other causes, should also be taken out of the 35,000*l.*?—Yes; certainly.

949. *Chairman.*] Then do I understand you to wish still to keep up a fixed fund?—I think that the present fund would do; that is my only reason; there is a large surplus at present. Of course it would be much more liberal if the Government would give more. But you must come to some end to it; you cannot allow them to retire exactly as they choose.

950. Then you think that the total amount of retirement should be limited, and that if there was no sum available on that fund, although an officer might have reached 60 years of age, he should not be compelled to retire?—Yes; I think he should.

951. You think that he should be compelled to retire?—Yes; I think that at 60, he should.

952. Supposing two or three officers reached the age of 60, and the fund was full, how would you provide for their retirements?—We must contrive some means or other; we could not retire them if we had not the money; but I think they ought to be compelled to retire; the money for this purpose should be forthcoming.

953. Would it not be better to lay down fixed rules which an officer should understand, and under which he should know what his absolute rights of retirement were, rather than that the system of retirement should depend upon the accident of whether a certain fund was full or not?—I am only guided in my answers by the surplus we have in hand. Of course the other arrangement would be much better if we had as much money as we liked.

954. Ought not retirement to depend upon some principle rather than upon the accident of a certain sum of money being available for it?—I do not think you can arrive at any principle, except in the cases of officers of 60 years of age. I do not think you could come to any principle of retiring captains after 20 years' service, because one man as has much right to it as another generally.

955. Then would not it be better to apply a fixed rule to that portion of the retirement which you think should be absolute; but to establish what is called a fund, or a fixed sum of money with respect to that portion which ought not to be absolute, but ought to be limited by the amount available?—Yes.

956. At the present time an officer has an absolute right of retirement after 25 years' service, has he not?—Subject to the sanction of the Admiralty; I do not think it is a right.

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957. Do not the conditions of the warrant which applies to the army apply also to the Marines?—No, they are a very great guide, but they are not absolute. I think the only absolute retirement we have is the compulsory retirement at 60 years of age.

958. The words are these, are they not, "Colonels second commandant will be permitted to retire on 25 *s.* a day, and lieutenant colonels of not less than 30 years' service, will be permitted to retire on 30 *s.* a day"?—That says, he "will be permitted," the other is "shall be compelled" to retire at the age of 60.

959. Then is it the interpretation of that rule at the present time that an officer of 30 years' service who applies to retire is not necessarily permitted to retire?—If there is money, certainly he is.

960. He is only permitted to retire if the fund admits of it?—That is all.

961. Do you think that that condition should apply to an officer of 30 years' service?—No.

962. Then, with respect to officers of 30 years' service, you would make the retirement independent of any fixed fund?—Certainly; I am only giving my own opinion now. I think every officer, after 30 years' service, should be allowed to retire.

963. You modify your previous recommendation to this extent that all officers of 60 years' of age should be compelled to retire, and all officers of 30 years' service should be permitted to retire?—Yes.

964. But that below that, officers of 20 or 25 years' service should be permitted to retire only if there was money available from a fixed fund for those retirements?—Yes, and always upon the principle that officers of 25 years' service should have an augmentation over officers of 20 years' service.

Colonel GLOUCESTER GAMBIER, C.B., R.A., called in; and further Examined.

Colonel *Gloucester Gambier*, C.B., R.A.

965. *Chairman.*] YOU were asked when the Committee last met whether you were in a position to suggest to the Committee any changes in the present system of retirement, which you then said was not entirely satisfactory?—Yes.

966. Are you in a position now to make any such recommendation bearing upon the evidence, which I think you have heard of the previous Artillery officers?—I have a scheme which I think a better one than the present; if you please I will hand it in, or I will read that part of it which it would be desirable for you to hear.

967. Perhaps you would give to the Committee the heads of your plan, and it can then be put in as a paper?—Yes, without going into the reasons which lead up to them, I can give the practical suggestions. In order to provide for the future efficiency of officers in all ranks, it has been generally admitted that it is necessary to fix some stated period at which officers should be removed from the effective list, and also that some outlet should be provided for the retirement of officers who have not completed 30 years' service. The following plan for the attainment of these objects, is therefore proposed: first to remove all officers who have completed 38 years' service.

968. Captain *Vivian.*] Compulsorily?—Yes; "and who are not colonels' commandant to a retired list in the ranks they now hold: secondly to allow these officers the option of retiring absolutely upon 700 *l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank, or of remaining upon their present rate of pay and succeeding to colonel commandant, and the higher grades of general officer according to their army rank."

969. You mean that they are to remain on a retired list?—They would all be on a retired list, but those who elect to take 700 *l.* a year, get one step, and have done with it; the others go upon their present pay, which would be 478 *l.* a year if not employed, and also rise to the position of colonel commandant.

970. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you explain what is the pay of the existing rank?—The pay of the existing rank is 478 *l.* a year.

971. *Chairman.*] Whether major general or colonel?—Whether major general or colonel; "thirdly, officers so removed from the regimental list who elect to remain on their present pay with a view to further promotion to be eligible, while on the retired list, for any employment (not regimental), and to retain the appointments they may now hold until the usual five years' period of holding them shall have expired."

972. Captain *Vivian.*] They are to be eligible for staff appointments, in fact?—Yes, but not regimental.

973. You are always referring now to officers of 38 years' standing?—Yes.

974. It is for a 38 years' compulsory retirement?—Yes. "Fourthly, to give an unqualified right of retirement to officers of less than 38, but of 20 years' service and upwards, upon the following scale per annum: 30 years' service to retire upon a permanent pension of 600 *l.* a year, or with the option to capitalise it at 450 *l.* a year; that is to say, that an officer of 30 years' service could retire upon a pension of 600 *l.* a year, or capitalise his pension upon 450 *l.* a year as an annuity.

975. Major *O'Reilly.*] He would capitalise it at his average chance of life?—Yes, of course, on 450 *l.* a year; 600 *l.* a year would be too great a sum to capitalise.

976. Captain *Vivian.*] That is, on 30 years' service?—Yes.

977. This is optional retirement?—Yes, it would be optional; either a permanent retirement of 600 *l.* a year, or the option of capitalising it according to the plan Colonel Percy Herbert suggested.

978. You began by saying that officers of from 20 to 38 years' service were to have a right of retirement?—I am coming to the scale, what I have given yet does not go below 30 years' service.

979. *Chairman.*] This is for 30 years' service, and above?—Yes. Now below that; after 25 years' service, I propose that officers should be allowed to retire, if they choose, upon a permanent pension of 400 *l.* a year, or to capitalise it upon 300 *l.* a year. Officers of 20 years' service to retire upon a permanent pension of 200 *l.* a year, or to capitalise it upon 150 *l.* a year. "Those retirements to be governed by length of service, and irrespective of the rank the officer may have attained." They should also be available at any time (after the stated period of service is completed), without reference to vacancies or the retired list, or in the amount of the annual vote for retirement."

980. *Chairman.*]

980. *Chairman.*] You mean that there should be no limit?—There should be no limit.

981. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] It is to be optional with them to take it?—Yes. "Fifthly, every facility to be afforded to the officers who retire with less than 38 years' service to capitalise their retiring pension at the rates laid down for each period of service in paragraph 4."

982. *Chairman.*] That is absolute capitalisation?—Yes; they are to afford them every facility for so doing. "Intermediate periods of service to be calculated both for permanent retirement and for capitalising, and the scale raised in proportion," that is to say, if they wish to retire between the dates, the amount should be estimated accordingly. "6thly. The present retired full pay list to be discontinued as vacancies occur therein." That is the 32,000 *l.* a year, and the addition at present made. "7thly. The half pay list to be also discontinued, except in the case of officers of less than 20 years' service, who may be incapacitated for duty from wounds in action, or from ill health contracted in the service."

983. Mr. *Grenfell.*] Do you limit the half pay to two years?—No; they can retire upon half pay, according to the present rule, after 25 years' service.

984. You mean not temporary, but permanent half pay?—Yes.

985. *Chairman.*] In future there is to be no permanent half pay?—No; there is to be none in future. Those are the heads of my proposal; I have a calculation of the expense of it.

986. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you mean to exclude temporary half pay in the case of temporary sickness?—No, not temporary half pay; you would not exclude that; they would come back to the regiment.

987. You do not make any alteration in that respect?—No; it is only the permanent half pay list that is altered. I have made a sort of calculation of the effect of this, and also the cost of it. "The number of officers who have not reached the rank of colonel commandant, but who have completed 38 years' service, is 17; namely, 14 major generals and three regimental colonels," that is to say the three senior regimental colonels in the list now have 38 years' service. "During the next 10 years the number who will reach 38 years' service (not deducting deaths or retirements in the meantime) would be 55" (that is supposing this scheme was carried into effect as it goes), "including the above 17" (that is the 17 who at the present moment have completed 38 years' service), "being an average of 5½ promotions from the top of the list alone for each year." That is is to say that the compulsory retirement after 38 years, according to this plan, would give 5½ promotions for the next 10 years.

988. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Five and a half steps?—Five and a half steps per annum. "The 17 officers who have now completed 38 years' service, exactly correspond with the number of colonels commandant, and as promotions to that rank would almost invariably be made from the retired list of officers on major general's pay, that number of steps would be lost as vacancies occur, and the annual average of retirements at the top of the list would thus be reduced to about four for the next 10 years," that is to say that if a general officer or colonel commandant died, the step would be lost through the regiment, because it would go to the officers on the retired list as long as there was a sufficient number of them who elect to serve; at present it would be filled up, and a step go through the regiment. Therefore you would lose that step, and actually the retirements would be only four per annum after the present year. "As the regiment now stands, it is not calculated that there would be any officers under 38 years' service, who would retire, except for the purpose of capitalising their annuities, and the expense of the proposed plan, as regards these officers, would therefore be inconsiderable. The number who might retire for this purpose would not exceed 20 for the present year, in the three periods combined, and therefore, supposing this number retired, the total vacancies for the lower ranks this year would be 37. Of the officers of 38 years' service, and upwards, who would be removed from the regimental list, it is calculated 12 would elect to remain on their present pay, to succeed to colonel commandant, and the expense of starting the proposed plan would be as under: 12 officers to retire upon their present pay (478 *l.* a year), would be 5,736 *l.*; five officers to retire absolutely on 700 *l.* a year would be 3,500 *l.*, making a total of 9,236 *l.*"; that would be the cost as far as that goes. "Against which there would be a saving from the full and half pay list of 6,700 *l.*; the actual cost would be 2,536 *l.* In the money estimated to be saved, is included 5,200 *l.*, which has been sanctioned by the Treasury (subject to the Vote of Parliament) for next year as the balance of the increased grant of 10,400 *l.*, to which the regiment is entitled, for the number of officers of the old Royal Artillery alone, added to it since the 32,000 *l.* was first granted in 1854, and for whom no retiring allowances have hitherto been provided. The foregoing remarks and proposal have applied solely to the old Royal Artillery, but the amalgamation of the Indian artilleries have added (and continue so to do annually) a large number of lieutenants to the general list, and consequently when the present Indian list of officers have died out, there will be a regiment nearly twice the strength of the old Royal Artillery at the present time, with retiring allowances for only one-half. In the meantime, the Indian Government bear the expense of the retirements of all those officers of Artillery who were on the Indian lists at the date of the amalgamation, and in addition, pay to the Imperial Government a capitation grant for retirements, and pensions of 3 *l.* 10 *s.* for every officer and soldier of the Royal Artillery embarked for India. The same rate of capitation is paid for the cavalry and the line, but the Indian Government have nothing further to do with the retirements and pensions for these branches of the service. It will thus be seen that the Imperial Government have been receiving a certain rate for the retirements of the whole list of Indian Artillery officers, since the date of the amalgamation, and have not hitherto applied any portion of it to that purpose. The additional expense therefore, involved by the plan now proposed, or any other that may be decided upon, may be fairly met by the sum of money which has thus been paid into the Imperial Treasury by the Indian Government for the purposes of retirement of Artillery officers, but which has not been yet applied." The first part of this paper consists of my reasons for leading up to that conclusion; I will hand in this paper. (*The same was handed in,* vide *Appendix.*)

989. *Chairman*] I will ask you first of all upon the last part of it, because it is separate from

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from the rest of the question, is it your understanding of the arrangement with the Indian Government that the entire retirement of all officers of Artillery who have joined since the amalgamation will be thrown upon the Imperial funds?—So I believe it stands.

990. You have at any rate prepared that paper upon the assumption that the entire retirement of all officers who have got their commissions in the Artillery since the amalgamation will come upon the Votes of Parliament?—Not the entire retirements, because 3 *l.* 10 *s.* per man and officer is paid for the retiring allowances of officers and pensions of men of the Cavalry, Line, and Artillery. That is calculated from the rates of retirement for the Line and Cavalry, and therefore, after the subaltern lists in the three Indian lists have run out, the British Government would be entitled to call upon the Indian Government for a greater rate of retirement for the Artillery and Engineers than the 3 *l.* 10 *s.* covers.

991. Mr. *Grenfell.*] Is that agreed to by the Indian Government?—It is not agreed to, but they are, I believe, aware of it.

992. *Chairman.*] That greater contribution would have to be paid into the Exchequer, and it is your understanding that the entire retirements will have to be voted by Parliament?—Yes, eventually, because the capitation grant by the Indian Government will be paid into the Exchequer.

993. Mr. *Grenfell.*] With regard to the 3 *l.* 10 *s.* per man, then, was not it calculated that it would be sufficient to pay the retirements?—Not for the Artillery and Engineers; but it is calculated that it will be sufficient to pay the retirements for the Line and Cavalry and the pensions for the soldiers. The Indian Government are, at present, paying 3 *l.* 10 *s.* per man for the Artillery and Engineers in India, as well as the whole of the retirements of their own old officers, on the lists of those two corps.

994. The Indian Government are now paying the 3 *l.* 10 *s.* per man plus the old retirements?—Yes.

995. *Chairman.*] Plus the retirements of all Indian officers who got their commissions before the amalgamation?—Yes.

996. But your understanding is, that the retirements of all officers who got their commission since the amalgamation, will come into the Retirement Vote?—Eventually, of course they will; there is nothing required for them now.

997. Going to your plan of retirement, you propose that all officers after 38 years' service, who you assume would be either colonels or major generals, should go to a retired list on their existing rank, and with their existing pay?—Yes.

998. And should succeed in their proper turn, to the rank of colonel commandant?—Only those who elect to remain on their present rate of pay of 478 *l.* a year.

999. On their existing rank and pay?—Yes.

1000. Will not the effect of that, simply be to transfer from one nominal list to another nominal list, a certain number of major generals, without altering their position in any degree?—I think so.

1001. The effect of it will be, that a certain number of major generals, who are now major generals on the establishment, and major generals on unattached pay will be called major generals on retired pay, but will retain precisely their existing rights?—Precisely.

1002. So that with respect to major generals, it will be a mere form, so far?—Yes.

1003. With this difference, that it will give steps for all who take it?—It will give steps to the regiment.

1004. Do you propose that the major generals who have served 38 years, and who go upon this retired list, taking their existing pay and retaining their existing right to succeed to the command of battalions, should make vacancies in the list of general officers?—Yes; and they would make promotions through the regiment.

1005. But they would make vacancies in the fixed list of general officers on unattached pay, would they not?—They would remain as general officers on retired unattached pay.

1006. But they would make vacancies in the fixed list, would they not?—Yes.

1007. Your proposal is this, that assuming in the first instance, that 14 major generals have 38 years' service, they should go to a list which is to be called a list of retired major generals, that they should retain their right to succeed to the battalions, that they should receive the same pay that they are now receiving, and that 14 steps should be given to the colonels?—Yes.

1008. That is to say, the act of their retirement would practically add 14 to the number of major generals, all having the right to succeed to battalions?—It would add the number only, who elect to remain on 478 *l.* a year, but who are however, on a retired list, those who follow them would be colonels on retired full pay; that is to say, they would be colonels on a retired list. There would be 17, because the three senior colonels have 38 years' service; those, as well as the 17, would have to elect whether they would remain upon 478 *l.* a year, or take the 700 *l.* a year.

1009. Captain *Vivian.*] You mean as well as the 14; there are 14 major generals?—Yes, but there are three full colonels of 38 years' service.

1010. That makes the 17?—Yes.

1011. *Chairman.*] Supposing the 14 major generals did not elect to take the 700 *l.* a year, they would continue to receive the 478 *l.* a year; they would continue to have a right to succeed to battalions, and they would give the 14 steps to colonels to become major generals?—They would.

1012. I think there is some little misunderstanding about your plan; you do not propose that the major generals who are put upon the sort of retired list should add to the number of major generals at all?—Not to the effective establishment.

1013. No steps would go in the regiment until an officer, whether upon the major generals' establishment, or upon the major generals' retired establishment, succeeded to a battalion?—No, that is not the way I propose it.

1014. Perhaps you would make your proposal more clear?—I think I could give you an instance from the present list; at present there are 14 major generals on the establishment and the three senior colonels.

1015. Perhaps you will take the 14 major generals on the establishment first?—They would have to elect whether they would take 700 *l.* a year and retire at once with a step in rank, or remain with 478 *l.* a year, as they are in their position in the army list; they would be removed on to the retired list, keeping their present rank of major general.

1016. *Chairman.*] In either case they would be removed to the retired list?—Yes, but those who elected to take the 478 *l.* a year would keep their rank according to their present places.

1017. Supposing

1017. Supposing an individual major general has attained 38 years' service he will be compelled to go to a retired list; he will have his option of two retired lists, one in which he would give a step of major general, and would receive 700 *l.* a year, and disappear from the list altogether; the other, in which he would have 478 *l.* a year, and go upon a distinct retired list, retaining his succession to a battalion?—Exactly.

1018. Would he make a vacancy in the old list?—Certainly.

1019. If he made a vacancy in the old list, a colonel would be entitled to succeed to that vacancy, would he not?—Yes.

1020. Therefore, if 14 major generals did so, there would be 14 vacancies in the old list, and 14 colonels would be entitled to succeed to them?—Yes.

1021. Your plan is this, that all major generals of 38 years' standing should under any circumstances make vacancies in what is called the major generals establishment, to which colonels would succeed, though these major generals so long as they retained the 478 *l.* a year would be entitled, as now, to succeed to the command of battalions?—Yes, to the command of battalions; but we will take the first senior colonel.

1022. I want to deal with the major generals first, if you please?—The major generals would remain upon a retired list. The whole of those 14 would be removed; we will say that seven or eight of them would take 700 *l.* a year, and the remainder would remain with their present rank of major general and their present pay, only on the retired list.

1023. Each of the 14 would give a step in the regiment, would they not?—Yes; and the 14 officers to succeed them, would be taken from the rank of colonels, who would be put on to the retired list, if they had had 38 years' service.

1024. If they had not had 38 years' service, they would remain?—Yes.

1025. That is to say, that if a major general of 38 years' service did not elect to take the 700 *l.* a year, he would under your system simply give a step in rank all through the regiment, and retain his right to succeed to a battalion?—Yes. The present 14 major generals would give 14 steps; part of them would go to the 478 *l.* a year list, and the other part to the altogether retired list.

1026. And those who did not elect to take the 700 *l.* a year while they gave the steps through the regiment, would retain their right to succeed to a battalion?—Yes.

1027. Captain *Vivian.*] I thought I understood you to say, in the third part of your plan, that they would be eligible for staff appointments, but not for regimental?—Those who elected to take the 478 *l.* a year would be so, though put on a retired list. They would be eligible for employment on any staff appointments in which the Commander in Chief liked to employ them, but not for regimental employment, such as colonels on the staff commanding brigades, or anything of that kind.

1028. *Chairman.*] Do you mean, then, that major generals retiring from the list of the establishment of general officers would be entitled to be employed, or only colonels?—Major generals would be entitled to be employed.

1029. You apply it to both?—Yes.

1030. Then what is the advantage, except to give a certain amount of promotion, of retiring a major general, from one list to another, if he retains upon his new list equally his right of succeeding to a battalion?—The advantage is that it gives promotion.

1031. But beyond giving promotion, there is no object in it?—Yes, there is an object; you enable these officers to be employed.

1032. I said as to a major-general, what is the object in transferring a major general from one list in which he gets 478 *l.* a year, and succeeds to a battalion to another list in which he gets 478 *l.* a year, and succeeds to a battalion, except the advantage of giving a step in the regiment?—There is no other advantage than that it creates promotion.

1033. Then your only object in that part of your scheme is to give a certain amount of promotion?—Yes; and it also secures younger major generals on the fixed establishment.

1034. First I came to the question of the 700 *l.* a year; why do you propose to increase that from 600 *l.* to 700 *l.*?—Because the 600 *l.* a year has not fully answered the anticipations which were formed of it; those who have taken it have been during the last few years, the junior colonels. The 700 *l.* in my opinion, would induce officers to take it from the higher ranks.

1035. But if the higher ranks of colonel are only 55 years of age, and if you have a provision for compulsory retirement from the higher ranks after 38 years' service, why should you give an additional inducement for them to retire?—I do not think 700 *l.* a year is too much for an officer who has served 38 years.

1036. Then you propose that 700 *l.* a year, because with reference to the former 600 *l.* a year, you think the times call for an increase?—They have not taken the 600 *l.* a year as freely as they ought; it has not been a sufficient inducement; they have all been waiting for the 1,000 *l.* a year.

1037. If you have a compulsory retirement after 38 years' service, do you want anything which should be an inducement?—No, you would not want any inducement as regards that upper rank.

1038. Your retirement from that upper rank will not operate as an inducement; it will operate as a compulsion?—Yes.

1039. The question, therefore, is, is it fair as the amount upon which an officer should be compelled to retire?—I think 700 *l.* a year is.

1040. The question of inducement so far passes away?—It vanishes.

1041. You propose that after 30 years' service, that is between 30 and 38 years' service, an officer should be entitled to retire on 600 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1042. What is the present rule?—The present rule is, that an officer may retire if he is in the rank of full colonel after 30 years' service upon 600 *l.* a year.

1043. If, at least, there is a vacancy upon the list?—Yes, he can do so if there is the money available.

1044. If there is not the money available, what right has he of retirement; has he any at all?—None.

1045. He has the right of retirement upon permanent half pay, has he not?—Yes, he has the right of retirement upon permanent half pay.

1046. If of the rank of colonel, what permanent half pay can he get?—16 *s.* 9 *d.* a day.

1047. At present, therefore, no officer can get more than the half pay of his rank after 25 years'

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service, unless there happens to be a vacancy on the 32,000 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1048. But whether there is a vacancy or not, the existing system would enable a full colonel to retire upon nearly 300 *l.* a year, and a lieutenant colonel to retire upon something over 200 *l.* a year?—Yes, a lieutenant colonel is able to retire upon 400 *l.* a year, provided he has served 30 years, and he is a brevet colonel.

1049. That is, if there is a vacancy on the 32,000 *l.*?—If there is a vacancy, he can retire upon 400 *l.* a year.

1050. If there is no such vacancy, a lieutenant colonel could only retire on about 200 *l.* a year, after 25 years' service, and a full colonel on something under 300 *l.* a year, after 25 years' service?—Yes.

1051. You propose that that should be increased from 200 *l.* a year to 400 *l.* a year, after 25 years' service, and to 600 *l.* a year after 30 years' service, without any limit to the rank of the officer?—Yes.

1052. And you propose further, that after 20 years' service, an officer may retire upon 200 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1053. And you suggest that those retirements should be capitalized at three-fourths of their value?—Yes.

1054. Can you state to the Committee why they should not be capitalized at their full value?—I thought it would be too expensive a plan.

1055. And you made the reduction simply with a view to economy?—Yes.

1056. Your plan proposes the entire abolition of the 32,000 *l.* a year?—Yes, quite so.

1057. And that these retirements after 20 years' service should be absolutely at the option of officers?—Absolutely.

1058. Without any power in the Commander in Chief to say no?—Without any such power.

1059. Is it your opinion that less than that would not secure a sufficient flow of promotion in the corps?—I think less would not secure it; so much so, that I think but few of the retirements which I have proposed under 30 years' service would be accepted, except in the way of capitalizing them.

1060. Are you in favour of maintaining the present age of admission to the Woolwich Academy?—I am not.

1061. You would reduce it?—Certainly.

1062. At what age would an officer get his commission in that case?—I would reduce the entrance to the old standard, from 14 to 17 years of age.

1063. At what age would an officer then, on the average, get his commission?—On the average, he would get his commission at from 18 to 19 years of age.

1064. So that under your plan, every officer at 38 or 39 years of age would be absolutely entitled to retire upon 200 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1065. And you think that that is a fair bargain for the country?—I do.

1066. You do not anticipate that you would lose any considerable number of efficient officers by such a plan?—I think we should lose a great many efficient officers, if they accepted it.

1067. If so, are you still satisfied that the bargain for the country would be a good one?—I still am, because I think that any officer who has completed 20 years' service has a right to retire; at least, it is a just thing to give him an opportunity of retiring if he likes.

1068. You apparently prefer service being the rule to age being the rule?—I do.

1069. Can you tell the Committee why?—I think the fairest mode of calculating any retirements for officers is by service; and I also consider that calculating by age would lead to a very great many complications. I will give an instance; we will take the two senior colonels or lieutenant colonels. The senior from having entered the regiment at a different age, is the younger man; the other, an older man, is below him, and would be put over his head into the next rank as a major general, or, as the case may be, until the other officer is brought in, too. I think that calculating by age would lead to such complications.

1070. You think that as between colonel and major general, if under your plan a colonel, after 38 years' service, went to the major general's list with 700 *l.* a year, that would be unfair to his junior, who might be above him?—Yes; who would not be eligible for the promotion, and in consequence elect for it; but this man, who was a junior officer to him, would go over his head, and would have the chance before him.

1071. If he did not elect for the 700 *l.* a year, but only for the 478 *l.* a year, he would not get a step in rank?—No; and in case of his electing the 478 *l.* a year, of course the junior officer in age, when he was promoted, would be put in his proper place over him; but that is a complication which I think is better avoided.

1072. The only difficulty would be as an officer who elects for the 700 *l.* a year, and therefore takes his step in rank?—No, the same would take place in the other case.

1073. But if an officer elected to take his existing rank and existing pay, it would make no difference whether he was taken out above or below; your proposal was that all officers after 38 years' service should go to a retired list on their existing rank and existing pay?—Yes.

1074. The age rule would create no difficulty in that case, because an officer going to the retired list under these conditions would not get a step in rank?—No.

1075. The difficulty which you contemplate from the age rule is that an old officer would get a step in rank before an officer who was senior to him in the corps?—He might get a step in rank, or he might be taken over his head into this list, where he would be eligible to take the 700 *l.* a year retirement before the other officer.

1076. But in the event of his taking the 700 *l.* a year, he is out of the corps altogether, is not he?—Yes.

1077. Is not that the case at present, if an officer takes the 600 *l.* a year over others who remain in the corps?—He does not go over another man's head; if an officer senior to him wishes for it, he has it.

1078. He gets a step in rank, does he not?—Yes; but he does not go over another man's head.

1079. You think that the effect of the option under the present system, would justify that step being got sooner, whereas under the new system the retirement would be compulsory?—Yes, but I think the main reason is that the justest way of taking retirements, is by service; that is my idea of it, at all events.

1080. Is every officer in the corps considered to count his service, unless after two years' sickness?—Yes.

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1081. A seconded officer counts his service?—A seconded officer counts his service.

1082. So that the rule of service, if all officers entered the corps at the same age, would be identical with the rule of age, barring the cases of officers who are put on half pay for sickness after two or more years' sickness?—Yes.

1083. An officer after two or more years' sickness, loses his steps, does not he?—Yes.

1084. If he is put upon half pay, and comes back again, he loses his position, does he not?—If he comes back again, he loses all promotions that have taken place while he was on half pay.

1085. He loses his position; he comes in again at a different point, does he not?—Yes.

1086. Then the only difference between service and age, if all officers got their commissions at the same date, would be the accidental case of an officer being for two or more years sick?—Yes.

1087. Do you consider that the system of allowing service while officers are on the seconded list, would be fair under your plan?—I think so.

1088. Mr. *Grenfell.*] All the old retirements in the Indian service were after service, not after age, were they not?—I do not know; I am not aware of that.

1089. Colonel *North.*] Supposing an officer is obliged to retire temporarily on half pay from severe wounds, or anything of that kind, will he be allowed to count one or two years, or whatever the time may be, towards the 20 years' service?—If he is allowed to retire temporarily for two years, not over two years, it would count.

1090. Captain *Vivian.*] The two years while he was on the half pay list would count?—Yes.

1091. Colonel *North.*] Supposing an officer on temporary retirement of that kind, is able to rejoin his regiment in one year, is he allowed to do so?—Yes.

1092. *Chairman.*] The two years is simply a limit?—Yes, it can be extended, and it is extended sometimes.

1093. Then it is your deliberate opinion that the cost of your plan would be only 2,000 *l.* or 3,000 *l.* a year more than the cost of the plan which has been assented to this year?—That cost is merely upon the first item; the compulsory retirement after 38 years' service; I have not taken the rest; what the cost of the others would be it is impossible to judge.

1094. You have not made any estimate as to how many officers would take advantage of the improved system of retirement between 20 and 30 years' service?—No; no estimate could be made of that.

1095. But if the compulsory system was in force, as it is a fact that you have no demand for additional retirement at the top of the corps, why should the country with respect to the retirement of colonels be put to additional expense in providing retirements?—I do not see how you would get the promotion, unless you took the colonels off the list.

1096. Your plan for retirement at the top is double; you propose that every officer after 38 years' service, that is, every colonel, should be compulsorily retired, and that a step should be given?—Yes.

1097. But you propose, in addition to that, that every major general after 38 years' service, should also be compulsorily put upon a separate list, with the same rights, and it is putting those major generals upon this new list that creates the additional charge. I ask if you get a full flow of promotion from the retirement of colonels, why should you put the country to an additional charge for the retirement of major generals?—I do not think my plan does so; the pay of those major generals remains the same as it is on their present list.

1098. But they give a step all the way through, do they not?—Yes; but if one of those major generals died, at present he would create a vacancy all through the regiment, but if he dies under my plan, he creates no vacancy.

1099. Between the time of his going on to the retired list, according to your plan, and his death, he creates additional expense, does he not?—That is necessary to start the plan.

1100. Is it necessary to create this additional expense to start the plan, when at present your senior colonels are men of 55 years of age?—If you could keep them in that condition, of course it would be much more desirable to leave the system as it is.

1101. Would not the compulsory retirement of all colonels of 38 years' service keep them in that condition?—I do not think it would, because it gives you four steps a year, or $5\frac{1}{2}$ steps a year after the next 10 years, and in order to get that promotion, you must start with a certain number of promotions at once.

1102. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Have you had any cases in the artillery, of officers leaving the corps for the purpose of taking appointments in the civil service of the country?—No, not in the civil service; at least I do not remember any.

Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. HUSSEY FANE KEANE, R.E., called in; and further Examined.

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1103. *Chairman.*] YOU have heard, I think, the evidence that was given by Captain Galton?—Yes.

1104. And you have heard to-day the evidence that was given by Colonel Gambier?—Yes.

1105. Is the present state of retirement in the Engineers satisfactory to your mind?—Not at all.

1106. Will you state to the Committee in what points it appears to you to be unsatisfactory?—The age of our senior officers is too great to admit of their being efficient for the great amount of work they have to go through.

1107. What is their present age?—The senior colonel at this moment is $65\frac{3}{12}$.

1108. What, in your opinion, ought to be about the age of your senior colonel?—I think certainly not more than 60.

1109. Does the same objection prevail as to the ages of the officers in the lower ranks?—Yes.

1110. To any serious extent?—No, it is not felt so much in the lower ranks.

1111. Is the difficulty increasing in this respect, or do you think that you see as bad a state of things now as you anticipate?—I do not think it could be worse than it it is now.

1112. Then, what suggestion have you to make?—I have sketched out a scheme which, I think, would possibly meet it; perhaps you will allow me to read it.

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1113. Do you consider that the unsatisfactory state of things as to age which you have described, arises from the inadequacy of the sum applied to retirement, or from the manner in which the officers avail themselves of that retirement?—I think from both reasons; I think, had the money been more, a larger number of the senior officers would have taken it, which, of course, would have made the junior branches younger; and, as a proof of that, I may mention that the moment we had an increased allowance, according to the votes of Parliament this year, two of the senior officers have taken it, of 63 and 62 years of age respectively.

1114. Colonel Gambier stated to us, at the last meeting of the Committee, that the present system would not work satisfactorily without a very large increase indeed. I think he used the word, an "extravagant" increase in the amount available; is that your opinion also?—No, I think not; I think it need not be a very great amount, more than we have at present.

1115. Without any change of the existing system?— I suggest in my paper herewith attached, an entirely new scheme.

1116. Then the recommendations you are about to make constitute a system which you think will meet all the difficulty?—Yes.

1117. Will you read your paper?—"First, at the age of 60 a colonel must elect either to take 600 *l.*, without prospective advantage, or be removed to a separate list on 478 *l.*, and there to await his promotion to major general, and eventually his battalion; secondly, there will be thus three effective lists: No. 1, colonel commandant; No. 2, eight unattached major generals; No. 3, colonels waiting for vacancies which are made by casualty in No. 1 and No. 2; in either of which a death vacancy would have to be filled by the senior colonel in list No. 3; thirdly, colonels (regimental) after the age of 53, to be eligible for retirement on 600 *l.* a year; fourthly, lieutenant colonels (regimental), after the age of 46, to be eligible for and able to claim 450 *l.* a year."

1118. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Not only to be eligible, but to be able to claim that?—Yes.

1119. *Chairman.*] You meant that also with the first, did you not?—Yes, to be entitled to it. "These retirements to have no prospective advantages, but to carry a step of honorary rank; officers who shall have received brevet rank for service, are to have their option of retiring or serving when the officer next below them, in army rank, has reached the prescribed age; should these brevet officers refuse retirement, and elect to take the 478 *l.*, they are to get it when the officer next below them has reached 60 years of age, continuing to serve in the meantime; it may happen that a younger man may stand in the regimental list, above the elder; in this case the younger will not have the option to retire or serve until he has completed the prescribed years. The older can choose when his years are completed, but the younger will not be superseded by the older, but retain his original place above him (when his time is completed), whether he wishes to serve or retire. This arrangement will be necessary in all age retirement schemes." It is to prevent what Colonel Gambier explained, that the older officer should not go over the head of the younger. We have a few instances where it might happen. "Employment to be open to the officers on list No. 3, if considered by the Commander in Chief efficient; Medical Board retirements to lieutenant colonels and junior officers to be as at present. The advantage of this scheme is, a constant flow of promotion is kept up when it is required; being founded on age, it will only fail to give promotion when it is not wanted, the officers being too young to claim their retirement. The expense will be increased at first, but every death among the retired officers brings back their retiring allowance to the public. After a time the senior officers will be so young, that but few will have age enough to claim retirement."

1120. Then your plan is practically this, that no change should take place with respect to the present establishment of major generals; that an officer of the rank of colonel, at the age of 60, should go to a sort of intermediate list, either retaining his pay and his right in his turn to succeed to the major generals' establishment, and so on to a battalion, or having a right to take 600 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1121. That every officer at 60, whichever he does, whether he goes to the list, which I will call above the line of colonels, or to the 600 *l.* a year list, would give a step through the regiment?—Yes.

1122. And that is the only provision you propose at the top of the list?—That is the only provision.

1123. But, lower down, you propose that every officer at 53 years of age should be entitled to take 600 *l.* a year if he likes, or that at 46 he should be entitled to take 450 *l.* a year if he likes, without any conditions as to service?—Without any conditions.

1124. And you propose minor plans to obviate difficulties as to seniority?—Those are simply matters of detail, as to the seniority by brevet and the age of officers.

1125. Will you state to the Committee why you prefer a system of compulsory or optional retirement by age to a system of compulsory or optional retirement by service?—I think age is a test of efficiency more than length of service, and, although, cadets get their commissions about the same age, there may be a difference of two or three years in age between cadets getting their commissions at the same time.

1126. You propose that all officers who have gone to the separate list at 60 should succeed to the major general's establishment, according to their original position in the colonel's list?—According to their army rank.

1127. That is according to their army rank, according to their original position in the colonel's list?—Yes; it is merely a supplementary list to the major general's.

1128. So that a brevet colonel would get his step on the major general's establishment in his own turn, though he might be very much younger than the officers who had gone forward in the regimental list?—Yes, that is the principle that prevails now; I do not pretend to alter that at all.

1129. With reference to the retirements at 53 or 46 years of age, you have heard, no doubt, of the proposals that have been made to commute the annuity into a fixed sum?—Yes.

1130. Do you think that that would be advantageous?—Decidedly.

1131. Do you think it would be necessary to commute it upon the whole sum, or do you think that the attraction of commuting it upon a portion

tion would be sufficient?—I think I have put it sufficiently low in proposing that it should be commuted upon the whole sum. My scale of retirement is lower than Colonel Gambier's.

1132. Colonel Gambier's plan was, that after 30 years' service an officer in whatever rank should be entitled to take 600 *l.* a year, or to commute it upon 450 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1133. You think that 53 years of age is not quite so favourable as 30 years' service?—No.

1134. And therefore you would commute it upon the full amount?—I would commute it upon the full amount.

1135. Do you think it desirable to continue the age at which cadets enter the academy at Woolwich, and get their commissions?—No; I have held a decided opinion for many years that they ought to enter the Academy very much younger than they do now.

1136. At what average age, in your opinion, should a cadet get his commission?—Eighteen is a very good age.

1137. What superior limit would you impose?—I think a cadet ought to go to the Academy at from 15 to 17 years of age; that should be the limit for entrance.

1138. And get his commission, when?—That so much depends upon the details of education, that I do not think it ought to be limited.

1139. You think that 18 should be about the average age at which an officer should get his commission?—I think that would be the practical result of making the age of admission to the Academy from 15 to 17.

1140. Practically, an officer is not entitled to retire upon half-pay until after 25 years' service, and he cannot get a colonel's full-pay retirement of 600 *l.* a year until after 30 years' service; that is, until he is 48 years of age?—No.

1141. Do you think that below those ages there should be any option to an officer to take a special rate of retirement?—I think it would be desirable if that could be entertained.

1142. You think it would be a good thing for the corps, but you doubt whether it might not cost so much as to frighten Parliament?—I certainly think it would be a good thing for the corps, especially considering the circumstances of the Engineers, so many of whom are civilly employed.

1143. Would you be satisfied with a retirement at the age of 46 on 450 *l.* a year?—I should for lieutenant colonels; but we must also have the 600 *l.* retirement for colonels.

1144. What do you expect would be the cost of your scheme?—I have not entered into that.

1145. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] A corps like the Engineers worked like one regiment is liable to a good many fluctuations in promotion, is it not?—Yes.

1146. Sometimes you get a considerable number of officers of nearly the same age lying together in the list?—Yes, frequently.

1147. That is disadvantageous to the corps, is it not?—Very much so.

1148. Would it be advantageous to the corps to apply some system of retirement lower down than you have spoken of as yet to the Committee, in order to relieve those blocks in the list?—Yes.

1149. I presume that when 40 or 50 officers found themselves of the same age lying together in the list, it would be much easier to operate upon a flock like that; and if there were something offered to them after 15 or 20 years' service that would be a means of relieving the list?—That is taking an improbable number when you speak of 40 or 50 lying together; we might have six or seven or eight, but never more than that in the Engineers, because we do not get commissions given to us in such large quantities. There are rarely more than 8 or 10 commissions given at the same time.

1150. Sometimes two or three batches may be very much of the same age, may they not?—Hardly.

1151. What I wanted to arrive at was this: is not it sometimes the case that a man has a much worse prospect of promotion than a man who happens to be 30 or 40 steps ahead of him comparatively?—Yes.

1152. In that case, owing to the field officers being young, he has no prospect of promotion to the rank of field officer?—No.

1153. Therefore, the first or second captains might be somewhat discontented with their position, and apprehensive that they would not arrive at a field officer's rank within a reasonable period?—I think that an officer standing at the bottom of, say 8 or 10 men of about the same age, would be much more likely to wish to retire upon a fixed sum than one who was at the head of them.

1154. And you would be glad to see some arrangement by which some annuity or lump sum could be offered to officers under those circumstances to facilitate their retirement?—I think it would be very greatly to the advantage of the corps, and would certainly increase promotion.

1155. And it would average promotion?—Yes; very much so.

1156. Instead of having it coming in rushes, with ebbs and flows?—Yes.

1157. There are many of your officers employed in the civil departments of the Government, are there not?—A great number.

1158. Do any from time to time leave the corps, to be employed permanently in the civil service?—Yes, occasionally a few.

1159. Do they receive any advantage for their former public service in the corps of Engineers, when they leave your corps and join the civil service?—Not under a certain rank.

1160. What is that rank?—If a man succeeds in getting to the rank of lieutenant colonel, he reaps an advantage from it, but if he retires in the rank of captain, unless he has served 24 years, he loses all benefit from it. Of that, we have had an instance lately, in the case of Captain Tyler.

1161. He is employed in the railway department, is he not?—He is employed in the Board of Trade.

1162. Will you state what were the circumstances of his retirement?—He had served 13 years upon the seconded list, and was called upon, according to the terms of the warrant, having completed the 10 years, either to rejoin his corps, or to leave. He tried to get half pay, but the wording of the warrant did not permit it, and he resigned his commission altogether, after 22 years' service.

1163. For that 22 years' service he receives no benefit whatever as a military man?—No; he only receives a civil service pension for the 13 years he has served at the Board of Trade; he has no benefit from the previous nine years which he served in the Royal Engineers.

1164. Then you think it would be an advantage if more liberal arrangements were made by the

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the civil service to enable the previous military service to count?—Decidedly.

1165. Inasmuch as several of your officers are employed in the civil service?—Yes; it was considered a hardship by even those who had the arrangement of this matter, that Captain Tyler lost nine years' service by it.

1166. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] You say that you ground your recommendation for retirement by age, upon the fact that age is the test of efficiency; that holds good, no doubt, of compulsory retirement when you wish to get rid of inefficient officers, but the same argument will not stand in the case of voluntary retirement, will it?—It applies more closely to the case of compulsory retirement, certainly, but I take the age instead of the service for the voluntary retirement, because it strikes a particular line in each grade, when I think an officer ought to have the option of leaving after giving a certain number of years' service, because age really means service within a year or two in the two corps of the Artillery and Engineers. You can approximate within a year in those corps what a man's service is by knowing his age.

1167. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] That is if you limit the age of entry to the academy to two years?—It is limited, and always has been so.

1168. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] I think when you went to the academy the limit was from 14 to 16 years of age?—It was from 15 to 17.

1169. That was the effect of an alteration which was made?—Yes, you entered at 14.

1170. Of course you have had a very considerable experience of officers who have obtained their commissions in the Royal Engineers at the age of 18, or thereabouts; are you fully confident that a young man at that age can qualify himself in scientific studies for all the practical requirements of your corps?—Yes.

1171. Colonel *North.*] With regard to Captain Tyler's case, can you state what were the conditions of the Horse Guards Circular Memorandum of the 15th April 1861, by which Engineer officers of all services, of 21 years, 22 years, and so on (for instance, Captain Galton) employed in the civil service, receive full pay; is there any reason why Captain Tyler should have been shut out from that?—They are placed on half-pay, having passed a Medical Board.

1172. Who did?—Captain Galton passed a Medical Board.

1173. Major *O'Reilly.*] You said that you thought it would be desirable to offer some inducement to officers younger than 46 to retire, but that you did not see your way to do it?—Exactly.

1174. Allow me to make this suggestion: if an officer will be entitled at the age of 46 to an annuity of 450 *l.* a year, and he is at present aged 40, or any other age you choose to fix, may not it be taken as a deferred annuity to accrue after five years of 450 *l.* a year, and is not the value of that easily calculated?—Very easily.

1175. If that was offered to him, it might be a sufficient inducement to him to retire, might it not?—At 40.

1176. At any age?—I should not object at all to go back to 20 years' service.

1177. Do you think that that principle, which can be worked out in detail, affords a solution of the difficulty, by offering inducements to officers to retire earlier than 46, without inflicting any additional burden upon the State, because of course, paying down the value of a defined annuity now is no additional burden?—Every officer who took a retirement before 46 years of age would be an additional burden upon the State, because his place must be filled up by another, of course.

Monday, 24th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel North.
Mr. Childers.	Major O'Reilly.
Mr. De Grey.	Mr. Otway.
Marquis of Hartington.	Colonel Sturt.
Sir John Hay.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Captain Vivian.
Major Jervis.	

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

General Sir JOHN BURGOYNE, Bart., G.C.B., called in; and Examined.

General Sir *John Burgoyne*, Bart., G.C.B.

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1178. *Chairman.*] You are Inspector General of Fortifications, I believe?—I am.

1179. And the Senior Officer of the Royal Engineers?—I am.

1180. Have you considered at all the present state of the age of the senior colonels of your corps?—The subject has only recently come under my notice, and I have not had time to study it well; but I know that several other officers have, and I have been rather waiting to hear what they had to say, and how they drew up their respective cases, intending then to form my own opinion upon it. Therefore, I am afraid that at present I should not be able to give the Committee any information that would be of much value, except that I feel it is a matter of importance, and of great interest, and I hope it will be treated liberally by the Government.

1181. You are of opinion that the corps is in a state that requires some amendment, but you are not in a position to say what that exact amendment should be?—Yes, precisely; I think the matter is more in anticipation than in existence at this moment. That is the reason why I have not attended to it so much; it is rather forthcoming in the future than an urgency which exists at this moment. It is not for me to anticipate what may be the recommendations of the Committee; but should they comprise a compulsory retirement by age, I would submit that as such a rule, if rigorously enforced, might cause the removal from the service of individuals of great value to it, whether it might not be modified by a discretionary power to make exceptions to meet such cases.

1182. Captain *Vivian.*] You think that it is an evil to be prevented, and not an existing evil to be done away with?—Exactly; it is an evil to be looked forward to, and to be anticipated and prevented, but I feel that it is coming on.

1183. *Chairman.*] When you say that, you are aware that the senior colonels of Engineers are men of 64 and 63 years of age, whose case requires consideration?—What I judge from is that I do not think we have yet found any practical inconvenience from the ages of the respective ranks. It is rather a hardship upon the individuals being retained in the junior ranks, and particularly when they come into positions in the junior ranks of great responsibility and charge.

1184. Mr. *Otway.*] I wish to ask your opinion with regard to the seconding of officers of the Royal Engineers; do you consider that the system of seconding officers of the corps for 10 years, weighing their removal on the one side and the inducements which it gives to officers to join the corps on the other, is prejudicial to the interests of the corps, or the contrary?—I think it is very advantageous to the corps; I think we gain more by the stimulus it gives to others than we lose by losing the services of good officers. I think it is of great consequence.

Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable HUSSEY FANE KEANE, R.E., called in; and further Examined.

Lieut. Col. the Hon. *H. F. Keane*, R.E.

1185. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] WHAT is the establishment of general officers of the Royal Engineers?—Eight with battalions, and eight without; 16 in all.

1186. Do you recollect in what year the establishment was fixed at that number?—I cannot tell you. I think in 1858.

1187. It was previous to the augmentation, was it not?—It was in consequence of the completion of the 8th battalion, the 8th battalion gave us the eighth general.

1188. You have had no addition since that time in consequence of subsequent augmentations?—No.

1189. Captain *Vivian.*] You said, in answer to a question of Mr. Pack-Beresford's on Thursday, that he had entered the academy at 14 years' of age, and that you entered when the age was from 15 to 17?—Yes.

1190. Can you tell me when that alteration in the period of entering was made?—In 1836.

1191. Do you think 14 too young to go to the college?—I think 15 is better, but I think that the standard of education would have to be lowered; much lower, of course, than it is at present, if 15 were the limit; the only argument in favour of the age of 17 now, is, that the standard of education is so high that it would be quite impossible to get a lad of either 14, 15, or 16 who could compete under it.

1192. Do you think the standard of education too high?—Nothing can be too high as far as the standard of education goes, but the objection to it

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it is that it obliges the young men to be so much older than they would otherwise need to be.

1193. Do you think it would be of advantage to the corps if the standard of education was made rather lower, and the men began their military career earlier?—I think it would be of advantage if they entered earlier, certainly.

1194. Do you think 14 too young?—Yes.

1195. You would say from 15 to 17?—That would meet both cases better, I think.

1196. I think you stated that at the present age the men have a difficulty in coming up to the standard?—Yes, we always get as many as we want, but still the competition is of a very arduous character.

1197. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What is the time for being at the academy?—It depends upon how they pass through the different classes; it may extend to three years; the average is about two and a-half, or from that to three years.

1198. Captain *Vivian.*] They are limited to three years, are they not?—I think there is a limit of that sort; it used in my day to be four years.

1199. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are the cadets at liberty to remain there for three years?—Yes, I believe that that is the case; three years is the period that they may remain, but in exceptional cases they are allowed to remain longer than that; another term is given in the event of illness, or any ostensible reason that appears to justify it to the commander in chief; I am not quite positive about these dates.

1200. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] There is a specified time, and if they do not qualify within that time they have to go?—Yes.

1201. Mr. *Otway.*] I wish to direct your attention to one or two of the answers you made to the questions addressed to you on a former occasion, with reference to the officers of Engineers who have left the corps, and been employed in civil departments; I find that in answer to Question 1159, "Do they receive any advantage for their former public service in the corps of Engineers, when they leave your corps and join the civil service?" You said, "Not under a certain rank." Will you explain what that is?—I implied by that a certain period. Unless a captain had served 24 years, he could not derive a benefit from his former service, because he could not get half-pay from it. If he retires before serving 24 years, he loses all his previous service, because he thereby has no claim to half-pay.

1202. But then he would retire to obtain a civil employment?—Of course it would be for that purpose.

1203. Do you think it would be fair, if he received for the civil employment 1,000 *l.* or 1,500 *l.* a year from the State, that he should also receive military half-pay?—I think the Treasury take precautions against that. If you get half-pay from one branch, they deduct it from the other emolument you receive.

1204. Then it would be of no importance one way or the other?—No.

1205. I should like to ask your opinion with regard to the seconding; whether you think that the system of officers leaving the corps for 10 years is advantageous?—Yes, decidedly.

1206. Will you state your reasons for that opinion?—A corps that has the opportunity of civil employment of all kinds naturally has greater inducements to a young man coming into it than one which has not. There are all kinds of openings for which engineer officers are frequently, I may say, constantly being asked for; and under this system they are enabled to take an employment, and test whether they like it or not, for a period of 10 years. If they do, they give up their military career, and take to whatever else it may be. It is extremely desirable to have such a system, and the proof of that is that in other branches of the service, in the Line, for instance, applications are constantly made to second officers, but it is not generally approved. There are certain appointments which are allowed to be held by seconded officers.

1207. You think that the advantage of the inducement it holds out to men to remain in the corps of Royal Engineers counterbalances the disadvantage of losing the services of a young and efficient officer for 10 years, and then, at the end of 10 years perhaps, receiving him back, or perhaps losing him altogether?—You lose the individual, but you do not lose the step, because the promotion takes place during that 10 years, and at the expiration of the 10 years he has to be re-absorbed into the corps, if he wishes to return to it.

1208. Is it often the case that the officers return after 10 years, or do they remain in civil employment?—They almost always return to the corps. Captain Tyler is the only exception, in my memory.

1209. *Chairman.*] The point about these regulations is this, is it not; there are certain rules as to a seconded officer being entitled to retire on half-pay?—Yes.

1210. If he has not served the time to bring him within those rules, he loses the right to go on half-pay?—Certainly.

1211. If he has served that time, he has the right to go on half-pay?—Yes.

1212. Are you aware whether an officer appointed to a civil employment, such as a railway inspectorship under the Board of Trade, when he is superannuated, has a certain number of years added to his years of service, on account of his professional character?—No; I am not aware of that, but he counts the whole of the seconded period in which he has been employed by that department for his retirement.

1213. You do not know whether under the Civil Service rules, the Treasury add to the civil service of an officer of that kind a certain number of years on account of his professional character?—I am not aware.

1214. Mr. *Otway.*] In the case of Captain Tyler, you stated that he received a Civil Service pension for the 10 years which he served in the Board of Trade?—Yes; he will receive, but not for the nine years which he served in the Engineers besides.

1215. Major *Jervis.*] You said the other day, that you wished a lieutenant colonel to have an opportunity of retiring at 46 years of age; would not it be advisable, if the age of 46 is to be introduced at all, that it should be introduced as a matter of age, not with reference to rank; it is not a man's fault that he is not a lieutenant colonel at 46; it may be owing to something which has been done for the benefit of the public service?—If this rule was laid down which I have spoken of, an officer in the Royal Engineers would always be a lieutenant colonel at 46.

1216. Supposing he was not?—If my scheme is carried out, he would not be of a lower rank than lieutenant colonel at 46 years of age.

1217. If he was not, you would not mind leaving out the words "lieutenant colonel"?—No, not at all.

1218. *Chairman.*] You were asked generally the last time you were examined why you preferred age to service for compulsory retirement; do you think the same reasons apply to the optional retirement at the earlier stages?—Yes, I think so; precisely the same.

1219. All the retirements under 60 provided for all branches of the service, I think, are retirements on service?—All of them.

1220. Whereas the only compulsory retirement in the army at present is the age retirement of 60?—Yes.

1221. Might it not possibly introduce complication in the other branches of the service if the rule of age was used for the optional retirements lower down?—I think it might; I think you might advantageously adhere to the present principle with regard to service in the junior ranks, and then it would do away with any difficulty of that sort.

1222. So that, instead of 46 years of age and 53 years of age for the earlier periods, you would not see any objection to substituting the corresponding period of service?—None whatever.

1223. Captain *Vivian.*] You think that it would not cause confusion between the age of retirement upon the compulsory list and the other retirements?—No; I do not think that the difference of age in every ten years is sufficiently great amongst the cadets getting their commissions to make any great difference between age and service in that period.

1224. *Chairman.*] The retirements low down being absolute retirements from the army altogether?—Yes; altogether.

1225. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Have you any officers who got their commissions except under the competitive examination?—Yes.

1226. Their ages vary very considerably, do they not?—I only know of two; I think one of them is very much older than his contemporaries; his commission was given during the war, when there was great pressure.

1227. Major *Jervis.*] If you do away with the present high standard of examination, and you keep up the competitive system, open to all the world, as it is at present, will you not very much lower the class of men who come forward?—I think it would be necessary, then, to adopt the same principle in entering the academy or on competitive examination for the academy at Woolwich, as is now necessary for Sandhurst.

1228. Under the old system of selection by the Master General of the Ordnance, you were of course confined to those whom he thought proper to nominate; but now that it is open to all the world to come forward without the sanction of anybody, if you lower the standard of examination, you of course lower the expense of education, and therefore you might have a very different class of men altogether?—It would require, as an addendum to that plan, supposing it were carried out, that there should be an introduction of every individual competing in the same way, as is now the rule for Sandhurst: a man's father writes a letter to the military secretary, and he has to produce a certificate of somebody else who is known, saying who he is.

1229. Therefore, it would follow that you must do away with the system of open competition; it would become a system of selection by the Commander in Chief?—Yes, not to the same extent as it was in former days by the Master General of the Ordnance, but in the same way as is now required at Sandhurst.

1230. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] A reduction of the limit of age from 17 to 19 as at present to 15 to 17, as you propose, would probably have the effect of bringing the same youths to the academy as at present, would it not?—Yes, I think it would.

1231. Major *Jervis.*] Do you think that boys of from 15 to 17 years of age could pass the same standard of examination as they do now, when the age is from 17 to 19?—No.

1232. If you reduced the age from 17 to 19 to 15 to 17, would it not follow that you would be obliged to have a very much lower standard of examination, and therefore open the academy to a class of men who now cannot enter?—I do not think that altogether; I think that a lad who enters now by a very high standard of examination at 17 is the same class of boy that would enter at 15, at a lower standard, if he had directed his attention towards that particular line, with the intention of going to the academy at Woolwich.

1233. Then you do not think that an increased standard of study involves also an increase of expenditure to attain it?—Yes, it does, certainly.

1234. If it increases the expenditure, does not it also make a difference in the class of persons who come forward?—Not so much as I think one would imagine.

1235. Are you aware that that was one of the reasons why a good many years ago they made the standard at the *Ecole Polytechnique* so high as it is?—Yes, I know that that was one of the reasons.

1236. Major *O'Reilly.*] Is not it the fact that any standard of education which you can reasonably fix for boys of 15 will enable a much poorer class of the population to qualify their sons for passing that examination, than a relatively equal examination fixed at the age of 17 or 18?—Yes, I think it would; but I should propose to meet that objection by a nomination for competitions.

1237. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Do you think that in England when you have once opened the academy to all the people, as you have done, by a competitive examination, you can ever go back to a system of selection?—If the public submit to it in the case of Sandhurst, I do not see why they should not submit to it in the case of Woolwich.

1238. Only that at Sandhurst they never have opened it?—I suppose it is not impossible to retrace a mistake.

1239. Major *Jervis.*] Would it be a mistake if you maintained the present high class of examination, and allowed them while at the academy to count their time towards retirement the same as they did at Addiscombe, counting the time at the academy as part of the soldiering, in fact?—That is an idea I have never thought of. Under such a rule, an idler at the academy would count time for service for half-pay, with less army service than the industrious officer; both getting their commissions the same day.

1240. In the case of the Artillery and the Engineers in India, they could retire after 22 years, but the two years they spent at Addiscombe counted out of that time?—That is only a 20-years' service with the two years added on.

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1241. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You have a certain number of officers in the corps of Royal Engineers now on half-pay, have you not?—Yes.

1242. The Government has a claim upon their services, if they require them?—Yes.

1243. Is that claim ever practically put in force?—Never within my knowledge.

1244. In fact we may suppose that it is never put in force?—No, there has never been an opportunity.

1245. Then there would be no loss to the country if any retirement was given without that claim upon their service?—No, I think not.

1246. At present an officer being upon half-pay could not go to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and capitalise that half-pay, I presume?—He can, certainly; there is a warrant permitting it.

1247. When was that warrant issued?—Five or six years ago, I think; I will provide it.

1248. Mr. *Otway.*] With reference to the ages of the officers, are you aware whether the officers in your corps have entered later than the officers in other countries, France, or Prussia, or Russia?—I am not aware.

1249. Do many or any of the officers of the Engineers leave the corps, to your knowledge, to obtain employment other than under the Government; for instance, under any of the great companies for engineering purposes?—No, we have not an instance of it.

1250. Do I understand you to propose that any officer of the Engineers should be able to claim retirement at the age of 46, receiving 450 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1251. Major *Jervis.*] The junior officers of the Engineers in India are now entirely recruited from the Royal Engineers, are they not?—Yes.

1252. The Indian Government is obtaining the advantage of the services of those officers simply by paying what would be the amount of the yearly pay of the troops out there, without having to look forward to the future burden of the pensions, is it not?—I should imagine that the same reply would meet that question, as Colonel Gambier made with reference to the Artillery, that the capitation grant which they pay goes for everything.

1253. Is that taken into account in the capitation grant?—I think so.

1254. Do you know what proportion is taken into account?—No.

1255. I have never myself been able to get any explanation as to what the capitation grant covers?—Nor I either.

1256. Colonel *Sturt.*] Has your attention been drawn to Brigadier General Lefroy's proposal of a bonus system?—Yes.

1257. Do you think that it would answer for the Engineers?—No, I think not.

1258. Will you give your reasons why you think it would not answer?—I do not think the officers would like to portion off a certain quantity of their income for that purpose.

1259. Do you think that there would be any other objection upon public grounds?—No.

Major General COLLINGWOOD DICKSON, C.B., V.C., R.A., called in; and Examined.

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1260. *Chairman.*] You have no employment at present, I believe?—No.

1261. What was your last employment?—As Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Artillery, commanding the Royal Artillery in Scotland.

1262. Has your attention been directed at all to the question of the present system of retirement of the corps?—It has.

1263. And to the effects of that system upon the efficiency of the corps generally?—Yes, I have thought much about it.

1264. Do you consider that the present system requires amendment in any respect?—I do.

1265. Will you be good enough to state to the Committee in what respect you think it is deficient, and what amendment you can suggest?—I think the present mode of retiring officers on full pay being confined to the upper ranks of the corps has limited the number of retirements annually very much, and the emoluments of the officers in the higher ranks are so good from commands and so on, and their prospects are so good, that you cannot get them to retire. It is with great difficulty that you get officers in the higher ranks to retire; the junior full colonels, as a general rule, have been more the men to retire than those who hold the commands in the high places. And also the retirements being upon a fixed list, and a certain sum of money being voted annually, it amounts to a separate corps, in which the appointments go by death-vacancies. Of course until the younger officers retire, they clog the list, and prevent any additions of importance to it for many years to come. In the last five years I find, on looking at the returns, that there have been only 13 retirements on full pay from the Royal Artillery; that is an average of 2 ½, or thereabouts, per annum. That is very insufficient for such a corps as ours. That is all the retirement there is, with the exception of the retirement of officers on half-pay, owing to ill health and other circumstances in the lower ranks; and that is quite insufficient to meet the wants of the corps.

1266. What proposal would you make to meet this evil?—The proposal I would wish to make would be to extend the advantages of the retirement from the upper to the lower grades of the service. As far as regards lieutenant colonels and captains, I would propose that the present mode of retirement be suffered to die out, that is to say, that as the holders die off, the money should go to the Government. The new scheme which I propose would be to revise a warrant which I believe answered very well for a long time; it only allowed, I think, a limited number of retirements. I refer to the Warrant of the 10th of April 1841. It allowed four lieutenant colonels and four captains to retire on full pay annually. Therefore, there was no limit to the number who might be on the list, but eight officers every year were allowed to retire on full pay, provided they could prove before a medical board that they were no longer able to continue in the service, and they must have completed 21 years' service; that was the warrant, I believe.

1267. Under the system then in force, there was a fixed establishment of retired full-pay officers, was there not?—There was.

1268. And those annual retirements were in addition

addition to the fixed establishment?—The annual retirements were in addition to a fixed establishment which had been formed previously.

1269. Was the option of retirement given to those officers who were retired annually, or were they selected by the Master General? — The option was given to them in order of seniority. The retirement was offered to an officer whose state of health prevented him from continuing in the service. If more than four presented themselves the senior four obtained it, if a medical board confirmed the state of their health as being unfit for service, of course supposing them to have served the requisite time. That was the case with lieutenant colonels, and it was the same with captains; any one over 21 years' service received it.

1270. Only, if I rightly understand you, in the event of their being certified by a medical board to be unfit for service?—That was all.

1271. So that there was no absolute option to any lieutenant colonel to take his retirement?—Not unless he could prove his health to be such as to unfit him for service. But as a general rule, owing to the Colonial service, very many of the officers found that their health was not in that state that would enable them to serve, and they could show it.

1272. At that time there were no officers retired from the colonels' list, were there?—No; at that time the number of colonels was very different from what it is now. There were the same number of colonels per battalion or brigade, but they were employed in very limited numbers. At the time when that warrant existed, there were, I think, nine battalions of artillery, and one brigade of horse artillery, which made 20 colonels; out of those not above five or six were employed, the rest might be said to be on full pay, with the prospect of succession to general officers in their turn.

1273. So that the colonels' list was almost a retired list in itself?—It was looked upon in those days as an honourable retirement almost; there were only four or five employed from it.

1274. The senior colonels were nearly 70 years of age, were they not?—They were.

1275. According to that system, the colonels' list being a sort of honorary retired list, no one was to be retired below the rank of colonel, except upon a medical certificate?—No one except upon a medical certificate.

1276. Is the Committee to understand that you think that a similar system might be restored now with advantage?—Yes, with regard to length of service; but, putting aside the requirements of a medical certificate, I would abolish the system of an officer making his health the cause of retirement, and allow him to retire after he had served a certain length of time. I will explain in a very few words the system I would propose. It would be that for a sum of 5,000 *l.* a year, voted annually, two full colonels, four lieutenant colonels, and eight captains, should be allowed to retire; the colonels upon 600 *l.* a year, and the lieutenant colonels upon 400 *l.* a year. When I say colonels, I mean either colonels or major generals from the effective list of major generals, if they liked to take it, besides four lieutenant colonels and eight captains, on the full pay of their rank, with, of course, the addition of any brevet pay they may enjoy at the time of retiring.

1277. Captain *Vivian.*] What is the full pay of captain?—The full pay of the rank of first captain is about 240 *l.* a year, but then many of them are brevet officers, and you might fix the average at from 250 *l.* to 260 *l.* a year. The whole sum required, would amount to about 5,000 *l.* per annum.

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1278. *Chairman.*] Two hundred and seventy-five pounds would give exactly 5,000 *l.* a year?—I fix it at that, to put the sum in round numbers; it would be very nearly as much as that with some of the brevet officers. The scheme I propose would give 14 officers retiring annually, to bring forward, at least 14 subalterns, if officers were found willing to accept the retirement. It is also capable of expansion, because if that number is not considered sufficient, and the country is willing to afford the expense, for 7,500 *l.* a year, you could retire in addition, one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and four captains; that would make 21 in all. For the sum of 7,500 *l.* if that number, 21, could be found to retire, you could give them a retirement. But as the list stands at present, as the officers enjoying 600 *l.* a year who went under the warrant of 1854, and all the old warrants from 1840 onwards, and the captains who retired under the warrant of 1854, die off, their money will come into the country again. Therefore, that would lessen the expense for many years. And also if that number of officers I have mentioned retired annually, their retirements would soon begin to drop in. In 10 years' time, for instance, the total sum voted by the country, taking it at the rate of 7,500 *l.* a year, would be 75,000 *l.*; but you must deduct from that, the money falling in continually from the old retirements dropping off, and also from the deaths of some amongst the body of officers who have retired under it; I think that is a better scheme than having any list which becomes, as I said before, a mere seniority list, in which officers must wait for a death vacancy, to retire.

1279. You have no basis upon which you could fix the amount to be deducted from the 75,000 *l.*?—No; I did not go into that. There are 23 general officers at this moment, and adding nine officers who have taken 600 *l.* a year under the grant voted by Parliament this year, that makes 32 officers enjoying 600 *l.* a year each; many of those are men of a great age, and 10 years must necessarily make a great difference in their number, and there would be several of those 600 *l.* a year coming in. Even taking the death vacancies at two per annum off this retired list, that would in 10 years give you 12,000 *l.* back, and at the same time you must allow for any of the officers enjoying the retired pay under the new warrant, dropping off; I have no other data to go upon; I cannot go into it further.

1280. You think therefore, that you might probably get back 15,000 *l.* out of the 75,000 *l.*?—Yes; I should think at the end of 10 years you might say that the expense to the country would be from 55,000 *l.* to 60,000 *l.* that would have been voted by Parliament. At present, the state of things is this, the money voted this year was 32,000 *l.*, and an additional 5,000 *l.*; that makes 37,000 *l.*, and if the present system of retirement had been carried on, I believe it was to have been 5,000 *l.* more next year, which would have made 42,000 *l.* I do not apprehend that the carrying out of my scheme would entail a very large additional expense. We are a very large corps, the country wishes to see it efficient, of course it

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requires a great expense to keep it so, but I do not think that the scheme I propose would entail any very great additional expense upon the country.

1281. Your proposal is this: that the 32,000 *l.* a year or 37,000 *l.* a year now allotted to the Artillery, should die out altogether?—Yes; that it should die out.

1282. That at the top, instead of it, two colonels should be retired every year on 600 *l.* a year?—Yes.

1283. You would offer that in turn to the whole body of colonels from the top?—From the major generals, who are like myself unemployed, waiting for commands, or brigades. I would offer it amongst them or the colonels; amongst the superior list.

1284. You would offer it from the top amongst the major generals and colonels, whichever chose to take it?—Yes; according to the practice at present.

1285. Would you give any preference to those who are anxious to take it, and satisfy a medical board that they are unfit for service?—I should say that if you fixed the length of service, I think a medical board might be dispensed with, because the case of an officer having to satisfy a medical board is where he declines to serve. In such a case he must appear before a medical board, and if the medical board finds him unfit for service, it is for the authorities to tell him that he must take a retirement.

1286. My question is this, supposing the senior colonel on the list is fit for service, and the second colonel is not fit for service, would you retire the senior colonel all the same in preference to the second colonel?—If both were desirous of taking it, I think I should give the preference to the claim of seniority in a case where I made the retirement optional, because the second officer would have the chance of getting the retirement next year.

1287. Coming to the next rank, the rank of lieutenant colonel, you would give in the same way four retirements every year to the four senior officers who wanted it?—Yes.

1288. Would you, with respect to that rank, also give it to a senior officer who asked for it who was thoroughly efficient, in preference to a junior officer who was unfit for service?—It is a very difficult question to answer; I should say (and the same would apply to the case you mentioned before) that it would be most desirable to keep the officer who was thoroughly efficient, particularly in the case of a lieutenant colonel, where you have a greater hold upon him than in the case of a full colonel. There are always some full colonels who are unemployed, but there are never lieutenant colonels unemployed, therefore necessarily the lieutenant colonel who was physically unfit for service would get the retirement in preference to a senior officer.

1289. You would propose to revert to the warrant of 1842, under which a fixed number of officers were retired every year, but in each case, with the condition of the report of a medical board; you say, however, that you would dispense with the condition of a report of a medical board; would you dispense with it so far as to give the preference to seniority over those whom a medical board might prove to be desirable to be retired?—I think, on consideration, I should modify what I said; I certainly think, if officers cannot accept service on account of their health, they ought to be the first to be allowed to go; perhaps you will allow me also to state the length of service, which I have not yet done. I should say that for full colonels it should be as at present, after 30 years' service or upwards; for lieutenant colonels I think it should be from 25 years' service upwards, and for captain it should be from 21 years' service upwards. That was the warrant of 1841, only that it forced them to go before a medical board. I would dispense with that requirement except in cases where officers are called upon to serve and cannot do so; then if they cannot pass through a medical board I think you might allow them the option of retiring.

1290. So that if there were not eight captains of 21 years' service who wished to take the retirement, the whole amount of retirement would not be given?—Whatever retirements are not taken during the year would be saved, in the same way as under the warrant of 1841; occasionally there were one or two which fell in; the Government did not necessarily have to give them all. But our corps has increased so much, and our service has become so varied, with the addition of India and other places that have fallen to us in consequence of our amalgamation with the Indian army, that a great many officers lose their health, and particularly in the rank of captain. There are many officers now who cannot even get half pay, and who, I believe, would be very glad to go. They are men who have deserved, by the length and character of their colonial service, more consideration than mere half pay after 21 years' service.

1291. The effect of your proposal would be to make the amount of retirement from the corps dependent upon a rigid rule of a certain amount per annum being granted to officers of different ranks?—Yes.

1292. Will you be good enough to say whether you think any calculation can be made which will insure that that system shall not be either too much or too little?—I think that the only calculation I can make as to its effect upon the promotion would be, that taking the present number of subaltern officers of the Artillery who it is most desirable should reach the rank of second captain at the proper age for service, I think it would have the effect, with the addition of the ordinary vacancies in the regiment, of making subalterns captains at from 10 to 11 years' service, which is as much as can be reasonably expected.

1293. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] That is, second captains?—Yes; second captains. It would also bring forward the second captains if the retirements were taken (this is voluntary; there is no other way of doing it, except by making retirement compulsory), so that second captains would pass through their rank in about seven years on the average; therefore an officer would attain the rank of first captain after from 17 to 18 years' service. I doubt very much whether in a large corps like ours you could produce a much quicker rate of promotion.

1294. *Chairman.*] You have made this calculation with reference to the existing establishment of officers of Artillery?—Yes.

1295. If there was an augmentation, a larger number of officers, I presume, would have to be retired annually?—Yes, certainly.

1296. And, if the corps was reduced in the same way, the amount of annual retirement would have to be reduced also?—Yes.

1297. Have

1297. Have you considered the circumstance that the corps will be greatly increased by the addition of the Indian regiments?—Yes, I have; but that will not operate for many years to come. The Indian regiments are not with us at present as regards promotion, and will not be until the whole of the officers of the old Indian Artillery are absorbed in their own regiments. Then they will come to us, but many years must elapse before they can form a part of our Royal Artillery. In the present scheme, I have only taken the Royal Artillery at its present strength.

1298. Is that when the augmentation of the captains caused by the amalgamation of the Indian regiments with the old royal regiments takes place, it will be necessary to provide for a larger number of captains, for instance, being annually retired?—The Indian Government at present provide retirements for their own officers, and, I presume, as we get more amalgamated together, the system of retirement must be extended to the regiment as it increases, but I apprehend that what I propose is sufficient for the requirements for many years to come.

1299. Are you aware that now, for some years past, a subaltern has been appointed as a subaltern in the whole Artillery corps?—I am perfectly aware of it, and at present no subaltern of the Royal Artillery can be promoted to the rank of second captain in any of the Presidency corps until all the subalterns of those corps are gone. At present, in the Bengal Artillery, there are 92 subalterns; all of those must go before the senior subaltern of the present Royal Artillery can obtain a second captaincy in the Bengal Artillery.

1300. When the time comes that a subaltern appointed since the amalgamation, reaches to be a captain of 21 years' standing, it will be necessary, under your scheme, to increase the number of retirements from that rank?—Decidedly, it will.

1301. And you think that retirement from a corps so large as the Artillery will be better effected by a fixed amount from the different ranks every year, than by a mixture of the compulsory and optional systems at certain ages, or at certain periods of service?—I am averse to fixing compulsory retirement at certain ages or certain fixed periods of service, because I think that very often great injustice is done by it. If 60 years of age had been fixed as the maximum, the country would have lost the services of many officers, and excellent officers too, and there are many other officers younger than them, whose services I believe it would be a gain for the country to lose. Therefore, it is a very difficult thing to fix any date at which to compel officers to retire, and it would be a very hard thing, in many cases, if you had such a limit. You can make physical infirmity a cause of retirement, but I hardly think it would be fair to fix a limit of age, unless the age of the officers became very advanced, and an officer had no chance of becoming a general officer before he was 75 or 70. But without that state of things, I hardly think at present that it would be fair to fix any compulsory limit of that kind.

1302. Did you hear the previous evidence which has been given, with reference to the proposed retirement of a colonel at 60 to a list which would entitle him to succeed to battalions as now, or to be employed on the staff?—I did.

1303. Do you consider that the objection to fixing a limit of age, would extend to a qualified retirement of that kind?—A retirement like that is merely making a second list, because I believe from what I have heard of that scheme, that the officers so retiring were still to be allowed to serve on the staff. The consequence is, that you put new officers in their place, and you have not employment for them all, and then you get a still more extended list, and some of the older ones are still desirous of serving, though removed to that list, and you prevent the younger men who have stepped into their places from getting any employment, while they are taken out of the ranks where they were usefully employed.

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1304. Your first objection to retirement would not extend to that kind of retirement; but you find another kind of objection to it?—I find the objection, that I think officers who retire from the service ought to be *bonâ fide* retired, and as an ordinary rule not in any shape to look forward to it again.

1305. Do you think that your system of a certain number of annual retirements would be preferable to an optional retirement at a fixed age, or after a fixed length of service?—I think that an optional retirement at a fixed age or after a fixed length of service would be very desirable?—If no compulsion is used, I certainly have no objection to such a scheme as that; I think if an officer had his choice to serve on, or to retire after he attained a certain age, then it would be a very fair thing.

1306. In that case, might not the fixed age, or the fixed service, be pitched a little higher than according to your plan?—I think it might; I think you might even give the officers some years more, and by doing so you would allow officers who felt tired of the service, and who had the option of going, to take their retirements.

1307. Colonel *Percy Herbert*.] You object to compulsory retirement at 60 years of age, on account of the injustice to the individual officer?—Yes.

1308. Would you object to the proposal which was alluded to by the Chairman, that officers should be retired from the active duties of the artillery regiment at 60 years of age, but should be allowed to gain the rank of major general, and attain the honorary rank of colonel commandant, with the power to her Majesty to employ them as general officers on the staff away from the corps of Artillery; would your objection extend to such a proposal as that?—No, I do not think it would, if an officer had the option either to take that or to serve. I object to any one, on attaining the age of 60, being told that he must be put aside. The chances at that age of his promotion on the staff of the army are very small, and he would be doomed to a life of idleness.

1309. That would be, perhaps, an appropriate thing, after he had attained the age of 60?—There are, or have been, many officers, and very good ones of that age; at present there are none of that age in the Royal Artillery, from our senior colonels downwards. I believe there is no officer within three or four years of 60, but in old days we had some very good officers of that age. I do not mean to say that a man of 60 ought not to be a man of higher rank than a colonel of Artillery; but from unavoidable causes he may be so, and in that case I do not think he ought to be removed, when he can remain and do good service.

1310. Not in the interests of the corps itself?—I think

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—I think if the interests of the corps can be served by optional retirement, that would be much more advisable. I would not come to compulsory retirement until a fair trial had been given to optional retirement. Of course, if it comes to a *dernier ressort*, one must take it, but that is a thing which I would put aside until other things have been tried.

1311. I think you proposed that the rate of retirement should depend upon the rank the officer held at the time that he retired?—Yes, upon the rank.

1312. For the lower ranks of the service, at any rate?—Yes, for captains.

1313. And lieutenant-colonels?—A lieutenant-colonel would receive 400 *l.* a year; that was what I proposed.

1314. Should you have any objection, in the interests of the corps, to fixing the rate of retirement by the number of years' service which the officer had seen, irrespective of his regimental rank, on the same principle as is followed in the Indian service?—I should think that that would not be an objectionable principle at all. If the officer was to have the option of retiring upon the completion of so many years' service, irrespective of his rank. I think that plan would answer equally well with the one I have proposed. You give the officer, in fact, the Indian system of pensioning. I think it would answer equally well with the other plan.

1315. It would have this advantage, of remunerating an officer in some degree for having had the misfortune of slow promotion, which might have been owing to no fault of his?—Exactly.

1316. If that system was followed, might it not make it easier to provide for the cases of officers who were reported unfit for service by a medical board, inasmuch as they might be put as supernumeraries on a list to fall in at the first vacancy?—Yes, I think that would be of advantage.

1317. Because of course, if the retirement depended upon the rank of the officer, it might be that there was a field officer who was sick when there was only a vacancy for a captain?—Yes, I understand what you mean; if you made it depend on the number of years' service in a progressive corps like ours, whatever the number of years' service you lay down, you may almost predict the rank which an officer will be in after that length of service; that is the general rule.

1318. It varies from period to period, does it not, very materially?—I think the service of the senior captain of the Royal Artillery waiting to become a lieutenant colonel, is about 23 or 24 years, barely 24 years.

1319. According to a return which has been handed in by the Deputy Adjutant General of Artillery, we see that the senior captains of Artillery in 1836 had 36 years' service, but that in 1866 they had 21 years' service, so that there is a very great difference of age in the same rank at different periods?—Yes; but you must bear in mind that that state of things in 1836 was the result of a reduction of the army after the Peninsular war in 1822, in which a great many officers were put upon half-pay, and no vacancies were filled up until every one of those officers of the different ranks, from lieutenant colonel downwards, were brought back again. I know that when I entered the service, and joined the regiment in 1836, I mounted guard with subalterns of 23 years' service, who were subalterns with myself who had just joined. That was an exceptional case.

1320. Future augmentations and reductions may cause something of the same kind again, may they not?—If there were great reductions, of course the corps would suffer enormously.

1321. I should like to have your opinion as to the number of years' service at which you think that it is desirable for an officer to attain the rank of first captain of Artillery?—I think he ought to attain that rank after from 16 to 17 years' service, if possible. I should think probably it would be 18 years, but, if possible, it should be less; it might be as low as 12 years, but that would be impossible with the great list of subalterns, because the retirements to be given would have to be so very extensive, that you could not possibly get subalterns promoted to the rank of second captains much under 10 or 11 years' service. And the second captains' list is a very large one; I believe, with officers of all classes, seconded officers, and one thing and another, there are 181 of them. To go through such a list as that, you must allow at least six or seven years, with every wish to benefit the officer and push them forward. Therefore I say he must have 17 or 18 years' service under any scheme, before he could attain the rank of first captain.

1322. The rank of first captain of Artillery in a battery in the field is a very important one according to the organization of your corps, is it not?—Yes, it is as important as the command of a regiment; the officer has a very large charge, exclusive of his guns, in war time; he has something like 220 men and 190 horse; he has charge of the ammunition and the reserve stores; in fact, he is the paymaster as well for his battery, and he is a commissariat officer, in fact he combines a great many offices in his person.

1323. The personal character of the officer reflects very much upon the efficiency of the battery under his command, does it not?—Of course.

1324. And to secure his full efficiency and bodily vigour you think he ought to attain that rank at not later than about 17 years' service?—Decidedly; sooner if possible.

1325. Not later than that?—Not later than that, most certainly.

1326. Am I to understand you, then, that having regard only to the efficiency of the service, and not to the mere interests of the officers, you think that any system of retirement ought to have that for its aim?—Yes, to bring officers up to the commands of which the command of a battery is the most important as soon as possible.

1327. Captain *Vivian.*] You were asked just now why you objected to compulsory retirement at 60 upon a list, from which list the officers would be eligible to staff appointments, and you objected to that scheme because you said it would be practically shelving officers?—I did.

1328. Do you know how many general officers of Artillery there are now employed upon the general staff of the army?—Yes.

1329. How many are there?—There are five general officers of Artillery employed in that way. There is Major General St. George, the Director of the Ordnance in War Department; Major General Ward, the Commandant at Woolwich, who commands the district; Major General Burke Cuppage, the Governor of Jersey; Major General Ormsby, the Governor of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and Major General Taylor, the

the Inspector General of Artillery. There are 15 general officers of the Royal Artillery on the establishment on unattached pay, not being colonels commandant, and five of those are employed at present.

1330. Are officers of Artillery ever selected as major generals for appointments on the general staff of the army for such posts as the command at Gibraltar or Malta?—I have only known one instance, and that was many years ago; that was the late Sir Robert Gardner. Besides that case, Sir William Williams, of Kars, was Commander in Chief of the Forces in North America. I only know of those two officers who have held staff appointments on the general staff of the army.

1331. Therefore you think that, according to the present system, putting officers upon such a list as that which was proposed, would be almost a forlorn hope?—I am confident of it, for this reason: that the officers of the general army being much younger than ours, they would be naturally selected for all important commands in preference to men of 60 and over from our corps. I have not a doubt of it; not one of our officers would practically get a command.

1332. *Chairman.*] Is not it the case at the present time in the line that a colonel has to retire at 60 years of age?—He has only got the option; he can go if he likes, but they do not compel him.

1333. Is he not compelled to go under the warrant?—His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge has it in his power to compel him, but he is very reluctant to exert it.

1334. Are not the words of the warrant, "shall be compulsorily retired, unless the Commander in Chief chooses" to dispense with it?—It so happens that that "unless" has saved the thing from ever being carried out; but allow me to state that an officer in the line, at the age of 60, who, either at his own option or because he is compelled to go, retires from the command of a regiment, is put upon a retired list with a rate of pay which will remunerate him for his loss; in fact, he receives the same rate of pay as he would get if commanding a regiment, that is, 1 *l.* a day, and he becomes a major general in his turn, and is eligible to be employed on the staff.

1335. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What is your objection to putting an Artillery officer on precisely the same footing?—My objection to it is that, as I have already stated, I am averse to compulsion. I do not even approve of the plan of putting out lieutenant colonels commanding line regiments if they do not wish to go. But I think the cases are very rare in a line regiment for an officer of 60 years of age to be still only in that position, whereas it appears that in our corps there are several colonels, at least more than one, who are in that position, and still willing and able to command, and my objection to putting them out is, that in the line an officer may by chance get a command, but an Artillery officer will never have a chance of it at that age; they would never employ him.

1336. Captain *Vivian.*] Officers employed in command of the Artillery in districts are colonels on the staff, not brigadiers, are they not?—Yes, they are colonels on the staff.

1337. However large their district may be, and however many guns they may have, and however important their command, they are never raised to the rank of brigadier generals, are they?—Never, except in war time.

1338. So that a colonel of Artillery going to take the command of the Artillery at Aldershot, would still find himself under all the brigadiers of infantry?—Yes; but that would not generally have any practical effect. He is at the head of his own arm, and is responsible to the general in command of the force at present, and therefore no brigadier general would interfere with him, except where by seniority the command would devolve upon him; that is the only case in which it would operate, and such cases are very rare; but the colonels of districts of the Royal Artillery exercise a command, which is in many cases threefold larger in point of numbers, that is in the numerical strength of the men and horses, and as regards the stores of artillery, ammunition, &c., of which he has charge, than that which a brigadier exercises. Of course I do not want to make any comments upon the one or the other; I speak only of their rank.

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1339. However, that is simply the fact?—Yes. The only general officer of Artillery employed purely as such in peace time, was Major General Sir Richard Dacres, who, after the Crimean war, went to Ireland; I was his adjutant general at the time, but that appointment was abolished in 1859; and the officer who succeeded General Dacres, Colonel Ormsby, now Major General Ormsby, came to Ireland to command seven field batteries, and three troops of Horse Artillery, exclusive of garrison Artillery, altogether a large charge throughout the country without even being a colonel on the staff; he came as a simple colonel to command there, with no advantages or pay, except what he got from his regimental rank.

1340. That was the case with Sir David Wood, I think?—Yes; until in the end of 1859, or the beginning of 1860, the Duke of Cambridge got the Government to sanction the appointment of so many colonels on the staff for the great and important districts of England, Ireland, Scotland, and abroad. Since that we have had five or six colonels on the staff in England and Ireland, and the colonels in great districts have got those appointments.

1341. None of these offices would be open to the compulsorily retired list?—No; decidedly not, unless the officers on that list retained their rank of colonel only. They are anxious to serve as colonels, and if you make them major generals you preclude them from that.

1342. Colonel *North.*] Sir Fenwick Williams was Commander in Chief in Canada, was he not?—I mentioned him.

1343. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] I apprehend that Colonel Percy Herbert in his scheme did not propose promotion to the rank of major general?—As I said before, if you allowed them as colonels to get employment as Artillery officers, then your second colonels list would be so clogged that you would have a number of young colonels whom you could give nothing to.

1344. You consider that a compulsory system of retirement would in course of time create such a large list of colonels that the prospects of promotion of those at the bottom of the list to major general, or their prospect of being absorbed into the establishment of major generals, would be almost hopeless?—Yes, it would; I have considered that question, and it is simply the old story of a double list. You put men aside, and then there is a question about keeping them there; and there is the old objection against it, it does

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not remove them. Whatever retirements there are, ought to be *bonâ fide* retirements from the corps; there ought to be no looking back to it; they should take their retirement and go, then they would make vacancies; they would never make any vacancies in the way you mentioned.

1345. The great aim and hope of an Artillery officer of course is to arrive in course of time at the highest rank?—Yes, of course.

1346. Do you not consider that it would be a great boon to the Artillery, and to the service generally, if general officers were employed in commands where the force of artillery justifies such a course in comparison with the strength of your general officers' command?—Most decidedly.

1347. Going back to your suggestion, you said, I think, that you would allow in your scheme of retirement 600 *l.* a year to be offered either to major generals upon the establishment, or to colonels?—Yes.

1348. If major generals upon the establishment took the 600 *l.* a year, that would not necessarily give a step throughout the regiment?—Yes; it gives a step throughout the regiment, because it promotes the senior colonel of the regiment to be a major general *bonâ fide* upon the establishment.

1349. That is, if you had no supernumerary major generals?—Yes.

1350. I should like to ask your opinion as to the age of officers on first getting their commissions, and to their relative efficiency at the time when they went to the Academy at 14 years, and at the present time?—I think at present in a seniority corps like ours, the age at which they generally get their commissions is too great, but as Colonel Keane stated in his evidence just now, when you take the high character of the competitive examinations that have been going on into consideration, I do not see how you can well remedy that state of things without lowering the whole character of the acquirements to be attained by the officers. At present, I believe the average ages of the officers who get their commissions are from 21 to 22. I know that the duties of the corps were well and efficiently performed by young officers of 17 or 18, whom I had under me; when I had the honour of serving in the Crimea, I had a great number of officers of Artillery under me who came fresh from the Academy; some of them very little over 16, owing to the pressure, and certainly the duties were performed by them to my entire satisfaction, and they proved themselves a most gallant and efficient body of young men. I believe they were quite equal to the officers who are now coming into the regiment in every way.

1351. As to the education, do you think that if officers got their commissions at 18 years of age, they would be able to acquire sufficient theoretical attainments to qualify themselves as Artillery officers?—I think if they were to get their commissions at 18, you would have to reduce the present scale of education, because I do not think if they went into the Academy, say from 15 to 17, you could get lads who could attain that degree of knowledge which is now acquired. The difficulty is to take any step which will lower the standard of attainments.

1352. What I wished to ask your opinion upon was this, whether for all practical purposes, a young man at 18 might not have acquired sufficient theoretical education to qualify himself for a first-rate Artillery officer, and if he wished subsequently to pursue his studies to enable him to arrive at great eminence in physics, or anything else to which he chose to turn his attention?—I am quite satisfied of that; I think 18 is a very good age, and by that age a young man might have acquired quite sufficient knowledge for a good Artillery officer; we do not want every officer to be a man of great scientific attainments. There are plenty of men, indeed there were plenty of men even in the old days, with what was called our defective education, men like General Lefroy, and other men highly distinguished in arts and science, who have been at the same time most eminent men in our corps as artillerists; and I should say, as a general rule, that 18 was a very proper age for a young man to get his commission.

1353. The distinguished scientific officers whom you mentioned (and one could mention a good many more), in fact, all those you referred to, got their commissions at 18 years of age, did they not?—In some instances at 17; from 17 to 18.

1354. Do you think that the advantages to the corps to be gained by getting in officers at 18 would not outbalance their want of the very high scientific education which is now required?—I think the advantage of getting them in at that age would more than balance the loss of any very high scientific qualifications, for they could acquire these afterwards in the great schools we have at present for the instruction of officers.

1355. Major *Jervis.*] You stated that there were five major generals on the supernumerary list employed; out of those four are employed in what you may call strictly regimental employments, are they not?—I stated the total number employed; there are but two, indeed, only one employed on the general staff of the army, that is Major General Cuppage, the other four are strictly regimental employments; I only stated the number who were employed altogether; only one, strictly speaking, is in command of mixed forces.

1356. I think out of the 17 officers who have obtained the honorary command of a battalion not a single one is employed in any way?—Sir William Williams has been employed.

1357. I mean at the present moment?—He is now governor of Nova Scotia; that is a civil appointment.

1358. He is not on the staff of the army?—Not now.

1359. You have been asked whether it would not be fair that a colonel of Artillery should retire at 60, because a lieutenant colonel in the line has to retire from a regiment of the line at 60, if he is required to do so; but I think the duties of a lieutenant colonel in command of a regiment are hardly to be compared with those of a colonel of Artillery in command of a district; you would rather compare the duties of the colonels of Artillery to those of a major general on the staff, would you not?—A colonel of Royal Artillery, an officer of 60, who gets employment would be a colonel on the staff. His duties are of a much more extensive and important nature than those of a colonel commanding a regiment.

1360. In fact they are duties which should be performed by an officer of the rank of major general?—Yes, by a general officer.

1361. Therefore, the proper comparison would be in reality to compare the retirement of colonels of

of Artillery at 60 to the retirement of major general of the line at 60?—Exactly; their duties are analogous.

1362. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] I see there are 19 unmanned batteries of Artillery according to this return?—I think those are Indian.

1363. Are the officers in those batteries in the line of promotion?—Yes, they are unmanned; but the officers are employed elsewhere on other employments. It was because the Indian Government did not require the services of so many men and officers, but they could not well reduce the number of officers, and as they had ample employment for them elsewhere, they were employed in that way.

1364. They stand in the way of promotion?—Yes.

1365. Is that besides the other difficulties of retirement, the corps of Artillery at present labours under the anomaly of having 70, 80, or 90 more officers than are required for the service?—I do not think there are so many as that.

1366. There are 19 batteries not quite fully manned with officers?—They are the Indian batteries; they stand, as you say, in the list; but although their men and horses are not there, they are employed in various ways, and attached to other companies. The Indian service is a peculiar one. Many officers are obliged to come home on furloughs and leaves, and they fill up the places with the others; these officers could not well be dispensed with, if there were not the others to take their places. I do not think they could well reduce them; it would be making matters worse, because the officers would be reduced to half pay.

1367. Besides all the other difficulties attending the question of retirement in the Artillery, there is the difficulty of having all this number of officers who stand in the line of promotion, is there not?—They are in the Indian Artillery, which is not in our line of promotion at present.

1368. I thought you said that all the Indian lieutenants had to reach the rank of second captain, before any promotions could take place?—What I said was, that every lieutenant in the Indian Artillery must be absorbed in his own corps before a promotion can be gained in ours. Until 92 lieutenants of the Bengal Artillery become second captains in their corps, the promotion in the Bengal Artillery cannot come off the head of our list; and the same is the case with the Bombay and Madras Artillery.

1369. Then they do stand in the line of promotion of the Royal Artillery?—They do stand in the line of general promotion, when the corps are amalgamated.

1370. In the case of an army going upon active service, with say 10 or 15 batteries, how many Artillery officers above the rank of captains would be employed?—A division of Artillery of two batteries would be in the command of a lieutenant colonel, and in ten batteries, they would have five lieutenant colonels specially to be employed in the command of them, and of course there would be superior rank; there would be a colonel, and if the force of Artillery attains the full size there would be several full colonels, and a major general commanding; but the proportion is one field officer to two field batteries of Artillery nominally.

1371. Colonel *North.*] I think you mentioned that there were several captains of your corps at this moment whose health had suffered from the service, and who would be happy to go on half-pay, but would be unable to do so. Is that caused by their not getting a sufficiently strong certificate as to their sickness, or by what other cause?—They are officers who have not served sufficiently long, according to the warrants, to get half-pay; no officer can receive half-pay until he has been 25 years in the service, as the warrant stands now; and there are officers of 17, 18, and 19 years' service, who are not entitled to half pay. They would get temporary half pay for sickness, and then at the expiration of a certain period they would be examined by a medical board, and if they were found then unfit for service, if the circumstances were very strong, and they had been made unfit by the climates in which they had served, they might get half-pay as a boon, but that would not necessarily be the case.

1372. What becomes of them if they do not?—They have to resign their commissions in those cases.

1373. Without any remuneration?—Without any remuneration; but I believe wherever the War Office can do so, they grant half pay where the circumstances show a sufficiently strong case; that is to say where the officer's services have caused his loss of health.

1374. In the case of an officer who has been severely wounded, is he obliged to retire from the service without any remuneration whatever?—I presume he would get, in addition to his pension for his wound, his half pay, because those are peculiar cases. I was only speaking of general service, when sickness or ill health is the cause of retirement; then he would retire without remuneration.

1375. Considering the climates to which our officers are exposed, and the risks to health, for instance, in China, do you mean to say that an officer of your corps would be obliged to leave the service without any remuneration whatever under the circumstances you have described, and would not even be allowed to sell out?—If he were in ill health he would get leave, and he would receive temporary half pay, which temporary half pay might be prolonged for one year or two years, or even three years; but if at the end of that time he is not able to fulfil his duties, I believe there is no option but for him to resign his commission.

1376. *Chairman.*] Have you heard of any such case occurring lately?—I have not, but I believe that that is the rule.

1377. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the duty of an Artillery officer, is it requisite that he should have the very high class of education which he is obliged to have at present before he can get his commission?—It has been deemed so by the higher authorities, and by public opinion. For my own part, I was perfectly satisfied with the class of officers who served under my command at different periods under the old system; but there is no doubt, as the science of Artillery has progressed so much of late, and is progressing, it is desirable that officers should have a higher education than they used to obtain in the days when I was a cadet. But I think that could be obtained, and still leave a margin for an officer obtaining his commission earlier than he does now, and acquiring the superior attainments in the course of his service. We have a school of instruction at Woolwich, to which

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officers are allowed to volunteer, where they receive a special class of instruction, and where, I believe, they reach a very high degree of mathematical and scientific education, to qualify themselves for holding appointments of a superior kind in the Royal Artillery; and there is always a sufficient number of candidates to do that, who will always maintain the credit of our corps as a scientific body.

1378. But the every-day duty of an Artillery officer does not require that high class of qualification?—Certainly not.

1379. What is the age now for a cadet to enter?—He enters at from 17 to 19, I think.

1380. What was the age formerly?—It has varied at different periods. When I entered the Academy the age was from 14 to 16; it was then increased, about five or six years after I entered the service, to from 15 to 17, and it remained at that age until just after the Crimean war, when they threw it open to public competition, and increased the age; each competitive examination of late has been severer year after year, and the consequence is that young men of the very highest attainments even fail now in getting admission to the Academy under the competitive system.

1381. Is there physical competition as well as mental?—Of course they must pass an examination as being sound and healthy, and strong, and their eyesight must be good, but there is nothing beyond that. There is every inducement for cadets to get physical strength at the Academy. They have gymnasiums and every means of manual and physical exercise of every kind.

1382. Major *O'Reilly*.] You said that young men of the very highest attainments failed to enter the Academy?—Yes.

1383. Was not that in consequence of young men of still higher attainments presenting themselves for examination?—Yes, I am perfectly aware of that; it is the natural result of competitive examination.

1384. You stated that you were averse to any compulsory retirement at the age of 60; may I ask you to supplement that by saying down to what rank of the service you think that a man is fully competent for the duties of the rank over the age of 60?—I think myself that even under the worst system of promotion we may have for some years to come, allowing for a fair proportion of retirements, we should rarely get officers to become colonels much later than 50, we will say, or 53 or 54; and they are quite competent to perform the duties of their rank up to the age of from 60 to 65, because, as I said before, the colonels on the staff perform duties more similar to those of general officers than regimental ones; and, as we know, there are many general officers employed on the staff of the army discharging perhaps less important functions than those of the colonels of Artillery on the staff at a much greater age.

1385. My question was, down to what rank would you allow an officer over 60 to serve?—I do not think that any man over 60 years of age ought to be, you might say, a lieutenant colonel; he certainly is not competent to perform the duties of the rank of lieutenant colonel as a general rule, I think, at 60.

1386. Then, am I right in understanding that you would think compulsory retirement from the rank of lieutenant colonel at the age of 60, to be justified by the requirements of the service?—I am averse to compulsory retirement altogether, but if it is absolutely necessary for the good of the regiment to carry it out, I should say that the compulsory retirement of a lieutenant colonel at 60 would be right. Decidedly, a lieutenant colonel at 60 cannot be considered fit for his work.

1387. My question was not with regard to the good of the regiment, but with regard to the efficiency of the service; do you consider that a lieutenant colonel is not, as regards the efficiency of the service, fit for the work of a lieutenant colonel over 60?—Most decidedly.

1388. Major *Jervis*.] The good of the regiment is the good of the service?—For the good of the service I think he is not fit for regimental duty after 60.

1389. Major *O'Reilly*.] You think that while it would be unjust to compel colonels to retire at 60, because they might be fit for the duties they would be called upon to discharge, it would be right to compel lieutenant colonels of 60 to retire, because they would not be fit for their duties?—Yes, certainly.

1390. Is there any age at which you think a man might be fairly required to retire from the rank of colonel?—I should say at 65 he might be fairly asked to do so.

1391. Then, do you consider that a colonel would be fit, on the average, over the age of 60, for the active duties in the field belonging to the rank of colonel?—Perhaps not, on the average; you might here and there get a man who would be fit for active service in the field at that age, but I think not, on the average.

1392. Do you not think that the retirements in all branches of the army ought to be calculated upon what is required for efficiency in the field?—Certainly we ought to look at the whole army from that point of view; all officers ought to be of such an age as would make them efficient in the field. But in the same way in which officers are said to be retired, and eligible for command, even if you put them aside; at 60 an officer might get a command which, in the case of war, might give him very important duties to perform after 60, if you allowed him to serve. I should be sorry to see compulsory retirement, but if for the good of the service it is necessary to have it, it should at once be made a *bonâ fide* retirement; the officers should get a pension, and retire from active service altogether.

1393. You stated that in the system you would propose, of a certain number of annual retirements being open to officers, you would consider it right that a preference should be given to those who were reported unfit by a medical board?—Yes.

1394. Might not that give rise to a good deal of difficulty, when there were two officers, both of whom wished to retire, and it was known that the one would have the preference over the other, because he could get a board to incline in his favour; we are speaking of course of officers not clearly disqualified by wounds, but of officers comparatively disqualified?—Then to avoid that difficulty, there is no other remedy than to give it to the senior, because if you allowed officers to retire in consequence of the reports of medical boards, it might lead to an officer who wanted to get the advantage of it, getting up a case to retire; it is very easy to get up a case for that purpose. Therefore I should say, in order to obviate that

that difficulty, that you must give it strictly to the senior.

1395. You think, upon the whole, you must give it strictly to the senior?—Yes.

1396. You stated that officers in bad health, which is not directly the effect of service, have not now the means of retiring; would not that continue to be the case under the plan you propose?—I would give officers who were under 20 years' service, from 15 to 20 years' service, if they were found unfit for service by a medical board, from ill health, either half pay or a compensation in lieu thereof.

1397. My question applies to an officer of over 20 or 25 years' service, who is in bad health, but who happens not to be the senior entitled to the retirement under your system; would not that officer be in just as bad a position as ever?—No, because if he sends in a claim for retirement one year, and fails to get it, as the retirements take place every year, the chances are that he will be sure to come in the next year. If he failed the first year, when he sent in his application, it would be a question of a year or two, and if his health was bad, he could be allowed leave; he might get temporary half-pay in the meanwhile.

1398. I believe, under the present system of retirement, it not unfrequently happens that the retirement offered is taken by a younger and more efficient officer, and that an officer who has a more immediate chance of promotion declines it?—Yes.

1399. Do you not think that that objection might apply also to the system you have suggested?—It would apply, I am afraid, in the case of men in the higher ranks.

1400. Would not it apply in the case of the lower ranks; is not it probable that a much younger captain, a man quite at the bottom of the rank of captains, might retire in preference to a much older and less efficient man who, being near the top of the rank of captains, declined your voluntary retirement?—It might be so occasionally, but I think that it would not happen often; and I think no system of retirement short of compulsory retirement would prevent that evil from arising. I always speak of compulsory retirement, or any system that fixes an age at which an officer must go, as the very last resource.

1401. Your system of retirement for the Royal Artillery is entirely founded, is not it, upon the present condition of that branch of the service, and on the present number of subalterns, and on their present age?—Yes.

1402. But you think it would work, and be satisfactory, probably, for some number of years to come?—I think so; I am pretty sure of it.

1403. You cannot say whether it would for anything more than a certain number of years immediately coming on?—You leave the retirements to the option of the officers themselves; but even in the case of compulsory retirement, you could hardly put it in force yet for some years to come; the senior colonel of Artillery at this moment is only 56 or 57, and you could hardly retire him at that age.

1404. Your system is not founded upon any principle which will work in other times and circumstances, but only founded upon the requirements of the present condition of the service?—I beg your pardon; I should think that such a system as I have proposed would last for a very long time.

1405. It is a question of how long it will last; it is not a system which will necessarily apply to all times?—The only system which will apply to all times is a system of fixing an age, and making the officers go at the age you fix; and the question is whether that system would be advantageous to the service.

1406. The system which you propose, you think will not apply as soon as the influx of Indian officers comes in to affect the service, which will not be, you say, for a considerable time yet?—It will be a great many years before that could apply.

1407. When that time comes, your system will not apply?—It would apply by increasing it. Of course, if the corps gets larger, you must increase the numbers to retire.

1408. Is it founded upon any principle compared to the numbers of the corps now, so that you could work it out, and see what increase would be required when the corps was increased?—It is founded upon the principle of a certain sum of money to be voted annually by Parliament; and as you know the number of the officers to be retired, it is very easy to tell the sum which would be required; it is a fixed sum annually, and you could increase it at the same rate as the corps increases. All the Indian retirements at the same time would drop in, as their holders died off, to the Treasury, as well as our own. That would relieve the expense considerably in time, though some of the incumbents of these pension lists must naturally go on for some time to come.

1409. Am I right in understanding that you think while 7,500 *l.* a year would be the proper sum to provide the retirements for the corps which you suggest in its present strength, the proper sum which would have to be provided for retirements for the corps in any other strength, greater or less than the present, should be founded upon the basis of 7,500 *l.* a year for the present strength?—Yes, the strength of the Indian Artillery that will be amalgamated with us by degrees, is 14 brigades, which is less than half of what the whole corps will be; 31 brigades will compose the whole of the Royal Artillery, including the Indian as well as the others; it would be less than half of that; so that it is a matter of simple calculation. There are 17 brigades at present of the Royal Artillery; the old corps, and 14 of the Indian corps.

1410. Then one may arrive at the conclusion from that, that if 7,500 *l.* is what you suggest for your present strength of 17 brigades, something rather less than twice that annual amount would be what you would suggest when the additional number of 14 brigades was added?—It would come to about that.

1411. Mr. *De Grey.*] Do you object to a compulsory system of retirement, in consequence of the hardship it would entail on an individual who was required to retire, or on the ground of the loss which the county would sustain in losing his services?—I put it more on the ground of the individual. I considered it more upon the question of the individual officer. I think the feelings of individual officers may be consulted in these cases, provided the service does not suffer by it.

1412. If a discretionary power was left with the commander in chief to retain the services of any distinguished and efficient officer, would that

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remove your objection to the compulsory system?—I think there would be no end to it, because it would be rather an invidious and difficult thing to do. The question would become one of interest and favour as much as one of merit. Therefore, that is a proposal which I should not like to recommend.

1413. With respect to lowering the standard of education, what do you think would be the effect of lowering the standard of the competitive examinations on entering the academy? — The standard depends on the age; of course, if the age is lowered, you must necessarily lower the standard. I do not think that the regiment would suffer in any way thereby.

1414. You think that it would not admit a different class of men?—I think not, for I fancy that the expenses of the preparation would be very nearly as great to the parents as they are now, and the expenses of the academy are another consideration which would prevent a lower class of men in many cases from going there; I except, of course, the cases of officers, whose sons pay a very moderate scale; but as regards civilians, for noblemen's and gentlemen's sons who enter the academy, paying now a very high rate, that would remain as before; and I think that that is a greater deterrent to people of a lower class from entering than anything else. I know there is at present nothing to prevent the son of a wealthy shopkeeper or tradesman, or any one of that class, coming in and becoming a competitor for the academy. In fact they do it now, and they could do it then; it is the same thing as regards the open competition. I do not think it would make the slightest difference in the class of cadets; it would lessen the expense very often for the sons of officers who are men of not good incomes, and who have to prepare their sons for the competition. Any diminution of the preparation that was necessary would of course make a great difference to them, but I do not think there would be the slightest difference, generally speaking, in the class of cadets you would receive.

1415. You think, on the whole, as I understand you, that it would be advantageous to the service that the standard of age and the standard of education should be lowered? — Yes; the younger you can get an officer in within a reasonable limit, the better for the service, because you get the benefit of the continuance of his services for a longer period.

1416. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] You said, in answer to a question, that you should not so much object to a fixed limit of service or age in one of the junior ranks; for instance, I think you said that at 60 a lieutenant colonel might be made to retire?—Yes.

1417. Do you not think that as a rule it would act much more harshly upon the body of the officers, if you selected a junior rank, with of course a lower scale of pay, to make officers retire from, than if you allowed them to arrive at the top of the list, and then retire, of course on considerably more pay?—I only spoke of the compulsion with reference to an officer being unable to perform his duties; as I stated before, I am averse to compulsory retirement altogether; I think it would be a great hardship, so that I only spoke of it in reference to an officer being able to perform his duties properly.

1418. I think your objection was, that it would be a hardship on certain officers, and hurt their feelings?—Yes.

1419. Taking the body of officers, would it not be a much greater hardship upon the officers, as a whole, if they were obliged to retire from a junior rank, because the effect of not retiring in an upper rank would of course be very much to increase the age or length of service in the next lower grade, so that all the officers, if put out at a certain age, would go from that rank?—I am averse from putting out any in that way.

1420. *Chairman.*] You are averse altogether to the system of compulsory retirement?—I am; I only said if the country is compelled to come to it, it would be best that they should come from that rank which I mentioned.

1421. Colonel *Sturt.*] Are you aware that the standard of admission to the corps is higher than the standard of admission to the French Artillery, or that of the foreign armies generally?—I believe the French standard is a very high one.

1422. As high as ours?—I am not aware; I think not at present; it used to be much higher than ours, because I think a young man went from the Ecole Polytechnique, and got into the Artillery as an officer, before 21; I believe ours is as high now as theirs.

1423. That is the case with our Artillery now; the average age of getting commissions is about 21, is it not?—Yes, about 21 or 22.

1424. Captain *Vivian.*] Can you tell me whether the age of the general officers at present employed upon the staff of the army is above or under the compulsory age, taking it at 60?—There is but one who is above that, namely, Major General Cuppage, who is in Jersey.

1425. The others are all under 60? — The others are all under 60.

1426. And with regard to the 15 general officers upon the list of general officers now, are they over or under the age of 60?—I suppose there are about seven of them above 60, and the remainder are under that age; six are over 65. I think I should be about right in saying, that there are about eight or nine over 60; there are altogether only 15, and of those six are above 65. I think the rest jumped down to 56 or 57.

1427. Captain *Vivian.*] What is your opinion with regard to reducing the period of entering the academy to the old time of 15 years of age, from the present time of 17? — I think it would be very advisable to reduce the time if possible.

1428. You think it would be very advisable that youths should enter at from 15 to 17, instead of from 17 to 19?—Yes.

1429. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you remarked upon the few general officers of Artillery who are employed upon the staff?—Yes.

1430. Are you aware that of the 17 colonels commandant there are only three that are under 75 years of age?—Yes.

1431. We may assume that they entered the service at 18 years of age, which would be of course sufficiently correct?—Yes.

1432. Of the 15 general officers unattached, not colonels commandant, six are over 65?—Yes.

1433. *Chairman.*] You dropped the words with the present great list of subalterns; did you mean by that to imply that the number of subalterns in the corps is, in your opinion, excessive, compared with that of the captains and field officers?—No, I do not think, in war time particularly, and in peace time, as the corps is now constituted, you could carry on the duties of a battery with less than three subalterns, which is the present strength

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strength. I only spoke of the great augmentations which have increased the total numbers.

1434. One of your objections to the compulsory retirement of a full colonel at 60 was based upon the supposition that he would get a step in rank, and that he would only be eligible for staff appointments as a major general. If he did not get that step in rank, would the objection be as strong as you have hitherto felt it to be?—I think if a colonel does not continue in his command or appointment from which it is proposed to retire him for being 60 years of age, he is not likely to get any other employment on the staff.

1435. If he was practically excluded from service in the field, but still available for certain employments on the staff which colonels in the corps get, would that diminish your objection?—It has this effect; it clogs the list with a number of colonels whom you do not want.

1436. Putting it simply as a question of grievance to the officer, what would you say?—It would be no grievance to the officer if he gets employment as a colonel on the staff after he is put aside on the retired list, and can hold the appointment for five or six years, as usual; I suppose he could have no grievance then.

1437. Then the only remaining objection you would have would be its making the list of colonels so large as to clog the promotion to the major generals' list?—It would not help in the least towards any promotion, except that to full colonel, which certainly is the rank from which they would have to select officers to command the Royal Artillery.

1438. You said that one of the grievances of the present system was the inability of an officer who was not wounded, but who was disabled by service in a tropical country from retiring on half-pay under a certain length of service, and you thought that your system of annually retiring a certain number of each rank would meet that, because, if such an officer did not get his retirement one year, he would probably get it the next?—Yes.

1439. Might he not meanwhile be promoted?—Yes.

1440. And then he would lose his chance till he got to the top of the next rank?—Yes, that might happen.

1441. So that if he did not get his step through this system of retirement, but expected to get it next year, is not there a very considerable chance that during that year he would get his step by a death vacancy?—That might be so; but if an officer found himself so high up on the list that he would be likely to get a step, I think he would strive all he could to avoid retiring till he did get his next step, and then he would serve on.

1442. Is not it practically the case that you cannot expect to retire officers who are inefficient from ill-health under a system of mere fixed optional retirement from the top of each rank?—I think, if you took the numbers to whom it is to be allowed, you would find that it would work so.

1443. You said that you considered the system of seconding of advantage to the corps, I think?—No; I do not think I said anything about seconding.

1444. Will you be good enough to state to the Committee whether in your opinion the system of seconding is of advantage to your corps or not?—It is of advantage as creating a certain number of vacancies for bringing forward subalterns. The seconding is simply taking away officers who hold civil employment in the manufacturing departments and other Artillery establishments; as they are not performing regimental duties, you fill up their vacancies with officers who do perform the duties, which they do not. I think it is of great advantage to have the system. While those appointments exist each of them creates a step for the subalterns, or whoever it may be.

1445. Do not the Artillery officers get a certain number of appointments outside the service altogether; I mean civil appointments?—None that I know of, except that Lieutenant Colonel Anson has just been appointed Governor of Penang, and there are one or two other officers who have had foreign or colonial appointments, but that is not so common an occurrence with us as it is with the engineers; in fact it is very rare.

1446. As a balance of advantages and disadvantages, do you consider the system of seconding officers for civil employment a good one?—Yes; because you take them from their regimental duties, and if you had not the system of seconding, you would oblige other officers to perform their duties without the advantages of the rank or pay belonging to them.

1447. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] With regard to the artillery establishment of general officers, are you aware, that in proportion to the strength of the regiment, it is below the strength contemplated, when it was recommended to have a fixed establishment of general officers?—Yes.

1448. Do you know what number of general officers are required to bring up the proportion?—When the Royal Commission of 1854 made its report and recommendation, there were then 13 brigades of Artillery and 1 brigade of Horse Artillery, making 14, and the number then fixed was 32 general officers for the establishment. Since then, we have got 2 brigades of Foot Artillery and 1 brigade of Horse Artillery added, which makes 17; and I presume, having regard to the establishment having been fixed when there were 14 brigades, that there ought to be at least four, or half-a-dozen more general officers added to the list.

Colonel JOHN M. ADYE, C.B., was called in; and Examined.

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1449. *Chairman.*] You are Lieutenant Colonel of the Royal Artillery, and a Colonel in the Army, I believe?—Yes.

1450. What is your present employment?—I am temporarily employed in the Ordnance Select Committee.

1451. Have you considered the question of retirement from your corps?—I have.

1452. Have you considered it both with reference to the flow of promotion in the corps, and to the efficiency of the officers themselves?—Yes, I have.

1453. Is it your opinion that the present system is a satisfactory system in those respects?—No; I think it is not quite satisfactory.

1454. Will you tell the Committee in what respect

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respect you consider it unsatisfactory?—I think, in the first place, that we have an insufficient number of general officers, as compared to the rest of the army; secondly, that there is the want of a limit of service at the top of the list of colonels. There ought to be a limit at the top, defining how long an officer has to serve in a regimental capacity; thirdly, I think that the grant for retiring allowances is insufficient; fourthly, I think that the appropriation of the present retiring allowances is defective; I think, fifthly, that the condition of the regiment is unsatisfactory at present, owing to its abnormal state, in consequence of officers, comparatively young in years, having been pushed on to the top, and ultimately, unless something is done, there will be a great reaction, and those now at the bottom will be of great age before they get to the top.

1455. What suggestions do you make to remedy those evils?—The remedies I would propose are, 1st. An increase in the establishment of general officers in proportion to the augmentation of three brigades, which have occurred since the fixed establishment of general officers was first laid down in 1854.

1456. What addition would that be?—It does not exactly divide; it would amount to about six; we have now 17 brigades to 32 generals; therefore three more brigades would make very nearly six more generals. 2ndly. I would have a limit of 40 years' service at the top of the colonels.

1457. Do you mean by a limit of service that every full colonel of 40 years' service should be retired?—I do not say that he is to be retired; I will enter into the detail if you wish it, directly; what I mean is, that no officer should remain in the regiment to do regimental duty as a colonel after 40 years' service. 3rdly. I propose a graduated scale of pensions (with a small bonus) to be given by service, and not by rank; the rules to be very simple and few. 4thly. An honorary step of rank on retirement. 5thly. Officers to enter the corps at about 18 years of age. 6thly. That the establishment of subalterns shall not be kept full in time of peace. If you would allow me, I should like to explain that.

1458. Have you a paper upon this subject?—I have a paper, but it goes, first of all, shortly into the history of promotion.

1459. Will you put it in, and read that part of it which bears distinctly upon the proposals you have made?—"In a seniority corps there are but three ways of obtaining promotion: 1st. By death vacancies. 2nd. By promotion of colonels to be generals. 3rd. By retirement with pension. The first is a constant quantity, that is, it will occur at a certain proportionate rate, but as the average duration of life far exceeds that of efficiency in an officer, it is not of itself sufficient to maintain a regiment in a sound condition. The second outlet is by the promotion of colonels to the rank of general. There are, however, but 32 officers of the latter grade, including the colonels commandant to a regiment of over 900 officers, so that promotions from that source are very few. It is to be observed that on the abolition of periodical brevets in 1854, the above number of generals was fixed for the Royal Artillery as being in proportion to those of the Cavalry and Infantry. Since that date, however, the other two branches have received certain augmentations, and an increase to their generals accordingly. Whereas, though the Royal Artillery have been augmented from 14 to 17 brigades, the number of their generals remains the same. It also appears that the Royal Marines have 11 unattached generals to 489 officers, whereas the Royal Artillery have 15 to 905. There would therefore appear to be valid reasons for somewhat increasing the number of general officers of the Royal Artillery, and such a measure would, to its extent, prove beneficial to the corps as adding to the proportion of those in the higher ranks.

"The third and apparently only effectual method of maintaining regular and efficient promotion in a seniority corps is by a system of pensions or retiring allowances. Those of the Royal Artillery previous to 1840, it will have been observed, were reported as quite insufficient, and evidently proved so; and although in the latter year some considerable improvement was made in this respect, still, again, in 1854, a second Royal Commission recommended a more liberal scale of pension, and an increase in the numbers; since 1854 three more brigades have been added, consequently the amount then given, even if sufficient at that time, is evidently not so now; it is not, however, that the annual grant has not kept pace with the augmented establishments of the corps, but there are inequalities and other defects in its distribution, which seem to require alteration. The rules hitherto in force in this matter appear, for the most part, to have been temporary expedients rather than parts of a comprehensive plan, and although the general design has always been to provide against extreme age and consequent inefficiency in the upper ranks, still no definite limit of age or of service has ever been laid down at which officers are to cease performing regimental duties; thus, within the last few years, we have seen colonels doing duty when over 70 years old, whilst others have obtained 600 *l.* a year retirements when they were under 50; cases of this kind can hardly have been contemplated by the Royal Commissioners of 1854. It appears to me that an essential rule in a seniority corps is to define the limit of service at which officers should cease to perform regimental duties, and I would suggest 40 years' service as appropriate; my view is that each officer who, on arriving at the head of the list of colonels (by army rank) has 40 years' service (this is laid down on the supposition that each officer is about 20 years old when he receives his first commission) shall, at the discretion of the military authorities, either be promoted at once as a supernumerary major general or else shall be called upon to retire on 600 *l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank. Of course if any officer reaches the top of the colonels before 40 years' service, he would be promoted in due course, whilst, by thus giving a discretionary power to the military authorities, they would be enabled, should promotion languish, to retain occasionally as generals, such colonels of 40 years' service as might be considered desirable. The generals so promoted as supernumeraries would be gradually absorbed into the fixed establishment as vacancies occurred. The great advantage of this limit of service at the top of the colonels would be that the regiment, even in time of peace, would never fall below a certain level, and the other ranks would also fall into a natural gradation of length of service. Another point calling for remark is, that hitherto pensions have been generally given by rank rather than by length of service,

service, and this operates unequally; for instance, within the last few years we have seen colonels accepting 600 *l.* a year when over 70 years old, whilst now the officers eligible for the same amount are not 50, so that in the latter case the recipients have not only enjoyed good fortune during their career, but find themselves entitled to large pensions on retirement; thus an inducement is held out to the comparatively young and prosperous officers to retire, whilst the object should be just the reverse. The regulations as to retirement on full or half pay after a certain number of years, also act unequally, as they depend on the rank held at the time of retirement. I therefore propose a graduated scale of pensions according to service, and not by rank."

1460. Will you be good enough to state your proposals, one by one, shortly?—First, officers from 15 to 20 years' service wishing to retire, to be allowed 1,000 *l.* sterling bonus on leaving the corps, but no pension.

1461. Would that be their absolute right?—No, I have a limit; secondly, officers from 20 to 25 years' service wishing to retire, to be granted a pension of 150 *l.* per annum, with a bonus of the first year's salary of 150 *l.* As regards these first two rules, I would place a limit on the number of officers allowed to retire under them, say two of the first, and four of the second, per annum.

1462. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you just say how you would give the option; would you give it to the senior?—As a matter of course to the senior. Thirdly, officers of over 25 years, and up to 40 years' service, to be granted pensions at the following rates, and to be free to take them without limit as to numbers: 25 years' service, pension 250 *l.*; 26 years' service, 270 *l.*; 27, 290 *l.*; 28, 310 *l.*; 29, 330 *l.*

1463. *Chairman.*] There is an increase of 20 *l.* every year?—Yes, every year up to that time.

1464. Colonel *Sturt.*] Without limit as to number?—Yes; and the whole of those in that category to have a bonus of 200 *l.* on retirement. Then at 30 years, a pension of 350 *l.*; 31, 370 *l.*; 32, 390 *l.*; 33, 410 *l.*; 34, 430 *l.*; those from 30 to 34 years' service, inclusive, to have 250 *l.* bonus on retirement. At 35 years' service, a pension of 450 *l.*; 36, 480 *l.*; 37, 510 *l.*; 38, 540 *l.*; 39, 570 *l.* The whole of these last officers to have a bonus of 300 *l.* on retirement, in addition to their pensions. Officers of 40 years' service, to have 600 *l.* a year pension, and 350 *l.* bonus.

1465. *Chairman.*] Is that all the proposals you make?—I would only wish to mention that this system is somewhat similar to one which is now adopted in India, and has been for many years. I can go into the reasons, if you wish it. I will hand in my paper.—(*The same was handed in.* Vide *Appendix.*)

1466. Then your plan is, in short, this, to get rid of the present 32,000 *l.* a year retirement as such?—Yes.

1467. To increase the number of major generals upon the establishment by six?—Yes.

1468. To leave the pay of the major generals, and the succession, to the command of batallions as it is now?—Yes.

1469. To retire every officer compulsorily, after 40 years' service, on 600 *l.* a year pension?—Yes; either to retire or to be made a supernumerary major general.

1470. With a step in rank or not?—With an honorary step of rank, or with the option on the part of the military authorities if they wish to retain his services, and there is not a vacancy, that he should be made a supernumerary major general.

1471. And between 40 and 25 years' service, to give every officer a limited right of taking, if he likes, pensions graduated from 600 *l.* down to 250 *l.*, and bonuses graduated from 350 *l.* down to 200 *l.*, and below 25 years' service to give a limited number of optional retirements, some at 150 *l.* a year, with 150 *l.* bonus, and two a year of 1,000 *l.* down?—Yes.

1472. Do you propose with respect to those who retire at their own option between 39 and 25 years' service, that they should have a step of rank?—Yes, I propose on retirement, in whatever rank they may be, that they should have an honorary step in rank, and have done with it.

1473. And with regard to those who retire below that, between 15 and 25 years' service, is it your proposal, that they also should have a step of rank?—I see no objection to it.

1474. Have you calculated what this scheme would cost?—No, I do not think it is possible to calculate what it would cost, because you do not know how many men will take it, but I do not think it is a question so much of cost, as whether the pensions are of a moderate kind, and if they are, I think then that the Government, if they wish to benefit the corps, and to make the promotion moderately good, must adopt some plan of the kind.

1475. Will not the extent of the benefit to the corps, depend upon the number of officers who take it?—Yes.

1476. And will not the expense depend upon the number of officers who take it?—Certainly.

1477. Therefore, will not the benefit to the corps depend upon the amount of expense?—Yes.

1478. Therefore, when you calculate upon a certain amount of benefit to the corps, cannot you give us also a certain amount of probable expense?—No, it is impossible to give any idea, except in this way; you can reason from the Indian service; the Indian service pensions are a good deal more liberal than those I have stated; I can tell you what they are, if you wish, but I have never heard that there is any undue pressure upon those pensions; they are thrown open to the whole army. And secondly, in various branches of the civil service, there is a graduated scale of pensions to be given after so many years' service; I am not aware that there is any limit to the number, and I do not think that they lead to any excessive run upon the pension list.

1479. You recommend this as the right system because you think it will produce a certain amount of promotion in the corps?—Yes.

1480. You have calculated the extent to which you would carry this system to be of use?—Yes.

1481. Having calculated it, cannot you give us the amount which at these figures it would come to?—No, it is quite impossible; it would be quite illusory to give anything of that kind. I think, if the retirements are moderate, the numbers will be moderate. Of course, if I put large figures down, you might expect to get a rush of officers from the corps, and the Government might find they had given too much.

1482. You recommend this system because you think

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think that a certain number of people will take advantage of it?—Yes.

1483. If they do not take advantage of it, it will not be of sufficient use to the corps?—Quite so.

1484. If they do take advantage of it, it will be of a certain use to the corps?—Yes.

1485. To what extent do you think advantage will be taken of it?—I think having a limit at the top of 40 years' service, an officer knows that he must go then if he is not a general; he finds that the pensions are graduated down from that point; he sees his future clear before him, and he may take a retirement at any time. A number of officers will, no doubt, go every year in various parts of the regiment, which is the great object, namely, to break up the long lists.

1486. You have not calculated to what extent officers will take advantage of such a system as you propose?—No; I think a calculation of that kind is not possible.

1487. If it is not possible to make such a calculation, how can it be possible to say that this system will remove the evils of which you complain?—I have done it upon the general principle that officers below 30 years' service should retire upon less than what might be expected to be their full pay; that at 30 years' service it should be about their full pay, and then gradually increasing. Those are the kind of principles I went upon. I considered that an officer of 30 years' service was entitled to a fair calculation of what might be his pay at the time.

1488. You cannot give the Committee any idea to what extent this plan of yours really will be carried out, and how much it would cost the country?—No. Perhaps you would allow me to read remarks that were made upon the same subject from the Report of the Royal Commission of 1854. It is a memorandum upon promotion in the Royal Engineers, I believe, by Sir John Burgoyne, but it is not signed. He is speaking of promotion; he says, "The only remedies are a system of liberal retirement which will make it easier to remove such members, and one that will raise the whole corps to higher grades at lower ages; and this cannot be attained at all without considerable expense, and the inconvenience will be the greater as compared with other public services in proportion to the greater wear and tear of bodily powers which at the same time are so much more required in the military service." Again, he says, "In the Ordnance Corps, unlike the rest of the army and navy, the service is continuous. There is no half pay (except as permanent retirement) or unemployed list. It can then scarcely be considered an unreasonable charge on the public, if they become entitled to a liberal retirement after 30 years' actual service; that is at 50 years of age, for such portion as may be then thought unequal to the duties, with a lower rate for those who may be disqualified at an earlier period." Then he finishes by saying, "It is suggested that the only just proposition for the arrangement should be founded on that mode of reasoning, and not on the aggregate amount of charge to the public."

1489. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Surely it would be a complete matter of calculation to ascertain how far the retirements must be made use of to keep the regiment efficient; by going into the matter you could calculate without any great difficulty how many officers must retire, to provide for promotion to particular ranks at a particular age throughout the regiment?—I have two rules; one is that 40 years' service is the limit at the top; secondly, that there should be a gradation of pensions below that. In laying that down, I believe you will find that by simply having that limit at the top, the other ranks will fall into their natural gradation of age; they never can be very old; but I cannot say how many men will accept a particular scheme of retirement. I think it would be quite an illusion for me to put forward any figures.

1490. I meant to say this: if you go through the Army List you have certain fixed quantities; that is to say, you have those officers per annum who you suppose certainly will retire at 15 years, 20 years, and 25 years, and you also have officers retiring or put aside at 40 years of age; and from the Army List you know, in the course of the next 10 years, how many steps that will give you. Then it remains to be seen how many other retirements you must provide, in order to bring the subalterns up to 15 years' service, or whatever you think efficiency requires. In that way you might get an idea of the expense, might you not?—I do not think you can go into those calculations with any certainty. My view would be this: if 600 *l.* a year, for instance, is the proper pension at 40 years' service, then an actuary would tell you what an officer ought to get at 30 years' service; a man who was 10 years younger in fact; that is the way I would put it. If you think 600 *l.* a year is not too much for an officer 60 years old to receive, an actuary will tell you what one of 50 or 40 ought to get. Therefore my scheme is not one of unlimited expense.

1491. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You spoke of the number of general officers for the Artillery having been fixed some years ago with reference to the number of brigades of Artillery; with reference to the number of combatant officers I think it was?—Yes.

1492. I think the list of the general officers for the army at large was also fixed about the same time, was not it?—Yes.

1493. With reference to the same question, was not it?—Yes.

1494. You say that there has been no increase to the Artillery of late years, though the number of brigades has been increased?—Yes.

1495. There has been an increase to the infantry and cavalry, has there not, since then?—Yes.

1496. And there has been no increase in the number of generals to them either, has there?—Yes, there has been a large increase to the number of generals of cavalry and infantry.

1497. Since that time?—I do not remember the date; I think it was about the year 1858; but these are matters of fact which can be ascertained. I have not traced the augmentations of the general officers of infantry and cavalry, but I know that when new regiments have been added, and battalions brought in from the Indian Army, general officers were brought in also.

1498. Were any general officers added for the 27 second battalions which were added during the Russian war?—I think you will find that there were a considerable number added.

1499. Major *Jervis.*] A question was asked today with reference to the non-retirement of the Indian officers in proportion to the number of subalterns of Artillery, having regard to the number of brigades. It was said that the only chance

chance of promotion the subalterns at present attached to the Indian brigades have, until the whole of the captains of the old Indian brigades die off, is in the English Artillery; are not their chances very much lessened by the addition to the corps?—No, their chances are not lessened; those who have joined since the amalgamation will, in point of fact, have the promotion of the four regiments.

1500. The question was put in this way. In the Bengal Artillery there are still more than 90 subalterns of the old regiment who have to see their way up in the Bengal Artillery; and, until that takes place, all the subalterns of the English Artillery attached to that brigade have only got the promotion in the old English Artillery to look to for their promotion?—No; the subalterns in the Bengal Artillery take promotion in their own list; they are all older officers, and have been longer in the service than those who have joined the old Royal Artillery since the amalgamation, and, therefore, they are deservedly promoted. First. Directly they die off, the promotion will go to those who have joined since the amalgamation. I think that is all just enough, but I think in view of the stagnation which is probably coming on our regiment, it would be advisable not to fill up all the steps in the subalterns' list.

1501. When you were Deputy Adjutant General to the Artillery in India, was any reference made to your office in any way, with a view of seeing what charge should be made upon the Indian Government with reference to the pensions that would accrue in respect of those officers. Was the question brought before your notice as to what share the Indian Government should bear of those pensions?—No, but I think that it is a question that ought to be gone into.

1502. At present, as far as we can learn, they get the services of the English Artillery out there at this moment, without at all bearing their share of the burden of the pensions accruing from the service that takes place there?—Quite so; I believe they do; I am told that it is supposed to be covered by what is called the capitation grant; I am not aware on what principles that capitation grant was drawn out, and I doubt very much whether the Indian Government ought not to be called upon to pay the pensions of the 14 brigades which were added; and, in addition to the 14 brigades, I would point out that there are two brigades of the old Royal Artillery in India. Consequently there are 16 brigades of Royal Artillery in India; I think the Indian Government ought to be called upon ultimately to pay the whole, and at present they ought to pay a fractional part of that burden; that is to say, they ought to pay for the services of those subalterns who have joined our regiment since the amalgamation.

1503. But that was never brought before you whilst you were Deputy Adjutant General to the Artillery in India?—No, I never heard anything about the capitation grant.

1504. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] Do you consider that the officers of these 19 unmanned batteries are in addition to the requisite strength of officers of the Royal Artillery; that they are superfluous, in fact?—As a matter of my own opinion, I think that they are in some degree. There has been a great deal of correspondence with the Secretary of State for India and the Indian Government as to those officers. They are supposed to be used to supply officers for the depôts at home, to supply officers in place of others who are sick, and to supply officers for the Native Artillery. But these officers of the unmanned batteries are in large numbers; I think in larger numbers than are required for the wants that were detailed for them.

1505. So that they clog the promotion of the Royal Artillery, and at the same time are used for purposes alien to the Royal Artillery?—They do not clog the promotion, inasmuch as there are the same number of the upper ranks in proportion to those officers as to the others. It does not stop the promotion, because they are in all grades. The batteries consist not only of captains and subalterns—there are field officers in proportion; but to my mind there are a greater number of field officers, captains, and subalterns than are required for the service. However, that is not a question upon which I am in a position to give a decided opinion; it is a question for the military authorities to decide whether they think they are required or not.

1506. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] The expression was used "for purposes alien to the Royal Artillery." I think the mode in which those officers may be employed is laid down and provided by officers of the Royal Artillery in India?—Yes; I cannot say that they are employed in duties alien to the Royal Artillery; they are employed always regimentally, including the Native Artillery, which is a part of the duty of artillerymen as long as they are maintained.

1507. Major *O'Reilly.*] You said that an actuary would determine what pension ought to be given to a man of 30 years' service if 600 *l.* was given to a man of 40 years' service?—Yes.

1508. You mean that an actuary would determine what is the present value of a deferred annuity not to accrue for 10 years; that is to say, what is the present amount that you should pay down to a man to get rid of his chance of a pension of 600 *l.* a year if he lives 10 years longer?—Yes; that is what I meant. But when you get the figure from the actuary, it does not follow that you should go by his figures exactly. I think an actuary would give you merely the amount of the value of a man's life.

1509. Is that the amount of pension you would propose for a man of 30?—No, I think the longer an officer stays in the service, the more pension he ought to get for every year that he stays in the service.

1510. Do you think that a man of 20 years' service ought to get a far higher pension than is the present value of what he would get if he lives to complete 40 years' service?—No, I think he ought to get less.

1511. If you propose to give a man of 15 years' service a sum of 1,000 *l.*, is not that simply an addition to his pay; is not it just the same thing as having paid him so much a year more during those 15 years?—I think if a man has done 15 years' service, whether he is efficient or not, if circumstances induce him to leave the army, he has a fair right to say "Fifteen years of my life have been spent in doing my duty." I think a man ought to go into private life with some sort of provision under those circumstances.

1512. I ask is there any difference between that and paying him a higher rate of pay for those 15 years' service?—Certainly.

1513. Would it not be exactly the same thing to the man if you paid him so much a year for

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the 15 years, and he laid a portion of it by?—No; if he does not finish his 15 years he gets nothing.

1514. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Do you think that the compulsory retirement, after 40 years' service, which you propose, would of itself keep down the age of each rank to an efficient point?—No, I think it would hardly do so. I think it would be slow; it would keep it down very much, however; and I think with the moderate scale of pensions I have laid down below that, it will work equably and well.

1515. Then, is the object of your graduated scale of pensions to afford a proper current of promotion, or is it that you think that it is just to a man after a certain number of years' service, that he should have a chance of retiring?—Both; my object is this; I think the service demands that we should have comparatively young men in the different ranks, and at the same time an individual who has served a certain number of years should be able to look forward to an amount of pension which he may get for a certainty.

1516. So far as the accelerating of promotion is concerned, you cannot form any opinion of what the effect would be?—It depends entirely upon the amount of the pensions whether they are moderate or not.

1517. Supposing your system was adopted to-morrow, you cannot form any estimate of what would be the effect in the next year, or in the next 10 years?—In my own mind I have formed an opinion, but I cannot lay anything down with certainty, because I do not know the minds of other people. But my principle is that a moderate scale of pensions would be beneficial to the service, and to the individual.

1518. I believe you propose to reduce the number of subalterns in time of peace, do you not?—Yes.

1519. Could that be done, in your opinion, without causing the duties of the remaining subalterns to be too heavy?—In time of war, the three subalterns are essentially necessary; in time of peace with garrison batteries, I think you might have some of them with two subalterns per battery. In former days—in fact, until of late years, there was always a certain margin allowed in our regiment; the bottom vacancies were not filled up; there were a good many vacancies in the regiment till of late years; now I believe there are none.

1520. *Chairman.*] Do you happen to know in the French Artillery, how many men there are in a battery?—They vary very much.

1521. They are much larger in number than ours, are they not?—No; they are not so strong; they vary as we do; in time of war they rise to a large figure, and in time of peace they cut them down; a battery is an elastic thing.

1522. Do you know whether the proportion of subalterns to the other officers is as large in the French army as in ours?—I believe it is; but in time of peace they employ some of their captains in arsenals, and in other ways, and call them in in time of war, so I have been informed.

Thursday, 27th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack Beresford.	Major Jervis
Mr. Childers.	Colonel North.
Mr. De Grey.	Colonel Sturt.
Mr. Evans.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir John Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT BIDDULPH, R.A., Examined.

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1523. *Chairman.*] You are a second Captain in the Artillery and a Brevet Lieutenant Colonel are you not?—Yes.

1524. You held recently a staff appointment in India, I think?—Yes.

1525. What was it?—I was Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief at Madras.

1526. You have had occasion to consider the question of the present arrangement as to retirement from the regiment of Artillery?—Yes.

1527. I suppose you have considered it to a certain extent from the point of view of your own standing in the corps?—To a certain extent, and also with regard to all ranks; with regard to the general state of the regiment.

1528. Will you be good enough to tell the Committee whether you consider that there are any improvements feasible in the present system?—I think that the present system is unsatisfactory, because the condition of the regiment in 1854, when the present system was put in force, was so very different from the present state of the regiment.

1529. In what respects, especially, was it different?—On the 1st January 1854, which was about the time the Royal Commission was ordered to sit, to take into consideration the state of the regiment, the senior lieutenant colonel was 67 years of age, the senior captain 50, the senior lieutenant 27, and the senior second lieutenant 20 or 21; from which you will see that in the lower ranks the subalterns were getting their promotion very fairly, but that the field officers and captains were getting on in years very considerably, so that the higher you went in the list the worse was the promotion, and that the top of the regiment required relieving very considerably, in order to make it thoroughly efficient. There was no field officer who was not over 50 to go out to the Crimea at first, though there was afterwards. In comparison with that state of things, on the 1st of January of this year the senior lieutenant colonel was 49, that is 18 years' difference; the senior captain was 41, that is nine years less; the senior lieutenant was 29, and some of them, lower down, are 32; and the senior second lieutenant (that is to say, the officer in the corresponding position, for that rank has been abolished) is from 25 to 26 years of age. So that whilst the upper ranks have gone down in years, that is to say, they have benefited so far, that benefit gradually decreases as you go downwards, till you come to the subalterns, who have gone up in years. Whilst there was in 1854 30 years' difference of age between the senior second lieutenant and the senior captain, in 1867 there is only a difference of 15 years; and whilst, in 1854, there was an interval of 40 years from the senior first lieutenant to the senior lieutenant colonel, in 1867 there is only an interval of 20 years, and the difference is even only 17 years in some cases. Therefore, while the regiment has become larger between these grades, the difference of age has become half, or less than half of what it then was.

1530. So that the changes which have taken place since 1854 have had the effect of very much improving the state of the upper ranks in the regiment; but they have tended in the opposite direction as to the lower ranks?—I do not know that the system tended of itself to hurt the lower ranks, but it had the effect, which I presume the Royal Commission intended it should have, of especially improving the upper ranks; because, in their report to Her Majesty, they laid particular stress upon the necessity of having younger field officers, and pointed out that there was no officer to take the command of the Artillery in the East who was not of a very considerable age.

1531. What would you then suggest should be done at present to modify that tendency that you have spoken of?—I think we can observe from this, that the lieutenants are the officers who are worst off in the regiment, because they are getting worse and worse, whereas the other have been getting better. Certainly the others will not get better now, owing to the slowness of promotion, but at present the lieutenants have suffered more than any one. Therefore they should be relieved by giving them as many steps as is consistent with the good of the service generally. I do not mean so as to destroy entirely the promotion at the top, but that a larger proportion of vacancies should go to the rank of subalterns than should go to the rank of captains.

1532. Beginning at the top of the list, do you think that a system under which at a certain age every officer should go off, so far as standing in the way of promotion is concerned, would be satisfactory?—It is a very difficult question, I think, and requires a good deal of consideration; but

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but it seems to me that the question can only be entertained in so far as it affects the whole army; it is difficult to make it apply to one corps more than to another.

1533. You think that non-purchase corps and purchase corps should stand upon the same footing in that respect?—Yes, as regards superannuation; because the public do not care very much whether officers have quick promotion or slow promotion, so long as they have officers of efficient age and of sufficient ability to perform the work.

1534. Does not the purchase system in the Line practically accelerate promotion sufficiently without any such rule being laid down?—Yes.

1535. Practically, is not the effect of the working of the seniority system in the non-purchase corps, not so much in your corps as in your sister corps the Engineers, to keep a great number of old men at the top of the list?—Yes; a seniority system must invariably tend to keep old officers at the top of the list.

1536. Would you not draw from that the inference that it would be wise to have a limit of age in a seniority corps at the top, which it would not be wise to have in a purchase corps?—I do not see why; I apprehend that you mean that it may be unnecessary to have any limit of age at all in a purchase corps; but still you may have an officer of very great age in a purchase corps whom it would be advisable to remove, and the Royal warrant provides for that.

1537. The Royal warrant now enables the Commander in Chief to remove any officer from the command of a regiment after he is 60 years of age, does it not?—I rather think it is compulsory that he is to be removed from the command of a battalion at that age.

1538. I think you will find that it is from the command of a regiment?—I believe the words are nearly these: That every lieutenant colonel commanding a regiment shall retire at 60, unless the Commander in Chief wishes to retain his services.

1539. Yes; that admits entirely the principle of compulsory retirement in the Line?—Yes.

1540. The principle being admitted, your objection to it in the other corps, the non-purchase corps, perhaps would not be felt so strongly?—No; if a man is unfit to command a regiment of the Line at 60, he is equally unfit, I presume, to command a brigade of Artillery, arguing from equal premises.

1541. Then if such a regulation were in force, and if a liberal system of retirement after 25 years' service were established, do you think that that would upon the average meet the difficulties which you anticipate from the present state of the corps?—It is very difficult to say what a superannuation system would do, because it would not act at all at present, although undoubtedly, if such a course is deemed advisable by the Government, it is better to introduce it now, when it does not affect anyone, than afterwards, when it would be thought a great hardship to introduce such a system at a time when it would cut a great many officers suddenly out of the active list; but it must be borne in mind that, if the system of superannuation is introduced, there will at a future period be some captains superannuated at 60, even with a superannuation system in operation.

1542. But if every colonel is superannuated at 60, it is hardly likely that any captain will reach the age of 60, is it?—Yes; there are at the present time lieutenants older than I am.

1543. Between the top of the colonel's list and the top of the captain's list, are there not a sufficient number of officers to keep the age down?—It would be so, now that the regiment has resumed the regular course of admission; but it was so uneven about the years 1856 and 1857, and officers of such various ages came in, that practically some of them would be superannuated long before they got to the top of the regiment.

1544. You mean that, according to an actuary's calculation, such was the unevenness of ages in the corps extending over a period of some years, that you might have a senior captain as old as a senior colonel?—Yes (I should not say by an actuary's calculation, because I have not made it.)

1545. That is your own impression, from your own inquiry?—Yes.

1546. Therefore a simple retirement at 60 during those dead-level periods would not be sufficient?—It would cause, of course, a very great amount of promotion when those officers came to the age of 60.

1547. Meanwhile it would not be enough?—No, I think not; I think it would have a very small effect.

1548. My original question was, Would such a system of retirement at 60 years of age, coupled with a satisfactory optional retirement after 25 years' service, meet the case?—I think that a system of retirement after 25 years' service would have a very good effect in relieving the list, if it were, as you say, a satisfactory retirement.

1549. What would you consider would be a fair and satisfactory retirement, after 25 years' service; are you satisfied with the present half-pay retirement?—I think that there are a great many things to be considered in a question of that sort; of course it is not always easy for a private individual to give a fair opinion; at the same time, I think that half pay is not sufficient after 25 years' service, in a seniority corps, to induce a man to retire.

1550. The present rule is, that an officer, after 25 years' service, has an absolute right to take the half pay of his rank?—Yes, I believe so.

1551. If he is a lieutenant colonel, do you remember what his half pay is?—No; I do not know the rates of half pay at this moment; I cannot absolutely say what it is.

1552. At any rate, you think that some better rate would have the effect of clearing the corps sufficiently to promote a fair flow of promotion?—Yes.

1553. Can you give the Committee an idea, without troubling yourself with the details, about what rate you think would have that effect?—I have not considered the question of the amounts of pension that should be given, and I do not exactly like to make a random statement about it; but I think that a certain idea may be taken from the amount given by the Indian pension rules. I do not know the amount given under them, nor do I say that officers in the Royal Artillery would be entitled to have so much retirement; of course service in that climate is more severe than in other climates, and the Indian Government were more liberal, probably, than our Government would be disposed to be; at the same time, a great portion of the service of many of our officers is in the Colonies, and in bad climates.

1554. Do you remember what the proportion of retired pay is to pay after 25 years' service in India?—No, I do not know exactly.

1555. But

1555. But you think that some such proportion would be a fair rule to lay down here?—Yes, I think the system of retirement for years' service is a good one to go upon.

1556. Would you make the rate of retired pay dependent upon the rank upon which the officer retired, or simply upon the number of years' service?—Not entirely upon the rank; I think that a certain length of service should entitle an officer to the pension of a certain rank; but if he attained that rank before that length of service, the Government might be disposed to give him the pension of his rank, allowing the rule as it is in India to apply.

1557. Do you think that it is necessary to make any provision for the retirement of officers of less than 25 years' service, except in case of wounds or sickness?—I think it would benefit very considerably the promotion in the regiment if the Government allowed officers to retire before 25 years' service.

1558. What limit would you propose?—I should say after 20 years' service.

1559. Irrespective of wounds or sickness?—Yes.

1560. Then according to your plan there should be an optional retirement, commencing after 20 years' service?—I think that if you introduced that system of an optional retirement, that is to say, an unqualified right to retire after a certain number of years' service, you could not begin it at a less service than is taken in the Indian army, which is 22 years; but if the question were merely considered as regards giving a modified inducement to officers to retire, then you might begin after 20 years' service.

1561. What do you think that the officers of the corps would prefer, an absolute right to retirement, after a certain number of years, at certain amounts, or a right perhaps at a somewhat earlier period, but limited by the amount to a certain number every year?—I should think that an absolute right after a certain number of years would be the best.

1562. You think that, instead of calculating chances, the officers would prefer to know at a certain point of their service, that they acquired certain absolute rights?—Yes, because at present the absolute right to retire is null, except at the very top of the list. It is not very long, I believe, since a colonel wished to retire on full pay, who had more than 30 years' service, by which, under the Royal warrant, he would be entitled to retire, but he could not retire because there was no money for him.

1563. At present it depends upon the actual balance of a fund of 32,000*l.*?—Yes, I believe so.

1564. And officers are from time to time calculating their chances of getting upon that fund?—Yes.

1565. You would prefer to that, an absolute right to retire at certain points of service, and an absolute liability at a certain age?—I think so.

1566. Then may I take it that your general views would be to get rid entirely of the present system, and to substitute an optional retirement at rates to be considered at a graduated scale, beginning at 20 years' service, with compulsory retirement at the age of 60, at the top of the list?—A great deal depends upon what is proposed instead of the present system. I do not know that it would be right to say that I should like to see the present rate entirely abolished. At present it does induce the officers at the top of the list to retire, but if they do not get a sufficiently satisfactory proposition under the new arrangement, they might not be induced to go, and then it would work badly in that respect; we might get clogged at the top of the list again.

1567. I did not speak of amount. I said, supposing the amount were satisfactory, the general tenor of your proposal would be, to have a compulsory retirement at the top, and to have an optional retirement upon a graduated scale beginning at 20 years' service?—Yes.

1568. You were, I think you said, military secretary to the Commander in Chief in Madras?—Yes.

1569. Do you happen to be able to tell the Committee anything of the arrangements which were made as to the skeleton batteries at the time of the amalgamation of the Indian and imperial regiments?—The arrangement made at the time of the amalgamation was that there should be one skeleton battery for each brigade of artillery serving in India. There were then 14 brigades of the old Indian Artillery, and two brigades of the old Royal Artillery. Therefore, there were to be 16 batteries of officers without men, and besides that, there were four batteries which were supposed to be kept for the local artillery, which has since died out, and for the native artillery, which is of a very small amount.

1570. There are, therefore, now 20 skeleton batteries of artillery in India?—There are more; there have been seven batteries reduced since; I mean, reduced in men.

1571. Then I understand that there are 27 batteries at the present time with their full establishment of officers; but with no men, or with only a certain number of non-commissioned officers?—With no non-commissioned officers, and no men.

1572. With no men at all?—None.

1573. That arrangement did not, I suppose, affect the officers who got their commissions before the amalgamation?—No.

1574. What do you conceive will be the effect of that large number of skeleton batteries upon the prospect of the officers who have got their commissions since the amalgamation?—The effect, I conceive, will be this, that when at some distant period, not very distant now, the Indian regiments become entirely filled up by Royal Artillery officers, the War Department will say that they do not require so many officers, and that they will place a certain number of them on half-pay; that is my impression.

1575. With the alternative, I suppose, of a very heavy clogging of the list if they are maintained?—Of course they would be admitted to return to full pay in their turns, the same as took place after the Peninsular War.

1576. Did the arrangements as to these additional batteries come under your notice officially at the time of the amalgamation?—They did.

1577. Were the numbers suddenly augmented in consequence?—No, no great augmentation took place of the Indian Artillery at that time, there had been an augmentation before; but there was no augmentation made that I am aware of to fill up those regiments. At the actual time of these brigades being formed I was not in India. I was in China, and therefore I lost sight at that time of what was actually done; but the number of commissions given can easily be ascertained by reference to the Army List of that date

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date. At the time of the amalgamation they had very few vacancies; but still there were a few when the regiments were formed anew on the Royal Artillery footing; they had, I think, eight vacancies altogether left.

1578. The result, however, is that there may be apprehension of a demand for reduction when the whole of the Artillery corps comes more directly under the view of the War Office?—That is my impression.

1579. And that at present there are 27 surplus batteries, with comparatively nothing for the officers to do?—I do not say nothing to do, because they are supposed to be employed in various ways. It was specially laid down in Sir Charles Wood's Despatch upon the subject, that those officers were to provide for the cases of officers on furlough and sick leave; that was specially quoted in his Despatch; at that time there was a difficulty in getting officers; I cannot imagine that there is quite so much difficulty now, because very large secondings have taken place. At the time I speak of, I remember in Madras we had very great difficulty in getting a sufficient number of officers, but there were also no less than 13 captains on civil and political employment in the Madras Artillery alone, who have been all seconded since.

1580. Have you considered at all the question of the age at which officers in your corps get their commissions?—Yes.

1581. At what age did you yourself get your commission?—I was not quite 18.

1582. Do you know what the average age is now?—From 21 to 22, I believe.

1583. Do you think that that is an advantageous change?—No, I do not.

1584. For what reason?—Because, I think that an officer entering the army should enter before he is 20; I do not think that captains would generally like subalterns of 21 and 22 in preference to those of 18; I should say the reverse.

1585. Do you believe that reducing the age by two or three years would lower the standard to any considerable extent?—There can be no doubt that a young man who has been studying up to the age of 21 must have more theoretical knowledge and learning than one who leaves school at 18; but I consider that that advantage is very much counterbalanced by the difference of a young man beginning his profession early.

1586. Do you think that that is the general opinion in the corps?—I think it is.

1587. Mr. *Evans.*] I suppose you think a young man is more easily moulded at 18 than at 22?—Yes.

1588. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] I suppose, in a picked corps like the Artillery, the mere fact of being in the corps is an education in itself, in the same way as being in the Indian Civil Service is practically an education?—Exactly; the artillery education is very little learnt in the Academy; the whole of the duties, strictly speaking, of an Artillery officer are learned in the regiment.

1589. And you find that the moral and intellectual change in a man for the better goes on as fast or faster in a corps where he has plenty of duty and intellectual companions than when he is professedly studying in the college?—Really, that very much depends upon the personal character of the man himself; but I do not think that an officer is personally deteriorated by being kept at college two or three years longer. As a man, he does not become morally and intellectually worse; there is no reason to suppose that. I think it has one evil effect upon the officer himself, namely, that he feels he is not beginning life so soon as he might have done. I think it is a great start to begin life at 18 instead of at 21.

1590. Are you aware that in the Civil Service in India, a good many of the numerous examinations are studied for during the time the men are in the service itself, while they are actually performing their duties?—Yes.

1591. Would that be possible in the Artillery; would it be possible to carry on the higher branches of instruction when a young man was performing duty with his regiment, if he joined at 18?—It would be quite possible; it has been done at times. It used formerly to be the case, when they got their commissions at 18, that for the first six months after getting their commissions, they did pursue their instruction at Woolwich under an officer especially appointed for the purpose.

1592. With reference to those unmanned batteries, would it be possible to diminish the number of entries in the corps on account of the number of officers who are in the service, and who have no men to command?—It is not very easy for me to say whether that could be done or not, because I am not in a position to say whether all the officers are employed or not in India. My impression is, that the lieutenants could be reduced by giving fewer admissions, on account of the extra number that there are at present.

1593. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the daily regimental duties of an officer of Artillery, do they require the very high class of education for the performance of them, which is now practically necessary in order to get a commission?—No; certainly not, the daily regimental duties do not require it.

1594. Then, however much it is desirable that any officer should be as accomplished as possible, the regiment would not be likely to suffer in the regimental work by the age being reduced, and the officers entering the regiment at an earlier age than they now do?—No; I think not.

1595. What is the average age which a subaltern of Artillery would reach before he got his company if he entered at 21?—The subalterns who are now getting their promotion have upwards of 11 years' service.

1596. That is, 11 years' service as subalterns?—Yes; as subalterns.

1597. Some have even entered the regiment as late as 23 years of age, have they not?—I believe older than that; I am not sure of it, but I have been told that there have been some older.

1598. Can you give the Committee any information with regard to retiring; is there any particular age up to which an officer must serve before he can retire, and is there any system by which an officer of Artillery can claim half pay as a matter of right?—No more than there is in the rest of the army; that is, after 25 years' service.

1599. Supposing an officer wishes to retire from ill-health before completing his 25 years' service; take your own case; you have served in China, which is a bad climate; suppose you have served 16 or 17 years, or some time less than 25 years, and wish to retire from ill-health, have you a claim to go upon half pay?—Only on temporary half pay.

1600. Supposing at the end of your temporary half pay your health is so shattered that you are not

not able to rejoin your regiment?—Then my case would be specially considered by the Secretary of State for War.

1601. Then it is in the power of the Secretary of State for War to say that you shall not have any half pay at all?—Certainly.

1602. Then what becomes of you?—Then, I presume, I should have to leave without anything.

1603. You would have to resign your commission?—Yes, I presume so.

1604. Then your corps is different from any other branch of the army in that respect?—I believe the same rule exists in the rest of the army, with the exception that the officers in the Line are able to sell their commissions.

1605. The officers in the other branches of the army consider that they have either a right to half pay or to sell their commissions, do they not?—Yes.

1606. Did you ever know an instance of an officer in the Line being obliged to throw up his commission without any remuneration whatever?—No, not unless he was turned out of the army for misconduct.

1607. Do you know what the rule is in your regiment at this moment with regard to temporary half pay; if the temporary half pay last two years and you recover in that time, at the end of the two years where do you find yourself in the regiment?—You are put back in the same place in which you were when you left it; that is to say, if you were the 100th captain when you left you would be put back as the 100th captain, and you would lose the steps which had been given in the meantime.

1608. *Chairman.*] After how long; after two years?—After two years.

1609. Major *Jervis.*] It would be so after any time, would it not?—Yes; it is usually for two years.

1610. Captain *Vivian.*] The temporary half pay only extend to two years, does it?—I believe not longer; it is sometimes less.

1611. You cannot, except under very special circumstances, be put upon the temporary half-pay list for longer than two years?—I believe not; but I am not well acquainted with the War Office rules on the subject.

1612. Colonel *North.*] Suppose you get temporary half pay for two years, and recover in one year, are you then able to rejoin your regiment?—Yes.

1613. Supposing an officer is obliged to continue on temporary half pay beyond two years; is he allowed to count the first two years, or the whole of the period, towards completing his 30 years' service?—I believe not; I believe it is full pay service that is required for retiring on full pay.

1614. Do you not think that, considering the position in which that officer is placed, he ought to be allowed to count, not the whole time he may be on temporary half pay, which may be three or four years, but the first two years, which is the usual period, towards the 30 years' full pay service?—I think he should; but all rules on that subject in our corps must be guided by the rules of the rest of the army; I think you could not make an exception in our case.

1615. If the officer has not recovered at the end of two years, the temporary half pay is extended, is it not?—It is a subject with which I am not well acquainted.

1616. In the regular army we have no means of going upon temporary half pay for two years, in consequence of ill health; it is confined to your corps, I think; I never heard of it in the Line?—No, because there is a half pay list for the army, which there is not for the Artillery.

1617. Then your corps is not placed on the same footing as the rest of the army, with regard to half pay?—We have no unattached list as the rest of the army has.

1618. Do you think that it is fair to your corps, that after 17 or 18 years' service, when you have lost your health in such climates as British officers are bound to go to, you should be sent to the right about without any remuneration of any sort or kind?—I should like some provision of the kind you refer to, if we could have it, of course.

1619. Mr. *De Grey.*] Would an officer in a regiment in which the purchase system might be in force, equally lose any steps there might be going while he was on half pay?—I imagine that he would go to the bottom of the captains' list, if that was his rank.

1620. That would be so, would it?—That is the rule of the service.

1621. Captain *Vivian.*] I think you have stated that, in your opinion, there are two means of remedying the evil which is likely to occur in the Artillery corps, and that those are to be found, first of all, in an optional retirement after 20 years' service and upwards; and secondly, in compulsory retirement at 60 years of age?—I said that I thought that compulsory retirement would not give very much promotion; but that if the Government fixed an age at which they consider an officer incapable of performing certain duties, of course it might be made compulsory for him to retire.

1622. Which do you think would be the fairest and most advantageous to the corps, compulsory retirement at the age of 60, or compulsory retirement after a certain number of years' service?—I do not exactly know what you mean by compulsory retirement after a certain number of years' service.

1623. Which do you think is the best test of an officer's efficiency to perform his duties; the test of length of service or the test of age?—Generally speaking, the test of age; though some individuals at 50 are certainly much better than others at the same age; as a general rule, age must be the best test, I presume.

1624. You consider age a better test than service, then?—Yes; because an officer does not deteriorate from having entered the army a year or two sooner or later; it makes no difference to him physically.

1625. You think that the fairest way would be to say that an officer should retire at 60 years of age, rather than that he should retire after 40 years' service?—Certainly.

1626. With regard to this optional retirement after 20 years' service; of course whether officers would retire or not would depend upon the inducement held out to them to retire?—Certainly.

1627. Have you considered at all what inducement should be held out to officers in order to get them to retire?—I have not considered the subject particularly: I do not think that an officer of 20 years' service could be expected to go at much under full pay; because, unless he had very strong reasons for wishing to leave, he would naturally remain.

1628. You

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1628. You have heard, I daresay, the scheme of a bonus being offered, discussed?—I have.

1629. What is your opinion about that; do you think it would be preferred by officers to retirement upon an annuity?—I think it would be the means of inducing many officers to leave.

1630. You prefer a bonus to an annuity?—I think officers of a comparatively short service, that is to say 20 years' service, would very often go for a bonus; I think it would be a means of doing good in another way; it would be a means of removing inefficient officers from the regiment.

1631. You think that a bonus would be a greater inducement to an officer than an annuity?—It depends entirely upon the amount; I do not think you can lay down one rule more than another; I think the relative amount is the thing to go upon.

1632. You have been asked, I think, about the establishment of subalterns?—Yes.

1633. There are three subalterns to every battery of Artillery now, are there not?—Yes.

1634. Do you think that the subalterns' list in time of peace might be reduced?—I do not think that the duties of a field battery can be carried on efficiently with less than three subalterns.

1635. Do you mean in time of war, or in time of peace?—In time of peace; as long as you have six guns you must have three subalterns; a garrison battery might do with less at home.

1636. You have stated, I think, that the subalterns might with advantage enter the service at an earlier period than that at which they now enter?—Yes.

1637. Do you know the period at which the cadets enter the Woolwich Academy now; is it not from 17 to 19 years of age?—I really do not know the present rules; they have been changed a great many times.

1638. You were at the academy, of course?—Yes.

1639. At what age did you enter the academy?—At 14.

1640. And you entered the service at 18?—Yes.

1641. When you were at the academy, was the time limited for a cadet to go through his education there?—One could not stay there more than five years, except under very peculiar circumstances, such as an illness, which had prevented a cadet keeping one of the terms.

1642. Do you not think that the period of entering the academy might, with advantage to the service, be reduced from 17 to 19, to from 15 to 17?—It depends upon whether it is considered that the theoretical education of the academy is better than what the young men can get at other places. Apparently, the opinion of the Council of Military Education, and of the authorities in general, is that the cadets should acquire their theoretical education to a very large extent before they came into the academy. But if they were allowed to learn only the practical part of their profession at the academy at Woolwich, then it would not be so necessary for them to enter young, and they would only go through the practical course at the academy, whereas I believe at present they continue the theoretical course for some time after they enter.

1643. Do you know anything about the examination of the cadets at the present day?—Nothing but what I have been told by young officers now entering the regiment.

1644. Can you tell me whether it is or is not a fact, that comparatively very few young men are enabled to pass at a very early age, on account of the severity of the examination?—I imagine that that is the reason why the age has gradually risen; namely, that on account of the severity of the examinations, very young men or boys were unable to pass them.

1645. Do you think that for all the practical purposes of an Artillery officer, the examinations need not be so severe as they are?—I should think not, if they are so severe as I imagine they are; but I am so little conversant with the present course of education at the academy, that I am unable to speak precisely upon the point.

1646. Colonel *Sturt.*] The examination has been made more severe by the number of candidates, has it not?—I believe that that has had the effect of increasing the severity of the examinations.

1647. Captain *Vivian.*] You said that you have no half-pay list in the Artillery; you have no half-pay list of your own, but colonels of Artillery go upon half pay, do they not?—When I made use of the words "half-pay list," I alluded more to the unattached half-pay list as it exists in the army. We have got a retired half-pay list, but that is not exactly the same thing as the unattached half-pay list.

1648. *Chairman.*] It is not called a retired half-pay list, is it?—No; the Government have a right to call upon the officers on that list to serve, if they are fit for service.

1649. I do not think the word "half" is used; it is called "retired pay"?—The army list would show; I think it says "retired pay and half pay."

1650. Captain *Vivian.*] A colonel of Artillery going upon half pay can sell his commission, can he not?—Yes.

1651. That comes out of the reserve fund, does not it?—Yes; but it is no right which is applicable to the Artillery alone; they only sell commissions under the terms of the War Office Circular of February 1861, which admitted of the Secretary of State reducing the half-pay list by purchasing officers out.

1652. By purchasing commissions from the reserve fund?—Yes, indiscriminately; they do not inquire whether he is an Artillery or an Infantry officer.

1653. It is a fact that an officer of Artillery who has not paid for his commission, but who goes upon half pay, can still sell that commission for 4,500 *l.*, and that that money is paid to him out of the reserve fund?—Yes; there have been some cases in which that has been done.

1654. Colonel *North.*] Do you know of any instance of any officer of your corps who has been obliged to leave the corps on account of ill health, without either selling his commission or getting half pay?—No, I do not.

1655. Major *Jervis.*] Can you give the Committee any idea as to what amount of bonus men of 15 or 20 years' service would like to have before they would go; I mean to say, what would be a fair inducement to get them to go; I will take your own case; you have seen about as much service as most men of your years; what bonus would you think fair as an inducement to you to go?—I really have not considered the subject sufficiently able to state.

1656. Taking an average of 100 *l.* a year, do you

you think that most officers would go for that?—Yes, I think they would go for that.

1657. *Chairman.*] That is to say, you think the least efficient men would go for that?—Yes, and many efficient men who do not wish to remain in the service would go.

1658. Major *Jervis.*] Taking your own case, you are a lieutenant colonel, I think, by brevet, for service in the field; when do you expect to become a lieutenant colonel of Artillery?—I cannot possibly, as it appears at present, be a regimental lieutenant colonel under 30 years' service, or upwards.

1659. Therefore even many men who, like yourself, have seen a great deal of service, and distinguished themselves, if they saw there was no prospect before them, might be willing to go with a bonus?—Yes.

1660. Captain *Vivian.*] How many years' service have you now?—Fourteen.

1661. *Chairman.*] Shall you be entitled to get a brevet colonelcy in the army after a fixed number of years?—Yes.

1662. Colonel *North.*] You cannot be a regimental lieutenant colonel for 16 years, as I understand it?—Not for fully that time.

1663. *Chairman.*] You may be a major general in the army almost as soon?—No, not in the present state of promotion.

1664. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] With reference to the garrison Artillery, I see there are six batteries of garrison Artillery at Dover; speaking very roughly, how many men would there be in each of the batteries, do you think?—They have about 100 non-commissioned officers and men in each battery.

1665. How many should you have in a battery of garrison Artillery in the Bombay Presidency?—I do not exactly know; the number has been altered by the different Despatches of the Secretary of State from time to time, so that I do not like to speak precisely.

1666. Major *Jervis.*] You have been asked about the high standard of examination at the academy; I should like to ask you whether the Artillery has got any advantage out of that high standard of examination; is it not the case that an officer having gone through that examination has still to go through the staff college if he wishes to get upon the staff; and if he wishes to get into the establishment of the War Office he has to go through a peculiar course of their own; therefore, if I am right, an officer of Artillery having gone through that high class of examination gets no benefit whatever as far as he himself is concerned?—None.

Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES BRISBANE EWART, R.E., examined.

1667. *Chairman.*] YOU are a Lieutenant Colonel in the Engineers, I believe?—I am a Captain in the Engineers, and a Lieutenant Colonel by brevet in the army.

1668. Where are you serving now?—I am at present the commanding Royal Engineer in the London district.

1669. How many years' service have you had?—I have had 22 years' service.

1670. Have you considered the question of the present system of retirement as far as it affects your corps?—Yes, I have.

1671. Have you considered it both with reference to its effect upon the efficiency of the officers, and the flow of promotion generally?—Yes, I have.

1672. Is it your opinion that the present system is satisfactory?—I do not think that it sufficiently provides for the requirements of the present day.

1673. How would you illustrate that?—Because I think, if we go on as at present, the field officers who will hold commands in various climates will be over the age that they ought to be; and I think that the subaltern officers, who are now of a greater age than they used to be, will be older than they ought to be for their position.

1674. Do you say that from observation of the movement of the last few years, or from a simple calculation on the present ages of the different ranks?—From observation of the last few years; and then I think that the lower ranks are becoming of a greater age than they used to be, owing to the officers entering the corps later.

1675. When you say, "they used to be," I suppose you mean within 10 or 15 years?—Yes, I mean in my own time.

1676. Twenty years ago the ages were very much greater, I think?—Not at entry.

1677. No; but the ages of the seniors in the different ranks of the service were much greater?—Yes, of the seniors, but not of the juniors.

1678. Twenty years ago the senior captains were 10 years older than they are now?—Yes.

1679. And the senior lieutenants were four or five years older?—Yes.

1680. But you think, from an observation of the movements of recent years, that there is a tendency to relapse to the former state of things?—Yes, as regards age.

1681. In what way would you suggest that that should be cured?—I think that the first principle is to establish removal from the regimental ranks at a certain age; but I should not propose, in our corps, that it should debar a man from employment if he is specially efficient.

1682. For instance, taking the rank of full colonel, at what age would you compulsorily remove a full colonel to this contingent list, upon which he might be so employed?—I should take the age which has been established by the regulations for the Infantry, the age of 60.

1683. At that age you would remove every colonel to a list upon which he might be employed, by his removal giving a step through the corps?—I should remove him from the Corps List, but leave him on the Army List.

1684. Then, how would you describe the employments he might have, after he was so removed?—I think that men vary very much in their fitness. It might be considered, by the authorities, that a certain man was peculiarly fitted for a certain engineer's command, or a staff situation, or other employment; and if so, I think that they should be able to employ him.

1685. You think that an officer so removed might continue to be eligible for certain staff employment?—If specially efficient.

1686. If he was specially fit he might be so employed, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief?—Yes.

1687. But without any right on his part to demand it?—Without any right on his part to demand it.

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1688. As it is at present, a certain number of colonels in your corps are practically unemployed, are they not?—There are ordinarily a few colonels practically unemployed.

1689. Although they are on full pay?—Yes.

1690. Would you give to those who are removed to this separate list about the same position as to pay?—Yes; I should allow them to receive the unattached pay, and succeed to the rank of general officer, unless they accepted the 600 *l.* a year retirement.

1691. You would retire all colonels from the existing list at 60, giving them the option either to go to this unattached list, with the regular unattached pay, and with succession to the battalions through the major general's list, or giving them 600 *l.* a year, with or without a step in rank?—With the same as at present; a step of honorary rank, if they accept the 600 *l.* a year.

1692. Then would you, if they did not accept the 600 *l.* a year, give them the present step in rank, or would you leave them as colonels on an unattached list?—I should leave them as colonels, on account of their relative position to the rest of the army, because if you gave them the position of major generals you would probably give one corps a larger proportion on the list than the other branches of the service.

1693. You would leave the succession to the major generals unattached, but precisely in the same position as now, and the right to command of battalions as now?—As now, according to the Army List.

1694. Then coming below the compulsory quasi-retirements at 60, what retirements would you offer?—I think that a full colonel in the corps should have the right of claiming his retirement on the 600 *l.* a year list, that is to say at the age of about 53.

1695. Then do I rightly understand that you would still maintain a limited 600 *l.* a year list?—I think a general unlimited list would be the best way of working it.

1696. You would give a full colonel, at the age of 53, an absolute right to retire upon 600 *l.* a year?—Yes, with a step of honorary rank.

1697. Would you go lower than that?—I think that, having reference to the working of the present system, you must also give a lieutenant colonel the right to claim a retirement at a certain age.

1698. What age would you say?—I think you might say the age of 46, but at a reduced rate of retirement.

1699. About what rate of retirement?—About 400 *l.* or 450 *l.* a year; 400 *l.* a year is what he could claim now.

1700. Do you think that below that any provision for retirement, except in the case of sickness or wounds, is necessary?—I think you should facilitate a young class of the officers leaving the corps.

1701. How would you do that?—The first question I would go into is that of the seconded officers, of whom we always have a good many in our corps; officers who are temporarily allowed to remain on the strength of the corps, in order to accept appointments under Government, sometimes the Home Government and sometimes Colonial governments. Those officers are only allowed to remain upon the strength of the corps, and to continue their regimental succession for 10 years; at the end of those 10 years they must elect whether they will leave the corps or whether they will return to the corps. I think it is better for the succession in the corps that they should not return, and therefore that their continuing in the Civil Service if they wish to remain, and the Civil Service wish to keep them, should be facilitated. At the same time I do not think it would be right that those officers should continue regimental succession, so that what I would propose would be, that if an officer has completed his 10 years' service, and wishes to remain in the Civil or Colonial Service he should come under the operation of the Superannuation Act; but I would allow his name to be retained in the Army List. After the usual lists of retired officers, you might have a special list of officers who have quitted the corps in order to accept civil employment.

1702. You would allow him to remain in the army, but you would regulate his superannuation as a Civil servant by his entire time which has been given to the public?—What I mean by his remaining in the army is merely that his name would remain on the Army List; he would retain the rank he had in the service as a sort of honorary rank; if he was a captain he would still be a captain, but his military service would cease.

1703. But his time served in the corps would go, in addition to his time served in the Civil Service, for superannuation?—I think that his superannuation should count according to the whole of his service to the State.

1704. You are aware, I suppose, that an officer with professional acquirements does receive some addition to his time of service when he comes for Civil Service superannuation?—Yes, under clause 4 of the Superannuation Act he can receive it.

1705. And that generally, that those offices which seconded officers of your corps take, are those to which some additional time is attached under that order?—Yes; but at present there is an uncertainty about it. I think that when an officer leaves the corps he should look forward to that as a certainty.

1706. You have mentioned two ages, 53 and 46, I think, as the ages at which an officer should have the option of claiming certain rates of retirement?—Yes.

1707. Do you think that a test of age is preferable for optional retirement to a test of service?—Yes; I think it is for the good of the service.

1708. I presume you would justify compulsory retirement at a certain age, on the principle that at that age the great chances are that an officer is not fit for work?—Not fit for the sort of work he would be required to do.

1709. But is not the retirement which you offer at an earlier age not so much a matter of fitness as a matter of reward to the officer, and ought not that to depend rather upon his service than his age?—Practically, in our corps, the age and the service run together, because we all enter about the same age; and therefore, in naming those ages, I am rather looking to the sort of periods at which men would be likely to wish to retire.

1710. Would not the rule be more logical if it depended, in the case of those earlier retirements, on the service, which would be a fair time to claim for, than if it depended upon the accident of age?—It would operate differently between officers who would now be coming up for that retirement and officers who will be coming up 20 years hence, on account of the alteration in the age at which they join the corps.

1711. Would

1711. Would you allow the period of seconding to count, if service were the rule?—Yes; for the 10 years.

1712. Then is not your reason for preferring age to service, that you could hardly justify the time while an officer was seconded being counted as time of service?—It always has been counted; it has always been customary to count the 10 years as service.

1713. Do you think that if a system were established under which an officer, on retirement, might commute his retired pay for a corresponding capital sum, that would be satisfactory to the corps?—I think that it would be very acceptable to some officers.

1714. Would it tend to induce inefficient or unsatisfactory officers to retire more than an annuity would?—Yes, I think it would; and I think it would enable the authorities to press them to go.

1715. It is not part of your proposal that there should be any compulsory retirement, except at the extreme age of 60?—No.

1716. But you think that the moral inducements to go would be assisted by the influence of a sum down, rather than an annuity?—Yes, I think so.

1717. Previous witnesses have been asked whether, in the event of an officer in the Artillery being put upon temporary half pay, there is any limit to that temporary half pay; is it so in your corps?—Yes; he is required to go before a medical Board again at certain periods.

1718. After the first year?—I am not quite sure about the rule; I think it is after each year.

1719. Is an officer allowed to remain on temporary half pay in your corps more than two years?—I think not.

1720. Have you ever heard of a case within your own recollection, of an officer being obliged to resign his commission from the necessity of exceeding the two years?—No; I cannot quote a case.

1721. Then I may sum up your evidence thus: it is your opinion that there should be compulsory retirement at 60?—I should call it rather removal than retirement.

1722. That compulsory removal to a list which qualified a colonel for staff employment at the option of the Commander in Chief, and which enabled him to claim the present 600 *l.* a year, and a step in rank coupled with optional retirement at 46 and 53, and the power of commuting the retired pay for a sum down, would practically secure the efficiency of the corps?—Yes, I think so.

1723. Have you considered at all the question of the age at which officers get their commissions now?—I think that the officers enter the corps older than is desirable.

1724. At what age did you yourself go to Woolwich?—At 15.

1725. When did you get your commission?—At 18.

1726. What is the average age now in the Engineers?—I think they come into the corps at about 22.

1727. Do you consider that too late an age?—I think it is better to begin life earlier in the corps, and it is better also with reference to the ages of other officers of the same rank in other branches of the service with whom they may be thrown.

1728. Your corps is eminently a scientific corps?—We are constantly called upon to perform financial and other duties under the State, and also to fill certain scientific positions.

1729. Do you think that the effect of reducing the age of admission either to the academy, or for a commission, would lower to any great extent the scientific standard of your corps?—I do not think so; but I should perhaps say that I think that there might be an advanced class for officers in after years, somewhat on the same principle as the staff college at Sandhurst.

1730. Should officers go to that advanced class immediately after they have got their commissions or later in life?—Later, after being abroad.

1731. After they have acquired full knowledge of their regimental duties?—Yes.

1732. And you think that that would keep up the full standard of scientific knowledge in the corps?—Yes, I think so.

1733. Major *Jervis.*] You stated that you thought it was right that colonels of Engineers should retire at the age of 60, because they do the same thing in the rest of the army?—I merely said I took that age because it had been laid down for other branches of the service.

1734. Is it a fact that colonels of the Line have to retire at the age of 60?—Yes, unless they are reported specially efficient.

1735. I think you rather allude to lieutenant colonels commanding regiments?—I mean lieutenant colonels commanding regiments, because there are no substantive colonels in the Line.

1736. Colonels in the army are not shelved at the age of 60?—There are no colonels in the army, except in the three non-purchase corps.

1737. There is a very large number in the Army List, and a good many of them are over 60?—They are brevet colonels.

1738. No man who had attained the rank of colonel by service would be shelved at 60, would he?—I think there are very few men in command of regiments over 60; there may be a few exceptions.

1739. Would you at all compare the duties of a full colonel of Engineers with the duties of a lieutenant colonel commanding a regiment?—A full colonel of Engineers is liable to be called upon to go at any time to any climate; he may be called upon to take the command in the field.

1740. So are general officers?—I do not think the duties are analogous.

1741. Are not the duties of a colonel of Engineers very superior in every sort of way, for responsibility as regards finance and everything else, to those of a lieutenant colonel of the Line?—Yes; I think they are.

1742. I think in the Crimea your two chief engineers were simply captains in the corps; Captain Gordon and Captain Chapman?—I was in the Crimea throughout the war, and can speak from experience; the senior officers died or broke down, that is to say, were invalided.

1743. Was that the reason why they sent out two still older ones; I refer to Sir John Burgoyne and Sir Harry Jones?—Sir John Burgoyne came out on special employment; he was not the commanding Engineer; Sir Harry Jones was also sent out on special employment, but he became the commanding Engineer.

1744. Both were sent out to perform engineering duties, were they not?—No; Sir John Burgoyne was sent out to make a special report for the

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the Government; he was attached especially to Lord Raglan.

1745. You think that a colonel of Engineers, taking into account the duties he has to perform, is not competent at the age of 60?—Not for the field, as a rule; some men are specially efficient; but, as a rule, I should say he should be under 60.

1746. Captain *Vivian.*] You propose by your scheme that officers should retire compulsorily at 60; that is so, is not it?—Yes; I used the word removal, not retirement.

1747. I apprehend that the whole of your evidence has been given with respect to your own corps, not with reference to the Royal Artillery at all?—I think that the same arguments would apply which I have used.

1748. To the Royal Artillery?—Yes.

1749. Then you have given your evidence with respect to the Royal Artillery as well as the Royal Engineers?—Yes; I think so, as regards those ages.

1750. How do you think promotion would be accelerated in the Royal Artillery by compulsory retirement at the age of 60, looking at the age of the colonels at present?—It would not be immediately accelerated, but it would be prospectively.

1751. That is to say, you apprehend that the age of colonels, and of the higher ranks of the Artillery, will increase?—Yes; from the fact that there is very little difference in age between a considerable number of them.

1752. Therefore you anticipate that the average age of the senior colonels of Artillery, which is now 53 years and 7 months, will increase to much above 60 very shortly?—Yes, I think so.

1753. I think you propose that those officers should be removed from their corps at 60, but that they should be left on the Army List, and be eligible for staff appointments?—Yes.

1754. Can you tell me how many major generals there are belonging to the scientific corps now?—I do not remember exactly; 32 and 16 respectively, I think; 48 in all.

1755. I think that the strength of the Royal Artillery has been increased, has not it, from 14 to 17 brigades?—Yes, it has.

1756. But the list of major generals has not been increased proportionately?—Not proportionately, I believe.

1757. Can you tell the Committee at all now what staff employments the major generals of Artillery or Engineers have, and how many of those 48 are employed on the staff?—There are very few employed.

1758. Out of the whole 48?—Very few are employed.

1759. As to your own corps, can you tell me how many are employed?—I do not think we have one employed at this moment, except Sir John Burgoyne.

1760. You have only one?—We have only one employed, and that is Sir John Bnrgoyne.

1761. Therefore, retiring those officers from the corps, and from taking any part in regimental duties, and putting them upon a list where they would be eligible for staff appointments, would be practically, if the present system is continued, shelving them, would it not?—I would not deter them from special appointments as commanding Engineers.

1762. As the practice goes now-a-days, and looking to the fact that there are such a very small proportion of officers in the Artillery or Engineers employed on any staff employment whatever, putting them upon such a list, with the hope held out to them of staff employment, would be practically shelving them, would it not?—It would; except that, supposing there was a colonel peculiarly efficient, he might be made commanding Engineer at Gibraltar, or commanding Engineer in Ireland, as a colonel on the staff.

1763. I think colonels on the staff have never the local rank of brigadier, have they?—No.

1764. Colonels on the staff of Artillery have not?—No; they are colonels on the staff.

1765. Although they are commanding large brigades, and have very responsible commands, yet they never have brigade rank given to them?—Only in the field, I believe.

1766. In time of war?—Yes.

1767. Colonel *North.*] Can your officers claim half pay as a right?—They can only claim it after 25 years' service; and under an old warrant three in two years can claim it after 24 years' service.

1768. I mean an officer of 12, 14, or 16 years' service, whose health is broken down by service abroad; can he claim half pay as a matter of right?—No; he has no claim.

1769. Can he claim to sell his commission?—No; there have been cases of men retiring on half pay, but not at that service.

1770. I mean as a matter of right?—Not at present.

1771. Then you have nothing to look forward to, when you enter your corps, as a matter of right; if your health breaks down before you have served 25 years, the Secretary of State, or anybody else, may give you nothing?—Under 21 or 25 years' service, it is so.

1772. *Chairman.*] Except in case of wounds?—Except in case of wounds.

1773. Colonel *North.*] Even then it is left to the Secretary of State; you would get a pension for your wound, but it does not follow that you would have half pay as a matter of right?—Not as a matter of right.

1774. *Chairman.*] As a matter of custom you would?—Yes, I believe so.

1775. Major *Jervis.*] Is it not a fact that at this present time all full colonels of Engineers and Artillery who are employed are colonels on the staff; I mean all colonels in command of districts?—No, not all; it is not so in the Engineers except at certain stations.

1776. Is not it the case with the commanding Engineer at Gibraltar and Malta, and Aldershot?—Not at Aldershot; the commanding Royal Engineer at Aldershot is not a colonel on the staff.

1777. You said you thought it would be right to reduce the age of officers joining the Engineers; and one reason you gave was to bring their age into comparison with the age of other officers joining the other branches of the service; do you not think that the country looks forward to having very different men, men of far higher attainments, in lieutenants joining the Engineers than in cornets or ensigns joining the regiments of the Line?—A lieutenant of Engineers learns a great deal after he joins the corps; he is always learning.

1778. Everybody is learning all his life; but is not it the fact that you look forward to much higher efficiency in a subaltern of Engineers, even on first joining, than you would in the case of a cornet

Lieut. Col. *C. B. Ewart*, R.E.

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cornet or ensign?—As a rule, a man joining our corps has two years more instruction afterwards at Chatham.

1779. Even with that, when you come to think of all the appointments they have at the Board of Trade, in the Topographical Department, and the Railway Department, and so on, is not it the fact that you expect a much greater degree of efficiency in a subaltern of Engineers, than in a subaltern of the Line?—Yes, you do; but I think a young man can attain what is necessary at the age of 18, before entering the corps.

1780. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] Is it your opinion that the competitive examination provides you with men of that class of mind, that they can take advantage of all their opportunities of learning in the corps?—They learn a good deal afterwards, in the corps.

1781. Is it the fact that the examination is competitive, or the difficulty of the examination which secures to you that class of men?—I think if they come in at 15, and pass the examination that is necessary, then a three years' course at the academy should be sufficient.

1782. After that, they could get better opportunities of learning in the corps than in the academy?—Yes.

1783. Colonel *Sturt.*] Would you propose to give the Commander in Chief a discretionary power to retain the services of an officer over 60 years of age, supposing that officer to be in very good health, and conspicuous for his ability?—I should not retain him in the list of the corps, but I should keep him on the Army List, and then the Commander in Chief could employ him.

1784. You would not give the Commander in Chief a discretionary power to retain his services in the Engineers?—Not in the corps list, but he might still employ him as an Engineer.

1785. *Chairman.*] Is there any other reason which holds colonels back from taking the 600 *l.* a year under the present regulations, except that of running their chances of a battalion at 1,000 *l.* a year, against the present 600 *l.* a year?—Yes, there is this—that on retiring, they are given the honorary rank of major general, and that rank does not entitle their widows to a higher pension than that of a colonel. Whereas if they happen to be near the top of the list, they look forward to succeeding in the course of a few years to the service list of general officers, and then their widows would be entitled to a higher pension of 120 *l.* a year.

1786. Widow's pension follows substantive rank, and not honorary rank?—Yes.

1787. Are you aware that that really has influenced individual officers in their choice?—I have reason to believe that it has had an effect in some cases.

1788. Do widow's pension follow brevet rank below that?—No, substantive rank.

1789. In every case?—It is always substantive rank throughout.

Major General George Colt Langley, R.M., further Examined.

Major Gen. *G. C. Langley*, R.M.

1790. *Chairman.*] You wish to be examined upon one or two points of your previous evidence?—Yes.

1791. Can you inform the Committee upon what grounds the number of 10 general officers was allotted to the Royal Marines on what is called the unattached list retired pay, I believe technically?—The Royal Commission appointed in May 1854, to report upon the system of promotion and retirement in the army, recommended a certain number of general officers for the army, and for the seniority corps. By their report 234 general officers were recommended for the army, 24 for the Royal Artillery, and 12 for the Royal Engineers; and the Admiralty, on considering that report, recommended 10 general officers for the Royal Marines as being in a supposed proportion to the numbers recommended for the other seniority corps.

1792. What was the basis of the proportion?—About one-third; a little under one-third.

1793. Was the proportion with reference to the number of men or the number of officers?—The number of officers.

1794. You say that the Admiralty arrived at that number so as to bear a fair proportion to the other seniority corps; was it in proportion to the number of men?—To the number of officers, I believe. That was the basis, I believe, of the recommendation of the Royal Commission.

1795. It was not in proportion to the number of field officers, but to the total number?—No; in proportion to the number of combatant officers.

1796. Since then three have been added to these 10, have they not?—The Order in Council by which those 10 general officers were allotted to the Royal Marines was dated September 1854; but the officers of the Ordnance Corps were enabled, by representing that the number recommended for them was inadequate, to obtain an increase from 36 to 48, as is shown in the Ordnance warrant, which is dated, I think, in November 1854. No increase was allotted to the Royal Marines until November 1866, when the number was increased to 13.

1797. Had there been any increase in the corps of Marines meanwhile?—It appears by the Estimates of the year 1854, that the total number of the corps of Marines was then 12,500. It has since been increased to 18,000.

1798. And it stands now at, what?—It stands now at 16,400.

1799. A question was asked whether general officers of Marines are eligible for commands; you wish to answer that specially, I think?—I should wish to remark that it has been stated, for the purposes of comparison as to the effect of retirement, that all general officers of Marines, whether retired or unattached, should be classed with the retired generals of Artillery and Engineers, and it might therefore be assumed that general officers of Marines were disqualified for commands.

1800. Captain *Vivian.*] Why should it be so assumed; general officers of Artillery and Engineers are not disqualified from commands?—It has been stated in evidence that they may be classed with general officers of Artillery and Engineers who are absolutely retired; and if such a statement were to pass unchallenged, it might be assumed that it was an acknowledgment on the part of the officers of the Marines that they were not qualified to assume commands.

1801. *Chairman.*] Was not there some additional reason, besides the reason of comparison of num-

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bers, which led the Admiralty to recommend the addition of three to the total number of general officers of Marines?—Yes, there was another reason; it was because the Royal Marine Artillery has of late years been very much increased in numbers, and it has been found expedient to place them on a separate list for promotion; it was therefore considered desirable that they should have a proportion of general officers specially set apart for them.

1802. So that there are, or are to be, two distinct establishments of major generals of Marines?—Of general officers of Marines.

1803. Ten attached to the Infantry, and three to the Artillery?—Yes.

1804. The establishment of general officers is to all intents and purposes, an establishment of retired officers, is not it?—No, I think not; general officers of Marines are not at all disposed to accept that position, that they are virtually retired and disqualified from further service.

1805. Practically, except as to the Inspector General, and in your case as to the Deputy Adjutant General, there is no employment for general officers of Marines, is there?—No general officer of Marines has as yet been employed upon the staff of the army, neither had a colonel of Marines ever been employed in command of a brigade until 1857; but during that year, when a portion of the army which had been sent to China was diverted to India during the mutiny, a brigade of Royal Marines, consisting of two battalions and a battery of Royal Marine Artillery, was sent out from England, under the command of a regimental colonel; another battalion was added to them, formed from a detachment from the different ships on the station, and that brigade performed very good service in the capture of Canton, and the subsequent operations in China. During their service, several officers belonging to that brigade were employed on the staff of the army, in the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General's Departments, and their services were most highly reported upon; therefore, if they were able to render efficient service upon the staff in those capacities, it is to be presumed that their promotion subsequently to be general officers, cannot be considered to disqualify them from any further employment.

1806. So that while there is no question, as a matter of fact, that with that one, or occasionally two, exceptions, the major generals' list is in practice a retired list, in principle you would contest that it should not be so considered, and you would hope to see a major general of Marines occasionally employed on the staff of the army?—Yes, I may say that a distinguished officer of the Royal Artillery has given in evidence, I believe, before this Committee, that the same is nearly the case with their corps; out of 32 generals there is only one now employed on the staff of the army, and of 16 generals of Engineers there is not one employed on the staff of the army, notwithstanding their high scientific acquirements.

1807. Reverting to the increase in the list, comparing equal things with equal, the result is that at present the Marines have the prospect of a larger proportion of well paid retirements than either of the other two corps?—No, I am not aware that that is the case; when you consider the large number of honorary appointments of commandants of battalions which are enjoyed by the Artillery and Engineer officers, compared with the five enjoyed by the officers of Marines, I think they are not more highly paid.

1808. Adding the highly-paid colonels commandant in the Artillery and Engineers to the unattached list, and adding the colonels commandant, who are not so well paid, of the Marines, to the body of retired or established generals of Marines, you get a better average, do you not, for the Marines than for either of the other corps?—I am not certain of that; I should think the average would be very nearly alike.

1809. At any rate, there has never been any claim to add to the 35,000 *l.* a year for the Marines, for the good reason that you have not nearly reached it?—No; we had had no necessity for any addition; indeed we have always been considerably under it; in fact, in the Order in Council of 1854, which first authorised that sum of 35,000 *l.*, it is stated in clause 16, I think, "that the retired full-pay list be prospectively fixed for the Marine corps at 35,000 *l.*, being 6,000 *l.* more than the actual expense now incurred for the full pay retirement of officers of all ranks in the corps, and it being only a reasonable compensation for the loss of an annual retirement of two lieutenant colonels and two captains recently granted, but not as yet in practical operation, though it may not be necessary to reach the maximum amount for some years." That provision has been acted up to, and the maximum amount has not yet been reached.

1810. Colonel *North.*] Have the officers of your corps half pay by right?—No; we have no retirement upon half pay by right.

1811. Nor by sale of the commission?—Nor by sale of the commission.

1812. Then what becomes of an officer if he leaves your corps?—If an officer's health breaks down on service, he is examined by a Medical Board, and if he is ascertained to be unfit for further service, he is given half pay.

1813. Sir *John Hay.*] After how many years' service?—According to the army regulations, which we follow, after three years' service he is entitled to be placed upon half pay, if he is reported unfit for service.

1814. Colonel *North.*] That is what the understanding, on entering your corps, would be, that he has a right to half pay under those circumstances?—He has that right to half pay if he is unfit for further service.

1815. *Chairman.*] Does he remain upon that half-pay list for an indefinite time?—Yes; he is not called upon to serve; he is not called back again, generally.

1816. If he is called back again, where does he come in?—We have only had one or two cases where an officer has been placed upon temporary half pay, and come back again; and as far as my recollection goes, those officers were brought back to their proper places in the list; they were not put at the bottom of the list, but they were brought back to the places they occupied previously to going upon half pay.

1817. However long they may have been upon temporary half pay?—The temporary half pay was, I think, for a twelvemonth; in the two cases I remember, the officers were brought back at the expiration of that time, but the health of both officers broke down afterwards, and they were placed upon permanent half pay.

1818. There is no way in which an officer of Marines can leave by the sale of his commission, that

that is to say, by getting a price for his commission?—No.

1819. There is no fund out of which commissions can be purchased?—No; some officers have, I think, been recently allowed to sell their commissions in the other seniority corps, but no field officer of Marines has been allowed to do so. It is only applicable of course to brevet field officers; a regimental officer cannot sell his commission.

1820. Sir *John Hay.*] What is the number of regimental field officers in the Royal Marines?—Thirty-two; there are five colonels commandant, five colonels second commandant, 20 lieutenant colonels, and two officers supernumerary, for employment on the general staff in London.

1821. Does that bear a fair proportion to the number of field officers in the other corps?—No, it is very much smaller.

1822. As a rule, is retirement asked for by the field officers?—No, it is not. The field officers of Marines have no fixed employment on foreign stations, and therefore they are not, as a rule, inclined to apply for retirement, which field officers of other corps sometimes are desirous of obtaining, in order to avoid the trouble and expense of moving their families abroad.

1823. How does that operate?—It operates disadvantageously upon the promotion of the junior officers, the captains, and subalterns.

1824. Have you any suggestion to make to remedy that?—I think it would be advisable to increase the amount of retirement to officers of a certain standing, say 25 or 30 years' standing.

1825. From the rank of field officers?—To include some field officers and the senior captains.

1826. Have you considered the advantage of restoring the rank of major in the Royal Marines?—I do not think it would be advisable to restore the rank of major; it would be rather preferable, I think, in the way of improving the position of junior officers, to introduce the rank of second captain, which exists in the two other seniority corps.

1827. Is there a proposal for doing that in the Marine Corps?—There is a proposal which has been under the consideration of the Admiralty, and has been recommended to the Treasury, and is now under their consideration.

1828. *Chairman.*] I suppose the number of field officers in the Marines is smaller in proportion to the number of field officers in the other seniority corps, because there is comparatively little for them to do?—Yes, from the want of a fixed employment on foreign stations, the number has been regulated by the wants of the routine duties in England, and is, I think, set as low as it can be with due regard to the efficiency of the service.

1829. There is, strictly speaking, no employment during peace for any field officer of Marines at all, is there?—No, there is not; that is a great want of the service, because on the one hand, you require field officers to be perfectly efficient so as to be ready for any foreign service which is required, and at the same time they are not, as a rule, generally disposed to ask for retirement.

1830. When you say "a want of the service," it is almost a necessity of the service; it would be impossible to find employment in ordinary times, in peace, for a field officer of the Marines abroad, would it not?—No, it would not be impossible; I think an arrangement might be made for employing them.

1831. You mean that a colonel of Marines might be put in command of Marines on board a flag-ship?—I mean that a certain number of Marines might perhaps be quartered in Malta or in Halifax, from which men might be supplied to the fleet.

1832. Sir *John Hay.*] As a portion of the garrison?—While they were there they would do garrison duty, and the vacancies in the fleet might be filled up from them, and the field officer who was with them would be ready to undertake any service that he might be called upon to perform, and at the same time to superintend the drilling and the instruction of the Marines of the fleet when the ships were in those particular harbours.

1833. *Chairman.*] It would be, to a certain extent, finding employment for the Marines abroad, at the cost of the army at large, would it not?—No, I think not; it would not interfere with the army at all.

1834. I suppose, if a certain number of Marines went and did duty at Halifax or Malta, it would relieve a certain number of soldiers, would it not?—It would not have the effect of causing any reduction in the force of the army.

1835. Sir *John Hay.*] As a matter of fact, field officers of the Marines have been occasionally embarked, have they not?—Yes, they have.

1836. Mr. *De Grey.*] Do you think it would be advisable that officers should be allowed to receive their retiring allowances in the shape of a lump sum?—I think many officers, particularly in the junior ranks, or say from 20 to 30 years' service, would be disposed to accept a lump sum, in preference to retirement on an annuity.

1837. Do you think that it would offer an extra inducement to them to retire?—I think so; I think that many officers would take a lump sum, who would not ask for the present full-pay retirement.

1838. Do you not think that the older officers would be more likely to accept a lump sum than some of the younger ones, on the idea that their lives were worth less?—They would be inclined to accept a lump sum certainly, if it was augmented in proportion to the value of their annual retirement.

Monday, 15*th July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Pack-Beresford.	Colonel North.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Otway.
Mr. Evans.	Colonel Sturt.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Captain Vivian.
Major Jervis.	

HUGH C. E. CHILDERS, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

His Royal Highness the Duke of CAMBRIDGE, K.G., called in; and Examined.

H. R. H. the Duke of *Cambridge*, K.G.

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1839. *Chairman.*] HAS your Royal Highness considered the present state of the retirement from the Ordnance Corps?—Frequently.

1840. Do you, Sir, consider that the state of that retirement is at present satisfactory?—No, I consider it is extremely unsatisfactory.

1841. In what respects would you say that it is extremely unsatisfactory?—I think that it is unsatisfactory in two respects. One is, that I do not think that there is sufficient retirement constantly going on in order to keep up a flow of promotion so as to bring the younger men to the head of the list at a period of life when their services are most valuable and most wanted. In the next place, it is unsatisfactory because there are officers whom one would be very glad to see removed, but whom we have no power whatever of removing, inasmuch as we can only get them to retire if they choose. The consequence is that officers retire whom we would much sooner see not retire, though we are glad thus to obtain promotion in the corps, while others remain whom we should be glad to see removed from the efficient staff of the regiment.

1842. Under the present system of retirement nobody can be retired unless there is a sum of money available at the time; does your Royal Highness consider that a satisfactory plan, or would you prefer a system under which, after certain conditions are complied with, the officer could retire whether there was a balance or not?—I should infinitely prefer the latter plan, because there is a system in it, whereas under the present plan there is no system at all. It is really a matter of accident whether any man retires or not, and whether the particular man whom you wish to see retire does retire.

1843. Do you think that after a certain length of service or age, every officer should have the right and exercise the option of retirement?—Yes.

1844. Does your Royal Highness consider that after a certain age every officer should be compelled to retire from active service?—I think it is very desirable that at certain ages officers should be called upon to make room for junior officers to take their place. I see no great hardship in such an arrangement.

1845. About what age do you consider an officer should be in that way called upon to retire?—If age is to determine it, I think it should be 60; we have a principle in the line where 60 has of recent years been established as the age at which officers should retire from the command of regiments, and if you extended that to the Ordnance Corps, you would be only extending an accepted principle. If it is to be length of service, I agree with Colonel Gambier, that 38 years is the proper length of service.

1846. Commissions being now given out between 20 and 23 years of age, 38 years of service would be nearly the same as 60 years of age?—The difference between retirement at 60 years of age, or after 38 years of service, I believe to be really hardly anything; I believe virtually it comes to the same thing.

1847. If an officer should have the right to exercise the option of retirement after a certain number of years' service, about how many years' service would your Royal Highness name for that option?—I think that 20 years is the earliest period at which an officer should retire. Considering how carefully an officer has been prepared for the more scientific corps, by a long course of study at Woolwich, and so on, you have a right to expect 20 years' service from him.

1848. At present, in the line, an officer has the option to retire on half pay after 25 years' service; do you see a sufficient distinction between the line and the more scientific corps, to make the period earlier in the latter case?—The only distinction is, that the line is not affected in promotion by retirement, as the Ordnance Corps are. I do not see how you can keep up a regular and proper flow of promotion, unless you begin pretty early; I therefore put the period of retirement for the Ordnance Corps at five years lower than for the line, on that ground, and on that ground only.

1849. Then the inducement to retire, in point of money, should be made somewhat better in the Ordnance Corps than in the line; would your Royal Highness therefore reconsider at all the question as between 20 and 25 years' service?—A man, of course, in the army who has a purchased commission would have a greater inducement to go out of the army, and would do so more easily than a man in a seniority corps, where the inducements for retirement by means of money are not available; therefore, to that extent, there is more inducement in the line to retire at an early period than in the ordnance corps. To that extent

extent the question is affected by the purchase system, or the non-purchase system, as existing in the line, or in the ordnance corps.

1850. But if the rate of retired pay fixed for the ordnance corps was something considerably better than the half pay at which the officers in the line retire, would it then be matter for consideration whether the period of service should be so low as 20 years?—Yes; I think the period of service of 20 years should be taken into account with reference to the mode in which you put that question, which is, that in a non-purchase corps there should be better inducements for men to retire than in a purchase corps.

1851. Have you, Sir, considered at all about what amount an officer should be retired upon after say 20 years' service?—That is a very difficult question to answer, for this reason, that you must make it worth his while to retire or he would not do it. On the other hand, you must look to the interests of the State, which of course would put the retirement as low as the interests of the State would permit. To strike a balance between the two points is the problem which I consider this Committee specially called upon to solve. I am not prepared to say what it should be, but unless it is made worth a man's while to retire, the inducement will not produce the effect which is intended.

1852. At present the rate of retirement from the rank of colonel is 600 *l.* a year, and from the rank of lieutenant-colonel 400 *l.* a year. If the compulsory system, of which your Royal Highness has spoken, was adopted at 60 years of age, do you think that the rate of retired pay should be less than the 600 *l.* a year which is now given to colonels?—I think that the rate of retired pay should be rather improved in the centre than at the top, because I think the want of a flow of promotion is more at the centre than at the top. I see no necessity for raising the retired pay at the top of the list, but I should like to see the retired pay at the centre more raised than it is now.

1853. The Committee may gather from your Royal Highness that you would prefer to see the retired pay of a full colonel, when that retirement was compulsory, at 60 years of age maintained at the present figure of 600 *l.*?—Yes.

1854. With a step in rank as at present?—Certainly.

1855. It has been suggested to this Committee, that the option should be given to an officer compulsorily retiring, to remain on a separate list, in which he should be eligible still for certain staff employments, and that he should succeed in his turn to the major general's establishment, and ultimately to the command of a battalion; do you think that that system would be desirable?—There is a great deal to be said for it, and a great deal to be said against it; if you retire a man at a certain age because you consider his age or his service such as to justify it, there is a certain amount of awkwardness in bringing him back to full duty, because you put him in a position where it would become necessary for the authorities to select him for a command if opportunity occurred, and it would be difficult in such a case to say to a man, "You cannot be placed in command, because you have already been on the retired list." But, on the other hand, if you compulsorily retire a man at 60 in a seniority corps, it is rather hard to say to a man who would be quite fit to take many positions which would enable him to continue his professional career, that he should be altogether debarred from availing himself of that chance; and therefore it is not an easy question to decide whether or not you should put such a man on the retired list. I myself, would rather have preferred that that list should not be called a "retired list," because I think the word "retired" involves the assumption that a man is no longer fit for active occupation.

1856. Then, if at the age of 60 an officer was compulsorily removed, and placed upon (we will say) a separate list, while upon pay he would be eligible only for a staff appointment, does your Royal Highness think that would be an objection to that system of retirement?—I would answer that question by illustrating Colonel Gambier's proposition; suppose that his proposition, which is, that retirement should take place after 38 years' service, or the system of retirement at 60 years of age were adopted, when that period arrived, in my opinion, an officer should be asked whether he would go on the separate list or whether he would go on the retired list; if he goes on the retired list his services are at an end, but if he goes on the separate list, he would be on a list which would enable him to be put back again to full pay as major general, with the prospect of having the command of a battalion, and you would get rid of the awkwardness of which I have spoken; I think that would be the only way in which you could meet the difficulty.

1857. Then in your Royal Highness's opinion, a colonel at 60 years of age should have the option either of taking his 600 *l.* a year and his step in rank, or of going to the separate list, giving a step in promotion in the regiment, on which list he would be eligible for certain staff employments, and would take his turn for the major general's establishment, and ultimately for a battalion?—That is exactly my opinion.

1858. It has been suggested that if this compulsory system of graduated retirement after 20 or 25 years' service were established, it would be a great advantage to the officers if they could commute their retired pay for a sum down; is it your Royal Highness's opinion that that would be a satisfactory arrangement?—I think it would be a very satisfactory arrangement to give them the option.

1859. That would involve a recognition of the principle that the State have no further claim on retired officers, would it not?—Certainly.

1860. Does your Royal Highness consider that for the State to have a claim on the services of retired officers is really of any value?—No, certainly not; for if there was a great war, or anything happened which would make it desirable to bring any officers back, their own good feeling would prompt them to volunteer for any special service, and the ordinary avocations of the service would not require them.

1861. If an officer had the absolute option of retirement after 20 or 25 years' service, is it your opinion that your Royal Highness, on the other hand, should have any right after that period of service to cease to employ an officer, if you considered him inefficient?—I think it is most important that that right should be vested in the military authorities, because, without reference to any individual case, I can assert from my experience, that we have had cases in which we have been obliged to employ officers on full pay who, in our opinion, ought not to have been so employed.

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1862. It has been suggested that a system of bonus contribution should be established, to facilitate the flow of promotion, by enabling the juniors to buy their seniors out; is it your opinion that that would be desirable in the Ordnance corps?—No; I have never approved of the bonus system; particularly on this account, that if a man does not choose to subscribe his share to the bonus, he is sure to be looked upon with the greatest disfavour by the whole corps of his brother officers.

1863. It has come out in evidence before the Committee, that officers who may be invalided (I am not speaking of wounds) by ill-health, are only allowed to go on half-hay for a limited time, and if their health does not improve, they may be required to surrender their commission; is it your opinion, Sir, that that is a proper regulation?—No, I think it is a most cruel regulation; I am sorry to say we had an instance of it the other day, which proved how unjust it was.

1864. You would advise that an officer going on half pay through ill-health, if permanently afflicted, should be placed on permanent half pay?—Certainly.

1865. Is it your Royal Highness's opinion that the half-pay list should be applied to any purpose in the corps except such a purpose as that?—It had much better not, in my opinion, and if proper retirements are allowed there is no object in it; at present, to a very limited extent, it is used to enable promotion to go on; but it is much better that officers should be retired altogether, and be put on half pay.

1866. A good deal of difficulty in settling details has been experienced by this Committee, through the inequality of the ages at which cadets have been admitted to Woolwich, and have obtained their commissions; and we had it in evidence that in the Artillery, in one case there were nearly 100 officers of almost exactly the same age; is it, Sir, your opinion that the present ages at which officers are admitted to Woolwich and obtain their commissions are satisfactory?—No, the age is too high; but if it is put lower, you must not expect the same amount of qualification for going into the college as you expect now, because it is impossible to come up to the present requirements unless a young man is admitted at an age senior to that which I think would be really advisable.

1867. At what age ought cadets, in your Royal Highness's opinion, to be admitted to Woolwich?—I think 15 to 17 would be the best age.

1868. If that change were made, the officers would reach the period at which they would be entitled to exercise the option of retirement at first at very unequal ages; is it your Royal Highness's opinion that, under those circumstances, any qualification of age should be attached to the period of service after which retirement might be attained; in other words, in addition to service, would you attach any condition with regard to age?—I think it might be an advantage; but it has this disadvantage, that you might have a "senior" in regimental standing younger in years than a "junior," and, therefore, a junior in the service might get an advantage offered to him which a senior, though a junior in age, might feel hurt at not having the option of.

1869. I gather that it is your view, Sir, that the right to the option of obtaining the retirement ought to depend simply on the length of service, and not at all on the age?—I think, on the whole, I prefer the length of service. If it comes to a question of retirement at 60, I think the age of 60 would have no disadvantage; but if you extend the principle below that, there might be some disadvantage.

1870. The system of retirement which your Royal Highness would advocate would be this: That after varying lengths of service, commencing, say, with 20 years, an officer should have the absolute right to take out varying rates of retired pay, and to compound them for a fixed sum of money; and that at the age of 60, whatever his period of service might be, he should compulsorily exercise the option, either of retiring or of going on to that separate list?—Just so.

1871. And your Royal Highness thinks that if the officer, on the one hand, is entitled to that advantage, the military authorities, on the other hand, should have the right, from the time when he has that advantage, to remove him if they think him inefficient?—No doubt.

1872. That would be an indirect inducement to him to make his choice?—Yes. The reason I attach much importance to that is this, that if we have those officers who may be inefficient kept on full pay, the War Office naturally expects us to employ them. If there is an appointment vacant and we do not employ them, we are liable to be asked why we do not employ officers who are without employment on full pay; that more especially affects the Engineers, because a large portion of them do not serve with the men, but are selected for different duties of construction, for maintenance of works, or formation of works, in various parts of the country, an important duty, as of course the Committee understand.

1873. If the system of retirement which you have spoken of were adopted, do you see any reason to alter the present conditions upon which officers are seconded?—No, I do not; because I do not think we have any officer seconded who ought not to be so under any circumstances.

1874. My question pointed to the fact, that the time during which the officer is seconded now counts as service; if the option of retirement were a right of the officer after a certain period of service, would you see any reason for altering that regulation?—Of course the Committee might think it desirable that the seconding should only count for a certain period, and there might be financial reasons which might make such an arrangement necessary. I see no hardship in letting two years go for one, or something of that kind; but I do not think, as far as the corps is concerned, it would make any material difference in the flow of the promotion, which is the great object we have in view.

1875. On military grounds your Royal Highness sees no reason to alter the present Regulations?—No.

1876. And I presume, that considering the facilities for seconding as one of the great inducements for able men to go into the Ordnance corps, you would not wish that those advantages and facilities should be diminished under any new system?—No, I should think it would be better not. If any change were made in this respect, it would be only, in my opinion, for financial reasons, and of course they might weigh.

1877. If I might recapitulate your Royal Highness's evidence, it would be this; that half pay in future should not be considered as a means of retirement, or of increasing promotion in the corps,

corps, but should be simply granted to officers whose health breaks down, and that they should retain it permanently if their health permanently breaks down?—Yes; unless it is thought that power could be given to the military authorities, in the case of a man becoming inefficient, to put him on half pay for his inefficiency, he having perhaps formerly been an active and intelligent officer, but having, either through circumstances of climate or otherwise, become, though not altogether unfit for duty, still unequal to the important charges which might be, and ought to be under other circumstances, entrusted to him.

1878. But that power of putting him on half pay should only be exercised after the officer has reached the period at which he is entitled to take his retirement?—Certainly.

1879. The system of retirement which your Royal Highness would propose, would be that after 20 years' service, every officer should be entitled to a graduated rate, and to compound that for a sum of money down, through the agency of some public department?—Yes.

1880. And at 60 years of age he should be compelled to go to a separate list upon full pay of the major general's establishment, succeeding to that establishment, and to the command of a battalion, with the option of taking the present 600 *l.* a year, with a step of rank, and leaving the corps altogether, as he would leave it on retirement at an earlier period?—Yes.

1881. When an officer has retired after a number of years' service, but who is below 60 years' of age, would you, Sir, give him a step in honorary rank?—I do not see any objection to that, because it never can tell, except upon his social position, never relatively to other officers; if it did I should object to it; but the mere compliment of giving a step in retired rank on quitting the service is, I think, a reasonable favour.

1882. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In the event of men being compulsorily retired at 60 years of age on 600 *l.*, your Royal Highness said that you had no objection to officers being on the separate list, having the option to be on the general list; in the event of their being on the general list, they would have a claim to succeed to battalion, would they not?—Of course they would.

1883. I suppose, in that case, your Royal Highness would recommend that the immediate retiring allowance should be less than 600 *l.*, otherwise they would all incline to remain on the general list?—I apprehend that the officer who waits for the chance of being brought back again as a general officer of battalion would retire on the pay and the allowance of the rank which he then holds, and that it is only officers who really retire altogether who would get the 600 *l.*

1884. Is your Royal Highness aware what is the rate of pay for retired colonels?—Yes, it is about 470 *l.* a year. But I think that in the case of the officer who is put on the separate list, it is open to consideration whether he ought not to get not only his pay, but also the advantages which he would have if he were to remain on the active list; because it is a hard thing to put a man on the separate list against his will, admitting that he is still competent to do active duty, and then reduce the pay and allowances which he would be entitled to if he were not so to retire. Therefore you must add to the 470 *l.* the allowances which he would be entitled to.

1885. In that case your Royal Highness would bring it up to 600 *l.*?—Yes.

1886. But suppose no one would take that?—Then raise the 600 *l.* I would not do that if it can be avoided, but that is the only alternative.

1887. Would not the present rate of retirement that they receive, namely 478 *l.* a year, be sufficient, in your Royal Highness's opinion, with the prospect of succeeding to a battalion?—It would be very hard for a man in command of a brigade of Artillery, or a colonel on the staff at Portsmouth, to be compulsorily placed on the separate list, because he was 60 years of age, with the prospect of being re-employed as major general when it came to his turn, if he had to lose any of the advantages he possesses when he is so placed; because you do not place him on the list from his unfitness for duty, but because you wish to give a flow of promotion through the ranks to benefit the regiment.

1888. That would necessarily involve that the compulsory retirement rate should be more than 600 *l.*?—Yes; I should say the compulsory retirement rate must be at least 100 *l.* more than an officer would get if he was only put on the separate list, so as to induce him to retire altogether.

1889. Would your Royal Highness not be satisfied with the retirement after 60 years of age, on this footing: that the officer should be compelled to retire at 60, but that he should have the option either of an immediate income of 600 *l.* a year, or the enjoyment of his full pay as it is at present, with the prospective right of employment as a major general, and of succeeding to a battalion in the corps?—To a certain extent that would meet the difficulty of retiring only on his pay; but I think it is a matter of consideration whether that pay ought not to be, to a certain amount, increased, considering the great advantages which the officer has in his allowances.

1890. *Chairman.*] The proposal made to the Committee was rather this; that a full colonel should not be retired altogether from the corps, but that he should be placed on a separate list in the corps, and that he might still be employed on the staff; if such a condition were attached, would your Royal Highness see any occasion to increase the pay beyond the 470 *l.*?—I think that would very much modify my opinion.

1891. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Her Majesty has an undoubted right to dispense with the service of any officer, has she not?—Yes.

1892. But under the circumstances of the Royal Artillery, the officers not being able to sell out, and there being no retired allowance available under 25 years' service, I understood your Royal Highness to say that there has been a delicacy in exercising that right in some cases, and that the service has to some extent suffered in consequence?—That is so.

1893. In the event of a retiring allowance being fixed at 20 years' service, which any officer had a right to claim, your Royal Highness would have no hesitation in recommending Her Majesty to exercise that privilege of dispensing with the services of an officer who was inefficient, inasmuch as he could then claim the retirement due to his length of service?—Decidedly.

1894. Your Royal Highness is of opinion, that that would be a great advantage to the service?—That would be a great advantage to the service, but it does not obviate the necessity which I have pointed out, of having the power, whether an officer wished it or not, of placing him on half-pay in case he would not go out, and it was thought his efficiency was so much impaired, that it was of great importance that he should go out.

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1895. Has not Her Majesty the power of dispensing with the services of any officer?—The Queen has the power of striking an officer's name out of the Army List, whether of the Line or of the Ordnance corps, but it is a power very rarely exercised; I know cases in which, if the removal of an officer was desirable, it would not be wished that the officer's name should be struck out; but I should like to have the intermediate power of removing a man without striking his name out of the service; because in the one case there is no disgrace, whereas in the other case there is a positive public disgrace; and in some cases it is not desirable to disgrace a man though he is not competent for the public service. It is of the greatest importance that the military authorities should have the power of taking that intermediate course, instead of having recourse to the very extreme measure of the penalty, which is never resorted to if it is possible to avoid it.

1896. Captain *Vivian.*] Your Royal Highness wishes that the authorities should be able to exercise that power after a certain number of years' service?—Quite so.

1897. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] It has been suggested that it might be advisable to reduce the number of subalterns attached to the garrison brigades in the Artillery; does your Royal Highness think that that would be at all expedient?—It would be perfectly impossible to do that, and to keep the Artillery efficient; and for this reason, that at this moment we have out of 102 batteries of garrison Artillery 82 subalterns employed in other ways; so that the only alternative would be to add officers to the general list for the 82 duties which those officers now perform. Of course, if that were done, it might be possible; but inasmuch as you have no reserve to fall back upon except in the batteries, it would be practically impossible to reduce the number of officers.

1898. There was a question raised by a Member of the Committee with regard to the unmanned batteries in India; I should like to ask your Royal Highness if those unmanned batteries which are attached to the Indian brigades are necessary in consequence of the nature of the Indian service?—They are absolutely necessary; and in proof it I would state, that even with those unmanned batteries we have at this moment in India two batteries with only one officer doing duty, and 17 with only two officers; if that is the case now, how would we possibly get on unless we have a reserve? In fact, the unmanned batteries of officers are the only reserve we have. So far from that being too large a reserve, the complaint from India has always been, "We have not officers enongh to do the duty."

1899. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are the officers of manned batteries allowed to take other employments in India?—Yes; there are 15 captains and 20 officers doing duty with the Native Artillery.

1900. Do they belong to the manned batteries or the unmanned batteries?—There is no real distinction; it is merely a nominal distinction; the officers take their duty throughout the whole of those batteries.

1901. But are the officers of the manned batteries allowed to be absent from the batteries on other duties?—If you have no others to employ, you take them, of course; that is the reason why we have actually only one officer to the two batteries, and with the 17 only two; that is to say, 19 batteries with a very insufficient number of officers; and so, of course, if you have not any unmanned batteries, you would only have one, or at the utmost two officers per battery doing duty, in many cases.

1902. Are the officers belonging to the manned batteries allowed to take staff appointments?—The officers belonging to the manned batteries are allowed to take staff appointments in the corps; there is no question of manned or unmanned batteries for regimental duty.

1903. But not what would be called staff appointments in India, which are employments under the Civil Government?—Assuming that they take civil employment, they go into the staff corps. Only the other day there was a large promotion, in consequence of a number of officers who had been for a long time doing civil duty, having been placed in the staff corps, and their places being taken by fresh appointments from the Academy for service in the Royal Artillery.

1904. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Up to a recent date I think the officers employed in semi-civil duties were seconded, the colonels, more particularly, in the Artillery?—Yes.

1905. Do you not think, Sir, it would be an advisable thing if the officers who were so employed were seconded at present?—I think it would be very desirable, but it is more expensive. We were very anxious to increase some portion of the Artillery, but such increase involved expense, and we adopted this plan rather than not have that necessary increase.

1906. Is your Royal Highness of opinion that it would be only fair, so far as the public is concerned, to charge the expenses of those officers to the establishment to which they are attached?—To a certain extent; but considering the number of colonels of Artillery that we have, I see no great objection to a certain proportion of them being employed without being seconded, in employments such as those in the Arsenal, which are really artillery employments. I think they ought not to be employed in positions not connected with the Artillery, or, if they were, they should be decidedly seconded. On the other hand, as far as promotion goes, if they could be seconded, it would be an advantage to the regiment.

1907. With regard to compulsory retirement at a certain age, or after some length of service, does you Royal Highness think it would be desirable that the Commander in Chief should retain the power of continuing the officer in any exceptional command, that he might be engaged in at the time he arrived at the limit?—I think that in all those hard lines of retirement, you ought to give the military authorities the power of retaining the officer if his services are considered as really valuable; for that power is retained with regard to colonels in the army, when they come to the age of 60, if they are reported as specially qualified to continue in command, and I think the same ought to be done in the Ordnance corps.

1908. Major *Jervis.*] Your Royal Highness compared the proposed supersession of colonels of Artillery and Engineers at 60 years to the power which there is now of superseding colonels in command of line regiments; but the duties of a full colonel of Artillery or Engineers are rather more to be compared to those of a colonel having temporary rank as brigadier, or major general, are they not?—I merely used the colonels of the line as an example

example of our having already a system established in the service by which the officers at a certain age were called upon to retire; and as that has been already acknowledged, and benefits are found to result from it, I cannot help thinking that if you extended the principle to the colonels of the Artillery or Engineers, it would be desirable.

1909. But the power is not compulsory, is it?—We call upon them when they get to the age of 60 to retire, and unless a report comes in that their efficiency is such that their retirement is undesirable, they are retired compulsorily.

1910. If the colonels who were placed in the separate list at 60 years of age looked forward to staff commands, I conclude that they would look forward to the command of districts as part of those staff commands?—I apprehend they would be placed exactly as the general officers of Artillery are, eligible for any appointment, irrespective of the corps to which they belong.

1911. It would thus make a great difference to the full colonels on the active list?—The same advantages which the general officers possessed who belonged to the Artillery or Engineers would be possessed by those officers who were placed on the separate list, with the object of being brought back on the permanent list of major generals when it came to their turn; those officers would not be in a worse position than they are now.

1912. But would those colonels on the separate list have the option of looking forward to the staff commands of districts?—They would be exactly in the same position as the general officers are now.

1913. But those appointments are filled by full colonels on the active list, are they not?—Suppose that the command at Woolwich, or the inspector generalship of the Artillery, became vacant, and there was no general officer who had a great claim, or was qualified for such an appointment; if there was an officer on the separate list qualified, I should be wrong if I did not select an officer from that list in preference to any other officer.

1914. But your Royal Highness would not include the appointments of colonels on the staff of the various districts?—No; because I consider those regular appointments are attached to the duty-doing colonels of the Royal Artillery, and not to those colonels who are on the separate list. In fact, I should consider the colonels on the separate list almost in the same position as I should consider the major generals.

1915. Captain *Vivian.*] Your Royal Highness would not, I suppose, consider colonels on the separate list eligible for command at Aldershot as commanders of Artillery?—No; because you would thereby debar the full-pay colonel of Artillery of the very advantages which we wish to give him earlier in life than he gets at present, in consequence of the slowness of promotion.

1916. The officer in command of the Artillery at Aldershot is a colonel on the staff?—Yes.

1917. Is he a brigadier general?—No; anything that is below the rank of brigadier general I should not consider him eligible for.

1918. But it is brigadier general's command, is it not?—There is no question that, in importance, it is; I do not deny that; but it never has been.

1919. It is always given to a full colonel or brigadier general of Artillery, is it not?—Yes.

1920. Does not your Royal Highness think that that has the effect of putting the colonel on the staff at Aldershot in rather a false position with regard to brigadiers of Infantry?—No; because he is attached to head quarters, and the others are attached to their own brigades. A colonel on the staff is always in attendance on the general officer in command, and has nothing to do with the brigadiers.

1921. But still he is their junior in rank at Aldershot, is he not?—I do not think that you would find an officer at Aldershot in that position.

1922. *Chairman.*] Although in all probability the Commander in Chief would only exercise his discretion in cases of appointments which would naturally be held by major generals on the establishment, you would not, I presume, Sir, debar the Commander in Chief from the employment of colonels, on the separate list in any staff employment that he thought desirable?—No, certainly not; but I conceive those appointments at Aldershot, Gibraltar, Portsmouth, and so on, to be purely regimental appointments which are the birthright of full colonels of Artillery. If you give them to the officers of the separate list, you debar the colonels of Artillery of a right which is a valuable one, and one of which I think they would seriously feel the loss; therefore, while opening the general service to those officers of the separate list, I do not think that they should be eligible for those appointments which I more or less consider regimental.

1923. Captain *Vivian.*] The appointments they would have might be the command of districts?—Yes; or the inspector-generalships of Artillery, and there is the director general of Artillery at the War Office; there is the head of the Select Committee, and there are various appointments of that sort which would be open to those officers as well as others, but not those regimental appointments which I conceive are the birthright of the colonels of Artillery on full pay duty.

1924. Major *Jervis.*] With regard to doing away with the half-pay list altogether, would your Royal Highness do away with the power which you have of giving half-pay to men who require longer leave than you could otherwise give them, but whom you would like to bring back to the regiment?—Those men would go on medical certificate; I think you ought to be most liberal in the way of medical certificate; it is a cruel thing if you place an obstacle in the way of a man being placed on half-pay on a medical certificate; but beyond that I do not see that anything special is required upon that subject.

1925. Your Royal Highness was very distinct that the retired pay should be with regard to the length of service, and not to be added to in any way with respect to age, I think?—The only age I should like to see fixed is 60; with that exception, I think service is a better criterion than age.

1926. Mr. *Otway.*] Does not your Royal Highness consider that so long as an officer is in receipt of pay as a commander in the army, that you have the power to command his services to the State at any time; I am referring to the retired officers?—I think the State has a right to demand something of an officer; but the question was put, whether if he obtained a bonus he was not virtually exempt from further duty; if that is attached to the bonus, I think it is better to allow

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allow that than not to give a bonus; but otherwise, in cases of great emergency, any officer who receives any emoluments from the State for previous services is considered available, and if it was desirable he might be called on to serve; nothing but great emergency would justify that; still I think that should not stand in the way of giving a bonus.

1927. Now with regard to the bonus or rather the composition, taking the case of a young officer who at 19 years of age may enter the Engineers, and after 20 years' service receive the retirement as proposed, does not it seem to your Royal Highness that in that corps an officer receiving a certain sum down might be induced to retire from it with the prospect of obtaining that lucrative appointment that his talents might entitle him to expect, and so cause the State to lose his services?—Yes, and on that ground I put the time at 20 years, though others put it at 15, because I think you have a right to claim the man's services, but I think that after 20 years' service you may give him the right of retiring if he thinks fit, otherwise we should not get the proper flow of promotion.

1928. Suppose an officer to be retired on half-pay at the age of 39 or 40 with the rank of regimental colonel of artillery; he having fulfilled the conditions necessary to ensure his coming on the permanent half-pay list, and that that officer at that age entirely recovers his health, and is able to do service in any part of the world, does it not seem to your Royal Highness that it would be desirable first for the benefit of the country, and then for the benefit of the officer, that there should be some means of bringing that officer back to active employment, saving thereby, I presume, his receiving 30 or 40 years' half-pay to the country, and obtaining the benefit of his services?—There is no doubt that is so. The only objection to that is that you miss the advantage which you obtain in the flow of promotion which you are anxious to obtain by those retirements, so that it is a question of counterbalancing advantages. You obtain greater promotions on the one hand, and, on the other, every now and then a man may retire whom you would rather not see retire. You get the benefit for the whole corps of greater elasticity of promotion, while by losing the services of the man you do not do him any injustice, though perhaps it may be rather hard measure to him, and the State will lose his services. But of the two, the less evil is leaving him alone.

1929. Your Royal Highness cannot suggest any means by which a revision could be made of the medical certificate to enable an officer to return to active service on his perfect restoration to health?—There is no difficulty about that, because if you bring him before a medical board, and he is called fit for duty, you can always bring him back again, but you must bear in mind that you lose the advantage of promotion, because he becomes a supernumerary, and you stop the promotion until his vacancy is absorbed.

1930. It has been mentioned that there have been cases of officers in the Engineers, and I think in the Artillery, who have retired by the sale of their commissions. May I ask your Royal Highness from what fund has the money been paid to them?—I believe from the Reserved Fund of the War Office, though I must confess I never understood upon what principle that is done. I suppose it is thought by the State that it is better to give a bonus than to keep a man permanently on half-pay, otherwise I do not see on what principle a man who is in a non-purchase corps should receive money from a fund raised from officers of the Army in general, who have purchased their commissions.

1931. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In fact, those retirements are not purchased by the State?—No, they are purchased by the officers who pay the money into the Reserved Fund at the War Office.

1932. *Chairman.*] At all events your Royal Highness does not consider it a proper system of retirement to use any funds of that kind as the means of promoting the flow of promotion?—No, I think it would be very desirable to get rid of that system.

1933. The honourable Member for Chatham asked a question with regard to the half-pay, if it was your Royal Highness's opinion that putting officers on half-pay should not be considered as a means of increasing promotions, but should only be the result of the officer's disability through sickness or wounds?—Just so.

1934. So that if an officer were allowed to remain longer upon it than he is allowed, according to the present rule, it should not be a question of promotion or non-promotion, but a question of his personal efficiency?—Just so.

1935. At present with regard to an officer put upon the half-pay list for wounds, does he lose his service time after the first year?—He is restored to exactly the same relative position which he filled when put on half-pay from the top of the list; if he was twentieth, he would be put back again in exactly the same position, irrespective of the promotions which had taken place since.

1936. If the system which has been advocated, of allowing an officer to be an indefinite time on the half-pay list through sickness were established, your Royal Highness would think it right that he should be restored to the same number in the list as he was at when he went off active service?—If that system is continued, he ought to be brought back to the same relative position as he was in when he was put on half-pay.

1937. But if he was put on half-pay through wounds, do you consider, Sir, it is fair to him to lose all his steps, or should he not be in the position of a seconded officer who comes back into the same position as he was in before?—You might make a regulation, that with wounds only, and for no other cause, if within two years he was sufficiently restored to justify his being put back, he should be looked upon as a seconded officer, but I would not extend it indefinitely.

1938. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Your Royal Highness would not extend that to ill-health?—No; I would confine it to wounds.

1939. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Referring your Royal Highness to the colonial service; take the case of an officer in the West Indies being obliged to be put on temporary half-pay, surely the distinction would be rather invidious between him and a wounded officer?—No; because the system exists now, that the officer is allowed to be on half-pay for two years on a medical certificate, and at the end of that period he may be brought back to exactly the same relative position as he was in formerly.

1940. But not to the position which he had previously occupied with regard to other officers?—My experience of the Medical Board is, that they are very liberally disposed, and under those circumstances I have no desire to extend the facilities

facilities with which officers might be placed on half-pay; but the case of wounds is so palpable and so self-evident, that I should be quite prepared to recommend the suggestion thrown out, though I have my doubts whether I would extend it upon other grounds, such as the colonial service.

1941. Colonel *North.*] Taking such a case as that of Hong Kong, has not your Royal Highness the power to deal with a sick man as if he had been severely wounded?—Not at present; at present wounds are not treated as special cases, but whether wounded or medically incapacitated, if the officer who is placed on half-pay is restored within two years, he reverts to the same relative position as he occupied when placed on half-pay in the corps to which he belongs. The proposal now made suggests, that the officer wounded should be considered as a seconded officer; I should be prepared to agree to that recommendation with regard to wounds, but, if it was adopted with regard to wounds, I should not think it advisable to extend it to colonial or other services.

1942. Captain *Vivian.*] Your Royal Highness has said that you think the age of entering the Academy at Woolwich is now too old, but that if it was reduced to the age of 15 or 17, you must not expect such a high qualification; do you not think that the present examinations are unnecessarily severe to qualify officers for the ordinary duties in the Artillery?—They are very severe.

1943. Is your Royal Highness of opinion that it would be an advantage to the service to reduce the age of those entering the Academy, and to accept necessarily a less qualification?—I do; I am strongly of opinion that it would be an advantage, but you must be prepared for a great outcry if you put down the qualifications which, of course, have been brought up to the highest pitch.

1944. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] General Lefroy stated he did not consider it necessary for the officers of the Royal Artillery to pass such high examinations as they do now on leaving the Royal Academy, because those very high attainments were not necessary for the ordinary duty of the officers of Artillery; is that in conformity with your Royal Highness's opinion?—I think that the higher the attainments an officer can acquire the better, but the disadvantage of coming in so old is so great that, for my part, I would desire, if we could, to bring younger men in, which necessarily involves reducing the attainments, and which also, as a corollary, would lower the rate of attainment when the officers quitted the Academy, which, however, I do not believe would be any important disadvantage to the service.

1945. Colonel *North.*] The Committee have had a great deal of evidence on that point, stating that the regimental duties of an Artillery officer do not require the officer to be so highly educated; is that your Royal Highness's opinion?—I do not think that the general run of the officers need be so highly educated, but the more highly educated they are the more benefit they are to the service, of course.

1946. Mr. *Otway.*] Is there any reason to suppose that those who leave Woolwich have made greater proficiency than the officers at Berlin or the Ecole Polytechnique?—Not that I know of.

1947. Captain *Vivian.*] Your Royal Highness said that you thought the subalterns of the Royal Artillery could not be reduced in number; did your Royal Highness's answer apply to garrison batteries as well as field batteries?—It was garrison batteries especially that I referred to. I stated that out of 102 garrison batteries there were 82 subalterns employed and absent from their batteries. We always take care to keep all our field batteries complete, as far as we can; we take officers of garrison batteries for other duties; occasionally we are so placed that we cannot give field batteries the full complement.

1948. But your Royal Highness thinks that three subalterns are necessary to each battery in time of peace?—Absolutely necessary.

1949. Are the 82 officers all employed in military service?—Yes, every one of them.

1950. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] When your Royal Highness spoke of some batteries in India having only one officer, they were garrison batteries, and not field batteries, I suppose?—Yes; because we try to keep the field batteries as efficient as possible; but I may state that there are many field batteries in India commanded by subalterns (so short are we of officers), which I think extremely objectionable.

1951. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] When we were on the question of certain commissions being bought out of funds supplied by a purchase corps, did you mean that you disapproved of favouring one branch of the service at the expense of another, or that you only disapproved of the State acting as a middle-man?—Although the Reserved Fund is a very great advantage, and I should be very sorry to see it done away with altogether, I think it ought not to be used to assist promotion in the Ordnance corps, where there is no purchase, at the expense of the officers of the line who all contribute to maintain this Reserved Fund; and on that ground I object, in a military point of view, to the employment of that money for that purpose; but, financially, I cannot say whether it is objectionable or not, because it is really a question with regard to buying up the half-pay, which originated, I believe, this system of giving money from the Reserved Fund to the officers on half-pay.

1952. *Chairman.*] The question practically is this: whether the State or the contributors are those who have the interest in the Reserved Fund, and that is a question which is before another Committee?—Yes.

1953. Major *Jervis.*] Your Royal Highness doubtless remembers that the system of retirement from that fund was in consequence of a circular from the War Office in the year 1861, and not at the request of the officers themselves; that, in fact, it was made compulsory?—Just so; I did not mean to impute that the officers had anything to do with it personally.

1954. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Does your Royal Highness think it is desirable that the Artillery officer should be enabled to retire by the sale of his commission in a non-purchase corps?—That is a mere financial question for the War Office officials, because it is a question of keeping men for a long period on half-pay, or commuting it by giving them a sum of money; the military question would not affect it, nor would it affect the promotion, because the mere buying up of a commission gives a man no promotion in the corps.

1955. Captain *Vivian.*] But it is not done now, with regard to the age or the value of his life;

H. R. H. the Duke of *Cambridge*, K.G.

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life; it is estimated an actuary, and a colonel of Artillery gets 4,500 *l.* whether the officer is 50 or 59 years of age?—Yes, but it gives him no promotion in the service; it is a question of the reduction of the half-pay; it does not affect the arrangement of the Ordnance corps; it is a mere question of relative value with regard to the continuance of the half-pay, or a bonus in lieu of it.

1956. But what I mean, sir, is, so far as the State is concerned, it is not treated as a question whether it would be an advantage to the State to pay a man so much a year, or buy it up; but in all cases the man gets his 4,500 *l.*?—Yes.

1957. *Chairman.*] Your Royal Highness has stated that it would be highly desirable if proper rates of retirement should be established, that the State should commute those for a fair sum of money?—But then it would not come out of the Reserved Fund. I thought it was hard that it should be employed for such a purpose.

1958. Mr. *Otway.* In a military point of view there is this difference, that an officer, while receiving half pay, could not accept service in a foreign country?—Yes.

1959. Whereas, with a commuted allowance he could go anywhere?—Yes.

1960. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] There is one other question which I wish to put to your Royal Highness, on a matter which was alluded to by Colonel Ady, namely the expediency of the subdivision of the Artillery into separate regiments, with a view to avoid the difficulties which retard the proper flow of promotion in so large a corps. I would ask your Royal Highness if such a subject has ever been in contemplation, or if you have ever thought of the expediency of that as a question in connection with retirement?—It is a very great question whether it would not give greater facilities of promotion, and as that is the object to be attained, it is a subject for consideration; but with regard to retirement, I do not see that it would make the least difference, because the principle of retirement which I have supported has no reference to a corps divided into separate regiments, or to a corps as a whole. There is no doubt that there is more elasticity of promotion where you have small bodies than where there are large ones. We have often had that subject under consideration, and the difficulty is to know how to make it consistent with pure seniority, which has been the principle always adopted by the Ordnance corps.

Sir Alexander Spearman, Bart., and Alexander Glen Finlaison, Esq., called in; and Examined.

Sir *A. Spearman*, Bart.; *A. G. Finlaison*, Esq.

1961. *Chairman.*] (To Sir *Alexander Spearman.*) You are the Comptroller General at the National Debt Office?—I am.

1962. (To Mr. *Finlaison*). You are Actuary at the National Debt Office, I believe?—I am.

1963. (To Sir *Alexander Spearman.*) The Committee desire to have information from you with regard to the feasibility of commuting for a fixed sum through the agency of the National Debt Office the pensions or the retired pay of officers at the time of their leaving the service; it is the case, is it not, that you at present perform the converse process of granting annuities on the payment of a sum of money down?—Yes.

1964. Would it be, in your opinion, feasible to purchase annuities from public officers and public officers only, at the time of their retirement by the payment to them of a sum down?—It would be the introduction of a new principle into the administration of the National Debt Office, but if the funds were provided by Parliament I do not see that there would be any difficulty or that there would be much difficulty at all events in effecting the converse proposition to that which we now carry out by granting an annuity, and receiving the money value of the annuity to be applied in the reduction of the debt.

1965. I believe that you have at present tables calculated at different rates of interest for the value of every annuity to a person supposed to be in good health, have you not?—No; we do not enter into the question of health.

1966. That is to say you gain if a person is not in good health?—Yes; the worse the life that comes to us the better for the public.

1967. But the tables have been computed on good lives, have they not?—Mr Finlaison will explain that better than I can.

1968. (To Mr. *Finlaison.*) Will you be good enough to inform the Committee the principle which you adopt with regard to those tables?—The tables have been computed upon rather an extensive basis. They were computed upon the experience of lives that entered into the tontines, commonly known as the Irish tontines of 1773, 1775, and 1777. There were also a large body of lives, male and female, that were concerned in the tontine, commonly called the great tontine of 1789, and it was divided into two remarkable classes; first, there were a body of lives supplied by the contributors, who paid down their money in shares, but as that number fell short of the number originally contemplated, the Treasury, at the request of the shareholders, supplemented that body by lives taken from the gentry and freeholders of England, chiefly esquires and persons of that quality, which lives were nominated by the instrumentality of the clergy chiefly from the children of the English gentry. Then there came a further body, but at the time the observation was taken it was not very extensive, but still numerous. Namely, the life annuitants who had purchased annuities from the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. They contributed highly selected lives, both female and male, and the combination of all the lives above mentioned supplied the observation on which the Government tables were framed for the sale of life annuities.

1969. Then is it your opinion that those tables give fair rates with regard to what are called good lives?—I think they rest upon the very highest class of life, because experience has shown that lives selected from tontines, were even superior to those that were self-selected. At this very great distance of time, there is a remarkable number of the tontine lives still alive.

1970. If the converse process were established, and the National Debt Office were empowered to purchase annuities at the time of the annuitants leaving the service, say calculating interest at 5 per cent., is it your opinion that the National Debt Office could make itself safe in such a transaction?—That is a very great question, for in that operation, the National Debt Office would be purchasing annuities dependent on lives which obviously

obviously were not of the highest quality, for lives of the highest vitality would not be the lives that would retire; but I think there would be no difficulty in adjusting the system by an increase of the rate of interest; perhaps even 5 per cent. would do it, and bring that difference, or that supposed difference, of quality into an equilibrium with the normal table.

1971. The rate of the Government interest being on an average, a trifle under 3½ per cent., you think that the difference between that and 5 per cent., with ample means of medical scrutiny, would make the office safe where a life was not fully up to the mark, if it was possible to add a considerable number of years?—I think it would.

1972. That is the process adopted in insurance offices, is it not?—Yes.

1973. They cause the life to be scrutinised?—Yes.

1974. And on the report of the medical officer, they add, what in their opinion is a sufficient number of years?—Yes; and by that method, I think you may arrive at a fair consideration for the annuity to be surrendered.

1975. (To Sir *Alexander Spearman.*) Is it your opinion that a medical officer could be attached to your department, with whose assistance, and that of the medical officer of the regiment in which the officer had served, you could arrive at proper information with regard to his health for this purpose?—A medical officer might be selected without any difficulty; but the occasional use of his services, I should take for granted, would be so rare, that it would not be necessary to attach him to the establishment of the office.

1976. But you feel no doubt with regard to the feasibility of adopting such a system, if you were able to obtain the services of such a medical officer as would be competent to advise with regard to the health of the annuitants?—I think, with the assistance of a competent medical authority, and the assistance of the army medical officer, who would be better acquainted with the habits and the real state of health of the military officer, we should be able to compute the retired pay for a sum of money paid down, and with the assistance of the actuary, I do not see why it should not be done in the National Debt Office.

1977. Would you attach a condition that the officer compounding his annuity at your office should have to do so when he left his regiment, and not afterwards, when less would be known of the state of his health?—If he compounded at all he should compound at once.

1978. In transacting the business of the National Debt Office, you are associated with the Commissioners?—Yes; I am in fact Comptroller General, acting under the Commissioners.

1979. In transacting the business of the Exchequer Loan Commissioners, you are associated with another body of Commissioners?—Not as Comptroller General of the National Debt Office; I happen to be Deputy Chairman of the Public Works Loan Commissioners, but not in connection with the National Debt Office.

1980. But if it were decided to establish such a system as is described under which the National Debt Office and you, as its Comptroller, were to have the charge of the business of compounding for certain pensions or annuities of public servants, do you think it would be desirable that you should have associated with you, for that purpose, persons of standing in the City, like the Commissioners of the Exchequer Loan Commission?—I think it would be very desirable that other persons should be associated with the person at the National Debt Office who should transact the business; it would be to some extent an invidious office that he would have to perform, and both for the protection of the public and for the protection of the officer who wishes to commute his retiring allowance for a sum paid down, it should not depend on the medical officer and the actuary with the Comptroller General alone, but other persons should be associated with them.

1981. The Exchequer Loan Commissioners are, most of them, men of business in the City?—Yes; but I cannot offer any opinion whatever with regard to the employment of any member of that body; it is a body of a very peculiar character, and the only person connected with the public service who is in that body besides myself is Sir John Hay; we are both officers in the public service, he in one branch, and I in another. Whether they would consent to be employed in carrying out such a business, I cannot venture to say.

1982. My question is rather, whether it would not be very advantageous if such a business as this was assigned to the National Debt Office, that you should have associated with you persons of the stamp, as men of business in the city, of the Exchequer Loan Commissioners?—No doubt.

1983. As a matter of fact, the Exchequer Loan Commission, though in one sense a department of the Government, acts quite independently of the Government?—They are entirely independent of the Government; they receive no remuneration for their public services, and they act as independent private gentlemen performing a public duty of great importance, and receiving no salary.

1984. They have to decide very difficult questions with regard to loans to harbours and public bodies, with respect to which there may be great differences of opinion?—No doubt.

1985. Am I not right in saying that so impartial are they known to be that the House of Commons has rarely, if ever, been appealed to against their decisions?—I am not aware that the House of Commons has ever been appealed to against their decisions.

1986. (To Mr. *Finlaison.*) Supposing the plan were adopted, with regard to which I have asked the Comptroller General, of computing the pensions or annuities of certain officers at certain ages, through the instrumentality of your office, with regard to the number of years' purchase which that annuity on a sound life would be worth at five per cent., that, of course, would be simple matter of calculation?—Certainly; and to show that it is so, I have brought a table of the values of a life annuity at quinquennial ages, from 30 to 80 (which of course can be extended to every age), at the rates of four, five, and six per cent.

1987. Take five per cent., how many years' purchase is an annuity at 40 worth?—An annuity at 40 would be worth about 13½ years' purchase.

1988. So that an annuity of 300 *l.* a year would be worth at 40, just 4,000 *l.*?—As near as possible.

1989. At 45, how many years' purchase would it be worth?—At 45, it would be worth about 12½ years' purchase.

Sir *A. Spearman*, Bart.; *A. G. Finlaison*, Esq.

15 July 1867.

1990. So that an annuity of 400 *l.* a year would be worth 5,000 *l.* at 45?—£. 5,022.

1991. At 50 years what would it be worth?—At 50 years it would be worth about 11½ years' purchase.

1992. At 60 years what would it be worth?—At 60 years it would be worth about nine years' purchase.

1993. So that an annuity of 600 *l.* would be worth nearly 5,500 *l.* at 60?—Yes.

1994. I believe that you can put in a table giving the years' purchase at 4 per cent. and 6 per cent. at each of the extreme ages, and at the intermediate ages?—Yes; I can do so with facility.

1995. In fact, showing the number of years' purchase at every age between 25 and 60 at 4 per cent., 5 per cent., and 6 per cent?—Yes; certainly.

1996. Mr. *Pack-Beresford.*] Will you also be good enough to put in the per-centage of lives taken at 20 years of age that reached 32, 46, 54, and 60?—Yes, I will do that—of course according to the established table.

1997. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] How would you propose to deal with the lives that are not sound, if such a system of retirement were proposed?—The question put by the honourable Chairman has suggested the mode; it would be on the opinion of the medical officer that the life was so many years older than the actual age, and consequently that the annuity was of so much less value, that the actuary would recommend his Board to proceed.

1998. (To Sir *Alexander Spearman.*) It would be necessary, would it not, in order to protect the public, to reserve the power of refusing to commute altogether?—I think the power of refusing to commute ought certainly to be vested in the Commissioners. There was a case that took place very lately, which was the case of the grant of an annuity equal to his full salary, to an officer in Greenwich Hospital; it was purchased for him at the National Debt Office by the transfer of an equivalent value of stock, having regard to his age, and he died within, I think, three months of the grant of the annuity; the public received from the Greenwich Hospital Commissioners about 12,000 *l.* stock for the annuity. The stock was cancelled, and the National Debt Office never paid a farthing of the annuity beyond one-fourth of the annual sum.

1999. *Chairman.*] If the converse operation had been proposed with regard to that person, you would undoubtedly have refused to carry it out?—I think so.

2000. Then, in your opinion, if such functions were assigned to yourself or to the Commissioners in connection with the National Debt Office, their decision should be, in your opinion, final?—I think so.

2001. And you think if it was properly guarded, such a system could be carried out without public detriment?—Mr. Finlaison is more capable of answering that question than I am; but I do not see why it should not.

2002. (To Mr. *Finlaison.*) Is that your opinion?—I think it could, under proper safeguards, be carried out without any fear of loss to the public.

2003. (To Sir *Alexander Spearman.*) When you grant an annuity, I think you purchase the stock and cancel it?—Yes.

2004. So that the public pays during the life of the annuitant, in addition to the interest which it would have paid on the stock, the difference between that interest and the amount of the annuity?—Yes, during the annuitant's life.

2005. And the National Debt has been reduced *pro tanto?*—And the National Debt has been reduced *pro tanto.*

2006. Would it be the proper course, if you purchased annuities, to apply the annuity as it was paid over to you in the reduction of the National Debt?—That is a question upon which I cannot express any decided opinion.

2007. (To Mr. *Finlaison.*) In granting annuities at the National Debt Office, the process of reducing the National Debt goes on; a slightly increased charge falls on the public during the annuitant's life, and at the end of his life the National Debt has been so much reduced?—Yes.

2008. Might not a similar operation be performed, if the converse plan were adopted of purchasing annuities; I mean if the instalments of the annuity paid over to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt were invested in stock, and that stock was cancelled?—That would be a process of extinguishing the National Debt piecemeal.

2009. But it would be practically the same thing as that process which is gone through in the converse operation when an annuity is granted, other would it not?—No doubt; except that in the one case you apply the capital to cancel debt; in the other you would apply only the yearly income.

2010. If an Act of Parliament was obtained, under which the Treasury was authorised to issue out of the Exchequer the whole amount to commute those pensions, there would be no difficulty, would there, in applying the pensions, as they were paid over to the Commissioners, to the reduction of the National Debt?—There would be no difficulty except the trouble of it, for the pension itself is a debt, and when you have bought it up you have paid it, *quo ad* the original creditor.

Sir *Alexander Spearman.*] You have already cancelled it by buying it.

2011. (To Mr. *Finlaison.*) But if the half-yearly receipts were accumulated and applied to the reduction of the National Debt, that would be practically the same process as is gone through in a case where an annuity is granted?—It would have the same effect in the end, in point of principle.

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ROYAL ARTILLERY.

App. No. 1.

STATEMENT showing the AGES of the SIX SENIOR OFFICERS in each Rank of the ROYAL ARTILLERY, from Colonel downwards, in the Years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866.

RANK.	1826.	1836.	1846.	1856.	1866.
	Yrs. mos.	Yrs. mos.	Yrs. mos.	Yrs. mos.	Yrs. mos.
Colonel - - -	60 8	62 11	65 9	67 2	55 0
	60 2	63 9	66 4	67 3	54 5
	57 6	63 4	66 10	68 0	53 2
	56 5	62 3	70 11	67 7	54 3
	No record -	62 2	67 1	67 3	53 11
	52 11	63 8	65 10	65 9	53 7
Lieutenant Colonel -	48 0	59 3	63 1	56 9	48 0
	49 10	58 6	63 0	56 4	48 2
	No record -	58 6	60 11	56 5	48 1
	48 1	55 4	62 5	54 5	48 7
	49 0	57 11	60 1	55 8	48 1
	No record -	56 11	63 6	53 7	47 0
Captain - - -	No record -	52 2	55 2	38 2	39 9
	45 10	54 9	55 4	40 6	40 6
	46 4	51 3	55 10	39 0	40 9
	46 9	51 6	55 11	38 11	40 6
	No record -	51 1	55 9	38 3	40 3
	46 5	53 7	55 1	38 11	39 8
Second Captain - -	39 1	46 2	45 9	35 5	32 7
	No record -	46 7	45 3	29 7	32 6
	No record -	44 3	45 1	29 8	32 2
	38 3	45 2	43 7	30 7	31 9
	39 6	45 3	43 8	28 3	32 1
	39 11	45 3	42 8	29 2	32 9
Lieutenant - -	35 5	40 0	29 0	24 6	31 8
	35 0	40 0	29 0	22 8	30 10
	37 4	40 0	29 0	23 11	31 11
	37 5	42 4	31 3	23 1	30 1
	37 2	39 11	29 7	25 5	30 10
	37 7	39 3	30 10	25 4	31 9
Second Lieutenant -	25 5	21 5	20 3	The rank of Second Lieutenant abolished in 1855.	
	26 3	21 8	20 7		
	26 2	19 7	19 10		
	25 9	20 4	20 7		
	28 5	20 9	20 10		
	No record -	20 3	19 0		

Horse Guards,
20 May 1867.

G. Gambier, D. A. G.

App. No. 1.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

STATEMENT, showing the Length of Service of the Six Senior Officers in each Rank of the Royal Artillery, from Colonel downwards, in the Years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866.

Rank.	1826.		1836.		1846.		1856.		1866.	
	Yrs.	mos.	Yrs.	mos.	Yrs.	mos.	Yrs.	mos.	Yrs.	mos.
Colonel	43	6	43	7	50	10	52	1	37	7
	43	6	43	6	50	10	51	3	37	4
	43	6	43	0	50	10	50	9	39	2
	35	7	42	8	50	10	49	7	36	1
	No record		42	8	50	10	49	5	36	1
	33	6	42	8	50	1	49	4	36	1
Lieutenant Colonels.	32	0	41	3	46	3	36	1	30	6
	32	0	41	2	46	1	35	5	30	1
	No record		41	1	45	8	34	11	30	1
	31	7	40	3	45	2	31	1	30	1
	31	6	40	3	44	11	30	8	29	6
	No record		40	3	44	11	30	5	29	6
Captains	No record		36	6	39	6	21	1	21	6
	30	0	36	2	39	4	20	7	21	6
	29	6	36	0	39	3	20	7	21	6
	29	6	35	3	39	3	20	7	21	6
	No record		34	11	39	3	20	1	21	6
	29	6	34	11	39	1	20	1	21	6
Second Captain	22	9	29	6	20	9	11	6	14	7
	No record		29	6	20	7	11	1	14	7
	No record		29	6	20	7	11	1	14	7
	22	9	29	6	20	6	11	1	14	7
	22	9	29	6	20	6	11	1	14	7
	22	4	29	3	20	6	11	1	14	7
Lieutenant	19	1	21	8	11	1	6	1	9	10
	19	1	21	8	11	1	6	1	9	10
	18	11	21	8	11	1	6	1	9	10
	18	11	21	8	11	1	6	1	9	10
	18	8	21	8	11	1	6	1	9	10
	18	8	21	8	11	1	6	1	9	10
Second Lieutenant	8	7	2	7	2	1	The rank of Second Lieutenant abolished in 1855.			
	8	6	2	7	2	1				
	8	7	2	7	1	7				
	7	6	2	7	1	7				
	7	6	2	7	1	7				
	No record		2	7	1	7				

Horse Guards,
20 May 1867.

G. Gambier, D. A. G.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

RETURN showing the Establishment of COMBATANT OFFICERS on the 1st January in the Years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866; together with the Augmentations and Reductions which have been made in the several Grades during those Periods.

YEAR	ESTABLISHMENT. Colonels Commandant.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Total.
1826 - -	10	20	42	161	242	10	485
1836 - -	10	20	42	161	241	10	484
1846 - -	10	20	42	161	241	10	484
1856 - -	15	30	60	242	365	16	728
1866 - -	17	34	66	282	415	21	835

Reduction of 1 Lieutenant.

AUGMENTATION OF	Date.	Colonels Commandant.	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Adjutants.
1 Battalion - - - -	10 April 1846	1	2	4	16	24	1
2 Battalions - - -	11 & 12 Sept. & Dec. 1848.	2	4	6	32	48	2
1 Battalion - - - -	13 Mar. 1854	1	2	4	16	24	1
1 Battalion - - - -	14 May 1855	1	2	4	16	24	1
½ Troop, Royal Horse Artillery	- June 1855	-	-	-	1	2	-
- - - - -	- Sept. 1855	-	-	-	-	2	1
		5	10	18	81	124	6
				244			
½ Troop, Royal Horse Artillery	- Mar. 1856	-	-	-	1	2	-
2 Troops, Royal Horse Artillery	- Jan. 1858	-	-	-	4	6	-
Depôt Brigade - - -	- Aug. 1859	-	-	-	10	8	2
2 Batteries for China - -	- Nov. 1859	-	-	-	5	6	-
1 Brigade and Depôt - -	15 April 1860	1	2	4	20	28	2
1 Brigade, B., Royal Horse Artillery.	- April 1864	1	2	2	-	-	1

Horse Guards, S.W., May 1867. *G. Gambier*, D. A. G.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

STATEMENT showing the Number of OFFICERS of each Rank of the ROYAL ARTILLERY (including the Establishment of General Officers) on RETIRED FULL PAY, in the Years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866; also the Number and Ages of the Officers permitted to Retire each Year, from 1826 to 1866 inclusive.

ON RETIRED FULL PAY.

YEARS	Major Generals. No.	Major Generals. Age.	Colonels. No.	Colonels. Age.	Lieutenant Colonels. No.	Lieutenant Colonels. Age.	Captains. No.	Captains. Age.	Lieutenants. No.	Lieutenants. Age.
		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.
1826 - - -	-	-	-	-	2	-	20	-	4	-
1836 - - -	-	-	-	-	4	-	13*	-	8	-
1846 - - -	-	-	-	-	30	-	36	-	6	-
1856 - - -	3	-	8	-	57	-	46	-	4	-
1866 - - -	3	-	18	-	36	-	33	-	2	-

* 1 Captain Supernumerary to the list.

Note.—The above numbers include all Officers of Royal Artillery on Retired Full Pay on the 1st January in each year stated, without reference to the Warrants under which they respectively retired; those who retired before 1840 being supernumerary to the £.32,000 allowed by Royal Warrant of 1854.

STATEMENT showing the Number of Officers of each Rank of the Royal Artillery, &c.—*continued.*

NUMBER and AGES of those Permitted to Retire each Year.

YEARS	Major Generals.		Colonels.		Lieutenant Colonels.		Captains.		Lieutenants.	
	No.	Age.	No.	Age.	No.	Age.	No.	Age.	No.	Age.
		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.
1826	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1827	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1828	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1829	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	39 5
1830	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1831	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1832	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1833	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1834	–	–	–	–	1	56 8	–	–	–	–
1835	–	–	–	–	1	55 10	–	–	–	–
1836	–	–	–	–	6	56 11 55 10 55 4 54 5 54 0 53 3	–	–	–	–
1837	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1838	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	47 2	–	–
1839	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	50 2	–	–
1840	–	–	–	–	4	55 2 54 8 54 1 52 9	7	51 5 49 9 49 5 49 4 49 1 47 2 40 10	–	–
1841	–	–	–	–	4	56 10 54 0 53 3 Unknown.	4	54 5 51 1 49 8 49 8	–	–
1842	–	–	–	–	4	58 1 54 9 54 8 53 8	8	54 9 52 1 51 1 50 11 47 5 46 0 43 10 31 6	1	27 8
1843	–	–	–	–	4	61 2 59 1 55 0 54 3	5	54 0 51 11 51 9 47 5 47 3	–	–
1844	–	–	–	–	4	58 0 55 3 55 3 54 10	4	50 1 48 5 45 9 44 1	–	–
1845	–	–	–	–	4	58 7 56 1 55 10 48 6	4	48 3 47 6 45 0 45 0	1	29 4
1846	–	–	–	–	3	56 5 55 9 Unknown.	4	56 3 46 6 45 0 42 11	–	–
1847	–	–	–	–	3	57 6 57 3 56 6	2	46 8 37 5	1	62 4
1848	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	54 5	–	–
1849	–	–	–	–	2	58 10 58 0	3	54 0 40 5 36 11	–	–

STATEMENT showing the Number of Officers of each Rank of the Royal Artillery, &c.—*continued.*

YEARS	Major Generals.		Colonels.		Lieutenant Colonels.		Captains.		Lieutenants.	
	No.	Age.	No.	Age.	No.	Age.	No.	Age.	No.	Age.
		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.		Yrs. mos.
1850	–	–	–	–	6	60 0 58 11 58 6 58 0 57 10 57 1	1	41 2	–	–
1851	–	–	–	–	3	60 5 57 1 55 3	2	51 2 51 1	–	–
1852	–	–	–	–	6	63 4 59 0 57 5 56 4 56 3 54 5	1	54 2	–	–
1853	–	–	–	–	1	55 2	3	39 8 39 5 37 5	–	–
1854	2	72 5 67 8	1	67 0	8	55 10 55 6 53 8 51 8 50 10 47 5 43 1 42 3	3	42 9 42 5 37 6	–	–
1855	1	67 6	8	67 11 67 9 66 8 65 11 64 5 63 4 59 2 66 4	2	44 2 44 2	–	–	–	–
1856	–	–	2	67 7 65 7	–	–	–	–	–	–
1857	1	67 3	3	66 1 65 7 65 0	–	–	–	–	–	–
1858	–	–	1	65 2	–	–	–	–	–	–
1859	–	–	–	–	1	47 5	–	–	–	–
1860	–	–	2	63 8 61 4	–	–	–	–	–	–
1861	–	–	2	61 5 61 3	–	–	–	–	–	–
1862	–	–	2	63 0 62 7	1	47 7	–	–	–	–
1863	–	–	5	66 2 63 2 62 7 60 8 54 3	–	–	–	–	–	–
1864	2	74 0 71 11	3	52 3 51 11 50 4	–	–	–	–	–	–
1865	–	–	3	51 10 51 4 50 6	–	–	–	–	–	–
1866	–	–	2	49 6 48 9	–	–	–	–	–	–

Horse Guards,
24 May 1867.

G. Gambier, D. A. G.

App. No. 1.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

RETURN of the Number of OFFICERS of ROYAL ARTILLERY who have Retired on HALF PAY during each of the last Twenty Years, and the Total of Officers on Half Pay in each Year.

	Year	Lieutenant Colonels.	Captains.	Lieutenants.
On retired Half Pay	1847	2	74	42
Retired during the year			2	1
On retired Half Pay	1848	1	76	43
Retired during the year			4	—
On retired Half Pay	1849	1	75	43
Retired during the year			3	—
On retired Half Pay	1850	1	72	43
Retired during the year			5	—
On retired Half Pay	1851	1	73	43
Retired during the year			2	1
On retired Half Pay	1852	1	73	42
Retired during the year		2	5	—
On retired Half Pay	1853	3	76	39
Retired during the year			1	1
On retired Half Pay	1854	3	72	40
Retired during the year			8	1
On retired Half Pay	1855	2	75	38
Retired during the year		2	6	1
On retired Half Pay	1856	3	79	37
Retired during the year		1	5	—
On retired Half Pay	1857	3	81	35
Retired during the year		3	4	—
On retired Half Pay	1858	5	81	32
Retired during the year		1	2	—
On retired Half Pay	1859	6	78	30
Retired during the year			1	—
On retired Half Pay	1860	6	74	30
Retired during the year		1	2	—
On retired Half Pay	1861	7	72	30
Retired during the year		4	6	1
On retired Half Pay	1862	6	67	30
Retired during the year		2	4	—
On retired Half Pay	1863	6	67	27
Retired during the year			2	—
On retired Half Pay	1864	6	64	27
Retired during the year		2	5	1
On retired Half Pay	1865	6	65	27
Retired during the year			3	—
On retired Half Pay	1866	6	67	25
Retired during the year		2	4	—
On retired Half Pay	1867	7	71	25

Horse Guards, 24 May 1867. *G. Gambier*, D. A. G.

App. No. 1.

REGULATIONS for SECONDING OFFICERS of the ENGLISH and INDIAN ORDNANCE CORPS.

REGIMENTAL COLONELS.

OFFICERS of this rank who may hold appointments, not purely regimental, were formerly made supernumerary to the fixed establishment; but this regulation is no longer in force, and colonels now holding such appointments are still borne upon the effective establishment of the regiment.

In the Indian Branch of the Service there are still several of those colonels who are supernumerary, but in accordance with the last proposal to the Indian Government by the War Office on the subject, they will be absorbed as vacancies occur in the lists of colonels of their respective Presidencies; one absorption being made for every three vacancies.

The regulations now in force are the same throughout the entire regiment, not only as regards the rank of colonel, but also in the lower grades.

LIEUTENANT COLONELS.

AN officer of this rank who may be holding an appointment of a *quasi-military* nature is borne supernumerary whilst so employed, but in the event of his promotion to the rank of regimental colonel occurring, he would (if still retained in his appointment) be brought upon the establishment, and a step of promotion would be lost to the regiment in the lower grades.

If, on the contrary, the officer should be removed from his appointment on promotion to colonel, he would still be absorbed; but the officer who might be appointed to the vacant employment would be made supernumerary, and promotions would be made in the regiment in the several ranks below the officer so removed as a supernumerary.

CAPTAINS AND LIEUTENANTS.

THE same regulations apply to officers of these ranks as to lieutenant colonels.

A captain in the Indian Branch who may be a first class commissary of ordnance is eligible to retain that position on being promoted to lieutenant colonel; but officers employed as second or third class commissaries of ordnance, relinquish their appointment on promotion to that rank, and their successors in the appointment are made supernumerary in their stead.

GENERAL REGULATIONS.

OFFICERS who are appointed to the Ordnance, or Manufacturing Departments (which remove them to the Supernumerary List) hold their appointments for five years, at the expiration of which they return to regimental duty.

They are, however, eligible for reappointment for a second or third term, and in such cases remain supernumerary.

Officers who accept civil appointments are allowed six months' leave, on probation; after which they are "seconded," and may remain so for 10 years, when they are called upon to elect whether they will return to regimental duty, or remain in civil employ; in the latter case they are removed altogether from the position they hold in the Regimental Lists, and must either retire upon half-pay, if they have 25 years' service, or resign their commissions.

The distinction between a "Supernumerary" and a "Seconded" officer is, that the former receives his regimental pay in addition to the pay of the appointment he may hold, whilst the latter forfeits his regimental pay, and draws his entire income from the civil department under which he is employed.

G. Gambier, D. A. G.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

NOMINAL LIST of OFFICERS of the ROYAL ARTILLERY who have been permitted to retire from the Service by the Sale of their Commissions.

RANK.	NAMES.	DATE.	Full Pay Service. Yrs.	mos.	Amount Received.	Warrant or Circumstances under which they respectively sold their Commissions.
Lieutenant-Colonels -	J. M. Savage - - -	9 Nov. 1855	38	2	Not known in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.	To settle in Canada.
	C. L. Fitzgerald - -	17 Feb. 1857	21	7		- - Ditto.
	F. W. Haultain - -	12 June 1860	21	2		- - Ditto.
	A. R. Wragge - -	19 Mar. 1861	21	2		To settle in British North America.
	G. A. Maude - - -	10 June 1861	26	6		Horse Guards Circular, 15th February 1861.
	P. R. Cocks - - -	23 July 1861	24	11		- - Ditto.
	W. R. Gilbert - - -	23 Aug. 1861	23	0		- - Ditto.
	H. J. Thomas - - -	10 June 1862	21	9		- - Ditto.
	F. B. Ward - - -	3 May 1864	25	0		- - Ditto.
	J. Travers - - -	28 Oct. 1864	28	2		- - Ditto
	F. J. Travers - - -	13 Mar. 1866	26	10		- - Ditto.
Captains - - -	Hon. F. Savile - -	6 Dec. 1850	11	10		To settle in Canada.
	G. S. Robertson - -	24 June 1856	8	9		To settle in India.
	R. S. Allen - - -	23 April 1861	15	2		Horse Guards Circular, 15th February 1861.
	W. P. Pollock - -	23 April 1861	8	5		- - Ditto.
	A. T. Blakeley - -	10 May 1861	8	2		To settle in Canada.
	B. Bathurst - - -	11 June 1861	23	6		Horse Guards Circular, 15th February 1861.
	H. Murray - - -	18 June 1861	11	11		- - Ditto.
	W. M. D. Willan - -	23 Aug. 1861	15	1		- - Ditto.
	H. Lempriere - - -	10 June 1862	15	8		- - Ditto.
	R. M. Mundy - - -	15 Mar. 1864	14	3		- - Ditto.

This List includes all Officers who have retired from the Royal Artillery by the sale of their commissions within the last 20 years; they were all on the Retired Half-Pay List at the date of sale.

Horse Guards, 24 May 1867. *G. Gambier*, D. A. G.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

MEMORANDUM respecting the RETIREMENT of OFFICERS of ROYAL ARTILLERY on RETIRED FULL PAY.

IN 1826 and up to 1831, there was no fixed Retired Full Pay List of Royal Artillery Officers.

1831.—By Royal Warrant of 23 December 1831, the Establishment of Retired Full Pay was fixed at—4 Lieutenant Colonels, 12 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, but no officer was to be allowed to retire until the numbers then on Retired Full Pay were reduced to the above Establishment.

There were at the time two Captains beyond the above numbers.

1836.—By Master General's letter of 11 May 1836, four Lieutenant Colonels of Royal Artillery were added to the above numbers.

1841.—By Royal Warrant of 10 April 1841, four Lieutenant Colonels and four Captains were added to the above numbers, and eight of the Lieutenant Colonels (to be selected by the Master General) were to receive 400 *l.* a year, and the two seniors of these 50 *l.* additional.

App. No. I.

1854.—By Royal Warrant of 3 November 1854, the Retired Full Pay was fixed for the Royal Artillery at 32,000 *l.*, and a proportion of unattached General Officers, relinquishing the prospect of succeeding to the command of battalions, permitted to retire on 600 *l.*

Lieutenant Colonels, with the rank of colonel, of not less than 30 years' service, on 400 *l.*

Lieutenant Colonels of shorter service, and officers of inferior rank, on their regimental pay, having served on full pay for 21 years and upwards, unless from ill health, or wounds in action, compelled to retire before having completed that period of service.

1858.—The Royal Warrant of 14 October 1858 made no increase to the Retirement Fund, but altered the period of retirement to 30 years' service.

1861.—The Royal Warrant of 28 March 1861, fixed 30 years as the lowest period for all officers to retire on full pay, unless from ill-health or wounds it should be deemed expedient by the Secretary of State for War to reduce such service to any shorter period than 30 years.

The following is the distribution of the 32,000 *l.*:—

	£.	*s.*	*d.*
23 General Officers, on 600 *l.* per annum	13,800	–	–
1 General Officer, on 450 *l.* per annum	450	–	–
7 General Officers, on 400 *l.* per annum	2,800	–	–
LIEUTENANT COLONELS:			
1, 28 *s.* per diem, 365 *l.* per annum	365	–	–
15, 18 *s.* 1 *d.* per diem, 330 *l.* – *s.* 5 *d.* per annum	4,950	6	3
8, 16 *s.* 11 *d.* per diem, 308 *l.* 14 *s.* 7 *d.* per annum	2,469	16	8
CAPTAINS:			
1, Horse Artillery pay, 18 *s.* 1 *d.* per diem, 330 *l.* – *s.* 5 *d.* per annum	330	–	5
4, 14 *s.* 2 *d.* per diem, 258 *l.* 10 *s.* 10 *d.* per annum	1,034	3	4
22, 12 *s.* 2 *d.* per diem, 222 *l.* – *s.* 10 *d.* per annum	4,884	18	4
3, 11 *s.* 1 *d.* per diem, 202 *l.* 5 *s.* 5 *d.* per annum	606	16	3
1 Lieutenant, 10 *s.* 10 *d.* per diem	197	14	2
Balance, £. 111. 4. 7. £.	31,888	15	5

and when any portion of it becomes available for fresh retirements, the application of it is as under:—

Should the balance be 600 *l.* and upwards, the name of the senior colonel on the list of applicants for retirement is submitted by the Commander in Chief to the War Office (without any further reference to such officer) to be allowed to retire on 600 *l.* a year, with the honorary rank of major general.

In the event of the balance not quite reaching 600 *l.* (say 550 *l.*), the senior applicant is then asked whether he wishes to retire upon that amount, on condition that he receives the balance to make up the 600 *l.* from the first money that becomes afterwards available.

Should there be a lieutenant colonel on the list of applicants to retire on 400 *l.*, and the balance in hand amount to less than 600 *l.*, the lieutenant colonel would be allowed to retire.

In no case is an officer asked to retire; but as money falls in the seniors on the list of applicants are removed to the retired list.

Officers can at any time withdraw their names from the candidates' list by permission of the Commander in Chief, and should they not apply to do so, it is taken for granted that they are still desirous of retiring.

Horse Guards, 20 May 1867. *G. Gambier*, D. A. G.

Appendix, No. 2

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

STATEMENT showing the AGE and SERVICE of the SIX SENIOR OFFICERS in each Rank, from Colonel downwards, in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866.

RANK.	No.	1826.		1836.		1846.		1856.		1866.	
		Age.	Service.	Age.	Service.	Age.	Service.	Age.	Service.	Age.	Service.
		Yrs. ms.	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*Yrs. ms.*
Colonel - -	1	52 9	32 3	61 7	42 3	62 0	45 7	65 9	47 7	64 3	40 3
	2	51 5	32 3	60 7	42 0	61 10	44 5	64 5	46 8	63 2	40 3
	3	50 7	32 0	59 11	42 0	61 5	44 5	63 6	46 3	63 8	40 3
	4	49 11	32 0	59 4	42 0	61 3	44 0	63 10	45 10	62 4	39 4
	5	49 7	32 0	60 8	42 0	59 8	43 3	63 0	45 7	61 7	39 8
	6	49 4	32 0	56 2	41 0	59 8	42 9	62 8	45 5	62 2	39 3
Lieut. Colonel	1	45 3	27 9	54 1	37 6	60 7	41 4	59 10	40 9	50 8	33 3
	2	44 1	27 7	54 4	37 5	59 7	41 2	59 10	40 3	50 6	32 4
	3	44 4	27 5	53 5	37 5	55 0	40 0	60 2	40 3	51 7	32 4
	4	43 5	27 5	52 9	37 5	57 7	39 10	60 2	40 3	51 1	32 0
	5	42 9	27 5	52 9	37 0	56 5	39 8	60 5	40 3	50 10	32 0
	6	42 9	27 0	53 0	37 0	56 7	39 8	60 10	40 3	49 3	31 6
Captain - -	1	- -	22 0	47 0	29 3	52 2	36 3	40 8	23 3	42 0	24 0
	2	39 2	22 0	48 2	29 2	53 10	35 10	40 8	22 10	42 7	24 0
	3	- -	22 0	48 0	29 2	53 9	35 7	40 6	22 4	44 0	24 0
	4	- -	21 11	45 7	29 0	54 7	35 6	41 7	22 4	42 3	23 6
	5	- -	21 8	45 6	29 0	55 4	35 6	41 1	22 0	41 9	23 0
	6	40 8	21 6	45 4	28 7	53 4	35 5	41 1	22 0	42 1	23 0
Lieutenant -	1	- -	13 6	39 2	21 5	31 7	12 4	26 7	8 3	27 4	9 6
	2	- -	13 6	39 5	21 5	31 1	12 0	26 3	8 3	27 3	9 6
	3	33 2	13 6	40 5	21 5	31 1	12 0	26 6	8 3	25 6	9 3
	4	32 4	13 6	40 9	21 5	28 0	12 0	25 11	8 3	26 9	9 3
	5	32 7	13 6	41 0	21 5	29 7	12 0	27 6	8 3	28 6	9 0
	6	32 6	13 6	39 10	20 9	28 11	12 0	26 7	8 3	27 8	9 0

Horse Guards,
20 May 1867.

H. Fane Keane, Colonel,
D. A. General, R. E.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

STATEMENT showing the Establishment of OFFICERS in each Rank in each of the following Years, and the Dates and Extent of the several Augmentations and Reductions during those Years.

YEAR.	RANKS.							Totals by Augmentation.	Total Establishment.	REMARKS.
	Colonels Commandant.	Major Generals.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Captains.	Second Captains.	Lieutenants.			
1826 - - -	5	–	10	25	40	40	120	–	240	
1836 - - -	5	–	10	25	40	40	120	–	240	
1846 - - -	5	–	10	25	40	40	120	–	240	
18 June 1847 - -	1	–	2	5	8	8	24	48	288	By augmentation.
17 February 1854 -	1	–	2	5	8	8	24	48	336	By augmentation.
3 November 1854 -	–	8	–	–	–	–	–	8	344	Fixed by Warrant of 1854.
1 April 1855 - -	1	–	1	2	4	4	12	24	368	By augmentation.
1856 - - -	8	8	15	37	60	60	180	–	368	
1 April 1861 - -	–	–	–	–	1	2	12	15	383	By augmentation.
1 April 1862 - -	–	–	1	3	3	2	–	9	392	By augmentation.
1866 - - -	8	8	16	40	64	64	192	–	392	

Horse Guards, 20 May 1867.

H. Fane Keane, Colonel,
D. A. General, Royal Engineers.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

STATEMENT showing the Number of OFFICERS of each Rank, including the Establishment of GENERAL OFFICERS, on the RETIRED FULL PAY LIST, in each of the following Years, and the actual Number and Age of those that retired in each Year from 1826 to 1866.

YEAR, &c.	RANKS.						TOTAL.
	General Officers.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	First Captains.	Second Captains.	Lieutenants.	
1826 - January 1st, on the Retired List.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1836 - - ditto - - -	- -	- -	- -	2	1	1	4
1846 - - ditto - - -	- -	- -	5	11	5	- -	21
1856 - - ditto - - -	2	8	15	10	5	- -	40
1866 - - ditto - - -	- -	16	10	7	4	- -	37

Retired in each Year, from 1826 inclusive.

Year.	General Officers.		Colonels.		Lieutenant Colonels.		Captains.		Lieutenants.		Total Number Retired in each Year.
	—	Age.	—	Age.	—	Age.	—	Age.	—	Age.	
	No.	*Yrs. ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs. ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs. ms.*	
1826 -	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	—
1827 -	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	—
1828 -	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	—
1829 -	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	—
1830 -	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	–	—	—
1831 -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	1	40 7	–	- -	1
1832 -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	1	42 3	–	- -	1
1833 -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	1	38 8	1
1834 -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	1	44 0	–	- -	1
1835 -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	1	45 2	–	- -	1
1836 -	–	- -	–	- -	–	- -	4	45 8 43 10 46 8 46 1	–	- -	4

NUMBER of Officers Retired in each Year, from 1826 inclusive—*continued.*

Year.	General Officers.			Colonels.			Lieutenant Colonels.			Captains.			Lieutenants.			Total Number Retired in each Year.
	—	Age.		—	Age.		—	Age.		—	Age.		—	Age.		
	No.	*Yrs.*	*ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs.*	*ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs.*	*ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs.*	*ms.*	*No.*	*Yrs.*	*ms.*	
1837	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	48	7	1	43	0	–	–	–	2
1838	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	49	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1839	–	—		–	—		–	—		–	—		–	—		—
1840	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	50	0	3	41	4	–	–	–	5
								52	2		47	0				
											47	9				
1841	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	46	10	–	–	–	4
											41	9				
											48	10				
											47	6				
1842	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	48	3	–	–	–	2
											48	0				
1843	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	52	8	3	46	5	–	–	–	4
											49	1				
											50	2				
1844	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	47	4	–	–	–	4
											48	10				
											50	7				
											50	4				
1845	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	54	0	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1846	–	—		—	—		–	—		—	—		–	—		—
1847	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	57	1	1	44	8	–	–	–	3
								53	0							
1848	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	58	0	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1849	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	52	2	–	–	–	1
1850	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	56	8	2	46	3	–	–	–	3
											29	9				
1851	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	57	0	1	50	4	–	–	–	3
								56	9							
1852	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	56	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1853	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	55	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1854	2	67	3	2	67	2	2	54	0	–	–	–	–	–	–	6
		64	2		62	9		52	0							
1855	–	–	–	6	65	7	3	59	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	9
					61	0		55	8							
					65	10		53	8							
					61	6										
					63	0										
					66	4										
1856	–	–	–	5	61	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5
					62	7										
					60	1										
					64	6										
					64	0										
1857	–	–	–	2	63	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
					63	2										
1858	–	–	–	1	63	7	1	57	0	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
1859	–	—		–	—		–	—		–	—		–	—		—
1860	–	–	–	1	65	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1861	–	—		–	—		–	—		–	—		–	—		—
1862	–	–	–	1	68	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1863	–	–	–	1	67	2	1	46	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
1864	1	65	11	2	60	8	1	42	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	4
					60	5										
1865	–	–	–	–	—		1	44	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
1866	–	–	–	2	52	11	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
					52	11										

Horse Guards,
27 May 1867.

H. Fane Keane, Colonel,
D. A. General,
Royal Engineers.

App. No. 2.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

STATEMENT of the Number of OFFICERS who have RETIRED on HALF PAY during each of the last Twenty Years, viz., from 1st January 1846; and the Total Number on Half Pay in each Year.

YEAR.	On the Retired List on 1st January in each Year.				TOTAL.	Retired during the Year.				TOTAL.
	Lieut. Colonels.	1st Captains.	2nd Captains.	Lieu-tenants.		Lieut. Colonels.	1st Captains.	2nd Captains.	Lieu-tenants.	
1846	1	–	11	5	17	1	–	1	–	2
1847	1	–	12	5	18	1	–	1	–	2
1848	1	–	13	5	19	1	–	–	–	1
1849	1	–	12	5	18	–	–	–	–	–
1850	1	–	12	5	18	–	–	–	–	–
1851	1	–	12	5	18	–	–	1	–	1
1852	1	–	13	5	19	–	–	–	–	–
1853	1	–	12	5	18	–	–	1	–	1
1854	1	–	13	5	19	–	1	–	–	1
1855	1	–	13	5	19	–	–	1	–	1
1856	1	–	14	5	20	–	–	–	–	–
1857	1	–	14	5	20	–	–	–	–	–
1858	1	–	13	5	19	–	–	–	–	–
1859	1	–	13	5	19	–	–	–	–	–
1860	1	–	13	5	19	–	–	–	–	–
1861	1	–	11	5	17	2	2	1	–	5
1862	1	2	8	5	16	–	2	–	–	2
1863	1	–	8	5	14	1	–	–	–	1
1864	1	–	7	5	13	1	1	–	–	2
1865	1	1	7	5	14	–	–	–	–	–
1866	1	1	6	5	12	–	–	–	–	–

(signed) *H. Fane Keane*, Colonel,
D. A. General,
Royal Engineers.

Horse Guards, 21 May 1867.

REGULATIONS affecting the SECONDING of OFFICERS of ROYAL ENGINEERS.

OFFICERS of Royal Engineers appointed to Civil Situations are seconded from the date of their entering upon their Civil duties, and their places upon the Effective List of the Corps filled up.

While seconded they continue to hold their position in the Corps, and are promoted when seniority entitles them to such.

After 10 years absence from the period of being seconded, as a rule, they are required either to rejoin their Corps, or permanently retire on full or half pay, as their past Services may determine.

The pay of seconded officers is issued from the funds of the Civil department in which they may be employed.

Seconded Service reckons as Full Pay Service.

(signed) *H. Fane Keane*, Colonel,
D. A. General,
Royal Engineers.

Horse Guards, 23 May 1867.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

LIST of OFFICERS who have been permitted to RETIRE from the SERVICE by the SALE of their respective COMMISSIONS.

RANK.	NAME.	Date.	Full Pay, Service.	Amount Received.	Warrant or Circumstances under which they Sold their Commissions.
			Yrs. Days.	£. s. d.	
Colonel - -	R. D'Arcy - -	28 April 1824	39 0	Not known in the Office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engineers, Horse Guards.	From Full Pay, under the Master General and Board's Order, of 10th April 1824. Copy herewith.
Captain - -	J. Maclauchlan -	13 May 1824	20 7		
Ditto - -	W. Payne - -	19 Nov. 1824	20 8		
Lieut. Colonel	G. Landmann - -	29 Dec. 1824	29 7		
Ditto - -	G. H. Henderson -	9 April 1825	25 4		
Ditto - -	G. Macleod - -	24 Feb. 1829	27 7		From Full Pay, under the Master General and Board's Order, of 30th December 1827. Copy herewith.
Ditto - -	T. M. Dickens -	22 May 1829	26 3		
Ditto - -	S. Romilly - -	27 Oct. 1829	25 7		
Ditto - -	A. Fraser - -	10 Mar. 1830	25 8		
Ditto - -	H. Smart - -	16 Mar. 1830	27 0		
					From Half Pay:
Captain - -	J. S. Macauley -	22 Nov. 1836	27 2		- To settle in Canada.
Lieut. Colonel	G. F. Thompson -	3 May 1845	36 6		- - Ditto - Nova Scotia.
Ditto - -	G. Barney - -	28 May 1846	37 9		- - Ditto - Australia.
Ditto - -	Sir A. Bonnycastle -	26 June 1847	38 8		- - Ditto - Canada.
Ditto - -	G. C. Page - -	20 Oct. 1848	35 1		- - Ditto - - ditto.
2nd Captain -	R. Boleter - -	10 May 1861	15 10	1,550 – –	Under the conditions of Horse Guards Circular Memorandum of 15th February 1861.
Ditto - -	C. Bailey - -	30 April 1861	17 7	1,750 – –	
Lieut. Colonel	M. Dill - - -	4 June 1861	27 6	4,500 – –	
Ditto - -	G. A. Leach - -	6 June 1861	23 6	4,500 – –	
2nd Captain -	H. Williams - -	2 July 1861	14 7	1,200 – –	
Ditto - -	T. Webb - - -	16 Aug. 1861	15 9	1,550 – –	
Captain - -	D. Galton - -	2 Sept. 1862	21 7	1,800 – –	
Ditto - -	Hon. J. Bury -	8 July 1862	15 7	1,400 – –	
Lieut. Colonel and Colonel.	W. Yolland - - -	2 Oct. 1863	35 6	4,500 – –	
Lieut. Colonel	E. Y. W. Henderson	11 Oct. 1864	26 4	4,500 – –	
Lieut. Colonel and Colonel.	J. G. McKerlie -	26 May 1865	32 3	4,500 – –	

Horse Guards, 22 May 1867.

(signed) *H. Fane Keane*, Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engineers.

Sir, Office of Ordnance, 10 April 1824.

I AM directed by the Master General to acquaint you that he has received his Majesty's commands to allow a limited number of officers, on the full-pay of the Corps of Royal Engineers, who may have served not less than 20 years, to retire from the service by the sale of their commissions, at the regulated price of the infantry, to officers of the line, who shall be selected by his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, and who, when promoted, will become unattached.

The vacancies of the officers thus allowed to quit the Corps of Engineers will be filled from the half-pay list, or in cases where there may be no officers of the rank on half-pay, by promotion from the next rank; the vacancies in which will, in like measure, be filled from the half-pay.

The objects of this arrangement are, by making provision for certain officers of engineers who may be desirous of retiring in this manner from the service, to enable the Master General to reduce the half-pay list, and to accelerate the promotion in the corps.

It is, however, to be clearly understood, that this plan does not in any respect alter the nature of the promotion, or the ordinary rules for the retirement of officers of the corps of engineers, nor give any officer of the corps hereafter any right or claim to sell his commission.

Those officers who may be inclined to avail themselves of this plan, to retire from the service, will send their names to the Inspector General of Fortifications, and the Master General will select those who, according to his view of the public convenience, and of their respective pretensions, may have the best claim to that indulgence.

I have, &c.

General Mann, &c. &c. (signed) *Fitzroy Somerset.*

Sir, Office of Ordnance, 30 December 1827. App. No. 2.

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th ultimo, adverting to the general order of the 6th of that month, by which certain advantages are conferred upon the Royal Regiment of Artillery, on account of their "long, faithful, and gallant services," I am desired by the Master General to acquaint you that his Majesty, fully sensible of the equally meritorious conduct of the Corps of Royal Engineers, has been graciously pleased to extend to that distinguished and scientific corps the advantages of the above order, as far as it is applicable to them.

His Majesty has accordingly directed that during a period of three years, reckoning from the 6th ultimo, two field officers, who, from age, wounds, or other circumstances, may be desirous of retiring from the service, shall each year have that indulgence, upon the same principle as was allowed under the order of 10th April 1824.

To effect this object for the first year of the period, those officers who are desirous to retire will send their names to the Inspector General of Fortifications on or before the 1st of February 1828, when a selection will be made in the manner best suited to meet the spirit of his Majesty's gracious intentions.

I have, &c.

General Mann, &c. &c. (signed) *William Gosset.*

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

MEMORANDUM.—RETIRED FULL PAY OF OFFICERS.

THE present rates of Retired Full Pay are as follows, viz.:

Colonels (Regimental), after 30 years' service, £. 600 per annum.

Lieutenant Colonels, with the rank of Colonel, of not less than 30 years' service, £. 400 per annum.

Lieutenant Colonels, with 30 years' service, £. 365 per annum.

Lieutenant Colonels, and officers of inferior rank, with less than 30 years' service, are allowed to retire on the regimental pay of their rank, on account of ill health or wounds received in action:—

	s.	*d.*		£.	*s.*	*d.*	
Lieutenant Colonel - -	18	1	per diem - -	330	–	5	per annum.
Ditto - - -	16	1	ditto - -	293	10	5	ditto.
Captain, with Brevet Rank -	13	1	ditto - -	238	15	5	ditto.
Captain - - - - -	11	1	ditto - -	202	5	5	ditto.
Lieutenant - - -	7	10	ditto - -	142	19	2	ditto.

System pursued in the appropriation of the retiring allowance:—

Should there be a sum of £. 600 available, and no officers of the ranks of Major General or Colonel desirous of retiring on that sum, it would be given to Lieutenant Colonels or Captains, according to their seniority in the corps, having claim to retirement.

In the event of there being no candidates, the senior Colonel would be informed of the sum of £. 600 being available, and requested to state if he was desirous of retiring; should he decline, an offer is made to the next senior officer, and so on, until accepted.

(signed) *H. Fane Keane*, Colonel,
Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engineers.

Horse Guards, 28 May 1867.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

LIST of the SIX SENIOR COLONELS (1866), showing their Age on entering the ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, the Time they remained at the Academy, and the Time between passing their Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Engineers.

NAMES.	Age on Entering the Academy.		Period at the Academy.		Time between leaving the Academy and being Gazetted.	
	Yrs.	*mos.*	*Yrs.*	*mos.*	*Yrs.*	*mos.*
C. E. Wilkinson - - - - - -	14	3	5	11	3	9
W. T. Renwick - - - - - -	14	10	5	10	2	2
W. E. D. Broughton - - - - -	14	1	6	2	3	1
G. Burgmann - - - - - -	14	9	6	2	1	9
Sir W. T. Denison, K. C. B. - - - -	14	8	5	10	1	5
E. W. Durnford - - - - - -	15	7	5	7	1	10

(signed) *H. Fane Keane*, Colonel,
Horse Guards, 23 May 1867. Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engineers.

Appendix, No. 3.

App. No. 3.

ROYAL MARINES.

STATEMENT showing the AGES of the SIX SENIOR OFFICERS in each Rank of the ROYAL MARINES, from Colonel Commandant downwards, in the Years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866.

RANK.	1826.	1836.	1846.	1856.	1866.	REMARKS.
Colonel Commandant -	–	–	67	67	56	
	–	–	67	64	51	
	–	–	65	66	52	
	–	–	69	60	49	* 4 Officers only of this rank.
	–	–	*	*	†44	† 1 added in 1859.
Colonel Second Commandant	–	–	66	62	52	* 4 Officers of this rank established in 1837.
	–	–	65	58	49	
	–	–	66	60	48	† 1 added in 1857.
	–	–	64	60	46	
	–	–	*	*	†45	
Lieutenant Colonel - -	–	59	64	51	45	
	–	59	64	51	45	
	–	59	62	51	45	
	–	58	62	48	45	
	–	58	62	50	45	
	–	58	61	45	42	
Major - - - - -	–	57	–	–	–	Rank of Major abolished in 1837.
	–	57	–	–	–	
	–	56	–	–	–	
	–	56	–	–	–	
	–	56	–	–	–	
	–	56	–	–	–	
Captain - - - - -	–	55	58	48	43	No record of ages for 1826 and part of 1836, but a sufficiently accurate result might be obtained by adding 16 to the years of service.
	–	54	61	46	43	
	–	54	59	46	45	
	–	54	59	45	44	
	–	54	57	45	43	
	–	53	58	45	42	
First Lieutenant - - -	–	44	38	29	28	
	–	44	36	31	28	
	–	44	36	30	27	
	–	44	38	30	28	
	–	43	36	30	28	
	–	43	36	29	29	
Second Lieutenant - -	–	24	22	19	22	
	–	24	20	18	22	
	–	24	22	18	22	
	–	24	21	18	21	
	–	24	21	19	22	
	–	24	23	19	22	

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

App. No. 3.

ROYAL MARINES.

STATEMENT showing the Number of Years' SERVICE of the SIX SENIOR OFFICERS in each Rank of the ROYAL MARINES, from Colonel Commandant downwards, in the Years 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866.

RANK.	1826.	1836.	1846.	1856.	1866.	REMARKS.
Colonel Commandant - -	49	58	53	50	38	
	49	57	51	47	34	
	48	57	51	47	34	
	49	57	50	45	32	* 4 Officers only of this rank.
	*	*	*	*	†27	† 1 added in 1859.
Colonel Second Commandant	–	–	50	44	32	
	–	–	49	44	32	
	–	–	48	43	31	* 4 Officers of this rank established in 1837.
	–	–	48	42	29	
	*	*	*	*	†25	† 1 added in 1857.
Lieutenant Colonel - -	49	43	48	33	28	
	48	43	48	33	28	
	48	43	47	33	28	
	48	42	47	33	28	
	47	42	46	32	28	
	47	42	45	31	24	
Major - - - -	46	41	–	–	–	Rank of Major abolished in 1837.
	46	41	–	–	–	
	45	40	–	–	–	
	45	40	–	–	–	
	45	40	–	–	–	
	45	40	–	–	–	
Captain - - - -	34	39	43	28	25	
	33	38	43	28	25	
	33	38	42	28	25	
	33	38	42	27	25	
	33	38	42	27	25	
	33	37	42	27	25	
First Lieutenant - - -	25	28	18	11	12	
	25	28	18	11	11	
	25	28	18	10	11	
	25	28	18	10	10	
	25	27	18	10	10	
	24	27	18	10	10	
Second Lieutenant - -	17	8	4	1	5	
	17	8	4	1	5	
	17	8	4	1	5	
	17	8	4	1	4	
	17	8	4	1	4	
	17	8	4	1	4	

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

ROYAL MARINES.

RETURN showing the Establishment of OFFICERS of the ROYAL MARINES in the following Years, with the Date and Extent of Augmentations and Reductions.

YEARS.	Colonels Commandant.	Colonels, Second Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	REMARKS. Orders in Council.	
1826 -	4	–	9	9	108	115	101	23 Feb. - 1831	1 Lieutenant Colonel reduced. 7 Captains and 2 Subalterns added.
								10 Feb. - 1832	4 Captains and 2 Subalterns added.
								12 April - 1832	4 Colonels, Second Commandant, and 2 Subalterns added.
								30 April - 1834	15 Captains and 10 Subalterns reduced.
1836 -	4	4	8	9	104	106	106	21 June - 1837	5 Lieutenant Colonels added, 9 Majors reduced, and rank abolished; 12 Captains and 4 Subalterns reduced.
								8 May - 1841	1 Lieutenant Colonel and 5 Captains added, 8 Subalterns reduced.
								13 Jan. - 1845	2 Captains and 8 Subalterns added.
1846 -	4	4	14	–	99	136	72	10 Mar. - 1846	2 Captains and 8 Subalterns added.
								24 April - 1847	3 Captains and 12 Subalterns added.
								22 July - 1847	1 Lieutenant Colonel, 6 Captains, and 12 Subalterns added.
								8 May - 1848	2 Lieutenant Colonels, 12 Captains, and 24 Subalterns added.
								5 Feb. - 1850	10 Captains and 20 Subalterns reduced.
								30 Jan. - 1854	1 Lieutenant Colonel, 11 Captains, and 24 Subalterns added.
								28 Feb. - 1855	3 Captains and 8 Subalterns added.
								21 Nov. - 1855	1 Captain reduced.
1856 -	4	4	18	–	125	184	92	2 Feb. - 1857	1 Colonel, Second Commandant, added.
								12 April - 1859	3 Captains and 2 Subalterns added.
								30 April - 1859	2 Lieutenant Colonels, 10 Captains, and 24 Subalterns added.
								22 Oct. - 1859	1 Colonel Commandant and 1 Subaltern added.
								22 Feb. - 1860	5 Captains and 12 Subalterns added.
								18 May - 1865	9 Captains added, 20 Subalterns reduced.
1866 -	5	5	20	–	152	211	84		

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

ROYAL MARINES.

STATEMENT showing the different Systems of RETIREMENT in force in the CORPS of ROYAL MARINES, during and since the Year 1826.

YEARS.	ESTABLISHED RETIREMENT. Colonels Commandant.	Colonels, Second Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	REMARKS.
1826 -	2	–	3	3	20	10	10	Special retirements for 15 Captains. By Order in Council, 30th April 1834.
1836 -	2	–	3	3	20	10	10	Order in Council, 21st June 1837. Retirements augmented by,— 6 for Colonels Commandant. 2 for Colonels, Second Commandant. 1 for Lieutenant Colonel. 5 for Captains. Special retirements for 27 Captains.
1846 -	8	2	4	–	25	10	–	Special Retirements,— 4 for Lieutenant Colonels. } Order in Council, 4 for Captains. } 10th November 1852. 4 for Lieutenant Colonels. { Order in Council, 8th August 1853. By Order in Council, 9th March 1854, 2 additional permanent retirements for Colonels, Second Commandant, and annual retirement for 2 Lieutenant Colonels and 2 Captains.

By Order in Council of 13th September 1854, 35,000*l.* granted for the full pay retirement of all ranks, and the restrictions as to the number in each rank, and the numbers who may annually retire, abolished.

By Order in Council of 13th November 1858, 35,000*l.* allowed for the full pay retirement of all ranks, and a special rate of retirement at 1*l.* 5*s.* a day sanctioned for Colonels, Second Commandant, and of 1*l.* a day for Lieutenant Colonels of 30 years service.

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Order in Council.

At the Court at Windsor, the 13th day of November 1858.

Present:—The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas there was this day read at the Board a memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 11th of November 1858, in the words following, viz.:

Whereas we consider it expedient to submit to Your Majesty a revision of your Majesty's Order in Council of 13th September 1854, regulating the promotion and retirement of officers in Your Majesty's Royal Marine Forces, and we would therefore venture most humbly to lay before Your Majesty the following propositions:

1. That there shall be a fixed establishment of 10 General Officers of Royal Marines, viz.:

2 Generals.
3 Lieutenant Generals.
5 Major Generals.

2. That every vacancy on the fixed list of general officers be filled by the senior Lieutenant General, or Major General, or by the senior Colonel on the serving strength of the corps, unless there should be a supernumerary officer, in which case the supernumerary shall fill the vacancy.

3. That, in addition to the Colonels promoted to be Major Generals under the above rule, Colonels of Marines shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of Major General, either for brilliant service in the field or afloat, or in consequence of having held commands with temporary rank as Major Generals for five years during peace, or for any shorter period during war which may appear to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with the sanction of your Majesty, to give a just claim to have their temporary rank made permanent.

4. That the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with the sanction of your Majesty, and the concurrence of the Commander in Chief of the Forces, should exercise the power of appointing Colonels of Marines to commands as Major Generals, and of selecting officers of Marines for special service abroad, and give such local rank or promotion by brevet to such officers as their merits may appear to require, and that Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels may be selected to serve as Field Officers of Marines embarked in the fleet, without reference to seniority.

5. That the rank of Colonel be given to officers after serving five years with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Corps, or on the Staff in situations held by Lieutenant Colonels.

6. That the rank of Colonel be given to officers who obtain the rank of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel for services in the field, after eight years' actual service in that rank.

7. That any Captain or Lieutenant Colonel of Marines may be rewarded by brevet promotion for distinguished service in the field or afloat; but no officer receiving such promotion shall be permitted to exchange brevet promotion for substantive rank, except for conspicuously distinguished services; and the recommendation in which the services of the officers shall be detailed shall be published in the "London Gazette."

8. That no officer who held brevet rank, and was considered eligible, under the 11th clause of Your Majesty's Order in Council of 13th September 1854, to have that rank converted into substantive rank, can any longer retain that privilege; but a Captain and Brevet Field Officer, while continuing in command of his company, shall receive the pay of Major, *i. e.*, an increase of 2 *s.* 5 *d.* a day, and if reduced to half-pay, shall receive 9 *s.* 6 *d.* a day, the half-pay of Major.

9. That the command of a general officer or of a division of Marines, and situations on the staff of the corps, should not be held for more than five years, except by re-appointment.

10. That command of divisions may be given, without reference to seniority, to officers holding the rank of Colonel, whose services and qualifications best justify their selection.

11. The Deputy Adjutant General not to be of rank inferior to that of Colonel. The Assistant Adjutant General not to be of rank inferior to that of Lieutenant Colonel. Two officers of the Royal Marines to hold appointments of Aides-de-Camp to Your Majesty, to be selected from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and promoted to the rank of Colonel.

App. No. 3.

12. The retired full-pay list being fixed for the Marines at 35,000 *l.* for the retirement of officers of all ranks in the corps, the selections shall be made by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty for long and meritorious services, and impaired health.

13. Colonels Second Commandant, upon relinquishing the prospect of succeeding to command of divisions, shall be permitted to retire on 25 *s.* a day.

14. Lieutenant Colonels of not less than 30 years' service will be permitted to retire on 20 *s.* a day, and those of shorter service, and officers of inferior rank, on their regimental pay.

15. Paymasters and barrack masters of the Royal Marines, after 30 years' service, including at least seven years as pay or barrack master, shall be permitted to retire on 15 *s.* a day. If retired after shorter service from impaired health, to receive 11 *s.* 6 *d.* a day.

16. Each officer placed on the full-pay retired list shall receive a step of honorary rank, together with the pay of the rank from which he retired, or the special rates above sanctioned, but such officer cannot be further promoted.

17. Officers commanding divisions of Royal Marines shall be required to retire therefrom on attaining the age of 60, unless the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are satisfied that the discipline and condition of the division are such as to prove that it would be advantageous to the service for the Colonel Commandant to continue in command of it for the regulated period.

18. The names of all officers who may retire on full-pay to be printed in italics.

Should Your Majesty be graciously pleased to approve of these suggestions, we would further most humbly recommend that the same shall take effect from the 14th October 1858, the date of Your Majesty's Royal Warrant regulating the promotion and retirement of officers in the Army and Ordnance Corps.

Her Majesty, having taken the said memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed, and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

(signed) *Wm. L. Bathurst.*

ROYAL MARINES.

RETURN of the Number of OFFICERS of the ROYAL MARINES of each rank (including the Establishment of General Officers) on the RETIRED LIST at each of the following periods.

YEARS.	Establishment of General Officers.	ON THE FULL PAY RETIRED LIST.							
		Major General.	Colonel Commandant.	Colonel Second Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.
1826 -	- -	- -	4	- -	1	3	21	15	9
1836 -	- -	- -	2	- -	3	3	34	12	10
1846 -	- -	- -	8	- -	9	1	55	10	4
1856 -	10	- -	6	4	16	1	61	12	3
1866 -	10	1	13	8	24	—	50	3	—

Royal Marine Office, 24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

ROYAL MARINES.

RETURN of the Actual Number of OFFICERS of ROYAL MARINES Retired on FULL PAY in each of the following Years.

YEARS.	Colonels Commandant.	Colonels Second Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenant.	Second Lieutenants.
1826	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1827	–	–	–	–	1	–	1
1828	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
1829	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
1830	–	–	–	–	2	–	1
1831	1	–	–	–	3	–	–
1832	–	–	1	–	1	–	–
1833	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
1834	–	–	–	1	18	–	–
1835	1	–	1	2	–	–	–
1836	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1837	4	–	3	1	28	–	–
1838	–	1	–	–	6	–	–
1839	2	–	–	–	–	–	–
1840	–	–	–	–	3	–	–
1841	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
1842	2	–	2	–	1	–	–
1843	–	–	–	–	2	–	–
1844	1	–	1	–	1	–	–
1845	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
1846	2	–	2	–	–	–	–

YEARS.	Major General.	Colonels Commandant.	Colonels Second Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Captains.	First Lieutenant.	Second Lieutenants.
1847	–	–	–	–	3	–	–
1848	–	1	–	–	3	–	–
1849	–	2	2	–	1	–	–
1850	–	–	–	1	11	–	–
1851	–	5	1	1	1	–	–
1852	–	2	–	5	3	–	–
1853	–	–	–	4	2	–	–
1854	–	2	1	5	3	–	–
1855	–	2	1	2	5	–	–
1856	–	–	–	2	3	–	–
1857	–	1	1	1	2	–	–
1858	–	1	–	2	2	–	–
1859	–	3	–	3	4	–	–
1860	–	–	1	3	–	–	–
1861	–	–	–	1	–	–	–
1862	1	3	3	3	–	–	–
1863	–	–	–	–	3	–	–
1864	–	3	–	1	2	–	–
1865	–	2	1	2	3	–	–
1866	–	–	–	1	–	–	–

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

App. No. 3.

ROYAL MARINES.

RETURN of the AGES of OFFICERS of the ROYAL MARINES of the Rank of Colonel and upwards on Retiring in each of the following Years.

YEARS.	Major Generals.	Colonels Commandant.	Colonels Second Commandant.
1826	No record of the ages of Officers who retired prior to 1846.		
1827			
1828			
1829			
1830			
1831			
1832			
1833			
1834			
1835			
1836			
1837			
1838			
1839			
1840			
1841			
1842			
1843			
1844			
1845			
1846	–	67	–
	–	67	–
1847	–	–	–
1848	–	67	–
1849	–	69	66
	–	72	67
1850	–	–	–
1851	–	67	–
	–	68	–
	–	66	–
1852	–	64	–
	–	67	–
1853	–	–	–
1854	–	70	66
	–	66	–
1855	–	67	63
	–	67	–
1856	–	–	–
1857	–	67	61
1858	–	64	–
	–	61	–
1859	–	63	–
	–	54	–
1860	–	–	51
1861	–	–	–
	–	57	54
1862	67	52	51
	–	56	50
1863	–	–	–
	–	54	–
1864	–	54	–
	–	53	–
1865	–	52	47
	–	52	–
1866	–	–	–

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

ROYAL MARINES.

App. No. 3.

RETURN of the Number of OFFICERS of ROYAL MARINES who Retired on HALF-PAY in each Year during the last 20 Years, and the Total Number of Officers on Half-Pay in each of those Years.

YEARS.	Retired on Half-Pay in each Year from 1847 to 1866.					Number of Officers on Half-Pay in each Year from 1847 to 1866.					
	Colonel Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.	Colonels Commandant.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	First Lieutenants.	Second Lieutenants.
1847	–	–	3	–	7	–	1	1	64	157	113
1848	–	–	2	2	1	–	1	1	66	159	114
1849	–	–	4	–	1	–	–	1	65	145	101
1850	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	62	139	101
1851	–	1	3	1	1	–	1	–	60	139	101
1852	–	–	3	2	–	–	1	–	61	133	101
1853	–	–	1	3	–	–	1	–	60	135	100
1854	–	–	1	3	–	–	1	–	55	116	90
1855	–	–	3	1	1	–	1	–	51	98	85
1856	–	–	1	2	–	–	1	–	49	94	81
1857	–	–	7	2	–	–	1	–	48	85	78
1858	–	–	3	1	–	–	1	–	47	76	75
1859	–	–	5	2	–	–	1	–	50	75	70
1860	–	–	2	2	–	–	1	–	47	71	63
1861	–	–	7	3	–	–	1	–	49	70	60
1862	1	–	3	3	–	1	1	–	49	66	59
1863	–	–	6	3	–	1	–	–	54	64	57
1864	–	–	3	4	–	1	–	–	57	62	49
1865	–	–	4	2	–	1	–	–	57	61	44
1866	–	–	2	1	1	1	–	–	55	51	41

Royal Marine Office,
24 May 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel *Gambier*.

App. No. 4.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

RETURN of the Age at which each of the Six Senior Officers in each Rank, from Colonel downwards, in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, entered the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; the Time they remained at the Academy; and the Time between passing their Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.

Year.	Rank.	Age on entering the Academy.	Time at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.	Remarks.
		Yrs. Mo.	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	
1826	Colonels	15 0	2 0	Cannot be ascertained.	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.
		13 10	2 10		
		15 7	5 9		
		14 11	5 10		
		Cannot be given	4 1		
		12 4	9 4		
	Lieutenant Colonels	14 2	1 11		
		16 0	2 0		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		15 6	2 2		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
	Captains	15 2	1 0		
		14 0	1 9		
		15 8	1 4		
		15 8	1 2		
		14 1	2 6		
		15 8	1 6		
	Second Captains	14 2	2 4		
		14 1	2 2		
		14 0	2 8		
		14 1	2 7		
		15 3	1 11		
		14 8	2 1		
	Lieutenants	14 8	2 8		
		14 2	1 10		
		14 4	2 7		
		14 10	2 8		
		15 0	2 5		
		15 3	2 2		
	Second Lieutenants	14 8	3 2		
		14 5	4 6		
		14 5	5 7		
		14 0	4 3		
		16 0	4 10		
		15 1	6 6		

Age at which each of the Six Senior Officers entered the Royal Military Academy, &c.—*cont^d.* App. No. 4.

Year.	Rank.	Age on entering the Academy.	Time at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.	Remarks.
	ROYAL ARTILLERY.	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	
1836	Colonels	12 4	9 4		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		15 5	5 4		
		14 9	5 5		
		14 6	5 8		
		15 1	4 8		
	Lieutenant Colonels	Never in Royal Military Academy			
		15 10	1 7		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		14 4	1 7		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		14 3	1 11½		
	Captains	14 9	3 0	Cannot be ascertained.	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.
		14 6	2 8		
		14 5	1 10		
		14 4	2 2		
		14 9	1 5		
		15 0	3 0		
	Second Captains	14 8	1 11		
		14 9	2 4		
		14 1	1 8		
		14 1	3 0		
		14 0	2 1		
		14 4	2 2		
	Lieutenants	15 3	6 0		
		15 7	3 8		
		15 2	4 1		
		15 3	6 10		
		15 6	2 11		
		15 5	3 8		
	Second Lieutenants	14 3	4 9	- nil.	
		14 4	4 10	- nil.	
		14 5	2 7	- nil.	
		14 2	3 7	- nil.	
		14 2	3 7	- nil.	
		14 3	3 4	- nil.	
1846	Colonels	14 3	1 7		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		14 0	1 11		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		14 0	1 8		
	Lieutenant Colonels	14 2	2 7	Cannot be ascertained.	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.
		14 10	1 10		
		Never in Royal Military Academy			
		14 6	2 8		
		14 9	1 5		
		15 0	3 0		
	Captains	14 1	3 0		
		14 0	2 1		
		14 4	2 2		
		14 4	2 3		
		14 10	2 7		
		14 2	1 10		
	Second Captains	15 0	6 7	3 4	
		15 7	5 6	3 6	
		14 4	6 7	3 7	
		15 9	5 3	2 0	
		14 4	6 3	2 7	
		14 9	6 4	1 0	
	Lieutenants	14 0	3 10	- nil.	
		14 2	2 10	- nil.	
		14 0	3 4	- nil.	
		16 1	4 1	- nil.	
		14 2	4 4	- nil.	
		14 11	3 10	- nil.	
	Second Lieutenants	15 3	2 10	- nil.	
		15 5	2 10	- nil.	
		15 1	2 10	- nil.	
		15 5	3 4	- nil.	
		16 0	2 10	- nil.	
		15 1	2 4	- nil.	

App. No. 4.

AGE at which each of the Six Senior Officers entered the Royal Military Academy, &c.—*cont^d.*

YEAR.	RANK.	Age on entering the Academy.	Time at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Artillery.	REMARKS.
	ROYAL ARTILLERY.	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	
1856	Colonels	14 3	0 11	Cannot be ascertained.	This information has been obtained from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and the statement cannot be completed from the records in the office of the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery.
		14 9	1 2		
		15 6	2 9		
		14 1	1 11		
		14 10	2 10		
		14 4	2 2		
	Lieutenant Colonels	14 3	6 6		
		14 3	6 5		
		14 0	8 3		
		14 4	6 0	3 0	
		15 0	6 7	3 4	
		14 4	6 3	2 7	
	Captains	14 3	2 10	- nil.	
		16 0	3 7	- nil.	
		14 1	4 4	- nil.	
		14 2	4 1	- nil.	
		14 2	3 10	- nil.	
		14 3	4 4	- nil.	
	Second Captains	17 0	2 10	- nil.	
		15 2	3 4	- nil.	
		15 5	2 10	- nil.	
		15 10	3 4	- nil.	
		15 0	2 10	- nil.	
		15 0	2 10	- nil.	
	Lieutenants	15 3	2 11	- nil.	
		14 0	2 3	- nil.	
		15 0	2 8	- nil.	
		14 2	2 7	- nil.	
		15 8	3 7	- nil.	
		15 5	3 7	- nil.	
1866	Colonels	14 5	3 1	Six weeks.	
		14 10	3 2	- nil.	
		14 0	1 9	- nil.	
		14 5	3 10	- nil.	
		14 11	2 10	- nil.	
		14 0	3 7	- nil.	
	Lieutenant Colonels	14 1	4 4	- nil.	
		14 2	3 10	- nil.	
		14 10	4 1	- nil.	
		14 2	4 4	- nil.	
		14 2	4 4	- nil.	
		14 1	4 4	- nil.	
	Captains	15 1	2 10	- nil.	
		15 5	3 4	- nil.	
		16 0	2 10	- nil.	
		15 4	3 4	- nil.	
		15 6	2 10	- nil.	
		15 1	2 10	- nil.	
	Second Captains	14 11	2 10	- nil.	
		14 3	3 5	- nil.	
		14 1	3 5	- nil.	
		14 1	2 10	- nil.	
		14 1	3 4	- nil.	
		14 6	3 4	- nil.	
	Lieutenants	The officers of this rank were never in the Academy.			

G. Gambier, Deputy Adjutant General.

App. No. 4.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

RETURN of the Age at which each of the Six Senior Officers in each Rank, from Colonel downwards, in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, entered the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; the Time they remained at the Academy; and the Time between passing their Examination and being Gazetted to the Royal Engineers.

Year.	Rank.		Age on entering the Academy.	Period at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted.	Remarks.
			Yrs. Mo.	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	
1826	Colonels	1	16 8	3 5	nil.	
		2	14 3	4 7	0 2	
		3	14 4	4 4	1 8	
		4	14 5	3 3	nil.	
		5	- -	- -	- -	No record at the Royal Military Academy.
		6	15 0	2 1	nil.	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	16 0	1 3	nil.	
		2	15 0	1 5	nil.	
		3	14 5	2 1	nil.	
		4	14 3	1 10	nil.	
		5	14 0	1 5	nil.	
		6	14 3	1 7	nil.	
	Captains	1	- -	- -	- -	No record at the Royal Military Academy.
		2	14 0	2 3	0 5	
		3	14 11	1 10	0 6	
		4	- -	- -	- -	ditto.
		5	- -	- -	- -	ditto.
		6	- -	- -	- -	ditto.
	Lieutenants	1	14 11	3 7	Doubtful.	
		2	14 11	4 2	ditto.	
		3	14 5	4 8	0 7	
		4	15 2	3 1	0 7	
		5	15 0	3 7	0 7	
		6	14 4	4 1	0 8	
1836	Colonels	1	16 8	3 5	nil.	
		2	14 3	4 7	0 2	
		3	14 4	4 4	1 8	
		4	14 5	3 3	nil.	
		5	14 6	3 11	nil.	
		6	14 1	1 0	nil.	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	16 0	1 3	nil.	
		2	15 0	1 5	nil.	
		3	14 5	2 1	nil.	
		4	14 3	1 10	nil.	
		5	14 0	1 5	nil.	
		6	15 1	1 10	nil.	
	Captains	1	14 0	1 7	0 8	
		2	16 0	2 3	0 10	
		3	15 6	2 11	0 6	
		4	14 0	1 11	0 8	
		5	14 0	1 10	0 7	
		6	14 0	2 2	0 6	
	Lieutenants	1	14 3	2 11	0 8	
		2	15 9	2 9	Doubtful.	
		3	14 8	3 8	0 9	
		4	14 2	4 6	0 9	
		5	14 5	4 6	0 9	
		6	15 6	2 10	0 9	

App. No. 4.

AGE at which each of the Six Senior Officers entered the Royal Military Academy, &c.—*cont*.

YEAR.	RANK.		Age on entering the Academy.	Period at the Academy.	Time between passing Examination and being Gazetted.	REMARKS.
	ROYAL ENGINEERS.		*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	*Yrs. Mo.*	
1846	Colonels	1	14 3	1 7	- nil.	
		2	15 1	1 10	- nil.	
		3	14 0	2 11	0 6	
		4	14 1	1 7	Doubtful.	
		5	- - -	- - -	- - -	No record at Royal Military Academy.
		6	15 4	1 11	- nil.	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	- - -	- - -	- - -	No record at Royal Military Academy.
		2	14 3	2 7	1 8	
		3	14 0	1 4	0 7	
		4	15 6	1 6	0 9	
		5	- - -	- - -	- - -	No record at Royal Military Academy.
		6	14 3	2 0	1 1	
	Captains	1	14 10	2 7	0 7	
		2	15 11	2 3	Doubtful.	
		3	14 8	2 11	0 8	
		4	14 1	3 1	Doubtful.	
		5	14 6	2 11	0 6	
		6	14 11	1 9	0 7	
	Lieutenants	1	15 9	3 1	0 7	
		2	14 2	3 7	0 6	
		3	14 0	2 10	0 7	
		4	14 0	2 4	0 7	
		5	15 0	3 4	0 6	
		6	15 11	3 4	0 6	
1856	Colonels	1	14 11	2 10	0 5	
		2	14 7	2 7	0 8	
		3	14 6	2 8	0 8	
		4	14 4	2 5	0 6	
		5	14 10	2 7	0 7	
		6	15 11	2 3	—	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	15 6	2 10	0 9	
		2	15 7	3 7	0 5	
		3	14 4	4 2	1 5	
		4	15 0	1 3	2 8	
		5	15 6	5 3	- nil.	
		6	14 8	5 7	0 4	
	Captains	1	14 0	2 8	0 9	
		2	15 10	2 4	0 8	
		3	15 1	2 4	0 9	
		4	15 9	2 10	0 8	
		5	14 0	4 4	0 9	
		6	15 9	3 1	0 7	
	Lieutenants	1	15 11	2 2	0 4	
		2	15 1	2 7	0 5	
		3	15 4	2 7	0 5	
		4	15 3	2 2	0 4	
		5	15 10	3 2	0 4	
		6	15 11	2 2	0 4	
1866	Colonels	1	14 3	5 11	3 9	
		2	14 9	5 10	2 3	
		3	14 1	6 0	3 1	
		4	14 8	6 2	1 9	
		5	14 8	5 10	1 4	
		6	15 5	5 8	1 6	
	Lieutenant Colonels	1	14 0	2 8	0 9	
		2	15 1	2 4	0 9	
		3	15 9	2 10	0 8	
		4	14 0	4 4	0 9	
		5	15 0	3 4	0 6	
		6	14 1	3 1	0 7	
	Captains	1	15 1	3 0	0 10	
		2	16 0	2 10	- nil.	
		3	16 2	3 11	- nil.	
		4	16 4	2 4	- nil.	
		5	15 11	2 10	- nil.	
		6	16 4	2 4	0 7	
	Lieutenants	1	15 7	2 2	0 1	
		2	15 7	2 2	0 1	
		3	14 1	2 1	0 2	
		4	15 0	2 6	0 1	
		5	18 9	0 8	0 1	Appointed by a direct nomination to the practical class.
		6	17 10	0 8	0 2	

Horse Guards, June 1867.

J. Browne, Colonel, A. A. G., R. E.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER delivered in by Brigadier General *Lefroy*, 17 June 1867.

App. No. 5.

MEMORANDUM on the probable position of the Officers of the Old Royal Artillery in respect to Length of Service, in the Years 1875, 1880, and 1885, and the Number of Retirements that will be necessary if no Colonel is continued on the Effective List beyond 40 Years' Service. The Retirements to be such that no Officer shall be a Captain beyond 27 Years' Service, or a Lieutenant Colonel beyond 34 Years' Service.

There are now (1867) 25 officers of more than 40 years' service, and 34 others who, if they all live, will complete 40 years' service in or before 1875. Of the former, it is probable that 11 will be then surviving; and of the latter, 26. There will, therefore, be 37 officers over 40 years' service, 26 over 34 years' service, and of less than 40 years; and there will be 120 officers over 27 years, and less than 35 years. In all, 63 officers above the limit assigned for a lieutenant colonel, and 183 above the limit assigned for a captain. Now there are on the establishment 66 officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonels, consequently the limit of service assumed for that rank will not be reached in 1875, but there are not 183 officers on the establishment above the rank of captain. There are only 142 consequently to bring the junior of the above 183 into the rank of lieutenant colonel, 41 vacancies must be made by retirement, or at the rate of six a year.

Life Decrements.	
2·2	in 1867.
2·3	„ 1868.
1·9	„ 1869.
1·8	„ 1870.
1·6	„ 1871.
1·6	„ 1872.
1·2	„ 1873.
1·2	„ 1874.
13·8	
25·	
11·2	

There will be 46 officers who will complete 40 years' service in or before 1880, of whom the two ranks of commandant and general officer absorb 32, leaving 14 to be provided for by retirement; 63 who will complete 34 years, 143 who will complete 27 years; in each case making the full deduction for deaths. In all, therefore, 109 who will have passed the limit assumed for service in the rank of lieutenant colonel, of whom 43 must make vacancies by retirement in order that the junior may reach the rank of colonel, and 252 who will have exceeded the service assumed for the rank of captain, of whom 110 must make vacancies by retirement; but we have already assumed 41 retirements before 1875, leaving 69 + 43, or 22 a year to be made to retire between 1875 and 1880.

Again, there will be 72 surviving officers who will complete 40 years' service in or before 1885, of whom 32 are provided for as before, that is to say, they will fill the ranks of colonel commandant and general officers on the establishment, and 14 are assumed to have already retired, leaving 26 to retire; 104 who will complete 34 years, and 239 who will complete 27 years. In all, 176 who will have passed the limit assumed for service in the rank of lieutenant colonel, of whom 110 must make vacancies by retirement, if the junior is to reach the rank of colonel at 34 years' service. We have already assumed 43 of these retirements before 1880, leaving 67 to be made from that date to 1885, or 13 a year.

With regard to the captains, there will be 415 officers beyond the limit of service assigned for that rank, of whom 273 must retire to bring the junior within the list of lieutenant colonels. We have already assumed 153 of these retirements, leaving 119 to be made between 1880 and 1885; 119 in five years is at the rate of 24 a year.

We can arrive at the expense of this amount of retirement pretty nearly, but it is necessary to assume some scale of retirement, and it must be one that will be reasonably likely to tempt officers to retire in sufficient numbers unless a limit is fixed for service in each rank, and retirement made compulsory, which I do not advocate for any rank except that of colonel. Such a scale I submit, and for the purpose of this calculation suppose it to be the one in force.

App. No. 5.

ESTIMATED Expense of the Retirements necessary to realize the foregoing results, dividing them equally over all the Lengths of Service.

	1875.		1880.		1885.	
	No.	£.	*No.*	£.	*No.*	£
To retire at 40 years' total service, unless removed by promotion to the rank of Major General.	–	–	14	8,400	14 26	8,400 15,600
Required to retire voluntarily in order that the rank of Colonel may be reached by officers of 34 years' service.	–	–	43	10,000	43 67	10,000 14,840
Required to retire voluntarily in order that the rank of Lieutenant Colonel may be reached by officers of 27 years' service.	41	7,678	41 12	7,678 2,247	41 12 70	7,678 2,247 15,356
TOTAL - - -	41	7,678	110	28,325	273	74,121

To the foregoing sums are to be added the amount now appropriated to the half pay and full-pay retirements; and from the total is to be deducted the probable falling in of pensions by the deaths of retired officers, as follows:—

	1875.	1880.	1885.
	£.	£.	£.
Foregoing new retirements - - - - - -	7,678	28,325	74,121
Present full pay retirements - - - - -	32,000	32,000	32,000
Estimated amount of half-pay list - - - -	9,000	9,000	9,000
	48,678	69,325	115,121
To be deducted,—			
By falling in of retirements on 600*l.* a year at one annually.	4,800	7,800	10,800
By falling in of retirements on smaller pensions, which average 270*l.*	7,039	10,192	13,000
By falling in of half pay - - - - - -	4,000	6,000	8,000
Prospective annual charge to secure that no officer of the Royal Artillery shall serve as captain beyond the age of 48, or Lieutenant Colonel beyond the age of 55, or Colonel beyond the age of 60.	32,839	45,333	83,321

Of the foregoing charge, a proportion is strictly to be considered a part of the expense of the Indian Establishment, and should either be directly contributed by the Indian Revenue, or covered by the Capitation Grant. There are about 83 batteries of artillery maintained for service in India, and 122 for service elsewhere; the officers added to the Royal Artillery since the amalgamation, to meet this liability, will begin to complete 15 years' service in 1875, and thenceforward all retirements should be divided *pro ratâ*; that is to say, officers commissioned before November 1860, remain chargeable to the Imperial Revenue at whatever period they may retire; officers commissioned in and after November 1860 are chargeable on retirement in the proportion of 60 per cent. to the Imperial Revenue, and 40 per cent. to the Indian Revenue.

PROPOSED

App. No. 5.

PROPOSED SCALE of RETIREMENT based on Length of Service, irrespective of Rank.

Under 15 years, when compelled to retire by Wounds, Sickness or Disability, contracted in the Service, £. 100.

This Sum is almost exactly intermediate between the Half Pay of a Captain and a Lieutenant.

SERVICE.	Estimated Age.	Proposed Pension on Retirement.	Approximate Capitalized Value.	REMARKS.
Under—		£.	£.	
15	-	100	- -	
15	35	100	1,706	
16	36	110	1,873	
17	37	120	2,006	Present Provision.
18	38	130	2,145	No retirement by right unless from effect of disability, then half pay :—
19	39	140	2,281	£. Lieutenants - - - - - - 76
20	40	150	2,420	Captains - - - - - - - 134
21	41	160	2,537	Lieutenant Colonels on Major's pay - - 184
22	42	170	2,567	On Lieutenant Colonel's pay - - - 206
23	43	185	2,847	
24	44	200	3,028	
25	45	220	3,273	Half pay by right. Full pay under certain circumstances up to a fixed annual charge of £. 32,000 :—
26	46	240	3,504	£. If Lieutenant Colonels - - - - 330
27	47	265	3,794	If Brevet Colonels - - - - - 400
28	48	290	4,066	If Colonels of 30 years' service - - 600
29	49	320	4,391	Beyond that charge, half pay.
30	50	350	4,697	
31	51	380	4,984	
32	52	410	5,254	
33	53	440	5,506	
34	54	470	5,742	It is proposed that officers who have attained the rank of full Colonel with 30 years' service, and elect to remain on the effective list and to succeed to a battalion, retire on 500 *l.* a year whatever their service. If they renounce all claim to succeed to a battalion, the retirements to be as here stated.
35	55	500	5,961	
36	56	520	6,050	
37	57	540	6,128	
38	58	560	6,197	
39	59	580	6,255	
40	60	600	6,300	

TABLE I.—OFFICERS of the ROYAL ARTILLERY who will complete the Term of SERVICE stated in the First Column in each successive financial Year, supposing them not to Die or Retire in the Interval.

The Officers inserted as Completing 15 Years' Service in 1867 were those Commissioned between 1 April 1852 and 31 March 1853, and so on.

Years' Service.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.	1878.	1879.	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	1891.	1892.	1893.		Years' Service.
Commissioned.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.	1856.	1857.	1858.	1859.	1860.	1861.	1862.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.														
15	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	15
16	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	16
17	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	17
18	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	18
19	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	19
20	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	20
21	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	21
22	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	–	22
23	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	–	23
24	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	–	24
25	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	–	25
26	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	–	26
27	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	–	27
28	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51	28
29	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	29
30	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	30
31	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	31
32	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	32
33	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	33
34	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	34
35	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	35
36	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	36
37	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	54	37
38	4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	47	38
39	6	4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	69	39
40	–	6	4	4	4	7	3	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	15	13	13	21	12	22	34	14	21	28	21	25	16	54	40
Above 40	25	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	Above 40

TABLE II.—Officers of the Old Royal Artillery who may be expected to be Living in each Successive Year, arranged according to Length of Service and taken to the nearest Whole Number.

Years' Service.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	1872.	1873.	1874.	1875.	1876.	1877.	1878.	1879.	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.
1867	25	16	54	69	47	54	20	56	72	66	45	50	95	47	51				
15	25	15	53	67	45	52	19	53	67	61	42	46	86	42	45				
16	21	25	15	53	67	45	51	19	52	67	61	41	45	85	42	45			
17	28	21	25	15	52	66	45	51	19	52	66	60	41	45	84	41	44		
18	21	28	21	24	14	52	65	44	51	19	51	66	60	40	44	84	41	44	
19	14	21	28	21	24	14	51	65	44	50	18	51	65	59	40	44	83	41	44
20	34	14	21	27	20	24	14	51	64	43	50	18	51	64	59	40	44	82	40
21	22	34	14	20	27	20	24	14	50	64	43	49	18	50	64	58	39	43	81
22	12	22	33	14	20	27	20	23	14	50	63	42	49	18	50	63	57	39	43
23	21	12	22	33	13	20	27	20	23	14	49	62	42	48	18	49	63	57	39
24	13	21	12	21	33	13	20	26	20	23	14	49	62	41	48	18	49	62	56
25	13	13	21	12	21	33	13	20	26	20	23	13	48	61	41	47	17	48	61
26	15	13	13	20	12	21	32	13	19	25	19	23	13	48	60	41	47	17	48
27	2	15	13	13	20	11	21	32	13	19	25	19	22	13	47	60	40	46	17
28	3	2	15	13	12	20	11	21	32	12	19	25	19	22	13	47	59	40	46
29	11	3	2	15	12	12	20	11	21	31	12	18	25	19	22	13	46	58	39
30	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	21	31	12	18	24	18	22	13	46	58
31	7	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	20	30	12	18	24	18	21	13	45
32	5	7	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	20	30	12	18	24	17	21	13
33	6	5	7	5	11	3	2	14	12	12	19	11	20	29	12	18	23	17	21
34	3	6	5	6	5	11	3	2	13	12	12	18	10	19	29	11	17	23	17
35	7	3	6	5	6	5	10	2	1	13	11	11	18	10	19	28	11	17	23
36	4	7	3	6	5	6	5	10	2	1	13	11	11	18	10	19	28	11	17
37	4	4	7	3	6	5	6	4	10	2	1	13	11	11	17	10	18	28	11
38	4	4	4	7	3	5	4	6	4	10	2	1	13	11	10	17	10	18	27
39	6	4	4	4	7	3	5	4	5	4	10	2	1	12	10	10	17	9	17
40	–	6	4	4	4	6	3	5	4	5	4	10	2	1	12	10	10	16	9
41 to 72	25	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	{11 / 26}	–	–	–	–	{6 / 40}	–	–	–	–	72

The figures in the top line show the number of officers serving in 1867, the survivors of whom will complete 15 years service in each successive year following.

The figures in the last line show the officers who will have completed 40 years service in the years 1875, 1880, and 1885, making proper reduction for deaths in the intervals.

App. No. 5.

The General Conclusions of this Paper may be Summarised as follows:

1875:				
Remanets of those now over 40 years	11			
Will complete 40 years by that time	26			
Survivors of those now under that service	–	37		
Will be over 34 years, under 40 years	–	26		
			63	
Will be over 27 years, under 34 years	–	–	120	
			183	
There are above the rank of first Captain	–	–	142	
Therefore must retire, in order that no first Captain may have more than 27 years' service (all of them above the junior officer of 1848)	–	–	41 A.	
1880:				
Remanets	6			
Will complete 40 years before 1880	40			
		46	–	46
Will be over 34 years, under 40 years	–	63		— 32
				14 D.
Total over 34 years' service	–	–	109	109
Will be over 27 years, under 34 years	–	–	143	— 66
Total over 27 years' service	–	–	252	43 E.
There are, above first Captains	–	–	142	
Therefore must retire, in all	–	–	110	
Supposed to have retired above	–	–	41 A.	
Leaving to retire, 1875–1880	–	–	69 B.	

Of whom 14 D. must be above the junior officer of 1840, in order that no Colonel may be over 40 years' service; 43 E. must be above the junior officer of 1846, in order that no Lieutenant Colonel may have more than 34 years' service; and the whole 110 above the junior officer of 1853, in order that no Captain may have more than 27 years' service.

1885:				
Remanets	–			
Will complete 40 years' service	72			
		72		72
Will be over 34 years, under 40 years	–	104		— 32
				40
				— 14 D.
				26 F.
Total over 34 years' service	–	–	176	176
Will be over 27 years, under 34 years	–	–	239	— 66
				110
				— 43 E.
				67 G.
Total over 27 years' service	–	–	415	415
There are above the rank of first Captain	–	–	142	—142
Therefore must retire, in all	–	–	273 I.	273 to retire H.
Supposed to have already retired before 1880	–	–	110 A. & B.	
Therefore must retire, 1880–1885	–	–	163 K.	

Of whom 26 F. must be above the junior officer of 1845, in order that no Colonel may have more than 40 years' service; 67 G. above the junior officer of 1851, in order that no Lieutenant Colonel may have more than 34 years' service; and the whole 273 above the junior officer of 1858, in order that no Captain may have more than 27 years' service.

(signed) *J. H. L.*

Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER delivered in by Admiral *Dacres*, 20 June 1867.

ABSTRACT of the Cost of the FULL PAY RETIREMENT of OFFICERS of the ROYAL MARINES, for the past Ten Years. App. No. 6.

YEARS.	Total Yearly Amount of Retirements.	Surplus unexpended.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
1858	27,895 6 8	7,104 13 4
1859	29,677 15 –	5,322 5 –
1860	32,001 10 10	2,998 9 2
1861	32,372 12 11	2,627 7 1
1862	28,596 8 4	6,403 11 8
1863	32,228 2 11	2,771 17 1
1864	30,222 3 4	4,777 16 8
1865	32,019 15 10	2,980 4 2
1866	32,807 5 10	2,192 14 2
1867	31,252 19 7	3,747 – 5

Royal Marine Office,
17 June 1867.

Geo. C. Langley,
Deputy Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 7.

PAPER delivered in by Colonel *Gambier*, 20 June 1867.

App. No. 7.

Royal Artillery.—Full Pay Retirements.

The present system of Full Pay Retirement which was established by the Royal Warrant of 1854 (when an annual grant of 32,000*l.* was substituted for the mode, then in existence, of allowing a certain number of lieutenant colonels, captains, and lieutenants, of 21 years' service, to retire each year upon the full pay of their rank) has been found open to several objections, the more prominent of which may be thus stated:—

1st. It increased the qualifying period for Full Pay Retirement, from 21 to 30 years, and deprived the regiment of the promotion which had previously accrued from the retirement of officers of between 21 and 30 years' service.

2nd. As the grant of 32,000*l.* had to include all officers who retired upon full pay, between 1840 and 1854, the number of unattached general officers and regimental colonels who could then avail themselves of the retirements on 600*l.* a year was necessarily limited, and was not equivalent to the number of steps which would have resulted from retirements in the lower grades under the old system.

3rd. The officers who had retired since 1840, and who were included in the grant of 32,000*l.*, were comparatively young men, so that the money available by their death only became again disposable at uncertain periods, and by slow degrees.

4th. The augmentations which took place soon after 1854 gave the senior officers, who would then have retired had funds been available, a much better prospect of reaching the rank of colonel commandant, and consequently they declined the retirement which they would previously have accepted.

5th. The retirements on 600*l.* a year have therefore, generally, been taken by junior regimental colonels, and thus the flow of promotion has been retarded by the money being locked up in the lives of the younger instead of the older officers.

6th. The retirements on 400*l.* and 365*l.* a year offered to lieutenant colonels of 30 years' service has been almost inoperative, from the fact that the same period of service is required in this rank as in the higher, and the officer therefore naturally prefers to wait for promotion to colonel, when he can retire upon 600*l.* instead of 400*l.*

7th. The 30 years period for retirement, therefore, practically excludes all officers, below the rank of regimental colonel, of any right to retire upon full pay.

At the present time, however (notwithstanding these objections) the age and length of service of officers of all ranks in the Royal Artillery must be considered satisfactory, being but little behind the rest of the army; but it must not be forgotten that this state of things has arisen mainly from the large augmentations which have occurred during the last 20 years, and that promotion from this source can no longer be reckoned upon; but, on the contrary, the additions thus made to the number of officers will eventually tend, in a great measure, to increase the future stagnation against which it is now sought to provide.

The prospects of attaining the rank of major general which are now held out to officers joining the regiment, have already been stated in evidence, and need not therefore be here repeated.

In order to provide for the future efficiency of officers in all ranks, it has been generally admitted that it is necessary to fix some stated period at which officers should be removed from the Effective List, and also that some outlet should be provided for the retirement of officers who have not completed 30 years' service.

The following plan for the attainment of these objects is therefore proposed:—

1st. To remove all officers who have completed 38 years' service, and who are not colonels commandant, to a retired list in the ranks they now hold.

2nd. To allow these officers the option of retiring absolutely upon 700*l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank, or of remaining upon their present rate of pay, and succeeding to colonel commandant, and the higher grades of general officer, according to their army rank.

3rd. Officers so removed from the regimental list who elect to remain on their present pay, with a view to further promotion, to be eligible, while on the Retired List, for any employment (not regimental), and to retain the appointments they may now hold, until the usual five years period of holding them shall have expired.

4th. To

4th. To give an unqualified right of retirement to officers of less than 38, but of 20 years' service and upwards, upon the following scale per annum:

	£.
30 Years' Service:	
Permanent pension - - -	600
To capitalize - - - -	450
25 Years' Service:	
Permanent pension - - -	400
To capitalize - - - - -	300
20 Years' Service:	
Permanent pension - - -	200
To capitalize - - - - -	150

These retirements to be governed by length of service, and irrespective of the rank the officer may have attained.

They should also be available at any time (after the stated period of service is completed) without reference to vacancies on the Retired List, or in the amount of the annual vote for retirement.

5th. Every facility to be afforded to the officers who retire with less than 38 years' service to capitalize their retiring pension at the rates laid down for each period of service in paragraph 4.

Intermediate periods of service to be calculated, both for permanent retirement and for capitalizing, and the scale raised in proportion.

6th. The present Retired Full Pay List to be discontinued as vacancies occur therein.

7th. The Half Pay List to be also discontinued, except in the case of officers of less than 20 years' service, who may be incapacitated for duty from wounds in action, or from ill health contracted in the service.

The number of officers who have not reached the rank of colonel commandant, but who have completed 38 years' service is 17; viz., 14 major generals and 3 regimental colonels.

During the next 10 years the number who will reach 38 years' service (not deducting deaths or retirements in the meantime) would be 55, including the above 17, being an average of 5 ½ promotions, from the top of the list alone, for each year.

The 17 officers who have now completed 38 years' service, exactly correspond with the number of colonels commandant, and as promotions to that rank would almost invariably be made from the retired list of officers on major general's pay, that number of steps would be lost as vacancies occur, and the annual average of retirements at the top of the list would thus be reduced to about four for the next 10 years.

As the regiment now stands it is not calculated that there would be any officers, under 38 years' service, who would retire, except for the purpose of capitalising their annuities, and the expense of the proposed plan as regards these officers would, therefore, be inconsiderable.

The number who might retire for this purpose would not exceed 20 for the present year in the three periods combined; and, therefore, supposing this number retired, the total vacancies for the lower ranks this year would be 37. App. No. 7.

Of the officers of 38 years' service and upwards, who would be removed from the regimental list, it is calculated 12 would elect to remain on their present pay to succeed to colonel commandant, and the expense of starting the proposed plan would be as under:—

	£.
12 officers to retire upon their present pay (478 *l.* a year) - - - - -	5,736
5 officers to retire, absolutely, on 700 *l.* a year - - - - - - - -	3,500
	9,236
Against which there would be a saving from the full and half-pay list - -	6,700
Actual Cost - - £.	2,536

In the money estimated to be saved is included 5,200 *l.* which has been sanctioned by the Treasury (subject to the Vote of Parliament) for next year as the balance of the increased grant of 10,400 *l.* to which the regiment is entitled for the number of officers, of the old Royal Artillery alone, added to it since the 32,000 *l.* was first granted in 1854, and for whom no retiring allowances have hitherto been provided.

The foregoing remarks, and proposal, have applied solely to the old Royal Artillery, but the amalgamation of the Indian Artilleries have added (and continue so to do annually) a large number of lieutenants to the general list; and, consequently, when the present Indian lists of officers have died out, there will be a regiment nearly twice the strength of the old Royal Artillery at the present time, with retiring allowances for only one half.

In the meantime the Indian Government bear the expense of the retirements of all those officers of Artillery who were on the Indian lists at the date of the amalgamation; and, in addition, pay to the Imperial Government a capitation grant, for retirements and pensions, of 3 *l.* 10 *s.* for every officer and soldier of the Royal Artillery embarked for India.

The same rate of capitation is paid for the Cavalry and the Line; but the Indian Government have nothing further to do with the retirements and pensions for these branches of the service.

It will thus be seen that the Imperial Government have been receiving a certain rate for the retirement of the whole list of Indian Artillery officers, since the date of the amalgamation, and have not hitherto applied any portion of it to that purpose.

The additional expense therefore involved by the plan now proposed, or any other that may be decided upon, may be fairly met by the sum of money which has thus been paid into the Imperial Treasury by the Indian Government for the purposes of retirement of Artillery officers, but which has not been yet applied.

G. Gambier, D. A. G.

20 June 1867.

Appendix, No. 8.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Adye*, 24 June 1867.

App. No. 8.

PROMOTION IN THE ROYAL ARTILLERY.

For a general history of promotion, *see* Royal Commission of 1854, pages 18 to 21.

Causes of the rise and fall of promotion.

THE promotion of officers in a corps strictly regulated by seniority would appear at first sight to be a simple matter, and were no disturbing elements to interfere with the ordinary succession, no doubt such would be the case, and the ages of the officers of each rank could be calculated with comparative ease. But in considering the past history of the Royal Artillery, it will be found that a variety of causes, such as sudden augmentations or reductions of the establishment, alterations in the proportions of the separate grades, changes in the pension rules, &c., have considerably upset this theoretical simplicity, and that, consequently, the ages of the officers in the several ranks have varied very much at different periods.

It will be sufficient for our present purpose to sketch the outlines of the promotions and of the successive changes which have occurred during the present century, because within that period the corps has twice undergone the varieties of fortune arising from the operation of the causes above specified.

In the year 1800, the regiment consisted of a horse brigade of six troops, and six battalions of 61 companies, with a total of 340 combatant officers. During the following years, between 1801 and 1808, it received large and successive augmentations, so that at the latter date its establishment had increased to a horse brigade of 12 troops, and 10 battalions of 101 companies. Two rocket troops were subsequently added, and the esta-

1814. blishment in 1814, and the approximate ages of the officers of each rank, were as follows:—

	Number of each Rank.	Age of Senior.
Colonel Commandant - - -	11	78 years.
Colonels - - - - -	22	61 „
Lieutenant Colonels - - -	35	53 „
Majors - - - - -	11	43 „
Captains - - - - -	115	41 „
Second Captains - - -	127	33 „
First Lieutenants - - -	249	30 „
Second Lieutenants - - -	99	-
TOTAL - - -	669	

It will be observed that the effect of these large augmentations, which had nearly doubled the regiment, combined with the casualties of a very protracted war, was to raise the corps to a fair state of efficiency as respects the ages of its officers. At all events, their position at that time in this particular was very much more favourable than for many years subsequently; and it is only in these present days that the operation of similar causes has once again restored prosperity and efficiency to the corps.

The general peace which succeeded Waterloo soon led to extensive alterations in the establishment.

In 1817, five troops of horse artillery, and one battalion of 10 companies, were reduced, the officers being placed on temporary half-pay, to be brought back as vacancies occurred. Again in 1819 a further reduction of two troops and 18 companies took place, the officers being dealt with as before, so that no less than 133 officers of various ranks were at that time waiting to be brought back to their places.

The effect of these measures was almost to paralyse promotion in the regiment, especially in the lower ranks; a general stagnation ensued, which continued for many years, depressing the

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the officers, and greatly injuring the service. The whole corps, as it were, grew old, and the promotion was so slow, that the second lieutenants appointed in 1817, 1818, and 1819, remained between eight and nine years in that rank. It was with reference to the condition of the regiment at that period that the late Lord Hardinge, then Clerk of the Ordnance, wrote in 1825, saying that he was quite in despair at the state in which it was allowed to fall. Various attempts were made from time to time to remedy this state of affairs. A certain number of officers were allowed to withdraw by the sale of their commissions; a few were transferred to the line and staff corps; and a considerable number accepted permanent retirement on half-pay. These measures, however, proved quite insufficient to remedy the evil, which, in the junior ranks, reached a climax about the year 1840, the establishment of officers at that time being 439, and the ages of the seniors of each rank as follows, taking 18 as the age of entering the corps:—

See evidence of Sir A. Dickson, Cator, &c. Royal Commission of 1840.

1840.

Senior	Colonel Commandant -	76 years.
„	Colonel - - - -	64 „
„	Lieutenant-Colonel - -	61 „
„	Captain - - -	55 „
„	Second Captain - -	50 „
„	Lieutenant - - -	38 „

In 1840 a Royal Commission was assembled to consider the subject of army promotions generally, and reported that the retiring allowances of the Royal Artillery were quite insufficient. Accordingly, in the following year, they were considerably increased. By the previous regulations, the fixed establishment of the retired full-pay list had been limited to—

Royal Commission of 1840, p. xii.

8	Lieutenant Colonels.
12	Captains.
8	Subalterns.
28	

By the new warrant, four lieutenant colonels and four captains, who were unfit for service from age or infirmity, were allowed to retire annually on full pay, in addition to the above. Certain minor advantages as regards half-pay were also granted, and the effect of these measures, added to the numerous vacancies arising from natural causes, was to give a considerable impetus to promotion in the lower ranks, which was still further accelerated by the augmentations of four brigades between 1846 and 1855, the establishment of the regiment, and the approximate ages in the latter year, being as follows:—

Page xix.

See Royal Commission of 1854, page 56.

1855.

Colonel Commandants - - -	14	- Age of Senior	80 Years.
Colonels - - - - -	28	- „	69 „
Lieutenant Colonels - - -	56	- „	56 „
Captains - - - - -	113	- „	40 „
Second Captains - - -	126	- „	30 „
Lieutenants - - - -	337	- „	25 „
	674		

It will be observed that although promotion in the lower ranks had considerably improved, that of the colonels had become worse than before. In the meantime, however, in the year 1854, a second Royal Commission was assembled, which reported that the inducements held out by the previous one had not proved sufficiently attractive to the full extent authorised, and that a considerable portion of the annual retiring grant had lapsed. Their recommendations were embodied in a Royal Warrant, and are shortly as follows:—

Royal Commission of 1854, page 21.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 25, para. 114.

Royal Commission of 1854, pages 53, 56, 57.

1. A fixed establishment of general officers, including colonel commandant, as follows:—

Generals - - - - - - - - - -	6
Lieutenant Generals - - - - - - - -	10
Major Generals - - - - - - - - -	16
	32

2. An annual fixed retiring allowance of 32,000 *l.*, the scale of pensions to be as follows:—

Royal Commission of 1854, page 26.

Unattached Generals and Colonels - - - -	£. 600 per annum.
Unattached Lieutenant Colonels of 30 years' service	400 „
Officers between 21 and 30 years' service - - -	Full pay of their rank.

The officers wishing to retire under the above rules could only do so in the event of a vacancy on the retired list.

Independently of the above, the officers over 25 years' service were allowed to retire on half-pay at their option. These measures proved advantageous to a limited degree, and a subsequent augmentation of three brigades, added to the casualities of the Crimean and

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Indian wars, have since contributed largely to stimulate the promotion of the regiment; the general result being that at present the establishment of the old Royal Artillery, and the respective ages, stand as follows:—

Colonel Commandants - - -	17	- Age of Senior	88 Years.
Major Generals (unattached) - -	15	- „	— „
Colonels - - - - - -	34	- „	57 „
Lieutenant Colonels - - - -	76	- „	48 „
Captains - - - - - -	150	- „	40 „
Second Captains - - - -	181	- „	34 „
Lieutenants - - - - -	432	- „	31 „
	905		

Royal Commission of 1854, paras. 95 and 96.

If the rates of promotion of recent years could be maintained, the prospects of the officers would be fair, and the service efficient; but the very fact that the present condition of the corps has been produced chiefly by large augmentations, and by thus pushing up into the higher ranks men comparatively young in years, is in itself a proof that unless some outlet is given, the subalterns of the present day will have to endure a stagnation much similar to that which crippled the regiment for so many years subsequent to Waterloo.

It is true that there are no half-pay officers to be absorbed, as after Waterloo, and that the present pension rules are more liberal than of yore, but still the exceptional impetus has been so great that the senior colonel of the regiment is only 57 years old, and this is a proof that the ordinary promotion must be very slow for many years to come.

It must also be borne in mind that of late years the average age of officers on receiving their first commission has been about 21 years, in contrast to 18 as formerly, and further, that, in consequence of the augmentations, large batches of young officers have joined the corps in rapid succession and all nearly of the same age, all which circumstances considerably prejudice their chance of reaching the upper ranks even moderately young.

In a seniority corps there are but three ways of obtaining promotion:—

1. By death vacancies.
2. By promotion of colonels to be generals.
3. By retirement with pension.

Death vacancies.

The first is a constant quantity, that is, it will occur at a certain proportionate rate, but as the average duration of life far exceeds that of efficiency in an officer, it is not of itself sufficient to maintain a regiment in a sound condition.

Promotion to general.

The second outlet is by the promotion of colonels to the rank of general. There are, however, but 32 officers of the latter grade, including the colonels commandant, to a regiment of over 900 officers, so that promotions from that source are very few.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 62, for number of generals by former brevets.

It is to be observed that on the abolition of periodical brevets in 1854, the above number of generals was fixed for the Royal Artillery, as being in proportion to those of the cavalry and infantry.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 25, para, 113, and page 29.

Since that date, however, the other two branches have received certain augmentations and an increase to their generals accordingly, whereas, though the Royal Artillery have been augmented from 14 to 17 brigades, the number of their generals remains the same. It also appears that the Royal Marines have 11 unattached generals to 489 officers, whereas the Royal Artillery have 15 to 905.

There would therefore appear to be valid reasons for somewhat increasing the number of general officers of the Royal Artillery, and such a measure would to its extent prove beneficial to the corps, as adding to the proportion of those in the higher ranks.

Pensions.

The third and apparently only effectual method of maintaining regular and sufficient promotion in a seniority corps is by a system of pensions or retiring allowances. Those of the Royal Artillery previous to 1840, it will have been observed, were reported as quite insufficient, and evidently proved so, and although in the latter year some considerable improvement was made in this respect, still again in 1854 a second Royal Commission recommended a more liberal scale of pension and an increase in the numbers. Since 1854, three more brigades have been added; consequently the amount there given, even if sufficient at that time, is evidently not so now. It is not only known that the annual grant has not kept pace with the augmented establishment of the corps, but there are inequalities and other defects in its distribution which seem to require alteration. The rules hitherto in force in this matter appear for the most part to have been temporary expedients rather than parts of a comprehensive plan; and although the general design has always been to provide against extreme age and consequent inefficiency in the upper ranks, still no definite limit of age or of service has ever been laid down, at which officers are to cease performing regimental duties.

Thus within the last few years we have seen colonels doing duty when over 70 years old, whilst others have obtained 600 *l.* a-year retirement when they were under 50. Cases of this kind can hardly have been contemplated by the Royal Commissioners of 1854.

Limit of service.

It appears to me that an essential rule in a seniority corps is to define the limit of service at which officers should cease to perform regimental duties, and I would suggest 40 years' service as appropriate.

Royal Commission, 1854, page 24, para. 109.

My view is that each officer who on arriving at the head of the list of colonels (by army rank) has 40 years' service,* shall, at the discretion of the military authorities, either be promoted at

* This is laid down on the supposition that each officer is about 20 years old at first commission.

at once as a supernumerary major-general, or else shall be called upon to retire on 600 *l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank. Of course, if an officer reaches the top of the colonels before 40 years' service, he would be promoted in due course, whilst by thus giving a discretionary power to the military authorities, they would be enabled, should promotion languish, to retain occasionally as generals, such colonels of 40 years' service as might be considered desirable. The generals so promoted as supernumeraries would be gradually absorbed into the fixed establishment as vacancies occurred. The great advantage of this limit of service at the top of the colonels would be, that the regiment, even in time of peace, would never fall below a certain level, and the other ranks would also fall into a natural gradation of length of service.

Pensions by service, not by rank.

Another point calling for remark is, that hitherto pensions have been generally given by rank rather than by length of service, and this operates unequally; for instance, within the last few years, we have seen colonels accepting pensions of 600 *l.* a year when over 70 years old, whilst now the officers eligible for the same amount are not 50; so that, in the latter case, the recipients have not only enjoyed good fortune during their career, but find themselves entitled to large pensions on retirement; thus an inducement is held out to the comparatively young and prosperous officers to retire, whilst the object should be just the reverse.*

The accession to rank is, in fact, uncertain and various, as the history of the regiment shows, whereas service is certain, and uniformly progressive; and, in my opinion, it would therefore be advisable that all pensions should be regulated by length of service quite independently of rank, as is the system in the Indian army.

See Appendix (B.)

Again, the grant of pensions hitherto has been in a great measure limited to the higher ranks, and, more especially of late years, the tendency has been almost to exclude the junior officers from a chance of retirement. To a certain extent, no doubt, this is a correct principle, but, when carried to excess, it inevitably checks promotion, as it almost forces the whole of the officers who enter the corps to remain in it throughout their career. Now, there are many causes which tend to induce men of middle age, and sometimes even those of short service, to leave the regiment; and if some fractional and increasing value were attached to each successive year passed in the corps, it is possible that a graduated scale of pensions might be framed, which, without unduly pressing on the finances, would still assist promotion, and would tend to break up the uniformity of increasing age in a long seniority list.

Royal Commission 1854, page 18, para 82, 83.

The following may be quoted as some of the causes which predispose officers to early retirement:—

1. Disinclination for a military life.

2. Early marriages, and the consequent expense of frequent removes, and the education of children.

3. Service in the Colonies sometimes ends in emigration.

4. Inheriting private property.

5. Failure in health.

It must also be borne in mind, as already pointed out, that the augmentations of late years have not only blocked up the upper ranks with officers of comparatively short service, but large batches of lieutenants have joined the regiment in quick succession at the bottom, all so nearly of the same age that their prospects are irretrievably injured, and a graduated scale of moderate pensions would therefore possibly tend to lighten this part of the list.†

See Royal Commissi of 1840, Colonel Cator's evidence, pa 37, question 676.

Those who are in the lower ranks argue, and with some show of reasoning, that whereas a pension of 600 *l.* a year, when given to a colonel, only creates one vacancy, the same amount, if distributed amongst the captains, would probably be sufficient to purchase the retirement of three or four, and would thus materially benefit the subalterns. Should the principle of a graduated scale of pensions according to length of service be considered sound, I would advocate the combination of a small bonus on retirement as a part of the scheme, and also a step of honorary rank.

The following is the outline of a proposed scheme of the kind, the details of which could be modified at discretion:—

PROPOSED SCALE of PENSIONS and BONUSES, according to Service, counting 20 Years as the Age at entering the Service.

1. Officers from 15 to 20 years' service wishing to retire, to be allowed 1,000 *l.* bonus on leaving the corps.

2. Officers from 20 to 25 years' service wishing to retire to be granted a pension of 150 *l.* per annum, with a bonus of 150 *l.*

A limit to be fixed as to the number of officers retiring under these rules; say, two of the first, and four of the second, per annum.

3. Officers

* The regulations as to retirement on full or half pay after a certain number of years also act unequally,

† depend on the rank held at the time of retiremen

Five-sixths of the corps are captains and subalterns.

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3. Officers of and over 25 years' and up to 40 years' service to be granted pensions at the following rates, and to be free to take them, without limit as to numbers:—

Average Age.	Years' Service.	Pension.	Bonus.
		£.	£.
45	25	250	
46	26	270	
47	27	290	200
48	28	310	
49	29	330	
50	30	350	
51	31	370	
52	32	390	250
53	33	410	
54	34	430	
55	35	450	
56	36	480	
57	37	510	300
58	38	540	
59	39	570	
60	40	600	350

Should the foregoing scale of pensions be considered as framed on sound principles and of moderate amount, it does not appear to me that it could then be necessary to limit its operations to any particular number of retirements in each year after 25 years' service; in fact, any such limitation would, I think, very much interfere with its beneficial working. The scheme of full-pay retirements granted to the regiment in 1840 was never taken full advantage of, and the Royal Commissioners of 1854 stated their opinion that its partial failure was due to the restriction imposed as to the number of retirements allowed in each year. In the Indian service the system of retirements at will according to a graduated scale after 20 years' service, and without reference to numbers, has prevailed for years, and has not, I believe, led to any undue increase to the pension list; and in various branches of the Civil Service similar arrangements as to superannuation are found to work beneficially. It does not appear to me possible to regulate the pensions of a great seniority corps by a narrow adhesion to an annual fixed grant, and still less so when any sums not accepted in one year are considered as forfeited, and lapse to the Government.

See Royal Commission of 1854, page 59, first and last paras.

Royal Commission of 1854, page 25, para. 119.

A consideration of the promotion of the officers of Royal Artillery during the present century tends, I think, to prove that the present organisation, if left to itself, and without the stimulus of considerable retiring allowances, is quite inadequate to maintain efficiency in point of age in the several ranks. (*Vide* Appendix C.)

There are only two periods when the regiment has risen to a fair rate of promotion, and on each occasion it was produced chiefly by large augmentations in consequence of great wars. It should, however, be borne in mind that the mere increase of numbers to a corps, though beneficial to individuals for the moment, does no permanent good; on the contrary, it creates a fictitious prosperity, which is sure to be succeeded by a corresponding reaction. We have seen this reaction already occur once, namely, after Waterloo; and unless some steps are taken to prevent it, the second epoch of retardation, which has already commenced, will lead again to depression and inefficiency.

Defects.

The chief defects in the present organisation and condition of the regiment appear to be as follows:—

1. Insufficient number of general officers.
2. Want of limit of service at the top of the colonels.
3. Insufficient grant for retiring allowances. *
4. Defective appropriation of the present retiring allowances.
5. Abnormal state of the regiment from great augmentations.

The remedies I would propose, are—

Proposed remedies.

1. An increase in the establishment of generals in proportion to the augmentation of three brigades, which have occurred since the fixed establishment of generals was first laid down in 1854.

2. A limit of 40 years' service at the top of the colonels.

3. A graduated scale of pensions with bonus, to be given by service, and not by rank. (The rules to be very simple and few.)

4. An honorary step of rank on retirement.

5. Officers to enter the corps at about 18 years of age.

6. The establishment of subalterns not to be kept full in time of peace.

Hitherto

* The Marines have 35,000 *l.* per annum to a total of 489 officers.
The Royal Artillery have only 32,000 *l.* per annum to a total of 888 officers.
The annual rate for the Royal Artillery, if raised to that of the Royal Marines, would be 63,558 *l.* per annum.

Hitherto I have spoken of the regiment as consisting only of 17 brigades, but as by the amalgamation in 1862, 14 more have been added to it from the Indian army, it now amounts to 31 brigades, with upwards of 1,600 officers, the whole of whom will eventually rise in one long seniority list; and when it is considered that of this vast body about five-sixths are captains and subalterns, it will be conceded that the question is not only important, but that its future difficulties must be met in a large and liberal spirit.

Amalgamation.

Appendix (A).

As regards the present question of retirement, those officers who are still on their separate Indian lists, are eligible for pensions according to a graduated scale by Indian rules, and will continue so throughout their career, and therefore require no remark. But the subalterns who have joined the old Royal Artillery since the amalgamation, to replace casualties in the Indian lists, and whose numbers are daily increasing, are not provided for either in the Indian or home rules of pensions and retirements, and consequently their case has to be considered. It may perhaps be argued, that as these young officers are not at present eligible for retirement, and will not be so for some years, their case demands no immediate decision.

Appendix (B).

It appears to me, however, that every year of an officer's service from his entering the corps, has a fractional and increasing value towards future retirement, and that as the pension lists of the Indian Artillery will receive no more candidates for ultimate pensions subsequent to amalgamation, so the Indian funds ought from that date to begin subscribing annual grants towards the general retiring allowances of the regiment as it gradually progresses to unity. The amount to be paid is a matter of calculation for an actuary: it will be small for some years to come, but will increase hereafter in proportion as the existing Indian Artillery officers' pensions decrease.

In short, the aggregate amount of annual pensions hitherto paid to the officers of Indian Artillery, should be transferred to the home funds, concurrently with the gradual formation of the 14 brigades which will ultimately be added to the Royal Artillery, and whose pensions ought to be paid by the country which requires their services. In addition also, to the 14 Indian brigades, there are two brigades of old Royal Artillery serving in India, making 16 in that country out of 31; consequently, the proportion of pensions for the two extra ones ought also to be provided out of Indian revenues.

I would take this opportunity of observing, that in like manner, the funds of India ought to be called upon to subscribe, so as to give increased pensions to the widows and children of artillery officers. Several officers of the old Royal Artillery have been killed, or have died in that country since 1857, but neither their widows nor children have derived any provision from Indian revenues.

In the foregoing observations on the Royal Artillery, I have limited my remarks to what appear to me the best means of improving the promotion of the officers by certain alterations in the pension rules, &c., and by other minor proposals, but without advocating any radical changes in the organisation of the corps. I am quite aware, however, that the subject has another aspect, and that it is thought by many, that the difficulties of promotion, and the disadvantages of a long seniority list, from which no officer can emerge either by talent or even by fortune, would be removed by a complete reorganisation, and by a subdivision of the corps into separate regiments. This, however, is a very large and difficult question with many aspects, and without either advocating or rejecting it, I would at present merely name it as one which is thought by many as worthy of grave consideration.

June 1867. (signed) *John Adye*, Colonel, R.A.

App. No. 8.

Appendix (A).

PRESENT ORGANISATION of the ROYAL ARTILLERY.—February 1867.

	Old R. A.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL.	
Colonels Commandant -	17	7	4	3	31	61*
Major Generals, unattached	15	10	3	2	30	
Colonels - - - -	34	13	8	5	60	73
Seconded - - - -	–	4	5	4	13	
Lieutenant Colonels - -	67	28	16	12	123	141
Seconded - - - -	9	5	2	2	18	
Captains - - - -	139†	55	32	24	250	282
Seconded - - - -	11	7	7	7	32	
2nd Captains - - -	164	63	36	27	290	317
Seconded - - - -	17	9	1	–	27	
Lieutenants - - -	432	94	43	24	593	730
Added for Indian Brigades	137	–	–	–	137	
	1,043	295	157	110		
GRAND TOTAL - - -						1,604

* Generals - - - 61 } 275 = 1/6
Field Officers - - 214 }
Captains - - - 599 } 1,329 = 5/6
Lieutenants - - 730 }
1,604 1,604

† Detail of Captains.

130 Batteries.
2 Unmanned batteries.
11 Seconded.
2 Gentlemen Cadets.
1 Riding establishment.
4 Depot.
150

* The future establishment of Generals is to be 58 (Royal Warrant, 15 June 1864).

	Generals.	Lieutenant Generals.	Major Generals.	TOTAL.
Royal Artillery - - -	6	10	16	32
Indian Artillery - - -	5	8	13	26
	11	18	29	58

Appendix (B).

INDIAN PENSION RULES.

	£.	s.	d.	
Old Rules.				
35 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England - - - - - - - - - - - - -	456	5	–	per ann.
31 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England - - - - - - - - - - - - -	365	–	–	„
27 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England - - - - - - - - - - - - -	292	–	–	„
23 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough in England - - - - - - - - - - - - -	191	12	6	„
New Rules.				
32 years' service, including cadet service, with four years' furlough	456	5	–	„
28 years' service, including cadet service, with three years' furlough	365	–	–	„
24 years' service, including cadet service, with two years' furlough	292	–	–	„
20 years' service, including cadet service, with two years' furlough	191	12	6	„

Or full-pay of his rank at any time after 20 years in India.

Appendix (C.)

APPROXIMATE AGES of the Senior Officers of each Rank of the Royal Artillery, as they would be if left to Regimental Seniority as at present, and with 86 Retired Officers included.

Senior Colonel, nearly 75 years old.
Senior Lieutenant-Colonel, between 60 and 65 years old.
Senior Captain, between 50 and 55 years old.
Senior Second Captain, between 40 and 45 years old.
Senior Lieutenant, between 30 and 35 years old.

Diagram of Promotion in the Royal Artillery from 1800 to 1865.

(Adopted from Genl. Lefroy's Pamphlet.)



Appendix, No. 9.

PAPERS furnished by Mr. *Finlaison.*

App. No. 9.

TABLE showing the Number of Years' Purchase, and also the Price in Cash, of an ANNUITY of £. 100 on the LIFE of a MALE of an Age undermentioned; the Interest of Money being taken after the Rate of FIVE PER CENT. per Annum payable half-yearly, and the Law of Mortality being that adopted for the Tables regulating the Grant of Annuities on Male Lives at the National Debt Office.

Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.	Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.
		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
20	15·06861	1,506 17 3	51	11·21356	1,121 7 1
21	15·00258	1,500 5 2	52	10·98145	1,098 2 11
22	14·96111	1,496 2 3	53	10·75133	1,075 2 8
23	14·92519	1,492 10 5	54	10·52560	1,052 11 3
24	14·88969	1,488 19 5	55	10·30351	1,030 7 –
25	14·85191	1,485 3 10	56	10·08363	1,008 7 3
26	14·80890	1,480 17 10	57	9·86670	986 13 5
27	14·74746	1,474 14 11	58	9·64896	964 17 11
28	14·67951	1,467 19 –	59	9·42649	942 13 –
29	14·60551	1,460 11 –	60	9·19800	919 16 –
30	14·52581	1·452 11 8	61	8·95666	895 13 4
31	14·44054	1,444 1 1	62	8·70132	870 2 8
32	14·35005	1,435 – 1	63	8·43435	843 8 8
33	14·25257	1,425 5 2	64	8·16571	816 11 5
34	14·14731	1,414 14 8	65	7·89583	789 11 8
35	14·03442	1,403 8 10	66	7·62437	762 8 9
36	13·91478	1,391 9 6	67	7·37082	737 1 8
37	13·79016	1,379 – 4	68	7·11881	711 17 8
38	13·66060	1,366 1 2	69	6·86850	686 17 –
39	13·52738	1,352 14 9	70	6·62170	662 3 5
40	13·38854	1,338 17 1	71	6·38068	638 1 4
41	13·24313	1,324 6 3	72	6·14448	614 8 11
42	13·08568	1,308 11 4	73	5·90561	590 11 3
43	12·92050	1,292 1 –	74	5·65540	565 10 10
44	12·74483	1,274 9 8	75	5·39538	539 10 9
45	12·55834	1,255 16 8	76	5·12566	512 11 4
46	12·36096	1,236 1 11	77	4·81532	481 10 8
47	12·14690	1,214 13 10	78	4·50565	450 11 3
48	11·92339	1,192 6 9	79	4·20762	420 15 3
49	11·69128	1,169 2 7	80	3·91477	391 9 6
50	11·45362	1,145 7 3			

TABLE showing the Number which will survive at the Ages undermentioned out of 100,000 Males of the Age of 20 Years, according to the Law of Mortality which is the basis of the preceding Table.

AGE.	Number Surviving.
20 - - - - - -	100,000
30 - - - - - -	87,507
32 - - - - - -	85,310
40 - - - - - -	77,005
46 - - - - - -	70,962
50 - - - - - -	67,051
54 - - - - - -	62,137
60 - - - - - -	52,621

National Debt Office,
17 July 1867.

Alexander Glen Finlaison,
Actuary of the National Debt.

App. No. 9.

TABLE showing the Number of Years' Purchase, and also the Price in Cash, of an ANNUITY of £. 100 on the LIFE of a MALE of an Age undermentioned; the Interest of Money being taken after the Rate of SIX PER CENT. per Annum payable half-yearly, and the Law of Mortality being that adopted for the Tables regulating the Grant of Annuities on Male Lives at the National Debt Office.

Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.	Age.	Number of Years' Purchase.	Present Value of the Annuity of £. 100.
		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
20	13·21716	1,321 14 4	51	10·25251	1,025 5 –
21	13·16936	1,316 18 9	52	10·05787	1,005 15 9
22	13·14346	1,314 6 11	53	9·86440	986 8 10
23	13·12289	1,312 5 9	54	9·67436	967 8 9
24	13·10323	1,310 6 6	55	9·48710	948 14 2
25	13·08211	1,308 4 3	56	9·30135	930 2 8
26	13·05696	1,305 13 11	57	9·11782	911 15 8
27	13·01511	1,301 10 2	58	8·93307	893 6 2
28	12·96973	1,296 19 6	59	8·74346	874 6 11
29	12·91849	1,291 17 –	60	8·54773	854 15 6
30	12·86260	1,286 5 2	61	8·33943	833 18 10
31	12·80212	1,280 4 3	62	8·11731	811 14 8
32	12·73736	1,273 14 8	63	7·88343	788 6 10
33	12·66670	1,266 13 4	64	7·64703	764 14 1
34	12·58941	1,258 18 10	65	7·40847	740 16 11
35	12·50557	1,250 11 2	66	7·16739	716 14 9
36	12·41591	1,241 11 10	67	6·94224	694 4 6
37	12·32198	1,232 4 –	68	6·71770	671 15 5
38	12·22380	1,222 7 7	69	6·49394	649 7 10
39	12·12250	1,212 5 –	70	6·27270	627 5 4
40	12·01629	1,201 12 7	71	6·05620	605 12 5
41	11·90429	1,190 8 7	72	5·84363	584 7 3
42	11·78150	1,178 3 –	73	5·62787	562 15 8
43	11·65172	1,165 3 5	74	5·40060	540 1 2
44	11·51237	1,151 4 9	75	5·16317	516 6 4
45	11·36307	1,136 6 1	76	4·91557	491 11 2
46	11·20362	1,120 7 3	77	4·62780	462 15 7
47	11·02864	1,102 17 3	78	4·33929	433 18 7
48	10·84454	1,084 9 1	79	4·06063	406 1 3
49	10·65200	1,065 4 –	80	3·78571	378 11 5
50	10·45371	1,045 7 5			

National Debt Office,
24 July 1867.

Alexander Glen Finlaison,
Actuary of the National Debt.

THE Present Values, according to the Government Life Annuity Tables, of an ANNUITY of £. 100 on a MALE LIFE of an Age undermentioned, where the Rate of Interest is respectively FOUR, FIVE, or SIX PER CENT. per Annum.

Age.	At Four per Cent.	At Five per Cent.	At Six per Cent.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
20	1,743 11 4	1,506 17 3	1,321 14 4
25	1,708 14 11	1,485 3 10	1,308 4 3
30	1,659 18 2	1,452 11 8	1,286 5 2
35	1,591 6 5	1,403 8 10	1,250 11 2
40	1,504 19 2	1,338 17 1	1,201 12 7
45	1,398 5 2	1,255 16 8	1,136 6 1
50	1,262 12 4	1,145 7 3	1,045 7 5
55	1,124 10 10	1,030 7 –	948 14 2
60	993 11 8	919 16 –	854 15 6
65	843 19 3	789 11 8	740 16 11
70	700 9 1	662 3 5	627 5 4
75	564 11 5	539 10 9	516 6 4
80	405 3 2	391 9 6	378 11 5

National Debt Office,
24 July 1867.

Alexander Glen Finlaison,
Actuary of the National Debt.

I N D E X

TO THE

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT).

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
26 *July* 1867.

482—I.

I N D E X.

[*N.B.*—In this Index the Figures following the Names of the Witnesses refer to the Questions in the Evidence; those following *App.* to the Pages in the Appendix; and the Numerals following *Rep.* to the Pages in the Report.]

A.

ACADEMY (*WOOLWICH*). See *Age of Entry. Examinations.*

Adye, Colonel John M., C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has considered the question of retirement and promotion in the Royal Artillery, and has prepared a paper on the subject, which he submits to the Committee, 1449–1452, and *App.* 138–144——Enumeration of the several causes of the the present unsatisfactory condition of the corps in regard to promotion and efficiency, 1453, 1454. 1459——Insufficiency of the number of general officers as compared with the rest of the army; claim to an addition of six more major generals, 1454–1456. 1459. 1491–1498——Want of a limit of service at the top of the list of colonels; proposition hereon for retiring every officer after 40 years' service on a pension of 600*l.* a year, with a bonus of 350*l.*; 1454. 1456, 1457. 1459. 1464. 1469, 1470. 1485. 1514.

Inadequacy of the present grant for retiring allowances in the Artillery, whilst the appropriation is defective, 1454—— Great clog to future promotions on account of the comparatively young age of officers in the higher ranks, *ib.*—— Suggestions for a graduated scale of pensions, with a small bonus in each case, to be given according to length of service, 1457. 1460–1471. 1487. 1507–1517——Proposal that on retirement an honorary step in rank be given, 1457. 1472, 1473——Suggestion that officers should enter the corps at about eighteen years of age, 1457——Also that the establishment of subalterns should not be kept full in time of peace, 1457. 1518, 1519.

Witness reads an extract from the paper before referred to, in elucidation of his views on the subject of promotion, 1458, 1459——Suggestion that two officers, of from fifteen to twenty years' service, be allowed to retire annually without pension, but with a bonus of 1,000*l.*; 1460–1462. 1471. 1511–1513——Examination to the effect that witness has not calculated the cost of his scheme, it being impossible to ascertain the number of officers who would avail themselves of it, 1474–1490. 1514–1517——Anticipation that the proposed scale of pensions, together with a bonus in each case, will have a very salutary and equable effect as regards future promotion and efficiency, without leading to any undue expense, 1474–1489. 1514–1517 —— Facility of calculating the relative amounts of pension after forty years' service and after thirty years or twenty years, 1490. 1507–1510.

Statement that promotion in the Royal Artillery is not at present impeded or prejudiced by the promotion of subalterns in the Bengal Artillery, 1499, 1500——Grounds for concluding that there is a claim upon the Indian Government to pay towards the pensions of officers of the Royal Artillery serving in India, 1501–1503——Opinion as to the unduly large number of officers of the unmanned batteries serving in India, though it can hardly be said that they are employed in duties alien to those of the Royal Artillery, 1504–1506——With regard to the proportion of subalterns in the corps, there is great elasticity in this respect in the French service, 1520–1522.

AGE OF ENTRY:

Impression that between 1820 and 1826 there were some Artillery cadets who did not get their commissions for some years after leaving the Academy, *Gambier* 132, 133——Average of about twenty-one years of age at which Artillery officers have obtained commissions since 1860, whereas in former years the average of age was four years younger, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 578–580——Entire efficiency of the officers who formerly entered the service at the age of sixteen or seventeen, though their mathematical attainments were, as a rule, much less than are possessed by young men now entering the service, *ib.* 580, 581. 641–643.

Facilities for the acquisition of superior scientific attainments after young men have entered the service, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 581, 582; *Major General Dickson* 1377 ——Conclusion that the mischiefs likely to arise from a late age of entry to the service are not counterbalanced by the advanced attainments on entry, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 581–583——Opinion that eighteen rather than twenty-one should be the age of

Report, 1867—*continued.*

AGE OF ENTRY—continued.

entry to the Artillery; practice hereon in the French army, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 625-627——Suggestion that if the age for entering the Artillery were lowered, ample mathematical attainments may be secured in a sufficient number of officers by providing that certain appointments shall only be held by officers having special qualifications, *ib.* 638–641.

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Opinion in favour of reducing the age of entry to the Academy to the old standard, *Gambier* 1060-1062——Approval of placing the age for entering the Academy at from fifteen to seventeen, *Keane* 1135-1139. 1168–1170. 1189-1196; *Major General Dickson* 1427, 1428——Objection to the time at the Academy counting towards retirement, *Keane* 1239, 1240.

Conclusion that the advantages to be gained by young men obtaining their commissions at the age of eighteen would more than compensate for the loss of the high standard of examination under the present system, *Major General Dickson* 1350–1354. 1377–1383. 1413–1415——The present average age of getting commissions is about twenty-one or twenty-two, *ib.* 1350. 1423.

Suggestion that officers should enter the Artillery at about eighteen years of age, *Adye* 1457——Grounds for the conclusion that it would be better if young men entered the Artillery at the age of eighteen, though with less theoretical acquirements than at the present age of twenty-one or twenty-two, *Biddulph* 1580–1591. 1593–1597. 1636–1646——Statement to the effect that the age of entering the Academy might be advantageously reduced, *ib.* 1636–1642.

Opinion in favour of Engineer officers entering the service at eighteen rather than twenty-one or twenty-two years of age, *Ewart* 1723–1729. 1777–1782——Means by which advanced attainments might, if necessary, be acquired after joining the regiment, *ib.* 1729–1732.

Evidence in favour of cadets entering the Academy at from fifteen to seventeen years of age, though this would involve the necessity of lowering the examinations which are now very severe, *Duke of Cambridge* 1866, 1867. 1942–1946.

List of the six senior colonels of engineers (1866), showing their age on entering the Royal Military Academy, the time they remained at the Academy, and the time between passing their examinations and being gazetted to the Royal Engineers, *App.* 115.

Returns of the age at which each of the six senior officers of Artillery and of Engineers in each rank from colonel downwards in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866 entered the Academy; the time they remained at the Academy, and the time between passing their examination and being gazetted to the Royal Artillery, *App.* 124–128.

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See also *Examinations.*

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65¼ years

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AGES OF OFFICERS—continued.

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Army Reserve Fund. Disapproval of the use made of the reserve fund at the War Office in connection with the sale of commissions in the Artillery and Engineers, *Duke of Cambridge* 1930–1932. 1951–1957.

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Memorandum

Report, 1867—*continued.*

ARTILLERY—continued.

Memorandum on the probable position of the officers of the old Royal Artillery in respect to length of service in the years 1875, 1880, and 1885, and the number of retirements that will be necessary if no colonel is continued on the effective list beyond forty years' service; the retirements to be such that no officer shall be a captain beyond twenty-seven years' service, or a lieutenant colonel beyond thirty-four years' service, *App.* 129–134.

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See also *Age of Entry. Ages of Officers. Age Retirements. Annual Retirements. Bonus on Retirement. Captains. Colonels. Commutation of Pensions. Compulsory Retirement. Cost of Retirements. Death Vacancies. General Officers. Half-Pay. India. Lieutenant Colonels. Promotion. Purchase. Reserved List. Sale of Commissions. Seconding of Officers. Service Retirements. Subalterns. Voluntary Retirement.*

B.

Biddulph, Lieutenant Colonel, R. A. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was for some time military secretary to the Commander in Chief at Madras; has considered the question of retirement in the Artillery, 1523–1527——Very unsatisfactory operation at present of the system adopted in 1854, the condition of the regiment as to the age of the several officers having greatly altered in the interval, 1528–1530——Great improvement since 1854 in the state of the upper ranks on the score of age, 1529, 1530——Want of improvement, more especially in the rank of lieutenant, in which rank the age has increased since 1854; 1529–1531.

Approval of compulsory retirement in the upper ranks at the age of sixty, though this by itself would be far short of what is required, 1532–1547. 1621–1625——Statement in favour of a well-matured scheme of optional retirement after twenty years' service, conjointly with compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, 1548–1567. 1620–1627——Insufficiency of half-pay retirement after twenty-five years' service, 1548–1553——Suggestion that reference be made to the Indian pension rules in fixing the retiring rates, 1553–1555.

Statement explanatory of the arrangements made as to the skeleton or unmanned batteries at the time of the amalgamation of the Indian and Imperial regiments, 1568–1579——Unfavourable effect as regards future promotion by reason of the excess of officers in respect of the unmanned batteries; question hereon whether the lieutenants might not be reduced in the meantime, 1574–1579. 1592.

Grounds for the conclusion that it would be better if young men entered the regiment at the age of eighteen, though with less theoretical acquirements, than at the present age of twenty-one or twenty-two, 1580–1591. 1593–1597. 1636–1646——Statement that the Artillery education is very little learnt at the Academy, 1588. 1593, 1594——Absence of any legal claim of Artillery officers to a retiring allowance unless they have served twenty-five years, 1598–1606. 1615–1618. 1654——Regulation that when an officer is retired on temporary half-pay his promotion is stopped; exception taken thereto, 1607–1620.

Circumstance of there being no unattached or half-pay list for the Artillery, like that for the rest of the service, 1616, 1617. 1647–1649——Advantage of retirement having reference to age rather than length of service, 1622–1625——Approval of a bonus as an inducement to retirement on twenty years' service, 1628–1631. 1655–1659——Opinion as to the necessity of three subalterns for each field battery, 1632–1635.

Question considered whether the age of entering the Academy might not be advantageously reduced, 1636–1642——Severity of the examinations at the Academy, the effect being to increase the age, 1643–1646——Circumstance of a colonel of Artillery going on half-pay being able to sell his commission, 1650–1653——Necessity of Artillery officers, notwithstanding the high standard of examination, going through the staff college in the same way as infantry officers before getting on the staff, 1666.

BONUS ON RETIREMENT:

Advantage if officers were allowed to subscribe privately in order to provide retirement bonuses, with a view to their own promotion, *Brigadier General Lefroy*, 504——Evidence in explanation and support of witness's proposition that the junior officers in the Artillery should be permitted to provide a bonus fund as an inducement to officers to retire at an earlier period than at present, or after fifteen years' service, *ib.* 524 *et seq.* 595–604 *et seq.*——Willingness expressed by about 330 of the captains and

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lieutenants to contribute to a bonus fund, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 526——Inducement to many of the younger officers to retire, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of an annuity, *ib.* 528——Advantage if portion of the sum allowed for retirements in the higher grades were appropriated as bonuses in the lower grades, *ib.* 534–545. 551–562. 572.

Insufficiency of 1,500 *l.* as an inducement to officers to retire after fifteen years' service; probability, however, that there would always be a few officers willing to retire for such sum, *Brigadier General Lefroy,* 545. 549–562——Benefit rather than detriment by the operation of a bonus fund, as the less zealous officers would be the most likely to accept it, *ib.* 573–577——Readiness expressed by a large number of Artillery officers to contribute 10 *l.* a year to a bonus fund; belief that this would be fully compensated in their earlier promotion, *ib.* 596–603——Distinction between the mode of contribution proposed by witness and the proposal to contribute 10 *l.* a year, *ib.* 597, 598——Necessity of a trial of the bonus system for some years in order to prove how it will work, *ib.* 603.

Contemplated provision of a bonus fund by Government and also by the officers, the arrangement being voluntary rather than compulsory in the latter case, *Brigadier General Lefroy,* 604. 618–622——Opinion as to the facility of preventing the payment of much larger bonuses than the prescribed amount, *ib.* 607–610——Belief that no bad feeling would arise through some officers not contributing though sharing in the advantages, *ib.* 620–622. 695, 696——Broad distinction between the bonus system proposed by witness for the Artillery and the purchase system in the Line, *ib.* 632, 633. 696, 697.

Necessity of the proposed system being recognised by the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief, though at present there is no actual regulation against its voluntary adoption, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 634–637——Though there have been numerous assents some officers have dissented, *ib.* 634——Consideration of objections to witness's proposition as involving the retirement of efficient officers; improvement nevertheless in the general efficiency of the corps, *ib.* 652–662. 697.

Objection to a bonus system as an incentive to retirement in the Engineers, *Keane* 1256–1259.

Explanation of witness's scheme for granting a pension and a bonus conjointly on retirement after different periods of service, *Adye* 1457. 1460–1471——Suggestion that two officers of from fifteen to twenty years' service be allowed to retire annually without pension, but with a bonus of 1,000 *l.*, *ib.* 1460–1462. 1471. 1511–1513——Approval of a bonus as an inducement to retirement on twenty years' service in the Artillery, *Biddulph* 1628–1631. 1655–1659.

Disapproval of a bonus contribution by officers as an incentive to retirement, *Duke of Cambridge* 1862.

Disapproval by the Committee of a bonus fund created by the officers, as involving the evils of the purchase system, *Rep.* v——Objection to combining a small bonus with a reduced rate of pension, both to be provided by the State, *ib.*

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Burgoyne, General Sir John, Bart., G.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Considers that at present no great inconvenience arises from the ages of the senior colonels in the Engineers, but that unless there be some amended system of retirement, great inconvenience will be experienced in the future, 1178–1183—— If there be a compulsory age retirement as a rule, there should be power to make exceptions, 1181 ——With regard to the seconding of officers, it is very advantageous to the corps, 1184.

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Cambridge, His Royal Highness the Duke of, K. G. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Considers that the present system of retirement in the Ordnance corps is extremely unsatisfactory, 1839–1842——There is no proper flow of promotion in the junior ranks, whilst in the higher ranks it is altogether accidental whether the retirements are accepted by efficient or inefficient men, 1841, 1842——It would be infinitely preferable if after a certain age or length of service every officer might retire, instead of retirement depending upon a limited fund, 1842, 1843. 1865.

Approval of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, or after thirty-eight years' service, 1844–1846. 1869. 1925—— Proposal that after twenty years' service every officer should have the option to retire, 1847–1849——Careful consideration necessary in fixing the amount of retirement after twenty years' service, 1849–1851——Expediency of improving the rate of retired pay at the centre rather than at the top of the list, 1852.

Approval of the present retirement of 600 *l.* a year, together with a step in rank, being maintained in the case of colonels compulsorily retired at the age of sixty, 1852–1854. 1880——Contemplated establishment also of a separate list for colonels at the age of

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of sixty, on which list they should have a claim to succeed to the major generals' establishment, and the command of battalions, 1855–1857. 1880. 1882–1890.

Advantage if officers retiring after twenty or twenty-five years could commute their annuities, though this would exempt them from any further claim on their services, 1858–1860. 1870. 1879. 1926, 1927. 1958, 1959——Importance of the Commander in Chief being free to dispense with the services of any officer; expediency on this score of a retiring allowance after twenty years' service, 1861. 1871, 1872. 1877, 1878. 1891–1896. ——Disapproval of a bonus contribution by officers as an incentive to retirement, 1862 ——Hardship in officers who are permanently disabled by ill-health not being placed on permanent half-pay, 1863, 1864——Inexpediency of half-pay being considered as a means of promotion, 1865. 1877, 1878. 1933, 1934.

Evidence in favour of cadets entering the Academy at from fifteen to seventeen years of age, though this would involve the necessity of lowering the examinations, which are now very severe, 1866, 1867. 1942–1946——Preference, on the whole, for the test of service rather than of age, as the basis of retirement, 1869. 1925——Satisfaction expressed with the present system in regard to the seconding of officers, 1873–1876——Approval of a step in honorary rank on retirement, 1881——Decided objection to any reduction in the number of subalterns attached to garrison brigades, 1897. 1947–1949.

Absolute necessity of the unmanned batteries of artillery in India, 1898. 1901. 1950 ——Practice in India as to officers of manned batteries being allowed to take civil employments or going into the staff corps; effect as regards promotion, 1899–1903—— Advantage in some respects if colonels of Artillery employed in semi-civil duties were seconded, 1904–1906——Expediency of the military authorities having the power of retaining in command any colonel of Artillery or Engineers on arriving at the fixed age for retirement, 1907–1909.

Conclusion that the same appointments should be open to colonels on the proposed separate list, as to the general officrs, 1910–1914. 1923——Objection to colonels on the separate list holding appointments as colonels on the staff of the various districts, or holding the commands at Aldershot, &c., 1914–1923——Expediency of liberality in the way of half-pay on medical certificate, 1924——Disadvantage as regards promotion, if efficient officers who have been on half-pay through ill-health were brought back into active service, having recovered their health, 1928, 1929.

Disapproval of the use made of the reserve fund at the War Office in connection with the sale of commissions in the Artillery and Engineers, 1930–1932. 1951–1957——Concurrence in the suggestion that officers placed upon the half-pay list for wounds, who should return to active service within two years, should share in the promotion whilst on half-pay; objection to this concession in the case of half-pay through sickness, 1935–1941——Difficulty as regards seniority, if the Artillery were subdivided into separate regiments with a view to increasing the flow of promotion, 1960.

Captains (*Artillery and Engineers*). Decrease in the ages of the senior captains of Engineers owing to the operation of the warrant of 1854, *Keane* 66, 67—— Captains should be retired at the age of fifty upon the pay and rank of lieutenant colonels, *Galton* 219, 220. 259–260. 313. 330. 360, 361——Special importance attached to a limit of age in the case of Artillery captains, witness proposing to fix the maximum age at forty-seven, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 532, 533——Examination relative to the probable number of officers between twenty-eight and forty years' service in the year 1885, after allowing for deaths in the meantime; question hereon as to the number of retirements necessary in order to bring the senior captains down to twenty-seven years' service, *ib.* 664–694.

It will take nineteen years to get through the rank of first captain of Artillery according to the rate of promotion in the last five years, *Gambier* 712——Calculation that under witness's scheme subalterns of Artillery would become second captains in about ten years, and first captains in about seventeen years; great importance of the latter rank being reached in this period, *Major General Dickson* 1292, 1293. 1321–1326.

Statement of the ages and length of service of the six senior captains of Artillery, Engineers, and Marines in 1826, 1836, 1846, 1856, and 1866, *App.* 101, 102. 110. 116, 117.

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Captains (*Marines*). Average reduction since 1854 of two or three years in the ages of the captains of Marines, *Admiral Dacres* 799–804——Large augmention of the Marines since 1854; this, however, not having the effect of increasing the age of the captains, *ib.* 815–821.

Civil Employment. Restrictions as to the military service of engineer officers counting when they obtain civil employment; hardship experienced, as in the case of Captain Tyler, *Keane* 1157–1165, 1171, 1172——Precaution taken by the Treasury that an officer in civil employment does not receive military half-pay and full salary in his civil

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capacity, *Keane* 1201–1204——Regulations as to the military time of officers who accept civil employment counting towards retiring allowance, *ib.* 1209–1214.

Suggestions for facilitating the entire transfer to the civil service of seconded officers, or officers who have held civil appointments for ten years, *Ewart* 1700–1705.

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Colonels (Artillery and Engineers):

Regulations in regard to the retirement allowance of 600*l.* a year for regimental colonels of Artillery after thirty years' service, *Gambier* 18–26 ——Nature of the inducement to senior colonels to remain in the service rather than accept the full pay retirement of 600*l.* a year, *ib.* 41–51——Circumstance of younger men than those at the top of the list sometimes taking the retirement on account of the senior officers declining to do so, *ib.* 49–52.

Considerable increase since 1826 in the age of the senior colonels of Engineers, *Keane* 62, 63——Delay before some of the present colonels of Engineers got their commissions after leaving the Academy, *ib.* 71, 72. 128, 129.

Suggestion that every colonel of Artillery and Engineers be retired at the age of sixty or sixty-two on the pay of a major general and with a step in rank, *Galton* 204–211. 257——Contemplated retention of the present voluntary retirement of 600*l.* a year, in addition to the proposed retirements on major general's pay; it might, however, be preferable to have but one system, and that compulsory, *ib.* 223–232. 331——Examination upon the question of retired colonels rising to the rank of major general on a separate list (as proposed by Colonel Herbert), and being eligible for employment as general officers after the age of sixty; objections to this plan considered, *ib.* 285–293. 374–376. 406–412. 421–435.

Very satisfactory position of the colonels in the Artillery at the present time; comparatively early age at which a liberal retirement may be claimed, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 457–463——Opinion favourable to a fixed age for retirement in the rank of colonel, *ib.* 465–470. 480——Other causes besides the retiring allowances of 600*l.* a year to which the present favourable position of the Artillery colonels is owing, *ib.* 517–519 ——Less probability of the retirement of 600*l.* a year being taken by the senior colonels in the Artillery than by the junior colonels, *ib.* 592–594.

Proposition that it should be open to Artillery officers removed after thirty-eight years' service to retire absolutely upon 700*l.* a year, with a step of honorary rank, or to remain upon their present pay and be entitled to succeed to battalions, *Gambier* 968–974. 997–1033. 1068–1079.

Suggestion that every colonel of Engineers at the age of sixty must either elect to retire on 600*l.* a year, or be removed to a separate list on 478*l.* a year, and there await his promotion, *Keane* 1114–1122. 1126–1128——Proposal, further, that colonels after fifty-three years' service be eligible for retirement on 600*l.* a year, *ib.* 1117–1123.

Grounds for objecting to the proposed compulsory retirement of Artillery colonels at the age of sixty to a list whence they might be eligible to succeed to battalions, or to be employed on the staff, *Major General Dickson* 1302–1304. 1308. 1327–1344. 1434–1437.

Proposed removal of colonels of Engineers at the age of sixty to a list whence they might be eligible for staff appointments, and succeed to the rank of major generals, that is, unless they accepted 600*l.* a year with a step in rank, *Ewart* 1681–1693. 1721, 1722, 1753–1762. 1783, 1784——Proposed optional retirement of colonels at the age of fifty-three with 600*l.* a year and a step in rank, *ib.* 1694–1696.

Approval of the present retirement of 600*l.* a year, together with a step in rank, being maintained in the case of colonels compulsorily retired at the age of sixty, *Duke of Cambridge* 1852–1854. 1880——Contemplated establishment also of a separate list for colonels at the age of sixty, on which list they should have a claim to succeed to the major generals' establishment and the command of battalions, *ib.* 1855–1857. 1880. 1882–1890.

Returns of the age and length of service of the six senior colonels in the Artillery, Engineers, and Marines at decimal periods since 1826, *App.* 101, 102. 110. 116, 117.

Conclusions of the Committee in favour of every colonel of Artillery or Engineers being placed on a reserved list at the age of sixty, or being retired on 600*l.* a year with a step in rank, *Rep.* vi.

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Colonels Commandant (Artillery).

Total of seventeen colonels commandant of battalions, all of whom are general officers, and get 1,000*l.* a year, *Gambier* 42, 43. 56–59——Instance at the present time of an officer who has held the rank of colonel commandant for twenty years, *Brigadier General Lefroy*, 659.

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Colonels Commandant (*Marines*). Insufficiency of the retirement of 700 *l.* a year as an inducement as to colonels commandant to retire from the Marines, *Admiral Dacres* 809–814——Contemplated increase in the retiring allowance of a colonel second commandant of Marines after thirty years' service *ib.* 823–833. 835.

Command of Battalions (*Artillery and Engineers*). Consideration of the subject of officers retired at the age of sixty, going on to the list of major generals, and of their succeeding to the command of battalions, according to their seniority as colonels, *Galton* 233–243. 247–250. 254–256. 285–291. 314–320. 406–412. 421–435——Practice now to select officers from the major general's list for the command of battalions according to army rank, *ib.* 244–246. 251–253——Expediency of all appointments to the command of battalions being by merit, *ib.* 377–379——Effect of Captain Galton's scheme that officers would get up to the full pay retired list of colonels better than at present, but would rarely succeed to the command of a battalion, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 474–477.

Evidence in favour of colonels if compulsorily retired, having the option of being placed on a separate list, where they might succeed to the command of battalions, *Keane* 1114–1122. 1126–1128; *Gambier* 968–974. 997–1033. 1068–1079; *Ewart* 1681–1693. 1733–1762——Contemplated claim on the part of officers to succeed to the command of battalions if they were retired at the age of sixty, and elected to be placed on a reserved or separate list, *Duke of Cambridge* 1855–1857. 1880. 1882–1890.

Commandants of Divisions (*Marines*). Practice occasionally to apply some pressure in order to cause the retirement of inefficient officers, that is, by not appointing them to commands of divisions, *Admiral Dacres* 743–760. 891–893. 921–930——In witness's experience, no officer has been passed over for appointment to a division, *Major General Langley* 921–923——Further explanation relative to, and in defence of, the practice in the selection or appointment of commandants, *Admiral Dacres* 895–906. 919–934.

Commutation of Pensions:

Advantages of the proposition of Colonel Percy Herbert for giving officers a lump sum of money in lieu of a pension for retiring after a certain number of years, *Galton* 262–269. 294–312——Contemplated commutation of retiring pensions in connection only with a compulsory system, *ib.* 369–373——Question as to the principle upon which the sum to be applied in commutation of retiring allowance should be determined; system of purchase involved in this proposal, *ib.* 386–389——Disadvantage in the bonus sum for voluntary retirement being fixed so high as strongly to induce many good officers in sound health to retire, *ib.* 403–405.

Approval of officers being allowed to commute the annual retiring allowance, and to take lump sum down, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 485–493——Objection to an annuity being commuted into a smaller sum than the real capital value; thus an annuity of 100 *l.* at thirty-five years of age should represent, not 1,500 *l.*, but 1,700 *l.*, *ib.* 567–571.

Approval of officers being allowed to commute their annuities for a fixed sum, *Admiral Dacres* 885–890; *Ewart* 1713——Proposal that officers retiring under thirty-eight years' service be empowered to capitalise their pensions at three-fourths of their value, *Gambier* 974–981. 1053–1055——Contemplated commutation of the proposed pensions upon their full amount, *Keane* 1119–1134——Power of officers on half-pay to capitalise their annuities, *ib.* 1246, 1247——Extra inducement to retirement if a lump sum were obtainable, *Ewart* 1713–1716; *Major General Langley* 1836–1838.

Advantage if officers retiring after twenty or twenty-five years could commute their annuities, though this would exempt them from any further claim on their services, *Duke of Cambridge* 1858–1860. 1870–1879. 1926, 1927. 1958, 1959.

Introduction of a new principle into the administration of the National Debt Office if it had to commute for a fixed sum the pensions of military officers, *Sir A. Spearman* 1963, 1964——Conclusion as to its being perfectly feasible to carry into practice the proposed commutation, it being essential to have proper medical assistance in order to test the state of health in each case, *ib.* 1964–1966. 1975, 1976. 1998–2001.

Explanation of the principle upon which the tables used in the calculation of Government annuities were framed, *Finlaison* 1968, 1969——Opinion that the National Debt Office might make itself safe against loss in the purchase of military pensions, by assuming an increased rate of interest in conjunction with a medical scrutiny, *ib.* 1970–1974, 2002.

Expediency of the commutation taking place at the time of the officer leaving his regiment, *Sir A. Spearman* 1977——Advantage if persons of the standing of the Exchequer Loan Commissioners were associated with witness in carrying out the proposed commutation, *ib.* 1978–1985.

Simple matter of calculation as to the number of years' purchase which a pension would be worth at any age, assuming the life to be sound; reference to certain tables in

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illustration, *Finlaison* 1997——Less value of the annuity accordingly as the life is less sound, *ib.* 1997——Importance of there being absolute power of refusing to commute, *Sir A. Spearman* 1998–2000——Doubt as to the advantage of applying the commuted pensions annually to the reduction of the National Debt, *Sir A. Spearman and Mr. Finlaison* 2003–2011.

Table showing the number of years' purchase, and also the price in cash of an annuity of 100 *l.* on the life of a person of any age from twenty to fifty years old, the interest money being taken after the rate of five per cent. per annum, payable half-yearly, and the law of mortality being that adopted for the tables regulating the grant of annuities on male lives at the National Debt Office, *App.* 145——Table containing particulars similar to the foregoing, supposing the interest money to be taken at the rate of six per cent., *ib.* 146——Table showing the number which will survive at different ages out of 100,000 males of the age of twenty years, according to the law of mortality, which is the basis of the preceding tables, *ib.* 145.

Statement of the present values, according to the Government Life Annuity tables of an annuity of 100 *l.* on a male life of an age from twenty up to eighty, where the rate of interest is respectively four, five, or six per cent. per annum, *App.* 146.

Conclusions of the Committee favourable to a power in officers to compound their annuities or pensions, so as ro receive the equivalent in one immediate payment, *Rep.* v, vi——Suggestions as to the mode of carrying out the proposed commutation, *ib.* vi, vii.

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Evidence in favour of compulsory retirement after a certain age; detailed suggestion hereon as to the conditions of compulsory retirement in each rank, *Galton* 179. 182 *et seq.*——Complaints anticipated if a rule as to compulsory retirements in the Artillery and Engineers were liable to relaxation, *ib,* 185——Contemplated retirement, without option, down to the rank of captain, *ib.* 189–199——Question considered as to the operation of a system applying the same age for compulsory retirement in all ranks, *ib.* 271–284——Conclusion as to the advantage of a compulsory system over a volun ry system in regard to the efficiency of the service, *ib.* 322–330. 364–368.

Reasons for preferring a system of compulsory retirement regulated by age rather han by length of service, *Galton* 332–338; *Keane* 1119. 1125. 1166, 1167; *Biddulph* 1022–1625; *Ewart* 1706–1712. 1722——Further approval of but one system of retirement, with reference to age, the special or voluntary retirements being abolished, *Galton* 438–440——Opinion favourable to a fixed age for retirement in the rank of colonel, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 465–470. 480——Expediency in any case of retiring inefficient men by fixing a maximum of age, *ib.* 659.

Approval of compulsory retirement from the Marines at the age of sixty, it being easy to weed out inefficient men before that age by not appointing them to divisions, *Admiral Dacres* 854–867——Expediency in any case of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, *ib.* 950–954——Proposed compulsory retirement of all Artillery officers after thirty-eight years' service, *Gambier* 967, 968.

Concurrence of evidence in favour of the retirement of colonels of Engineers at the age of sixty, or of their being placed on a separate or reserved list on arriving at that age, *Keane* 1114–1122. 1126–1128; *Ewart* 1681–1693. 1733–1762 —— If there be a compulsory age retirement as a rule, there should be a power to make exceptions, *Sir J. Burgoyne* 1181.

Evidence opposed to the compulsory retirement of colonels at the age of sixty, or after a certain period of service, *Major General Dickson* 1301. 1305 *et seq.* 1411, 1412. 1416–1420——Less objection to the compulsory retirement of lieutenant colonels at the age of sixty than of colonels, *ib.* 1384–1389. 1416–1420——At the age of sixty-five, colonels might be fairly required to retire, *ib.* 1390.

Advantage of compulsory retirement in the upper ranks at the age of sixty, though this by itself would be far short of what is required, *Biddulph* 1532–1547. 1621–1625.

Approval of compulsory retirement at the age of sixty, or after thirty-eight years' service, *Duke of Cambridge* 1844–1846. 1869. 1925——Approval, also, of the present retirement of 600 *l.* a year, together with a step in rank, being maintained in the case of colonels compulsorily retired at the age of sixty, *ib.* 1852. 1854–1880——Expediency of the military authorities having the power of retaining in command any colonel of Artillery or Engineers on arriving at the fixed age for retirement, *ib.* 1907–1909.

Conclusion of the Committee that it is not necessary that any officer should be compelled on account of age absolutely to retire from the army, *Rep.* iv——Proposition that colonels or other officers at the age of sixty be retired on 600 *l.* a year, with a step in rank, or be placed on a separate or reserved list, retaining their prospect of succession to the higher grades, *ib.* iv–vi.

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Explanation that witness has not gone into any detailed calculation of the cost to the public by the proposed retirement by age in the rank of colonel, and by length of service in the other ranks; means of arriving at such calculation, *Brigadier General Lefroy* 491–493. 504–512. 520——Large increase required in the sum available for retiring allowances in the Artillery, in order to prevent inefficiency of service some years hence, *ib.* 545–550. 563–566——Calculation as to the greater cost of retirements at the top of the list than of graduated retirements all down the list, *ib.* 660.

Conclusion as to the sufficiency of the fund of 35,000 *l.* a year to meet the different plan of retirement contemplated by witness for the Marines, *Admiral Dacres* 914–918. 945–953——Advantage if the retirement fund were not limited so as to prevent the effectual carrying out of an established system, *ib.* 945–955——Contemplated permissive retirement from the Marines after thirty years' service, independently of any fixed fund, whilst short of such service retirement should depend upon the money being available from such fund, *ib.* 954–964.

Unduly large increase necessary in the amount appropriated to Artillery retirements if continued to be applied on the present system; that is, almost exclusively to full colonels, *Gambier* 725–730——Calculation of the cost of witness's scheme, more especially as regards the compulsory retirement after thirty-eight years' service; slight expense beyond that now incurred, *Gambier* 987, 988. 1093, 1094, and *App.* 136, 137——Considerable increase of allowance involved in witness's proposal for optional retirement after twenty, twenty-five, or thirty years' service; impracticability of calculating the cost of this portion of his scheme, *Gambier* 1041–1059. 1093, 1094.

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TO THE

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT).

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
26 *July* 1867.

482—I.

Under 4 *oz.*

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES);

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
26 *July* 1867.

Tuesday, 26th February 1867.

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the duties performed by the British Army in India and the Colonies; and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies, or to organise a force of Asiatic Troops for general service in suitable climates.

Wednesday, 6th March 1867.

Select Committee nominated of—

Viscount Cranborne.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Childers.	Captain Vivian.
Sir James Fergusson.	Viscount Hamilton.
The Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Laing.
Captain Hayter.	Lord William Hay.
Mr. Oliphant.	Colonel North.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Major Anson.

Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, That Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Wednesday 13*th March* 1867.

Ordered, That Colonel *Percy Herbert* be added to the Committee.

Friday, 26th July 1867.

Ordered, That the Committee have Power to Report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Duties performed by the British Army in *India* and the Colonies; and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Native Indian Army in our Colonial and Military Dependencies, or to organise a Force of Asiatic Troops for General Service in suitable Climates;—— HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:—

YOUR Committee have examined numerous witnesses upon the matters referred to them; and they have also directed that questions should be sent to a number of persons in high official positions in India and the Colonies. It is not possible that all the answers to these questions should arrive in England within the period to which the Session of Parliament ordinarily extends. They have therefore agreed to report the evidence they have taken to the House, and to recommend that the Committee be re-appointed at the commencement of next Session, for the purpose of considering their Report.

26 *July* 1867.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Friday, 8*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Colonel North.
Captain Hayter.	Major Anson.
Lord William Hay.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Childers.	Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Cranborne.	Mr. Oliphant.
Mr. Laing.	Captain Vivian.

Viscount CRANBORNE was called to the Chair.

Colonel *H. W. Norman* examined.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.

Saturday, 9*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Captain Vivian.
Sir James Fergusson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Colonel North.	Captain Hayter.
Lord William Hay.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.	

Order of the House of 8th March giving leave to the Committee to sit this day, notwithstanding the adjournment of the House, read.

Colonel *H. W. Norman*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 12*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Captain Hayter.
Major Anson.	Lord William Hay.
Captain Vivian.	Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.	Sir James Fergusson.

Sir *Walter Elliot* and Colonel *Keys*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

Friday, 15*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir James Fergusson.	Lord William Hay.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.	Mr. Childers.
Captain Hayter.	

Colonel *H. H. Clifford*, V.C., examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 19*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Sir James Fergusson.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.	Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.	Captain Vivian.

Major General *Pears*, Colonel *Probyn*, V.C., Captain *Mends*, R.N., and Lieutenant Colonel *F. M. Baker*, were severally examined.

Lieutenant Colonel *Keyes*, further examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 26*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Marquis of Hartington.
Viscount Hamilton.	Sir James Fergusson.
Mr. Oliphant.	Captain Hayter.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Mr. Childers.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	

Lieutenant General Sir *Hope Grant*, and Sir *Robert Montgomery*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

Friday, 29th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Mr. Laing.
Sir James Fergusson.	Captain Hayter.
Viscount Hamilton.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Oliphant.	

Colonel *Johnson* and Mr. *Thomas Caird*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 2nd April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Viscount Hamilton.	Major Anson.
Lord William Hay.	Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.	Marquis of Hartington.
Sir James Fergusson.	

Sir *George Russell Clerk* and Colonel *Kenneth Mackenzie*, were severally examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

Friday, 5th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Colonel North.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.	Viscount Hamilton.
Major Anson.	

Colonel *Macdonald* and Mr. *Alexander C. Macpherson*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 9th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Lord William Hay.
Major Anson.	Viscount Hamilton.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Oliphant.	Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.	Sir James Fergusson.
Captain Vivian.	

Mr. *Henry Taylor* examined.

The

The Committee deliberated.

Motion made, and Question put, "That printed questions be sent out to witnesses to be selected, upon subjects referred to this Committee"—(Mr. *Chairman*).—The Committee divided.

Ayes, 8.	Noe, 1.
Sir James Fergusson.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Marquis of Hartington.	
Captain Hayter.	
Mr. Oliphant.	
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	
Viscount Hamilton.	
Colonel North.	
Major Anson.	

[Adjourned till Thursday next, at One o'clock.

Thursday, 11*th April* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.	Mr. Laing.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Captain Hayter.
Captain Vivian.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Oliphant.
Colonel North.	Marquis of Hartington.
Viscount Hamilton.	Sir William Russell.

The Committee deliberated.

Several questions to be sent to witnesses, *agreed to.*

Motion made, and Question put, That the following question be sent:—"In case of pressure at home, would it be more advantageous to withdraw European regiments that might be wanted in England from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India, or to withdraw them from India—(Major *Anson*).—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 10.	Noes, 2.
Sir James Fergusson.	Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Oliphant.	
Sir H. Rawlinson.	
Sir William Russell.	
Captain Vivian.	
Viscount Hamilton.	
Lord William Hay.	
Colonel North.	
Major Anson.	

Several other questions agreed to.

[Adjourned till Friday, 3rd May, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 7th May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major ANSON in the Chair.

Colonel North.	Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Oliphant.

Captain *Mends*, R.N., further examined.

Lieutenant Colonel *Shadwell* examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 14*th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Sir James Fergusson.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Vivian.	Colonel North.
Captain Hayter.	Mr. Laing.
Lord William Hay.	Marquis of Hartington.

Sir *Robert Montgomery* further examined.

Mr. *E. B. de Fonblanque* and Colonel *Charles Gordon*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

Friday, 17*th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Colonel North.	Viscount Hamilton.
Mr. Laing.	Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	Marquis of Hartington.
Sir James Fergusson.	Sir William Russell.
Mr. Oliphant.	

His Royal Highness the Duke of *Cambridge* (attending by permission of the House of Lords) examined.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at One o'clock.

Tuesday, 21*st May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Mr. Laing.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Childers.	Sir James Fergusson.
Major Anson.	Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.	Mr. Oliphant.
Sir H. Rawlinson.	

Mr. *Ross D. Mangles*, Sir *Henry Storks*, and Major General *Kavanagh*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 12th July, at One o'clock.

Friday, 12*th July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Captain Hayter.
Colonel North.	Sir James Fergusson.
Lord William Hay.	

The Lord *Strathnairn*, attending by permission of the House of Lords, examined.

[Adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.

Tuesday, 16*th July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel North.
Major Anson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.

[No quorum being present, the Committee was adjourned till Tuesday next, at Twelve o'clock.]

Tuesday, 23*rd July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Lord William Hay.	Sir James Fergusson.
Captain Vivian.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Captain Hayter.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.	Viscount Hamilton.

Major-General *Balfour*, examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

Friday, 26*th July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Viscount CRANBORNE in the Chair.

Lord William Hay.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Captain Hayter.	Viscount Hamilton.
Major Anson.	Sir James Fergusson.

Major-General *Balfour*, further examined.

DRAFT REPORT proposed by the Chairman, read the first and second time, and *agreed to.*

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence and Appendix.

EXPENSES OF WITNESS.

Name of Witness.	Profession or Condition.	From whence Summoned.	Number of Days Absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during Absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses allowed to Witness.
				£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
James M. Macdonald - -	Colonel (Ceylon Rifles).	Edinburgh -	3	7 10 -	3 3 -	10 13 -

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MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Captain Hayter.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Laing.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Marquis of Hartington.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Lord William Hay.	Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, C.B., called in; and Examined.

1. *Chairman.*] WHAT office do you hold?—I am Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

2. How long have you held that office?—For five years.

3. Major *Anson.*] Can you give the Committee the numbers of the native army in India, in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay?—The number will be found slightly to vary in any return that you obtain; but according to the latest information that I have had access to, the following was a return of all the ranks of the army in India, exclusive of commissioned officers. Bengal army Proper, 34,890 British soldiers; 45,376 natives. Punjaub frontier force, 11,770 natives. Madras army, 11,576 British soldiers; 29,964 natives. Bombay army, 11,746 British soldiers; 25,452 natives. Hyderabad Contingent, 7,807 natives. Contingents in Rajpootana (including a regiment of Bengal cavalry temporarily under the Governor General's agent), 4,581; the Governor General's body-guard, 127; and the Resident's escort in Nepaul, 94; making a total of 58,212 British soldiers, and 125,171 native soldiers; but the Hyderabad Contingent and the Rajpootana Contingent, I would remark, are maintained under treaties, and are paid for to some extent by the native states.

4. Colonel *North.*] They are included in the total you have given?—Yes; they were separately specified.

5. *Chairman.*] Is not the Hydrabad Contingent entirely paid for by the native state?—A territory is made over which is to cover the expense of it. The Indian establishment of British troops is as follows, exclusive of depôts in England: 20 batteries of horse artillery, consisting of 2,929 men; field and garrison artillery, 8,930 men; eleven regiments of cavalry, 5,069 men; 52 regiments of infantry, 44,744 men. There would seem, therefore, on the 1st of October last to have been 3,460 British soldiers wanting to complete the establishment in India.

6. Major *Anson.*] Can you give the Committee the different races of which the native army is composed?—It is rather a long detail.

7. Will you put it in?—An exact return could be obtained from the India Office with regard to each regiment; it is sent home from India periodically; I could give in a general way the composition of each of the armies; perhaps the Committee would wish me to read out the composition of one branch of the service.

8. *Chairman.*] Which branch do you propose to take?—Perhaps, I had better take the Bengal Infantry, which is the largest branch. The composition of the 49 regiments of the Bengal Infantry under the orders of the Commander in Chief, is as follows: 283 Christians——

9. What does that mean?—Most of them are East Indian, I apprehend.

10. Are they natives?—Yes, some few are native Christians.

11. Are there any Karens?—Not in the native army; there are 2,539 Hindoostanee Mahommedans, 2,622 Hindoostanee Brahmins, 3,924 Hindoostanee Rajpoots, 1,007 Jats, 66 Mahrattas, 4,953 other castes of Hindoostanees, 2,889 Punjaubee Mahommedans, 774 Punjaubee Hindoos, 4,850 Sikhs, 1,719 Muzubee Sikhs, 507 Affghans, 664 of the Trans-Indus Border Hill tribes, 29 Belloochees, 36 Persians, 3,319 Goorkas, 1,346 Dogras, and 986 of other Hill men.

12. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is not there a regulation against there being only one caste or religion in a regiment; is not the maximum proportion of each religion fixed by regulation?—Yes, but certain regiments are race regiments, regiments of one description, such as the Goorka regiments. There are detailed rules in force regulating

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regulating the composition of every regiment in the service, but there are different rules for different regiments; each particular regiment has its own regulations laid down by the Government.

13. *Chairman.*] As to religion or as to race, or both?—The two are very much mixed up together. The Goorka regiments are supposed to be purely Goorkas; they enlist none but Goorkas or men who are supposed to be Goorkas. There are other regiments in which there are a certain proportion of Sikhs, and there are other regiments in which there are a certain proportion of Hindoostanees, but there are rules in force, of which there are no doubt copies in the India Office, as to the composition of the whole of the Indian army, or Bengal army at all events, for that was gone into very carefully a few years ago.

14. Lord *William Hay.*] There are very few real Goorkas in the Goorka regiments, I believe?—I think they are limited in number, except in the 2nd Regiment, which is composed to a great extent of Goorkas.

15. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Those men come very much from Nepaul, do they not?—Most of them come from Nepaul; they are not real Goorkas, or what are generally called Goorkas, but they are better men than Jung Bahadoor's own Goorkas. I have similar information with regard to the other armies.

16. *Chairman.*] Will you hand in those papers?—I will.

17. Major *Anson.*] Do you know which of those races object to being recruited for general service or have religious prejudices against service beyond the seas?—I think all Hindoos have a prejudice against service beyond the seas on religious grounds.

18. *Chairman.*] Does that apply to the Madras regiments?—To a great extent it does.

19. Do they not go to Burmah?—They go, but I do not think they like it.

20. It is not an insuperable objection, then?—With regard to service in Burmah, there was some considerable correspondence many years ago about the employment of Madras troops on foreign service; and it was considered purely optional with a man to go or not up to a comparatively recent date. If a regiment was going on foreign service, the men were given their option of leaving it not very long ago; but when Lord Hardinge was Governor General, he laid it down that there was a broad distinction between service across the seas in our own territory, such as at Burmah and the Straits Settlements and Aden, and foreign service, such as service in China; and he considered that that should be optional with them; but all service in the territories of India, whether it were across the seas or not, should not be optional; and since the year 1856, every enlistment in all the Indian armies has been for general service, distinctly, "wherever ordered, whether by land or by sea," those words being used in the oath taken by the recruit.

21. Major *Anson.*] Since India has been under the Crown, and has ceased to belong to the East India Company, do you suppose that the natives would draw a distinction between Burmah and China, or between Aden and the Mauritius, and other places like that?—I think they would to some extent; they have been accustomed to go to Burmah and the Straits, but if they found they were going to other places, they would hardly know where the limit would be drawn.

22. There were a great number of Sikh regiments employed in China a short time ago; did they raise any objections on their return home to their employment there?—They raised no objection, and I do not think there would be any difficulty in getting native troops to go on field service anywhere; but what they would object to would be prolonged absence from their families on garrison duty.

23. They were in China for some time after the conclusion of the war; did they raise any objection that you are aware of while they were on garrison duty in China after the conclusion of the war?—I have not heard that they did, but none of them were there for three years; the last regiment returned within three years; if they had been kept longer, I do not know whether they would not have objected. There is a case in point in Java, where the troops were kept some time after the field service had been concluded, and it ended in a very serious mutiny.

24. Mr. *Laing.*] Have not the Madras troops furnished the garrisons for Singapore as well as the Burmese settlements for several years?—The Bengal troops furnished the garrisons for Singapore for many years, and the Madras troops have done that duty now for many years past; but those places have formed part of the Indian territory; the native troops have been accustomed to go there ever since we took the Straits.

25. In fact, have not the Madras regiments been serving beyond seas either in Burmah, Singapore, or China in such numbers that in the course of rotation almost every regiment in the Madras service has had a turn of service beyond the seas?—I suppose every regiment must have had a turn, because eight out of the 52 regiments were always on foreign service.

26. Did you ever hear of an objection on the part of the men in the Madras army to that service?—I believe that evidence could be produced to show that they do not like it at all.

27. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The Madras regiments take their families with them, do they not?—No, not when they go on foreign service.

28. But they differ from the other armies in that particular, do they not; that when in India their families live with them?—Yes.

29. In the other armies the wives and families live in their native villages?—Yes; the families live with the Madras regiments, so that when a regiment moves the total number is 3,000 or 4,000 souls; but when the men cross the sea the families are collected in a depot, and remain there.

30. So that the objection on account of removal would apply even more strongly in the case of Madras soldiers, who usually have their families with them?—Yes, I presume it would. I might mention that several representations were made to the Government of India about the unhealthiness of the troops in the Straits settlements, and that they had not sufficient money to live upon; and that one of the reasons why they had not sufficient money to live upon was that the remittances to their families absorbed so much of their pay that they had not enough left to provide for themselves.

31. Mr. *Laing.*] It would be mainly a question of pay and allowances on the one hand and the length of the service allowed on the other, would it not?—I think not, altogether; the liabi-

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lity to go on foreign service as a regular part of their duty would seriously affect the recruiting.

32. That regulation has applied to the whole of the Madras army for many years back, has it not?—Until we took Burmah, in 1853, they had a comparatively small number on foreign service; there were two regiments on foreign service in China during the war; but there were but few regiments on foreign service compared to what there have been during the last few years.

33. Since 1853 they have had a considerable turn of foreign service in the Madras army, have they not?—Yes; but I have always understood that representations have been constantly made to reduce the foreign service in consequence of the frequency with which the turns came round.

34. Mr. *Oliphant.*] What is the term of foreign service?—Never beyond three years.

35. Lord *William Hay.*] No difficulty is found in getting coolies to go to the West Indies in large numbers, I believe?—They do go in large numbers, I know.

36. Do you know whether any difficulty is found in inducing them to go?—I am not acquainted with the system which is pursued; I cannot say whether any great bounty is offered to them, or not.

37. They are chiefly Hindoos, are they not?—No, I think the majority of the coolies are the people of the Kole districts and the Sonthal districts; I do not think they are regular coolies.

38. Mr. *Oliphant.*] A great many go to Ceylon, do they not?—Yes, but then Ceylon is almost a part of India; there is no difficulty about that.

39. Mr. *Laing.*] Is not the sugar cultivation in the Mauritius carried on almost entirely by coolies from the Madras territory?—It may be; I believe it is carried on by coolies, but I am not sufficiently acquainted with the subject to say from what place they come.

40. *Chairman.*] What share does the religious objection bear in the matter; I do not suppose that the religious objection is in any way affected by the fact of this or that bit of territory belonging to the Government of India, or being under the Colonial Office?—It only applies to the sea voyage.

41. Then the religious objection appears to be pretty well got over?—I do not know whether it can be said to be got over, because a Hindoo would object to going to sea at all.

42. Still he does go?—I do not think the class of men who go as coolies is the same class of men as that which forms our native army.

43. I spoke of the Madras army going to Rangoon?—There are only a comparatively small proportion of Hindoos in the Madras army compared with the other armies, and the voyage to Rangoon is a short voyage by steamer.

44. Still they do go without objection, and I suppose the fact of its being a short voyage or by steamer does not affect the objection against going to sea?—I think it does to some extent, because a Hindoo will not cook on board ship; if he is only on board ship for two or three days, that is a comparatively trivial difficulty, but if he is on board for six weeks or two months, as in the case of the Chinese expedition in 1842, it is a very serious matter; in the case I have mentioned the natives died by hundreds of dysentery.

45. Major *Anson.*] But the Sikhs, and the Affghans, and others, from whom the army is largely recruited, have not got those objections; a Sikh would cook on board ship, would he not?—He might; a Goorka certainly would not, and a very strict Hindoo would not.

46. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Does not it depend mainly upon the question of caste; has not a high-caste Hindoo a very much greater objection to go on board ship than a low-caste pariah?—A much greater objection.

47. Is not it also the case that when any Hindoo comes back, having lost caste, it is absolutely necessary for himself to pay a certain sum in order to regain his caste, and therefore going across sea involves a positive money loss to them?—They have great difficulty in regaining caste at all if they have broken it.

48. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Have very high caste regiments ever to your knowledge been sent across sea?—Yes, I think the two Bengal regiments which were sent to China, one in the year 1840, and the other in the year 1842, were both composed of high caste men, but owing to their prejudices and the difficulty about cooking on board as they were a long time at sea (they were sent in sailing vessels), the mortality among them was very great indeed.

49. Major *Anson.*] But the regiments are not now recruited from the old high caste Brahmins?—Several of the regiments are composed much the same as they were formerly.

50. Sir *James Fergusson.*] There are very few high-caste men in the Madras army, are there?—Comparatively few, in fact, very few. I have the numbers here.

51. Major *Anson.*] Caste does not exist at all among the Sikhs, does it?—No.

52. Lord *William Hay.*] What you have said upon this question does not apply to Mahommedans of any kind, does it?—Certainly not on religious grounds, but they have imbibed so many Hindoo prejudices that, practically, a great many of them will not cook on board ship to my knowledge.

53. Is that on religious grounds, or because they object to going to sea at all?—I think the religious objections could be got over, because there are a great many of them to whom the objection on religious grounds does not apply at all, but I think their dislike to being separated from their families and being sent on foreign service, and especially to distant countries, is so great that the liability to foreign service would have a very serious influence on recruiting.

54. *Chairman.*] As I understand it, your fear is that the liability to foreign service would affect the recruiting, not that the being sent across sea would cause them to mutiny or resist when they have been recruited?—I would not say that, but I think if a rule were to be laid down now, that in future eight regiments of the Bengal army were always to be on foreign service in Mauritius or the Cape, or even at Malta or Gibraltar, there might be great discontent.

55. Major *Anson.*] They would not always be on foreign service; it would be only that occasionally they might have to serve abroad?—There would be a probability that every man would have his turn of foreign service; there would be a liability to foreign service.

56. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] You think that there would be greater difficulty in obtaining recruits under those circumstances?—Yes, and that the existing regiments would strongly object to going. I do not say that it would amount to mutiny on their part, but I think they would not like going at all.

57. Captain *Vivian.*] It would be only a question of pounds, shillings, and pence. I suppose

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pose if you increased their pay that would set it right?—I doubt whether any increase of pay that would be likely to be given to them would compensate them for it. They have a great increase of pay when they go on foreign service now.

58. Captain *Hayter.*] Do the Sikhs entertain all these objections to going across the sea?—Not on account of the caste, but they are so utterly unaccustomed to the sea that I do not think they like it.

59. Lord *William Hay.*] Can you state to the Committee how often regiments have mutinied on proceeding to foreign service, or on being sent or ordered to go on foreign service?—I do not think there have been very many mutinies, but there have been instances of discontent and dissatisfaction. I found that there was some dissatisfaction about the Madras troops in China, when a relief was required after the war; they were retained there for some time; there was some correspondence about it.

60. Major *Anson.*] After which war?—In 1845. In Bengal there was the instance of the 47th Native Infantry, which mutinied when ordered to Burmah, but then that arose out of other questions connected with their pay and allowances.

61. *Chairman.*] Does any desertion take place on those occasions?—From Bengal, in my time, we never sent regiments abroad save on field service.

62. So that you are not very familiar with the question of sending native regiments abroad personally?—I have read a great deal about it.

63. But you have had no actual experience of it?—No; I have had no experience of the sending abroad of the Madras and Bombay regiments beyond reading what has come up in the correspondence.

64. Major *Anson.*] In the case of the Bombay and Madras regiments, they never have deserted when they have had to go to Aden or the Straits Settlements, or to Burmah, have they?—That I cannot say. I observe Lord Hardinge says, in June 1845, writing to the Government of Madras, "The discontent of the regiments in China was notorious; the service at Hong Kong had no longer the stimulus of active service before an enemy in the field, and the Governor General in Council was clearly of opinion that in cases such as Egypt, Java, China, Mauritius, &c., where the service is really foreign service, the option ought to be given. Lord Hardinge also stated in the same despatch, that it would be "imprudent to force the question of foreign service too far with the native army, and that it being voluntary it ought to be made popular by the honour and reputation to be gained against the enemy. Their ardour for foreign service against the enemy should not be damped by permanent garrison duty in remote and unhealthy localities." In the same despatch, the Duke of Wellington was quoted on the proposal to send native troops to the West Indies. His Grace noticed the serious blow which would be struck at recruiting, and observes that "the families would see with disquiet men enlisting in a service which rendered them liable to be sent to an unknown country," and the duke considered these arguments to apply equally to the Cape.

65. Mr. *Childers.*] That was before the native soldiers were enlisted for general service, was it not?—I believe the theory was, that the Madras army was always enlisted for general service, but in practice a sort of option appears to have been given.

66. Major *Anson.*] It was also at a time when we were in much greater dread of the native army than we are now. It was when we had a far greater number of native troops than our own troops, and when we had a much larger proportion of fortified places in their hands than we have at present; therefore we were very much more afraid of making innovations in anything affecting the native army than we are at present?—Decidedly.

67. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Are you aware that the sea is called "The Black Water," "Kala-pani," and that a Hindoo has an especial horror of crossing the black water?—Yes.

68. Major *Anson.*] In the Chinese expedition in 1860, our native troops had not only to go from India to Hong Kong, but they were kept on board ship for several weeks together, and that was the case with all classes of native troops. Did you ever hear of any complaint having been made of that as one of the consequences of a state of war on the part of the native soldiers?—No, I heard no complaints, and I have a strong belief that with good officers the present army would go anywhere with a prospect of service.

69. Mr. *Laing.*] Of active service?—Yes, I mean of active service.

70. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Have you the power, if you choose, to send the native troops into Europe?—We have the power to send them anywhere, legally.

71. They are enlisted for general service, just in the same way as an English soldier is?—They are enlisted to serve wherever they are ordered, by land or sea, that is the oath they take.

72. Sir *James Fergusson.*] When you say that you think native regiments will go anywhere, if they are well officered, do you think if a regiment were sent for a course of foreign service, it would be necessary to give it a larger proportion of staff corps officers than the native regiments have at present?—I think if the present system is continued, when it has developed itself, the regiments will not require more European officers than they have at present; indeed I think they would be injured by it; I presume you speak of field service against the enemy.

73. Supposing the Indian regiments were sent for a course of service out of India proper, do you think it would be necessary to send a larger proportion of European officers than they have at present?—I think not; I think that sending officers suddenly to a regiment who do not know the men, and who, perhaps, are not picked officers for the service, would be rather detrimental than otherwise.

74. When you said just now, "If the present system is continued," you meant, I presume, the present system of keeping officers as far as possible in the regiments to which they are posted?—Yes.

75. If the officers were moved about from one regiment to another, it would be necessary to add to their number, would it not?—I think it is very undesirable that they should be often moved about.

76. In that case you could not depend upon the number of officers being sufficient?—It would render the corps less efficient, certainly.

77. Mr. *Laing.*] Did they not send additional doing duty officers with all the regiments that went to China during the late war?—They did, but then they had not the system of European officers

officers commanding wings and squadrons which they have now; a native regiment then had only a commandant, a second in command, who had no real assigned duties, and an adjutant; now an infantry regiment has an experienced officer to command each wing, as a sort of major, and a cavalry regiment has an officer to command each squadron, besides which, they both of them have a quartermaster, two subalterns attached, and a medical officer.

78. Colonel *North.*] What is the strength of a regiment?—Seven hundred and twelve of all ranks for an infantry regiment, and 427 for a cavalry regiment.

79. Including the officers?—Excluding the European officers, which are eight in number in each case, but including the medical officer.

80. Are the non-commissioned officers any of them Europeans?—No, none of them.

81. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Are none of the serjeant-majors Europeans?—No.

82. Captain *Vivian.*] How many mounted officers are there?—They are all considered to be mounted if wanted; they all draw horse allowance.

83. *Chairman.*] Will you now give the Committee some idea of the mode of recruiting adopted for native regiments?—For regiments serving in India the recruiting has been carried on entirely under the orders of the commanding officer of the regiment; if he finds his regiment is running short, he obtains permission to send a small recruiting party into the district where he wants to get a particular class of men.

84. Do you mean to say that that course is adopted whenever a vacancy occurs?—No; suppose there are a good many vacancies, and recruits are not coming in readily at the head quarters of the regiment, the commanding officer then gets this permission.

85. Then there is a certain amount of spontaneous recruiting going on constantly?—A great deal; the relatives of men in the regiment come to enlist sometimes in expectation of a vacancy, and at other times knowing that there is a vacancy. If a regiment is away from the usual recruiting districts, the plan resorted to is, to send a non-commissioned officer and two or three men to the district from which they wish to get recruits, to raise them and bring them to the regiment. If the recruits are approved, they get the travelling allowance, that is an allowance for travelling from the district from which the recruits come.

86. Is anything per head given to the recruiting officer?—No.

87. Is there any bounty given to the recruit?—No, not at present.

88. Major *Anson.*] Has any question of giving a bounty been raised in India?—There has been a question raised about it, but it has not been done as yet. There was some difficulty two or three years ago about recruiting, and the pay was supposed to be insufficient in consequence of the dearness of provisions. The Madras Government strongly represented the difficulty they had in raising recruits, and said that the men were altogether half starved. They had not sufficient pay, which was not met altogether by the allowance that was given to them on account of the dearness of provisions, and certain advantages were then given to the native army by the Government of India after considerable correspondence; but instead of a direct increase of pay, it was given in the shape of giving good conduct pay at earlier periods of service, and making some advantageous alterations in the regulations for compensation for dearness of provisions. I might mention that each native soldier, if the articles which comprise his ration exceed in price half his pay, that is *Rs.* 3. 8. a month, is entitled to compensation for the difference.

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89. *Chairman.*] Does he find his own lodging?—The huts are built at some places; they are now found by the Government altogether; at other places the sepoy receives an allowance on coming to a new station for the construction of his hut, or on coming to an old one for the repair of his hut.

90. Colonel *North.*] Every article of his kit is found, I suppose, as he gets no bounty?—No; his coat and pantaloons are found for him, but his shoes and white clothing, and so on, are found by himself, and deductions are made from his pay for them, but those come rather heavily on a recruit; afterwards they are comparatively small. In the Bengal Army the deductions are limited to five rupees per annum.

91. Major *Anson.*] That does not apply to a recruit during his first year of service, does it?—During the first year of a recruit's service, the deductions are much greater, and it was thought if the measure became necessary that it would be a most desirable thing to give him a free kit.

92. What is the actual pay of a sepoy?—A sepoy on enlistment, and not on foreign service, receives seven rupees a month in all the three presidencies.

93. Is that the pay of an infantry soldier?—Yes, for an infantry soldier; a cavalry soldier on enlistment now receives 27 rupees a month; out of that he has to furnish his horse, and arms, and clothing, and to keep his horse.

94. What is the pay of the men when they go upon foreign service?—The ordinary rate of pay, and they receive in addition the old full batta, which was *Rs.* 3. 8, and if at sea, provisions, or if they do not receive provisions they receive *Rs.* 3. 8. in lieu of provisions. There may be some local differences here and there, but in the main that is what a sepoy receives; and each grade receives also the full batta of its grade. In the year 1864, it was proposed to employ two sepoy regiments in China, and we were called upon for an estimate of the cost; the establishment of European officers put down differed slightly from the present establishment; the present establishment has the advantage in point of economy, but only to a very small extent. It was supposed then that to cover every cost of paying the men, feeding them, clothing them, arming them, relieving them, and hutting them; and to allow for the cost of pensions, 560 rupees annually would be required for every man in the regiment, that is, 56 *l.* The cost of a regiment thus estimated would be about 39,000 *l.* per annum, that includes the European officers.

95. That was in China?—Yes; giving them what I mentioned, that is, seven rupees for each sepoy, *Rs.* 3. 8. for batta, and *Rs.* 3. 8. for provisions.

96. Captain *Vivian.*] That is 56 *l.* per head per soldier?—Yes; including the European officers and the native officers.

97. Including the whole expense of the regiment?—Yes.

98. Major *Anson.*] I think you included in that the hutting of the men?—Yes.

99. That would be far heavier last year than it will be in subsequent years, would it not?—That

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That is the average of what it costs us in India. I do not know that it would cost less in China.

100. What is the average cost of a native soldier in India, including all those things?—I am not prepared to say, it varies so much in different parts of the country according to whether he gets compensation for provisions or not; an average might be struck, but it would not be of any practical use, I think.

101. *Chairman.*] Is there any part of the country now where you have any difficulty in recruiting?—I am informed constantly that the men wish to take their discharge in considerable numbers, and that pressure is put upon them by the commanding officers to keep them in; it is said, that the pay is hardly sufficient to retain them in the infantry.

102. Is that the case all over the country?—We have had representations from Bombay and from Madras, and the commanding officers have said so in Bengal, but the present efficiency of the establishment of native infantry in the three Presidencies, and the Punjaub frontier force, is 94,695 men, and the actual number on the 1st of October was 92,065, leaving 2,630 men wanting to complete the establishment, although the great reductions of late years have lessened the demand for recruits, and have left a good many supernumerary native officers, and non-commissioned officers. Of this deficiency 880 vacancies are in the Bengal native regiments.

103. Is there any more difficulty in recruiting now than there was before the words were inserted in the oath, "wherever ordered by land or sea"?—There is a greater difficulty, because there was very little difficulty then, but the army has been reduced by more than 100,000 men since that time.

104. I suppose if there is an increase of difficulty it is more to be attributed to the rise in the price of provisions than to the words of the oath?—I should conclude so, for I do not think the men believe that they are liable to foreign service as a rule, although they take this oath.

105. Do you know any part of the country where the recruiting has been hindered by the fact that regiments have been sent abroad either to Rangoon or elsewhere?—No; but no regiment from Bengal has been sent abroad except on field service.

106. You have never heard from Madras of a difficulty which has been stated to arise from that source?—No, I have not.

107. Mr. *Laing*] The general rise of wages throughout the country must account for a great deal of the increased difficulty in recruiting, must it not?—No doubt, and the rise in the price of provisions, and other things also. People formerly given to warlike pursuits are now settling down as agriculturists and traders.

108. Then, in fact, the effect of obliging every regiment to serve across the sea, if it had any effect, would be that of excluding the high caste men, who were the most dangerous before the mutiny, and might be the most dangerous again, if they preponderated in any regiment?—I am not at all certain that they are the most dangerous.

109. Major *Anson.*] They are more likely to be discontented, and more likely to be worthless as soldiers, are they not?—They are not such good soldiers; I do not know that they are more likely to be discontented, except about caste matters.

110. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Some regiments are composed exclusively, I suppose, of one race, as, for instance, the Goorkas; but others are mixed, as I understand it?—Yes.

111. Are the castes mixed also?—Yes, the castes are mixed sometimes. There has been a desire to avoid uniformity in the composition of regiments as much as possible; some are composed of various races, by companies, and others are composed entirely of one race, but those are few. In the Madras army no alteration has been made.

112. Do you think that the system of mixing the castes and races is a good system, or that it would be more easy to get regiments recruited for foreign service by classifying them?—I should be sorry to give a positive opinion about it, seeing how much the matter has been discussed, and how many valuable opinions have been given on both sides, but I think it is desirable to avoid uniformity in the army, and to have regiments of different kinds; to have some class regiments, and some mixed regiments; it may sometimes be desirable to employ class regiments, and it may sometimes be very desirable to employ regiments which have no preponderance of any one class.

113. By having them mixed you might always have some men in one regiment who might object to going on foreign service, but if you had class regiments you might have some regiments where there would be no men who would have any objection to going?—You might get over the difficulty in that way, but regiments of one class, if they were in their own part of the country, would be very dangerous in case of insurrection.

114. Lord *William Hay.*] How do you account for there being so few Mahrattas in the Bengal army?—The Mahrattas mainly enlist in the Bombay army; there are very few in the Bengal army.

115. Major *Anson.*] You have stated that the pay of a native soldier is seven rupees a month; have they not to find out of that seven rupees a month the whole of their food?—Yes, entirely.

116. Mr. *Laing.*] Can you give any estimate of the comparative expense of a European regiment and a native regiment of the same force in India?—I believe that a European regiment costs nearly double what a native regiment costs, but I speak with some doubt about that.

117. Is not the difference considerably more than that?—If you include the cost of the barracks it may be, but the new standard barracks are hardly constructed yet, and we have no means of knowing what the cost will be.

118. If you include rations, and provisions consumed, ought not the estimate to be something like 100,000 *l.* for a European regiment against 35,000 *l.* for a native regiment?—I do not think it is as high as that; I have seen an estimate which puts the cost of each European soldier at 60 *l.* or 70 *l.* a year.

119. Major *Anson.*] Can you give the Committee some idea of what the pensions are of the soldiers after a certain length of service?—The pensions vary according to the grades; four rupees is the pension of a sepoy.

120. Per month?—Yes; four rupees per month.

121. After how many years' service?—If he is invalided after 15 years' service, but he must be declared to be invalided and unfit for service in order to get that pension. Formerly he could never get a pension unless he was invalided, and declared to be unfit for service, but now the rule has been relaxed, and after 40 years' service he can get a pension; but in the Madras and Bombay

bay armies, the pension rules have certainly been more open; they have allowed men to go more easily.

122. Mr. *Childers.*] What is the term of enlistment, or is there any term?—There is no term; a man can always claim his discharge in time of peace, provided his regiment or troop is not more than 10 below its strength.

123. Major *Anson.*] After any number of years' service?—After three years' service.

124. Will you state what are the arrangements for the wives and families of the native soldiers?—In Bengal, and I believe to some extent in Bombay, they do not live with the regiments.

125. They leave them at home?—Yes.

126. Do the Government transmit to them the men's pay?—The men are most regular in remitting a portion of their pay to their families; those who do not do so are very much looked down upon in their corps.

127. That is done by the men, not by the Government?—It is done by the men, but facilities are afforded to them by the Government for doing it; they get drafts on the treasuries.

128. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The men get long furloughs, do they not?—Yes, they get long and frequent furloughs in the Bengal regiments; the men are in the habit of taking their discharge if the furlough is stopped at all; they are very fond of going to their families; in Lower Bengal the men object, and are desirous to get out of the service, if they are kept away from their families more than two years.

129. *Chairman.*] Do they get all their pay when they are on furlough?—They get *Rs.* 1. 8. deducted out of the seven rupees, leaving *Rs.* 5. 8.

130. Is there any limitation to the amount of furlough?—Furlough is usually only given in the hot weather to a certain per-centage of men, as laid down in the general orders.

131. For how long a time is the furlough given?—About seven months. If the regiment is near the homes of the men, that is divided into two or three periods, so that two or three sets of men go on furlough in the seven months; besides that, in the hot weather when the regiments are near their homes, an extra number of men get leave between musters to go to their homes.

132. Then this pay which you have spoken of is given them all the year round without deduction, though you lose a portion of the regiment?—We do not lose a portion of the regiment; 10 per cent. is the number fixed for furlough at a time during seven months.

133. Major *Anson.*] Do you give each man a furlough every year?—No; it may come round about every three or four years; it depends on how near the men's homes the regiment is; if it is at a distance, each man gets seven months; if it is near, each man gets half that time, and then the turn comes round quicker.

134. Lord *William Hay.*] The Goorka regiments have their families with them, have they not?—Yes.

135. All the Goorka regiments?—Yes.

136. Sir *James Fergusson.*] In the Madras army the families always live in the lines, do they not?—Yes.

137. How is it in the Bombay army?—As far as I am informed, they keep a certain medium between the Madras and the Bengal systems, but certainly a great many of their men have not their families with them, because a great many of their recruits are or were from Bengal.

138. *Chairman.*] Do those whose families live in the lines require furlough?—I do not think the Madras army takes furlough to the extent that the Bengal army does.

139. Mr. *Childers.*] If the native troops were sent to a colony which had been garrisoned by European troops, could they be put into the barracks where the European troops had been?—They could certainly; that is to say, a native regiment on foreign service without its families could.

140. Would there be any objection on the part of the men to that being done?—I think not; they would probably like to run up partitions, and they would rather injure the barracks by their habits.

141. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you not think they would object to being shut in out of the air, accustomed as they are to pendals?—I do not know that that would be a very serious objection, because in many forts they are put into places much more enclosed than the ordinary run of barracks.

142. Colonel *North.*] When a native regiment is ordered to do garrison duty at Gibraltar or Malta, or at any places of that kind, would they be obliged to bring all their families with them?—No, I presume not; they never take their families on foreign service.

143. I do not know whether that would be considered foreign service or not?—I presume they would be relieved within three or four years. Certainly it would add greatly to the difficulty and expense of sending them if they were allowed to take their families.

144. *Chairman.*] Otherwise you say they would get discontented, unless they got furlough every two or three years?—Yes, unless they were relieved every two or three years.

145. In fact, without their wives and families they would not stay more than two or three years in one place?—I think they would object very strongly to doing so; they are all married, as a rule.

146. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Besides their wives they have a number of relations living with them, have they not?—Where they have their wives, they have their friends living with them to a certain extent.

147. Lord *William Hay.*] The Goorkas have a particular objection, have they not, to being separated from their wives and families?—A great objection; we have had to do it sometimes even in India: for instance, when a Goorka regiment went to Bushire, we had constant applications from them to be relieved, or to have their families sent up; and the other day we had to move a regiment on that account.

148. *Chairman.*] Does that apply to the Affghan Hill soldiers you have referred to; are they equally anxious to have their wives and families with them, or to return to them?—To return to them. In the case of Coke's Rifle Corps, which was mainly composed of Border Affghans, he has told me that if the men could not pretty often get to their homes, they wished to take their discharge, and in some cases they had deserted.

149. Is there any race in India which will be contentedly absent for five years from India without their wives and families?—I am not aware of any.

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150. Do you think that any efforts of money would overcome their objection?—I suppose a sufficiently high offer would tempt men to do almost anything; but I do not think anything which is likely to be offered to them would compensate for their continued absence.

151. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Would it not be cheaper to relieve native regiments every three years than to relieve European regiments every five years, considering the great difference in the cost of the regiments?—You mean, I presume, if the European regiments were relieved from England?

152. European regiments are now generally stationed for five years in a place, for instance, at Malta; would it not be cheaper to make a transfer of a native regiment more often, considering how much cheaper the cost of a native regiment is?—I have not sufficient information to say whether it would or not; but I apprehend that from most stations there would be a constant return of men on sick leave from the foreign stations, and their places would have to be supplied. I think that would not apply to the stations in the Mediterranean, for I apprehend that they would agree with them pretty well.

153. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that Colonel Merewether has organised a force at Aden of Belloochees?—Yes, a small force.

154. Do you imagine that they will not be able to remain five years at Aden without being relieved?—They may have peculiar advantages, and he has peculiar influence over that class of men, from his knowledge of them; but I am not aware of the circumstances under which that force has been organised.

155. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you know how long the native regiments which have been stationed at Aden have remained there?—They have never remained more than three years; that is the only foreign station that the Bombay army has, so that the turn to serve there comes round very seldom, and there are many men in the Bombay army, of course, who have never seen Aden.

156. The cost of the relief would depend mainly upon the distance of the station; take, for instance, Mauritius. The cost of relieving the regiment there every three years from Bombay would be very small as compared with the cost of relieving a European regiment, which would have to come all the way from England?—Yes, necessarily.

157. Colonel *North.*] I think you stated that an Indian regiment, with all its appendages, would amount to 4,000 souls; have the men followers besides their wives and children?—The amount of followers of a native infantry regiment on foreign service would be very few, if you did not take their families.

158. I mean taking their families?—That would, of course, vary; it is estimated at from 3,000 to 4,000 souls for an infantry regiment in India. The number of followers for an infantry regiment on foreign service is only 56.

159. Supposing the system of a native infantry regiment being stationed in European quarters, such as Malta and Gibraltar, were adopted; and, supposing they brought their families with them, do you think that their number would amount to anything like 3,000 or 4,000?—I am informed so.

160. Captain *Vivian.*] What limit do you put to the followers of a regiment; the number, 3,000 or 4,000, of course includes many besides the wives?—I am not aware of any limit in the case of a regiment in cantonment; of course there are the wives and mothers, and so on.

161. Do you allow each man to take as many as he likes?—I am not aware of any limit; of course they do not go on service.

162. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Are you aware of any case of a regiment having taken their wives and children on foreign service?—No; I believe it would be quite impracticable.

163. Sir *James Fergusson.*] To remove troops who have been always accustomed to live amongst their families, as in the case of the Madras army, or to make frequent visits to them, as in the case of the Bengal army, to a foreign station for from three to five years, makes a very great and violent change in their habits, does it not?—Yes, undoubtedly.

164. In many points of view the removal of an Asiatic regiment in that manner is open to serious objections, is it not?—Yes, it is, in my opinion. There is, of course, the alternative of having local regiments composed of men who enlist specially for foreign service; but I think they would be inferior to the existing regiments of the army.

165. Mr. *Childers.*] Would the objection you have just mentioned extend to the Mauritius; do you think there would be any difficulty in substituting a native regiment for a European regiment in the Mauritius, with three years' reliefs?—Mauritius is nearer than some other places, but I think there would be great difficulty about it.

166. Practically it is very little further than Aden?—Anything that added to the amount of foreign service, or cross sea service, for the native troops would be viewed with dislike.

167. Is it much further, or at all further, than Singapore?—It is certainly further; I do not know what the exact distance is, or how long the steamers take going, but it would add to the amount of foreign service.

168. Do you think that they would distinguish between the Mauritius and Rangoon?—I think they would; they are very acute, and rather oversuspicious at to new measures being brought into force.

169. Major *Anson.*] The system pursued by the Government with respect to the Madras army, as regards the wives and families of the soldiers, gives them a far greater power over the soldier than the system pursued by the Bengal and Bombay Governments, does it not?—Yes, but you could not alter the system prevailing in the Bengal army so as to let them have their wives with them, as the men have in the Madras army; they leave their wives in the villages; they have been accustomed to that system, and you could not carry out the Madras system in Bengal.

170. Lord *William Hay.*] What becomes of the wives of the soldiers in the Madras army when a regiment goes on foreign service?—They remain in depôt somewhere.

171. Where?—I suppose it depends upon the station from which the regiment marches.

172. Do they remain in depôt at that station?—Not necessarily at that station; they might be moved to a depôt in their own provinces.

173. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Has it been found very demoralising to a regiment to be quartered as they are at Aden, for a period of years?—I have not heard so; I have not heard that there is a great mortality or sickness in Aden, but the regiments that were in China in the years 1842, 1843, 1844, and 1845, were greatly disorganised.

174. I mean

174. I mean to ask whether it has been found to be the case, or whether you would be apprehensive that it would be the case, that a regiment would become seriously demoralised from the change in their domestic habits?—I have had no experience on the subject, and Aden is such a peculiar place that we could hardly judge by that. It is almost a mere fortification.

175. I think, therefore, it would bring out what I wish to know in the very strongest way?—I have never heard that they are demoralised by being at Aden.

176. Major *Anson.*] The immorality, and the drunkenness, and crime, in a native regiment is infinitely less than in a European regiment, is it not?—Infinitely less; drunkenness is the rarest possible thing except amongst certain men. The Sikhs occasionally may drink a little, but very much less than the Europeans, and they are seldom in hospital from any diseases owing to themselves.

177. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Gross immorality is very rare because the habits of the men are extremely domestic, is not that the case?—Yes; and if a man commits immorality he is looked down upon by his colleagues.

178. But if you removed a regiment from the habits to which the men had always been accustomed, it would probably make an utter change in the characters of the men, would it not?—It might, but I am not able to say.

179. Major *Anson.*] Have you looked at the medical reports of the army in China for the last five or six years?—Yes, I have.

180. Have you observed with regard to such a question as that which was being referred to that the venereal diseases are almost unknown in the native regiments, whereas a very large proportion of the European regiments have suffered from them?—I am quite aware of that from my own experience of the native regiments. There are very few men in hospital with venereal disease, or unfit for duty on that account.

181. *Chairman.*] What is the origin of the practice of the families living in the lines in the Madras army; do you know whether it prevailed under the princes who preceded us, under the Nabob of the Carnatic?—I presume it must have done so, because it appears to have been in existence as soon as the Madras army came under our control.

182. Does it exist in Hyderabad?—It does exist in the Hyderabad Contingent.

183. And on the Nizam's force?—I do not know.

184. Marquis of *Hartington.*] You are not aware of any moral objections which there would be to garrisoning the European stations with native troops, leaving their families behind them; Malta, for instance?—It is difficult to say; the thing has never been tried, I think.

185. Should you have any apprehension of making the experiment?—I do not think I should have much apprehension with a good commanding officer. I think that the tendency of natives to run riot has been rather exaggerated, as far as I can see; in the public press.

186. Sir *James Fergusson.*] For instance, is the general conduct of the native regiments quartered at Hong Kong, or has anything in their conduct towards the inhabitants, been bad?—I never heard any complaints, and I see that General D'Aguilar, in writing to the Madras Government about the conduct of the regiments at Hong Kong which suffered very severely, speaks very highly of the native regiments.

187. *Chairman.*] You do not think that they would be worse at Malta than the English soldiers?—I should think not, if they went there contentedly.

188. Mr. *Childers.*] Would you have any hesitation in trying the experiment at the Mauritius, where there is a very large Indian population?—On those grounds I should not, with a good commanding officer.

189. *Chairman.*] It depends singularly, does not it, on the character of the commanding officer in dealing with native troops whether they behave well or ill?—To a very great extent.

190. Much more so than with European troops?—To a very much greater extent, for a good British regiment with a good system is not very much affected for a long time by a change of commanding officers, but a native regiment looks to its commanding officer in a way that is quite unknown to British soldiers, I believe.

191. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] If you were to ask a native regiment, either a Sikh or an ordinary Bengal regiment, to volunteer, not for field service, but for garrison duty, do you think they would go willingly; would they volunteer?—I do not think they would go willingly; certainly not unless very great advantages were held out.

192. Mr. *Childers.*] In the shape of more batta?—Yes.

193. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think it would be possible to recruit regiments who would go willingly out of any class in India?—Yes, with very great advantages. In Bengal we had certain regiments called General Service Corps, they took the duty for many years in Arracan and in the Straits. There was no difficulty in recruiting the number of men we wanted for those corps.

194. Captain *Vivian.*] All the men are now recruited for general service, are they not?—Yes.

195. And they know very well that they are liable to be sent at any time across the seas?—They know that they are liable, but they know that it is not done.

196. At all events they know that they are liable?—If they do not it is their own fault, for they take the oath, which says so expressly.

197. Is the supply of recruits equal to the demand?—As I showed, there are about 2,600 men wanting to complete the Indian establishment, but I have not the slightest doubt that the men believe that they never will be sent across the sea, except for field service, without their own consent.

198. Is there any secret understanding with them when they are enlisted, that although they take this oath, they are still to be kept in India?—None whatever; they only judge by the practice of past years.

199. Major *Anson.*] Could we obtain a return of the numbers and races of the native soldiers who have been employed in China, Aden, and Burmah?—I think so, but the ordinary regiments have gone, quite irrespective of race, except that a Bellooch regiment was sent from Bombay a little time ago to China, and remained there three years.

200. Could we get a return of the races of the native troops employed in China since we have employed native troops there?—I think so.

201. Mr. *Childers.*] You stated that the native troops

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troops would require peculiar advantages if they were sent beyond seas to do garrison duty; at what do you assess those peculiar advantages; in the case of the Mauritius, for instance, would the whole batta be enough?—No, that they are entitled to by regulation.

202. How much besides would be required?—I cannot say, but I should think to make them like to go, it would have to be a considerable addition.

203. How much would you add to that normal rate of 56 *l.*, at which you estimated the cost of a native regiment per head at Hong Kong?—I should say if you were to give them double batta that would be equal to about 4 *l.* extra. I do not say that that would be successful, but that that would be as far as you could think of going.

204. That would raise the cost per head from 56 *l.* to 60 *l.*?—Yes, it would give them double batta and rations, or an allowance in lieu of rations.

205. And you think that that would be sufficient to make the men satisfied with going, say to the Mauritius?—No, I do not think so; I am not certain unless you were to give them something which it would be quite out of the question to give, that they would be satisfied to go.

206. To go for three years' service on garrison duty to Mauritius?—I do not think you would satisfy them.

207. How much would you add for that purpose if you can reduce it to figures?—It is a pure matter of conjecture as to what would be necessary; I cannot say that I feel certain that any pecuniary reward which it is possible to give would make them contented, say double pay, for example.

208. Major *Anson.*] You have not commanded a regiment or had anything to do with soldiers who have been ordered abroad, have you?—I have talked to them very often, both before they have gone and after they have come back.

209. Mr. *Childers.*] Would any peculiar advantages be wanted in the case of Ceylon?—Ceylon is almost part of India; I do not think there would be any difficulty in ordering a Madras regiment to Ceylon on the ordinary terms.

210. Would any peculiar advantages be wanted for the Straits settlements after they ceased to be part of the Government of India?—No; I think if a Madras regiment had been kept there not a word would have been said, because they do not know anything about the Colonial Office.

211. Captain *Vivian.*] Have they their wives and families there with them?—No, I think not.

212. Mr. *Childers.*] Would more than 56 *l.* per head be wanted to keep up the reliefs at Hong Kong; I mean to keep up a number of native regiments relieved every three years?—Not if the regulated pay given in this estimate is adhered to; it would only cost 56 *l.*, including the reliefs.

213. You think that at 56 *l.* a head, the reliefs being for three years, there would be no difficulty in future?—No; I do not say that there would be no difficulty about making men contented or making them like to go.

214. Cannot you put down any figure at which they would be contented to go, they having been accustomed for many years to go to China?—They have not been accustomed to go to China to garrison it; after each war troops have been kept there for a certain period until other arrangements could be made; that is all.

215. How many years is it since the last war?—Six or seven years; there are no native troops there now, nor have there been for some years.

215.* Mr. *Childers.*] Only two years, I think?—Yes, they were withdrawn two years ago.

216. Major *Anson.*] They were there for three years?—Yes, they were relieved by two regiments from Bombay.

217. Mr. *Childers.*] At what price could that practice have been kept up?—I suppose it could have been kept up at 60 *l.* per head if it had been continued to that extent, namely, two regiments.

218. *Chairman.*] It has been suggested by various persons that the evils which arise from the very large disparity of the sexes would be very much aggravated in the case of Asiatics left for several years on garrison duty; is it your opinion that that does apply to the character of the Indian soldiers as you know them?—I am afraid it might to some extent after a considerable period of absence from their families and female society.

219. Would it apply more to any one race in India than to others?—I do not know much about it, but I believe it would be the case with the Sikhs and Affghans more than with Hindoos of caste.

220. Lord *William Hay.*] In the case of Affghans it would not make them worse than they are now, or than they are supposed to be now, would it?—I do not think that they are very bad in the sense you mean in the regiments; we know that in their own country their habits in their towns are very bad, but I do not think such a thing is tolerated in any of the regiments composed of Affghans.

221. Do you think their being employed on foreign stations would make any alteration in their moral conduct?—I think so, because they go home now from time to time.

222. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Can you tell me where these 507 Affghans are employed; do those numbers you mentioned of Affghans employed in the Bengal army include details from the different regiments, or do they form one distinct body?—They are mixed up in regiments. These 507 are pure Affghans from Affghanistan; but there are a much greater number of Border men, such as Afreedies and Eusufzais; but the largest number of Affghans, I may mention, is in the Punjaub frontier force, whose proportion I did not give. There are 1,853 Affghans, and Border Affghans, in the Punjaub Infantry.

223. Sir *James Fergusson.*] In some regiments there are whole troops, or half troops, of Affghans, are there not?—Yes; what I gave was the number of the infantry; I have the number in the cavalry here.

224. In some cases there are whole troops of Affghans, are there not?—Yes.

225. Lord *William Hay.*] Can you account for there being so few Mahrattas in the Bengal army?—An effort was made after the mutiny to raise two regiments of Mahratta infantry and two regiments of Mahratta cavalry, but very few would enlist; it appears that though numbers of them go into the army they have a great field for enlisting in Scindia's service; he has 4,000 or 5,000 cavalry.

226. They prefer the local service?—Yes. The designation

designation of Mahratta had to be given up altogether in the regiments which we commenced to raise as a Mahratta regiment, because so few enlisted.

227. Major *Anson.*] You have already given us, I think, the number of European troops in India; will you give the Committee your opinion as to the necessity of maintaining this number, and the causes of their increase since 1857?—The increase of European troops, though larger on paper, has actually been only about 13,000 men, which does not seem excessive, considering that we have substituted European artillery for native artillery, and that we garrison all forts and arsenals with European troops now, which we did not before; for instance, Delhi, one of the largest places, was entirely in the hands of native troops, and sanitary considerations also have led the Government to keep a larger percentage of men on the hills in convalescent depôts, they being supposed to require a change of air; and, whilst there is an increase of 13,000 in the number of the Europeans, there is a decrease of 107,000 in the native troops, who were, of course, very useful for many duties. I think that our present army is not an excessive European army for India, when we consider that it garrisons Burmah and Aden, as well as India proper; it protects something like 4,000 miles of frontier, and though there are railways in progress, they do not as yet touch many parts of the country, and the line of railway for hundreds of miles in places is without a single soldier upon it, and is therefore liable to be destroyed and taken up.

228. What is your opinion of the advantage of having fortified places in India for Europeans to garrison?—I think there is a great advantage in having a certain number of them, not too many, so as not to force too many troops to be devoted to their defence in time of war; but wherever you have an arsenal, I think there ought to be a decent sort of fortification, which might also be a place of refuge for the European population in the surrounding country.

229. What fortified places are there in India at the present moment which would require European troops to garrison them?—There is Fort William, a large fortification and arsenal, which is absolutely necessary to be held by European troops, I think. Then there is Allahabad, a large arsenal, and a very important strategical point for the North-Western Provinces. At Benares, the arsenal is probably a small one, but it is a very large and important city; it commands the passage of the Ganges. Agra is also a very important position, and it has an arsenal; at Gwalior there is a fort, and it appears desirable that we should hold it.

230. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is not garrisoned by Europeans, is it?—Yes, it has been ever since the mutiny.

231. *Chairman.*] That is not very much in the way of a fort, is it?—No; but as long as we had a garrison at Gwalior, and by treaty we have one, it was considered very undesirable that we should give up the fort. For some time a sort of promise had been given to Scindia that he should have the fort; but it appeared impossible to let him have the fort, and let our comparatively weak garrison remain there with his large army in the cantonment, he holding the fort. He was, therefore, induced to let us keep the fort, upon allowing him to have more field artillery than he had previously had.

232. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It was through the fort in Gwalior that the Europeans were saved, was it not?—I think it was more owing to their getting to Agra.

233. The Rajah would not have been able to save them if they had not been in the fort?—I think they got to Agra as soon as they could.

234. *Chairman.*] They are building fortifications at Peshawur, are they not?—Yes; it is very desirable to have a fortified place there; there was an old Sikh fort, but it is tumbling down; it is very badly situated, and hardly strong enough to hold a garrison. There are some old native fortifications, which, though not as good as they might be, yet it is very desirable to hold, such as Attock, on the Indus; it would cost a great deal to erect a regular fortification there; and for most of the purposes for which we are likely to have to use it, it is probably sufficient.

235. Major *Anson.*] Delhi is still a fortified place, is not it?—There is no regular fortification at Delhi; the garrison and the magazine are, as you are aware, in the palace, which, to a certain extent, of course is a fortification; and they have adapted it more for purposes of defence. At Lahore there is an old native fort, which commands the town in some way, and in which we keep a small garrison, a company or two of Europeans; and Mooltan they are now, I believe, making a fortified place.

236. Captain *Vivian.*] Is that an important post?—Mooltan, I think, is a very important post; it is a support to the Punjaub frontier, and there is a magazine there which contains the stores.

237. *Chairman.*] There are several small works along the Indus, are there not?—All along the frontier there are small posts right down from Peshawur, and in the Peshawur Valley; there are small posts for one or two companies.

238. Major *Anson.*] Those are chiefly held by native troops?—Entirely by native troops, I believe.

239. Mr. *Oliphant.*] What arrangement is proposed to be made with regard to hill stations for the troops?—It is proposed to be arranged that about 12 per cent. should be in the hills, some portion of which is composed of regiments that have been shaken by disease, and the other portion is made up of men who are thought to require change of air by the medical officer.

240. Are there no regular stations on the hills?—There is a station for one regiment at Subathoo, and one at Dugshai, and there is one making in the hills near Mussooree.

241. Lord *William Hay.*] Those are hill stations proper?—Yes; and there is a wing of a regiment at Darjeeling.

242. Major *Anson.*] There has been a great discussion as to which is the best system, massing the European troops in healthy stations or scattering them broadcast over the country; can you give the Committee any information about that?—I think if you obtain all the documents that have been received in this country, mainly, I believe, at the India Office, regarding the distribution of troops in India, it will be seen that all those considerations have been very fully gone into, with a view to endeavour to mass them to some extent, and at the same time to endeavour to hold every important point. With regard to unhealthy stations, those that have proved themselves to be unhealthy have been, in some cases, abandoned, if there were not strong military or political considerations

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siderations for holding them. But some stations which are unhealthy it is absolutely necessary to hold; others get a reputation of being unhealthy one year and recover their good reputation the next; so that it is very difficult to decide that a certain station shall be given up merely because it is unhealthy for a year or so. If it is given up, very likely when the troops are removed it will turn out to be a very healthy place afterwards; for example, Allahabad was given up as a very unhealthy place some years ago, although it is a cool place; but at the time of the mutiny the pressure of circumstances rendered it necessary for troops to be sent there, and it then turned out to be very healthy indeed, and troops were subsequently sent there to regain their health; but it seems now to have gone back to its former character, and there has been a good deal of fever there.

243. Do you think that it would be advisable to employ, in places where it is desirable to have other than native troops, a certain number of Chinese troops to do the work of Europeans?—I do not know much about the Chinese, but I think it would be a very bad plan; it would have a very bad effect upon the natives. The natives would dislike our bringing other Asiatics amongst them, and collisions would probably occur between the two descriptions of troops.

244. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the Chinese are better soldiers than the native troops themselves?—I have never seen the Chinese as troops.

245. Captain *Vivian.*] You have heard of the very fine body of Chinese Regulars that were raised in 1862, I think, by Colonel Gordon of the Engineers?—Yes, but I have no particular knowledge of the character of the fighting they have had with their own countrymen; naturally with European officers they would be better, I think, than other Chinese without European officers. It is not their fighting qualities that I so much doubt as I should doubt the expediency of having them in India. They would not be so cheap as native Indian troops, I fancy.

246. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The Malays do not conflict, I think, with the natives of the Island of Ceylon; the Ceylon Rifle Regiment is composed entirely of Malays, I believe?—It is very small in number, and I think you will find that it is not composed entirely of Malays by any means; there are a large number of Madrasees; they have found a great difficulty in getting Malays.

247. Formerly they were all Malays, and the Malay element did not conflict at all with the native element in the island?—Yes; but I do not think the Singalese are a warlike nation, who would look with jealousy upon any other native soldiers brought amongst them, as our Sikhs and Affghans would upon Chinese garrisoned amongst them.

248. Lord *William Hay.*] One of the recommendations of the sanitary commission which has been referred to was, that a sufficient number of hill stations, or stations on elevated ground, be provided, and that a third part of the force be located in those stations, in rotation; can you say how far that recommendation has been carried out?—That was a recommendation of the sanitary commission, who had not before them the political and military considerations which have to be taken into consideration in India. The question was discussed upon that report with an anxious desire to have as many of the troops in the hills as possible, and it was thought that at present there were no places from which troops could be withdrawn, beyond three or four regiments, and a per-centage of the men of other regiments; and so many of the plain stations were as healthy in point of per-centage of sickness and mortality as hill stations, that the necessity for carrying out the recommendation did not seem so important.

249. Such stations as Geloondra?—Yes; Geloondra, Rarapondra, Shahghur, and Bareilly.

250. In Lord Strathnairn's evidence before the Recruiting Commission, he complains of the withdrawal of the troops from Roy Bareilly, a place which he says is admirably adapted for the reserves wanted for Allahabad?—The regiments were not wanted in Oude; they were wanted elsewhere in the general reductions of the army, and Roy Bareilly seemed a place which, though it might be slightly healthier than the others, might be given up, whereas the others could not be given up; and it was not thought that it would be of any use for the defence of Allahabad, for really the Allahabad garrison is killed with taking care of itself, and could not be reduced by having half of it at Roy Bareilly without danger, there being a large arsenal and fort to be protected.

251. The expression which Lord Strathnairn uses is, that "Roy Bareilly ought to be a support and reserve for Allahabad and Cawnpore"?—That whole question was gone into by Lord Strathnairn with the Government of India, and after much consideration it was thought better to have a small garrison at Allahabad, no more than was necessary; and it was considered that it hardly required a reserve, and that having a force at Roy Bareilly would interfere with the withdrawal of the troops out of the plains as much as possible. I am not aware of any station in India, certainly not in Bengal, from which the authorities would like to see troops withdrawn at which they now are.

252–5. Is not it true that Sir John Lawrence was rather at issue upon that question of massing the troops in the hills, with such authorities as Lord Strathnairn?—Lord Strathnairn said that he would like more regiments in the hills; but I do not think there was any definite plan proposed, or that he exactly clearly said what stations could be given up, but of course he was very anxious for the health of the troops. The question was most carefully discussed (the Papers are accessible, I have no doubt) in the beginning of 1865, when a complete scheme for the distribution of the army was sent home after all the local governments and the Commander-in-Chief had been consulted, as well as the sanitary considerations taken into account.

256. Do you happen to know what, up to the time of the transfer of the Straits Settlements, was the garrison maintained there?—Two regiments of native infantry from Madras and three batteries of garrison artillery.

257. Of British artillery?—Yes; that includes a detatchment sent to Behar.

258. Is it an arrangement which is considered satisfactory by military men, to have British artillery supported by native infantry?—No; it is not satisfactory; it would have been desirable to have had European infantry there, and barracks were constructed long ago for them; but it was not easy to spare them, and it was considered that they might be sent there if occasion arose.

259. There is no native artillery there, is there?—No; there is no native artillery, but the Punjaub frontier force has a small mounted battery, and there are three batteries of native artillery

lery in the Bombay Presidency to give relief to Aden. Sir William Mansfield having represented that if there were not a large force available for that purpose, gun lascars might have to be raised, which was considered objectionable, and there is also a small battery of native artillery where it was considered requisite to have guns, at Kanderpore and at Attock; but, practically, for the purposes of offence against us, it may be said that the native artillery is nowhere except at Hyderabad, where four native batteries form part of the contingent force, which, I believe, under treaty cannot be converted into Europeans, but they have only four guns each there.

260. Supposing that a plan could be adopted for employing native troops to replace British troops in the colonies, as has been proposed, do you know of any objection that there would be to employing native artillery as well as native infantry, and do you know of any objection to raising native artillery force for that purpose?—I do not. If natives would willingly go, I should think they might be very usefully employed as garrison artillery in such places as Malta or Gibraltar.

261. But you would not recommend raising a native artillery force to be employed in India?—I think we ought not to add any more to the native artillery force which is kept up, more as a matter of necessity, in order to avoid having the European in unhealthy and distant places than from choice.

262. Do you yourself consider the arrangement of garrisoning a station by British artillery and native infantry only, an objectionable one?—I do not think it is a good one, but we must draw a distinction between field artillery and garrison artillery. I should think it would be highly objectionable to have only a native force with British field artillery, whose guns they might perhaps seize, or, at all events, hamper them, and prevent them from acting. I think that objection would not so much apply to garrison artillery.

263. Apart from the possibility of the guns being seized, is it not necessary that artillery should be supported by an infantry force in whom they have complete confidence?—It is desirable; but we know that over and over again we have had none but native troops with European artillery in action in India, and very considerable achievements have been performed by them. It is the experience of the mutiny that has led us to dread it.

264. Are you aware that the Commander in Chief, and the other authorities of the Horse Guards, have always protested against leaving at any station a force of British artillery unsupported by British infantry?—Yes; we have endeavoured in India to prevent that as far as possible. When any regiment has been withdrawn from sanitary considerations from some station, wherever it could be managed, a company or two has been left, but the Straits Settlements have always been garrisoned in this way; and there is so little temptation to the native troops to mutiny there, and there is so little likelihood of their doing so, that the objection has not quite the same force there as it would have elsewhere.

265. As the native army is now composed, do you consider that all the native regiments would be equally available for garrison duty out of India?—No; I think some are composed of races which it would be more difficult to move than others; for instance, I think Goorkas would be very difficult regiments to take; there would be very great difficulty in employing them abroad.

266. Have you any idea what arrangements you would make if you were told that in future, as a permanent arrangement, 10 or 12 Indian regiments would be required to go abroad out of India, and you had to make the best arrangement you could, either by raising new regiments, or by supplying them from your existing force?—I think it would be a matter to be settled by very serious consultation with some of our most experienced officers of the native regiments as to what would be the best plan, whether to raise particular corps for the service by volunteers from the present corps, or to employ the corps as they stood from the roster, or to call for volunteers to enlist for the service.

267. You do not think that you could take Indian regiments from the roster just as they stood, taking them from the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras armies in regular rotation?—I think that would create great dissatisfaction, and a great feeling of disquietude in Bengal certainly, and to a lesser extent in the other Presidencies.

268. In any arrangement it would be necessary to raise new regiments; you do not think that any of the existing regiments could be placed at disposal for this service?—Two of the regiments have been placed at disposal from the Straits, so that we could not say that two regiments could not be spared, and some of the native Madras regiments will not be wanted in Bombay, so that altogether, probably, three or four regiments might be spared, but then they are the only reserve we have in case of war to replace the regiments at the seat of war.

269. If they are not wanted for the purpose I have referred to, they will be reduced by the India Government, will they not?—Yes; no doubt. There is every year great difficulty about the estimates; four regiments of Madras native infantry were reduced three years ago on that account; we hoped that two regiments of Bombay native infantry might be reduced, but they said they could not spare them, and they remain with 30 regiments. Whether any reduction will take place in consequence of this reduction of two regiments from the Straits Settlements, I do not know, I should suppose it would.

270. Have you any personal knowledge of the Ceylon Rifle Corps?—I have seen them two or three times, or portions of them rather, at Colombo and Galle.

271. Do you know whether they are considered an efficient corps?—For the simple duties which devolve on them there, I presume they are, but I do not know how they would do for a campaign involving much marching about; they are quite untried for anything of that kind.

272. They are not composed entirely of Malays, are they?—A great many Madrasees are in the corps now, I believe. I may observe that they are highly paid.

273. Do you think it would be possible to extend the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps by adding new battalions which might be composed of other races than the Malays and Indians, and which would be able to replace existing colonial corps, or even British troops in the colonies in the tropics?—It might be; but I have heard that when the Ceylon rifle regiment furnished a detachment for Hong Kong, as they did some years ago,

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ago, and I believe are now doing again, they had a difficulty in getting any recruits they liked to take.

274. Then they recruited or attempted to recruit entirely from Malays or Madrasees?—I believe so; the system you allude to would get over one difficulty, namely, that with regard to the pay of the officers; according to the present arrangement a junior subaltern in a native infantry regiment draws more pay than a lieutenant colonel of a regiment of the line.

275. Would it not be possible to add another battalion (say a Chinese battalion) to the Ceylon rifle regiment for service in Hong Kong, the officers to be interchangeable from Ceylon to Hong Kong, and *vice versa*; but the Chinese men always to remain and do duty at Hong Kong?—I presume it would be possible; but I am told that there would not be much confidence in a Chinese regiment at Hong Kong.

276. In the same way, it would be possible to recruit for fresh battalions of the Ceylon rifles in India for service in Hong Kong?—That experiment remains to be tried; I have my doubts as to whether this Belooch corps, which has been talked of for Hong Kong, will be easily raised in India.

277. Would there not be some advantage if, instead of raising a distinct corps as is now proposed by the War Office to be done, it was attached to and formed of the organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps?—That appeared to me to be the most obvious plan; but I was told that recruiting in the Celyon Rifles was so difficult, that it could not be thought of when I mentioned it, but possibly, as you say, they might be recruited from other races; that has not been tried yet; but I do not know of any but the Malays and the people of India, except the Chinese, whom I believe there is great objection to employing in China.

Saturday, 9th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Viscount Cranborne.	Mr. Oliphant.
Sir James Fergusson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Lord William Hay.	Sir William Russell.
Captain Hayter.	Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel HENRY WYLIE NORMAN, called in; and further Examined.

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278. *Chairman.*] HAVE you anything to add to your evidence of yesterday?—Yes, I should like to add to it on some points. I wish to put in a memorandum of the composition of the native army as respects the non-commissioned officers and rank and file of its principal branches for the armies of the three Presidencies.—(*The same was handed in*, vide *Appendix.*) Mr. Laing asked me some questions about the relative cost as respects pay of British and native corps. I have prepared a memorandum showing the pay and allowances, and charges for the different corps of the different branches of the army, exclusive of the commissariat, ordnance, clothing, and barrack charges, and the capitation allowance to the British Government, which is at the rate of 13 *l.* 10 *s.* per annum.

279. Are those figures adjusted to corps of equal sizes?—To the corps complete.

280. Are the native and foreign corps equal in the number of men of which they are composed?—No; but the number of men is shown in each corps in this memorandum.

281. You have not reduced it to the cost per man?—No; but that could be done very easily by calculation. There is the cost of each corps, native and European, in the Indian army in this paper.

282. Will you put it in?—I will.—(*The same was handed in*, vide *Appendix.*)

283. Have you any further information to add to that which you gave us yesterday?—Yes. I would ask leave to observe, that the objections I raised to the employment of native troops on colonial service in no way extended to their employment on field service anywhere, or, in case of emergency, to their temporary employment in the colonies, supposing it was necessary to withdraw British troops for any temporary and pressing emergency. I would allude also to the difference between a soldier and a coolie. As I understand the coolie emigration, the coolie goes out of his own free will, with a view to better himself; and, in fact, in a few years to come home with what to him is a considerable fortune. He also is allowed, I believe, in most cases, to take his family with him. No such option could well be given to the native soldier as the coolie has, nor could he be allowed to take his family, nor has he the same prospect of making a fortune, nor does he in any way better his position. There is also a danger which strikes me may arise from regiments being sent to the colonies, and being there placed under generals who, with their staff, are quite ignorant of the prejudices of the native soldiers, and who may have, in some cases, rather a contempt for them. In 1864, at the request of the Ceylon Government, a corps of pioneers was formed in the Punjaub, and sent to Ceylon on liberal terms of pay, but when they reached there a misunderstanding occurred with the local authorities as to the terms of the men's service, and how they should be employed, and it resulted in the bulk of the regiment deserting and making their way up through Ceylon and through the Madras Presidency towards the Punjaub, some of them dying in the jungles on the road. Major Anson asked me a question as to the pensions of the native troops, I did not answer it as completely as I should like to have done. The pension of a sepoy is four rupees a month, but it goes up according to the grade, until the pension of a subadar major of 40 years' service is 65 rupees a month; a pensioner also takes with him any order of merit pay which he may have gained for valour in the field during his service. If he is a member of either of the Orders of British India he takes with him, when he retires on his pension, the pay of that order, so that it is possible that a subadar major and a suda bahadoor, which is the first class of the Order of British India, would have 125 rupees a month pension. Major Anson asked me to specify the fortifications in India; I only mentioned a few. Probably it would be hardly expected of me to mention all of them immediately, considering how numerous they are, but I might mention generally, that of fortifications in the European sense there are very few.

284. Major *Anson.*] All I wanted to know was the fortifications that were garrisoned by European soldiers; they are not so very many, are they?—Those which are garrisoned are not so very many, but there are a good number that have a European regiment at hand, which gives a guard for them; many of them are hardly garrisons in a European sense, though no doubt they could be held against any native enemy. With regard to Lord William Hay's questions about Roy Bareilley not being occupied as a large station, in compliance with some recommendation of Lord Strathnairn's, I might add to what I said, that the Government of India were not satisfied, from the experience of a comparatively short time, with a small body of troops at Roy Bareilley, that its healthiness was so assured as to justify

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justify them in forming a very large cantonment there. The Marquis of Hartington asked what would be the measures taken if the Government of India received orders to send 12 native regiments to the Colonies; I think that if the Government of India received such an order they would receive it with feelings almost amounting to dismay, certainly with a great sense of difficulty. But the first consideration would be, in what manner to replace these men, supposing they were taken away; for I apprehend that the Government of India would be quite unable to spare 12 regiments for permanent garrison duty from the present native army, without raising other regiments in lieu of them. I think I have nothing else to say with regard to the evidence of yesterday. I wish now to speak about the employment of Chinese troops.

285. Colonel *North.*] In speaking of the Colonies, do you refer to our colonies bordering upon India, or to all of our colonies; for instance, you mean the Mauritius and Ceylon; but would you come further towards Europe?—Just now I was only alluding to the withdrawal of 12 regiments; for whatever colony they were intended, the drain upon India would be the same.

286. I understand you to say that in time of war the native troops would go to any of our colonies?—To any suitable colony; perhaps there might be rather a difficulty about Canada, but the Cape they could go to.

287. The Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon?—Yes, and of course such foreign service as in Egypt.

288. You would include Gibraltar and Malta?—If it was necessary for native troops to be sent there in time of war, I do not think there would be any insuperable objection to it.

289. Major *Anson.*] What are your objections to the employment of Chinese troops or other troops, not European, foreign to India?—I think, to bring Chinese troops, or any other Asiatic troops to India, if they were intended to replace Indian troops, would be very dangerous, and very costly. If they were intended to replace European troops; it would be equally dangerous, and the arrangement would, I consider, tend very materially to weaken our secure hold of the country.

290. Why do you think it would be dangerous to replace European troops by Chinese?—Because I do not consider that Chinese troops would be equal to European troops in any way; they could not be depended upon either for fighting qualities or for fidelity, and certainly the European population in India would not have the confidence in Chinese troops that they have in British; nor do I think our artillery (a question was asked on that point yesterday) would feel they had sufficient support in Chinese troops, or at any rate, a support equal to what they have in British troops.

291. Captain *Vivian.*] Have you had much experience of Chinese troops?—No.

292. Upon what do you base your opinion that Chinese troops would not be as good soldiers?—On all I have read of the wars with the Chinese, and the accounts I have read of large masses of them being defeated by small bodies of our troops, and driven from strong positions with very small loss on our part.

293. *Chairman.*] When you say "our own troops," do you mean British troops?—Both British troops and native Indian troops.

293*. Captain *Vivian.*] Have you read, on the other hand, of the conduct of the Chinese troops led by Colonel Gordon in the last wars in China?—They were fighting against other Chinese, and they were organised by British officers, and led by British officers. I should have no doubt that a body of Chinese troops organised and led by a British officer would easily thrash another body of Chinese troops led by their own people.

294. Do you not think that any body of Chinese officered by British officers would equally hold their own against any body of native troops that could be brought against them in India, whether Sikhs, or Affghans, or Mahrattas, or whatever they might be?—I am not certain of that.

295. *Chairman.*] Are not the Chinese very liable to be enrolled in secret societies?—Yes, most of the Chinese in Singapore are said to be so.

296. Is not the tendency of those secret societies to undermine the Government, as was the case in China?—I am not aware of what the tendency of those secret societies is; but they would be very dangerous in the army, certainly.

297. It was those secret societies that produced the rebellion at Sarawak, was not it?—I have no information upon that subject.

298. Major *Anson.*] Do you think that our employing foreign mercenaries would have a bad effect upon the minds of the natives of India?—I think it would have the very worst effect; I think they would believe that we for some reason or other were unable to furnish British troops, and I think the foreign mercenaries would be very apt to come into collision with the natives in various ways.

299. *Chairman.*] Do you apply that remark to all Asiatic foreign mercenaries?—I should apply it to Malays and all people who come from out of India whom the natives are not accustomed to see employed as soldiers in our service.

300. Is not there a black contingent at Hyderabad?—If your Lordship means under the Nizam, I am not aware what troops the Nizam has. Very many native princes have had a few Abyssinians and people of that sort in their service for special purposes.

301. Have they shown any tendency to quarrel with the natives of India?—I am not aware, but the Arabs have always given much trouble there, I believe.

302. There are many Arab troops in Kattywar, are there not?—There may be under natives.

303. Major *Anson.*] Why should it have a worse effect upon the natives for us to employ Chinese than to employ Belloochee troops?—Because the Belloochees are much more like all other natives of India than the Chinese are, who are of an entirely different religion and of different habits.

304. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I suppose the natives of all parts of India are very well aware of the existence of nations belonging to other parts of Hindostan, and know the Beloochees to be natives of Hindostan, whereas if Chinese were employed, the natives of India would know very well that they belonged to a different country altogether?—Perfectly, and the inhabitants of some districts are so very like those of the adjoining district that there is sometimes very little distinction between them; for instance, it is difficult to tell except from his dress or language a Beloochee from an Affghan, and they are Mahometans too.

305. Major *Anson.*] We have many men in our service of the same religion as the Chinese, I suppose?—I am not aware of that.

306. Are there none that we enlist from the hills who are at all events well acquainted with the Chinese religion?—Some of them may know something about it, but I am not aware that there is a single Buddhist in the Indian army.

307. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you not think that the parallel hardly holds good between European and native Governments employing foreign Asiatic troops, inasmuch as a European sovereign would naturally use his own people, and the employment of Arabs or Beloochees would be exceptional, whereas when a native prince uses the same mercenaries it is the ordinary custom of the country. In Hyderabad and in Kattywar, and wherever they use foreign troops, the native Governments use those foreign mercenaries according to old-established custom, as if they were their own people, so that for the Government of Baroda, or the Government of the Nizam, or the chiefs in Kattywar to employ Arab troops is very much the same thing as for the British Government to employ British troops. But the point that would strike the natives would be, that if a European Government employed Arabs he could not get Europeans, whereas if a native employed them it would be his natural military resource. Is that your view of the case?—I believe a native prince generally brings in those mercenaries as a sort of body-guard for himself, and as a safeguard against an insurrection of his own people or among the troops of his own nation and territory; but it does not always succeed.

308. *Chairman.*] What construction do you imagine the natives would put upon our employing Chinese: that the Englishmen would not serve, or that we had got poor, or what?—That we were unable to keep up the army which they had been accustomed to see in India of European soldiers.

309. They would not understand the view of economy?—I am not certain that there would be such a great economy in it; but whatever passes in England is very soon known by the natives, and I have no doubt that the native press will give information about the difficulties of recruiting, and so on, in the British army.

310. Captain *Vivian.*] The natives have not always been accustomed to see the large British army which there now is in India?—There are only 13,000 men more than there were before the mutiny.

311. That is a very large increase, is it not?—No; we now hold many places which we used not to hold, and we have greatly reduced the native army. If those 13,000 British soldiers were replaced by 13,000 Chinese, I think it would seem to the natives a sign of weakness.

312. There are more than 13,000 more British troops than there were before the mutiny, are there not?—No, there were 45,000 European soldiers in India at the beginning of 1857, and there are 58,000 and some hundreds now; there ought to be more.

313. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The number is 68,000, is not it?—No, 58,000. The establishment, including officers, is 65,000 according to the War Office Estimates; 3,065 of those are officers, and there are vacancies, so that according to the last returns there are 58,700 men actually in India of non-commissioned officers and rank and file, of whom about 54,000 were fit for duty out of hospital; that includes all branches and all ranks, except officers.

314. Colonel *North.*] You stated, I think, that they were 3,000 under the establishment besides that?—Between 3,000 and 4,000.

315. Major *Anson.*] In the case of another outbreak in India, such as the mutiny of 1857, what effect do you think railways would have upon the war in the upper part of the country?—To a certain extent they would no doubt be very useful; but we must not rely upon them too much, for we have in many places sections of railway for 200 or 300 miles without a single station upon the line. Under those circumstances it would be almost impossible to protect the whole line of railways. At the same time, no doubt the railway would be of great use in bringing up the men and in bringing up the stores. But when you get to the end of your railway, unless you have carriage and equipment for the troops, so as to make them moveable, the railway is not of much use except to protect the place at the end of the line of railway itself.

316. In case the railways were broken up in different places, would there not be greater difficulty in procuring transport than you had before the railways were opened?—I believe the difficulty of procuring carriage has increased, and the number of cattle kept up by the Government is much less than it used to be; but still at most of the large stations there is a small moveable column of all arms kept ready equipped to take the field at the shortest notice.

317. Is there any instance of moving the troops by railway in India lately that you can mention to the Committee?—Nearly all the reliefs of infantry are carried out by railway when their course lies along a line of railway; for instance, British regiments (or even Indian regiments) coming from the North-Western Provinces come by rail from Delhi to Calcutta, and *vice versâ.* The railway is used as much as possible, but it is not used much for artillery and cavalry, as so much rolling stock is required for the conveyance of the horses and the grass cutters and ponies that accompany the cavalry and artillery, that it is a very long business to convey a whole regiment of dragoons, or even a battery of horse artillery by rail, so they generally march; but the railway is very extensively used for the infantry for drafts of men without horses. With regard to the question of carriage, I may mention that when the Umballah campaign was going on in 1863, and troops had to be moved up from Meerut to support the troops in the field, a great difficulty was experienced in getting carriage to move them, and there was delay in consequence in marching from Meerut and other places, where formerly the carriage used to be more abundant.

318. You do not think, then, that the establishment of railways should ever be made an excuse for reducing the number of European troops in India?—I cannot at present anticipate any such completion of the railway system for many years to come, as would in my humble opinion justify a reduction much below the present strength of the European troops in India. I think the reduction has been made in anticipation of railways that have yet to be made.

319. I suppose you think that the European force in India should always be kept up in proportion to the number of native troops you have, as the native army is our chief source of anxiety

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in India; is that your view of the case?—I do not think there need necessarily be any fixed proportion between the native army and the European army. Of course it would be unwise to have a much larger native army than the European army; but with the present proportion, which we may take as, in round numbers, two natives to one European, I do not think there is any probable danger to be anticipated from a mutiny; I would not much increase the native army, without making some increase in the number of Europeans. I believe that they are both at the minimum for their duty; I believe that you could not reduce the native army now without throwing the duty a great deal too hard upon the men that remain.

320. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The establishment for both arms of the service is calculated upon the amount of duty to be performed, is not it?—Yes, I do not think we have any necessity for retaining a single British soldier in India at the present moment in excess of the duties required from them, on account of the native army. Supposing that we could do with 80,000 native soldiers instead of 125,000, I do not think there would be any reason for reducing the Europeans. Nor, supposing it was thought desirable to increase the European army for any particular duty that might be required of them, do I think it would be desirable to increase the native army above its present strength. The duties required of both are really separate, and to be judged of for each separately.

321. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] In fact, you regard the European army as being kept there rather for the purpose of protecting the general interests, and supporting the Government of the country, than for the purpose of watching the native army?—Yes; at the same time, one would not like to see the native army without the European army.

322. *Chairman.*] What towns are there in India of such a size that you think they require to be watched by European troops?—There are a great number; most of the large cities. I do not mean to say that any great or very widespread injury would arise from an insurrection at any of them, but of course the presence of a few European troops might save loss of life, and the murder of all the Europeans in case of an outbreak at places such as Delhi, or Benares, or Patna, or Agra, or Secunderabad.

323. Or Peshawur?—At Peshawur, the city, I think, is a comparatively small place, compared to the immense number of hostile and warlike tribes who are within a few miles of the cantonment. The city could be overawed by a comparatively small body of troops.

324. At all those places you are liable to fanatical outbreaks, are you not?—At any moment.

325. And it is only in that case that the army can be said to be doing the police duty of India, in the sense of keeping a watch over those large centres of population?—Quite so; I may mention that when Colonel Mathieson was assassinated at Peshawur, I happened to be there, and though it was the act of a single fanatic, immense excitement immediately followed; I have not the slightest doubt that if there had not been a considerable force on the spot, there would have been a general rising.

326. Captain *Vivian.*] You mean a force of European troops?—Of European and native troops.

327. Are the native troops of any use in putting down a fanatical rising of that nature?—I think they may be generally trusted; of course there may be cases where a large body of Mahometan troops might sympathise with a Mahometan rising; but we have endeavoured to have them mixed in the garrisons as far as possible.

328. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] A rising at Peshawur would have been almost entirely Mahometan, would it not?—Yes; and at that time the native troops we had there would not have sympathised with anything of the kind.

329. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You have derived this advantage from having your regiments mixed; that whatever the religious fanaticism may be, a large portion of the native troops at your command cannot possibly share in it?—That is the case with regiments of mixed composition; but some regiments are formed of one description of men.

330. *Chairman.*] How many men do you keep at Secunderabad?—We keep at Secunderabad a battery of horse artillery, two light field batteries, a heavy field battery, a regiment of dragoons, a regiment of light cavalry, two regiments of British infantry, and three regiments of native infantry.

331. Of what class are the native troops?—They are Madras regiments.

332. They would, therefore, be Hindoos?—No, the Madras army has a large proportion of Mahometans; I think the proportion is one-third in the infantry, and seven-eighths in the cavalry.

333. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] The numerical statement you have given of the troops at Secunderabad is exclusive of the Contingent?—Yes; none of them are at Secunderabad, though there is a garrison of them a few miles off.

334. Major *Anson.*] What troops are there at Benares; are there any Europeans?—There was a regiment of European infantry there lately, but in consequence of sickness a wing was removed to the hills. We have there now a troop of horse artillery, four troops of dragoons, a wing of British infantry, and a regiment of native infantry.

335. Sir *James Fergusson.*] But that establishment is only temporarily reduced, is not it, pending the erection of new cantonments?—I doubt whether the wing will ever be sent back, as it has gone to the hills; and there was a general impression that the troops now stationed there would be sufficient for the local purposes of Benares, and that it would be undesirable to have any more troops there than were necessary, as the place, I believe, will always be more sickly than many of the stations higher up. It is also to be borne in mind that Benares and Dinapore are important positions if there should ever be differences with Nepaul, as there is a long line of frontier to be protected.

336. Major *Anson.*] Have you ever thought what would be the effect upon India if we were engaged in a great European war, and had to withdraw large bodies of troops from India?—Yes. If we had to withdraw large bodies of European troops from India for a long time, of course there would be a risk.

337. Do you not think, then, that it would be desirable to be able to withdraw native troops at the same time, and do for a short time with as few troops as possible?—I think that you could not do for any length of time, certainly, with any

any much less native force than you have now; and if you sent a native army of 20,000 or 30,000 men on foreign service, you would have to raise some in their room, and I believe your doing so would have a good effect upon the population. I think that was shown very much during the mutiny. In those districts where we were able to raise troops on the north-western frontier, we enlisted all the turbulent people for the time being on our side, and Peshawur was never more quiet than during the mutiny; all the bad characters were sent down to fight our battles.

338. Have you ever thought over the possibility of our employing a native army in connection with Europeans in Egypt, or places of that sort?—I have very often thought over it.

339. *Chairman.*] Supposing there were differences with Abyssinia, how many troops could you spare from India for such an operation?—I suppose that 8,000 or10,000 men could be sent for a time; perhaps it might be necessary to replace them by temporary levies in particular places.

340. You could do with 10,000 men short?—I am not certain that we could without raising some in their room, but they could be sent off, and the Government of India could arrange for other men in their places until fresh levies could be got together.

341. Major *Anson.*] If you had to employ a large number of native troops out of India, there would be no objection to raising other regiments to do the duties which it is proposed for them to do?—There might be, but if there were an emergency of the kind it would be necessary to resort to exceptional measures, which would always bring in men.

342. By offering a bounty?—Either by a bounty, or by an offer of commissions to men of influence for bringing in a certain number of men; that was done during the mutiny.

343. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you remember how many native troops we sent to the Persian Gulf?—I speak with some doubt, but I think we sent about six regiments of native infantry, and two of native cavalry; we could have sent a great many more of course at that time.

344. In the Affghan war we must have sent double or treble that number?—I should think we must have had 15,000 or 16,000 troops in Affghanistan at the time that General Pollock and General Nott were both in Affghanistan together.

345. Major *Anson.*] Do you not think that if we had several of the native infantry regiments dispersed in our colonies and completely in our power, it would give us a great hold upon the other native regiments in case we had to withdraw European regiments from India in time of pressure?—I would not rely upon that as a security.

346. The native regiments are recruited in the same districts, and they know each other well; there are friends and relations in different regiments?—If the men in India were inclined to mutiny, I do not think that would keep them from mutinying; they would know that we should not deal harshly with the regiments in the colonies on their account.

347. Do you not think that it would be useful to have the power, in case of any disturbance in a regiment, of sending it off to an out-of-the-way colony, to remove it from influencing other regiments?—I think that that would be rather a dangerous measure.

348. You do not consider that there would be any danger of mutiny in a colony, in a place like China for instance, or the Mauritius on the part of the native troops?—Not much; if they were in a minority. I am not aware what the strength of the European troops in Java was when the mutiny of the native troops took place there; but I have no doubt that there was some body of European troops there.

349. Captain *Vivian.*] Do I rightly understand you to say that, in your opinion, it is impossible to reduce the strength of either the European or the native troops in India, without endangering the safety of our hold upon that country?—That is rather stronger than I have put it. I think that for the purposes of complete security, we have not too large an army of either British soldiers or natives. As I mentioned yesterday, there are some regiments available now; there are two from the Straits which are in excess of the establishment. I conceive that, perhaps, they might be dispensed with, and owing to a redistribution of troops, a small Madras force has been dispensed with in Bengal; so that, perhaps, to a small extent a reduction might be made. But, speaking generally, I think we are at about the minimum.

350. Speaking generally, you think it is necessary to keep about 125,000 native troops, and about 65,000 European troops in India?—I think so; I do not think that a few thousand native troops, more or less, would materially affect our security.

351. What was the strength of the sepoy army?—Two hundred and thirty-two thousand men.

352. How many Europeans had we in India before the mutiny?—Forty-five thousand of all kinds.

353. The proportion, then, was 45,000 Europeans against 230,000 natives?—Yes.

354. And now it is 125,000 natives against 60,000 Europeans?—Yes; it was more than five to one at that time.

355. Why do you think that such a much larger proportion of Europeans is necessary now?—Because experience has shown us that we had much too small a proportion then; we had large garrisons without a European soldier at that time, we had most important positions held entirely by natives.

356. Sir *James Fergusson.*] And our territory has largely increased, has it not?—Yes; we have a British garrison at Gwalior, which was held by the Maharajah himself before, and we have a British garrison at Jhansi.

357. Captain *Vivian.*] What is the strength of those two garrisons?—The garrison at Gwalior consists of four batteries of artillery, including a garrison battery, a regiment and a half of British infantry, a regiment of native infantry, and two of cavalry. And the garrison at Jhansi is a field battery, a wing of British infantry, a regiment of native cavalry, and a regiment of native infantry; but it is proposed to give up Jhansi again, and to move the troops into our own territory, there being some political difficulty about Jhansi; it belongs to Scindia, and his troops occupy the fort, and it is considered an objectionable arrangement that his troops should be in the fort, and ours in cantonment. The same difficulty arose about Gwalior, but we got him to give up the fort there.

358. Looking at it from a political point of view,

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view, do you think that it would be desirable to bring Chinese troops to India, to replace certain Indian regiments, and to take those Indian regiments to China?—No; I think that that would be a double evil; you would create ill feeling by bringing the Chinese into India, and you would create further ill feeling by sending natives to China, who would much sooner serve in their own country.

359. I understand you to say that it is the habit of the native princes to bring certain foreign troops into their own country to protect them against their own armies?—Yes.

360. Why should not we adopt the same principle as is adopted by the native princes?—The natives can quite understand our bringing our own people into India; they have seen British soldiers for the last century, and they have learnt to some extent, certainly, to look upon them with respect, but I think if we brought in Chinese, they would have quite a different feeling.

361. The principle a native prince has in view is not to use foreigners to protect his own people, but to protect himself by foreigners against his own people?—Yes, but I am not aware that the system has succeeded with the native princes; we find them very often getting upset.

362. It is the system that still prevails, at all events?—I do not know to what extent it prevails.

363. Lord *William Hay.*] Are many of the duties which formerly were performed by that native army now performed by a police force which has a semi-military organisation?—The police take many of the duties which were formerly taken by the native army, or else it would be impossible for us to do with the present reduced native army; but we can hardly now say that the police has a semi-military organisation; they are, to a certain extent, drilled; but so are the police here and everywhere, I believe, and on certain occasions, and at certain places, they have arms; but the per-centage of arms is fixed; at gaol posts, for instance, they have arms. There is a per-centage of arms kept at certain posts, otherwise they would not be able to resist the dacoits.

364. *Chairman.*] Can you say how many arms have been supplied to the police force?—I can only say, in a general way, I understand that 25 per cent. of the force have arms; or, at least, that there are arms for them.

365. Do you know the strength of the force?—I could not speak with any certainty about it.

366. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you not think that the strength of the regular army depends a good deal on the strength of that police force?—Yes; and I think that if any great reduction in the police force were to take place, so that they could not perform some of the duties they now perform, such as escorting treasure and stores along the lines of road, you would have to add probably to the native army, for the regiments are very weak.

367. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Are you acquainted with the southern part of India at all?—Very little, except that in my position as military secretary I see the correspondence about it.

368. Do you know that the population of the northern part of Ceylon is precisely the same as the population of the southern part of India?—Yes.

369. And that Ceylon has been garrisoned entirely by Malays, without any objection on the part of the people of the island, who are of just the same race as the people of the southern part of India. It is true that latterly, as you have said, the Madrasees have to some extent composed the Ceylon Rifles, but formerly all the garrisons of Jafnapatam and Trincomalee, and other posts in the northern part of the island, were Malays; do you not therefore think that, as the population of the south of India are not so warlike a race as the people in the north, the same objection would not exist to introducing Chinese or Malays, or other non-Indian troops into the south of India, which would in the case of the north?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with Ceylon to speak upon that subject, but the number of Malays in the north part of Ceylon is very small; I believe it is limited to a few companies of one regiment, and the people of Ceylon are unwarlike in their character.

370. They are of the same race as the population of the southern part of India?—They have had those Malays, as far as I know, almost ever since we had the island, and they are accustomed to them as part of our system; but any alteration of the military system of India, by bringing in the Asiatic mercenaries, not being Indians, certainly would create a good deal of excitement amongst the native population, in my opinion.

371. Have you heard much of the way in which the Chinese Military Train behaved under fire during the war in China?—I presume you refer to the coolies; I believe they behaved very well.

372. So that, as far as our experience of Chinese troops go, they have behaved very well under fire?—I do not think that that is a criterion of their qualities as soldiers, because I have observed that the natives whom we take as coolies will stand being shot at, though they will not fight actively. I remember that at Delhi we raised a corps of them, and used them to bring up ammunition to the batteries, and they stood so well under fire that I think, in a small corps, there was something like 200 casualties. Those men would have been perfectly useless to attack any enemy, but the mere fact of one of them being shot over every now and then did not appear to have any effect upon the rest.

373. With respect to the Chinese triad and other similar societies, are you aware whether they were originally formed for purposes which were not political, though they have sometimes taken a political character afterwards?—I have heard that they are a great source of anxiety in the Straits Settlement.

374. Colonel *North.*] Even if the Chinese were received in a friendly manner by the natives of India, it does not follow that the climate of India would agree with them. It appeared in the evidence which we received last year in the Hong Kong Committee, that the Ceylon troops when they were sent to China suffered even more than the tremendous mortality which took place in the 11th and 9th Regiments, therefore we could not be certain that the climate of India would not be equally unhealthy for Chinamen going there?—We have no experience, I think, which enables us to say how the Chinese would stand employment in various parts of India, but I may mention one fact: there are Chinese in India in various employments, in Calcutta and on the tea plantations in the hills, and we find that they generally marry natives, and in some degree become assimilated to the people around them, which I think would be a great argument against supposing that they would ever be equal to European troops.

375. Major

375. Major *Anson.*] The Chinese quarter at Calcutta is perfectly distinct from the native quarter, is it not?—To some extent; but the Chinese there marry natives, Portuguese, and those I have seen in the hills on tea plantations, appeared also to marry native women.

376. Sir *James Fergusson.*] If you were to bring Chinese troops into the south of India, would not the mere fact that Chinese troops had been brought into any part of India immediately become known all over India, and create great excitement?—I think it would have a very bad effect where it was known.

377. Is not it a fact that any fresh intelligence, especially of a military character, becomes very rapidly known from one end of India to the other?—I think it probably would become known, particularly if it was done to any extent.

378. Captain *Vivian.*] Do not you think that the natives would get accustomed to it, in a little time?—I do not think they would ever particularly like it.

379. Major *Anson.*] In case of our having another war in China, or in Persia, or on the coast of Africa, we should be obliged to have recourse to our Indian native army in the same way that we had in 1860. The native corps we have raised, the Beloochee battalion for Hong Kong, and the Singalese corps for the Straits Settlements, would not be sufficient to enable us to carry on war in China and other places, would they?—No, not nearly sufficient.

380. And we should be obliged to have recourse to the native army in India, you think?—I think it would be absolutely necessary.

381. Do not you think from your knowledge of military matters generally that it is infinitely better to have the system regularly organised in time of peace which you are obliged to use in time of war?—No, I do not see that at all. I do not see that it is desirable to keep troops in an unhealthy or an unpleasant locality in time of peace, simply because you might have to use them there in time of war. I think it would have the effect of making the natives dislike the service in China.

382. If you get the native army to believe that they are not called upon for service abroad, might it not happen that when the time arrived that you wanted their help for foreign service, they might object to it. If you allowed an interval of 10 or 12 years to pass before you employed them again out of India, they might make a serious objection to leaving their country?—I think it is hardly a question of "getting" them unaccustomed, they are already unaccustomed to foreign service except for field service; that is the present state of the army that we have to deal with. If we were to form a new army the question might arise as to whether we should not habituate them to foreign and colonial service, if it was thought desirable to do so, but you have an army, and an army that is unaccustomed to foreign service already, and which on almost every occasion of being employed on foreign service has been dissatisfied.

383. Would there be any very great difficulties in our habituating the army in future to look to foreign service as a natural consequence of their being enlisted?—I think that any change of the kind would produce great excitement and disquietude in the native army.

384. Even if it was effected very gradually?—You might, of course, raise particular corps to commence at once on the understanding that they were to go on foreign service, then the men would enter those corps with their eyes open. But I see great objections to that; you would have to give them greater advantages than the other men in the service have.

385. Only while on foreign service, I suppose?—I think you would have to give them greater advantages at first to induce them to enlist.

386. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Would it be desirable, in your opinion, to take the form relating to general service out of the oath, so as to have a distinction between the two classes of troops?—No; I think it is desirable that you should have the power of sending any regiments of the native army abroad, because otherwise they might refuse to go on field service, and it might be necessary to send a regiment to a colony even. I think that should be done as sparingly as possible, but, supposing a case of imperial necessity arose, the difficulty would have to be met.

387. Lord *William Hay.*] I understood you to say yesterday, that you would have to call for volunteers in case of requiring regiments to go out of India?—No; I said that in the Madras army that was the practice, as I have ascertained from documents, until comparatively recent years, but I do not think there would be any necessity to call for volunteers for field service.

388. In the Madras army they used to call for volunteers even when the regiments were recruited for general service?—They used to do so, I am not aware that they do now.

389. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] If a regiment were sent on garrison duty to one of the colonies, what do you think would be the effect when it returned; would the reports brought back by the men be favourable or unfavourable?—It would entirely depend upon the circumstances they had encountered. If they had had no sickness, and if they had been to a place the climate of which they liked, and if they had been well treated, and if the duty had not been very hard, and if all things had gone very smoothly with them, perhaps it might have a very good effect upon the other natives in lessening their objection to serve abroad; but if anything had gone wrong with them, if they had had much sickness or mortality, or if they had been mismanaged by the officers in command, or conceived themselves to have been aggrieved in any way (and the natives often conceive themselves to be aggrieved without any cause), they would spread a very unfavourable report. I have not the slightest doubt that the regiment of pioneers which was sent to Ceylon in 1863, and came back, has spread the most unfavourable report about Ceylon, all over the regiment.

390. Sir *James Fergusson.*] There would always be the difficulty about the separation from their families, to which they could hardly be expected to become reconciled?—That would be a great difficulty.

391. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] What has been the effect on their native comrades of the reports of the regiments which returned from China?—I believe there has not been any unfavourable effect, but they went on field service and enjoyed it; they were proud of having been to Pekin, besides having had great extraordinary advantages of various kinds.

392. I meant with regard to the garrison duty at Hong Kong particularly?—I am not aware what report those two regiments which came

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back last from China may have made to their comrades about it.

393. Major *Anson.*] Do you not think that we are very apt, in India, to lay too much stress upon the religious prejudices of the natives in considering any alterations which are proposed, and too apt to find excuses for them on those grounds?—That is a very difficult subject to deal with; on the one hand, we do not allow religious prejudices to interfere too much with the efficiency of the system, but, on the other hand, we cannot altogether ignore them.

394. When railways were first started in India it was generally said that the high caste natives would never make use of them?—I never heard that. I was with a high caste native regiment, just after the railways were opened, and they were loud in their praise of them; some people may have said so in the newspapers, but I do not think it was well founded.

395. *Chairman.*] It was a misapprehension of the religious prejudices of the people?—Yes, by people who did not know much about the subject.

396. Major *Anson.*] It was said that the high caste natives would come in contact with people of the lower castes in the railway carriages?—There may have been something said about it.

397. *Chairman.*] Is the avoidance of contact with people of different castes one of the prejudices of caste?—Only contact with people of very low caste. And so far as that goes that extends to the Sikhs. I can give an illustration of that. During the mutiny two companies of Muzubee sappers were sent down to Futtyghar, and the other Sikh sappers refused to stand in the ranks with them; they were given every chance of withdrawing their objection, but they would not; they all preferred to take their discharges and leave the service sooner than fall in with Muzubees.

398. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] The essential objection, I imagine, to going on foreign service, is in reference to cooking on board ship, that is the great difficulty arising from caste?—That is the great difficulty of the Hindoos.

399. And that objection does not apply to railway travelling, because necessarily that difficulty would never arise in railway travelling?—I do not think that the experienced officers ever anticipated any difficulty with regard to railway travelling.

400. Sir *James Fergusson.*] But as a matter of fact, there is considerable difficulty in railway travelling, is there not, on account of the want of accommodation for cooking at the stations?—Many of the railway arrangements are very bad, and many of the natives who travel long distances suffer great hardships on that account, that applies to all third class passengers as well as troops; they are not allowed time practically to get food or perform any necessary office, nor have they any place at which they can do it.

401. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Are there any Bhootias who are Buddhists in the army?—I do not think so; if there are, they would be so few that they are not included in any separate column; there is a column for "other hill tribes," they may be included in that.

402. Lord *William Hay.*] In the Goorka regiments, are there no Buddhists?—I could not say that there were not two or three. I never heard of them. If there are, they are so few that they are disregarded in the returns.

403. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Are there any Jain men in the Bengal army?—I am not aware of any.

404. Major *Anson.*] With regard to that question which the Marquis of Hartington asked yesterday about the complaints that have been made on the part of the Horse Guards to European artillery being entrusted to the support of native troops, I think that applies to India itself?—I have never seen any complaint to that effect. It was arranged that artillery should always be placed with European troops, and that principle is observed, I think, in every place, with this one exception of Singapore in the Straits, where there are three batteries of garrison artillery and only one regiment of native infantry.

405. There is not the same objection to garrison artillery being supported by native troops as there would be in the case of field artillery, and there is not the same objection to the arrangement at Singapore that there would be to batteries in India being supported by native troops?—Not the same amount of objection, but of course there would be the same objection; the Straits are a peculiar case; the reason for not having European artillery supported by native infantry, was a doubt in the mutiny as to the fidelity of the native troops, but that would hardly apply to Singapore, where a mutiny would be very unlikely.

406. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you see any objection to having one or two regiments entirely officered by natives?—I think it would be better not to have them; but I am aware that very high authorities, including Sir Henry Lawrence, were in favour of it.

407. Were not such regiments employed during the mutiny?—Yes, as a sort of military police, in Oude.

408. Did you ever come across such a regiment yourself?—No, I think not.

409. Do you not remember one commanded by Meer Jaffer?—I know Meer Jaffer intimately, but I did not see him after he was in command of a regiment, or rather while he was with his regiment; but I think there are many objections to raising up a class of native leaders.

410. It would be a good opportunity of rewarding very distinguished native officers, would it not?—I would sooner reward them in any other way; but there is no reward that could be too great for a man like Meer Jaffer, whose fidelity might be depended on under almost any circumstances, I should think; but you might not always get a man of that stamp in command if you once established the system.

411. *Chairman.*] Have you ever had under your consideration any plans for retaining in India a certain number of English troops who had served their time, and were coming home; has that subject ever been under the consideration of the Indian Government?—Yes, and the bounties were fixed at what was thought a liberal and sufficient scale some years ago; but the question still remains whether more men would not stay if a larger bounty was offered to them.

412. The bounties have been found to be practically very inefficacious, have they not?—A considerable number of men have renewed, but a vast number have not done so, and I do not know that any addition to the bounty would very materially alter the number of men who renew, because the temptation is so exceedingly great to them to come home.

413. They

413. They do not take to Indian life at all?—I think they like it as a rule; but this is the sort of temptation which is presented to them: say a man is with his regiment at Peshawur; he gets away from all drill and duty for three months while he is coming down through the Presidency, and then he has the voyage home, and he sees his friends and relations in this country, and then, in a short time, he can go and re-enlist without forfeiting his previous service. It is a sort of temptation that it must be very difficult to resist; but still many do renew, and of the regiments coming home, from a third to a fourth of the men remain, and they are the best men of the regiment. I say the best, because men of bad character, and men who are sick or physically unfit for the service, are not allowed to remain.

414. What is the average age of the men in the service?—I could not say that; I should think it must have considerably altered in the last three or four years, owing to the number of men who have taken their discharge under the 10 years' Act.

415. They are generally very young men, are they not?—Yes; I may mention that I saw all the men who took their discharge from all the regiments in 1864 and 1865, which was very great indeed, pass through Calcutta, and they were the very flower of the army, I should think.

416. Do you encourage men who are taking their discharge, and who do not intend to enlist, to stay in India?—No; there is no organised system of encouragement on the part of the Government, but good men can get employment on the railways.

417. You have no system of granting land to them in parts of India which are fit for the European constitution?—None whatever.

418. Has any such plan ever been under the consideration of the Government?—It has been mooted; but whether it has come to be officially considered by the Government, I do not know; I think not.

419. Do you think that, on the north west frontier, it would be possible, by any such arrangement, to add to the security of the frontier from small inroads or disturbances?—No, I think not; and if these men were to locate themselves in places where there is a liability to disturbance, they would be a great source of anxiety.

420. That is, if they did not locate themselves in numbers sufficient to take care of themselves?—Yes, and on the north western frontier, they would require to be in very large numbers indeed to be able to take care of themselves. By the north western frontier I mean Affghanistan.

421. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] And there is this circumstance also to be taken into account, that it is particularly unhealthy along the base of the hills?—Yes, and if they were in large numbers they would not be able to support themselves by agricultural operations on those very barren hills.

422. Lord *William Hay.*] I suppose they would be liable to insult or injury on the part of the fanatical tribes around them?—Yes, and as mere labourers, which most of them would be, they could not compete with the natives, who could live on much less than they could.

423. You think they could not make a good living in such a way?—I think certainly not.

424. Colonel *North.*] Is there any difference between the bounty given to the men who belonged to the Indian army before the amalgamation of the services and that given to our own troops, to induce them to remain, or is it the same?—It is the same. There are very few men left of the old local army, and who have gone into the British army. There are only 39 of those men in Bengal altogether. I think they do not renew their service unless they go into the British army.

425. What is the amount of bounty that they receive for remaining in India?—It depends upon the length of time they have to serve, the number of years that are unexpired of their service; I suppose you mean to induce them to remain when the regiment comes home.

426. I mean the time-expired men, who may be entitled to their discharge at the end of their 10 years, from regiments which have perhaps only just come to India, or only been serving in India a few years; what bounty would they receive to induce them to re-engage for another period?—The exact sum I cannot say at present, but I think it is nearly as much as 15 *l.* in some cases; it is certainly 10 *l.*

427. I suppose it ought to be large to induce them to remain?—There was some proposal to increase it some little time ago, but it was not carried into effect.

428. Lord *William Hay.*] Are not the soldiers in our Indian regiments allowed to take service with planters and others whilst still in the regiments?—No, not that I am aware of.

429. I remember a case of a man who was librarian in the Simla library whilst still in the army?—I know the case you mention; there have been a very few cases of men being allowed furlough for the purpose of taking employment; but, generally speaking, the furlough has been limited to a few months; and I think in the case you allude to, the man's employment was rather contrary to regulation.

430. During the whole time I was at Simla, we employed a man of that sort; it was not the same man all the time?—That makes a difference; in the hot weather furloughs are given to the men to go to the hills; that was done even before the mutiny, and they were allowed to take any sort of employment they liked during the hot weather.

431. Do you see any objection to increasing that system?—I think we have reduced the establishment so low now, and there are so many men at the convalescent depôts, that if you had a great many men away from the regiments on employment with planters and others, the duty would fall very heavily on those that remained.

432. You think you could not supply their place with other men in the regiment?—No; I may mention that I think nearly a thousand men of the British army are employed on the unattached list; they become supernumeraries directly they take employment in the Commissariat, the Ordnance, or in the Public Works Department. There are a large number of men who have well paid employment, and remain away from their regimental duty for years; some of them never return; they become assistant commissaries or conductors, or receive other appointments.

433. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Their places are filled up, are they not?—Yes; I think that that has hardly been dwelt upon sufficiently as an inducement to enlist. There is no doubt that a soldier enlisting now in the British army with a fair education, and going to India, can get

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employment there, and rise to a very respectable position. That used to be confined to soldiers in the service of the East India Company, but now it is open to the British army.

434. Lord *William Hay.*] Might they not be kept on the railways and still retained in the army?—A proposal of that kind was made some years ago; but I think the Commander in Chief and the Governor General of India rather objected to it.

435. Upon what ground? — Upon various grounds. The men so employed would not be under military control in any way; they are under military control on the unattached list; in nearly every case they are under military officers, and in all cases they are under officers, under the Government.

436. They would be liable to be sent back on misconduct of any kind being proved?—Yes; but it would be difficult to take the report of a station master or an officer of that kind against a soldier as conclusive. There are a great many discharged and pensioned soldiers employed as guards on the railway; some of them do very well, others take to drink and break down, and become rather a nuisance to the community.

437. Sir *James Fergusson.*] What is the bounty at present offered to European soldiers to re-enrol in India?—I am sorry I did not bring a memorandum of that. It varies under different circumstances; I think in some cases it is 10 *l.*, and in others it is as high as 15 *l.*

438. It costs, on the whole, about 50 *l.* to bring a European soldier home on discharge, does not it?—Not the passage money.

439. But altogether?—That must depend upon the station at which the regiment is at the time the man takes his discharge; of course it is much more expensive to bring a man home from a regiment far up the country, because there are not only the transport charges down by railway, and so on, but he charges his pay so much longer after he has ceased to do duty.

440. *Chairman.*] What is the cost from Southampton to Bombay?—The ships have come home round the Cape hitherto; the cost varies every year.

441. Do you know what the charge is to be in future under the new system?—No, I do not know; but I know sometimes it is as high as 30 *l.*; I think even as high as 34 *l.* for soldiers from Calcutta to England.

442. Colonel *North.*] It was 29 *l.* last year?—Every year it varies according to the tenders made by the shipowners.

443. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Supposing a man took his discharge in the North West Provinces, the bringing him down to the Presidency, his passage home, and his pay to the time of his discharge, would not come to much less than 50 *l.*, would it?—No; I have not the slightest doubt that it would be a pecuniary gain to give any good soldier in any part of India 50 *l.* to induce him to renew.

444. At present what is offered to him is not much more than 10 *l.*?—I think not.

445. *Chairman.*] Are you aware whether any objections were raised by the Home authorities against raising the amount of the bounty?—I am not quite certain what the Home authorities said about it; but I think they discouraged any attempt for the present to raise the bounty; it may have been because there were questions under consideration respecting the pay of the soldier, and the conditions of the service generally; but I think the Government of India were quite prepared, as was recommended by Lord Strathnairn, to advocate an increase of bounty.

446. Do you know anything with respect to the cost of transport of a native soldier, for instance, to Rangoon?—There is a contract with the British India Steam Navigation Company for the conveyance of soldiers to and from Burmah. I am not aware of the exact cost, but native soldiers are charged rather less for than European soldiers would be.

447. On what ground is the charge less in the case of a native soldier?—On the ground, which I think is an unsound ground, that they are given less space.

448. Are they given less space? — If the steamer or vessel was full they would have less space, and instances have occurred of native troops being excessively crowded on board ship, and sickness taking place in consequence. From what I have seen of troop ships, I cannot imagine that the space allowed for European soldiers would be at all too much for the natives.

449. A native soldier is not more able to endure crowding than a British soldier, is he?—No, and he is less on deck, probably.

450. His constitution is no stronger, is it?—No, it is weaker.

451. Major *Anson.*] In that climate, namely, the climate of Burmah, is his constitution weaker than that of a European soldier?—In Burmah of late years, the British soldier has been remarkably healthy. Rangoon has been a perfect sanatorium for several years past for the British soldier.

452. But not up the country at Tatmoo? — Even there, the mortality has not been very great, except that there has been an outbreak of cholera. At Tatmoo and Taungmoung the mortality is not more than 30 per thousand.

453. *Chairman.*] What force have we in Burmah?—The garrison at Rangoon is, a battery of garrison artillery, a regiment of British infantry, detaching a company to the Andaman Islands, and a regiment of native infantry. The garrison at Moulmein is a regiment of native infantry, detaching two companies to the Andaman Islands. Tongo and Tialmoo are widely separated from each other; the garrison at each is a battery of artillery, a wing of British infantry, and a regiment of native infantry.

454. Those detachments to the Andaman Islands are entirely for penal purposes, are they not?—Entirely; and there is also a company of British sappers.

455. Do you think that soldiers are necessary to do that gaol duty?—There were no soldiers there for a long time, but they had what they called the Indian Naval Brigade, of seamen who were partly ashore and partly manned a gunboat or two; but a superintendent who was sent down about the year 1862 thought that that was not an efficient arrangement for security, and asked for European troops, and the Government of India, in one of the civil departments, decided that they were requisite.

456. As I understand you, there are about 800 European troops in the Andaman Islands?—No; one company of British infantry, two companies of native infantry, and one company of British sappers.

457. Major *Anson.*] Do any of the native troops that have been employed in China, Singapore,

gapore, or Aden, have furlough during their term of service there?—Not if they are relieved every three years; but men on sick leave, on the recommendation of a medical committee, or of their medical officers, return for a time while on sick leave to their own Presidency.

458. *Chairman.*] Do you know the cost of transport to Aden per head?—No, I do not.

459. Nor to Hong Kong?—No; it must vary very much from time to time according to circumstances.

460. Should we be able to get those figures at the India Office, or should we have to send to India for them?—I should think you would very likely have to send to India for them; but they must vary from time to time according to the rates of freight, and the facility with which ships can be got to take troops.

461. Could not the British India Steam Navigation Company give us the information?—The British India Steam Navigation Company could tell you what their rates were for taking troops from one part of the coast to another; to Burmah and the Straits, for instance; but I do not think their steamers go to China.

462. Captain *Hayter.*] You explained yesterday that the mode of recruiting for the native army, was by detaching small parties with non-commissioned officers?—Yes, when necessary; but very often a regiment can get its recruits from men who come voluntarily to the head quarters of the regiment.

463. The system of recruiting is something similar to the English system, is it not?—Yes; except that it is entirely done by a regimental arrangement, and there is no general system for the army. A commanding officer obtains permission to send a party to whatever district he thinks most favourable.

464. Do particular regiments send to particular districts?—Yes, very much so, because the regiments are formed of particular classes of men, and the regiment must send to the districts where they can get the class of men they want.

465. If this system of employing Indian native troops in the colonies were adopted, do you anticipate any difficulty in recruiting for the troops so quartered beyond the sea, so far as the system is concerned?—No difficulty in the system, because we should form a small depôt for a regiment under some competent officer, who would look after the recruiting, and supply the vacancies which he would know of from time to time by the men of the regiment who were left in the depôt. There would be no difficulty in the system, but I guard myself against saying that there would be no difficulty in getting recruits. As far as the system goes you might, whenever a regiment was on foreign service, have a small depôt where you would keep the sickly men, and drill instructors, and the recruits would be brought in and drilled there.

466. The recruiting parties would be attached to the depôt as in England, I presume?—Yes.

467. And the men could be equally well drilled under that arrangement?—They could be sufficiently well drilled.

468. The recruits in England are drilled at the depôt?—Yes, there would be no difficulty about that.

469. There would be no difficulty about the drilling them?—No, none whatever.

470. *Chairman.*] I think you stated that you knew nothing about the black troops at Hyderabad; you do not know from what part of the world they come?—No; I have heard that they are Abyssinians, or Africans of some kind.

471. Are they Christians or Mussulmen?—I do not even know whether they are Mahometans or not.

472. Lord *William Hay.*] Are they negroes?—Yes, I think so; they are Abyssinian Seedees of some kind, but I have no information really about them. Some two years ago it was deemed rather of importance to ascertain exactly what was the force kept up by each prince in India, and we had the greatest difficulty in getting any reliable information at all; the information we got from Hyderabad was very meagre indeed.

473. Sir *William Russell.*] Do you think that it would be safe to trust either China, or any one of our colonies to the native troops, without a nucleus of Europeans at the same place?—I do not think it would be a satisfactory arrangement, but we have entrusted the Straits for many years to the native troops, with only a small portion of European artillery.

474. Do you consider that they are to be relied upon for active service without a nucleus of Europeans upon which to fall back?—I think it would depend greatly upon the enemy that was brought against them; but that there might be danger in a colony, if there were none but native troops stationed there, of some outbreak amongst them which might be disastrous.

475. Major *Anson.*] All the duties to be performed in our colonies would be garrison duties, which the native troops are very well adapted to do, for they make very good gunners, do they not?—Yes, they make very good gunners.

476. Captain *Hayter.*] You think favourably of them, as garrison artillery?—I think very favourably of them as garrison artillery and as field artillery too.

477. With European troops or with native troops?—With any troops. They used to be very good gunners; the native horse artillery were excellent. It was because they were such good artillerymen that we rather objected to having any of them.

Tuesday, 12th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Viscount Cranborne.	Mr. Oliphant.
Sir James Fergusson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Lord William Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Captain Hayter.	

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir WALTER ELLIOT, K.S.I., called in; and Examined.

Sir *W. Elliot*, K.S.I. 12 March 1867.

478. *Chairman.*] WHAT office have you held?—I was in the Madras Civil Service.

479. At what time?—From 1820 to 1859.

480. Were you in Madras all that time?—No; I was employed in different parts of the country; for the first 13 years I was employed under the Bombay Presidency in the Southern Mahratta country.

481. During the time you were in Madras it was the custom to supply Burmah with Madras troops, was it not?—Yes.

482. Used they to go willingly?—Yes; generally with the greatest alacrity.

483. What was the composition of the troops who went?—Madras Infantry and Sappers.

484. I meant as to race and creed?—The general run of the Madras army, almost all the corps in succession, at least a great many of them, went.

485. Then they were all Hindoos?—No; Hindoos and Mahometans, the usual composition of Madras sepoys.

486. Did you ever hear any objection made by them to crossing the sea?—Yes, on one or two occasions I did; in 1841 or 1842, I think, the 4th and 41st Regiments were ordered out as a relieving force to China, and they made some objection to embark, but it was owing to some difficulty about the family pensions.

487. It was purely a money question?—Purely a money question.

488. It was not a religious question?—Not in the slightest degree.

489. Have you ever heard of any religious objection being taken to crossing the sea?—No.

490. You do not believe that any discontent ever existed among the troops on that account?—No; certainly not in Madras troops.

491. Was there any amount of desertion previous to the embarkations of the regiments going on foreign service?—No; on the contrary, when some of the corps went out, men were known to come down long distances from leave to join their corps.

492. I suppose they got certain advantages?—Yes, in the shape of additional allowances; the Madras troops have constantly been in the habit of serving across the sea since some time in the last century. They went on the expedition to Java; they went to the Mauritius; in fact, they have served wherever the Indian army has been employed across the sea; Madras troops have almost always formed part of the expedition.

493. The only solicitude they have ever shown upon such an occasion has been upon the question of money?—That was all, and that only after some changes were introduced. After our possessions in India had extended very much, the pension rules and the pay rules were all assimilated to those of Bengal. From that time there has been constant discontent, but only from the men not understanding what the Government meant, and distrust being infused into their minds by those changes, which they thought were not keeping faith with them.

494. Were those expeditions always for field duty, or were they sometimes for garrison duty?—Originally they were for field service, but latterly they have been for garrison duty.

495. The men have gone equally willingly to the garrison duty and to the field service?—Quite so, except on those occasions when there was a change in the original rule to which they had been accustomed with regard to their pension or allowances.

496. What was the term of years for which they went when they were to perform garrison duty?—I think it was never more than three years; it seemed to be understood that three years was the rule.

497. Were there any Brahmins in those corps?—A very few; there are very few Brahmins in the Madras regiments.

498. They were all low-caste men?—Yes; men of the ordinary Hindoo castes, commonly called Sudras; good Hindoos and Mahometans.

499. You never heard of such Brahmins as there were making any special objection to going abroad?—Never. There are generally a few Bengal Brahmins in some of the corps; they have a small number, from 10 to 15 or 20. They never made the slightest difficulty that I ever heard of.

500. Of course there was no difficulty about the Mahometans?—No. The Madras regiments have almost all of them got their men from particular localities. From an early period of our possession of India, the men have all been taken in the old provinces; each regiment has some particular village or town from which it is principally recruited, and they merely take the classes of men belonging to that particular locality. There are regiments composed principally of

of Telugus, and others composed principally of Tamils.

501. Did they take their families with them?—Not abroad; they have not taken them across the sea.

502. Not even to Burmah?—No.

503. When they are in India they always live with their families, I believe?—Yes, in fact, a Madras regiment forms a sort of military colony; it has everything within itself; the men are not only recruited from the original place where the regiment is raised, but they are also recruited very often from the individuals in the regiment, and accompanying the regiment. The stoutest and most promising sons of sepoys are enrolled from their earliest years into a body called recruit boys. It was an institution peculiar to the Madras army; they recruited the sons of sepoys, who were fit for the ranks, when they were quite little, receiving some small pay—I think, three and a half rupees a month; they went through a certain amount of drill, and learned military discipline, and then, as the boys grew up to man's estate, they were taken into the ranks. Thus, the regiments were almost military colonies; not only the men's wives, and children, and families, but all their relations used to live with them constantly, at least a considerable number of their relations.

504. Was any discontent shown by these men when they had to go abroad without their wives and families?—No, not the least; these family pensions seemed to do away with all difficulties; the families were generally taken to the place where the regiment was raised, or to some other convenient place, and remained there until the troops returned.

505. Was the money paid to the families or to the men?—To the families.

506. Not to the men on service?—No; there was a local paymaster who distributed the money at the place where the families were left.

507. What is the habitual food of the Madrasees?—Rice, principally.

508. Did they get that when they were on foreign service?—I believe so; the commissariat were bound to supply them as well as the other troops.

509. Did you ever hear of any sickness resulting from a change of food?—There was great sickness when they went to China. I do not know whether it was owing to a change in their food, or to other causes.

510. Was it at sea, or after they landed?—Both, principally after they landed. The 4th embarked in a sickly condition, and suffered very much on the voyage, and very much afterwards also. From first to last they suffered most severely. I recollect, also, that testimony was borne to the good conduct of the corps under these circumstances. They never showed the least discontent; though they lost a great number of men, they behaved very well throughout.

511. They never behaved riotously at all?—Never.

512. There were no great irregularities in consequence of it, then?—No.

513. Do you know anything of the system of recruiting in the Madras army?—Yes; it is principally done by recruiting parties being sent to the place where the corps for which they are recruiting was originally raised, as I mentioned just now; and, also, men come down from their native villages to their relations in the regiment and remain in camp, and they are taken into the ranks from time to time; and, also, the children of sepoys are constantly taken into the ranks.

514. Had the difficulties in recruiting, of which we have heard in the Madras army, commenced before you left India?—Not that I heard of; I certainly did not hear of anything of the kind.

515. Major *Anson.*] You mentioned the case of the sickness of the 4th Regiment embarking for China; do you know anything of the mutiny of the 8th Cavalry when they were ordered to embark for Burmah?—Yes, I recollect it. I was a member of the Government at the time they were ordered out; it was in 1858, I think, whilst the mutiny was going on; they were at Bangalore, and when they were ordered down they were asked whether they had any objection to go, and they complied with the order most cheerfully. On the way down they were repeatedly asked whether they wished to go, or whether they had any objection to going, and they were asked so often that, when they came to Poonamalee or somewhere near Madras, they said they would rather not go.

516. By whom were they asked?—By the commanding officer, and he was a very good officer, too. I do not know why it was done, but at that time men's minds were a good deal disturbed by various things that had happened, and were happening in Bengal. These cavalry regiments were composed of Mahometans, and the Mahometans were the most active instigators of the mutiny; of course there was a little excitement in their minds about it. When they came to Madras, their horses and arms were taken away from them, and they were ordered back to Arcot, the head-quarters of the cavalry, and after a time the native officers were all dismissed.

517. Did they present any petition to the Government?—Yes, they presented a petition some time afterwards to the Government, in which they said that they had been quite willing to go, and had thought very little about going, but they were asked this question so often, that they thought the Government did not wish them to go. They made this a sort of reason for asking to be pardoned, and restored to their rank. Their dismissal was a very serious loss to these men, many of whom were very old officers, almost on the verge of getting their pensions; some of them were men of 30 or 40 years' service, and to them it was a very severe punishment.

518. If they had been ordered to embark and no questions asked on the subject, you do not think they would have objected to go?—I do not think so, and many others I know did not think so.

519. Do you know a case of a mutiny in the Madras 47th Infantry, when they were sent to Surat?—I know it merely from the public papers; I was not in a Government office at that time.

520. They went to sea without any objection, but they afterwards mutinied at Bombay?—Yes, at Bombay some change was made in their pay and allowances, and that gave rise to discontent; in fact, I do not think that a case of mutiny has ever occurred, as far as my knowledge goes, in the Madras army, which was not connected with pay and allowances.

521. Do you think that it would have a bad effect politically in India upon the minds of the natives, if we were to employ native troops in

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the colonies in places which were well fitted for them?—No, I do not think so, because many regiments of the Madras army have been employed everywhere, and they have not made the least objection to it.

522. You do not think that it would injure our military prestige at all?—No, not at all; I think the Government during Lord Tweeddale's time represented strongly the necessity of not interfering with the men's pay and allowances, and Lord Tweeddale said that he would pledge himself that the native army would go wherever it was required so long as the old pay and allowances were not interfered with. He was then Commander in Chief; I think that statement of Lord Tweeddale's is on record.

523. You never encouraged, in the Madras Presidency, caste and religious prejudices in the army, in the way they used to encourage them in the old Bengal army?—No; men of the highest and the lowest caste will stand side by side on parade; they have not the slightest objection to that. As soon as parade is over, of course they retire to their respective quarters, and then there is no communication between them; but on parade there is not the slightest difficulty, nor had we ever any difficulty about those matters in Madras. We do not recognise caste at all in Madras; it is probably owing to the state of society. In Madras all our domestic servants are men of the lowest caste—Pariahs, in fact; I think that that has been one great reason why there has been so much less prejudice on account of caste in Madras than elsewhere. In Bengal most of the men in service are of better caste, and there you have the same sort of tyranny amongst the domestic servants as amongst the sepoys. The domestic servants there will not do anything that they say is contrary to caste; it is a sort of way they have got of laying down their conditions of service, and they adhere to them most strictly amongst themselves. I can give an instance of that. I had myself a Bengal servant, a man of high caste, who went with me all over India, and did all I wanted for about 18 or 19 years. He was a khidmutgar of Sir William Rumbold's, a smart Qui Hy, when he went with me up the country. Had he been in Calcutta, he would not have done anything like what he did for me.

524. In 1852, when the Indian Government had to provide garrisons for Pegu, did they not find themselves under considerable difficulty about supplying native garrisons for that place?—I was up the country in 1852, and I had not much opportunity of knowing what was going on beyond the district in which I was.

525. The native army at that time was not enlisted for general service, and it was not accustomed to the idea of serving abroad, was it?—No, I think not; but that was introduced afterwards.

526. Do you know whether at that time there were only six regiments in the Bengal army enlisted for general service?—I have heard so.

527. Do you not think that in case of a European war, or our being obliged to employ European troops out of India, there would be great danger in our not having accustomed in time of peace the minds of the natives to perform general imperial duties in the colonies and elsewhere?—Yes; I think it would be inadvisable to introduce it then for the first time.

528. Do you think it would be an advisable thing to do in time of peace, in case we should have to do it in time of war?—Yes; I think it would be objectionable to have to introduce it in time of war in the first instance.

529. Are there any other classes or races in India which you think might recruit the native army?—Yes; I think there is one class particularly, namely, the East Indians, who might be very useful.

530. You mean the half-castes?—Yes; the half-castes; they are continually increasing in number, and they will increase much more now that a greater number of Europeans resort to India. I do not see why they should not be enrolled. They have been employed very usefully already; there was a corps of them 30 or 40 years ago in the Madras army, called the Carnatic Ordnance Artificers, who were a most exemplary class of men; they were a superior class of men, but they were selected. They were employed in the Ordnance Department as artificers. During the mutiny we raised a corps of volunteers in Madras entirely of half-castes; the service improved them, and they turned out very well; they took pride in the service, and they were very efficient soldiers. These half-castes are used a good deal in other places. The Spaniards use them in the Phillipine Islands; they have a large force of them there, and they are exceedingly good soldiers, and the sailors employed in their marine are entirely drawn from the same class of men.

531. Do you know whether the French have borrowed some of these half-castes from the Spaniards?—Yes; at the time the French force at Saigon suffered so much from sickness they got two corps from Manilla, who did all the exposed service, and saved the Europeans immensely.

532. They are not nearly so costly as Europeans, are they?—No, I should think not.

533. Do you think that the effect upon the native mind, of the employment of foreign mercenaries, probably Chinese mercenaries, would be to weaken our power?—No, I do not see why it should at all. I may mention also a fact, which occurred during the mutiny, which is rather remarkable; there are a great many native Christians in the south of India, in Tinnevelly and Madura; they petitioned the Government to have a corps enrolled from their body, and the only condition they made was, that they were not to be treated as native soldiers; they were to be treated in matters of pay and allowances, and so on, not like sepoy troops, but more like Europeans. I do not mean as to the amount of pay, but as to the general conditions of their service. That offer was declined; it was not thought necessary to have them.

534. You do not think then that, politically, the employing of foreign mercenaries, such as Chinese, would have a bad effect in India?—No, I do not think so. I do not think that the general body of the people have any great feeling on the subject. The great body of the agricultural classes submit very quietly to any arrangements the Government choose to make in these matters. There are a number of warlike tribes in India who have never been enlisted at all.

535. In the Madras Presidency?—In the Madras Presidency we have, and they might, I should think, with proper tact, and if care was taken, be made useful, but they belong to parts of the country which were acquired after the

the Madras army had been principally formed, and therefore no corps were ever raised from them. I refer to all that class of men such as the Polygars and the people under the native chiefs in the hills; there are several very warlike tribes amongst them, the Marawars, Kallars, Bédars, Ramoosees, Kooles, Bheels, Goojars, &c., and people of that kind; they are very warlike in their habits and very different from the rest of the Hindoos, and very little under the control of the Brahmins. I should think if they could be organized they would prove valuable troops. There have been local corps raised amongst them; for instance, one raised in the Deccan by Captain Macintosh, from the Ramoosees, who were of exactly the same class.

536. *Chairman.*] Is not it difficult to get troops of that kind to submit to discipline?—The difficulty is not to get them to submit to discipline so much as to bring them under control at all, because they are ignorant and unacquainted with civilized life. But when once they are under control they are very easily disciplined by men who understand how to deal with them; such men as Sir James Outram, for instance; he began his career by raising a corps of Bheels, which he made very useful.

537. They are far less accessible, are they not, to pecuniary inducements than the ordinary natives?—They are, on account of their very scanty wants; still I think they would be very glad to be remunerated, and I think their fidelity might be insured by a suitable remuneration; but they are very independent; they are fine, athletic, large men, very fond of warlike pursuits, and generally addicted to the chase in their own country; I merely make the suggestion of employing them; it never has been tried.

538. Are there any foreign mercenaries employed at Hyderabad?—Yes, they have a large force of Arabs, and they have likewise a large force of Sikhs, and they have also, I think, Beloochees.

539. Have they no blacks?—Yes, they are all black; I presume your Lordship means negroes. I do not know whether they have any negroes now; they used to have them in considerable numbers, particularly in the Bejapoor State, which was only destroyed at the beginning of the last century; they had a large force of negroes, and there are still a great number of those men remaining on the coast of the continent. There is a place called Janjeera in the S. Konkan, where there is a Hubshee colony; they have remained there permanently, and I have also found them all down the western coast in different villages; some of them are landowners and heads of villages.

540. Those are the remains of the old mercenaries?—Yes.

541. From what part of the coast did they come?—From the opposite coast, the Abyssinian coast.

542. Of what religion are they?—They are generally Mahometans; they were all converted to the Mahometan faith when they entered the service of the Mahometan Government, and they remain Mahometans still. I think Aurungzebe's fleet was almost entirely manned with that class of men, and the admiral was one of them, and I believe in fact it is the descendants of that admiral who occupy Jazeerah now.

543. I suppose those troops were all slaves, were they not?—They were bought as slaves, undoubtedly; and some years ago, when there was a difficulty in getting men for the Bombay marine, one of the officers proposed to recruit from the Coast of Africa, in the same way as had been done before, and he got a considerable number of boys; but not having acted with much prudence or inquiry, it turned out afterwards that the lads had been brought down by one of the chiefs as slaves, though he was not aware of it; he was tried before the Supreme Court and sentenced to seven years' transportation, but was pardoned because he had not known that they were slaves. There is no doubt that they are a very valuable class of men, and might be employed with great effect in India.

544. It is difficult to obtain them by voluntary enlistment, I suppose?—It is difficult unless you set about it in the right way. I daresay in Natal you might get them, or some of the liberated slaves might be willing to take service on those conditions; they are exceedingly hardy, and are a fine class of men; at present all the heavy duty on board the steamers is performed by men of that class. The stokers and the men who have the very heavy work to do are all of this class

545. Which would you say are the best materials for soldiers, they or the Chinese?—I should say they were, because they are much more simple-minded and much more easily controlled than the Chinese, who have their own peculiar characteristics, which make it difficult to bring them under perfect discipline, especially their habit of forming secret societies which they seem to carry with them everywhere; they have them at Singapore, and I should be afraid they might carry on the same thing if they were embodied in regiments; it seems to be a principle of their constitution to combine in that way.

546. Major *Anson.*] You stated a short time ago that there were in each Madras Regiment some Bengalese, amounting to 15 or 20; are there not in many cases a great many more than that?—There may be; I only spoke of cases under my own observation. I recollect a case I had to try magisterially, in which the men of the 23rd Regiment came before me; in that instance, there were about that number in the regiment. I only know the general circumstance with regard to the men engaged in other corps, but I do not know their exact number. I might mention, perhaps, with regard to other classes of men who might be enlisted, that I think the ethnology of India has been very little studied hitherto; there are some very remarkable races, of which the military class I have mentioned is one, and there is another class which is very remarkable also; they are generally shepherds, and are found all over India, from the south up to Bengal. In the south they are called Kooroobars or Dhangars. The Santals belong to that class; they are remarkably simple, and a fine class of people; one of their principal characteristics (it is a very curious one in India) is, that that they always speak the truth; every person who has observed them has borne testimony to that particular characteristic.

547. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Of what religion are they?—I do not know; their worship is of a very simple character. I think they worship the deities of the hills and trees and mountains; they are altogether an exceedingly simple race. Those found in the plains worship the inferior Hindu deities.

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548. *Chairman.*] Where do they live?—They are found all over India. They were formerly in the south the dominant race; they were called Kurumbars at that time, and they are still called Kurubars in the south. They are found in Mysore, and all the country of the Carnatic, and as you go north you find them as the Santals The Koles, I think, belong to that class; they have the same characteristics throughout; they are shepherds by profession, and they are extremely simple in their way of living, and very truthful.

549. Have they ever been used as soldiers?—Never; all those people are without the pale of civilisation; we only became acquainted with the Santals by their rebellion a few years ago, in 1856 or 1857.

550. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] They are the race which we suppose to be the aborigines of the country?—I suppose they are one of the earliest. The slave classes, I think, are the aborigines; those are people you find in great numbers, and in all parts of the south. I think there is very good evidence of successive tribes of people having come in, and occupied the country one after another. Those shepherd classes were at one time certainly the dominant race. We have records of their existence in Madras from a very early period, and then come these Polygar races, which you find from Delhi down to the south. The Goojars round Delhi, I suppose, are of the same race, and the Ramoosees and the Bheels and the Bedars. I think the Koolis of Guzerat belong to that race, but I think the Koles belong to the other—to the Santal class.

551. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Would there be any means of employing European soldiers after their period of service has expired, such as the establishment of colonies in the hills, which would operate as a sufficient inducement to keep them in India, as a kind of reserve?—I should think that might be done, because a great number of the hardiest and toughest soldiers who are pensioned off are located as pensioners at different places; there is a large number of them at Cuddalore, to the south of Madras, and another large body of them at Poonamalee, and there are others at various other places. Those men are pensioned and left to do what they choose, and they drink hard and do very little good. I think it would be easy to utilise them on the hill stations.

552. In the Neilgherries, on the chinchona and coffee plantations, might they not be used as superintendents; there might be a colony of them organised by the Government, might there not?—Yes, many of the best of them are employed as superintendents; but, I think, instead of letting them live there as they please, it would be a very good thing to give them land and encourage them to cultivate.

553. It would be better for them to be placed under control, would it not?—Yes, it would be better for them to be under suitable officers. Certainly, the materials for the experiment are there; they never think of coming home, they live and die there; but then these were men who had been enlisted for the East India Company's regiments.

554. It is rare now, is it not, for a man to take his discharge and remain in the country?—I do not know. I left India at the time of the amalgamation, and I do not know what has happened since. Those old pensioners settled down for good; they never dreamt of coming back to England; they lived with their families quite settled in India; some of them were even comparatively young men who had been invalided from some accident.

555. Do you think it might be possible to encourage them to do this on a large scale, if there was a system organized so as to hold out an inducement to them to remain and settle in the country?—I have no doubt it would.

556. It would be quite healthy for them?—Yes, I think so; it would be exceedingly beneficial to the men themselves.

557. Do you know anything of a corps, the remains of which still exist in Ceylon, of men recruited from Mozambique?—No, I have never had any means of knowing about that.

558. Lord *William Hay.*] There is ample land available in the Neilgherry hills for such a purpose?—Yes, a great quantity.

559. Much more than in any other hilly part of India?—I think on many of the hills, if they were explored, there would be found to be equally good positions.

560. In the south of India?—Yes.

561. Not in the Himalayas?—I did not mean there; there is a place above Mangalore, to which the civilians are in the habit of going for change of air, and where they have built houses, which is just as good as the Himalayas. The Bellarungan hills are also adapted for this, and there are the Pulny and the Sherwaroyah hills; in fact, there are many places which, if explored, might be turned to account in that way.

562. Do you think that the average European soldier would be able to support himself with his own labour in those places?—I should think with his pension he would, quite; the experiment has to be tried. I do not see why he should not.

563. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I understand you to give us your opinion that native corps might be sent with advantage to garrison colonial stations, either corps such as at present exist, or corps specially raised from other native races?—I do not think there would be any difficulty about it, as far as I know the people myself, if they were treated with good faith, and if they had officers with tact who could manage them properly.

564. And you grounded that opinion very much upon there having been no difficulty hitherto in getting Madras troops especially to go when desired?—Certainly.

565. But have those occasions not been in the regular routine of service to certain stations, or in case of field service?—In the first instance it was always in the case of field service, but latterly, in Burmah and China, they did ordinary garrison duty after the war was over.

566. But the stations to which they were sent were so few, that the turn of any regiment came round very rarely, and also those stations were recognised as specially belonging to the garrisons of India?—Yes; they were recognised from time to time as the occasions arose, but the number of them increased as the occasions arose, and there was never any difficulty about sending the troops to them; therefore, I do not see why there should be any difficulty in increasing the range still further.

567. Do you not recognise there being a certain hardship upon troops of the habits of the Madras troops in being separated for a certain number of years from their families?—I do, certainly; it is a privation, but it is a privation to which they are ready to submit, and they always have

have been ready to submit to it, provided the term of foreign service is not longer than they have been accustomed to.

568. What time is that which it should not exceed?—Three years, I think.

569. Do you not think that if this practice came to be much more resorted to, so that the term of service would come round oftener to each regiment, the hardship would be more severely felt?—Of course it would be more severely felt, no doubt; just as in our own army the hardship of going to India makes the service much more irksome than it used to be, and many officers leave the service in consequence.

570. Might not the prospect of certain separation from their families for lengthened periods, at regular intervals, operate against the recruiting?—I do not know; it would make the service more trying. If you increase the number of places at which they are employed, it follows that you must increase the army. I think if you adopt a policy of the kind that is proposed, it would be necessary to raise other men.

571. You think that it would be necessary to increase the native army for that object?—I think so. If you increase the number of places at which they are employed, I think it follows, as a necessary consequence, that you must increase the number of your soldiers; and if you raised them from other races than those who now compose the bulk of the army, I think it would facilitate the service very much.

572. Major *Anson.*] You would not look upon increasing the native army as a drawback, provided we do not give it too great a preponderance in India itself?—No; the great danger is that of having too large a number of men of one class. As I said before, the Madras troops were all raised in particular districts, just as the Bengal troops were raised very much from Oude and the neighbouring localities. The greater the number of elements you bring into the ranks the greater the chance of safety you have.

573. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you think that there would be any difficulty in raising regiments for special service?—No; I think it would require a good deal of tact and management; but what has been done before can be done again. I have no doubt that it could be done if it were set about in the right way.

574. Colonel *North.*] Do you confine your opinion to colonies bordering on India, such as Mauritius and Ceylon; or do you include any of our other colonies, such as Gibraltar and Malta?—I should say that there would be very little difficulty about the Mediterranean; Malta is almost an Oriental place.

575. If they were bound to be relieved every three years, the sending them to the Mediterranean would be attended with considerable expense. Our regiments now serve in India 10 years or more?—Yes, it would be attended with considerable expense, no doubt; but I should confine the term of foreign service to three years. The Madras regiments are more like military colonies than regiments; of course, you cannot take men away from their homes and connections without holding out some prospect to them of returning. If you raised men expressly for that sort of service, which you might do from other races and classes, I think the difficulty would be diminished.

576. Would these men be satisfied to be away from their families for a succession of years?—I should think, if you raised them in the way we were speaking of, by enrolling Africans, Seedees, and so on (these are men who have no family ties—apparently they come and live abroad for years and years, without any family ties at all), it would be perfectly easy.

577. Major *Anson.*] In fact, you think that those are difficulties which you only have to face, in order to overcome?—Yes.

578. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You have recognised the great loyalty and uniform good conduct of the Madras troops?—Yes.

579. You attribute that, do you not, partly to the absence of caste prejudices amongst them, and partly, also, to the character of a military colony which those regiments have assumed?—Yes, and to keeping good faith with them.

580. But would those elements of safety not be wanting in the case of regiments raised under different conditions; for instance, regiments raised from special races, and having different habits to those Madras troops, would be wanting in those characteristics to which you ascribe their loyalty and safety?—I do not exactly know that; I think if you raise mercenaries, and pay them well, and keep faith with them, they will serve anywhere; those military colonies are a peculiarity in the Madras army, but I do not know whether it is an advantage that they should continue to form them.

581. Would it not be the nature of regiments raised with a view to service abroad, that they should not have these peculiarities of having all their families with them, and so forth?—For that purpose you must raise regiments from other races than those from which you raise them now. Every Indian, whether a Mahometan or a Hindoo, marries at a very early age; it is a part of their system of society, and is so closely interwoven with all their habits that they could not depart from it; so long as you have that class of men, you must have their families with them. That system has its advantages as well as its disadvantages. You have a hold upon their fidelity, their good conduct, and their morality; those are the advantages. Then you have the disadvantage of not being able to move those regiments where you wish, without moving these impediments with them.

582. Or leaving them behind?—Yes, which you could only do for a time. You could not expect men to leave all that they prize, all their families and connections and ties, for more than a very limited time.

583. Is not three years, or it might be five years if they went to a distant station, a very long time to make the separation?—The habit of limiting the period to three years has become so well understood that it is just one of those points which you could not depart from without shaking their confidence, just like tampering with their pay; they would feel that it was departing from what had been promised them over and over again. They would feel any change on that point like a change in their pay and allowances.

584. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you think that the climate of the Mediterranean would suit the natives of India?—Yes, I think it would; it is a very fine climate, as far as my experience goes.

585. And you think that Malta, being rather an Eastern kind of place, would suit the habits of the natives?—I think it would.

586. You have been asked whether you do not think it a great hardship to Indian soldiers to be sent across the seas. I suppose it is your opinion that

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that every soldier thinks it rather a hardship to take his turn of foreign duty?—Yes, it is a trial.

587. It is not in the least a worse trial for a native than it would be for a European, is it?—No.

588. Can you tell me what is the cost of a native soldier?—No, I have no financial experience; I could not say what the cost of a native soldier is.

589. Do you apprehend that it would be much more expensive to relieve the native regiments at Malta, bringing them from India, than it would be to relieve a European regiment from England?—Speaking generally, I should say it would be much less expensive, judging merely from what I know, but I cannot say from actual experience.

590. And if it was a general principle that those native regiments were to be relieved every three years or thereabouts, then the hardship would not be considered great by the native soldiers, would it?—No, it would not be so great.

591. And there would be no great objection on their part to crossing the water, would there?—Not if the turn of service did not come round too often. If it came too frequently, there would be a hardship felt.

592. You think that those men whom you would bring away from India would be reliable men?—I think so; I think they would be more reliable away from India than in India.

593. When they were away from their own homes, and their own traditions, they would be more to be trusted than in their own country?—Yes; in fact, the only times that their fidelity has been doubtful have been on the occasions of those Mahometan *émeutes* which have arisen from time to time, and which arise from a totally different cause from all others in the service.

594. Can you tell the Committee the names of the different castes which there are now in the Madras army?—I think I could if I had a little time for recollection.

595. Are there any Sikhs?—There are a very few Sikhs; scarcely any. I do not think I ever met a Sikh soldier. There are men of all castes. I could easily find them out with a little care. There are the ordinary Suddra castes, the mixed castes of the Tamil, and Telugu country, the cultivators and weavers, and people pursuing occupations of that kind, and a few Pariahs, and a certain proportion of Mahometans. I couldg ive a complete list with a little inquiry.

596. Are there not any Pathans?—Yes, there are some.

597. Lord *William Hay.*] Are there no Mahrattas?—There are a very few Mahrattas in the Madras cavalry, but not many.

598. Do they not take service readily in our army?—No, I think not, because they have such a large field in the armies of their own chiefs, such as Scindiah and Holkah, that they do not care for our service.

599. They make excellent light cavalry, do they not?—Yes; some of the best troops of Scindiah and Holkar were composed of the Pariahs; a class called Hool-sawars, Pariahs mounted on the chief's own horses, and forming part of his pagah or household troops, were celebrated.

600. Were not the founders of the Mahratta dynasties very low-caste men?—They were the cultivating class principally.

601. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that any inconvenience would arise from the employment of native troops in Colonies, where the commanding officer was not at all accustomed to the Indian army, never having had any such troops under him?—Yes, it requires considerable tact and knowledge of the men, I think, to manage them well. I think to manage them well there must be a good deal of consideration for them as men as well as soldiers. A very rigid military rule with those sort of men, requires to be tempered with a good deal of discretion.

602. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you know from what classes the coolies who go to the West Indies are drawn?—Yes, they are drawn principally from the lower classes of the Tamil race; the same class of men, in fact, as are taken into the army. Many of them are Pariahs.

603. Has any difficulty been found in inducing them to go to those distant Colonies?—None, rather the reverse. The Government had rather to restrain the emigration, and to see that they were not taken away under false pretences; they were ready to go, and consequently a number of crimps took advantage of that for their own benefit, and carried them away, so that it was necessary for the Government to interfere to protect them.

604. They took advantage of their anxiety to go?—Yes, their readiness to go.

605. Do the coolies generally make money by those emigrations?—A few made money and came back. Of course those few were held up as examples to all the others; many did not come back at all.

606. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Those who go to Ceylon come back regularly, do they not?—Yes, they merely go across the Paumbum Straits and return; they get fully double wages in Ceylon.

607. Major *Anson.*] If the native troops find that their fellow-countrymen, and people of the same class as themselves, are in the habit of going to the Mauritius for their own profit, they would not be likely to look with any great horror upon going there for service, would they?—No, I should think not; they went readily on the expedition to the Mauritius.

608. Lord *William Hay.*] The prospect of finding their friends and relations there might be an inducement to them to go?—Perhaps it might, but they would not have many friends and relations out there. Many of the regiments are a world in themselves, and have very little intercourse with the outside world.

609. *Chairman.*] It is not usually thought desirable, is it, to put native troops under English officers, who are not accustomed to the management of them?—I think it would be objectionable.

610. And, therefore, it would not be safe to send native troops to a colony where there was only an English officer in command, untrained in the management of native troops?—It would not be advisable, certainly.

611. It would, therefore, follow that you must either use them alone, with their own officers, or not at all?—You must either use them with their own officers, or not at all.

612. The commanding officers at the places where they were in garrison, must be officers accustomed to the management of native troops?—Yes; or at least willing to attend to the representation of their own officers.

613. Mr. *Oliphant.*] There would be no objection to a mixed garrison, would there?—I do not

not think so: they generally fraternise very well with European troops; they are on very good relations with them.

614. Captain *Vivian.*] As long as the regimental officers know how to manage the native troops, it does not much matter whether the commanding officer knows much about them or not, does it?—No; except the commanding officer were to interfere.

615. Major *Anson.*] Are there not a great many English officers who have commanded at the stations in India, where there are mixed garrisons of European and native troops?—Yes.

616. Therefore, those English officers have got into the habit of being aware of the feelings of the native troops, to a certain extent?—In my time the staff was always taken from the native army. A Queen's officer might be the brigadier commanding at a station, but his staff was always taken from the native army.

617. The more the native army and the English army are brought to work together, the better, is it not?—Certainly. I think there is a danger of giving in too much to the prejudices of the officers of the native army. I think that one great cause of the difficulties we had in 1857 was, that the Bengal officers were so much in the habit of listening to the prejudices of the men, and pampering them.

618. There would always be the regimental officer commanding of the native troops, their colonel, in case they were serving in any colony like the Mauritius, who would be able to inform the general commanding at the station, of the feelings, the want, and the wishes of his men, and look after their interests in every way?—Certainly.

619. Lord *William Hay.*] Did not the Bengal as well as the Madras troops take part in the early campaigns in Burmah?—Yes; it was during the first expedition that a difficulty took place with the Madras troops; it was in the expedition to Arracan in 1824 and 1825. An order of the Supreme Government cancelling the allowances to the Madras troops caused the first difficulty to arise. It was represented very strongly to the Governor General, and the order was rescinded, and the claims of the Madras troops were recognised.

620. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Where have the Madras troops gone on garrison duty out of India?—I think, simply on garrison duty, they have only gone to the Straits, and to China; I am not aware of any other places.

621. Were there any Madras troops in Java at the time of the mutiny in 1815, or were they all Bengal troops?—There were Madras troops too, I think; there were certainly Madras troops.

622. Are you aware that the mutiny there was mainly caused by keeping the troops beyond their promised time of service?—I believe it was; that I only know from what I have heard and read.

623. Did you never hear of high-caste Hindoos losing caste in consequence of being obliged to cook on board ship?—I have known instances of men of high caste who would not cook on board ship; I took round a very valuable servant to Bombay, and he made himself so ill on the voyage that he died after landing in consequence of his sufferings from want of food.

624. Is not that a very strong objection to any high-caste men being sent across the sea?—As regards high-caste men, it is a very strong objection, undoubtedly.

625. What do you think would be the effect on the native mind generally of our bringing in foreign Asiatic mercenaries in the place of Europeans. Would it be favourable or unfavourable to our prestige. Would it give an impression of our power in being able to make use of foreign mercenaries, or would it create an impression that we had no English troops at our command, and were, consequently, obliged to use what we could get?—No, I think not. The only inference the natives would draw would be that, as the native troops had failed so signally in their fidelity, we were obliged to have recourse to other means.

626. I say in place of Europeans?—We have added so much to our European force that they would not draw that inference, because we did hold the country formerly with a less body of men than we have there now. The great body of the agricultural classes in India are perfectly indifferent upon the subject; they do not care in the least; they look upon the Government as the ruling power of the day, and submit quietly to whatever may be laid down; they never trouble their heads about the matter.

627. That is the agricultural population?—Yes, the great mass of the people.

628. Not the native Courts, or the people attached to the Courts?—No.

629. Was it not the fact that there was very little disaffection in the Madras army during the Mutiny in 1857?—Very little.

630. Was that attributable mainly to the mixed constitution of the army?—Yes.

631. To there being so very few high-caste men in the army, and its being recruited from different classes?—Yes. I may perhaps be allowed to add, that there have been again and again great symptoms of disaffection in the Madras Army; even in my own time, I recollect several instances; that has generally arisen from a different cause; from disaffection amongst the Mahometans, and from their stirring up the others.

632. The mutiny at Vellore was entirely Mahometan, was it not?—Yes, entirely. Then there was another mutiny afterwards in 1828 or 1829 (I forget the year), when there was a considerable amount of disaffection in some of the corps. And again, in 1832 there was a very serious outbreak at Bangalore amongst the artillery and amongst the Mussalman people generally. In 1838 there was a general mutinous feeling throughout the whole of the Madras Army, which ended in the resumption of Karnool and Wodigherry, belonging to Mahometan chiefs, who were also implicated. There was a very interesting Memoir drawn up upon that subject by Mr. Bailey, the Secretary to the Madras Government, in which it was stated that it had been found that Wahabee emissaries had come to every corps in the service, and had been inciting the Mahometan soldiers to take part in a religious war. There are three or four instances, in my own recollection, in which that has taken place. I think that is a chronic event, which will always require to be guarded against.

633. Some questions have been asked you with regard to the Mahrattas; are you not aware that during the time of the mutiny the Mahratta country generally, and especially the

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Southern Mahratta country was in a very unsatisfactory state?—It was.

634. And that one of the very few regiments which mutinied in the Bombay army at Kolapoor, was a regiment raised almost exclusively of those Mahrattas?—Yes.

635. Therefore, the precedent is not much in favour of enlisting Mahrattas except in combination with other castes?—Exactly, that is my opinion; but you know that the South Mahratta country is a very trying place; it is one of our latest acquisitions; there are many local chiefs there to whom the people have feelings of attachment. No doubt they worked upon the troops considerably, and in that way, I think it was a most unfavourable place for a Mahratta corps to be stationed just at that crisis; it was a severe trial for them.

Colonel C. P. Keyes, called in; and Examined.

Colonel *C. P. Keyes.*

636. *Chairman.*] In what capacity were you in India?—As commanding the 1st Punjaub Infantry.

637. How many years were you there?—I have been connected with the 1st Punjaub Infantry for 18 years; I was originally nominated by Sir Henry Lawrence as the Adjutant of the 1st Punjaub Infantry when it was first raised; and in 1854 I was removed to the command of the Scinde Rifle Corps, and remained in command of that corps until 1857, when I came home in ill health upon a medical certificate; upon my return to India I assumed the command of the 6th Punjaub Rifles again; but only remained about a month, when I was requested by General Chamberlain to return to the 1st Punjaub Infantry, after the departure of Major Coke; Major Lambert succeeded Major Coke, but he also went home on sick leave, and General Chamberlain wished me to return to the 1st Punjaub Infantry, and I did so, and have been with it ever since.

638. Of what race was the 1st Punjaub Infantry composed?—Chiefly of Pathans, Sikhs, Dogras, and Punjaubee Mahometans.

639. Lord *William Hay.*] Dogras are Rajpoots, are they not?—Yes, chiefly Rajpoots; the best of the Dogras are Rajpoots; there are some Brahmin Dogras.

640. *Chairman.*] Is it your impression that either of those races could be induced to go abroad for garrison duty in British colonies?—Does your Lordship mean the regiment as it stands now, or that men should be raised for the purpose?

641. Either that, or that a regiment for that purpose could be formed for that purpose out of the existing troops?—If a sufficient inducement were held out, I have no doubt that men could be raised for that purpose.

642. Would the inducement have to be very much larger than the present pay of the native soldier?—Yes, I think considerably larger.

643. How much is the present pay of the force which you command?—A sepoy of six years' standing gets seven rupees; after six years' standing it is raised to eight rupees, and after 10 years' standing to nine rupees.

644. What increase on that do you think would be necessary in order to induce the men to go abroad, and to enlist for the purpose of going abroad?—I should say very nearly double the pay, or at least five rupees in addition to that rate.

645. Would it be more attractive to them in the form of pay, or of bounty or pension?—I should think pay, because I do not think that they would serve with any intention of remaining any length of time in the service.

646. For how many years could they be safely enlisted for garrison duty in a colony across the sea?—I think it would be difficult to induce them to bind themselves to any particular time.

647. Do you mean to say they would require of you to take them back whenever they were tired?—The men enlisting in the army at present are bound to serve for three years; they cannot demand their discharge until they have served three years.

648. And you think they would demand the same term in any enlistment for foreign service?—I should say so.

649. You do not think that they could be induced to go for a longer time?—I do not think they would bind themselves for a longer period.

650. Major *Anson.*] Has it ever been tried?—Not that I am aware of.

651. Have you ever made inquiries in the regiment about it?—I have never made inquiries about garrisoning any of our colonies, or simple garrison duty out of their own country, but I have frequently spoken to the men on the subject of service abroad.

652. *Chairman.*] That was field service?—Yes, field service.

653. I suppose that is always connected in their minds with a certain amount of booty?—Yes, I think that is the first thing that occurs to them, the chance of bettering themselves by getting booty; but I think the Pathans, as a race generally, are fond of excitement; for a short time they would go with the greatest pleasure.

654. The idea of an expedition abroad without booty is not familiar to them?—I do not think so.

655. Do you think that if they were taken abroad on garrison duty their behaviour would be more or less regular than that of European soldiers?—I should say much more regular; they are more easily managed than the English soldier.

656. Their habits are not such as would produce great disturbance in any European community in which they were placed?—No, certainly not.

657. Would they be liable, do you think, to mutiny if they were placed in any colony by themselves, without European soldiers to check them?—No, I do not think they would.

658. Would it be safe, for instance, to entrust Singapore or Hong Kong or the Mauritius to their exclusive guardianship?—I do not think it would be wise to do so, because, I think precaution is better than cure; but I do not think they would mutiny, from my experience of them, or that it would be dangerous; still, I think, it would be much better for British soldiers to be at the same station with them wherever possible.

659. Do you think it would be necessary that the number of British soldiers should be equal to

to that of the natives, or would a smaller number suffice to prevent any mischief?—A smaller number would be sufficient.

660. Are they very averse to going to sea; have the races with which you are acquainted, a strong prejudice on the subject?—No; certainly not. I think there is a great misunderstanding on that point; I have never heard any man object to going across the sea, or on the sea at all; in fact, I have often spoken to the men on the subject, they would have been only too happy to have gone to China or Egypt, or anywhere else they were asked to go on service.

661. Take the Rajpoots, for instance, would they have no difficulties about their cooking?—No doubt there would be difficulties, and they would be put to inconvenience, but the difficulties would not be insurmountable.

662. They would not be insurmountable, in their own view?—No, I do not think so. I think it is a prejudice; but I think it is a prejudice that can be got over. The natives do like, of course, to adhere to the custom of the country, and it has hitherto been the custom, especially of the Bengal army, to have all those little prejudices attended to; they like fostering them, and keeping them up, if they get their own way; but it is not at all necessary that those prejudices should be observed in the strict manner that people generally suppose.

663. There is no prejudice that would stand against the attraction of an offer of double pay?—I do not think so; I am not aware of any. The Dogras, who are Rajpoots, dislike drinking out of leathern vessels, as the Mahometans and other classes of the regiment do, and they have asked me on service to get them their own water-carriers. Where it was inconvenient to do so, I have never had any difficulty in denying them their wish. I have told them that it was simply a prejudice on their part. I was very sorry that they should suffer by it, but as it was simply a prejudice, it would be inconvenient for the Government to give them any assistance on the subject, and they have always, without the slightest difficulty, procured water for themselves. But, no doubt, if the prejudice was given in to, they would like to maintain all those little things. They look upon it as a little privilege, but it is not at all necessary that it should be adhered to.

664. I suppose you have often kept troops under your command for a long time in the same cantonments?—Yes.

665. Have you ever found them restless under those circumstances, from having had to remain a long time at the same place and doing the same duty?—No; simply for the reason that they had a large amount of leave; if they were detained on duty for any length of time without being allowed to go to their homes and see anything, they would be restless; and when it has been inconvenient to give the men leave, I have frequently had excellent men in my regiment ask me for their discharge, simply because they could not go to their homes. The same men have come back and re-enlisted, in many cases.

666. At what intervals do they require their leave, on the average?—They like to get home every year, if they can. With regard to the Pathans, the Punjaubese, and the Sikhs, or, at least, the nearer race of Sikhs, it is so generally managed that they do usually, once in the year, get away to their homes for a short time.

667. Do they think it a hardship if they cannot get away within less than two years?—Yes, certainly; and it is one of the greatest difficulties I have had to keep the men contented and happy, without constantly giving them leave to go to their homes.

668. Then if they were enlisted for a term of three years, it would be rather a strain upon their ordinary habit?—Certainly.

669. A strain for which you would have to pay heavily?—Yes; it is not only that, but it is the idea of the indefinite time. You might say three years, but practically it might be much longer.

670. You mean, supposing any active service to arise?—In case active service should arise, or supposing it was not convenient for the Government to relieve them at the end of the three years. If they were in a distant colony, and it was not convenient for the Government to relieve them at the end of three years, they would have to remain longer. They could not divest themselves of the idea of the indefinite time they would have to serve. When once away from their homes they could not realise to themselves that they really would see their homes again at the end of three years.

671. Of the races at your command are there any which, more than the others, would be willing to go abroad, or which would be more indifferent to the absence from their homes?—I think the Dogras would be the least inclined to go. As regards the Sikhs and Pathans, their disinclination would be very much the same.

672. Have you had any Beloochees under you?—No, never.

673. Or Affghans?—Yes.

674. Or Affghans who were not Pathans?—I have not had any other race under my command than those I have mentioned. Before the mutiny there were a few Hindostanees in my regiment; a company of Hindostanees, and they did excellent service during the mutiny at Delhi; none in the regiment did better, but they gradually died out, or have been removed, and they have never been replaced.

675. Major *Anson.*] Is your regiment the same that Colonel Coke commanded at Delhi?—Yes; he commanded at Delhi.

676. Do you think that if the commanding officers promised their men that they would only have to serve abroad for three years they would disbelieve them; do you not think that they would have confidence in their commanding officers?—I do not think they would disbelieve them, but they would doubt whether an exigency of the service might not arise so that they could not carry out their promises; they would not disbelieve the word of their commanding officer.

677. Do you not think that though there might be slight objections at first, after they found that the relief was very regular and that they were not detained more than three years, they would very soon lose all objections to going once in their lives for three years abroad though there might be a little feeling of doubt about it at first?—There is no doubt that they would have a doubt of it at first, and it could be only told by experience and by time whether that doubt would be removed; it is impossible to say that yet, but that they would start with that doubt there is no question.

678. If they found that they got extra pay, or double

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double the pay which they get in India, or something that made it worth their while to go, that would go very far to make them settle for three years in some colony, or even for a longer period, would it not?—As I said before, there is no doubt you could raise men for the purpose. I do not know whether your question referred to the existing regiments.

679. Even with regard to the existing regiments, do you not think that an increase of pay would tempt them to stay abroad for three years?—No, I do not think so.

680. Colonel *North.*] With regard to crossing the sea, the native troops might not care for a voyage of a few days, but to bring them to Malta or Gibraltar would take many weeks; how would they like that?—I do not think they would dislike it at all; of course it is the first prejudice that must be overcome. If the prejudice exists, it would have to be combated; I maintain that it is simply a prejudice, and that there is no actual objection to their going abroad.

681. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you think that the regiments under your command would be able to stand the climate of China better, for instance, than the European soldiers can?—No, I do not think they would be better than the European soldiers are there.

682. *Chairman.*] Would they prefer a colder climate?—Decidedly; I think many of the men of my regiment suffer from the heat quite as much as I do myself, or more.

683. Colonel *North.*] Is your regiment a Bombay regiment?—No, it is one of the Punjaub irregular regiments on the Punjaub frontier; it is close to the hills.

684. The two Indian regiments that were serving at Hong Kong hardly suffered at all; the climate agreed with them perfectly. I think they were Bombay regiments?—It depends entirely upon the amount of exposure they are put to.

685. Lord *William Hay.*] There would be no objection on the score of climate to the employment of your regiment in a cold climate, such as the Mediterranean or even in England, would there?—No certainly not; I think it would agree with them exceedingly well, provided they were properly clothed and properly fed. An Affghan, or Pathan, requires the same feeding almost as a British soldier.

686. As much meat?—If he could get it he would always eat meat.

687. Are not the Pathans singularly free from prejudice in regard to eating and drinking?—Yes.

688. For instance, would any of your men eat with you?—The head native officer in my regiment has frequently sat down to table with me, and if I am eating a biscuit or anything at the table, and eat only a portion of it, he will take up the remainder and eat it.

689. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] They are Mahomedans, are they not?—Yes.

690. There is no distinction of caste among them?—No; but the lower classes, our personal servants, for instance, would fancy, at least they would pretend to fancy, that they were dishonoured and disgraced by having touched our food, that is to say openly; but they would go in private, and if they liked what was on the table, they would finish it up very readily.

691. Mr. *Oliphant.*] What would be the effect upon the other native regiments in that part of India of the introduction of regiments composed of Chinamen, or men of an entirely different race; do you think it would injure our prestige in India?—I should not think it would be good at all to introduce regiments composed entirely of Chinese into India.

692. Lord *William Hay.*] Or negroes?—I think that the introduction of foreign levies, whether natives of China or negroes, would, as it were, cast a suspicion upon the natives; of course they already feel that we have not the same confidence in them that we had before the mutiny; they cannot divest themselves of that idea, whether true or not; I have no doubt of that.

693. And you think that that feeling might be increased?—I think it might increase that feeling of separation between us.

694. Have you ever commanded negroes?—No, never.

695. Or had any under you in the Scinde Corps?—There was one Seedee in the Scinde Rifle Corps; he came from the Bombay army; there was one individual only.

696. The men of the regiment had no objection to serving with him?—No, none whatever.

697. Captain *Vivian.*] You have stated that the pay of the native soldier is seven rupees a month?—It is, up to six years.

698. But he feeds himself for that, does not he?—He feeds himself and clothes himself for that.

699. For seven rupees a month?—Yes.

700. If that pay was doubled, do you think that that would be an inducement to them to go abroad?—Certainly. Taking the regiment as it stands now, as a whole, I think there would be a great objection to sending them abroad to serve, because to many of the men it would be most distasteful.

701. Supposing we were to put it to your regiment, as it is now composed; it is proposed by the British Government to send you to garrison Malta for three years, and you are to have double pay, how do you think it would be received by the regiment?—I should be sorry to put it to them in that way, because I maintain that the Government has a right to send the troops wherever it pleases; they are enlisted expressly on the understanding that they are to go wherever they are wanted to go, and, therefore, to introduce a system of volunteering in that way, I think, would be very injurious to the army.

702. I will put it in another way. Supposing we were to say to them, you are ordered to go to garrison Malta for three years, and you are to have double pay; would that create discontent?—No; many men might feel distressed at having to go, but that it would create discontent in the regiment I am not prepared to say.

703. You would have no fear of a mutiny, or of having any difficulty in inducing the regiment to embark?—No, none whatever; because I think I should have sufficient influence over the men to make them go; still I do not think that it would be politic to do so without first ascertaining very clearly (without putting it in the form of volunteering) what the feeling of the regiment was, and how many men it would affect.

704. Have you ever heard any desire or inclination expressed by the men to visit Europe?—Frequently. My own men, not the body of the regiment, but many of my native officers, were particularly desirous to come with me

me this time, when I came home; one was especially desirous of coming.

705. Do the men generally correspond much by letter among themselves?—Not the Pathan regiments much, I think.

706. Do you think that a native regiment being sent to a garrison like Malta would have a good effect in India itself when the news was spread, supposing the men wrote home to their friends, and told them what great things they saw?—It depends upon the light in which those men saw it. If they were put to great hardships and felt themselves aggrieved at going, no doubt the feeling that they would spread would be that of discontent.

707. When they got there, if they found that there was no hardship, and that they were very luxuriously treated, what effect would it have?—They would no doubt speak accordingly.

708. In short, you think that it is a prejudice which might be very easily got over?—I think that, where men find their interest in anything, of course it is not difficult to make them act accordingly; but if they found that the foreign service was inconvenient, it would have a contrary effect. There is no doubt that self-interest and self-convenience would be the ruling motives for men going anywhere.

709. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You think that there would be no difficulty in raising a new regiment of Pathans, for instance, distinctly upon the understanding that they were to be sent on foreign service?—No, I think not.

710. You think that there would be no difficulty in finding recruits for that service?—No; I do not think there would provided it was made worth their while; it would depend very much upon how those men were treated, and how they liked the service, whether you would get any others to follow them.

711. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You have stated that the seven rupees per month, which is the pay of a native soldier in India, includes clothing and rations?—The men have to provide for themselves what they call half mounting, that is to say, the ordinary fatigue dress; and now that is really a great hardship with the men, for what cost my men seven years ago *Rs.* 2. 8., they have now to pay *Rs.* 6. 8. for, that is 200 per cent. above what they used to have to pay.

712. As a matter of fact, they have considerable difficulty now in living on their pay, have they not?—An increase has lately been made to men of six years' service; that is the late order. I think it is a very good one, and has a very good effect; but still I think it is as little as a man can possibly live upon.

713. What was the late order to which you refer?—An increase of one rupee after six years' service, and an increase of two rupees after 10 years' service.

714. In case a regiment was sent abroad, the double pay which you say would be necessary, in your opinion, to reconcile them to that service, would be exclusive of rations, would it not; you would have to give them their rations besides?—You would have to provide rations for them certainly.

715. Besides any extra pay?—Yes.

716. Captain *Vivian.*] You would provide them with rice, I suppose?—Yes.

717. Lord *William Hay.*] Did you say that you would have to provide rations for them, besides their extra pay?—I said so, but it depends very much upon the price of food. If the price of food was very much in excess of what they have to pay in their own country, of course their pay would have to be raised accordingly.

718. Captain *Vivian.*] That is the principle followed now in the army, is not it?—That is the principle. When the price of provisions rises to famine rates, a certain allowance is made to them.

719. Mr. *Oliphant.*] I suppose rice is their staple food anywhere; they would never be satisfied without their rice?—The Pathans very seldom eat rice.

720. Lord *William Hay.*] It is considered a luxury by them, is not it?—They eat it now and then.

721. Is rice not regarded as a luxury by the people of the north of India?—It is not a general article of food amongst the Pathans.

722. Have you now any practical difficulty in obtaining recruits for your regiment?—I do not think they come quite so readily as formerly, but I have not much difficulty in obtaining recruits for the regiment. When my native officers and men whom I can trust go upon leave, as they frequently do, I make them always look out for good men, and bring them back with them for recruits, and though the regiment may be full, I keep them there to ensure my having them when I want them.

723. On the whole, is not there more difficulty now than there was a few years ago in getting recruits?—I think the same class of men do not come so readily as they did.

724. Is the present class an inferior or a superior class, do you think?—They are not quite of such good families; they are more needy; they are mostly the same class of men, but they are more needy men who come.

725. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is there anything in the habits of those races who compose the Punjaub regiments that would render them unsuitable for a European colony?—I think there would be the greatest difficulty in a European colony to give the men occupation to keep them contented to remain so long as three or five years away from their homes. I do not think that their simple duty would be sufficient occupation for them to keep them contented and quiet. I do not mean to say exactly quiet, but they would have home sickness, and always be desiring to return home.

726. *Chairman.*] They would find it dull?—Yes; and the Pathan race is a most excitable one; they are very much like the Europeans in their temperament; they require change and excitement just as much as Europeans do.

727. Captain *Vivian.*] Not more?—I think the Europeans require pretty much of it.

728. Mr. *Oliphant.*] European regiments will stay in a garrison, will they not?—Yes.

729. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you see any serious objection to having regiments commanded entirely by native officers?—For myself, I do not approve of it; I think that the generality of natives are not fit to command a body of men. There are exceptions to it, of course, but as a rule, I think it is objectionable.

Friday, 15*th March* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Childers.	Captain Hayter.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Lord William Hay.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel the Honourable H. H. CLIFFORD, V. C., Assistant Quartermaster General, Horse Guards; Examined.

Colonel the Hon. *H. H. Clifford*, V.C.

15 March 1867.

729*. *Chairman.*] WHAT are the subjects upon which you are prepared to give evidence to the Committee?—The only questions upon which I am prepared to give evidence are those of the movements of regiments from England, to and between the various colonies east of the Cape, to India, and to the West Indies, and of the mode in which the reliefs are carried out. All movements of corps at home and to foreign stations are first considered and ordered by his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief himself; that is the case with every move that takes place. The regiments at colonies eastward of the Cape, excepting India, are generally relieved by corps from India, but those in the West Indies are sometimes relieved by corps from Europe, and sometimes by corps from British North America. The corps eastward of the Cape, on being relieved, are sometimes brought to the Cape of Good Hope and sent to India, and sometimes brought to this country, whilst those in the West Indies have for the last 10 years been invariably brought home.

730. Do you mean to say that a corps in China on being relieved is never taken to India, but always either to the Cape of Good Hope or home?—Generally speaking, it is moved from China to the Cape, or brought home; I do not think there is an instance of a regiment having been brought, of late years, from China to India.

731. Mr. *Childers.*] To Australia or New Zealand?—The regiments are generally moved from China either to the Cape or home.

732. There was a corps sent to New Zealand in one case?—Yes, in one case.

733. Lord *William Hay.*] I remember the case of the 98th Regiment coming from China to India under Lord Clyde; Colonel Campbell, as he was then?—That was at the time of the mutiny, I presume?

734. No; it was long before the mutiny?—I am not fully acquainted with the facts of that case.

735. Colonel *North.*] The 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment were under orders to go to India from China; but in consequence of their being in bad state of health they were sent off to the Cape; however, I believe, it is very rarely that that is done?—Very rarely indeed; if the Committee require a statement of that kind with regard to the actual regiments, I can furnish it.

736. *Chairman.*] Will you let the Committee have a return of all the reliefs and movements of troops east of the Cape during the last 20 years; I suppose it will not be a very onerous duty to prepare such a paper?—I will; I suppose you would not require small drafts to be mentioned.

737. Merely regiments, of course?—I will prepare it as soon as I can.

738. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] There is no need to give movements in India itself, but only movements from one country to another?—There is no fixed rule as to the distribution of corps on being relieved at stations eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, as the place to which they are sent depends very much upon the length of their service abroad, and the stations at which they have been serving, and also upon their previous foreign service; regiments are sometimes exchanged between the Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius, and between the Cape and China.

739. *Chairman.*] Are the reliefs arranged only with a view to those considerations you have named, or with a view to economy?—They are arranged also with a view to economy. Their period of service at each station averages from two to five years, and their foreign service averages about ten years. I mean that that is the average of a regiment's stay at a colony; sometimes it is two years and sometimes it is five years.

740. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Ten years' foreign service is the intention, but that time is often exceeded, is not it?—Yes.

741. Lord *William Hay.*] Does that statement apply to India?—This is exclusive of India. Regiments generally stay a longer period in India than two or five years.

742. Does the average of 10 years include India, or is it exclusive of India?—The 10 years is inclusive of India. Ten years is supposed to be the period of foreign service.

743. *Chairman.*] Would you be good enough to include in that return, of which you have taken a note, also the time during which each regiment on foreign service has remained in each country:

country: it is merely the same facts in another form?—Yes. In the return of all regiments relieved during the last 20 years, east of the Cape, is it the wish of the Committee that India should be included?

744. Certainly?—I will take care that that shall be done.

745. Colonel *North.*] At this very moment there are many regiments in India that have exceeded their 10 years of service there, are there not?—Yes.

746. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Your intention, in the statement which you were making to the Committee, was to show the ordinary system of relief to colonies other than India?—Yes; other than India. Such a return as that of which I have just taken note having been called for, it would be useless to enter into any minor detail of what reliefs there have been. In order to give an idea of the time that regiments have stayed, I have prepared one, merely relating to the last three or four years, but, as a return is now called for for the last 20 years, that would comprehend everything I have, so that it would be useless my entering into any detail now.

747. Has there not been a new scale of foreign service laid down since the Crimean war?—The whole system has been reconsidered since the Crimean war.

748. *Chairman.*] Have you any further information to give to the Committee?—No.

749. You have no knowledge of the cost of transport, have you?—I should not like to speak about it officially, because we do not deal with it; it rests entirely with the War Department, and an officer of that Department is preparing the necessary detail, and is going to give evidence before the Committee with regard to it.

750. Was it part of your duty to undertake or direct the movement of Indian troops, such as the Sikhs, during the Chinese war?—No, I had nothing to do with them.

751. Nor the Ceylon Rifles?—No.

752. Mr. *Childers.*] When you stated that the average stay of a regiment in a colony is from two to five years before relief, you meant that the Horse Guards rule is that the reliefs are in five years, but it frequently happens that for the convenience of the service regiments are left for a much longer time before being relieved, does it not?—Frequently.

753. Captain *Hayter.*] The general rule for foreign service is 10 years abroad and five years at home, is it not?—Yes.

754. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That was the new scale laid down, as you mentioned, subsequently to the Crimean war, was not it?—I could not say for certain; I think there was no alteration in the time then. I think the same time, namely, 10 years abroad and five years at home, existed before then.

755. *Chairman.*] I understand you to say there is no rigid rule of any kind, but that it is a matter of absolute discretion on the part of the Commander-in-Chief?—Yes, there is nothing laid down; if the Commander-in-Chief thought it advisable that a regiment should remain a longer period abroad, it would remain there.

756. So that when a regiment goes to a station no man in it can prophesy how long he is likely to stay there?—He cannot be certain within a year; he knows that within a year or two at most the foreign service of the regiment will be 10 years; on going abroad a man knows that his foreign service is 10 years.

757. But he does not know where he will pass that 10 years?—No.

758. Are you at all acquainted with the question of the cost of relieving the troops in the various stations?—No, I am not prepared to give evidence on that subject.

Tuesday, 19th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson	Colonel North.
Viscount Cranborne.	Mr. Oliphant.
Sir James Fergusson.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Marquis of Hartington.	Sir William Russell.
Lord William Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Captain Hayter.	

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Major General THOMAS TOWNSEND PEARS, C.B., called in; and Examined.

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759. *Chairman.*] HAVE you any information with respect to the cost of the transport of troops per head per day from one oriental port to another?—No, I have not. I think there is no such information in the India Office at the present time. I have an estimate by the Government of India of the probable cost of the transport of a Sikh regiment from India (that is to say, Bengal) to China, but it is a mere estimate. It is the only information upon the subject I could find in the India Office. I have seen a statement, made also officially, on the occasion of a regiment returning from Hong Kong to Bombay a very few years ago. A vessel was offered at Hong Kong to take the whole regiment to Bombay for 5,000 *l.* That may give some notion of what the transport of a regiment would cost from one port to the other, but we have no returns of the actual cost from the Governments of India.

760. Have you any knowledge of the increased pay which was given to the Sikhs who were employed in China?—I do not think they had anything beyond the ordinary money privileges given to the troops going to China upon other occasions.

761. What are those privileges?—They have what is called full batta; they have that whenever they are on active service.

762. What is the amount of full batta?—It varies with the ranks; the amount to a private soldier is a rupee and a half a month.

763. Over and above his pay?—Over and above his pay, and then they have free rations besides when on foreign service.

764. Ordinarily they have seven rupees a month; then they have their food besides?—Seven rupees is their full pay ordinarily apart from good conduct pay, or length of service pay, which they get after a certain number of years' service. They get rations, estimated at 3½ rupees a month.

765. Have they any other privileges?—They have other privileges occasionally according to the service on which they are engaged. When we went 25 years ago to China, the troops had warm clothing of various descriptions given to them free of expense; but that is not part of the regulation.

766. Have they any pension privileges?—Yes, very great privileges. It is only the heirs of men who die, or are killed on foreign service, who get any pensions at all, and they do.

767. What is the increase of pay given to the Madras troops going to Rangoon; is there any?—It is the same as they get at other foreign stations; it is considered foreign service; all service beyond sea that involves the troops going on board ship has been always considered by the Madras Government and the Madras army as going on foreign service.

768. Only by the Madras army; the Bombay army often moves by sea, does not it?—They do; and they have not, as I understand, the same privileges; they have at Aden, but not in Scinde. Scinde is considered as a portion of the Presidency. Aden is considered foreign service, and they get the same privileges there.

769. Does any part of the Bengal army ever go to Burmah?—They have been, but they do not go there as a part of their ordinary routine duty.

770. Is that treated as foreign service in their case?—I am not certain; the last time they went was for active service there; therefore no doubt it was in that case; I cannot speak to a certainty.

771. From what Presidency do the troops come who garrison the penal settlements?—They have a small detachment of European troops, and they have natives.

772. From Madras?—From Madras, I am almost certain. I know that the Madras sappers are there, and I am almost certain that a Madras infantry regiment is there too.

773. That is treated, I suppose, as foreign service too?—Quite so.

774. Do you, from your experience, confirm the statement that no difficulty has ever been found in inducing the Madras troops to go upon that Burmese service?—I do not think that any difficulty has ever been found, excepting in cases where alterations have been made in their privileges as to pension.

775. It is always a question of money, and not of religion, is not it?—Entirely so.

776. From your experience, do you know if any difference took place in the case of men of high caste belonging to that army; are you aware whether they showed more reluctance than others to going on foreign service?—I have never heard of any such reluctance; I had a few men of high caste among my own men when we embarked for China in 1840, but there was not the least difference in their behaviour under orders for embarkation;

barkation; they all went with equal cheerfulness and readiness.

777. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you know anything of certain battalions styled Marine Battalions, which were raised in Bengal for foreign service?—I have reason to believe that there were such battalions many years ago, but that when they introduced the practice of enlisting men for general service they withdrew the name of "Marine Battalion" from those regiments, paying them a compliment, and saying that they would thenceforward be considered as regiments for general service.

778. Do you know the terms upon which they were raised?—No, I do not, further than that, judging from their name, I have no doubt they were raised with a view to foreign service.

779. Colonel *North.*] Do they form a part of the Madras army at this moment?—No; they were in the Bengal army, and they are in the Bengal army now.

780. Lord *William Hay.*] Were they not recruited generally from natives of good caste?—I do not know how they were recruited.

781. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you remember an extra allowance that used to be given to what was called the Trans-Indus service, that is, to all troops serving beyond the Indus?—I remember hearing of the withdrawal of such an allowance.

782. An extra allowance similar to that has never been restored, has it?—I believe not to the army of Bengal.

783. The withdrawal of it, you may remember, in Sir Charles Napier's time, caused a great deal of dissatisfaction?—Yes, I believe it did.

784. Speaking of marine battalions, do you know anything of a Bombay marine battalion which was raised specially for service on board ship?—Yes.

785. Does that exist at present?—Yes, it does; it is one of the regular regiments in their army.

786. But the Bombay Marine Battalion was especially employed in detachments on board the ships of the Indian navy?—I believe it was.

787. As the Indian navy is now abolished, how are those troops employed?—The Marine Battalion remains as one of the regiments on the establishment of the army in its regular number; in fact it had always a number, even while it was the Marine Battalion, and it retained that number by express order when the Indian navy was abolished; but it had no regular organised establishment of officers, and therefore it was looked upon as an exceptional regiment in its organisation till the whole army was organised upon its present footing, and then it took its place according to its number; I think the number was and is, the 21st.

788. Are you aware that that regiment was composed exclusively of low-caste men?—That I am not aware of.

789. Is it your opinion that high-caste men would go on board ship as readily as low-caste men?—All the men of the Madras army do, and many of them are men not of high caste, in the sense in which the term would be used in Bengal, but good caste men. They are men very particular about caste observances, as many men in the south of India are.

790. There are very few Brahmins in the Madras army altogether, I believe?—There are very few Brahmins.

791. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Have you any opinion upon the degree in which troops raised out of India, such as Chinese, would be acceptable to the natives of India as a garrison?—I should think that they would be anything but acceptable. I should think that their employment in India would be an offence to the natives of India.

792. Do you think that it would tend to raise the native estimate of the strength of this country if they found a part of the garrison of India, which had previously consisted solely of European troops, made up by contingents of that kind?—I should think certainly not. I should not think that it would raise the character of the British power in any part of the world.

793. Do you think that, man for man, such contingents would make up for a corresponding deficiency of European troops?—I have always thought that the Chinese were a very good material for soldiers. I think that they are a remarkably able-bodied and bold set of men, and if they were disciplined and organised they might in action, wherever they were employed, do very good service.

794. Do you suppose, if you reduced the establishment of, say, 60,000 European troops in India by 5,000 or 10,000, that 5,000 or 10,000 Chinese would suffice to make up for that reduction?—No, certainly not; and, I think, what they might make up in physical power would be in a great measure sacrificed by the moral effect of having them in lieu of British troops; for the British soldiers are looked up to with respect by the natives of India, and I doubt whether any foreign mercenaries whom we brought there would be looked up to in the same way.

795. In point of finance, therefore, you could not hope that any saving would be effected?—I think not.

796. What would be your opinion as to the success of substituting native Indian for European troops in an East Indian colony; would an equal number of native troops be in your opinion an equivalent for Europeans?—No; certainly not anywhere.

797. Wherever you placed troops raised in India, of whatever class or race, you think that the number would have to be considerably in excess of the European troops whose place they took?—I should think that a certain number of native troops for mere garrison purposes in a time of peace might be employed in substitution for an equivalent number of Europeans; but not, certainly, in time of war, unless it were such men as the Sikhs, and I should be sorry, even with them, to say that a certain number of Sikhs were equivalent to the same number of British troops; but the native troops might perhaps be employed with advantage as a mere garrison in a colony in time of peace.

798. At present the service of native Indian troops out of India has been confined either to certain known stations, or to the emergencies of field service, has it not?—Yes.

799. And native troops rarely object to go anywhere for field service, do they?—No, never, I think; certainly not those I know anything about, that is to say, the Madras regiments.

800. I suppose their employment in garrisoning places like Rangoon and Hong Kong in time of peace has not been agreeable to them, but they have submitted to it?—Yes; I think it is always distasteful to them, certainly; but they have certain advantages given to them which make up for the discomfort that they are subject to in separation from their families and exposure to an uncongenial

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uncongenial climate; for, strangely enough, it seems that all climates out of India disagree with the natives more or less. All foreign countries disagree with the natives of India, apparently.

801. But that consideration of the separation from their families is a very great hardship, I suppose, upon troops, especially upon troops with the habits of the Madras troops?—Yes; I think it is felt to be a great discomfort, but they will make great sacrifices for their families, even in separation from them. For instance, if they could hope to save money they would go for two or three years, and leave their families behind.

802. Do you think that they would go very willingly if the practice of employing them out of India became more general, as it would, for instance, if other colonies made a steady annual demand upon the native army for garrison duty?—That would depend, of course, upon how they were treated. I think such inducements might be held out to them as would encourage others to follow their example cheerfully, and promote a succession of volunteers for foreign service.

803. But you would have to compensate them for the hardships that such a service would entail by increased pay, would you not?—Yes, and by pensions to their families and other privileges; inducements, in fact, for them to go and undertake what is a serious discomfort for a time, in the hope of benefiting their families or themselves afterwards.

804. Can you form any opinion as to what increase to their pay and allowances would be sufficient to make up to them for the hardship of the change of life?—I think as far as regards the men of the Madras Presidency (and they are the only men of whom I have any personal knowledge) very little would be required beyond what they now get.

805. What is that?—They get their field allowance, full batta as it is called, and rations and pensions to their families. The only reluctance within my experience which has been shown by any of the men to proceed on foreign service, arose out of an interference with the regulations of pension as affecting their families, not themselves. The rule of the service is, that if a man is killed on foreign service, or dies on foreign service, his next heir gets the pension, which he would not do if he died in his own country; and 40 years ago this rule was extended, or, at all events, it was applied at the time of the first Burmese war to the heirs of those who died after their return to the coast before they were discharged from the hospital. The Government of India some years afterwards ordered that clause to be rescinded; that created great dissatisfaction amongst the native sepoys, and the Government at home desired that it should be restored, and so the rules now stand, and they give perfect satisfaction to all the sepoys who go abroad.

806. Then the difficulty of employing native troops further than has been the practice out of India beyond sea, is really a question of money?—I do not know that. I think it is a question of discipline also; it is a question how you would supply them with officers to maintain the corps when it was out of its own country in a state of efficiency and discipline.

807. *Chairman.*] That is a question of money too, is not it?—Not altogether. I think there are two ways in which a corps might be furnished from India for service at the Mauritius, either by raising volunteers to form a local corps, or by sending a regiment of the existing army. If you send a regiment of the existing army, you send officers with it, who have very high pay for a special service. I am told that that always caused some embarrassment if there were any troops of the British army serving there at the same time. If you raised a local corps for the service, you would find great difficulty in keeping up the supply of British officers.

808. Are not the officers of the British army of such a different description, and so differently situated, that no comparison would arise between them and the officers accompanying the Indian regiments?—Yes, they are; but the amount of pay which an officer of a native regiment would receive under the present system in India, would be very much higher than that of an officer commanding a British regiment. Their circumstances would be totally different, certainly, but I have been told that it would be considered rather an objectionable comparison.

809. Major *Anson.*] The Indian officer is a staff officer now, is he not?—He is a staff officer.

810. The English officers employed with them either in the artillery or elsewhere, would look upon their case as a different one to their own, inasmuch as the Indian officer would have to go back to India as his home, whereas the English officer would expect to come back to England?—I think they might very fairly look upon it in that way.

811. *Chairman.*] The Indian officer rises in a different way, and he has got into his profession in a different way, has he not?—Entirely so; and he is in a different profession, and the profession gives him different prospects; he has to serve all his life in India, while the other has only an occasional and temporary sojourn abroad.

812. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You were going on to say that, although they might very fairly balance those advantages, yet there would be some difficulty resulting from it in practice?—I have heard it suggested that there might be some difficulty, and there have been instances of it in China and India; but as has been pointed out, the difference in their position now that the Indian officers are all staff officers, might make a difference in the comparison, and in the effect of the comparison.

813. Major *Anson.*] No officers commanding Indian troops have served with European soldiers in China since that system has been established in India, have they?—No.

814. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is not there a regiment serving in China now which was serving there before that system was established?—There is no native regiment now in China.

815. Is not there a European regiment still serving there which is continued on the high scale of pay?—I believe there is.

816. I was asking you just now if the difficulty with regard to the native regiments going beyond sea was not mainly a question of finance; I mean as regards themselves, but as regards the advantage of the service, it would always be necessary, would it not, to place some European troops beside any native regiments so employed?—I should think so, decidedly.

817. And then the questions of differential allowances would come into play?—They might do so; but, as was observed just now, there is no question of allowances as between the native soldier

soldier and European soldier; it is merely as between the officers; and it is very possible that the officers of British regiments might see that the position of staff corps officers serving with native regiments was entirely different from their own position, and that there was no question of uniformity of pay and allowances between them; but, as a matter of fact, there would be a very marked difference in their pay.

818. At all events, the placing of native regiments in eastern colonies could never be in substitution for European troops, but only supplementing them?—I should think so; I do not know of any colony in the East where you would like to leave native troops entirely by themselves, unless it were the Straits Settlements, where they have recently determined to put them out.

819. Then, in fact, except as enabling a commanding officer to dispense with the services of European troops for duties which are peculiarly unhealthy for European troops, the object of garrisoning that part of the world would be as well attained by having European troops in each necessary point from which assistance could be given to other points in case of emergency?—Native troops at any of those colonies would no doubt be very useful to take the ordinary garrison guards and other duties which are now taken in uncongenial climates by European soldiers; for instance, at the Mauritius, which would be the most suitable post for a native regiment, I think there are a great many daily duties which might be injurious to European soldiers, but which might be taken by native troops. There is a large population of natives of India there, so that a native regiment might be suitably placed amongst them and would be very useful; not, however, without some Europeans as a check upon them, and as a support to the European population generally.

820. Mr. *Oliphant.*] At the Cape of Good Hope, or in Natal, or on the frontier, do you think it would be of advantage to have native regiments?—No, I should not think it would.

821. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Have you ever considered the question of employing native troops on garrison duty in the Mediterranean?—I have never considered it until lately.

822. Are you of opinion that it would be, I will not say possible, but desirable to use native troops either at Malta or Gibraltar?—I should think not; I should think you would be able to get native troops of the best description to go there, if they were sufficiently paid for it, but I do not think that it would have a good effect in Europe to show that we were dependent on Asiatics for the maintenance of our chief garrisons in Europe.

823. Do you not think that a native regiment isolated in Malta or Gibraltar would be in a very anomalous and exceptional position?—I think it would; I think it would be distasteful to them; their social habits, and their religion, and their feelings altogether would make their position unpleasant to themselves as well as to the population and to the rest of the garrison. But I do do not see, in time of urgent need, in time of war, for instance, why you might not have the advantage of a brigade or two of Sikh soldiers in any part of the world.

824. I speak especially of garrison duty?—I do not think that it would be a good plan to have native troops there to form a portion of the ordinary garrison.

825. Colonel *North.*] I believe three years has been the longest period hitherto for which Indian troops have served in the colonies, but if they were sent to Malta or Gibraltar in all probability they would be required to remain for a longer period in order to save the expense of sending them backwards and forwards; do you consider that there would be any objection to prolonging the period of their foreign service?—Yes, I think there would be very great difficulty in doing so. The men are accustomed to return to their homes from any foreign service, at longest, in three years, and if it is a notoriously distasteful service, in a shorter time. We have kept them in China, excepting those who were employed during the war, for only two years, and they were somewhat dissatisfied even then.

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826. It would be impossible to bring their families to a place like Gibraltar, or Malta, would it not?—Quite impossible.

827. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The experiment of having foreign mercenaries in India has never yet been tried; it is a matter of pure speculation whether it would be distasteful to the natives or not, is it not?—We may judge, I think, from what we know of the people, and the feelings with which they look upon foreigners.

828. I refer to the employment of Chinese or foreign troops in India; there has never, except in the case of the Ceylon Rifle regiment, which has been a success, been a case of any foreign mercenaries being garrisoned in India; we cannot form an idea, except by pure speculation, of the effect that it would produce upon the Indian mind?—No; except by a knowledge of the feelings of the natives themselves.

829. Lord *William Hay.*] Do you think that the natives of India have an antipathy to the Chinese?—I do not know that they have more than to any other strangers and foreigners.

830. Are you aware that Chinese are now employed extensively on tea plantations in different parts of the country?—I have heard that they have been employed.

831. Are they not treated with marked respect by the natives of those parts?—I am not aware.

832. Are you aware also that they intermarry with the people of the hills?—No; I know nothing of the people of the hills.

833. Sir *James Fergusson.*] At all events it is a different thing being in a country as a settler and being there as a soldier to keep guard over the people?—Yes, I should think so.

834. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you remember one remarkable instance that has occurred of the employment of native troops at a colony out of India, namely, the garrisoning at the beginning of this century, or the end of last century, of Nootka Sound, on the Coast of America, by a wing of the first Grenadier Bombay regiment for six months?—I was not aware of that. We send natives of India to the West Indies; so far as that goes, if you give them sufficient inducement they will go anywhere for a time.

835. *Chairman.*] It is a question of time?—Yes, they will go for a time.

836. Major *Anson.*] How long have we been in possession of the Straits Settlements?—I should think it is 50 years since the days of Sir Stamford Raffles. I am not quite certain as to the dates.

837. During that time what has been the garrison there?—Ever since I can remember it has been a native regiment or two, and some European artillery.

838. You stated that, in case of war, you thought it would not do in colonies of that sort to have

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have nothing but native soldiers; do you not think that, if they were supported by European artillery garrison, that would be quite sufficient?—It would depend very much upon whom we were at war with; not if we were at war with any European power, I think.

839. In case of war with any European power, places like China and the Mauritius would have to depend mainly upon our naval power, would they not?—I suppose they would; and so would India, I presume.

840. It would be fighting behind stone walls, which native troops could do?—Yes.

841. The fleet would be able to throw in a force of marines if necessary?—Yes.

842. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Did you not mean that either in time of war or in time of peace you would not think it desirable to place a native garrison in one of the colonies without any Europeans by their side?—Yes, I did mean that.

843. *Chairman.*] What is your objection to doing that in time of peace?—I think war might break out at any time very suddenly, and I think that where there is a large European settlement, the colonists themselves would object to there being no European troops at all in the place. In the Mauritius a large number of the population are natives of India. If you had only native regiments there, I think the European portion of the population would feel uncomfortable if they had no British troops at all there.

844. That is merely a question of feeling on their part, it is not a question of strategical necessity?—Not at all.

845. Sir *James Fergusson.*] When a colony is called upon to pay, as is the case now, the cost of its own garrison in whole, or in part, the colonists might naturally object, might they not, to having, without disparagement of native troops, a description of force not the very best we possess?—I should think so; but that is a point which is a mere matter of opinion. I should think that Her Majesty's Government, and particularly the Colonial Department, would understand that matter much better than I do.

846. Major *Anson.*] There have been no complaints from the Straits of being garrisoned simply with native regiments, have there?—No; but it was near at hand to India, and it was always looked upon at times when war threatened, with some anxiety, into which a force should be thrown immediately if it was required.

847. *Chairman.*] Have you any records of the death-rate of Indian troops at Rangoon, or the Straits Settlements, in the India Office?—I think we have.

848. Could you give the Committee a return of them for the last 10 years?—Yes, I have very little doubt we can; I will endeavour to find them.

849. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I think you have ascertained that it would be impossible in the India Office to procure a statement of the cost of transport of troops from the Indian ports to the stations at which they have been hitherto employed?—Yes; we have not got it.

850. *Chairman.*] Have you the death-rate for the Indian troops employed in China as long as they were there?—We have, certainly, for the two or three years after the war.

851. Perhaps you will include those in the return I have mentioned?—Yes, we may have them during the war; I am not quite certain of that. They were not quite so regularly kept up during that time.

Colonel DIGHTON PROBYN, C.B., V.C., called in; and Examined.

Colonel *D. Probyn*, C.B., V.C.

852. Major *Anson.*] YOU have commanded a native cavalry regiment in India for the last 10 years, have you not?—Yes, for the last 10 years.

853. During that time what class of men, or races of men have you had under your command?—They have been entirely northern men.

854. You served in China in 1860, I think?—Yes, during the war in 1860.

855. Had you any difficulties in getting your men to go on foreign service?—No, none; not the slightest; not a single objection was raised by any of my men.

856. No religious objections of any kind were made?—Not the slightest. My senior native officer was a man of one of the first families in the Punjaub, a high-caste Brahmin, and I never heard a murmur of any sort from him, or from any of them.

857. With regard to supplying your men with water on the voyage, you had no difficulties, had you?—No, none; not the smallest. When we were marching down to Calcutta from the North West Provinces, I was ordered by Sir Robert Napier to send men of all the different castes I had in the regiment (one from each caste) to superintend the pumping of the drinking water into the casks. I sent them off at once; but I hardly think it was necessary, as at Hong Kong, when we had to take in fresh water, Sir Robert Napier, not wishing to break faith in any way with the native soldier, again told me to see that the men had the same opportunity of superintending the pumping of the water into the casks as they had in Calcutta. I told this to my native officers, and they said, "Anything you order we will do, but it is quite unnecessary." The senior native officer in particular (the Brahmin I have just spoken of) said, "I do not care who pumps the water into the casks I have to drink from. If you order me to send a man to superintend the operation, of course I will do so, but it is quite unnecessary making any trouble about it, and if I do not care why should the other men care?" The water was afterwards pumped in by the Chinese, and I never heard a dispute of any sort raised about it, either in going to China, in China, or in coming back from China.

858. After the conclusion of the war in China, how long did you remain there?—My regiment was away from India for about a year. It was just eleven months from the time it first embarked to when it disembarked at Calcutta. My regiment came away immediately after the war; Major Fane's regiment remained in China for a year after the war.

859. Did you hear of any difficulties in the case of Major Fane's regiment?—I have heard Major Fane say that he had no difficulties of any sort.

860. While remaining in China?—Yes, while remaining in China; he used to write to me continually from China, and he frequently told me that he had no difficulty with his men. They did not feel the cold in the least; they were never more healthy than when in China.

861. It

861. It was a very severe climate, was it not?—It was a very severe climate in the north of China; I think I am right in stating that Major Fane told me he lost only one man during the whole time he was in China, except those killed in action; those I do not know about. He wrote me word in the winter that he had lost one old man out of his whole regiment.

862. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in getting native soldiers to serve abroad in time of peace?—I do not think so, if they were paid properly.

863. What do you think it would be necessary to pay them?—The pay of an infantry soldier in India now is seven rupees; that is always considered one rupee too little by all the infantry commanding officers, even for serving in India. I think if they had eight rupees a month for going on foreign service, and had their food and uniform found them, that would be sufficient.

864. Do you think that it would have a bad effect upon the minds of the natives to employ them on the roster of the English army for colonial duty?—I do not see why it should; I do not think so.

865. Do you consider that it would be advisable to do it?—Yes, I think it would be advisable; I think it is a pity, if we have such troops, that we should not make more use of them than we do now.

866. Do you think that there would be very strong objections raised on the part of the officers to our doing so?—I do not think there would; I think the officers would be likely to object if the pay for the natives was not good; if it was not considerably better than it is now in India; but you can make the pay very much better for them, and they would still cost a great deal less than the European soldier.

867. Colonel *North.*] We have had it in evidence, that in some regiment (I forget which), going from India to China, a great number of men died during the passage in consequence of their not cooking on board, owing to their caste; I suppose you had no men of that description under your command?—I only had men from the Punjaub; but I had in my regiment going to China several Brahmins from the Punjaub. I had Dogras in my regiment, but I heard no man make any difficulty about going. I do not think what you mention could have occurred in the case of any troops employed in the last war in 1860. There were only northern regiments sent there then.

868. *Chairman.*] The Sikhs have a great objection to remaining a long time away from their homes, have they not?—They have.

869. Would there not be some difficulty about arranging furloughs for them while on foreign service?—I do not think they should be kept for more than three years away from their homes, unless they were recruited specially for foreign service for a longer period, knowing beforehand that they were not to be relieved in a less time than that stated on enlistment.

870. Do you think that you could induce men to enlist on those conditions?—Yes, certainly, on good pay and with their own officers.

871. Major *Anson.*] Should you not consider that a garrison in a place like Mauritius or Singapore, or in China, of native soldiers supported by European garrison artillery, would be quite sufficient?—I think so; they must have officers with them who understand them thoroughly. Of course, if you put strange officers with them it would be a different thing altogether.

872. With the officers they had in India?—Yes, with the officers they had in India it would do very well.

873. You consider that a native soldier is infinitely cheaper in every way than a European soldier?—I should think so, in every way.

874. In the way of food, and hospital expenses?—Certainly; there are no hospital expenses at all for native troops; very little medicine does for them.

875. They do not require such expensive barrack accommodation, do they?—No, and they would not require the same amount of accommodation; they never have it in their own homes.

876. Do you consider that the cost of transport by sea is less in the case of native soldiers; do they require less room on board ship than European soldiers?—Much less; the natives can pack much closer than Europeans can.

877. You would not object in the slightest degree to have your regiment, in case you were ordered by sea, more closely packed than the Europeans?—No; the facts upon that question could be easily found out by the coolies sent away from Calcutta; they pack them much closer than they do other men, and yet they have plenty of room.

878. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You would not like your regiment to be treated like coolies, would you?—No, not like coolies, but it would be a short vōyage, and the coolies on board ship are well cared for, and I believe do not complain of want of room.

879. Lord *William Hay.*] Do your Sikhs mess together?—Yes, at times they have not the slightest objection to messing together.

880. Do they mess with the Muzubee Sikhs?—I have no Muzubee Sikhs in my regiment; I have nothing but high-caste men; perhaps they would not like to mess with Muzubees.

881. Your men would not mess with the Muzubee Sikhs?—They might do so on service, but they probably would raise an objection to it; I should think they would certainly.

882. They do not object to standing on parade with the Muzubee Sikhs, do they?—No, not in the least, but I have not got a Muzubee Sikh in my regiment; I never had a Muzubee in it.

883. Have you had any experience of Chinese soldiers?—Only in fighting against them.

884. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You stated that you thought it was advisable that Indian troops should take their turn of colonial service?—Yes.

885. Do you mean that it is advisable as contributing to the men's self respect and pride, as belonging to the general army?—Yes, I think that is one reason; I think too, as I said before, it is a pity that as we have such fine soldiers, they should not be made use of out of India; that is another reason. I think, also, that it would tend to make the men think more of our power if we let them see that we have other possessions besides those in India.

886. Your regiment would, of course, not be suitable for the sort of service that honourable Members have been pointing at?—Mine is a cavalry regiment.

887. Your regiment is a regiment of a peculiar kind; it could not, of course, be taken as a specimen of the general native regiments of India?—Yes, I think so. We have several good

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good regiments constituted in the same way as mine; the Guide Corps for instance.

888. Yours is a specimen of a *corps d'élite*, is not it?—Every officer tries to make his regiment as good as he can, or he should do so at any rate. Other commanding officers, I dare say, think their regiments as good as mine. It is composed of the same sort of men as Colonel Keyes has in his; his is an infantry regiment, and mine is a cavalry regiment; but they consist of the same sort of men, recruited in the same countries. Colonel Brownlow, of the 20th Punjaub Infantry has also much the same sort of men, recruited from the same districts. Some of my men have friends and relatives in his regiment.

889. You think that, on the whole, good as these regiments are known to be, they need not be taken as exceptionally good ones?—No, I do not think they need.

890. Except as regards any particular circumstances of them at present, they need not be taken as extraordinary?—No; I do not think they need. Many cavalry commanding officers may, perhaps, in their own imaginations, think their regiments quite as good if not better than mine.

891. Your experience of the service of such regiments abroad has been confined, has it not, to time of war?—Yes, in time of war.

892. And the idea of going to take part in a war has an extraordinary attraction to a Sikh soldier, has not it?—Yes; the Sikh race is a martial race. I think they are fond of fighting, and they have a better chance of promotion, of course, in a campaign than in time of peace.

893. It is a very different thing, is not it, to being employed almost as hewers of wood and drawers of water at a dull garrison station?—Yes; but I think the increased pay they will get while on foreign service will be quite a sufficient inducement to make them like it; of course they would get more pay while serving out of India than they would in India.

894. It would be a very different thing, would it not, for the Sikh soldiers to find themselves sent habitually to Hong Kong, in order to take duties that were thought rather too bad for the European soldiers?—I think that if only the worst of our colonies were selected for the native troops, and if they did not take a share of the best as well as the worst colonies, it might shake them a little, unless their pay was very good; it naturally would do so. As yet they have, I think, only had experience, in time of peace, of the worst foreign stations; Aden, for instance. They have never been allowed to go to any of the best foreign stations.

895. A great deal of the good conduct of the regiments on the foreign stations would depend, I suppose, upon the character of the officer?—Certainly, and the way in which the men are managed; if the men are not understood, of course difficulties will naturally arise.

896. The character especially of the commanding officer, we will say of a northern regiment, is of the first importance?—Certainly, of the very first importance.

897. And, I suppose, these regiments unless very well officered are more liable to get out of order than a European regiment?—I believe that officered as they are now, is sufficient, without any special officering. All I wished to avoid and guard against is the fear of officers who did not understand them being sent to them; and in the event of fresh regiments being raised, I should be sorry to see officers who do not understand the natives sent to command them. The officers who command them now are quite sufficient to command them abroad, or anywhere else.

898. There are very few such officers now, are there; there were only three or four in China, I think?—No, I had 19 officers with me in China.

899. Specially attached?—Yes, specially attached; or rather there were in all 19 British officers with the regiment.

900. Usually the number was three or four, and it is now seven, I think?—Yes, it is now seven.

901. Would you contemplate having an increase of the number of European officers in case of the regiment going abroad, or would you be content to take it abroad as it is?—I should be content to take it abroad as it is with seven officers.

902. You would consider it necessary that that number should be always kept up?—Yes.

903. *Chairman.*] What additional pay do you propose should be given to the native soldiers on going abroad; anything more than full batta?—Yes; the pay of an infantry soldier now is seven rupees, and then he has to feed himself out of that seven rupees, and sums are deducted from it for part of his uniform; I consider that he should have eight rupees a month, and that there should be no deductions of any sort; that his food should be found him, and his uniform found him.

904. That is about identical with what is now the allowance on foreign service given to the troops who go to Rangoon, is it not?—That I am not quite sure about; I do not know exactly what pay they get.

905. You do not think that any larger sum than what you have stated would be necessary?—I do not think so.

906. If it was the habit to send native regiments, as part of their duty, to the colonies, would there be any more difficulty in recruiting for those regiments?—No, I do not think there would be any more difficulty.

907. Did I rightly understand you to say that there were no difficulties with respect to cooking in the transport of high-caste troops by sea?—Yes, I said so, and I repeat it.

908. It has been stated by other witnesses that high-caste natives feel so much difficulty in cooking at sea that they will abstain from food rather than submit to the difficulties of cooking?—I can only repeat what I stated before with regard to my regiment when I took it to China; my senior native officer in those days was a high-caste Brahmin of very high family in the Punjaub, and there were several of his own men with him. The Sikhs are all Hindoos; and I had a great many Dogras in the regiment besides. The regiment was composed of two-thirds Hindoos and one-third Mussulmen; I had no difficulty whatever, and I never heard that any dispute arose about cooking.

909. And beyond the precaution of Sir Robert Napier's about pumping in the water, were there any other precautions taken by the officers?—No. There were two cooking places made on board the ships; one was used by the Hindoos to cook at, and the other by the Mussulmen.

910. Major *Anson.*] Is not there a little difficulty

culty about the cooking?—I never heard of any difficulty at all.

911. Did you never hear of any similar difficulties in the case of other native troops not under your own command?—Not in the case of any of those going to China during the last war.

912. The troops going to China were a long time on board ship at different times, not merely going from India to Hong Kong, but afterwards?—Yes. On our return from China we were two months on board ship; the men did not land.

913. They were two months on board ship without landing.?—Without landing; they may have landed for an hour or two at a time at Hong Kong and other places, that was all.

914. And also in going from Hong Kong up to Talien Whan Bay?—Yes; they were about two months on board altogether, I think.

915. Do you recollect when the army went up to the north, whether a Punjaub regiment was left at Shanghae; one of the native infantry regiments?—Yes, I think one was left at Shanghae.

916. Do you recollect whether one was left at Tientsin when we went on to Pekin?—Yes, I think one was left there too, at Tientsin.

917. Did you ever hear of any great discontent among these regiments at not going on with the army to share in the plunder?—They always consider being left behind rather a disgrace; any regiment does; but it is not fair to put this idea down solely to a love of plunder.

918. Exactly the same as a European regiment?—Exactly the same as a European regiment.

919. But there were no difficulties in the cases of the regiments so left?—No, I never heard of any difficulties at all.

920. It is proposed to raise a regiment of Beloochees and men from the frontier of India, I believe, for perpetual service in China; what class of officers do you think they will be likely to get for that service; would they be as good as the British officers who officer the Indian army now?—I suppose good officers are to be found. I dare say a good many British officers would be glad to serve in China.

921. *Chairman.*] The not having such a career as is offered by the Indian army, would diminish the attractions of the service, would it not?—I think you would find a great many officers who would be very glad to leave India, even for China.

922. Major *Anson.*] Temporarily they might, but would they if they had to remain in China for life?—Yes; I think there would be no difficulty about that. There might be a difficulty in getting native officers.

923. You think they would get an inferior class of men?—Yes, I think, certainly, you would get an inferior class of native soldiers, and native commissioned officers to serve in China always as a local regiment, but as regards British officers, I do not think you would have much difficulty in getting them.

924. Still, considering the very limited career before them at a place like Hong Kong, they are not likely to be such good officers as when they have all India before them?—I think you would find very many officers who would be quite willing to go and give up all the prospects they may have in India.

925. Mr. *Oliphant.*] What is your view with reference to the employment of mercenary troops in India?—I do not think it would answer at all; but it has never been tried.

926. In what way do you think it would not answer?—I think it would be very distasteful to the natives themselves; we can always raise as many men as we like from the country; they would say, "Why are those men brought in."

927. Lord *William Hay.*] You stated just now that two-thirds of your regiment were Hindoos?—Yes.

928. Are there any of them Sikhs?—I have three troops of Sikhs, one troop of Dogras Brahmins, and other Hindoos of the Punjaub, and one squadron of Mussulmen, composed of trans-Indus Pathans, Kussoor Pathans, Huzara Pathans, Towannas, &c.

929. The Sikhs have no caste, have they?—Yes; they are all Hindoos.

930. They are supposed not to have any caste?—They have fewer prejudices; they have hardly any prejudices.

931. They worship the cow?—Yes, they worship the cow; there are three, or rather four things a Sikh will not do: he will not kill a cow, he will not eat a cow, and he will not smoke, and he will not cut his hair; at least those things are what they tell you are forbidden by their religion, and consequently what they will not do; but you can even get them to do any one of those things if you like when they know you.

932. Have you found that the Dogras are more particular?—Yes, the Dogras are more particular.

933. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I think your experience of the conduct of native troops on board ship is drawn especially from field service?—Yes.

934. Do you think that there would be the same freedom from caste prejudices among troops proceeding on garrison duty?—I think so.

935. You do not think that that makes any essential difference?—I do not think it does in a regiment with a proper spirit in it, which they are supposed all to have.

936. *Chairman.*] It would be quite indispensable, I suppose, that any regiments that went abroad should be wholly under the management of officers who are supposed to understand them?—Yes, certainly.

937. From your acquaintance with the manners of Sikh soldiers, is there any reality in the suggested danger that the evils arising from the disparity of sexes would be peculiarly felt if they were placed in a European colony?—I do not think so.

938. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you think that the regular return of foreign service would be popular among the Sikh regiments if one of the duties was a prolonged residence, as a jail guard at the Andaman Islands, for instance?—No, of course not; they like good stations as well as other men; men of any nation like good stations, and if they are kept continually at the Andaman Islands that certainly would not be popular; but I do not think there would be the slightest difficulty in getting any regiment to take its share of bad places with the good.

939. Colonel *North.*] If those troops received an extra rupee a day, together with their uniforms and rations free, would not that increase the expense of them very considerably, and bring it very near the cost of European troops?—It would increase the expense very much, but I do not think it would bring it near to the cost of European troops.

940. Their position is different from that of British soldiers, because our men have their rations deducted from their pay, while these

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native troops get theirs for nothing, and also their uniforms?—Their uniforms are a very small affair, their kit is still smaller, and their rations are not so expensive as those of a British soldier.

941. Captain *Hayter.*] We have had very high testimony from Colonel Norman to those men as artillerymen; what is your opinion, in a military point of view, of their acting in that capacity with European troops in the Mediterranean garrisons?—I think the Sikhs are such good artillerymen that it is much best not to use them as artillerymen; they are too good for us; they are so good, and stick so well to their guns, that in the event of any mutiny again occurring we should find them dangerous as artillerymen opposed to us.

942-3. Could they act with European troops, forming part of a mixed garrison in the Mediterranean, keeping them as infantry?—Certainly; I think so, as infantry, but not as artillerymen; I would not recommend them as artillerymen, for the reasons I have just stated.

944. The difficulties which we have heard of are, first with regard to the difference in the pay of the officers, and secondly, the social difficulties; can you give the Committee any idea whether those difficulties could be got over?—I do not think there need be any difficulty upon the first point; I do not see why there should be. The officers of the British army have other advantages which those of the Indian army have not. It is only fair that the Indian officers should have a little more pay; they have got to serve in India for their lives without a chance of getting home to England, except under very great disadvantages.

945. You think that the difficulty with regard to the difference of pay could be got over?—Certainly.

946. With regard to the social difficulties, we have had evidence that such difficulties would arise from putting a mixed force in the Mediterranean garrisons?—I do not see why they should be spoken of and treated as difficulties.

947. You do not think that there would be any difficulty in keeping native regiments in mixed garrisons?—No, I do not think so.

948. With respect to the population, as well as the rest of the garrison?—Yes; I do not think there need be any difficulty on this point, but I have heard it spoken of as a difficulty before.

949. You have had considerable experience with Indian troops, besides those of your regiment, have you not?—I have always been with Indian troops; I have mixed with them for the last 17 years.

950. Major *Anson.*] Such a thing as drunkenness and crime is hardly known in your regiment, is it?—It is hardly known.

Captain WILLIAM ROBERT MENDS, R.N., C.B., called in; and Examined.

Captain. *W. R. Mends*, R.N., C.B.

951. *Chairman.*] CAN you give the Committee any information as to the cost of the transport of European soldiers from this country to India?—Returns are now in course of preparation, showing the whole cost of transport to the colonies for a series of years, by order. If I were to enter upon that, I could only give you one or two instances at present, being a portion of the returns which are now in course of preparation.

952. You refer to past returns, under the sailing-ship system?—In sailing-ships, or Her Majesty's troop-ships.

953. Have you any estimate of the expense, or probable expense, under the new system?—No; I have not any estimate with me.

954. Will you give the instances of which you have spoken?—The estimated cost for the transport of a battalion to Hong Kong from England in a hired sailing-ship is, for a voyage of, say, 120 days, and for the following strength, namely, 38 officers, 750 men, 87 women, and 160 children, for freight, 7,746 *l.*; for mess of officers, 2,280 *l.*

955. Have you taken out the figures per head per private soldier?—I am coming to that; victualling, 6,983 *l.*; bedding, 458 *l.*; fittings of ship, 471 *l.*, being a total of 17,938 *l.*, or 18 *l.* 15 *s.* 8 *d.* per adult.

956. That is per adult; but have you taken it out per soldier; there are a number of women included in that?—We always take women and children with soldiers; they are all cast in at two children to an adult.

957. Perhaps you could draw up that statement, so that we could see the cost per soldier, treating the women and children as part of the cost of a soldier?—They are so; they are a part of the cost of the hire of the ship, and they are cast into the rate per head in the whole sum.

958. Are those women and children according to a regular allowance?—Yes.

959. An invariable proportion?—Yes.

960. What is it?—Twelve per cent. to India, China, Australia, or New Zealand, 6 per cent. to certain colonies, and 8 per cent. on coastwise voyages at home.

961. What is that difference owing to?—I do not know; we simply carry out a requisition from the War Office. The practice as regards India is 12 per cent.

962. Twelve per cent. for wives?—Yes, 12 per cent. for wives, exclusive of children.

963. Exclusive of any children there may be?—Yes, for those wives.

964. That makes it the more necessary to take the figures out as per soldier, because, of course, the children are an uncertain element?—They are, rather.

965. Will you have the return modified in that sense?—Yes. We are preparing a statement of the cost of conveying officers and troops, with their families, between Great Britain, the Mauritius, China, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements; also native troops between India and China.

966. And in that you will state the cost per soldier?—Yes.

967. Perhaps you will also give us a list of the colonies to which these respective ratios of wives apply?—Yes.

968. You say you have no knowledge of the probable cost per head under the new transport system?—I have not got it with me.

969. It is larger than the old cost, is not it?—It is about 18 *l.* and some shillings per adult.

970. If you can get the material for that, will you draw it out in the same form, that is as per soldier?—Yes.

971. Have you any knowledge of the cost of transport

transport from India to China?—Yes, I have a statement of it here: the 22nd and 29th regiments of Bombay native infantry were conveyed from Bombay to Hong Kong in 1862 in the sailing transports, "Dora" and "Coloroon," and a small number in the "Emu" steamer. The voyage in the sailing ships averaged 36 days; the numbers conveyed were 11 European officers, 849 native officers and men. The cost was for freight, 4,646 *l.*; mess of officers, 528 *l.*; provisions and stores, 1,924 *l.*; and fittings, 257 *l.*; the total cost being 7,355 *l.*, or 8 *l.* 11 *s.* per adult. The native troops are not accompanied by their families.

972. Apart from that question of families, are the native troops more cheaply transported than the European troops?—The cost of freight would be rather cheaper, and their victualling costs considerably less; they do not cost more than about 8 *d.* per head per day for victualling.

973. Have you any record of the cost of the transport of European soldiers from India to China?—What I first gave was the estimated cost between Hong Kong and England of a regiment; I have now given the cost between India and China of the transport of a native regiment.

974. You have not got the cost of transport between India and China of a European regiment?—No, not with me.

975. Do you know the cost between India and the Straits?—No, I do not.

976. Have you the material for obtaining it?—I do not think we have; all engagements of that kind for troops in India are made in India, and hitherto it has been entirely an Indian question; we have never had anything to do with it.

977. I suppose you could not any more inform us of the cost of transport between India and the Mauritius?—No.

978. The cost between England and the Mauritius, I presume you can give?—Yes, we could give it.

979. Perhaps you will give that too as per soldier?—It shall be put in the Return.

980. Major *Anson.*] Is there much difference in the cost of transport between Bombay and China, and between Calcutta and China?—Yes; it would be rather more from Bombay.

981. Have you any returns of the cost between Bombay and China which you can put in?—I think we could give you details.

982. With regard to the cost of that regiment you mentioned, from Hong Kong to England, is that the average rate of freight?—The freight varies from time to time; it depends very much upon the state of the market, and also upon the emergency of the Government. The Government emergency is of course the shipowners' opportunity. If we go into a matter in a hurry, if a service requires to be performed with rapidity, we are obliged to take up ships more quickly than we otherwise should, and of course that enhances the cost. I have compared the cost of the transport of that regiment with the cost of a regiment conveyed in one of Her Majesty's troop-ships, and the cost by a troop-ship is considerably less.

983. *Chairman.*] If there are any very wide differences in the cost owing to the question of emergency, will you put in two or three instances of it?—Yes; that being an average case, the cost by the "Tamar" would be 14,710 *l.* against 17,938 *l.* by a freight ship conveying the same number.

984. That is owing to the ship having been taken up on an emergency?—That would be the relative cost even with an average service.

985. Colonel *North.*] We had evidence last year confirming what you have stated, to the effect that when the 11th were to be sent to the Cape, 35,000 *l.* were asked for the transport from Hong Kong to the Cape alone?—Yes, that was an enormous sum.

986. *Chairman.*] Could you give a list of the prices that have been paid for the transport of troops in the last five years; would it be very voluminous?—It would take some little time to get it out; a week or eight days.

987. You could do it?—Yes.

988. What we want is a return of all the payments made during the last five years for the transport of troops?—It could be done with ease.

989. And if possible it should always be taken out on the average cost per soldier?—Yes; of course the conveyance of the wives and families much enhances the freight; therefore the wives and families must be cast in to the cost of conveyance of the soldiers themselves.

990. Lord *William Hay.*] You stated that 12 per cent. of the men of a regiment going to India were allowed to take their wives?—Yes, 12 per cent.

991. Are they allowed to bring them back to England?—A certain portion return.

992. Is transport provided for 12 per cent. on returning?—Yes, equally, if required.

993. What becomes in England of the three per cent., the difference between nine per cent. and the 12 per cent.?—I do not know really; we only carry under requisitions from the War Office the numbers sent to us.

994. You have no knowledge as to what becomes of the extra three per cent. on their return to England?—No.

995. *Chairman.*] If European troops are ordered from India to China, do they take their wives with them?—Not during war.

996. For garrison duty?—Yes.

997. Do they carry all over the world those 12 per cent. that they have started with?—They carry that 12 per cent. all over the world. The Indian regiments sent from India to China are accompanied by their families.

998. Supposing they have been sent to India with 12 per cent. of wives, and are then sent from India to a six per cent. colony, that is a colony where the proportion of wives is six per cent., what becomes of the other six per cent. of wives?—They have to be provided for.

999. They are sent home again?—Yes, with the troops.

1000. Lord *William Hay.*] In practice they remain in India, do they not, as a matter of fact?—We act according to the requisition in the arrangements for the special Indian service; we are prepared to provide for the same number home as out, of women and children; that is, 12 per cent. of soldiers' wives upon the number embarked.

1001. *Chairman.*] Is the per-centage calculated on the number of private soldiers, or on the number of private soldiers plus officers?—It is calculated on the number of private soldiers.

1002. Major *Anson.*] Under the new system of transport, how will the reliefs be provided for the Mauritius and for China; would it be in connection with the new system, or is the new system to apply only to India?—The new system applies only to India.

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1003. The relief then to Mauritius, China, and the Straits, will go round the Cape as usual?—If those reliefs were arranged in connection with India, the ships which for fully 2-5ths of the year would not be employed upon the strictly Indian direct service could be utilised for those reliefs.

1004. *Chairman.*] That is during the hot season?—Yes; we could not trust the same ships out and home by the Cape; there would not be time.

1005. Major *Anson.*] If you garrisoned all those places from India you would only have that one system of transport between England and the East?—Yes.

1006. *Chairman.*] Is not it the fact, that the system of transport as at present arranged will not be adequate to the entire transport of the troops, and that you will still have to send some round the Cape?—Yes; it will not be quite adequate.

1007. Major *Anson.*] Was not it intended to make it adequate?—It was never intended to provide for more than about two-thirds of the Indian relief service. We may be able to do more; the ships will, I think, be able to do rather more than was contemplated.

1008. *Chairman.*] It is about one regiment short, is not it?—Yes, about one regiment short.

1009. The Mauritius service, then, will still be done by ships round the Cape?—It will still be done by ships round the Cape; it will be an Imperial service.

1010. And the same to Ceylon?—The same to Ceylon.

1011. I suppose, that to Singapore it would be decidedly more economical, would it not, to do it round the Cape, and the loss of time would not be very great?—No; I should suppose that to Singapore it would be a little less than to China, perhaps 1 *l.* per head, or something of that sort. The Straits Settlements we have not hitherto had under our control; we have no services in connection with them.

1012. Will you prepare a statement of the estimate of the expenditure on the new system compared with the old expenditure of the transport service?—I will.

1013. Perhaps you had better submit it to the India Office before you send it in, for any remarks they have to make upon it?—The statement we have prepared has been approved and concurred in by the India Office.

1014. The expenditure upon these transports has increased very considerably since the original design with regard to them, has it not?—No; the whole has been laid before Parliament.

Lieut. Colonel Frederick Moffat Baker was called in; and Examined.

Lieut. Col. *F. M. Baker.*

1015. Major *Anson.*] You commanded a regiment of native infantry in the Bengal army, did you not?—I did.

1016. What regiment was it?—The 65th General Service Corps in the Bengal army.

1017. Did you serve abroad in China at all with it?—The regiment has served both in Aracan, in Burmah, and in China since I have been a member of it.

1018. Was it one of the regiments enlisted as general service regiments?—Yes, it is a general service corps.

1019. At what time did your regiment leave India for China?—Sometime in 1858; I am not certain as to the date.

1020. During the progress of the Bengal mutiny?—Yes.

1021. Had you any difficulties with your men in China, or on proceeding there?—None whatever; the men never behaved so well, as far as my experience is concerned. They had the Chinese on one side of them, and the Europeans on the other, and they could not help themselves.

1022. Of what class of men was your regiment composed?—They are a peculiar regiment; they are composed principally of a caste of men who are called Zemindar Brahmins, or agriculturists of the priestly caste; that is, men who have given up their priestly caste to follow agriculture; they are men principally from the province of Behar; of course there are Mussulmen among them and low-caste men, but the mass are composed of Zemindar Brahmins.

1023. You had no difficulty with them on the voyage on board ship with regard to their caste prejudices?—None whatever.

1024. With regard to the cooking?—No, not the slightest; the Hindoos do not cook on board.

1025. What other regiments of native infantry were there quartered in China at the same time as yours?—The 47th and the 70th.

1026. Were those regiments enlisted for general service?—The 47th was enlisted for general service, but not the 70th.

1027. Did you come in contact with the 70th at all; did you see anything of the men or the officers?—We were brigaded in Canton together, that is to say, not in the same brigade; we were in the 2nd, and they were in the 1st.

1028. There were no objection made by the men who were not enlisted for general service serving there than on the part of your men, were there?—None whatever that I am aware of.

1029. From your experience of India, do you think that there would be any difficulty in generally garrisoning China by regiments of the Indian army?—Not if three things were attended to; there must be proper arrangements; the men must have high pay, and they must go with their own officers. The men would be placed in a country where they could hold no communication with either the inhabitants, or the foreign residents, or anyone else, and they would be solely dependent upon their own officers. In my opinion the present system, of having two or three officers to a regiment, will not answer for a permanency, as far as I can see at least.

1030. What do you consider high pay?—What they received before, the full batta and ration money.

1031. How much was that?—It varies according to rank. I should not like to state exactly what it is; it varies, of course, because they receive a certain fixed allowance for rations, and the cost of rations is deducted, they receiving the balance.

1032. Have you any idea what that allowance was?—I think the allowance for ration-money was about two rupees for a private per month.

1033. That was in addition to his regular pay?—It

—It is an addition to it in this way: they receive a ration, or the pay for the ration; the ration does not cost generally so much as the allowance granted by Government for it, and they receive the balance.

1034. You cannot tell me what the exact pay in hard cash was to the sepoy?—No, but it is all detailed in the pay and audit regulations.

1035. Was the pay at that time the same as it is now?—I believe so.

1036. Seven rupees a month?—I believe so; it is now seven years ago, and I could not speak with certainty; the pay was seven rupees, eight rupees, or nine rupees, according to a man's service; a sepoy gets seven rupees pay at first; he gets eight rupees after 15 years' service, and nine rupees after 20 years' service.

1037. At all events, as far as regards the employment of native soldiers in China, and places of that description, it is simply a question of money?—It is simply a question of money and proper treatment. Our men received great advantages in many respects; they went there with their own officers whom they knew; their officers were mostly men who had been with them for long periods, and spoke their own language fluently. They also received other slight advantages, such as extra clothing, woollen socks, flannel waistcoats, and things of that sort. It would be a very different thing to move native troops abroad under officers promiscuously attached to the regiment, to what it would be with officers who had been with them for years.

1038. Of course they ought to have the officers to whom they are accustomed?—Yes, and they require more officers abroad than they do in India.

1039. Do you consider that it is far cheaper for native soldiers to live in a place like China, than it is for European soldiers?—Yes, decidedly. China is a wild place at present; provisions at Hong Kong, I understand, are enormously expensive; the rise is something enormous.

1040. Colonel *North.*] Did you find any difficulty when you were taking your regiment from India to China about cooking on board?—No; for those who understand these things, it is as simple as possible; the same objection is frequently made as to water, but that has always been overcome. I have been on board ship more than once with my own regiment, and I have always overcome that difficulty by a very simple process, which is merely to let the men fill their own water. The Hindoos have one set of casks, the Mussulmen another. I make the Hindoo officer answer for the water; he puts a Hindoo sentry over the Hindoos' water, and a Mussulman sentry over the Mussulmen's water; they serve it out themselves, and you never hear another word about it. I never heard the slightest question about it.

1041. We have it in evidence that one regiment going from India to China suffered severely, and many men died in consequence, because they would not cook on board?—Hindoos do not cook on board.

1042. Lord *William Hay.*] How do they support themselves then?—They eat the chapanny, a species of parched grain; they eat sugar, and they get an allowance of tobacco, and various spices are furnished by the Commissariat Department as the men's ration. A Hindoo receives a certain ration, and a Mussulman receives a certain ration; the Hindoo's ration is dry; he eats it dry, in the condition in which he receives it, but the Mussulmen cook on board.

1043. When you use the word Hindoo, to what people do you refer?—All those are generally classed as Hindoos who are not Mussulmen, in a Hindostanee regiment.

1044. It would not be true of the Hindoos of the Punjaub, for instance?—The Hindoos of the Punjaub are quite a different race; I speak of the Hindoos of Hindostanee regiments. I have been for many years in the Punjaub, and I know that the Hindoos there are of quite a different race.

1045. You refer to Rohilcund and Oude?—I refer to Behar, Rohilcund, Oude, and the Doab; most of the old Hindostanee regiments were drawn from the Doab, Oude, and Behar, with a few Rohillas, and a few Bhondelas.

1046. Marquis of *Hartington.*] When your regiment went to China it was on field service, was not it?—It was on field service; I was not with them at the time they went, I joined them afterwards.

1047. Was your regiment one which remained as part of the garrison in China after the war was over?—It remained at Canton. The three Hindostanee regiments I have mentioned remained at Canton till the beginning of 1860, when they were relieved by three Punjaub regiments, consisting of men who also, I believe, had volunteered for service there.

1048. You have no personal experience of the employment of Indian troops out of India, then?—No, excepting being with them; I brought part of the regiment.

1049. I understood you to say that you did not go with them to China?—I did not go with them to China, being on staff employment, but I was ordered there, and I joined the regiment subsequently.

1050. What did you refer to when you spoke of the arrangement which it would be necessary to make to prevent discontent among Indian troops employed in the colonies: I mean general service corps, such as I understand your own to have been?—A general service corps was bound to go wherever ordered; and in the last 24 years, or rather during 24 years, not the last, my own regiment has been three times on foreign service of two years each; that is to say, for a fourth of its time it has been on foreign service. The arrangements I refer to are, in regard to the water and the supply of provisions, through the commissariat, not through the Navy, or anything of that sort. There must be a supply of provisions which the men may eat, and which they are accustomed to eat. Another great cause of discontent is, that during their absence their lands are liable to be disposed of for arrears of revenue, and matters of that sort; that is one very sore point with the men.

1051. As to the arrangements which would be necessary at the station itself, there would probably be no great difficulty in those commissariat arrangements, and so on?—There were none at Canton.

1052. The arrangements there were satisfactory, were they?—Perfectly so.

1053. What pay did the privates in your regiment receive?—The usual pay, the extra batta and rations.

1054. I mean in India; what did they receive?—According to their length of service, seven, eight, and nine rupees respectively.

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1055. Captain *Vivian.*] The pay is seven rupees up to six years' service, is not it?—Up to 16 years' service, I think it is.

1056. Up to six years' service, seven rupees; that is the general pay of European troops?—It used to be up to 15 years. I know nothing of the present arrangements.

1057. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Colonel Probyn mentioned, I think, eight rupees a month, with no stoppage for rations, or for clothing, or uniform, as what would probably be sufficient to pay Indian regiments in garrison employment; do you think that would be sufficient?—That is less than some men receive at present. They receive nine rupees after 20 years' service.

1058. Have they not to find their own food out of that?—No, not out of that; they receive ration-money. Colonel Probyn's men have all been enlisted, I should think, within the last 12 years or so. What I mean is, they are not men who would come probably upon the increased pay for length of service. I am not speaking with any actual knowledge.

1059. Do you think that it would be desirable to garrison any of our colonies in the East exclusively with Indian troops?—If you mean with Indian troops and European artillery, I do not consider it expedient ever to put artillery in the hands of natives.

1060. Is there not an objection on the part of British artillery officers to serving without any European infantry?—Probably there is, I should say.

1061. Have you never heard such an objection?—Never; I have never heard the question discussed.

1062. I think it is one which might very probably be raised?—I think it is very possible that it might if there were not a small force of Europeans, but the best force for that purpose would be marines and sappers.

1063. Major *Anson.*] That objection to their guns being supported by native infantry would apply to service in the field?—Yes.

1064. Not to garrison artillery such as you would have at the Mauritius or Hong Kong?—I should think that decidedly the best support are European troops. There is no question about it.

1065. Marquis of *Hartington.*] That applies either to garrison artillery or to field artillery?—Yes, because the mere fact of the artillery and the supports being men of the same nation would bring them into closer union.

1066. Major *Anson.*] Still the general objection as regards service in India is, that artillery officers do not like to have their guns unsupported by European cavalry, or European infantry; that is, in the field in action, but in the case of a garrison it is a totally different thing; they are not afraid of the sepoys running away with the heavy guns?—In regard to garrisons, I should think that the best plan would be to keep the artillery in fortified positions, and the natives never in fortified positions. We have plenty of forts in India, which would hold a very large portion of the European troops who are now there.

1067. Marquis of *Hartington.*] But you do not mean that if you sent Indian troops to one of our colonies you would not put them into fortifications?—Certainly not; but I would put the artillery either stockaded or with a slight breastwork around them, so that they might be always secure from a sudden rush of the people. The artillery should never have their guns exposed on an open plain; they should always have either a breastwork or a stockade round their positions.

1068. Do I understand you to say, that you would not put the Indian troops into fortifications in one of our colonies?—I would not.

1069. In some of our colonies, are not the fortifications the only place you would put them in?—Then it is inevitable; but what I mean is this: I would keep the fortifications for the Europeans only; I would make the natives canteen near the fortifications, both on account of giving more room, and being more salubrious by not crowding the men together, and also that they should be at hand to support the fort, but they should not be actually in it.

1070. Then I understand you on the whole, to think that it would not be desirable to garrison any of our colonies exclusively with Indians. You would certainly have European artillery?—I would certainly have European artillery.

1071. As I understand you, you would prefer also to have some portion of European infantry, and you mentioned sappers?—Sappers, marines, or infantry.

1072. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Your regiment, I think, was one of the old Bengal army?—It was one of the old Bengal regular regiments.

1073. When you speak of it as being "a general service corps," I do not exactly understand what you mean, because we have had it in evidence that the oath of enlistment was altered to include general service in 1856, and as your regiment must have been enlisted before 1856, in what sense do you mean that it was a general service corps?—The origin of the general service corps was this: there was originally a marine regiment, that was divided into two regiments, the 25th and 40th, which were general service corps; then when an increase took place, certain regiments which were then added to the Indian army were made general service corps; that is, they took the oath to go on board ship, and to go wherever they were ordered over the Black water, or anywhere else. Those regiments were about seven or eight in number, I think.

1074. Out of the whole army?—Out of the regular infantry there were seven or eight of those regiments; they have been almost everywhere; men of my own regiment have been at the Mauritius, I believe; they go wherever they are ordered. These are what are called the general service corps.

1075. Then it was not necessary when your regiment was ordered to China to ask for volunteers; they were ordered to go in the regular course of duty?—During the time of the mutiny things were in such a state, that the fidelity of the native army generally was doubtful; the men volunteered; they could have been sent without any volunteering.

1076. As a matter of fact, they did volunteer?—They did volunteer; they were willing to go; they would have gone any way, but it was not their turn to go on foreign service; they had lately returned from foreign service in Burmah; the consequence was, it had not come round in the usual course of duty for them to go on foreign service again, but they volunteered to go out of their turn.

1077. It was only those six or seven exceptional regiments enlisted for general service that were sent from the Bengal army, either to Burmah or to China; up to that time it was only one

one of those few regiments that ever went, was it?—No, these were the only troops that were used for general service up to that period. There had been instances of men volunteering for other service; for instance, some volunteered for Egypt, and others volunteered in other similar cases, but they were exceptions. These were troops that were bound by their enlistment to go on foreign service when ordered.

1078. With regard to the troops on board ship, have you ever observed from your experience that the Hindoos suffer in health from living merely on dry rations during a long sea voyage?—Yes, it decidedly decreases their strength; a man living in that way must more or less suffer.

1079. Do you not consider that a reason (I do not say an insuperable reason) against employing them out of India?—I consider it a slight reason, I do not think it is one of any grave importance; they equally starve themselves frequently to save money; they suffer quite as much in Aracan, where they can buy cheap provisions; from buying cheap provisions, that is, feeding upon rice instead of upon flour, for their own avarice.

1080. Have you ever considered the position that a native corps, for instance such a regiment as the one you commanded yourself would occupy if employed in garrison duty in the Mediterranean, at Malta, for instance?—Except in active service, I think it would be hardly possible to employ the men in the Mediterranean.

1081. You think the garrison duty would be so very distasteful?—I do not see how the men could procure provisions that would suit them, to begin with, and I think the separation from their families, and from all associations would create a feeling of discontent, excepting on active service.

1082. They would also have no distractions; they would have none of their usual sources of interest when they were isolated in a British colony like Malta?—I do not think that that is of very much consequence, because they had none in China; they would have as much in the Mediterranean as they had in China.

1083. How long did your regiment remain in China?—About two years.

1084. Would there have been any difficulty in keeping it there longer?—No, I believe none whatever.

1085. That is, if active service had continued?—I do not think there would have been the slightest difficulty; the fact is, the men returned rather with regret; they had made very heavy savings, and were laden with money, and I think they rather regretted returning.

1086. You have had no actual experience yourself of the conduct of a native regiment in garrison duty in any of our colonies in China, or Hong Kong, or the Straits?—I think that the native regiments at Canton might be considered in garrison duty, and the farewell orders issued by Sir Charles Straubenzee were the most flattering that could be penned regarding the conduct of the native troops in China.

1087. Mr. *Oliphant.*] In fact, you had no fighting at all to do in Canton, had you, or scarcely any?—Yes, at the first commencement; the regiment had not when I was with them, but they had had previously.

1088. Merely the taking of Canton?—Yes, there was the taking of Canton, and there were various expeditions about the country, and things of that sort; a serious attack was made upon them.

1089. It could hardly be called active service, could it; had the regiment anybody killed or wounded in it?—I believe so; I should not like to say what number, but I believe there were some casualties.

1090. At Malta, for instance, where rice is difficult to be procured, would there be any difficulty in finding food for Sikhs or Pathans or people who do not care about rice?—The sepoy does not feed upon rice; wheaten flour is his principal food.

1091. He would be able to get that?—Yes, he can get the wheaten flour.

1092. I understood you to say that the difficulty would be to provide them with food in those places?—Yes; but although the flour is one principal ingredient in their food, a preparation called "ghee," which is a species of butter, is almost the only portion of what you may call animal food that a Hindoo takes.

1093. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Dansupari would be difficult to obtain, would it not?—Yes.

1094. Major *Anson.*] Do you know how many regiments there were in the Bengal army that did not mutiny?—Fourteen regiments of the regulars, I think.

1095. Were there 14 regiments that did not mutiny at all, either partially or entirely?—There were 14 regiments that were retained.

1096. Out of that 14, did not several of them partially mutiny?—Yes, I fancy they did.

1097. Three regiments were serving in China; there was no such thing as a mutiny amongst them, was there?—There was no such thing as a mutiny amongst them, and the conduct of two or three regiments in the Punjaub was most praiseworthy; the 4th, the 21st, and the 31st Regiments.

1098. You were asked just now about the five or six regiments of the Bengal army which were enlisted for general service; the whole of the Bengal army now is enlisted for general service, and put upon the same footing as those five or six regiments; were you aware of that fact?—Yes; it is so now, but not those men I spoke of.

1099. They are all upon the same footing as those five or six regiments you were asked about a short time ago, like your own regiment?—As I understand it, it only affects those who have been enlisted subsequently to a certain date, the old men who previously enlisted; for instance, the men who were enlisted 30 years ago have not been enlisted anew for general service.

1100. Captain *Vivian.*] Then they are not liable for general service, in short?—I understand not.

1101. There must be very few of them left now?—They are long lived.

1102. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] The change in the enlistment took place in 1856, that is 11 years ago; I suppose there are a very considerable number of old soldiers who enlisted before that still remaining?—There are only a very few of the old regiments left; there are only about 15 of those old regiments altogether left, and therefore, comparatively speaking, there would only be a very small number of the old men in the service, because all the new regiments have gone upon a different organization altogether.

Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES P. KEYES, called in; and further Examined.

Lieut. Col. *C. P. Keyes.*

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1103. Lord *William Hay.*] THE regiment you command belongs to what is called the Punjaub Frontier Force, I think?—Yes, it does.

1104. Are your men recruited for general service?—Yes.

1105. Is not there a sort of understanding that your regiment shall not leave the Punjaub?—No; there is no understanding of that sort that I am aware of.

1106. Under whose authority is the Punjaub Frontier Force?—Under the Lieutenant Governor of Punjaub directly; of course, under the Supreme Government. It is under the Civil Government.

1107. Under the Civil Government of the Punjaub?—Yes.

1108. What are the duties of the force?—They are used as troops, in a military capacity, for the protection of the frontier.

1109. Especially for the protection of the frontier?—Yes.

1110. Extending from what place to what place?—From Mittunkote to the Hazara district.

1111. How many miles in extent should you say it is?—Between 300 and 400 miles.

1112. Peshawar is a very important point in that line of frontier, is not it?—Yes, it is supposed to be the key of the whole position; it is garrisoned by troops under the Commander in Chief; in fact, it has the largest garrison in any part of the Punjaub.

1113. Has any inconvenience arisen from the fact that the force which is employed for the defence of the Punjaub frontier is under different commands, that is to say, that a portion of it is under the Civil Government of the Punjaub, and the rest of it directly under the Commander in Chief?—Certainly not, to my knowledge; on the contrary, it has been found of much convenience.

1114. In time of peace the Punjaub frontier force is not under the Commander in Chief, is it?—No, it is under the immediate orders of the Punjaub Civil Government.

1115. But on war breaking out with any of these frontier tribes, would it be placed under the Commander in Chief?—Of course; immediately that it is necessary to employ regular troops with the Punjaub troops, it would be under the immediate command of the officer appointed to undertake whatever operation was in view.

1116. Are any duties of a purely civil or police character performed by the Punjaub Frontier Force?—Yes, they have frequently to escort treasure, and to form personal guards for the commissioners of districts.

1117. Then they perform duties which are not performed by the regular army?—Yes; I consider that both those duties are expressly duties belonging to the police.

1118. Then, in that respect, you think their being under the civil authority is objectionable?—No, I do not think that that is consequent upon their being under the civil authority. Where that custom is maintained there are no regular troops in the station with them; indeed, I suppose, that even if there were, they would not be told off for that duty, as personal guards for the district officers: the probability is that, what are supposed to be called the civil troops would be employed for that purpose, but both regular and irregular regiments have to escort treasure.

1119. There would be no difficulty in relieving the frontier force of those duties, would there, by the employment of police?—None whatever; the police are not in sufficient numbers to take those duties.

1120. On Tuesday last you stated to the Committee that natives of the same high position are not attracted now to the service in the same number as formerly; can you suggest any means by which the service could be rendered more attractive to natives of that stamp?—That is a question which is more easily asked than answered, simply for the reason, that it is more a feeling that has forced itself upon me, and I believe upon all officers who have been for any length of time on the frontier, than an established fact. I have conversed with officers on that point, and although they had the same convictions, yet no cause has ever been arrived at to explain it. I have also tried to draw out the men of my regiment upon the subject; and shortly after the mutiny the answers generally were, to use their own expression, that they were surfeited with the good things they had got during the mutiny.

1121. Do you not think that the Indian military service would be rendered more attractive if rewards of a more substantial character were offered to native officers who had done good service?—Yes; after the mutiny, the men have still stated that any number of men could be procured, and certainly numbers have come, but whenever I have found fault with the quality, they still say that they could procure better; but, I think, that they have never yet denied the fact that the men do not come so readily as formerly. This may be partially accounted for by the fact that when the Punjaub was first annexed we found many men who had been landholders dispossessed of all they had; these men were readily attracted by our service, not only by its novelty but as a means of gaining a livelihood. As the country prospered many regained their land and others have found occupation on it; for where there was one acre under cultivation when no man felt sure that he would reap what he had sown, there are more than ten now; the supply then of the class alluded to, dependent on military service, is not so great.

1122. Has there been any change in the power of commanding officers of such regiments as you command since the mutiny?—About the time of the mutiny they had very large powers; they had the power of magistrates, but that power has been taken away from them.

1123. Do you not think that the popularity of these irregular corps depends in a great measure upon the large power in the hands of the commanding officers; I mean, of course, the European officers?—Yes, undoubtedly; an officer in command of a regiment feels that he has a much higher position, and very much more influence over his men, when he has power to punish and reward.

1124. Do you think that those powers have been unduly curtailed of late, or is there any tendency to curtail them in a manner likely to affect the efficiency of the army?—I think the tendency is to drift into the old system of centralisation.

1125. You

1125. You think that there is a tendency in that direction?—Yes.

1126. Which, if indulged in, would prove most mischievous to the army?—Yes. I think it is very inexpedient to curtail the powers of officers in rewarding and punishing; and, I think, the Pathans, of all people in the world, have a greater respect for a man who has authority, and can exercise it for chastisement or reward.

1127. What power have you of rewarding a man who has distinguished himself in the field, for instance?—I have no power, of course, except promotion in the regiment. If a man has shown any distinguished conduct in the field, he can be recommended for the Order of Merit, and, during the Umbeylah campaign, I think, there was a very wise and very good innovation upon the old system. The general officer commanding there had given to him the authority to bestow the Order of Merit upon men recommended to him by the officers on the spot; I think that was excellent in the feeling of emulation which it created, and it was also good in the speedy manner in which the men met with the reward that was recommended for them.

1128. Captain *Vivian.*] The general officer commanding had power to decorate men upon the field?—Yes.

1129. Instantly?—Yes, and it was acted upon at Umbeylah; I think that power would be of the greatest value to commanding officers, and create a great spirit of emulation.

1130. Lord *William Hay.*] Would you not think it advisable to reward the men in a more substantial manner; for instance, by granting small jagheers?—Yes, I think the men of the higher class, in high positions in the regiments are very often, especially in the frontier regiments, men of family who have either themselves or their forefathers had possession some time before of land, and I think the *summum bonum* of their existence is to repossess land, or to become jagheerdars or landholders; there is, for instance, a native officer in my own regiment whose utmost wish is to obtain a jagheer, and I think his services have entitled him to the consideration of Government in that respect.

1131. *Chairman.*] What amount of jagheer do you think he ought to receive?—What he has asked for is the grant of his own village.

1132. What amount of revenue does that represent?—I should say about 900 rupees a year.

1133. If you rewarded all officers in that way you would make a hole in your land revenue very soon?—I would not reward all officers in that way, only men of superior claims, and there are not very many of them. The jagheers or grants of land were very largely given after the mutiny, for services. I have no doubt that the Government have in consequence found it rather embarrassing to meet all the hopes and wishes of those who perform very good service; I would not recommend that an officer should be removed from his regiment to become a jagheerdar; I think, after continued good and faithful service for a term of years if a guarantee were given to him that he would have this grant, when Government could reasonably dispense with his services, it would in a measure satisfy him, and is not more than he deserves.

1134. It is a hereditary grant, as I understand, that you propose?—Yes, certainly.

1135. A pension of 90*l.* a year for all generations, is rather a large pension to give to a deserving officer, is it not?—It would not be extensively given, nor ought it to be extensively given, but there are men who have performed such services to the Government that I think it is a fitting way to reward them, and would not be too much.

1136. You would not recommend it as the ordinary reward of any faithful service, but merely for exceptional cases?—No, for exceptional cases; there are very few men in the service to whom it should be given.

1137. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] It is also the natural way of rewarding men in India, and that which has been adopted, I believe, under all native Governments?—Yes.

1138. Lord *William Hay.*] There is no reason why it should be hereditary; the grant might be for one or two or three lives?—There is no reason why it should be hereditary; but in rewarding great and faithful service why deprive the reward of its chief value and attraction. It should only descend to direct male heirs, and being held on the condition of good service it could always be resumed in the case of wrong-doing. Every effort would be made to improve an hereditary estate, whereby many people might be benefited, but where there was only a life interest the desire would be to make the most of the present to the injury, in all probability, of others.

1139. Under the native rulers, it often was not hereditary, I believe?—Yes.

1140. Mr. *Oliphant.*] A suggestion has been made that a certain number of native officers very highly deserving of reward should be allowed to come to this country as aides-de-camp to the Queen; have you met with that suggestion?—No, I have never met with the suggestion before; I scarcely think that it would be a popular idea, unless the man was perfectly untrammelled with any home or any family ties.

1141. As I understand the suggestion, he would come here for a year or two, and be appointed in a certain capacity, answering to that of aide-de-camp to the Queen, which he would retain in India, as an honorary title?—I have not the slightest doubt that it would be very gratifying to many native officers.

1142. It would be a cheaper way of rewarding them than a grant of land?—Yes, certainly; but where men by their services were deserving of a grant of land, the shadow should never be substituted for the substance.

1143. Lord *William Hay.*] If the native officers were paid partly in land, and partly in cash, would it not be very attractive and popular with the native officers?—The natives in that part of India especially covet the possession of land, and to be in the position of a jagheerdar or landholder.

1144. A reward of that description would go much further than in any other shape, would it not?—I think so, certainly; it would be the most valuable and the most attractive reward you could offer them.

1145. Captain *Vivian.*] You speak now of a reward for long and faithful service?—Yes; it would include a very few men; there are very few men of that stamp, or who could show the services that I allude to, which would entitle them to such an honorary reward.

1146. I understand you to say that you think that there should be two classes of military reward, one for distinction in the field, given on the spot, if possible?—Yes.

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1147. And the other given in the shape of pay or of pension, or of land, for long and faithful service?—A reward in the field has always been given in the army, but it has been much more difficult to get ordinarily than it should be.

1148. Has it been given on the spot?—It has never been given on the spot before.

1149. Except in this campaign which you mentioned just now?—Yes, in this campaign it was so given, and had a most excellent effect.

1150. You recommend that commanding officers should have the power of rewarding in that manner?—Certainly, I think it is the greatest boon possible. Of all the races I have met with, I think the Pathans are about the most sanguine: and if on the other hand a Pathan cannot immediately get what he has set his heart upon, he is just as easily cast down; therefore, if rewards are to hang very much upon the future, the men cannot realise to themselves often that they will obtain them.

1151. A man does not care half as much about a reward given for gallantry in the field if it is not given upon the spot, but six months afterwards, does he?—No; but I was alluding especially to rewards promised to the men for long service. Of course, as regards a military reward for gallantry in the field, to give it on the spot is more gratifying to everybody, I think.

1152. Lord *William Hay.*] Are not pensions given to the wives of men who have fallen in service?—Yes; and I think that the pension rules with regard to our frontier troops are very defective indeed; there is such difficulty in procuring the pensions very often, that rather than surmount those difficulties they forego the privilege.

1153. The delays are so great in obtaining the pensions, that those who are entitled to them go without them sometimes?—Yes, not only are the delays so great, but they have to come sometimes from long distances. They have not only first of all to come to verify their claim, but they have to wait until it goes through the different offices; sometimes they have to wait for months, and then there is a recurrence of the difficulty of coming up, because they must always appear in person to claim their pension; and with regard to old men and women, who, under other circumstances are not allowed to go abroad, and who live at a distance, that is the greatest hardship possible, and very often, rather than meet this difficulty, people give up their claim. There is a suggestion I would make, that I think would materially do away with the difficulty. We all know how frequently fraud has been committed in the pension establishment, and how many fraudulent pensions have been given for years. I think, speaking with regard to pensions, that if a man's life was valued at a certain sum, and he were permitted to will it to whom he pleased, it would be very much more valuable as a boon. In the present instance there is a certain line of succession, and they can nominate any heir within the prescribed line; it may be a wife, or it may be a daughter, and those people very often rather than come for their pension, give it up. But if this sum, according to the valuation, were given for a man's life lost in action, he might will it to whom he pleased, and then there could be no chance of fraud. That would do away with the cumbrous pension establishment, and I think in a while it would be a saving to the Government. I am certain that to the Punjaub troops it would be a great boon.

1154. Is not it particularly important in the case of regiments liable to foreign service, that this matter of pensions for the wives of those who have died in action should be attended to; it is more important in the case of regiments liable to foreign service, or employed on foreign service, than in other cases, is it not?—Yes, certainly; because the boon is no boon whatever if it is hedged round with so many difficulties that practically it is unattainable; for instance, in my regiment, which was first raised in 1849, up to the date when I left it, between 500 and 600 men have lost their lives; they have either been killed on the field, or have died of wounds received in action. With many of these cases I have had more or less to do in procuring pensions, and I can speak to the difficulty there is, and the delay, and how often, as I said before, the people forego their claim altogether. I think it is a hardship that such should be the case, and I think it could be easily met by valuing a man's life at a certain rate. A fair value might be easily arrived at by ascertaining the average duration of pensions, and the aggregate amount paid; and I think on the whole it would be more satisfactory to the Government as well as to the men themselves.

1155. You think that the removal of those difficulties would enhance the popularity of the service very much?—Yes, I think it would have a great effect in that way.

1156. Marquis of *Hartington.*] You stated in your last examination, in reply to a question as to whether it would be safe to entrust Singapore, or Hong Kong, or the Mauritius to the exclusive guardianship of Indian troops, that you thought it would not be wise to do so, referring to the possibility (not the probability) of a mutiny; do you think, putting the subject of mutiny out of the question altogether, that it would be wise to entrust any of our colonies to the exclusive guardianship of Indian troops?—No; I think for every purpose it would be better that Europeans should be located with them.

1157. Do you think that under good officers they can be trusted in a time of riot or disturbance as implicitly as you can trust European troops?—Do you mean in the case of a riot among Europeans or among the natives?

1158. I refer more particularly to riot among other natives; in China, for instance?—Certainly, I think they could be trusted.

1159. Take, for example, a riot among the Chinese; would you trust as implicitly to Indian troops as you could to Europeans?—Yes, I should say so.

1160. Do you think that the colonists would have the same confidence in a garrison composed exclusively of Indian troops as they would if there were Europeans in the garrison?—I think it is very questionable whether they would or not.

1161. You believe that they might have the same confidence?—I believe that they might; it would depend very much upon the behaviour of the men, and the estimation in which they are held by their own officers, and those who were employing them.

1162. Would you, under any circumstances, have Indian artillery as well as infantry in a colony?—No, certainly not.

1163. Then you would have the artillery, at any rate, always European?—Yes.

Tuesday, 26th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Lord William Hay.
Mr. Childers.	Captain Hayter.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.	Colonel North.
Viscount Hamilton.	Mr. Oliphant.
Marquis of Hartington.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant General Sir HOPE GRANT, G.C.B., was called in; and Examined.

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1164. *Chairman.*] YOU are the Quartermaster General?—I am.

1165. Have you formed any opinion as to the possibility of employing native Asiatic troops in colonial garrisons?—I have.

1166. Would you kindly state your opinion to the Committee?—May I ask, in the first place, is it proposed that these colonial troops should be localized?

1167. I imagine that the weight of authority is in favour of their being borrowed from the Indian army, and not being localized; but without entering into the question, do you think it would be possible satisfactorily to discharge the duties of colonial garrisons by the help of Asiatic troops?—If you took them from the Indian troops you could not keep to the Sikhs, you would have to take the army generally by roster.

1168. What is the impossibility of taking any particular kind of troops, such as the Sikhs; would it excite discontent, do you think?—I do not think it could be done by the Government; I think, if they are called upon to supply so many regiments for such a service, they would have to take them by the roster.

1169. Supposing they did not take them by the roster, but confined themselves to one particular class of troops, say to the regiments of one Presidency, or half of one Presidency, what would be the result of that?—I think that would cause great discontent among the troops.

1170. Do you think that the competition for this kind of employment would be so keen as to cause discontent?—I think any employment, good, bad, or indifferent, would cause discontent among the troops, if they were taken out of one class.

1171. And your opinion is, that the mass of the Indian army would not be fitted for the service?—I think, decidedly not.

1172. In your opinion, if it was possible to confine them to the Sikhs, the Sikhs would be fitted for such a service?—The Sikhs might be fitted for such a service; but I think it would be very difficult to satisfy them and to please them. Going upon garrison duty is very different from going upon active service. The Sikhs and the native troops are always ready to go on active service, but not to remain in garrison at any foreign station.

1173. If it was so disagreeable a duty, do not you think that the other troops would rather congratulate themselves that the Sikhs alone were selected for the duty?—I think not.

1174. Do you imagine that the objections of the Sikhs would be of a character that money could not overcome?—Money might overcome their objections, no doubt; in the first place, they would, in all probability, go very willingly, till they found it injure their health, or anything of that sort; then it would become an unpopular service, and they would not like it.

1175. Do you think that all the other races employed in India, except the Sikhs, would be unfit for this service of garrisoning colonial stations?—I should think the Goorkas would be very good.

1176. And the Affghans?—And the Affghans too, but I should think it would be more difficult to get them to go willingly than any other classes.

1177. But you think that the high caste Hindoos of Bengal and Behar would not do?—No, they would not do, I think. I will tell you, for example, what happened in China: before I went there, during the last war, they had native troops at Hong Kong. The Chinamen there are a very bad class of men; they are the worst class in the whole of China; pirates, murderers, and thieves congregate in Hong Kong, because it is the only place they can go to; they are shut out of their own country; but Hong Kong is open territory, and any person may go there who is not known to our Government. There was a guard of native soldiers there. A Chinaman one night came, while a sentry was walking upon his post, and with a long stick tripped him up, and took away his musket from him; the consequence was that when I arrived, Sir Hercules Robinson applied to me for a European guard. He said it was not safe to leave a native guard there. The result is, that the whole of the Europeans think very badly of the native troops, and I am very certain of this, that if you were to propose to supply them with native troops, in the place of European troops, they would say, "If you do so we will object to pay any of the money we are now called upon to pay for troops.

1178. Who would say that?—The European residents at Hong Hong.

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1179. They would not exactly be asked?—I think they would object to pay the money which they pay now, and as far as I can make out, that is a considerable sum; it is 20,000*l.* a-year, and moreover it is a very valuable Colony to this country. I believe as much as 3,000,000*l.* passes through this country in consequence of the great supply of tea sent from thence; of course it is very necessary to look after the interests of the European population there.

1180. Do you know what the cost of garrisoning Hong Kong is?—I am not aware of the cost of the garrison there; I cannot speak to that.

1181. You do not know what proportion is paid by the Colony?—The Colony pays 20,000*l.* a-year.

1182. What proportion is that; how much is the whole cost?—I cannot say what fraction of the whole it is.

1183. You stated that you did not think that the Bengal and Behar Hindoos would be good soldiers to employ in such a service; do you think that the Madrasees would be any better?—No, I think not; they are very good troops in their way, but I should not think they would be at all good troops to employ under those circumstances.

1184. Do they not actually undertake the garrisoning of all the Burmese stations?—Yes, along with European troops. They take the Straits without European troops, but there is to be half a European regiment now sent to Singapore.

1185. Is that in consequence of its having been discovered that the Madrasees are insufficient?—No; the Madrasees are taken away from Singapore altogether, and there is to be a part of the Ceylon Rifles sent there; there are to be eight companies sent there.

1186. What is the ground of that alteration?—The Straits Settlements are taken over by the English Government now.

1187. It is purely on that ground?—It is purely on that ground, I believe.

1188. Hitherto the Madrasees have garrisoned Singapore without any injury to the public service, have they not?—Yes, but that is one of the quietest places in all India; the climate is good, and there is no reason at all why any troops should not take care of that place.

1189. There are an abundance of Chinamen there, are there not?—There are a good many Chinamen there, but they are very quiet in their habits.

1190. I thought it was a fear of the Chinamen that led you to say that you thought the ordinary Bengal and Madras regiments would not be fitted for garrisoning Hong Kong?—Yes, but those Chinamen who come to Singapore come for traffic; they are quite a different class of people altogether from those at Hong Kong. The people at Hong Kong are all pirates and other dangerous characters.

1191. They are a much more dangerous class?—Yes, a much more dangerous class.

1192. You think that the Madrasees would be incompetent to deal with them?—Quite incompetent.

1193. But you see no objection to Singapore being garrisoned by native troops?—No, not much objection; there is only a wing of a European regiment sent there now; it is a point of importance which would need to be protected if there came to be a war, because there are fortifications, and guns, and different things there which it is necessary, of course, to take care of.

1194. If there was a war should you like to lock up any notable proportion of the British Army at Singapore?—Not if they were required in England; but if there was a great war in England or Europe, and we required more troops than we could possibly get here, I do not see any insuperable objection to removing the European troops from Singapore. Of course there would be an objection, but I do not know why you should not remove the European troops away in that case, and put native troops in their places, and I do not think the natives would object to that.

1195. That would be rather a lengthy process, would it not?—I think it would not be a very lengthy process. If an order was to come out to send 10 or 12 regiments from the different Colonies, I think native troops from India could be found in a very short time to replace them; of course you would have to raise fresh troops in India to take the place of those you sent away.

1196. How soon would you get your English troops home?—You send them overland now, and, of course, in a very short space of time you would get them over land, after they were once embarked, in a month at the outside.

1197. Major *Anson.*] From Singapore?—When once they were embarked you could get them home in a month from Singapore; you would get them home from Calcutta in a month, and Singapore is no further than Calcutta.

1198. *Chairman.*] The mails by the Peninsular and Oriental Company do not come from Calcutta in a month?—Yes, the letters go or come back in a month.

1199. It is three or four days over a month, is not it?—It may be a little over sometimes. From Bombay they go home in three weeks occasionally.

1200. Sir *James Fergusson.*] They go through France?—Yes, the letters go through France. Coming round by Gibraltar would make it a little longer, perhaps.

1201. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the Mauritius could be safely garrisoned by native troops?—No, there would be a great objection to that in consequence of there being so many French people there.

1202. Why do French people object to native troops?—I should think they would.

1203. Do you think they like Englishmen better than Asiatics?—Decidedly.

1204. You mean that your fear is that they would object to pay for native troops?—The colonists would, in general, decidedly object to pay for native troops.

1205. If the colonists indulged in the costly luxury of English troops, do you not think it would be fair that they should pay for every man they got?—That is a matter upon which, of course, I cannot give an opinion. Have you got the power of obliging them to pay?

1206. We have got the power of taking the troops away if they do not?—I am aware of that; you might try it, but I think there would be very great difficulty in doing so, as many of these colonies are of great use to England.

1207. Do you think that Ceylon might be garrisoned entirely by Indian troops?—The only thing I can say with regard to that, is that of late they have reduced the native troops very much there,

there, and have added to the European Troops. For example, the Ceylon Rifles amount to 1,400; they will be reduced to six companies.

1208. On what ground is that?—I am not able to state the ground of it at all. I can only say that we have just received an order to supply half an European regiment, in addition to what was there before, and they have reduced the native troops to six companies, but I cannot myself say what the reason is. It appears to me from that, that they think it is not quite safe without European troops.

1209. You have no military knowledge of any danger that would be run by garrisoning Ceylon with native troops?—I am not aware of any military danger under the present circumstances. I think all these colonies would require to be taken care of, in case of war. If war broke out in this country, it would be necessary to defend them as well as you could; of course, European troops are the proper force to defend them.

1210. Could Ceylon be defended against external aggression to any large extent by European troops?—No; but it could be defended from gunboats or vessels of war coming and landing a force of marines.

1211. Would any small number of European troops be of any great use in case of an attack of that kind; would you not have to rely upon your native troops in the long run?—I think not, because the amount of force that a ship could land would not be very great; perhaps only 200 or 300, or it might be 400 or 500 men. They would go in and make a raid against a town, and burn a town, but European troops would be the proper force to keep them out and stop them; I think they would be much better than native troops for that purpose.

1212. Your idea is that the European force in Ceylon is kept up in case of a war breaking out, which might produce a raid upon some town in Ceylon?—Yes, certainly.

1213. And you think that native troops would be wholly incompetent to repel such an attack?—I do not know that they would be wholly incompetent, but not nearly so competent as European troops.

1214. Have you any knowledge of the cost of transport from one oriental port to another?—I commanded in Madras lately, as you are aware, and a regiment went over from there to the Straits; and as far as I can tell you (I cannot tell you with any certainty), I think the cost of transport only amounted to about 10 rupees for every native, and 15 rupees for every European sent over to the Straits.

1215. That was from Madras to Singapore?—Yes, that was from Madras to Singapore, and from Madras to Burmah.

1216. To Rangoon?—Yes. I cannot speak with any certainty; but as far as my belief goes, it amounted to 10 rupees for every native, and 15 rupees for every European; but that, of course, changes according to the market.

1217. What is the reason why a European costs 50 per cent. more to take than a native?—Because you put the natives so much closer into a vessel. A vessel that holds, say 500 natives, you would only put 300 Europeans into.

1218. On what ground is that; is it because the natives are smaller?—I think it is on no ground at all. I think it is rather a hardship upon the natives; but then the distance is not very great, and it is very seldom that there has been any accident or cause of complaint.

1219. Then the Europeans might be put into a vessel as close as the natives are?—You are obliged to give a European so many cubic feet; you are obliged to give them so much room.

1220. By Act of Parliament?—No, by the orders of the Indian Government, I think it is.

1221. Then the orders of the Indian Government do not take care of the native troops in the same way as of Europeans?—Not in the same way, certainly.

1222. You cannot give the reasons for this difference?—I cannot give the reasons, except that it is usual for natives to live in their houses crowded up together, and it is not supposed to go against their usual habits.

1223. That is rather the way with Englishmen, is not it?—It is not the way now; they are obliged to be in the most open rooms, and have abundance of air and plenty of cubic space.

1224. Have you found the natives die, or is there more sickness amongst them than amongst the Europeans in consequence of this arrangement?—No, I think not; in China, for example, the per-centage of deaths and sickness of Europeans was very nearly double that of natives.

1225. Had you any opportunity of observing what races of natives bore the Chinese climate best?—No, I cannot say for certain, because during the time I was there with the army it was the very best season of the year. It was during the cold weather, when there is very little sickness. The native troops I had there were uncommonly healthy and well.

1226. Those native troops were all Sikhs, were they not?—They were all Sikhs that I took up the country, but there were a Madras regiment and two Bombay regiments. I did not take them with me on service, they were left at Hong Kong and Canton.

1227. You had no opportunity of seeing the fighting powers of the Madras and Bombay regiments?—Not in that war; I saw it in the first war, in 1841.

1228. Did you form a high impression of them?—I think they could fight against the Chinese troops, because the Chinese troops were not well drilled, well armed, or anything else; and, except in forts, they were not a dangerous force to meet in the field.

1229. Were you much struck with their inferiority to the Sikhs?—I think they were decidedly inferior to the Sikhs; the troops in the Chinese army were badly armed; their swords were not sharp even; they had nothing but a matchlock; in short, they were not well armed.

1230. I was asking whether you were much struck with the inferiority of the Madrasees to the Sikhs?—I thought you were referring to the Chinese. No, I think the difference is just three to one and two to one; that is to say, a European is equal to three of the Hindostanee or the Madras troops, and equal to two of the Sikhs.

1231. And what kind of relation do you assign to the Chinese?—The Chinese, I should think, would be as fine soldiers as any, if drilled, disciplined, and armed.

1232. As fine soldiers as Europeans?—No, not as fine soldiers as Europeans; as fine soldiers as the Sikhs.

1233. You no doubt frequently saw embarkations of Madrasees going from Madras to Rangoon; did you ever hear of any objection on the score

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score of caste or religion?—No, it has been an old habit for them to go. First of all, the Government thought it was so very expensive sending those Madras troops over, that they formed two local regiments; but that arrangement so completely and utterly failed, that they were obliged to give it up, and send the Madrasees again. Then they thought to send their wives and families there, to make them more satisfied with the country, but that utterly failed. It was put to the Madras troops whether they would have their wives and families with them or not, and every man said no, they would not have them, so they were obliged to leave it, and the Madras troops are sent over as a matter of course. They have been long accustomed to that work; they are kept there three years; they leave their wives and children at a station that is appointed for them; they send almost all their money over; indeed, they even starve themselves in the country to send their money home to their families. First of all, a sepoy has seven rupees, that is, 14*s.* a month of pay; then, while on foreign service he has full batta, that is, three rupees eight annas, or 7*s.*; and then he has his rations found him; that amounts to another three rupees eight annas, so that his pay actually amounts to almost as much as a European soldier; in fact, quite as much, because they have got what is called good-conduct pay. They get, after a period of six years, an additional rupee, and another rupee after 10 years. It was formerly after 16 years and 20 years, but now they have increased it very much in consequence of a representation which I made as to the way in which they were paid. I considered they were so badly paid that they could not live upon their pay; the Government increased it, and gave them this extra rupee after six years' service, and another rupee after 10 years' service, instead of after 16 and 20 years. When the men go over to Singapore or Burmah they almost starve themselves; they send all their money, and almost everything they can get, to their wives and families, and they live there as best they can. Of course they do not actually starve themselves, because that would be taken notice of, but they do not live nearly so well as they do in their own country.

1234. Would there be any difficulty to induce them, for the sake of pay, to garrison for similar periods, such places as the Mauritius, Hong Kong, and Ceylon?—I do not think there would be any difficulty, but they would not like it, because the same difficulties of supplying their families would occur there as do now, and perhaps more so with regard to those far-distant settlements.

1235. They would have the same advantage?—Yes, they would have the same advantages; at least I do not see how you could send them otherwise.

1236. These advantages would be sufficient to induce them to go, would they not?—There is another thing to be taken into account; if a sepoy dies on foreign service his wife is pensioned; that seems to be another great expense to the Government; the wife's pension is, I think, 2 rupees 12 annas, that is 5*s.* 6*d.* a month.

1237. Do you know at all the relative cost of the Indian and European soldier?—I cannot answer that question; I do not know.

1238. You mentioned the cost of passage from Madras to Singapore; do you happen to know the cost of passage from Madras to Hong Kong?—No, I cannot say; I think that was done by a ship taken up according to the market-rate; it cost a great deal of money, I believe, but I do not know exactly what it did cost; the ship was sold for a time for a certain price, and as many men were put on board as they could send.

1239. Major *Anson.*] That is a return from your department which has been put in, is it not (*handing a paper to the Witness*)?—Yes.

1240. All the reliefs of regiments to the Colonies go through your office, I think?—Yes, they do.

1241. In this return I find that there are at the present moment five regiments in Australia, two of which are coming home this year?—Yes.

1242. There are five regiments at the Cape?—There are only to be four regiments at the Cape.

1243. Is one of them coming home?—One of them is coming home this year.

1244. And not going to be relieved?—It is not going to be relieved.

1245. There are two in China, are there not?—One in Japan, and one in China.

1246. And two in the Mauritius?—Yes.

1247. One at Ceylon, one at Jamaica, one at Barbadoes, and one in Bermuda?—One and a half are to be at Ceylon.

1248. Where is that wing of a regiment to be taken from?—It is going from the Cape. The 9th Regiment will go out and send one wing to Singapore.

1249. The other wing remaining at Ceylon?—The other wing is to remain at Ceylon.

1250. Is there to be another regiment in addition in Ceylon?—There is to be only a wing of a regiment in Ceylon in addition to the regiment there before.

1251. There is to be a regiment and a half there?—Yes.

1252. At the present moment what is nominally the length of service regiments abroad and at home?—Ten years is the length of service of regiments all over the Colonies and in India.

1253. How many years is it at home?—Five years at home.

1254. I find here that there are two regiments that are expected home this year, 1867, one of which has had 14 years' service abroad, and the other 12?—Yes.

1255. I find that there are two regiments coming home in 1868, both of which regiments have had 12 years' service abroad?—Yes.

1256. I find that there are five regiments coming home in 1869 that have had either 12 or nine years' service abroad?—Yes.

1257. And that five regiments are expected home in 1870 which have already had nine years and nine months' service abroad?—Yes.

1258. Six regiments are expected home in 1871 and 1872, that have already had nine years and eight months of service abroad?—Yes.

1259. How is it expected to be able to reduce the service of these regiments and bring them all home within the 10 years?—It cannot be done with those regiments, and the system cannot be carried out thoroughly for about four or five years. That has been caused in this way; for example, several of those regiments go out from England under four years.

1260. Under four years' service at home?—Yes, that has been caused by the second battalions having in many cases been obliged to be brought home in consequence of consisting of short-service time men; and also in consequence of

of so many regiments having been required to be sent out to India during the mutiny; that altered the roster altogether, and it will be some time before it falls into its proper form.

1261. The way in which you propose to bring about the 10 years' service abroad and five years at home would be by reducing the English Army in India, I think?—No, not at all; we have no intention of reducing the English Army in India; that would be one of the most dangerous things you could do, probably. I do not think India could be held with any certainty if you were to reduce a man in India.

1262. If you have got regiments up to the year 1872, which have been as long as 14 years abroad, I do not see by what process you are to reduce the length of the service of the regiments that are leaving now?—The number of regiments in India have been considerably reduced since the mutiny; there were 82 regiments, including the nine Indian regiments, at that time. There are now only 52; so that 30 regiments have already been sent home.

1263. Do you know how long the regiment that has been longest at home has been at the present time in England?—Five years and seven months, I think, is the longest.

1264. What regiment is that?—It is the 59th foot, it has been five years and seven months in England.

1265. How many regiments are there at home at the present moment that have been five years in the country?—The 2nd battalion of the 60th regiment has been five years and seven months, and the 1st battalion of the 6th, five years and four months; there are no more that have completed the five years.

1266. Can you give me the number that have been four years at home?—The 83rd, on embarkation for foreign service, will have been at home four years and eleven months; the 75th, four years and eleven months; the 92nd, four years and six months; the 85th, four years and six months; the 21st, 1st battalion, four years and one month; the 39th, four years and one month; the 71st, four years and four months; the 17th, four years and three months; the 66th, four years and five months; the 89th, four years and four months; the 81st, four years and five months.

1267. Will any of those regiments be going out this year?—The 54th, the 60th, the 83rd, the 6th, the 75th, the 92nd, the 85th; all those go out this year which have had over four or five years' service at home.

1268. Do you not consider that at the present moment there is a great deal too much colonial work performed by the British army?—I do not see how you can avoid it.

1269. For the sake of the army, do you not consider that there is a great deal more than there ought to be?—Why should you say on account of the army?

1270. For the general good of the army, do you not think it is fairer that the soldiers should have more time at home?—For example, take India; I should think the soldier prefers India very much to England; in fact, you will find every regiment coming home from India always leaves 200 or 300 men behind who have volunteered to other regiments. Look at the old Indian service, how easily they got recruits, and what fine recruits they got; theirs was the finest artillery in the world; they had the largest and finest men, and there was no difficulty in getting them.

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1271. The English soldier gets great advantages in India, does he not?—Of course, his accommodation is very much better in India for himself and for his wife and family; they have all got two excellent rooms and a cooking room besides.

1272. Do you think they are equally fond of the service in China, and the Mauritius?—No; I confess they do not like China; but there is one thing I should like to mention, which is this: that China would be greatly improved if the Government would determine upon building a barrack at Kowloon. The existing barrack is built against the side of the hill, where there is no south south-west breeze, and when the hot weather comes on, it gets fearfully hot, fearfully close, and very unhealthy. Kowloon lies in exactly the same position as Macao does, that is, open to the south-west monsoon, with no hills behind it, to stop the circulation of air. When once the ground has been finally opened and settled and built upon, it will become very healthy. It is not the fault of the Government that they have not done more, for they had so much cause, in consequence of the reports of sickness and ill health to stop the building, but they have merely built a trial hut for a company; that is all that is now completed. It takes two good years or three years to settle the ground, before it becomes fit for troops to live there. All that territory requires the ground to be perfectly settled for three years, in order to become healthy. After building this trial hut, if you were to put troops into it, and then to build another hut alongside of it, it would become unhealthy again. The Government ought at once to build the barrack completely, and let the ground all settle; do not let there be any more breaking up of the ground alongside of it, and you would then find that the troops would get much more healthy there.

1273. The Government would have to go to an enormous expense, would it not?—No; and the expense is to be incurred.

1274. Are you aware what the estimate is?—No, I am not aware what the estimate is, but it is settled what barracks are to be built there. They have begun upon this plan, for the sake of trying whether it is healthy or not.

1275. What duties do you consider that the English troops in places like China, the Straits Settlements, the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and Australia, have to perform at the present moment?—In China, I think, European troops ought to be very much exempt from all night duties, because the change of temperature is so very great; in the day it is excessively hot, and in the night it gets excessively cold.

1276. The duties they have to perform at these places, generally, are mainly to act as a sort of garrison?—Yes, of course.

1277. In China, against the Chinese themselves?—For the protection of the Colony in every way.

1278. In the case of the Mauritius, it is to garrison the fortifications that were built to defend the place against a naval attack?—Yes.

1279. At the Cape the troops are chiefly used for frontier work against Caffres, and probable attacks of that nature?—In the first place, the Cape is 6,000 miles from Calcutta; it is just half way between England and India. If you were to

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to relieve your troops there every three years, you would find the expense very great indeed.

1280. Would you not call it nearer two-thirds of the way to India?—No; I have got the particulars here.

1281. I do not care about the distance; the duties they have to perform there are to defend the Colony in case of difficulties with the Caffres or the native tribes in South Africa?—More than that; in the first place, it is the half-way house between India and England, and all our ships go in there to coal, and everything else. It appears to me to be a most important point to take care of.

1282. That refers to Cape Town?—Yes.

1283. Out of the four regiments we are going to have quartered at the Cape of Good Hope, how many will be quartered at Cape Town?—Two, I should think.

1284. Are there two there now?—As far as I remember, there are two; I think it is two, but I am not quite certain.

1285. What do you consider to be the duty of the three regiments of English troops that are in Australia at the present moment?—It strikes me, with regard to Australia, that the people there would, in the first place, I should think, object most strongly if you were to think of placing native troops there.

1286. I do not talk about placing native troops in Australia, I only ask what you consider to be the duties performed by the British soldiers in Australia now?—They are to keep their regiments together, not to scatter them over the country, but to keep them together in case of any disturbance; I do not know exactly what the duties are.

1287. Do you not think that those troops would be more useful at home in the country, than in Australia?—Certainly, they would be more useful at home than in Australia, if they are kept up; but that is one of the questions.

1288. What do you think is the effect upon the health and discipline of the regiments that are quartered in China, at Singapore, and the Mauritius; do you think that it has a bad or a good effect upon their health, and their discipline?—Of course it is not so good for their health as being in England; for example, in China, during the last six years the per-centage of deaths has been 5 $\frac{7}{10}$ ths per 100; that is, counting the very bad season which has taken place there. If you changed them over to Kowloon, I am sure they would be much more healthy.

1289. At present there are no barracks at Kowloon?—At Kowloon there is nothing but one hut barrack.

1290. There is no place to take European troops to at present there?—There is only accommodation enough for one company; but, for example, in the Mauritius the per-centage of deaths has been 1 $\frac{9}{10}$ ths in the 100, and at Ceylon it is 2$\frac{1}{2}$ in the 100.

1291. Do you think that these duties which the English troops are called upon to perform in those places are of very great imperial importance?—I think they are, decidedly; I think it is a most necessary thing that you should take care of the colonists, by whom the great wealth of this country is caused. I think it is necessary to support them.

1292. You consider that they are so important that you ought to use your best troops for that purpose?—I think so, decidedly.

1293. If you were in command of an army in the field, should you use all the powers of your army in taking care of your baggage, and performing outpost duty, or should you use what you considered not your most valuable troops for baggage guards, and the ordinary work of the army, apart from work in the field?—I should consider that an army ought to be equally good in every part of it, and I should certainly take very great care of my baggage, whatever I did.

1294. You would generally keep your best troops together, would you not?—Yes, I would certainly keep them together, but I certainly would have my outposts particularly good, and my baggage guard good.

1295. You have often been in the field in India, and elsewhere, with native troops and Europeans under your command?—Yes.

1296. If you had to use troops on very harassing duty, but not duty of very great importance, you used always to employ the native soldiers under your command, in preference to the Europeans, did you not?—Do you mean for difficult and dangerous duty?

1297. No, not before the enemy?—Yes, certainly, because considering the state of the country and the heat of the country, and the exposure, and everything else, the natives being acclimatised to the country as natives of it, I would of course employ them.

1298. Do you not think that the English army in Canada, in India, at home, and in Europe, in the great garrisons of the Mediterranean is called upon to perform much more important duties in time of war than are performed by the troops in China or the Mauritius?—I think, for example, that Malta and Gibraltar are two of the most essential posts to take care of, and that our best troops ought to be there, and of course in Canada also, which on account of its being so near to the American frontier, is a most necessary Colony for you to protect and take care of as well as you can.

1299. Do you not think that it is most important, considering the limited number of our army, and the enormous amount of duty it might be called upon to perform, to be able to concentrate our best troops as much as possible?—Decidedly.

1300. It is not your opinion that you could use native troops in any of those colonies, I believe?—I think it would be a false plan to go upon to make use of them.

1301. Can you give me any particular reason why you think we should not have China, for instance, Hong Kong, garrisoned with European artillery and native regiments?—It has always been a principle since the mutiny, especially in India, never to leave European artillery solely protected by native troops.

1302. When you went up to the north of China in 1860, what force did you leave at Shanghai?—I left a small force of Europeans and natives.

1303. Did you leave some artillery?—I think a battery of artillery was left there. There was one battery of artillery left there as far as I remember.

1304. When you went up to the north you left 475 Punjaub infantry, 50 Madras artillery, and 82 men of the 89th European Regiment?—I see, the force I left at Shanghai, at least, when I left the country, consisted of the Lodiana Regiment, a Punjaub Regiment, and half a battery of European

European artillery. You speak of when I went up to the north.

1305. That was at a time when there were great disturbances all round the neighbourhood of Shanghai, and it was being threatened by the Taepings, was it not?—Yes.

1306. When you came down from the north of China you altered the garrison of Shanghai, and I think you left the Punjaub infantry, the Lodiana Regiment, and half a battery of European artillery to garrison the place?—Yes, exactly.

1307. Without any European infantry at all?—Without any European infantry at all.

1308. In case of a great European war, do you consider that these scattered detachments of European soldiers all over the world are a great strength to the English army at home?—No, certainly not at home, they cannot be.

1309. In all probability you would have to send out reinforcements to them, would you not?—You might; my belief is that if you were in a regular war you would have to give up the Colonies; you could not protect them; I mean those small Colonies.

1310. Why?—Because if you were in a regular European war, for which you required every man you had, if recruits did not come forward readily, you might require to take your European regiments away from the Colonies, and not be able to supply their places with native troops at once.

1311. Why should you not supply their places with native troops?—You might supply their places with native troops in course of time.

1312. *Chairman.*] I thought you told me that you proposed to keep the European troops in the Colonies in case of war?—If you had a war going on and were distressed in this country for the want of troops, and were obliged to send from this country for European troops from the Colonies, you might supply their place with native troops.

1313. What do we keep them there for now?—To take care of the Colonies.

1314. In case there is a war?—Yes.

1315. But the moment that a war breaks out, you would send them away?—No; only in case of our not being able to get recruits here.

1316. In case of your being hard run?—Yes.

1317. Major *Anson.*] Do not you consider that it would be better to have your system organised, and be able to call upon the Indian army to provide garrisons for those places in case we required to withdraw the European troops?—I think quite the contrary; at first you would get the troops to go very willingly if you had them, but when they found they had bad health at those stations, they would be much disgusted at it, and you would find a difficulty in getting them to go when you required them.

1318. Would there be much difficulty in getting them to go to China?—On the contrary, during the war, they were pleased with the service, but then you took them to the best climate; you kept them there six months, and they had plenty of loot to take back.

1319. Have either the Bengal or the Madras army, who have had to perform the duty at the Straits, shown great symptoms of discontent, or been much disgusted at having to perform the service there?—No; but I do not see how any men can be happy when they starve themselves and send their pay away. They go there to live in the most economical way they can, hoping to get back to their families as quickly as possible; they cannot like it, it is impossible.

1320. Did you ever hear while you were Commander in Chief in Madras, any great complaints from the men on that ground?—I heard great complaints of the men being very badly fed there.

1321. *Chairman.*] From the men?—I did not hear the men complain themselves, but their commanding officer stated that that was the case.

1322. The commanding officers complained that the men did not feed themselves?—Yes; they complained that the men did not feed themselves.

1323. Major *Anson.*] That was purely voluntary on their part?—It was purely voluntary on their part; but then it would appear that it could not have been very pleasing to them, when they had to send back all their money to their relations and friends in Madras, and to live as best they could themselves upon the small remainder of their pay.

1324. I think you said just now, in answer to the Chairman, that at Canton you left some native troops alone, without any Europeans?—No, not without Europeans. There were two Bombay regiments left, and one European regiment.

1325. Alone?—No.

1326. *Chairman.*] And a Madras regiment you told me, I think?—No, the Madras regiment was at Hong Kong.

1327. Major *Anson.*] You spoke very disparagingly of the Madrasees, compared to the Punjaubees; I think when you were campaigning in Oude you had a Madras cavalry regiment in your division, which did very good service?—Not in my division; there was a cavalry regiment with me, but only for a few days, and it was never in my division regularly.

1328. You constantly had some Madras sappers and miners, had you not?—The Madras sappers and miners are the best troops in the Presidency, to my mind; however, do not let it be understood that I speak disparagingly of the Madrasees as troops, but I do not think they are equal to the Sikhs.

1329. You consider the Sikh to be one of the finest soldiers in the world, do you not?—No, I do not say that.

1330. Second only to the Europeans?—They are the best by far in India; the best of the Indians, certainly.

1331. Did you ever issue any general order while you were Commander in Chief at Madras, upon the subject of commanding officers discussing the question with their men about going on foreign service?—No; I do not remember it.

1332. Or asking their opinion upon it?—I do not remember it.

1333. Your chief objection, then, to the employment of the native troops in our Colonies, is that it would disgust them with it?—That the native troops would not like it.

1334. That in course of time they would be so disgusted with it that you would not be able to get them to serve then, when you wanted them in time of war?—I think, in all probability, that would be the great difficulty.

1335. You think that that would counterbalance the advantage of efficiently organising in time of peace, the system which we might be called upon to use in time of war?—I think it would be a most dangerous plan to attempt.

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1336. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I understood you to say that it was, in your opinion, desirable to maintain troops in many of our Colonies, which we may call Colonies proper, in contradistinction to military posts, such as Malta, Aden, or Gibraltar?—Certainly.

1337. Both for British interests, and for the interests of the colonists?—Yes, for both.

1338. I should like to ask your opinion (I do not think it has been expressed yet) as to whether it would be possible, with a consideration of security from outbreak, to garrison any of these Colonies permanently with native troops alone without Europeans?—I do not think that would be advisable.

1339. It would be imprudent?—It would be very imprudent.

1340. I presume from the scale of the value of the different troops you have mentioned, that you would consider that a smaller number of Europeans would give equal, or greater security, than a larger number of natives?—Decidedly.

1341. Therefore the relative cost, man per man, would not be a fair criterion of the cost of employing the two garrisons?—Certainly not.

1342. You said that you contemplated, in case of war, that it might be necessary in a European emergency to withdraw European troops from some of our Colonies?—Yes.

1343. I presume you meant altogether?—I mean altogether from any of those Colonies that have been mentioned to me.

1344. I believe you mean to say that in time of war it may be necessary to abandon many posts that are of great importance themselves, in order to maintain still more essential posts?—Yes, exactly.

1345. That is an ordinary practice in war, is it not?—Yes, I believe so.

1346. At the same time you would maintain them at those outposts at those distant Colonies, so long as circumstances permitted?—Yes.

1347. The objections to employing garrisons entirely composed of native troops, would not apply in the same way, I presume, to employing a mixed garrison of Europeans and native troops?—No, I think not.

1348. Would there be any objection, in your mind, to employing such a garrison as that at Hong Kong?—There is a garrison of that description there now.

1349. Is there any objection in your mind to employing such a garrison there?—It is necessary to have native troops there to do certain duties which Europeans could not do in that country.

1350. By that means, is the number of Europeans necessary for the garrisons in any way reduced?—I do not think they can be reduced below a regiment; I think one regiment is quite necessary there.

1351. Would one regiment be sufficient without the native troops?—No.

1352. Then the number of Europeans there is less than it would be if the garrison were composed exclusively of Europeans?—Yes, when I was there I recommended that more Europeans should be there, besides the present native force.

1353. Under present circumstances do you think that so large a European force is necessary?—One European regiment is, I consider, quite as little as can be placed there.

1354. If the native troops were withdrawn, it would be necessary largely to increase the European force, would it not?—It would be necessary to increase it largely.

1355. You think that the present arrangement tends to the efficiency of the service as well as to the saving of European life?—It does; but even the number that is there now is very much smaller than the number which I really believe ought to be put there for the benefit and health of the troops and everybody else. The duties are very severe.

1356. At any rate the principle of a mixed garrison is the right one to maintain at Hong Kong?—Certainly.

1357. I think you stated that the cost of native troops with double batta, amounted to almost as much as that of European soldiers?—I should think it would amount to more, because, in the first place, I do not see how you could well send native troops to garrison these places without increasing their pay. I do not think you could make a general rule of it without offering them a larger amount of pay than they have now. They get seven rupees pay now, and seven rupees more when they go upon foreign service; that is the general custom of India. That makes 28 *s.* a month, and besides that, there is the good-conduct pay, amounting to two rupees a month more, when a man has been 10 years in the service.

1358. Then do they have their rations?—Three rupees eight annas per month are given to the men for rations.

1359. Does the 28 *s.* include the cost of rations?—Yes. Besides that, you have to pay a man's wife's pension if he dies on service, so that the expense would be actually more than the amount I have stated.

1360. I think you have expressed an opinion that it is absolutely necessary to relieve native Indian troops every two or three years?—I think decidedly it ought not to be longer than three years; I should say two years.

1361. Therefore, that is to be added to the cost of their employment as against the cost of European troops in the case of garrisons such as the Cape of Good Hope?—Of course it is. There is one thing to be taken into consideration on the other side, namely, that you do not take their wives, which you do with European troops; that makes it a smaller expense in the case of the native troops.

1362. *Chairman.*] What per centage of wives do you take with European troops?—Seven per cent. is all that is allowed by Government everywhere.

1363. It varies, does it not, from six to nine and twelve per cent.?—No, it was changed the other day at the War Office, and it is now to be seven per cent. for all the Colonies, and for home, and everywhere else; India is the only place where they give now twelve per cent.; that is an Indian arrangement made by the Indian governments. But then we only allow seven per cent. of wives to go out with the men; they marry there; it seems rather singular. This change is quite a recent one; until within a very short period, there were eight per cent. of wives allowed at home, and only six per cent. in the colonies.

1364. I thought it was nine per cent. at home?—No, eight per cent. at home; six per cent. on the Colonies; Australia, 12 per cent.; and 12 per cent., not including serjeants' wives, in India. It was the most confused arrangement that could possibly be conceived; but now it is seven per cent. everywhere except in India.

1365. Lord

1365. Lord *William Hay.*] May they bring home that 12 per cent. of wives?—They never bring them home, because almost all the married men stop in the country.

1366. *Chairman.*] What happens to the five per cent. that are married in India, when they get home again?—They do not come home; almost all the married people stop out in India.

1367. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Reverting to the question of the relief of troops, you stated that it would be necessary to relieve the native Indian troops, at the furthest, every three years?—Yes.

1368. What is the time for the relief of European troops at the Cape of Good Hope?—Every 10 years.

1369. Therefore there would be three reliefs, and rather more, of native troops, the cost of which would probably exceed the cost of the one relief of European?—The distance to the Cape of Good Hope is 6,000 miles.

1370. The cost of the one relief of a regiment from England to the Cape of Good Hope in 10 years would be very much less than the relief of three or three and a-half battalions of native troops, would it not?—I should think so, certainly.

1371. Moreover, I presume, from what you have said before, that the garrison at the Cape of Good Hope would have to be more numerous if a large proportion of it was composed of native troops?—It certainly would.

1372. I will take the case of the Mauritius; what does the garrison there now consist of?—Two European regiments and two batteries of artillery.

1373. Those two European regiments seem a very small force for such an island as the Mauritius?—Yes.

1374. Would it be possible even, or, at any rate, would it be prudent, if you sent native Indian troops there, in any way to reduce that force, as a permanent measure?—I do not see how you could do it without sending more native regiments there. You have now only 1,388 Europeans there altogether; if you took away one European regiment, you would have to send, I think, two native regiments.

1375. You think it would not be prudent to do otherwise?—I think not.

1376. There would be no gain in point of finance there?—It appears to me that there would not; and then I think that the Colonies would object very much to pay the money which they pay now, if native troops were sent to them. The Mauritius alone, I think, pays 35,000*l.* a-year.

1377. Nevertheless, in time of war, you would be prepared to run the risks of such arrangements, and to withdraw the troops from many of those places, filling them, to the best of your power, with Indian native troops, or any other troops you could substitute?—I would only do it as the last resource.

1378. You would be prepared to do it as a last resource?—Yes.

1379. It is hardly necessary to ask you, would it be possible to garrison Ceylon with either native troops from India, or the Malay troops, without the services of Europeans?—You know they have got six companies now; they had formerly 1,400 men.

1380. Would it be possible to garrison that Colony with Oriental troops alone?—I do not think it would be advisable.

1381. It would not be safe?—I do not think it would.

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1382. Your attention has been drawn to the question of the relief of European regiments, of late years. I believe it was laid down some years ago that it was desirable to maintain the proportions of 10 years' foreign service to five years' service at home?—It was.

1383. That has been very much disturbed, I believe, by the exigencies of the Russian war, and of the Indian mutiny?—Yes, it has been disturbed by the Indian mutiny, and the 2nd Battalion's coming home.

1384. But principally by the exigencies of the active service in India, and in Turkey, and the Crimea?—Yes.

1385. Are the proportion of battalions in India and the Colonies, at the present time, such as will give for the future, in quiet times, that amount of relief?—The proportions at present are these: in the Colonies throughout there are 42 battalions; at home there are 39.

1386. And in India?—In India there are 52 battalions altogether; that is to say, counting Madras and Bombay also.

1387. Are there not 141 battalions altogether?—Yes.

1388. Marquis of *Hartington.*] The numbers you have given do not add up to 141?—Yes, but there are eight on the passage home; that makes the 141.

1389. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The present distribution of the army would give 47 at home, or on their passage, would it not?—Yes.

1390. Then, on the average, there are some five on their passage nearly all the year round, are there not?—There must be.

1391. Therefore it gives a proportion of about 42 for reliefs?—Yes.

1392. That will not do more than give a relief of five years at home to 10 years abroad?—No.

1393. Making some allowance for emergencies and contingencies?—Yes.

1394. But in the course of a few years you will be able to attain that if there is no great disturbing cause?—We hope to do it in between four or five years.

1395. I apprehend, from the length of time at home and abroad, that you have read out to the Committee, that the object of the Commander in Chief has been rather to lengthen the service abroad than to shorten the service at home below the fixed number?—Yes.

1396. It has been rather thought politic to let a regiment serve over 10 years abroad than to allow regiments to go abroad with very much less than five years' service?—Yes, that has been the case.

1397. That has been the policy?—Yes.

1398. You apprehend that, in a short time, you will be able to maintain the 10 years' service abroad and the five years at home?—Yes.

1399. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You stated that there was a regiment and a-half of Europeans quartered in Ceylon; where are they quartered?—There is only one regiment there now.

1400. There is going to be one and a-half, as I understand it?—Yes. They are going to build barracks for them at Galle; I believe so, at least; I am not quite certain. There is a certain amount of the regiment there just now. The barracks are very bad. I believe they mean to build a barrack there.

1401. Are not the invalids sent up to Newere Ellia;

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Ellia; there is a sanatorium there, to which invalids are sent?—Yes. I do not know much of that place. That is arranged by the Commander in Chief and the Government there themselves. I do not know much of Ceylon.

1402. Do you not think, as a general principle, that it would be more advisable to have a whole regiment at the sanatorium under the new arrangements?—Decidedly.

1403. With reference to the regiment which is at Japan, is it intended to be kept there permanently?—It is at present intended to be kept there permanently.

1404. Is there an arrangement with the Japanese Government to that effect?—Yes, and the Japanese Government have just now repaired all the huts they are quartered in.

1405. Would it not be available for Hong Kong at very short notice, without the necessity of keeping a large European force at Hong Kong?—I think not; it is a great distance from Hong Kong.

1406. It is six days from Yokohama to Hong Kong?—Sometimes you could hardly get across the water when a severe monsoon sets in, with constant typhoons. Besides, Japan is a place where it is very necessary to have a force at present.

1407. There has been an objection taken to the idea of mixed garrisons in some of the Colonies; you find that a mixed garrison at Hong Kong answers very well, do you not?—It is absolutely necessary at Hong Kong; you could not do the duty without it.

1408. Therefore there would be no objection to a mixed garrison in any other colony, provided there were no other objection on the ground of expense, or otherwise?—I do not think there would. There is one at Ceylon too.

1409. You stated that, under the old East India Company, the European troops were of a very first-rate class?—They were a fine class of men.

1410. Would it be possible, do you think, to have a local corps recruited in England for Indian service alone now?—I think it is greatly to the advantage of the soldier to come home; I think it makes his discipline so much better.

1411. If you held out a prospect to him of colonising the hill country of India after a short term of service, do you not think that you would establish the nucleus of a local army there?—No, I think not; India is a country which you may depend upon; we can never colonise regularly.

1412. What objection is there to settling men permanently in the hills; they have settled there already?—In very small numbers indeed; there are a few at Simla, and in some of those places. They have settled on some of the coffee plantations, and for similar purposes; but altogether they have settled to a very small extent only.

1413. Is not that because there are not facilities at present; if the Government were to help them, do you not think that there would be the means of establishing colonies of that kind?—I question very much whether they would settle.

1414. Then, in your opinion, it would not be advisable to have a local European force in India?—No; in the first place, every European who goes there, marries a black woman or a half-caste, and then their progeny is not very efficient in any way; they all dwindle down.

1415. Marquis of *Hartington*.] I think you stated, in reply to Major Anson, that in your opinion, it would be a mistake to employ, as it is proposed to do, Indian troops in our Colonies to a greater extent than they are now employed?—Yes.

1416. You stated several objections to the proposal; would you state what are in your own mind the principal reasons that, in your opinion, would make it a mistake?—The first great reason I mentioned was this; in the first place, you must apply to the Indian Government for troops; that is what Major Anson proposes to do, as far as I understand him, and then the next thing is, the Indian Government would have to give them throughout the army; they could not confine them to any particular corps; they could not take Sikhs altogether, they would have to take them from the army generally.

1417. In what way is that an objection?—I think it is an objection, because it is always usual to take troops according to the roster, and the other troops would, in all probability, be very much disgusted and very much annoyed to find they were not taken, and had not their share of the same duties, and the Sikhs themselves would say, "Why are we called upon to do all this bad duty, and the other native troops are not called upon to do any?"

1418. Why would it be objectionable to take the troops regularly from the whole Indian army?—Because the Hindoostanee troops are not reckoned a good and useful branch of the service.

1419. That is one of your objections?—Yes.

1420. Do you feel any other strong objections?—I think a strong objection is, that you would have to increase their pay so much; then another great objection is, that all the European settlers would object strongly to the system; and, as I stated before, they would in all probability object very much to pay the amount they pay now towards keeping up the army,

1421. Supposing those objections did not exist, would you, as a military man, be glad to see a number of European troops in our Colonies relieved by an equal number of native Indian troops?—Certainly not.

1422. You do not think that that would be a good military arrangement?—I do not think it would be a good military arrangement.

1423. I suppose if you could bring home, and keep on your establishment, all the British troops that were so relieved, you would admit that it would be an increase to your military force?—Of course it would; but it is a matter, in my opinion, of certainty, that whenever you brought European troops home to this country, the country would cry out, or Parliament would cry out, if there were more troops than were absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Government in this country. Then, if any were reduced, you would be substituting inferior troops for good troops.

1424. Major *Anson*.] Is not that your principal reason?—No, not at all. I think that is one of the most cogent and the strongest reasons; it is a very strong reason, but it is not my strongest. I think the objection which the troops themselves would have to it would be one of the strongest, besides the want of confidence on the part of the settlers.

1425. Sir *James Fergusson*.] Besides that you keep the troops in the Colonies for the protection of the Colonies, not as a reserve for the troops in Great Britain, do you not?—Certainly, for the protection of the Colonies.

1426. Marquis

1426. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Do you think, in a military point of view, that it is an unmixed disadvantage that our garrisons should be as scattered over the world as they now are; are there not some advantages in it?—There are great advantages in it. In the first place, our conditions are very peculiar; we have more Colonies over the world than any other nation. These Colonies bring in a large amount of money to the Home Government, and you must take care of and preserve those Colonies which enrich the country.

1427. Looking at it in a military point of view, is it not the fact that the garrison of one Colony is sometimes able to assist the garrison of another on the breaking out of war?—Certainly.

1428. Did not the case occur in the Indian mutiny; I understand that the first reinforcements that arrived in India were from the Cape?—From the Cape and from China.

1429. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] They were on their way to China, were they not?—They were on their way to China to a war that was to take place in China, and that was the great saving of the country of India.

1430. Marquis of *Hartington.*] In that one instance, at any rate, it was an actual advantage to us to have our garrisons scattered?—Decidedly it was.

1431. You state that an objection has always been felt to the practice of leaving European artillery unsupported by any but native troops, will you explain the grounds of that objection?—It is very natural; because in India, when the mutiny broke out among the troops, there was no protection for the artillery; the native troops in case of a mutiny would be most likely to seize the artillery.

1432. Supposing you could rely entirely upon the fidelity of your native troops, would you even then be willing to support artillery merely with native troops?—I do not think that as a principle I should.

1433. You want for the support of artillery, troops not only in whose loyalty, but in whose excellence as troops you have the highest confidence?—I look upon the artillery as the great stand-by of an army. If you lose your artillery you lose your army, you lose your power; it is a most necessary thing to take care of them to the utmost extent of your power.

1434. The artillery are not able entirely to take care of themselves?—No.

1435. They must rely upon the support of infantry?—They must necessarily rely upon the support of infantry.

1436. Major *Anson.*] Does that apply to garrison artillery as much as to field artillery?—Not so much to garrison artillery, because they have only charge of heavy guns which could not be moved about. Those guns might be destroyed; they might be put hors-de-combat, but the support of infantry would not be of so much consequence to garrison artillery.

1437. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Could you have prepared, in your office, a return made up to the latest date, similar to the return in the Report of the Committee on Colonial and Military Expenditure, without the money?—Yes.

1438. I gather from your answers to former questions, that you think it would be quite impossible to do more than establish mixed garrisons?—I think so, decidedly.

1439. In no instance would you rely entirely upon a native garrison?—No.

1440. Have you then considered, supposing the principle was adopted to that limited extent, what number of troops would be the utmost that you could replace by Indians?—I should think for every one regiment you would certainly require two native regiments.

1441. You have not considered how many British regiments it would be possible to relieve, and how many native regiments it would be necessary to send to replace them?—I suppose you would not include the Cape, because that would be so very expensive on account of its distance.

1442. I believe the Cape is included; I only asked if you had considered how many English regiments it would be possible to relieve by a partial application of this principle by the establishment of mixed garrisons, instead of purely English garrisons?—I should think about 10 or 12.

1443. And you think that it would be necessary, supposing you did relieve 10 or 12 regiments, to send 20 or 24 regiments of native Indian troops to replace them?—I think certainly double the number should be sent.

1444. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Would it not be necessary to replace the native regiments sent from India by fresh levies?—You would have to replace those regiments by other regiments in India.

1445. The 20 or 24 regiments sent to the colonies to relieve the European regiments, must be replaced by fresh native levies on India?—Yes; of course they would have to be replaced by native levies in India.

1446. Colonel *North.*] You stated that under a certain pressure of war, you would withdraw the European troops from the Colonies, and hand over different settlements to native troops?—Yes.

1447. Would you, under any circumstances of pressure in time of war, garrison either Malta or Gibraltar with native troops?—Certainly not.

1448. You mentioned just now, I think, that the pay of a native sepoy was seven rupees and so many annas?—Seven rupees.

1449. That includes his uniform as well; he finds his own uniform for that?—No, he does not find his own uniform, he finds only the white clothing, the jacket is paid for by the Government.

1450. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] And the shoes?—Yes.

1451. Colonel *North.*] You mentioned, also, that our European troops did not like being sent to China?—Yes.

1452. Provided they had the barracks built as you propose, and that they had proper allowance of pay, would that objection still exist, do you think; because it appears that the expenses of China are very considerably greater than those of India?—Yes, of course they are.

1453. But the pay and allowances of the troops there are not even up to the Indian pay; if they were properly paid, and if barracks were built as you propose, do you think the same objection would exist?—I think the same objection would not exist, provided they were not kept there too long; I think it was a mistake to keep them there so long; they are only to be kept there two years now.

1454. Did I rightly understand you to say, that in consequence of the 2nd battalions of regiments being brought home, because they contained a number of time-expired men, the regiments now abroad were thrown out of their

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proper turn of coming home?—Yes, out of the roster.

1455. Sir *James Fergusson.*] In keeping a small European force in a country like one of the Australian Colonies, it is intended to serve as a nucleus for troops locally raised in cases of emergency, is it not?—Yes.

1456. Therefore their place would be very ill supplied by native troops, who could not be regarded in that light at all?—Decidedly.

1457. I suppose you do not at all recognise the comparison of Australia with the outposts of Great Britain, in a military point of view, do you?—No; and I think the Australian colonists would object to it most strongly. My authority is General M'Cleverty, who was stationed there for a long time, and is now commanding at Shorncliffe. I asked him if he thought the settlers there would object to native troops being sent; and he said, they would object in the strongest way possible, if there were an idea of their being sent out there.

1458. The fact is, that the small establishment of troops there is calculated and paid for by the colony, as only a sufficient nucleus for their own defence?—That is all.

1459. It has no reference to the general defence of the Empire at all?—No, I presume not.

1460. With regard to the garrison at Singapore, may I ask why it is thought necessary to have a garrison of European troops there now, when there was not one before?—It was always a place that the Indian Government thought of so much importance that they built a barrack there for Europeans before any European troops were sent out to them. It is a post where the enemy would be sure to land if they intended any attack upon India, or any other place belonging to us.

1461. And it is therefore not thought proper to leave it without European infantry at all?—No, it is not.

1462. *Chairman.*] Do you think that any enemy could hold Singapore, who had not command of the sea?—A strong fortification has been built there.

1463. Still for an enemy that had not command of the sea to take Singapore would be very difficult?—Yes, very much so.

1464. And when taken it would be very difficult to hold, would it not?—Your ships of war would probably be employed where your war was going on; it would be very difficult to send out ships there.

1465. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Would there be any difficulty in laying it under contribution?—I should think not.

1466. Major *Anson.*] If the enemy attempted to do such a thing as lay it under contribution, do you not think that the Chinese population would fight very ardently upon our side?—The Chinese population are utterly useless as soldiers, just now.

1467. Sir *James Fergusson.*] With regard to the closer packing of native troops than Europeans in the transports, I suppose that in that climate it is more necessary for Europeans to have ample breathing space than for the natives?—Yes, of course it is; but then the distance is so very short (it is only five or six days), that I do not think it is of so much consequence.

1468. But the comparative space given to the two classes of troops is on account of the greater necessity for breathing space in that region for Europeans?—Yes, of course it is.

1469. You mentioned that a considerable number of British soldiers volunteered to remain in India when their regiments came home?—Yes.

1470. But there are a great number still, are there not, who at the end of their service come home to England, and take furlough before re-enrolling?—There are a great many.

1471. It is in evidence before the Committee, that the expense of bringing soldiers home under those circumstances is very considerable, being equal in many cases to 50 *l.* per man?—I cannot conceive that it can be 50 *l.* per man, or anything like it by the new regulations; because the five ships which have been built by the Government are to bring home and take out the troops at 18 *l.* per man, so that it could not be so much as you mentioned, I think.

1472. At present the cost of transport for a soldier from Bombay to England is something over 30 *l.*?—£. 23 I think it is; I may be wrong; the expense does not lie in my department.

1473. The question I want to ask is this; do you not think that it would be well worth while to offer troops a much larger bounty than has yet been tried, to induce them to re-enrol in India?—Decidedly; I do not think you would go far wrong in offering a much larger bounty. I made a mistake just now; coming home from India is much more expensive by the present plan than going out; it is only 23 *l.* going out, therefore I think it would be quite cheap to give a man 25 *l.* bounty.

1474. Major *Anson.*] One of your great objections to the employment in these colonies of troops in the Indian army, is that you would have to put the whole Indian army upon the roster for foreign service, including the Madrasees and other regiments?—I do not say that exactly, it might be limited to Bengal.

1475. You think that in all probability we should have to do so?—Yes.

1476. I believe they have garrisoned Aden, which is one of the most important military positions which we have; perhaps not even excepting Gibraltar, with native troops from Bombay, for a great number of years?—Yes, they have.

1477. They have also garrisoned Rangoon, which is likewise a place upon the sea, with Madras troops for many years?—Yes; but along with an European regiment.

1478. They have also garrisoned the Straits Settlements and Singapore, which you state is such an important position, with Madras troops for many years, and in the latter case even without the support of a European soldier; there has been no great change just recently, which makes the Madras troops less useful to the service than they have been during past years, has there?—No, I do not think so.

1479. If the Indian Government could entrust those possessions with safety to their care, is there any reason why the English Government should not do the same?—Singapore has never been attacked. It is in itself a quiet place, and native troops hold it very well; but if a war were to break out, it would require Europeans to defend it.

1480. Then do you consider that it is very short-sighted policy on the part of the Bombay Government, having had an Indian garrison at a place like Aden, and do you think the sooner it is done away with the better?—There is a

European

European regiment at Aden now, and there is a native regiment too, a Bombay regiment.

1481. There is only a wing of a European regiment, I think, at Aden?—It is a whole regiment consisting of 600 men; there is some small portion left behind; I do not know for what reason.

1482. That is one of the most important garrisons we possess; Gibraltar can hardly compare in importance with it?—Yes.

1483. We still supplement European troops there with Indian troops?—Yes.

1484. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you happen to remember the barracks at Singapore; are the large barracks for the Europeans finished?—They are finished for a wing.

1485. How many Europeans do they accommodate?—About 500 altogether, I think.

1486. Not more than that?—Not more than 500, I think.

1487. I thought they were being built for a very large number of men?—So they were, but they have not completed that other portion of the barracks; they have only completed them for about a wing.

1488. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] With regard to the climatic considerations, have you ever observed any effect of a very cold climate on the natives of India; I do not refer to the northern men or the Sikhs, but the ordinary men of the Bengal army?—No; I have known the Sikhs placed in a cold climate, but never the Hindostanees. Lieut. Gen. Sir *H. Grant*, G.C.B. 26 March 1867.

1489. Do you think, to put the matter plainly, that the ordinary men of the Bengal army, natives of a southern climate, would be fit to support the cold weather of the Cape of Good Hope or of Southern Australia, or New Zealand?—I am not aware what the climate is in New Zealand, but I believe it is very cold there. I should think they might bear the climate of the Cape, because I believe there is not any very cold weather at the Cape, as far as I have experienced it.

1490. You are aware that in the Affghan war the Bengal regiments were disorganised by the severity of the climate?—Yes.

1491. Consequently, climatic considerations must be taken into account in the employment of native troops out of India?—Certainly.

Sir ROBERT MONTGOMERY, K.C.B., called in; and Examined.

1492. *Chairman.*] WHAT is your opinion with reference to the possibility of raising troops on the north-west frontier, and in the Punjaub, for colonial garrison duty?—I think a certain quality of troops could be raised for garrisoning a Colony. Sir *R. Montgomery*, K.C.B.

1493. Upon what terms do you think it would be possible to raise them?—If you mean the amount of pay, I could hardly say that; a great deal would depend upon the Colony they went to; it would depend in some measure upon the price of food in the Colony they were to go to, because the native troops cannot eat any kind of food. Generally speaking, in different parts of India they have different foods; and it would be almost necessary to think of what was the price of food, and the particular food they eat, at the Colonies they were to go to, before one could say what amount of pay they should receive.

1494. In the part of India with which you are most acquainted they always eat wheaten flour, do they not?—Yes.

1494*. Can they get wheaten flour at a reasonable rate at all the Colonies?—I do not know.

1495. I presume that wheaten flour must be the main article of food for the European soldiers in garrison?—Yes; but they would buy their wheat, and grind it themselves; they could not import wheat ground, it would deteriorate on the voyage.

1496. That would be a breach of their caste?—Yes, it would be a breach of their caste. I do not mean that it would be a breach of their caste to eat imported flour; but in addition to its liability to deteriorate, it would give room for the idea that it had been tampered with to cause them to lose their caste.

1497. And you think that that would be an objection which would be insuperable?—No; I merely mentioned it because you asked me as to the rate of pay; and I think, to a great extent, you must take into consideration the prices that prevail at the Colonies they are to go to for the particular food they are accustomed to. With regard to the Sikhs, the principal food of the Sikhs is wheat; but they are very fond of milk, and they are very fond of vegetables, and sheep and goats. If they were sent to a Colony where those things were very scarce, or only to be procured by paying a very high sum for them, it would require a large amount of pay to reimburse them for the outlay.

1498. They would object to beef, I suppose, in any form?—They would object to beef.

1499. They would object to pork in any form?—Yes, in any form; and they would also object to poultry in any form.

1500. Does that apply to Affghans and Pathans, and all the races you are familiar with, in fact?—Yes, I think so; all the fighting races.

1501. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Not the Mahomedans?—No, I alluded to the Sikhs.

1502. *Chairman.*] Would the Mahomedans object to nothing?—They would object to pork.

1503. Not to beef?—No.

1504. Nor poultry?—Nor poultry.

1505. Do you think that that would practically operate upon the minds of the soldiers when they were enlisted with a knowledge that they were liable to be sent according to the roster to the colonial stations; do you think that they would count up the cost of provisions at the various stations?—I think so; I think it is their great thought; a sepoy is always thinking of his food, of what he is to eat, and the cost.

1506. He is always well informed about it, you think?—Yes.

1507. Do you think that if the custom of making them serve on colonial garrisons were introduced, recruiting would be hindered thereby?—It would not actually be hindered, but you would not get as good a class of men; if it was to be understood that the whole army was to take the roster turn of duty in the colonies, at least judging from what I know of the Punjaub, and the north-western provinces of India, I do not think you would get as good a class of men.

1508. What do you mean by not getting as good a class of men?—You would not get as good a fighting class of men; for instance, you would not get the Pathans of the border, who are the finest soldiers, because they are very fond of their homes; they would not leave India to go on garrison duty.

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1509. Not on any terms?—Hardly, unless you gave them leave very frequently; they are very fond of their homes; I speak of the Pathans of the border.

1510. Would they not go across the sea for three years?—No, I do not think they would. They are very fond of their homes. There are a great many of them in the Punjaub Border force, and it is necessary to give them, very frequently, leave to go to their homes; they have it every two or three months, I mean very often, indulgence leave, and if they do not get that leave they will cut their names and leave their regiments.

1511. Does that apply to the Beloochees?—I do not know about them.

1512. I understand you to say it does not apply to the Sikhs?—It would apply to the Sikhs to a certain extent, not to the same extent as to the Pathans, but it would apply to the Sikhs also to a limited extent, for they also are very fond of their homes.

1513. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you explain to the Committee what you meant by leave every two or three months?—You are aware that the frontier regiments are recruited largely from the Pathans from the hills, and their homes are close by. They are very fond of the service, and the furlough regulations are very liberal; but in addition to that, I have heard that the commanding officers are occasionally obliged to give them leave to go to their homes for a few days, otherwise the men get dissatisfied, and as soon as their term is up they leave the regiment; that class of men (and they are amongst the best fighting men in India) would not willingly go on garrison service, they would be quite ready to go for fighting service, but not for garrison service.

1514. *Chairman.*] Then what sort of people are they that would go for garrison service?—You would get a class of Pathans that would go on garrison service, and you would get a class of Sikhs who would go on garrison service, but you would not get what we consider our best men; I speak now of the Punjaub.

1515. Are they people to whom you could trust at all to fight?—I think they are very good men in their way, but you would not get the best men.

1516. Do you mean by that, the best men in physical force, or the best in martial spirit, or the best in point of family?—In martial spirit.

1517. Major *Anson.*] If the Sikhs and Pathans found that there was no difficulty in obtaining good food, and in obtaining their particular food at a cheap rate, that the Government took care that they did not suffer from the dearness of provisions, they would have no objection upon that score to going and serving abroad, I suppose?—I think if they were very liberally treated, and good arrangements were made, and great consideration altogether shown to them, you would get men to go; but what I meant to say was, that if it was to be an understood thing that the whole army of India was to take the roster of foreign service for garrison duty, I think that it would be unpopular with the army, and that you would not generally get the best class of men; I speak with regard to my particular part of India.

1518. Supposing that the officers commanding our best regiments now coming from the Punjaub and the north-west of India, find no difficulty in getting their men to go and serve abroad, and as they do not suffer from want of recruits, do you think that, politically, it would be a good thing for India to employ our native army in our own Colonies?—There are two great questions involved in this; one is the political difficulty, and the other is the military difficulty. The political difficulty would be this: supposing you got a regiment to go on foreign service, that that was all arranged, and that the regiment had arrived either in China, or Singapore, or the Mauritius, if anything offended the caste or the religious prejudices of that regiment, and they got dissatisfied, the political fear might be that it might re-act upon the army of India, and that it might give an unpleasant feeling to the general army, so that when it became necessary hereafter to send another regiment, there might be certain hesitation in going. That is one difficulty.

1519. But provided that great care, we will say the same amount of care, was taken of their religious prejudices, such as they may be, in the Colonies as is taken in India at the present moment, there would be no greater difficulties in the Colonies?—No, if nothing of that kind occurred; but that is one of the difficulties we must be prepared to meet. Such a thing might occur; it is not necessary that it should occur, but it is possible that it might occur. The cause of it might be the merest trifle; it might be such a thing as it would be difficult to provide against; the matter of the greased cartridges was a small affair in itself, yet it was really the thing that set the whole of India in a flame. Therefore, although it might be a very small thing in itself, it might make the men dissatisfied, and create some reaction in India; I think that is one of the difficulties. The military difficulty might be the point I have already alluded to, that if the whole army became a general service army, then I think that it would be unpopular in India.

1520. It is a general service army now, is not it?—It is a general service army for war; I doubt whether the men understand that it is a general service army for peace; and if you were to say "You have agreed to go on foreign service," and were then to take them, and locate them in a quiet, out-of-the-way place, far beyond the seas, without again asking them to volunteer for it, I think it is possible that they might consider it a breach of faith; I do not think that they ever originally contemplated garrison duty when they volunteered to go beyond the seas. Although there was nothing said, I think the probability is that in their minds they supposed it to be for war only.

1521. Supposing those difficulties were overcome, do you not think that it would be for the benefit of India at large, that the army should be employed in our Colonies if we took great care of their caste, and their religious prejudices there, and if we also overcame the scruple with regard to serving on the garrison duty?—I am of opinion that if it is considered necessary to resort to it on account of the difficulty of getting European troops, then it might be done as a tentative measure on a small scale at first, with great care, and with good pay; and it should be done under the direction of the Government of India; I say the Government of India, because although the Governor General for the time being may be a a person unacquainted with Indian matters, still he has about him a council and secretaries who are aware of all the difficulties that might occur in sending troops abroad, and they, and the Governor General under their advice, would be prepared to take all the precautionary measures which their experience dictated, and which would avert any evil that we might fear.

Friday, 29th March 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Captain Hayter.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Laing.
Viscount Hamilton.	Colonel North.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Oliphant.
Lord William Hay.	Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel EDWIN B. JOHNSON, C. B., was called in; and Examined.

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1522. Sir *James Fergusson.*] YOU are Assistant Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief, are you not?—Yes.

1523. Have you considered the question referred to this Committee of the propriety of substituting Indian troops for British in some of the Colonies?—Yes, since it became the subject of discussion.

1524. From your experience in India, will you state whether, in your opinion, the service would be as well performed by Indian as by British troops?—No, certainly it would not.

1525. You do not consider that an equal number of native troops would be an efficient substitute for Europeans?—To admit that would be to admit that the native troops are equal to British troops as soldiers. Now, without wishing to detract in any sort of way from the fighting qualities, the soldier-like qualities, and the discipline of the native army, I cannot for a moment suppose that the one can be compared with the other.

1526. Therefore, to be an equivalent, you would require to have a considerable increase in numbers?—Yes, to put it on that ground you would require a larger force of natives than you would of British troops for any service in which fighting was concerned.

1527. But for ordinary garrison duty, taking the present number of European troops in any colony as not in excess of the requirements, you would require to increase that number in order to produce an equivalent of native troops?—Certainly.

1528. Even then do you consider that it would be in all cases requisite to have a certain force of Europeans beside them?—On many accounts, indeed, on every account, it would be desirable.

1529. Of troops of the line as well as of artillery?—I never, under any circumstances, where it could be possibly avoided, would place British artillery with the sole support of anything but British soldiers.

1530. Have you ever served yourself in any eastern Colony?—My service has been almost entirely in India; in no Colony.

1531. Then you have no opinion as to the degree in which the inhabitants of one of those Colonies would be ready to receive native troops as a substitute?—One instance has come before me officially quite recently of a decided objection on the part of a Colony to be placed in the hands of a native force; it was a West Indian force in that case.

1532. It was a case of a West Indian Colony, was it not?—Yes.

1533. Will you state what occurred in that case?—The matter all came before me officially. It was proposed, in consequence of the great mortality which occurred at Demerara last year, to remove (in fact, they were removed, but I mean to remove altogether), a British garrison from that settlement, and to substitute a purely native force, that is, a West India Regiment. The Lieutenant Governor of the place who was in this country, sent in a letter to the Colonial Office, objecting, on the part of the colonists, very much to such an arrangement.

1534. They said, in fact, that they would rather have no troops at all than have black troops without white troops also, did they not?—Yes, that was what they said; they would rather make provision for their own safety than that.

1535. Have you any knowledge of the comparative expense of garrisoning an eastern Colony with native Indians and with European troops?—I do not think we have any data; I have no knowledge, certainly.

1536. I have asked these questions as to the efficiency of the proposed arrangements in the interests of the service, but now, as regards the effect upon the army of India itself; from your own experience, do you think that an extension of colonial service, in time of peace, would be acceptable to the native army?—I think it would be most distasteful.

1537. We have had evidence before this Committee of the willingness of certain races in India to serve out of India in the field, but you would draw a great distinction, I suppose, between that willingness to serve in the field, and the willingness to garrison a Colony in the ordinary way?—I think that the native Indian troops are most ready and anxious to be employed in time of war anywhere, but they would draw a very broad distinction between being sent for such a purpose as that, and being sent for mere garrison duty.

1538. I suppose they could be got to go by offering them the temptation of high pay?—I think regiments could be raised for that purpose;

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I think you would find it very difficult to induce regiments now in existence to go, even for increased emoluments of pay, though it would be feasible to raise regiments for that express purpose, and for that defined duty.

1539. You mean, I suppose, to take colonial duty, in excess of that which is now the ordinary routine of the service?—Beyond some settlements which were under the Government of the East India Company, and now belong to the Crown, there is no colonial duty.

1540. Although Rangoon is an Indian possession, the duty there is practically a colonial duty, is it not?—Practically it is; it does not belong to India, certainly.

1541. It comes under this description because the troops do not take their families there?—No, they do not take their families.

1542. The term of colonial service which certain regiments have been accustomed to take, is no test of the general effect upon India, I suppose, because those Colonies have been garrisoned from Madras?—Not always from Madras; Bengal formerly used to supply Aracan and Singapore.

1543. Did high-caste regiments go to Aracan?—General service regiments, volunteer regiments went.

1544. Do you think that some races in India would be more likely than others to acquiesce in colonial service?—I think it would be less objectionable to the lower class of Mussulmans than it would to any class of Hindoos, for instance.

1545. Take the Sikhs, Pathans, Affghans, Beloochees, and Goorkas, supposing you could get them?—I do not think any of the races you have mentioned would consent willingly to serve, out of their own country, beyond a very limited period.

1546. *Chairman.*] How long?—Three years is the outside of what any native would like to be away from his own country.

1547. Sir *James Fergusson.*] And you think that they would not go, even for that time, without great reluctance?—Certainly not without great reluctance.

1548. Without the temptation of high pay?—It would be necessary, in fairness, to give them higher pay than they receive in their own country.

1549. They always receive large allowances when they go abroad?—They always receive large allowances when they go on foreign service.

1550. Do you think it would be necessary to give them greater temptations than that; say the temptation of double batta?—I do not think that anything you could offer to the troops, as they now exist in India, anything in reason, at least, would tempt them to serve there willingly; and I believe that if it were proposed to undertake the duties of the Colonies by means of the native troops, it would be most decidedly necessary to raise troops for that especial service.

1551. Are you aware of the objections that exist to the raising of troops in India for service not under the Indian Government?—I imagine nothing of the sort would be attempted without the concurrence of the Government in India.

1552. Do you not see any objections to the practice of raising troops, naturally subjects of the Government of India, for service directly under the Home Government?—I think it would be objectionable beyond a very limited scale indeed. You are aware, of course, that it is being done now for one garrison, that is for Hong Kong; they propose to raise a regiment of Beloochees for that purpose.

1553. That is only proposed, is it not?—It is concurred in, excepting as regards the Government of India; it has been concurred in by the Secretary of State for War, and by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge; and I believe it is now under consideration by the Government of India in this country, in communication with the Government in India.

1554. Are you aware that the Government of India have expressed a strong preference for the employment of one of their own regiments, rather than the raising of a special corps?—I know that they entertain that opinion. I forget the terms of the despatch in which it was communicated, but I know that they do prefer it. They see difficulties, I believe, to what has been proposed.

1555. There might be difficulties, might there not, in practice, arising from the troops being raised by one Government and employed by another, in the event of their becoming dissatisfied with their service?—I think there might be difficulties of detail in regard to pensions and furloughs, and all those minor matters which would be insignificant as applied to one regiment, but of immense importance if that principle were extended.

1556. Supposing a regiment were raised from a particular district for a particular service, necessarily by the Government of India, though for service directly under the military authorities at home, and supposing the exigencies of the service required that those men should be kept abroad for a prolonged period, and that the dissatisfaction that they might feel was communicated to their friends at home; do you not see that inconvenience might arise from that?—The gravest inconvenience would arise in that manner. If there was an impression at all that the troops that were serving abroad were dissatisfied, and had reason to be dissatisfied, it would exercise a very injurious influence all over India in regard to our native army.

1557. Something has been said about the excellence of Goorkas for service, and especially in different climates; are you aware that great difficulties have arisen in procuring Goorka soldiers at all?—We have great difficulty in enlisting the true Goorka now; there is great jealousy on the part of the Nepaulese Government, and I imagine that the greater number of those who are called Goorkas in our own force at this moment are very spurious. I do not think it would be possible to obtain any number of true Goorkas beyond what we now have in the Indian army.

1558. The employment of Chinese has been talked of as a possible means of relieving some of the English regiments in India; do you think that that would be found to work well?—I think it would be a most ruinous proposal. In the first place, a Chinaman cannot for a moment be accepted as equivalent for a British soldier, and, secondly, its effects upon the country would be extremely bad.

1559. The effect upon the mind of the native population?—Yes.

1560. *Chairman.*] What is your view of the duties of a colonial garrison; what is the object of it?—There are two duties: that of defence and that of offence, external and internal; the one to defend Her Majesty's possessions from any enemy on the seaboard in time of war, and the other

other for the preservation of the peace internally.

1561. In fact, besides the ordinary military duty of defending the country against an enemy, they partially act as a reserve police force?—Yes.

1562. Do you imagine that for the latter duty the natives would be unfit in countries mainly inhabited by Orientals?—For mere police duties of a restricted nature, they would not be unfit, but there would be always an objection; supposing them to be at the Mauritius, they might be inclined, possibly, in the event of a rebellion or riot among the natives of India, who largely abound at the Mauritius, to side with them. They would be then a source of danger rather than of security.

1563. Do you think that a regiment composed of Pathans of the border would side with a rebellion of coolies in the Mauritius?—I have a strong opinion that where there is anything like an opposition to the white men, the blacks of all classes would combine.

1564. Then you think that any native subjects of Her Majesty in India, would, in all circumstances, and with any allies, combine against British officers?—I will not say that picked regiments would, but there is always that danger. There are some regiments in India, a great number of them magnificent regiments, whose loyalty has been proved in almost all circumstances; but those are not the regiments that you would find taking to colonial garrison duty with anything like pleasure or willingness.

1565. Was that our experience of the mutiny, that all coloured races would naturally side together in the contest against the white man?—The last was only a mutiny; but if there was a rebellion, I think you would see them all going together.

1566. The case we have before us is that of a Pathan or a Sikh regiment in the Mauritius, and a rebellion of coolies against the planters; your theory is, that the Sikh or Pathan regiment would combine with the coolies to exterminate the white men?—Not necessarily, but there would always be a danger of their doing it.

1567. Sir *James Fergusson.*] They might see that the power lay in their hands?—Exactly; the power would be in their hands.

1568. *Chairman.*] What is there in the former history of India to induce you to make such an assumption; has there been any case when we have had a difficulty with any of the natives of India where we have not found other natives of other races or creeds ready to help us in suppressing it?—I think self-interest has had a great deal to say to that.

1569. I presume that motive could be brought into action still?—Of course they might be moved by self-interest to remain loyal.

1570. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are you of opinion that the prospect of looting Delhi had a considerable influence in securing the loyalty of the Punjaub troops?—That, and a very decided dislike to the Poorbias.

1571. *Chairman.*] Who are not of white colour, are they?—No, they are not of white colour.

1572. As to the question of loot, which do you imagine a Sikh regiment would look upon as most likely to be its best paymasters in the end, the rebellious coolies or the Europeans?—Undoubtedly the Europeans.

1573. Surely the motive of self-interest would be in favour of loyalty then?—There is a very large population of coolies at the Mauritius, and if they rebelled, and the regiment of natives thought it was for their interest to do so, and that they had the power to overrun the island, perhaps they might think there would be a good prospect of loot there too.

1574. Do you think that there are any natives of India so deluded as to imagine that it could be for their interest to rebel on behalf of the coolies, in an island which, sooner or later, the British must re-conquer?—The native is not a very reasoning man; they are generally impulsive.

1575. You have had the natives in garrison at Singapore for I do not know how many years; have you ever heard of those impulses which you dread inducing them to prey upon the European population?—No; but then, again, Singapore is easily accessible from India; they are aware of our power in India in regard to the number of British troops available to send, and they are aware that their families are hostages in the hands of the Government, and that their pensions and everything are dependent upon their loyalty. Besides that, the service at Singapore was part of their regular duty, to which they were accustomed, and there was nothing novel in it; they accepted it as one of their stations, and the idea possibly never arose to them.

1576. I suppose there must have been a period when it was novel?—We have had Singapore, I think, about 50 years.

1577. Then in the 49th year it must have been novel?—We may say the same of most of our Indian possessions.

1578. And the time will come, if this proposed system is adopted, when it will no longer be a novel duty to garrison the Mauritius?—No, it will not be a novel duty, if it is accepted, of course, by-and-by. But there is, in the first place, the danger that may arise from introducing that novelty; and I think that that is a very great danger, in the influence such a measure would have upon the minds of the native army. If they supposed that they were to be called upon to garrison those places which are new to them, the idea would be a novelty, and it would have a very disturbing effect upon them.

1579. That would be a merely transitory danger, and in the course of a few years would pass by?—I do not think it would be a transitory danger, because the disagreeableness of that service would be always present, arising from the dislike of the natives to leave their own country.

1580. Do you imagine that that is a dislike which cannot be made up to them by money?——I do not think that, as regards the large body of the army certainly, it would be made up to them. I do not think that you would get the men to enlist in an army the tour of duties of which brought it into our Colonial garrisons. You might possibly raise regiments for the purpose.

1581. Have you any acquaintance with the Madras army?—I have seen one garrison of it; I have hardly any acquaintance with it; I have had no personal experience of it.

1582. You are not able to contradict what has been stated here, that the Madras army has always willingly undertaken the garrisoning of Rangoon, and that there has rather been a competition

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than otherwise for the duty?—I have never heard anything against that.

1583. Are you able to give any opinion as to the amount of saving which, supposing the policy were approved, could be made by employing coloured instead of English troops at the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong?—I have not got the statistics or data to go upon, but merely taking my own views upon the subject, I should doubt whether it would be any economy to speak of; because I never would have them anywhere without a supplement of British troops, at any rate.

1584. Supposing that that was not thought necessary, do you think that any economy would result supposing you could strike for the present those stations out of the roster of the British army?—It would depend very much, in the first place, upon the amount of pay which would be found necessary to induce the men to go there as a duty. Then there are the indirect expenses which would be involved in a large increase to the pension establishment; you would have to give them certain privileges which they do not now possess, in the shape of family pensions. Another and a much more serious item would be the more constant reliefs that would be found necessary.

1585. You would have to relieve every three years, I suppose?—I should think certainly as often as that.

1586. You have never attempted to draw out in figures the probable results of such a change?—No, I have not.

1587. Major *Anson.*] You stated in answer to Sir James Fergusson, that you thought if you had to replace European troops by native troops, you would have to send a far larger number of native troops than Europeans, and increase the garrisons of those places in the Colonies?—Yes.

1588. That is, assuming that the minimum garrison is established at the present moment, and that you could not decrease the garrison of any of the Colonies?—I do not know any Colony where it could be decreased.

1589. You say that there is a very strong objection to apportioning artillery with native troops, and that it is absolutely necessary to have Europeans?—Quite so.

1590. Is there not a very considerable difference between field artillery and garrison artillery?—It is more objectionable in the case of field artillery than in the case of garrison artillery, undoubtedly.

1591. Garrison artillery are very much the same as infantry of the line; they would have exactly the same amount of influence over native soldiers that infantry of the line would have?—Yes.

1592. They have not got their field guns to look after?—No, they have not their field guns; but we must suppose that every garrison battery has its battery of guns, and in the case of an *émeute* or anything of that sort, in which British infantry would be called into play, or would be required, it would be hardly safe to withdraw the whole of the European artillery to supply the place of infantry from their guns; you would have to leave some of them, at any rate, with their guns, as a guard to them.

1593. Still you would have sufficient in all probability to be a support to the infantry?—A garrison battery is only 80 men in India.

1594. If you had 200 European artillerymen, as I believe they have at the Mauritius, would not that be quite sufficient for the support of two native regiments?—I should be very sorry to place them so.

1595. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The artillery are very scattered at the Mauritius, are they not; they occupy a great number of posts?—I believe so.

1596. Major *Anson.*] Besides that there are two or three companies of engineers, I believe?—Two, I think; there was one, and one I think has come from China to it.

1597. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] That is a temporary arrangement, is it not, during the construction of the works?—I believe one company of engineers is the normal garrison, but I cannot speak with any certainty about it.

1598. Major *Anson.*] Has it always been the opinion of military men that it is not safe to leave European garrison artillery with native troops in Colonies?—Our attention has been far more directed to it since the mutiny, but even before that I doubt whether any artillery officer liked to be entirely dependent for his support on native troops.

1599. Was not the chief lessons we learnt by the mutiny, to have no native artillerymen?—It was one of the great lessons.

1600. How came it that the Indian Government for 50 years garrisoned Singapore with nothing but native infantry and artillery, both before and after the mutiny?—There was not that distrust of the natives before the mutiny.

1601. But they have done it since the mutiny and during the mutiny?—It may have been a necessity to do so, in consequence of a want of European infantry in India; we have not had the means of supplying all these places with British troops.

1602. Still they have done it for 50 years, and for the last 10 years, since the mutiny, they have garrisoned Singapore with native infantry and European artillery?—Yes; but Singapore you may consider as being so apart from India that it was not under the influence of the mutiny in the same way that one of our mere Indian possessions would have been.

1603. It is the general principle of leaving them so that you object to?—It is the general principle that I object to.

1604. Still it has been done by India?—It has been done, I imagine, from not having sufficient European troops to send to Singapore.

1605. Have you got your distribution returns here?—Yes.

1606. Can you give us the force at Singapore, or rather at the Straits Settlements?—There are three British garrison batteries.

1607. Will you state the number of men?—Two hundred and twelve, of all ranks.

1608. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Of British artillery?—Yes, of British artillery; there are two regiments of native infantry.

1609. Colonel *North.*] What is the strength?—The total strength is 1,418 men.

1610. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You only intend to have, for the future, two batteries, I believe?—We intend, for the future, to have two batteries of British artillery, and a wing of British infantry.

1611. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you explain the distribution of the infantry: are they at Singapore, or where?—At Penang there are six companies, at Malacca two companies, at Singapore

Singapore six companies, and at Labuan two companies.

1612. Major *Anson.*] Are there no Madras sappers and miners?—No.

1613. Are there no engineers in the Straits Settlements at all?—No.

1614. Colonel *North.*] Will the wing of a European regiment be in addition to the two native regiments, or will it replace part of the native troops?—Eventually they are going to take away the two native regiments altogether, and send them back to Madras, and replace them by eight companies, which are going to be added to the Ceylon regiment; so that the garrison will be reduced very much in point of numbers.

1615. Major *Anson.*] You mentioned a case that had come under your experience, of an objection of colonists to the employment of native troops; it was a case that occurred in the West Indies this year, I believe?—Yes.

1616. What were those native troops you referred to?—They were West Indian troops.

1617. Do you know how they are recruited, and from what people they are recruited?—If we can we get recruits from the real African negro.

1618. That was the case formerly, but they do not recruit from the west coast of Africa now?—No, they cannot now.

1619. In fact, those regiments were composed from the very people who, they were afraid, were at that time intending to rise in revolution against them?—Yes.

1620. And they preferred, under these circumstances, to have an English regiment sent down to them instead of the West India regiment that was offered to them?—Yes, a detachment.

1621. That is a very different thing indeed, is it not, to the employment of natives of India amongst the Chinese, or the employment of a higher race of natives in our army amongst the coolies in the Mauritius?—The cases are not exactly parallel; but what I wished to imply was, that the colonists would have a far greater dependence on British troops than on any alien troops that could be brought there; they would much rather that the money that they may pay for their defences should be applied to British troops than to East or West Indians.

1622. Do the West Indian colonists pay anything for their military defence?—I am not quite certain, but I can tell by reference whether they do or not. I find they do not.

1623. You stated that you thought it would be extremely distasteful to the native army to serve in these colonies; what practical experience have you had to lead you to that belief?—No practical experience of my own.

1624. Did you serve with a native battery of artillery?—Once I served for three years with a native troop of horse artillery; a Mussulman troop.

1625. The rest of your time, I believe, you served with Europeans?—With Europeans and on staff.

1626. Mr. *Laing.*] Were there not several stations during the mutiny in which there were only European artillery and native troops?—Yes; when the mutiny commenced we had the fortunate accident of an European battery at Mhow; in my opinion that saved Central India, although it had no European support.

1627. I think there was, in fact, no instance where we had European artillery where that artillery was overcome by the native troops in the mutiny, was there?—You may say that that was the case with the artillery at Cawnpore. I think they had one battery of European artillery and two companies of British infantry at Cawnpore; they were, as you are aware, all overcome.

1628. I suppose you would say that, though in the other places we may have escaped, it was too hazardous an experiment to repeat?—Most decidedly so.

1629. As regards employing any native artillery in the Colonies, how would the objection be met, that if they are to be relieved every three years, you must have a considerable number of native artillerymen always stationed in India for relieving the colonial garrisons, and that that would be contrary to the policy of the Indian Government in not allowing a large number of native artillerymen to be maintained?—I think it would be a fatal objection to the employment of native artillery in the Colonies, that it is opposed to our policy altogether to employ the natives as artillerymen in India, and therefore, on relief, there would be well trained artillerymen in India doing nothing.

1630. What number of native artillery would have to be continually kept in India for the reliefs. Supposing that you adopted the system of having native garrison artillery, say, for the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong?—You must have at least the same amount in India as in the Colonies, and that would be allowing a bare relief every three years. If you had a battery of native artillery at the Mauritius, you must, according to my theory at least, have one native battery to relieve it in India, and that native battery, whilst in India, would be doing nothing.

1631. We may take it, that for every native battery of artillery employed abroad, you must keep an equal battery at home in India for reliefs?—At least a corresponding number, probably more.

1632. Major *Anson.*] You said that you thought that if any scheme was carried out for the employment of native troops in the Colonies, it ought to be done by regiments raised for the express purpose?—Yes.

1633. You mean by that, I suppose, local corps such as it was recently proposed to raise for service in China?—Yes.

1634. Do you think that that regiment would be as good in the course of a few years, either in point of the men who compose it, or of the officers who command it, as regiments relieved from India, belonging to the large army there?—I think a regiment of that description localized, would very soon become demoralized and useless. Though I said that the regiments must be raised for that purpose, I did not intend to say that when raised, they were to be permanently located at those places. I do not think you would find it possible, on any large scale, to raise regiments for permanent foreign service. The objection, with respect to which I have just replied, in regard to the artillery, would equally apply to the infantry. You would have to keep regiments for the express purpose of relieving those that were abroad.

1635. You mean that you would have to keep regiments upon the same system as the six Bengal regiments which existed before the mutiny, which were raised for general service?—Yes.

1636. Is it not the fact that every regiment now

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now in the Indian army is raised for general service?—Theoretically it is.

1637. Actually they are, are they not?—Their oath makes them actually so, but practically I do not think you could carry it out.

1638. Has it failed whenever it has been tried?—It never has been tried, except for active service, when I do not think there would be any want of readiness to come forward on the part of regiments, whether raised for general service or for local service.

1639. You say it never has been tried; will you give me the garrison at the present moment at Aden?—There are two batteries of garrison artillery.

1640. European artillery?—Yes, European artillery. The head-quarters of a battalion of the 2nd Foot.

1641. It is not a complete battalion, I think, is it?—There are nine companies.

1642. *Chairman.*] What is the strength?—Five hundred and twenty-six at present. There is one wing of native infantry there, consisting of 338 men of all ranks, and one company of native artillery apparently, and two companies of native sappers.

1643. Major *Anson.*] Will you give the number of men of the native artillery and the native sappers and miners?—There are 220 of all native ranks of the sappers and miners, 69 of a company of native artillery, and 325 men of a wing of the 7th Native Infantry.

1644. Captain *Vivian.*] In addition to the two batteries of British artillery?—Yes.

1645. Major *Anson.*] As a military man, do you not consider Aden to be one of the most important possessions we have?—Yes.

1646. Not merely in an Indian point of view, but in an Imperial point of view?—Yes, from an Imperial point of view.

1647. Can you give the distribution of our army in Burmah at the present moment, at Rangoon, and the different stations there?—At Rangoon there is one battery, consisting of 77 of all ranks.

1648. Captain *Vivian.*] Is that a native battery?—No British; there is also the 2nd battalion of the 24th Regiment, consisting of 656 of all ranks, and the 26th Native Infantry, consisting of 700 of all ranks; that is at Rangoon. At Thyetmoo there is a battery of British artillery, consisting of 137 of all ranks, a wing of British infantry, consisting of 437 of all ranks, and a regiment of native infantry, consisting of 719 of all ranks. At Tonghoo there is a battery of British artillery, consisting of 55 of all ranks, a wing of a British regiment, consisting of 393 of all ranks, and six companies of native infantry, consisting of 592 of all ranks. At Shoaygheen, two companies of native infantry, consisting of 126 of all ranks; at Moulmein there are seven companies of native infantry, consisting of 617 of all ranks; at Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, they have one company of British infantry, consisting of 109 of all ranks: one company of native sappers, consisting of 122 of all ranks, and one company of native infantry, consisting of 89 of all ranks; that is all. In the return there is put "moving in division a battery"; that is merely in course of relief; it does not belong to the garrison. The artillery, I should say, consists of two garrison batteries, and one field battery; I did not make the distinction before.

1649. Major *Anson.*] Will you state to the Committee the exact reasons why you think it is advisable that Aden should be garrisoned with a mixture of European and native troops as it is now, and that the Mauritius should not be garrisoned at all by native soldiers?—Considering its importance, Aden could not wisely be left with purely a native garrison, and therefore they have British troops there; but Aden belongs, and has belonged for 30 years to the East India Company; it was taken, in fact, by men of the Bombay army, and they are aware that it was a possession of the company, and there was never any difficulty about going there; I may add however, with reference to the natives going to Aden as a garrison, they take it as a duty, but it is exceedingly disliked by them; they object to it personally, extremely.

1650. Lord *William Hay.*] Is it more objected to by them than by Europeans?—I do not know that it is more uncomfortable for them than it is for Europeans. Aden is a hateful place for anybody, but what I meant is, that it is more distasteful to natives than to Europeans, because the natives, as a rule, extremely dislike leaving their own country, and the sea voyage is in itself an objection.

1651. *Chairman.*] Do they ever resist?—Never that I am aware of.

1652. Do they ever desert in order to avoid going there?—I have no detailed experience of that sort with regard to Bombay, personally. The garrison has always been found either by Bombay or Madras. I believe at one time Madras troops occupied it in turn with the Bombay troops, but I am not very certain of that. I know nothing whatever about its effect upon the Bombay troops in that respect, as to whether it induces the men to desert or not. But I have heard, on good authority, that it is disliked; in fact, a Bombay officer of great distinction told me the other day, when I asked him about this very place, Aden, that it was excessively disliked by the men, and that they hated it as a station.

1653. Major *Anson.*] In the same way as Europeans dislike it, I suppose; it is the most unpopular station in the world?—Yes; but then it has this extra disadvantage to the natives, that it is the only garrison across the sea that the Bombay troops occupy. Though they sometimes go, I believe, to Kurrachee by sea from Bombay, still Aden is quite a different place to them from Kurrachee.

1654. Still the fact remains that the most disagreeable place almost upon the face of the earth is garrisoned by native troops from Bombay as a matter of course?—Yes.

1655. *Chairman.*] They have the power of taking their discharge generally, after they have been in the native army three years, have they not?—Yes, provided the company or the regiment (I forget which) to which they belong is not 10 per cent. below its establishment.

1656. When the troops are ordered to Aden, you do not know whether habitually there is a large application for discharges?—No, I do not know.

1657. Major *Anson.*] Where could we find out that fact?—No doubt you could get a return from the India Office.

1658. You stated that there was great objection to raising troops in India, except for the purposes of the Indian Government; the troops raised in

in India are raised, I believe, not for the service of the Indian Government, but for the service of the Queen?—For the service of the Queen.

1659. Mr. *Laing.*] From your answer with regard to Aden, I gather that upon military grounds you see no objection to a mixed garrison, where you have an European force sufficient to become master of the situation?—I speak of Aden as an exception. I say that there is no objection to native troops occupying Aden, because it has been an accepted fact for the last 30 years, and the circumstances under which we obtained possession of Aden, are well known to the native troops; it was a conquest of their own, and they have occupied it ever since; but I should have added, in answer to Major Anson, that none of these reasons apply to render the Mauritius an agreeable station to them, or an acceptable one.

1660. I think I gather that on military grounds the reason why you do not object to the mixed garrison at Aden is that it is a place of that importance, that we have there, at any rate, an European infantry regiment and European artillery; a sufficient force, therefore, to be quite master of any two regiments of native infantry which may supplement them?—Yes, quite so.

1661. That would apply on merely military grounds to any mixed garrison where there was a sufficient European force to secure our predominance?—Yes.

1662. That bring it to these questions merely, first, whether native troops will go without disaffection; and, secondly, of the expense and inconvenience of substituting them, to a certain extent, for European troops?—Yes, and also the effect upon the colonists themselves.

1663. The mere military argument would apply, for instance, to Malta, just in the same way as to Aden?—There would be the same objection to the employment of a pure native garrison at Malta as there would be at Aden.

1664. I mean, supposing that at Malta, as at Aden, you had some two or three native regiments willing to go, and supplement part of the European garrison, there would be no more objection to having a mixed garrison at Malta than at Aden, so long as you had a sufficient European force to insure your control of the place?—No; there would not be any objection beyond this, that you must first find the equivalent for British troops in natives, and it would be difficult to say what that equivalent is; that would be a question, certainly, to be considered in a military point of view.

1665. Supposing this colonial duty were confined to the Madras Army, where we know that there is no difficulty in getting them to cross the sea in regular roster, would you see any objection to their partly supplying the place of European forces at the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and stations in China?—There would be this very great objection to my mind in replacing British troops even in part by the natives of India. At present the garrisons which occupy all these possessions of ours in the East are, in fact, a reserve to India in case of an emergency. It had a wonderful effect upon the native mind when the mutiny broke out, to find that from all those places regiment after regiment of British infantry kept pouring in. Now, if we replaced those British regiments by natives, that advantage, or prestige, would be considerably diminished. In fact, the advantage would be taken away altogether, because instead of having a reserve of strength at these places we should have no reserve, and we should have an anxiety on the spot; that is to say, we should be anxious for the safety of the Colonies in the event of a mutiny occurring, instead of deriving strength and prestige from them.

1666. As regards China, would not any European troops in England be as near India, by the overland route, as they would in China, in point of time?—I imagine they would.

1667. During the mutiny, I think, the arrangements by the overland route were not sufficiently completed to admit of our sending any number of troops that way; do you think that that would be so in case of another emergency in India?—The means and appliances for sending troops overland now are very limited; it has not been matured yet; in fact, the new system has not been introduced, nor will it be introduced till next autumn, and then only to a limited extent, and therefore we should still have to rely upon other means of bringing troops to our assistance in India than the overland route.

1668. In short, does not it come to this, that as long as we can command the money and the men, no doubt we are safer with European garrisons at all those places?—Yes, undoubtedly.

1669. But that if either the money or the men ran short, we could supplement the Europeans by natives, to a certain extent, without any very great military danger?—I will not say that we could do it without any very great military danger. I understand you to mean, that in all cases you would have a mixed force of British and of natives?

1670. Yes, I presume so; but of course everything is a danger which is short of absolute safety; we will say without greater danger than we run at Aden?—Without greater danger than we run at Aden.

1671. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I suppose the danger might exist for a long series of years, and yet no calamity result from it to the very end of that time?—Yes, as it occurred in India; the danger existed, undoubtedly, for a vast number of years before it came to a climax, or before accident brought on the mutiny.

1672. Major *Anson.*] You stated that one of the reasons why the natives did not object to garrison Aden was, that they had helped to conquer that place; would they have any objection to garrison China after having materially helped to conquer that country, or at all events assisted in the prosecution of our wars there?—The natives have now been so much connected with China in the wars which have taken place there (I think we have had three wars there within the last 27 years), that I think there would be much less difficulty in making service in China acceptable to them than service in any other place with which they have not been brought into immediate connection.

1673. So that you think, in fact, that all this is merely a matter of habit on the part of the natives, with regard to the garrisoning of these places?—No, I would not say that.

1674. Colonel Percy Herbert asked you whether you did not think that one of the great reasons why we got the natives of the Punjaub to come down and help at the taking of Delhi, was on account of the loot that they expected in consequence?—Yes.

1675. One of the great feelings that actuated them was revenge, and race hatred as well, was it not?

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not?—Yes; they had a sort of vendetta to carry out against the Hindoos.

1676. Do you not think that it is rather unfair always to put the service of our native soldiers, who have done us good service in a great many places, upon this question of loot merely, or their hope of plunder?—I think it is an entire question of pay and self-interest.

1677. A question of pay?—Yes.

1678. Not of plunder?—A question of pay, and plunder, and self-interest; that has been the character of all mercenary armies. I do not say it at all against the native army, because it is the very characteristic of a mercenary army that the men should look to self-interest, pay, and plunder.

1679. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Great things are expected from 2*d.* a day in the English army?—Yes, by some.

1680. Major *Anson.*] The reason I asked you this question was, that you rather assumed that if there was a rising in the Mauritius amongst the coolies, the prospect of plunder would lead the native troops to join the coolies?—I say that that danger ought not to be lost sight of; it is a contingency. I do not say that it would occur; I say it is one of those dangers that should be borne in mind in introducing a new system.

1681. One of the great objects of these troops, when they get their plunder, is to transmit both their plunder and their pay home to their families, is it not?—Yes; or to take it home to their families.

1682. How would they propose, in case of their rising in the Mauritius, to take their plunder back to India with them to their families; do you not think that the Sikhs would take that into consideration, and think twice before they set to work to plunder the Mauritius?—I said, at the same time, that they were men of great impulse, and not very reasoning, but I do not know that they would count the cost when they joined with their fellow countrymen against us.

1683. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] If they were discontented and did rise, which do you think they would think the best people to plunder, the low native population or the rich European population?—They certainly would find more to gain in plundering the rich population.

1684. Is it not supposed to have had great effect upon the minds of the Sepoys in the commencement of the mutiny, that the treasury and the European property was at their mercy in a vast number of stations in India?—Undoubtedly.

1685. Major *Anson.*] Do you recollect the case of a Goorka regiment mutinying at Simla, and at Passowlee?—I believe they went very far towards a mutiny.

1686. Did not a detachment of their men go and seize the treasury at Passowlee?—I believe there was a detachment there on guard.

1687. They took possession of the treasury, did they not?—They took possession of the treasury.

1688. And there were no European troops, except the convalescent depôt at Dugshai; there were no European troops at Simla?—No.

1689. There was a large bank at Simla, over which the Goorkas mounted guard?—Yes.

1690. You recollect that circumstance?—Yes.

1691. After the Goorkas had taken possession of the treasury at Passowlee, what did they do with it?—I fancy, for a long time, they had not made up their minds what they would do with it, but eventually their loyalty returned, and the Government lost nothing by it, I believe.

1692. The regiment handed over the whole of the treasury back to the Government without the loss of a single rupee, was not that so?—I believe that was the case.

1693. Certainly, in that case, one of the most curious cases on record, it was not the mere prospect of getting possession of the treasury that incited them to rebel; there was no power to overawe them?—I think I must have mistaken Colonel Herbert's question; I do not know whether he asked me if that was the leading motive that induced the men to mutiny.

1694. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Was it one of the leading motives?—It was one of the leading motives in some instances.

1695. You see no objection to the continuance of the native troops at Aden, or to the composition of the garrison there?—No.

1696. You would have no objection to trying the experiment of having a few native troops to supplement the Europeans at Hong Kong?—No.

1697. You think that at those two places the native troops are habituated to serve, and that that would assist you in getting over any difficulties?—As regards China it is already, you may say, accepted as a fact.

1698. If you were to begin adding a great many other garrisons, and to say that they were to be composed of Europeans and natives mixed, do you think that that would have a good or a bad effect on the minds of the native army at large?—I hold a very strong opinion upon that subject, that it would have a bad effect.

1699. You have expressed an opinion that the colonists would not be satisfied with it?—I am quite of that opinion.

1700. Are you acquainted personally with the Mauritius in any way?—No, I have never been there.

1701. But you are aware that there are considerable fortifications there?—Yes, either existing or in course of erection.

1702. And that the small force of Royal Artillery there would be manifestly insufficient to deal with an insurrection of mercenary troops, if the infantry was entirely composed of them?—Most decidedly so, more especially considering the large native element there is in the Colony.

1703. You expressed an opinion that it was of great advantage in the Indian mutiny that our garrisons of English troops were echeloned on the route from England to India, at such places as the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and Ceylon?—It had an immense moral effect, besides its practical advantages.

1704. Under such urgent circumstances as then occurred, the garrisons remaining at those posts in the Colonies were reduced to a very low ebb?—They all spared, probably, more than they could have spared for any length of time.

1705. I believe they sent the whole of the Europeans away from Ceylon?—The only regiment there left it.

1706. And they left the Mauritius with one or two battalions?—Yes.

1707. There were some sent from the Cape also?—Yes.

1708. And they were a very valuable reinforcement?—Yes.

1709. If native troops were substituted generally for these, of course that supply would be entirely stopped?—Entirely.

1710. I think

1710. I think you expressed an opinion that there would be no money saving in the transaction?—I stated at the time that I had not gone into the financial part of the question at all; I have not the data upon which to go into it; but I think that the double system of British and native garrisons, for the reasons which I have already given, arising from indirect expenses, that is, the constant reliefs, the extra pay to be given to the natives, and the various pension advantages, would prove probably a much less economical measure than those who advocate the system imagine it to be.

1711. I dare say you are aware that during their Caffre wars, a large amount of indigenous troops have been raised at the Cape to support the British troops?—Yes.

1712. Supposing that a garrison was to be composed mainly of native Indian troops, do you, as a military man, think that it would be a satisfactory state of things to raise a large force of indigenous troops to be brigaded with them?—No; I do not think so at all; I do not think that that would be a satisfactory arrangement.

1713. You would be almost as much afraid of your indigenous allies as of your enemies, if you had not a backbone of European troops?—Without the European troops, certainly; I think there would be great antagonism between the indigenous troops and the foreigners who were brought in, leading to all manner of unpleasantness.

1714. Without the presence of European troops to take the side of the Government on all questions you would not feel secure?—Certainly not.

1715. You alluded to a case, I think, of a European battery at Mhow during the mutiny?—Yes.

1716. Will you shortly narrate the circumstance to which you referred; what was the force of the troops?—I cannot tell you at all the force of the native troops, but I do happen to know that we had one battery of British artillery there, under a very energetic and first rate officer, Captain Hungerford, when the mutiny broke out. His tact and management, and the precautions he adopted, saved his company, and in fact he held that part of India with his one company of British artillery against the rebels. There was a strong garrison of native regiments at Mhow itself, and the nearest garrison, Neemuch (I think that is the nearest) as well as Nusseerabad was held by natives alone. The position Captain Hungerford took up with his one battery, and the influence he exercised over Holkar, whose residence is within 10 miles of Mhow, at Indore, were most important in their results. He threw his men into a fort, and he held it until assistance came.

1717. That was a very peculiar case, in which the moral control and the moral command of an intelligent English officer was strongly exemplified?—Yes.

1718. Is that a state of things that you can expect to be able to rely upon constantly?—It is a most dangerous position to be in.

1719. It is not a position in which any officer would wish to be placed a second time?—No, it was a very false position.

1720. There was one very strong advantage in that case, was not there, that Holkar was more intelligent, being a great chief, than the ordinary run of Sepoys, and he had the conviction that our power would be supreme in the long run?—I think he was kept loyal to the Government entirely from the position taken up by this officer and his single battery; it saved Central India.

1721. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Where are the additional eight companies that are to be added to the Ceylon Rifles to be recruited from?—From Malacca; they will be of the same race as the present battalion.

1722. Do they not find it difficult to get Malays to enlist as soldiers?—They found a difficulty in getting Malays to enlist when the Ceylon Regiment was under the belief that it was going permanently to occupy Hong Kong; in fact, the occupation as a temporary arrangement alone, had a very unsatisfactory effect upon the enlistment among the Malays.

1723. What will be the strength of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment now?—Fourteen companies.

1724. Of which, how many will be stationed in the Straits?—Eight companies.

1725. Do you know at all where the West India Regiments are now recruited from?—An attempt has been made to recruit among the negro population of Canada, with what success I do not know, but I believe the main source of our West India recruits is among the creoles of our West Indian Islands and possessions.

1726. You seem to think that great objections exist to the employment of our Indian native army in our tropical Colonies; would the same objections exist to employing Chinese troops in those Colonies?—You speak apart from India altogether?

1727. Yes. The objections would not exist, I imagine, with reference to any indisposition on the part of the Chinese to serve abroad, and to stay abroad for any number of years; there would be no caste prejudices; all those objections, in fact, which apply to Indian troops would not apply to Chinese troops?—I have no knowledge of Chinamen beyond having seen them in the bazaars at Calcutta and other places; but I imagine that there would be no sort of objection on the part of the Chinese to serve anywhere.

1728. They would be in the West Indies as efficient, would they not, as the West Indian regiments are?—On that question, again, I could only speak without experience of the West Indian regiments. I have never seen one.

1729. You said that troops poured into India during the mutiny from the Colonies, but, with the exception of one regiment, I think, from Ceylon, one from the Mauritius, and two from the Cape, I am not aware of any having poured in, except the China expedition?—The China expedition was an abnormal thing, certainly; but those four regiments were a very large force of Europeans; it was a very great reinforcement.

1730. Do you think it was enough to create an impression on the minds of the natives?—Yes, as they came unexpectedly.

1731. Have you served at the Cape at all?—No, I have never been at the Cape.

1732. Then your answer with regard to what Colonel Percy Herbert asked you about was not based on your own knowledge?—No, it was not from experience, merely from my own idea and conjecture.

1733. Viscount *Hamilton.*] I think you stated that if sufficient pay was offered we could overcome all other scruples with regard to the natives serving in the Colonies?—I believe if sufficient

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inducements in regard to pay were offered, you could get a certain class of men, raising them for the special service; but I guard myself against being supposed to say that any amount of pay or advantages would induce the regiments of the present army to go there with readiness or willingness as a tour of duty; but for active service, certainly they would go.

1734. In that case, supposing they were induced to go they would have no objection to go to those Colonies with which they have had no associations before?—If they were raised for general service of that sort, of course they would understand at once what the conditions of service were, and they would go where they were ordered. But I again repeat, that I think it would be extremely difficult to raise any number of men for that service, unless there was an absolute guarantee that they would be relieved periodically every three years.

1735. Colonel *North.*] We have been talking about the Colonies. With regard to employing these native troops at stations like Malta and Gibraltar, in the first place, the expense would be enormous, because you would have to relieve them every three years?—Yes.

1736. And it would be an unsatisfactory arrangement under any circumstances, I suppose, to have them in European Colonies like those?—I think it would be extremely unsatisfactory, for many reasons, to bring the natives of India into places and positions where neither their habits, customs, religion, or language were understood. There would be a constant danger of embarrassment, arising from accidentally hurting any of their prejudices. Very little moves a native if his religion or his habits are touched, and that might be done unwittingly by officers, or by the inhabitants of the place unacquainted with them; and there is no knowing what dangerous consequences might not result from an accidental circumstance of that sort. On all these grounds, including, among other considerations, the expense of relief, I think it would be a very questionable policy to employ them at these places.

1737. And independent of the danger which might arise from officers of other regiments, and from the inhabitants of the place, it has been often mentioned in evidence here, that the greatest one must be taken in the selection of the officers to command those regiments themselves?—They ought certainly to be officers well acquainted with the natives of the country.

1738. If it was necessary in order to carry out this policy, that some European regiments must be reduced, and that others must be increased, would that be a change that would be satisfactory?—If it came to be an absolute necessity to raise an army, or to raise regiments, and you had not the means of raising them from your own countrymen, you would naturally go to India for assistance, as you would go to our Colonies; we have raised regiments wherever we could.

1739. But you would reduce no European soldiers in India, in order to carry out the policy?—I do not think we have a single British soldier in India that could be spared.

1740. Captain *Hayter.*] The danger of mutinying, which you alluded to, would not apply in the case of mixed garrisons abroad, would it?—The natives of India are so peculiar, that anything might lead to discontent; the infringement of some prejudice or religious observance of theirs might lead to discontent, and from discontent you never know what will follow next.

1741. When surrounded by an unsympathising people, there would be less danger with reference to their joining the natives of the Colony in a revolt?—Of course there would be far less danger of a mutiny in conjunction with the inhabitants of a Colony, than if they were stationed in India.

1742. Then those cases, with regard to the Indian mutiny, which Colonel Percy Herbert put to you, are not parallel; I understood the questions to refer to the danger of disaffection in India, but that would not apply to the case of a distant Colony, where the native troops would be surrounded by an unsympathising people?—I think a mutiny or a rebellion in India would have its effect upon a native garrison, even at a long distance from India.

1743. But such a garrison would be unable to offer any assistance, or to take any part in it?—Yes, it would be cut off from all communication with its own country.

1744. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has been stated before this Committee that there is no difficulty at all in getting coolies to go in large numbers for service in the Mauritius and other Colonies, and hence it is sought to be inferred that there would be no difficulty in getting soldiers to go to those Colonies; do you think that there is any parallel to be drawn between the two?—I do not think really that there is a parallel between them; a man goes entirely on his own account in the one case for his own interests, for his own gain; in the other case he goes in obedience to the orders of his superiors.

1745. Do you think it would be possible to raise any military force upon such liberal conditions as enter into the coolie engagements in respect of high pay, and the liberty of their families going also?—It would be impossible to send regiments to those places with their families.

1746. Would it be possible to raise a military force under the conditions which enter into the coolie engagements?—I do not know what the money arrangements are with the coolies, but if one of the inducements to emigrate to the Mauritius is, that they can carry their families with them, I do not think it would be feasible to raise soldiers on the same conditions.

1747. And the separation of Indian soldiers from their families must always be a very formidable difficulty to get over, must it not?—Yes, it is a very great difficulty, and they would very strongly object to the separation; it operates very much upon our own Indian army, when they are quartered in India; the men are so anxious to get to their families, that they look to and expect constant furloughs.

THOMAS CAIRD, Esq., was called in; and Examined.

T. Caird, Esq.

1748. *Chairman.*] YOU have been a Colonist in the Mauritius, I believe?—I have never been in the Mauritius; I was employed first by the Indian Government.

1749. Lord *William Hay.*] And afterwards by the Colonial Government, I believe?—Yes; I was nine years in the employ of the Indian Government, and afterwards, on Lord Ellenborough's

borough's recommendation, I was transferred to the Colonial Government.

1750. *Chairman.*] You were in Calcutta, were you not?—Yes, I was in Calcutta for 18 years.

1751. Superintending the transport of coolies to the Mauritius?—Yes, to Mauritius and the West Indies. At first I had the entire superintendence of the whole of the emigration both to the West Indies and to the Mauritius, but afterwards the West Indian Colonies appointed agents of their own. From 1844 until 1858 I was the sole agent.

1752. Lord *William Hay.*] Can you state approximately how many coolies went to the Mauritius and the West Indies while you were in office?—About 6,000 a year went to the Mauritius.

1753. And to the West Indies?—I should think they averaged, possibly, from 2,000 to 2,500; that is exclusive of their wives and families; that would be the men alone.

1754. Did their wives accompany them generally?—We tried to get as many as we possibly could; but there was great difficulty in getting their wives and families to go.

1755. What per-centage should you say of married men went, out of the 6,000?—I cannot say how many were married men, but not more than from 15 to 20 per cent. were accompanied by their wives.

1756. Do you think that the rest were mostly married, but left their wives behind, or not?—There were a great many who were married, and also some who never had been married.

1757. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do not their wives follow them, in many cases?—I have known instances where men have come back from the Mauritius, and have taken their wives over there.

1758. Lord *William Hay.*] Can you state from what classes your coolies were mostly obtained?—From all classes.

1759. I mean from what castes?—From all castes. The low castes were preferred, because they are the best labourers.

1760. The hardest working men?—The hardest working men.

1761. But you had no difficulty in getting Brahmins, Rajpoots, and other high-caste men, to go, had you?—There was a mixture of every caste; men of all castes went, from the highest to the lowest.

1762. The high-caste men showed no objection whatever to taking that sort of service?—No, not when it became known; in fact, they often concealed their caste in order to go.

1763. That is to say, you heard from them always what their caste was?—I never took high-caste men if I could get low-caste men to go.

1764. Did you make any peculiar arrangement for their passage, for their living on board ship, with regard to water, and so forth?—Everything they could require in regard to provisions and water was put on board.

1765. You do not recollect their making objections on the score of water?—None whatever; many who came back have told me that they had great difficulty in getting a sufficient quantity of water on board, and I have no doubt that they had.

1766. Can you state how many of these coolies returned to the Mauritius after having come back to India?—No, I could not; but I have known a great many make three, four, five, and six voyages; they were sent up by the planters in the Mauritius to recruit.

1767. Do you know whether amongst the coolies who went to the Mauritius or the West Indies there were any relatives of Sepoys?—I have no doubt there were.

1768. Do you know any instances of discharged Sepoys having gone to the Mauritius?—I was away in 1858 and 1859, but I was told when I came back to Calcutta, that a great many men belonging to the mutinous regiments had gone to the Mauritius.

1769. Men from the mutinous regiments had gone?—Yes, from the mutinous regiments, and men who had deserted.

1770. Can you give the number at all?—No, I cannot; there were a great many.

1771. Do you know whether any report of that was made to the Government?—I forget whether the acting agent stated it verbally or reported it in writing. I have a distinct recollection, however, of his telling me he had asked the Government if the mutinous Sepoys should be allowed to go without any enquiry being made whence they came, or if they had done anything for which they could be detained.

1772. You do not think that the natives of India, either of high or low caste, have any serious objection to crossing the sea?—They had at one time a great objection.

1773. You think they have not now?—I think it has been greatly removed of late years.

1774. Do you think that there would be any difficulty then in raising special regiments for service in the Colonies, supposing, on other accounts, it was desirable to do so?—I should think not; you might have a difficulty in starting in getting any large number, but I should think after a time you would not.

1775. It would be necessary to induce them to go by offering better pay, would it not?—Yes, certainly; and I think a great deal would depend upon the persons who were employed for that purpose. If they were officers who had been a great many years in India, and understood the native character thoroughly, they would not have any great difficulty in procuring recruits; but if a man went who was unacquainted with them, it would be a different thing.

1776. With regard to the pay which you give the coolies in the Mauritius, what proportion does it bear to the ordinary rate of wages in India?—I think, on the average, it must be double or treble; but it varies a great deal. Many years ago, the wages were very much higher than they are at present.

1777. Where?—In the Mauritius they were much higher than they are now.

1778. Then there is not the same difference with regard to the rate of wages now?—There is considerable difference still.

1779. What should you put it at?—I could not say exactly, but I should think at least double; more than double, I should say.

1780. Then with regard to food, do you think that living is more expensive in the Mauritius than in India?—Yes; but I think the planters there used to supply the men with rations, and deduct nothing. In the West Indies the men had to find their own.

1781. What increase of pay do you think it would be necessary to offer to the soldiers in India, to induce them to go willingly to the Colonies?—I should say three rupees a month, at the very

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very outside, would be sufficient; about 6*s.*; that is my impression.

1782. That is, supposing that their rations were made up to the average rate of the rations in India?—Yes, certainly, that must be taken into consideration. If they had to find their own provisions, and had to pay more for them in the Colony than in their own country, you would have to pay them in proportion.

1783. Do you think that the natives in India would have any objection to the introduction of, say one or two, Chinese regiments?—I think it is a thing they know nothing whatever about. I do not think they would care the least about it.

1784. Viscount *Hamilton.*] You say that the natives used to conceal their caste on several occasions?—Yes.

1785. What was the object of that concealment?—As I stated I never took a high-caste man if I could get a low-caste man, because the low-caste men are so much better labourers; they have been accustomed to labour, whereas the high-caste men have not. A high-caste man never touches the plough at home, and will never do any work if he can possibly avoid it; that is why enlisting in the army is so very popular with them; they like a work of that kind, but they do not like labouring at home. They will always take service with any European at 5*s.* or 6*s.* a month in the Mofussil, sooner than work at home.

1786. And this concealment of their caste showed their desire to go to some foreign country?—Yes; I stated before that I never took them unless I was obliged to take them; unless I was very short indeed of men, I always refused them.

1787. Lord *William Hay.*] They sometimes deceived you?—Yes.

1788. What did the Brahmins do, for instance, with their Brahminical string?—They concealed it under their cloth; round their waist often.

1789. Viscount *Hamilton.*] You stated that at first you met with a difficulty in entering upon this system of emigration, but that it grew less?—It grew less; and I believe it is much less since I left India than it was before.

1790. Did it grow less every year?—I believe so; it is four years now since I left, in fact, nearly five years.

1791. Mr. *Laing.*] How many rupees a month do the coolies get in the Mauritius now?—I cannot say at present.

1792. What was it when you left India?—I think it averaged five, six, or seven rupees a month, that is 14*s.*

1793. Was that with the provisions found them?—Yes; I think with provisions found them, they were getting from five to seven rupees. Of course, men who had been in the Colony some years were getting more; new arrivals were not getting so much, until they became acquainted with their work; the longer they remained, the higher wages they got.

1794. Did you engage them for any fixed term on sending them there?—At first they were engaged for five years, and latterly for 10 years.

1795. Did you make them any advance?—None whatever.

1796. You merely paid their expenses?—We merely paid their expenses.

1797. Viscount *Hamilton.*] After they had been in the Mauritius a few weeks or so, were there many who were anxious to return at once, and expressed their desire to return to their own country, not being satisfied with the different system of life?—They could not come back before their five years had expired, unless they came back at their own expense, and paid something for their passage down. Many did that when they had saved sufficient money to pay their passage back. Passages to and from the Mauritius were at that time very moderate; they could take the passage back, I think, for 30*s.* Some did come back, but not many. Many get dissatisfied with any colony they go to or any place distant from their homes.

1798. Major *Anson.*] Do you think there would be any objection on the part of the colonists and planters in the Mauritius to employing native troops there?—I could not give an answer to that; never having been in the Mauritius, I do not know what the feelings of the colonists might be.

1799. If it was proved that the conduct of the native infantry regiments is infinitely superior in every way to the conduct of the European regiments, there would not be very likely to be any very great objections on the part of the colonists, would there?—I should think not; I do not know why there should; the native soldiers are much more easily managed.

1800. I believe you have been in the West Indies?—Yes, I was there for a short time.

1801. You heard the evidence of Colonel Johnson?—Yes.

1802. In which he stated that a West Indian regiment had been objected to by the European inhabitants of Demerara; do you not think that that was on account of their being negroes recruited from the population itself?—I do not know; I could not give an answer to that. I never heard them speak of it.

1803. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you know what wages the coolies get to go to the West Indies?—I cannot say what they are getting at present. When first they went there they were earning very large wages indeed; but a much larger number of them have been introduced since then, and wages have fallen.

1804. How much a month were they getting when you left India?—In the West Indies, particularly in Demerara and Trinidad, they were paid chiefly by piece work, I think. They were not paid by wages, they were paid by the quantity of work they did.

1805. In order to get the coolies to go out, what inducements did you hold out to them?—I told them that they could earn on the average at least six, seven, or eight, and perhaps nine rupees a month; that was the inducement held out to them.

1806. With the provisions found them?—With the provisions found them; but they could earn a great deal more than that if they chose to work.

1807. They were told that that was what they would be likely to earn?—Yes. I should like to say I think a great deal depends upon the water that is supplied to the natives on board ship. Natives never know the value of water on shore, and do not economise it when at sea. I have heard them frequently make complaints on their return from the Colonies that they had not had a sufficient quantity of water on board ship. I think if troops were going, care should be taken that they should have an ample allowance of water put on board.

1808. *Chairman.*]

1808. *Chairman.*] Is it a mere question of quantity of water, or is it complicated at all by difficulties of caste?—It is a mere question of quantity; they never know how to economise water. When they spoke of the Mauritius, and the quality of the water in the Mauritius, they always said the water was good there; they liked the drinking water there. That is a thing that a native regards a great deal more than anything else.

1809. That does not apply to natives of all parts, even of the Bengal Presidency, does it?—I think it does; you find that servants who have come down to Calcutta in the employment of Europeans have frequently declined to remain at Calcutta, because the water did not agree with them, and have left the best masters on that account. You find cases of servants who have been with men, 17, 18, or 20 years having left them on arrival in Calcutta, because the water did not agree with them.

1810. Lord *William Hay.*] They drink nothing but water, do they?—They drink nothing but water.

1811. *Chairman.*] There is a great deal of water in India which is not fit to drink, is not there?—In the neighbourhood of Calcutta it is all tank water; it is all water collected in reservoirs; in the Upper Provinces they drink nothing but well water.

1812. Further up, there is a great deal of highly saline water, is there not?—Yes; but still, I think, the water they get in the Upper Provinces agrees with them much better than the water at Calcutta; the latter brings diarrhœa and dysentery.

1813. Is it your impression that the natives of India are generally incapable of going to any other climate than their own, and that they suffer heavily in mortality in doing so?—No, I do not think they suffer much after their arrival at their destination.

1814. You believe them capable of going to climates analogous to their own without suffering more than Europeans do?—Certainly. I think that their own country is the most unhealthy of all; unquestionably Calcutta is. The West Indies are not nearly so healthy as the Mauritius.

1815. You did not hear any complaints of the unhealthiness of the climates to which they emigrated, compared with that from which they went?—I never heard them complain of the Mauritius; I did of the West Indies; they are subject there to the insect called the jigger; that annoyed them very much in the West Indies. I think they complained more of that than of anything else.

1816. That insect is never found in the Mauritius?—It is never found in the Mauritius.

1817. Lord *William Hay.*] Is not it true that the badness of the water at Aden is one of the reasons why it is rather an unpopular station with the native army?—Wherever you have bad water, or a difficulty in getting water, I should think it would be an unpopular station.

1818. Major *Anson.*] There is a fixed ration of water for every person at Aden, is not there?—I do not know about Aden.

1819. Have you any idea of what the number of the coolie population of the Mauritius is at the present time?—No, I have not; but it is a very large number I should think.

1820. You have formed no estimate of what it is?—No, I have not; but that could be easily obtained from the Emigration Commissioners here.

1821. Have you not a large influx of population from the Island of Madagascar at the Mauritius?—I believe a great many men go from Madagascar to Mauritius.

1822. You do not know what the European population of the Island of the Mauritius is, do you?—No.

1823. Is there a large half-caste population there?—I believe there is such a population; I do not know whether it is very large.

1824. *Chairman.*] Did you draw the mass of your coolies from any one particular part of India, or from any particular race, or were they of all kinds?—The best men came from the hill districts of Chuttanagpore, others came from between Gayah and Allahabad, mostly from Patna, Chupra, Jounpoor, and Arrah districts.

1825. The people from the neighbourhood of Chuttanagpore are as near savages as they can be, are they not?—I have heard that there are people there almost approaching to savages, but I have never seen any myself.

1826. They did not form the mass of your exportations?—No, the greater part were of what is called the Danghur caste; any planter in India is glad to get them.

1827. Do you mean the savages?—No, the Danghurs, a hill people.

1828. They are stouter than the others, are they not?—Yes, they are by far the best labourers.

1829. Do they ever enlist?—No, never, to my knowledge; I do not think an attempt has ever been made to get that class to enlist. They are very short men, they may be refused for that; at any rate I have never heard of their being enlisted.

1830. You never heard of any effort being made to induce them to enlist?—Never.

Tuesday, 2nd April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Lord William Hay.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Laing.
Viscount Hamilton.	Colonel North.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Oliphant.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir GEORGE RUSSELL CLERK, K.C.B., K.S.I., called in; and Examined.

Sir *G. R. Clerk*, K.C.B., K.S.I.

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1831. *Chairman.*] HAVE you given your attention to the subject that is now before the Committee, namely, the proposal to employ Asiatic troops in garrisoning colonial dependencies of the Crown?—I have seen it advocated in newspapers.

1832. Have you formed any opinion with respect to its practicability?—I have only served in one colony, South Africa. You would find ample means there, I think, of raising any force you required, if withdrawing your European troops.

1833. I suppose if it was found necessary to withdraw English troops from the Cape, you would prefer to raise your troops upon the spot rather than go to India for them?—Certainly; I should infinitely prefer that. I would rather have one Fingoe or one Kaffir than 10 Sikhs in South Africa, to say nothing of the great saving of expense. The idea at present is, I believe, that Sikhs should be introduced into those colonies; I think that is one of the wildest proposals I ever heard of.

1834. What is your objection to it?—I do not think the Sikhs would answer the purpose in any way. They would not willingly serve far from home, unless engaged in active warfare in a rich country. The Sikh has always lived in excitement in the Punjaub; conquests have been carried on in the Punjaub, and on the few occasions in which you, or Runjeet Singh, or other chiefs, have employed him out of the Punjaub, it has either been in a scene of active warfare, where his services have, I believe, proved useful sometimes, or otherwise his employment has been an utter failure. The Sikh is apt to be troublesome during peace; I have not seen our Sikhs under arms since the Punjaub was taken. When I was amongst the Sikhs, for many years, they were an independent State. I knew them well then; some of the divisions of the Sikh army were then commanded by French or Italian officers. I saw a great deal of them then, in rebellion, in mutiny, and in pursuit of plunder.

1835. You do not think they would make very good garrison troops in quiet times?—Decidedly not.

1836. In the first place, you doubt whether they would go; I presume they would go for a considerable amount of money?—They might so serve for a short time; but like all races in India, they are much bound by their domestic ties.

1837. Would they go for three years?—Yes, for certain objects, they might go for three years; but it would be an expensive arrangement, I presume, to send to a great distance Sikhs or any other tribes from India for a three-years' service only; therefore, I conclude that also financially it would not answer, nor would I go, even were the cost no consideration, so far to find men for soldiers who could, I think, be found of better quality upon the spot.

1838. If you went to India for your soldiers you could get the Indian officers trained in the Indian army, but if you took your Kaffir or your Fingoe on the spot you would have to have special localized officers who never would rise beyond that service: do you think that there is any force in that difficulty?—That is all I should require; I should look for my officers among the Europeans who colonize there, and the "Africander" Europeans, as they are called; much useful service was done by those men, and local levies, in all your Kaffir wars.

1839. You would not look for regular British officers to command those men?—Certainly not; why should you go to the expense of having more than you require to have to keep the Kaffirs in check? Good faith towards the Kaffir chiefs and the Kaffir tribes will keep them loyal; the people are obedient to their chiefs. It may be alleged that Kaffirs may break loose from the chieftainship, but I have never seen that.

1840. Such a thing as a famine occasionally throws them upon the border, does not it?—No, not a famine. When you get to the Kaffir country you get to the fine part of South Africa. The wretched part of South Africa is what we possess, called the Cape Colony; there is little there really but desert; there is nothing to be made out of the Cape Colony when its markets lose British troops and your military establishments. It improves when you advance on the east frontier, where it is well watered; but until there, no extent of good grazing for flocks is to be found. That has been the cause of our several Kaffir wars.

1841. In your view, what would be the feeling of the colonists if a proposal was made to them to defend themselves by means of black regiments levied on the spot?—I have talked upon that subject with the colonists, particularly with the Dutch boers, and they were willing to undertake it.

1842. And pay for it themselves?—And pay for it themselves, and carry it out in their own way;

way; but then you check them from here; you will not allow a Dutch colonist to carry out what he calls a commando against a Kaffir tribe. If a tribe comes down and burns the homestead, then the Dutch colonists and the English, at least the few who are willing to join, will go and carry out a commando against any Kaffir tribe in a longer or shorter time successfully.

1843. Then they go out shooting Kaffirs as they would tigers, do they not?—Here it may be imagined so, and called an exterminating war, but I never saw anything of that. Mosheesh, with whom we have had so much to do, is a savage certainly, but not bloodthirsty. Shikonyella was another chief out fighting, with whom I had to do, and he deserves the same praise. They had a pitched battle not far from my camp. No greater outrages ensue from war in that part of Africa than are consequent on wars in Europe.

1844. The whole of those warlike operations are carried on as pitched battles; the colonists do not go out shooting any blacks they may see?—Certainly not; they know well enough the value of native labour, on which they are entirely dependent.

1845. Supposing the other plan was adopted, and Indian troops were taken to the Cape as a substitute for European troops, do you think that the colonists would object to paying for them?—I think they would; I think our Indian troops who have no bush fighting, would prove to be very inefficient when opposed to the stalwart active Kaffirs. The colonists would soon see that the expense would be much greater than that of raising local levies.

1846. Are Fingoe levies as capable of discipline as the Sikhs?—Yes, they may be just as well disciplined; they behaved well in the Kaffir wars under Mr. Mostyn Owen, and other civilian officers; General Sir George Cathcart employed them for many useful purposes.

1847. Are they intelligent soldiers?—Very. You have still a good corps there. If I was now responsible for the defence of that colony, for instance, and you withdrew from me the European troops (which I think would be a great mistake, for other considerations than the benefit of the colony), then I should propose increasing a force upon the same form as the existing corps there which you have now in the Royal service, called the Cape Mounted Rifles. I have, on my missions among the tribes, had them on service with me, and more active intelligent men I never wish to have out in the bush; they were well conducted, good horsemen, admirably mounted, and altogether, so far as I am capable of judging, they form a most serviceable corps.

1848. What is your reason for thinking that on other grounds it would be imprudent to remove the European troops from the Cape?—Because I think the keeping them there serves a sound Imperial purpose. England requires, I suppose, to have rather an imposing army, in order to hold our place among other nations. I do not mean to say that numerically you would have an army equal to those of some other States in Europe, but you require to have a greater force than you could keep in England without being questioned as to the supposed excess of your standing army. Now, it is very good soldiering in some of these colonies; take Sydney for example, and Australia generally; those are good quarters for troops, and the same is especially true of the Caffrarian frontier; that is a very fine climate, the finest in the world, so far as I have seen, in many countries. From the north-east frontier I brought away a company of the 45th, which had been there for five years; they had never had any serious illness among them, they had never had an epidemic; it was too far from headquarters for them to be relieved all that time, and the consequence was, this being so salubrious a climate, that those men were as hard and good soldiers as the veterans of battalions that Louis Philippe or Louis Napoleon sent to Algiers, who came back so thoroughly inured and fitted for active service. The troops there are exposed to the sun, as your Lordship is aware; but though a sunny climate, it is a very healthy one. There are no diseases there; cholera and fevers are never heard of. Therefore, I should have thought that it would pay the Government always to maintain a certain proportion of troops there, provided the colonists paid a fair share of the expense. That was a recommendation of mine to the Duke of Newcastle before I left. I do not know whether it has been carried out.

1849. Would not the troops be more available for any necessity of home defence or European warfare, if they were rather nearer than the Cape of Good Hope?—I think two regiments were brought to the Crimea; I am not quite certain about that; but I know you sent two or three regiments of well-seasoned troops thence to India on the breaking out of the rebellion there. I really have no title to express an opinion upon the subject, not being a soldier; but I should say that a regiment which had been soldiering in the bush at the Cape, would be better seasoned for campaigning than one coming from home quarters. In the bush they are marching about bivouacking with their *tentes d'abri*, and become handy for all purposes. I may not be quite correct, but I believe you despatched thence to India, during the rebellion, the 43rd, 45th, 73rd, and the 12th Lancers; and so, I presume, regiments could have reached the Crimea in a month.

1850. They would not go in a month from the Cape to the Crimea, surely?—One is a month in reaching England; what it might be direct to the Crimea, for instance, I cannot say.

1851. Do you know anything of the Mauritius?—I do not; Indian troops were employed there, along with European troops, in its capture, but it is so near their own homes that they were willing enough to go, and I dare say they would again go, on such an expedition.

1852. You think there would be no difficulty in inducing them to go there?—Not for three years' service, or a brief campaign.

1853. Do you know at all the freight, the cost of transport to the Mauritius?—No; it cannot be much.

1854. There would be no difficulty about feeding them in the Mauritius, would there?—It depends upon what description of Indian you employ there.

1855. I referred to the Sikhs?—No, it would not be difficult to feed the Sikhs; the Sikhs eat everything except the cow kind.

1856. Do they eat poultry?—They eat and drink anything except that one thing; they may not touch that, and they may not touch tobacco, but they make up for it in a preparation of opium, and all sorts of strong drink.

1857. Do you think that Aden could be garrisoned entirely by Indian troops?—I see no objec-

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tion to the employment of European troops there. Several important political considerations would lead me to prefer maintaining Europeans there. I have been at Aden three or four times; on one occasion an old friend of mine was commanding a wing of the 17th Foot there; a very fine regiment. He came off to see me, and to report (this was 20 years ago, when I was Governor of Bombay); he stated that his men were so healthy that none of them had suffered at all, except the master tailor, and he had had to let out every man's coat except two, they grew so lusty. That was, I believe, generally the case at Aden.

1858. That is because they can take no exercise, I suppose?—The heat is great, so that officers of course keep their men much under cover by day; but it is also hot at night, the temperature being very equable, so that there are no chills or checks upon the skin. That, I presume, may be the cause of the salubrity of the place, as I have observed it in other hot, but arid countries.

1859. The mortality is not high there?—No, quite the reverse. I believe it was once not higher than in quarters in England, which is extraordinary, unless to be ascribed to the cause I have mentioned. The year after I was there, there came a fall of rain; they had not had any rain for 10 years; they seldom have rain; and are better without it; and in the wake of that rain came scurvy and a little cholera; that was the first time they had ever had cholera there, and the first time they had been visited with scurvy severely. Since then it has rallied, I believe, but has never perhaps been so free from sickness as formerly.

1860. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you see any advantage to be gained by substituting Chinese or other foreigners for European troops in India?—Certainly not.

1861. Do you think that it would be ill received by the natives of India that we should employ other foreign troops?—Yes; I never would, under ordinary circumstances, have advocated anything of the kind, but I did on one occasion, to Lord Stanley, when we received news of the rebellion breaking out in India. I knew how short of troops they were down in the south-east of India, and I proposed that two of the West Indian regiments should be sent to garrison the forts on the coast; but only Fort William, Calcutta, and two or three other forts; not to be sent up the country, but merely to set free a wing of European troops here and there; they would have held such positions for a time, say for two years, in perfect safety.

1862. What would be your chief objections to the employment of foreign troops in India?—You would no longer recruit good natives of India for your own army. I think you are not only bound to recruit from the martial races of that country for service in it, but it is your interest to do so. Governing 200,000,000 of people there, it cannot be expected that you can keep them in subjection without a native army affording some of them a livelihood. I should say, in explanation of my remark, that you could no longer recruit good men, that they would be apprehensive that you were going gradually to get rid of them. That panic seized them a few years ago, when some people set forth in the public journals that we were going to introduce 200 or 300 Goorkas into every regiment; that would be quite an impossibility; for, first, their government would not allow it; and, secondly, the genuine Goorka cannot work in the plains, although he is a fine fellow in his mountains. Another statement was, that they were going to introduce 200 or 300 Sikhs into every regiment. That belief told very much upon the old recruiting ground on the Ganges, where the finest Hindoo sepoys were recruited; they gradually began to withdraw, and put their children to the plough, or sending them to serve in native states, instead of preparing them for the British army. In that way, and by the annexation of Oude, you alienated a fine race, which, for two generations, had been much attached to your service.

1863. Do you consider that the strength of Europeans which it is proper to maintain in India, is quite independent of the number of native troops which you also maintain?—No, I do not; I think there should be a certain proportion of European to native troops.

1864. You think that the strength of the European army should depend upon that of the native army, to which it should bear a certain proportion?—Yes.

1865. The native army, again, is calculated upon the requirements of the service?—Yes.

1866. And it would not be satisfactory to substitute for any portion of those Europeans any Asiatic troops not natives of India?—Not for any portion of the Europeans whom it is necessary to keep in India. I do not call the present the proper proportion; it is an excessive proportion.

1867. You mean that the European force in India might be reduced without danger?—Not now without danger, because, unless you observe good faith towards the people, of course you will require a very large force of Europeans to keep them down by the bayonet; but, until the last 20 years, we have not relied upon the British bayonet only to take the people along with us; they go willingly with us, if we are only true to them.

1868. Presuming, however, that the Government proceeds upon the principles of justice, you think that the force of Europeans need not be kept up as high as it is at present?—Certainly, I think it need not, putting it now as 65,000.

1869. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you know the difference between the European force in India now and the force maintained there before the mutiny?—Yes.

1870. What is it?—I cannot probably state it with great accuracy. But the success of the insurrection in India was not to be ascribed to a deficiency of European force in India at that time. I never looked upon it in that light. The success of the insurrection was owing to the greater part of your European troops being up in the north-west, holding one single province, leaving Hindostan proper denuded of troops. That was where the rebellion broke out.

1871. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It arose then from an insufficiency of troops in Bengal?—In army returns it is called the Bengal Presidency, but I allude to Hindostan proper. You had very few troops there, and, of course, when the people resolved to rise, they opened the ball where you had very few troops, but where you ought to have had an adequate force, and where you always had an adequate force before.

1872. Major *Anson.*] You refer to the mutiny in 1857?—Yes.

1873. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You stated you thought that there would be no difficulty in getting native troops to serve in the Mauritius, provided the service did not exceed three years, but even that extension of the present foreign service of the native army, so as to garrison the Mauritius, would require that those troops should be well paid, in order to induce them to leave their families? — It depends upon how you recruit; you must recruit men for general service, which you generally do not. Some good tribes will not recruit for general service. We have always had a few general service corps, to go to the Mauritius, Burmah, or places not distant; but generally the troops were not enlisted for such service.

1874. We have been told that, although practically it has not been expected of them, except in time of war, to go on general service, yet in fact the terms of enlistment since the mutiny have included general service, therefore they are nominally enlisted for foreign service also?—I was not aware of that being universal, but I know that foreign service is still disliked.

1875. What tribe would be willing to go if the best would not?—I did not mean that the best would not go to the Mauritius for a limited period of active service.

1876. Do you consider it preferable if Indian troops are to be employed for garrisoning colonies such as Hong Kong, that they should be regiments lent for a time from the Indian establishments rather than corps specially raised?—I think if I took any there, I should prefer that they should belong to the establishment; but I would take none at all. I would prefer Malays, who are nearer at hand to recruit for any stations beyond the Straits. The Malays are fine men. I think a battalion which I saw at Ceylon, the Ceylon Rifle Corps, was principally composed of Malays; I should prefer a corps of Malays to a corps of Hindoos for China, decidedly. A high-caste Hindoo of course does not like going to sea, because he cannot cook his food; it is against his caste, in fact.

1877. Mr. *Laing.*] I should like to have your opinion upon this matter with reference to the contingency of such another war as that in the Crimea occurring, in which the European troops in the East were reduced very much in number; that would be a great trial, I take it, for our whole dominion?—I do not think it necessarily follows that the people of India would rise against you, because you reduced your European army there for a time. However, it depends entirely upon your treatment of the influential classes in India.

1878. Still, supposing circumstances to arise which led you to reduce your European strength in India down as low as it was when the mutiny broke out, there would be considerable danger, would there not?—If we could not hold India with the force we had there before the mutiny, which is supposed to have been from 40,000 to 44,000 effective European troops, I think we ought to be ashamed of occupying India at all, and ought to withdraw from it.

1879. Looking to a contingency when the presence of every European regiment you could get in India was important for the safety of India, might there not be advantages in having some of your native Indian troops accustomed to cross the sea, so that you could garrison colonies like the Mauritius and Ceylon, and even the Cape of Good Hope with Indian troops, and withdraw your European troops from those colonies to India?—I should say it might be, if I did not feel that it would be preferable to raise local levies for that purpose.

1880. In the case of Burmah, that did happen in the mutiny, did it not, that having been accustomed to garrison it by Madras troops crossing the sea, we were able in the pinch of the mutiny to withdraw nearly all our European troops from it for service in India?—Yes, I believe that that was the case.

1881. Could that have been done if the Madras troops had not in time of peace been accustomed to cross the sea and garrison the province of Burmah?—Not unless you had had local forces which would have held it for you as well as the Madras troops. I have always advocated raising Burmese levies. The Burman is a powerful fine man.

1882. However, on an emergency, you would hardly have time to raise local levies, I suppose?—No; therefore I would have some at all times, keeping a few Europeans there. With regard to the garrison of India, putting it at 43,000 or 44,000 effectives, of course you could not withdraw many during a war in Europe, but you could withdraw a certain proportion, say, five or six regiments, I should think, without any danger, to the State; if that is, you governed with justice and maintained good faith towards the chiefs, who after all are your mainstay, and have been so during all critical times in India; for example, in 1817 and 1818, when the Marquis of Hastings had so many wars on his hands, he had only 18,000 European troops effective in all India; he had the Mahrattas to oppose, he had the Pindarries to oppose, he had the Goorkas to conquer, and he did subdue them all.

1883. Looking to the possible importance of having every European throughout the East available for service in India, do you think that it would be a wise preparation for you now, in time of peace, to accustom your Indian native regiments to go abroad to garrison these foreign places, or would you rather leave it till the emergency of war came, and then trust either to sending Indian troops or to raising local levies?—You might trust to local levies, but not to new local levies only; you should always have some nucleus to form levies upon in the colony. I would prepare the colonies for having levies of their own.

1884. You would think it a wise precaution to have the Cape, the Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and China in such a position that you could, in case of need, withdraw nearly all the European troops to meet an emergency in India?—I can only speak of the colonies I know. With regard to the Cape, you might withdraw every European regiment thence for a time, leaving only the Cape Mounted Rifles, a local regiment, and the levies to be raised there; nothing else would be required temporarily. It may be otherwise, perhaps, in Australia. You have a regiment in Sidney, I believe, always, but I should think that the Australian colonists would smile if you were to say that you distrusted them on the withdrawal of a regiment from Sidney for India, or for service elsewhere.

1885. In short, your policy would not be to send troops of the Native Indian Army across the seas for garrison duty in time of peace?—Certainly not.

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1886. Colonel *North.*] I understood you to say, speaking of levies at the Cape, that you would infinitely prefer those levies to having any Indian native regiments sent from India to garrison the Cape?—Yes; I would qualify what I have said with regard to never withdrawing native regiments from India by saying that for active campaigning I should have no objection to take them across the seas (sending them back to their homes when the campaign was over) for active service in Egypt or the Mauritius. If the French were preparing, as some say they will, to make a dash at the Mauritius, I would reinforce the European garrison there with general service regiments from India to aid in opposing their recovery of that Island.

1887. Mr. *Laing.*] You think that they would go cheerfully for such service?—Yes.

1888. Colonel *North.*] But in time of peace you would not keep them more than three years abroad?—Certainly not.

1889. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What would be your opinion of employing the sepoy of India in garrisoning such colonies as the Cape or the Mauritius in time of war, when there was no particular menace upon those posts, but when it was necessary to garrison them?—I adverted only to the Mauritius and Egypt.

1890. I do not refer to active service in the field, but I was referring to garrisons in time of war?—I should not hesitate, in time of war, to send some native Indian regiments to join a British force in the Mauritius or in Egypt, but not in South Africa, because I there could find better men on the spot.

1891. Colonel *North.*] You would not, under any circumstances, bring a native regiment to garrison such places as Malta or Gibraltar?—Decidedly not.

1892. Or any colony or station in Europe?—Certainly not.

1893. Or the West Indies?—Certainly not; and the climate would affect them there; they would get disheartened immediately. It occurs to me that one regiment, which was called a Sikh regiment, was sent off to Burmah a few years ago, on the 15th Native Infantry refusing to go. A great parade was made of their zeal and their soldierly qualities; I thought I knew my old friends the Sikhs; they believed Burmah to be a very rich country, and that all its idols have stomachs full of gold and emeralds. Ships had to be taken up very soon to take them back again; a serious thing, because you had first to convey them in ships to Calcutta, and then to send them all the way to their homes, from Calcutta to the Punjaub.

1894. Major *Anson.*] What regiment was that?—It was a Sikh regiment.

1895. Do you know the number of the regiment?—No.

1896. In what year was it?—I cannot be sure of the year; it was seven or eight years ago, or more; it may have been in 1854 or 1855.

1897. Do you know what was the actual cause of their being obliged to send them back from Burmah?—The commanding officer, of course, insisted upon discipline, as our officers do wherever they go, but the Sikhs do not go forth from their own country to lead a peaceable listless life.

1898. What were the circumstances of that case?—They began to desert soon as want of excitement made them home-sick.

1899. Where did they desert to?—They did not find it easy to desert; some few, I believe, got into the forests, and then it was, I believe, that the Government at Calcutta determined to send them back, and accordingly they were taken away. They were disappointed; they thought they were going for active operations, and would be indulged in plunder. The Sikh requires to be kept actively employed; he does not submit to be restrained much; and, when in for insurrection, he goes great lengths. A division of a Sikh army rose once near my camp on the banks of the Sutlej, mutinied, and massacred poor Captain Fowkes; and Colonel Mouton, a French officer, now a colonel in the Cuirassiers at Versailles, had a very narrow escape. They had very little provocation in that case to mutiny; only that they were ordered to Kooloo, a place on the slopes of the Himalayas, a temperate climate, but new to them. They rose before they got there, killed their English officer, Captain Fowkes; and Colonel Mouton was only saved by some of his Sikh cavalry, when the battalions were coming across the plain to kill him. The provocation was, as I said, very slight. They had a notion that their paymasters had cheated them; some deductions had been made, which were very unpalatable to them, and they thought the only redress was to kill off all the European officers; and further than that, all the non-commissioned officers too, who were Sikhs like themselves. The way in which they set about it was this: they would get somebody to write a manuscript paper, and, well armed, walk through the streets, and, presenting this paper, ask some one who was passing, "Be so good as to read this;" and if he could read, they immediately cut him down, because he could read and write. They thought they had been imposed upon by the scribes in the regiment. But in Runjeet Singh's time, if they mutinied, he always had recourse to the garrison at Peshawur, which is now garrisoned by us with Europeans; he sent them there, as formerly our neighbours across the Channel sent the republican battalions of France to Algiers; he sent them there to die; they never came back. He generally kept 25,000 or 30,000 men there, and whenever a battalion showed any signs of disaffection, or want of discipline or disobedience to orders, they got their route for Peshawur; that was his remedy, by the advice of his French officers for insubordination.

1900. *Chairman.*] We send our troops there without any such provocation, do we not?—Yes.

1901. Colonel *North.*] Is that place now garrisoned by Europeans?—Yes, I am sorry to say it is, to some extent.

1902. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You expressed a high opinion of the military qualities of the Fingoes and Kaffirs?—Yes, as levies of a useful description, if commanded by men who know them.

1903. Do you not think that it would be possible to recruit from those people a few regiments for general service, officered by English officers, and available particularly for service in the tropical colonies, such as the colonies to which we were proposing to send the Indian troops?—I have never talked to them about it, but I should say it is scarcely likely that they would go.

1904. What objection would they have if they were properly paid; they have no caste objection of course?—You would take them far from their homes, and they are a pastoral people, attached to their vast plains and to the bush.

1905. There

1905. There was a regiment of Kaffirs recruited in Mozambique, which served in Ceylon (not the Ceylon Rifles, they are Malays). I have seen them in Ceylon; they were disbanded about 20 years ago?—I was not aware we had Kaffirs there.

1906. Lord *William Hay.*] Was not a Sikh corps raised some time ago for service in Ceylon?—I did not hear further particulars of it, than that only half the regiment so sent down, 1,100 miles to Calcutta, embarked; but on reaching Ceylon and refusing to work, they were sent back from Ceylon, and the other from Calcutta, of course, at great expense to the Government. I believe that was in 1862 or 1863. I have been for some years out of the way of personally observing the Sikhs. My intimate acquaintance with the Sikhs, indeed, is of a long while back. I ought to say, therefore, that my opinion probably of the qualifications of the Sikh regiments, as they are now called, may not be worth much. I saw a great deal of the Sikhs under their French officers, and other Europeans in that service.

1907. *Chairman.*] As officers?—Yes.

1908. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] With regard to the question of the fondness for plunder on the part of the natives of India, have not cases come within your knowledge of servants and camp followers volunteering to go with officers without pay, in the prospect of a campaign?—I think you might find that in any country, if there was a promise of plunder; but it never came within my knowledge in India, nor do I think the natives of India generally are more addicted to plunder than European soldiers in European wars. The Sikh is an exception; there is no doubt a great deal to be said about the fondness of the Sikh for plunder. He came down, for instance, with a will to plunder Delhi, when you besieged it in 1857; but he did not do it for your sakes.

1909. The Sikhs did not come down against Delhi for our sakes?—No; anybody who knows the Sikhs knows that they had a very long reckoning to pay off at Delhi. On the decline of the Mussulman empire, the Sikhs sacked the viceregal city of Sirhind, putting all its inhabitants to the sword; the retaliation on the part of the Delhi army was to go into the Punjaub, collect all the horned cattle, drive them to Amritsir, and cut their throats on the brink of the Sikhs' sacred tank, and thus signally defile its waters. The Sikhs had never forgotten that, and they had vowed that they would lay Delhi in ashes sooner or later. That was accompanied by another vow, that they would do the same by Calcutta. The third was Hyderabad in the Deccan. The Sikh looks upon Hyderabad in the Deccan as the wealthiest city in India, containing more bullion, as I believe it does, than any other. There he proposes to end his pursuit of plunder.

1910. You expressed an opinion that the natives of India ought not to be kept down by British bayonets?—Not unless disposed to rise against authority.

1911. I think you expressed an opinion that the natives of India were now kept down by British bayonets in a degree in which they were not 20 years ago?—I meant rather that our authorities rely now upon keeping them down by an overwhelming force of European troops only, rather than by using other means also. India was as large and as populous in the days of the Marquis of Hastings as it is now.

1912. You expressed an opinion afterwards that if we cannot govern India with from 40,000 to 44,000 European troops, we ought to withdraw from it?—Yes.

1913. Can you tell the Committee generally the amount of the population of Lower Bengal?—It is many years since I was there; the census I have seen may not be very accurate, but I believe it is about 35,000,000.

1914. Is that the province under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal?—Yes.

1915. There is a very small proportion of European troops employed in that district, is there not?—I believe very small.

1916. What is the character of the population there; are they very effeminate?—Remarkably so.

1917. Are they very easily kept in order by very few troops?—Yes; when there in 1846, I was told that the European force in the whole Province consisted of only a wing of a regiment in Fort William, with a detail of artillery not far off.

1918. I believe it is a common practice of robbers when they wish to plunder a village in Lower Bengal to beat drums at one end of the village, and the men then run out and leave it defenceless?—I was not aware of that; but they are a patient, pusillanimous nation, excepting a sprinkling of Islam. Wherever that is there is a degree of courage, more or less. There is a growing sect of that persuasion there, which some day may give trouble, if not watched. I first tried to direct attention to that sect, called Ferazzees, 18 years ago.

1919. In the Punjaub the population is very warlike; they are a very different class of people altogether from that in Lower Bengal, are they not?—Very different from the population of Lower Bengal.

1920. The proportion of European troops necessary to maintain our dominion in that province is very much larger than that in Lower Bengal, is it not?—The proportion employed there is larger; I should not say the proportion necessary to maintain our dominion was larger, were it not that we are now in contact with the fanatical Afghan borderers.

1921. Would you undertake to keep the North-West Provinces with one regiment of Europeans?—I would say of that what I said just now of the whole of India; I would not continue so very costly an experiment as holding the Punjaub portion of the North Western Provinces, if not to be securely held by a less numerous garrison of Europeans than some think requisite.

1922. You would withdraw from it?—Yes; in that case to within the Indus; for it shows a constant annual deficit of a million and a half sterling, and is no real strength to us.

1923. You would recommend then that we should withdraw from the Punjaub?—No, not now you are there; and supposing all to the line of the Indus might, with vigilant government, be held without excessive force of European troops. I would never have taken it, because I consider that the greatest security we had in India was maintaining the Sikh dominion between Hindostan on the one side, and Islam on the other.

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1924. As you do not think we ought to withdraw from the Punjaub, would you advocate any very large reduction of the garrison of the Punjaub?—I am not aware what the garrison now is, exactly; but the European troops within it are, I believe, from 13,000 to 14,000. I dare say it may be susceptible of being reduced to some extent; it was very large when the rebellion broke out, I know; there were 18,000 European troops in it, and supporting the position there. When the general officers sat in committee in 1858 in Westminster, the Government of India, in answering the Committee, asked for 22,600 Europeans, and 52,000 native troops. That was for the Punjaub alone, exclusive of the North Western Provinces, now, in part, annexed to it.

1925. At any rate I apprehend you would not think it possible to maintain British dominion in the Punjaub by the small force which you mentioned we maintained in Lower Bengal some few years ago?—No; you might almost say you had no force there at all. I certainly did not consider it to be fully garrisoned; and the Punjaub must require the larger garrison, because you have to hold in check the tribes beyond.

1926. If the whole population of India either consisted of the warlike tribes of the north-west, or of the effeminate tribes of the district near Calcutta and Lower Bengal, generally the force required to maintain British supremacy would vary in an enormous ratio?—Yes; it would vary considerably.

1927. Then would you explain the grounds upon which you come to the conclusion, that if we cannot hold India with 40,000 or 44,000 European troops, we ought to withdraw from it, as showing that we have governed badly?—I do not admit that many in India are warlike tribes, or that any require a larger amount of European troops to keep them contented with our rule. I put the force at 44,000 effective.

1928. Would you explain the grounds upon which you express that opinion, and why, supposing we find it necessary to keep more than 50,000 or any other number, we should withdraw, and why it would imply that we were governing India in an immoral way?—I think it would imply that our rule was not popular with the agricultural classes, and that our supremacy sat heavily on the minds of the chiefs.

1929. Will you give any grounds for that opinion, taking into consideration the very great difference of the nature of the people we have to govern in different parts of India?—If I state the grounds of my opinion, I should state all the causes which excited the people to rebel in 1856 and 1857, and those were various. I do not know that those causes have come to an end yet. You know there was great dissatisfaction among the people; it was not dissatisfaction of the army only; it was a rebellion and not a mutiny; the people were up as well as the soldiers.

1930. Major *Anson.*] When was this?—In 1857.

1931. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] When the soldiers and the strong hand of Government were taken away from the people, is it not the case that they broke out into feuds and broils among themselves?—I never heard of that, further than that some of course profited by the occasion to recover some rights, lands, and jurisdictions, which we had unjustly transferred to others,

1932. Did you never hear in the north-west of feuds of 50 years' standing breaking out afresh during the mutiny?—Not particularly then. I have always seen them cherish these hereditary feuds; they are very averse to forego them. I have had a great deal to do with the suppression of feuds; they will in some localities continue while land is to be reclaimed and has a value. Large tracts once very fertile, under the Mussulman Empire, are now covered with forests. As they are reclaimed, the ancient inhabitants, the agricultural classes, come and fight for the land. In that way many an old feud is revived now, which in the days of the anarchy consequent upon the decline of the Mussulman Empire never occurred. In those days there were no feuds, because the land was going to waste; the land now has some value; it is not cultivated now as it was 200 years ago; it is a very small portion yet that is brought under cultivation, but the ploughs are advancing, and there may still be fights for it. I am not aware that more of these wholsome feuds broke out after the rebellion, or during the rebellion, than before.

1932*. Colonel *North.*] The establishment in India at this moment appears to be 61,672 British troops?—I thought it was approaching 70,000.

1933. You think that that is too many?—Putting it at 50,000, I suppose you would have 43,000 or 44,000 effective troops whenever you wanted them, and then you could spare five or six regiments for Europe.

1934. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You think that being able to govern with a particular number of European troops is a sound test of the morality of our Government?—I do.

1935. Major *Anson.*] You stated just now that the outbreak in 1857 was a rebellion as much as a mutiny?—I think so.

1936. What part of India was in a state of rebellion?—The North-West Provinces especially, but by no means exclusively.

1937. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think it would be desirable to have Europeans recruited for service in India, and that it should be understood by them that they would not be liable to service elsewhere, and that there should be certain advantages held out to them in the shape of military colonies in the hills after a few years' service, which should operate as an inducement to them to recruit?—I do not think it would be a good plan. I am not aware that it would be an attraction to the soldier to remain there; and with regard to colonies of European soldiers, I should doubt their succeeding.

1938. In the old East India service, I imagine that the European regiments were very much superior to the European regiments in the Imperial army?—I doubt that being admitted by any Queen's officer who has seen them both under arms in the field; of course I am no judge, but I doubt their concurring in it. With regard to colonising by European soldiers, I do not believe that the English soldier makes anywhere a good colonist to begin with, and the only climate they could live in is that which you allude to in the hills. Now, the soil in the hills is a wretched one; it requires an enormous amount of industry to produce anything there.

1939. Not in the Neilgherries, I believe; perhaps that may be the case in the Himalayas?—The Neilgherries are better, but almost all the land that is available or cultivable there is occupied, and the estates are sold, I believe. Again, even

even in the hills, in the second or third generation, Europeans degenerate very much.

1940. Major *Anson.*] In the case of a colony like the Cape, you approve of defending that colony by levies from the very people whom we have to keep in subjection?—They have done more good by raising levies of Hottentots and Fingoes than Kaffirs, who are our so-called enemy there; as I said before, if they were always treated, as Sir George Cathcart treated them, with justice, I do not think they are at all enemies of the British Government. With that exception, I should say that those are the best men you could employ in that colony.

1941. On all those occasions when those local levies have been raised, you have had English soldiers with them, I think?—I cannot assert that they have never been employed on detached duties, even during a campaign, but, generally speaking, of course there was a large reserve of European troops in the field.

1942. We always had a very large European army in the Cape on those occasions?—During the last war several regiments.

1943. Would you also provide for the defence of Burmah by raising a large number of Burmese?—I would not say a large number, but I have never understood why we should not enrol Burmese levies. The subject, no doubt, has been considered lately, though I have not been in the way of hearing of it. My own opinion has been that I should raise Burmese levies, not to any great extent, but I should have thought they might have assisted to hold the country, the population of which is only 20 to the square mile.

1944. *Chairman.*] You think that those Burmese levies would be sufficient to hold their own country?—Yes.

1945. Major *Anson.*] We tried that experiment in India in 1857, when we had a very large native army recruited only from the inhabitants of India, and then the result was that it ended in the mutiny; at least, without discussing whether it was a mutiny or a rebellion, the whole of the Bengal army mutinied, and left us, and fought us?—They had been very faithful to you previously; they had gone from one end of India to the other for you over and over again, under many difficulties.

1946. Still, judging from the fact, that in 1857 the army which had been faithful to us for so long, actually mutinied; do you think that would be wise to trust to Burmese levies to hold Burmah?—I did not contemplate absolutely withdrawing every European soldier from Burmah. And with regard to rebellion, it should be remembered that whenever those who rose against our troops, or met our poor defenceless people, they had but one war cry, and that was, "Deen! deen! deen! Our religion! our religion! our religion!" No other cry was ever heard from those rebels or mutineers than that.

1947. Whatever the cause was, it was a fact that we depended at that time entirely upon the natives of the country for the defence of it; and the result was the mutiny of the native army?—At that time certain important provinces had been left with scarcely any of their usual complement; Cawnpore, for instance, with 22 European soldiers instead of three regiments; those European regiments had been all withdrawn and sent up to the Punjaub, and that part was left open and exposed, while the people's feelings had been outraged. The outbreak began from what we chose to regard as a small matter; of course when we forced impure food down men's throats, they became dissatisfied, and sent their emissaries round to the villages, telling the people that they were all going to be treated in the same way. The people in that country are as credulous as they are in some other countries, and they believed it, though the information came from the convicts; but it was believed, and with good reason, so far as related to our jails.

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1948. You think the cause was the withdrawal of European troops from the districts in which they had formerly been; the insufficient number, in fact, of European soldiers?—Yes, the number was insufficient to suppress it at first. You wanted a force sufficient to check it at once, as at Meerut, where we had, when the rebellion first broke out, one of the largest forces of European soldiers of any station in India, I believe.

1949. But the native troops at Meerut did mutiny?—Yes; but the mutineers at Meerut mounted their horses and rode away; they did not raise the standard of rebellion there; they went over to Delhi, which was without Europeans, and there they raised it.

1950. There were some native infantry regiments not mounted on horses at Meerut?—Yes, they went over to Delhi too.

1951. You say that in former years (say 20 years ago) we governed India simply through good government, and the love of the people?—The love of the people is more than we should expect, but a good understanding prevailed, because we observed better faith towards the people than latterly; they were better satisfied to be governed by us than they were subsequently. There must have been some cause for that, and I ascribe the cause to some change in our system of policy pursued towards the natives; I have no doubt of it in my own mind. We interfered more with their prejudices; we interfered even with the native army in the way which I alluded to just now, by proposing to introduce Goorkas, and proposing to introduce Sikhs, and people of different castes in the battalions of the native infantry, and to employ all across the salt water; that of course would have been very unsatisfactory to the men of high caste, and indeed to many others. The troops enlisted in Upper Hindostan, are men of caste; they had always served well under the British Government, but their caste had been respected; a panic was spread that their caste had been interfered with; legislation was going on at a great pace, you were legislating for the re-marriage of their widows, and a variety of other things very vexatious to them. They did not understand it; such legislation may be very civilised, but they were much disgusted with it.

1952. You referred to a time when, although we had our seven wars going on at one time in India, we were able to manage with a very small number of European troops: do you not consider that the circumstances of India are very much changed now from what they were then with reference to our position in India; at that time we were constantly fighting in the country, we kept alive the hatred of race and caste; the natives were very much divided amongst themselves, but at the present time the tendency of our rule in India is to make them much more of a united people?—I do not know that they were divided in former days in those sentiments in which they are now united.

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1953. Do you think that that makes no difference at all in our position in the country now?—I think you are right regarding native soldiers, so far as that; there was more inducement to be attached to their corps in those days, because there were conquests to be made ahead, but I do not know that there was more dissension among the people themselves; you had chiefs who stood by you as good allies; no doubt they were influenced by knowing that there were territories to be acquired by them in reward for their services; that told, no doubt, and may then, as recently, have helped to secure their alliance.

1954. Then you do not think that the tendency of our rule now is to soften off the differences of caste and race in India?—Not the differences of caste; on the contrary, I think you rather throw them back to hug their prejudices; whenever they find that you are disposed to try experiments with their caste, it only makes them more careful to cherish their caste feelings. I have even seen that with the Sikhs, who are sprung from Jats, the greatest latitudinarians among all the Hindoos.

1955. You said that in case of a European war it would be very easy to withdraw our troops from the colonies and send them up to wherever they were wanted, and you instanced the Crimean war as a case in point?—I said, doubtingly, that I thought two regiments had gone to the Crimea, but I am not certain about it; I know that some regiments went to India from the Kaffir country.

1956. As long as you have your enemy's fleets shut up in their own harbours, that is all very well; but do you not think that it would make a great difference if the sea was swarming with cruizers, being obliged to bring our regiments home from distant places like Australia and the Cape?—Of course it would make it more difficult to get them home.

1957. It is rather a dangerous experiment to keep your regiments away at the Cape and Australia, is it not?—The same might apply to the relief of regiments if you were at war; you must do something, I suppose, to relieve them, or you would get very inefficient service.

1958. I suppose our ordinary reliefs would be somewhat interrupted in case of a maritime war?—I think our European army in India being so far from its recruiting ground as it is, at a distance of 15,000 miles off, if you put the figure for its total strength as high as it is now, I do not see how you are to keep up the recruiting, from England. Of course I do not consider India as being approximated to England by the European and Egyptian line of route, because that is through another's country; we hold that on sufferance. During times of disturbance, of course we must trust to the old ocean route round the Cape.

1959. You said that in case we were obliged to withdraw our troops from the colonies in time of war, it would be better to raise local levies for the time being, rather than to bring regiments from India?—I think so.

1960. How would you propose to get disciplined soldiers to do the work in a short space of time, and how would you propose to get officers to officer those regiments in a hurry?—I think I said I would have some formation of local levies at all times, and upon that nucleus I would form corps adequate to all the duties that would devolve upon them when you withdrew temporarily the European troops. At this moment, if you insist upon withdrawing all the European regiments from the Cape, I suppose the Government there, or the authorities upon the border, will immediately consider the expediency of raising additional levies, either adding to the strength of the Cape corps or raising another such corps with other small levies. It is not a system which I would advocate as a permanent one, because it is a good station for British troops.

1961. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What is the constitution of the Cape corps; are they natives or Europeans?—They were originally all Hottentots; in Sir James Jackson's time he thought it would be good to have two troops of Europeans; he introduced them accordingly.

1962. What is it now?—It is nine years ago since I was serving there. I was lately asking Sir Percy Douglas, who is now Commander in Chief there, and he also appeared to think well of the corps. I understood from him that the proportion of Europeans is now rather more than it was in his predecessor's time. I think the strength is about 800, and very efficient. All Commanders in Chief there have, I believe, found them very useful in ordinary times, and in their campaigns.

1963. Major *Anson.*] You think it a great military and political mistake for us to utilize the military tribes and races we possess in India for Imperial purposes?—I think so with reference to the Sikhs, for it is the Sikhs who are principally alluded to, I suppose; I think it is a mistake to cherish a military spirit amongst the Sikhs. It was a mistake that was committed before our occupation of the country. It was of course all very well for the French generals; it was a fine provision for them; they got their major generals' commissions from the King of France for it; but why the British Government should have also done all it could to encourage the formation of Sikh and Mahomedan armies by Runjeet Singh, I never could understand; however, they did so, and the consequence was those great field days which occurred on the Sutlej, when the Sikhs invaded the country south of the Sutlej, on provocation given to them, that led to those great battles. Then, again, when you took the Punjaub, you pursued the same system of cherishing a military spirit in the Sikhs, and you are pursuing it still. Now, the Sikhs are perhaps the finest cultivators in India; there are none better, being for the most part converted Jats. I should have thought that the right policy would have been to have brought them back as much as possible to the plough, providing for a moderate number only in our police or local regiments.

1964. You think it is a mistake to have Sikh soldiers in India at all?—I doubt whether you have many genuine Sikh soldiers. What are called Sikh battalions are, I conceive, too numerous.

1965. I mean men enlisted from the Punjaub?—On the contrary, I would give a provision of that kind to a fair proportion of the inhabitants of every province I held. I would not attempt to hold India without offering a provision, military, civil, and in all departments under the Government, to the natives of the country. I should not allow them to look upon our rule as despising the Hindoo chiefs and averse to Hindoo sepoys; at the same time we may go too far in enrolling Sikhs or Goorkas with the idea that you ought entirely to replace the Hindoo sepoy, because

because the Hindoo sepoy, with his fraternity in the villages and towns, was provoked to rise in rebellion.

1966. I do not wish to replace the Hindoo sepoy; I wish to utilize the whole of the army as it stands at present: have you any objection to utilizing the Hindoo, the Madras, or the Bombay sepoy in the way proposed?—No, I think that that is quite right. I would have a due proportion of them, and also of Punjaubees.

1967. You would employ them in the colonies?—No, not in the colonies; I think you have enough for them to do in India.

1968. Mr. *Laing.*] We have reduced the Sikh force, have we not, very greatly, since the mutiny?—I am not aware whether we have or not. I doubt about the Punjaub force being reduced. By the Sikh force you mean the frontier force, I presume.

1969. I mean the number of Sikhs in the native Indian army?—I know not how many genuine Sikhs are in the army. The Sikhs are but a small proportion of the inhabitants of the Panjaub, as you are aware; about Umritsir and Lahore is the chief settlement of the real Sikhs.

1970. If I recollect rightly, the number of Sikhs in the last year of Lord Canning's administration had been reduced to 25,000 men, just to carry out the policy you indicate, of weaning them from the pursuit of arms to agricultural pursuits?—I do not know what the actual strength of the Punjaubees is, but I should suppose it to be in excess of that.

1971. Major *Anson.*] You object, I suppose, to the employment of native troops at Aden?—I do not see why general service corps should not take their turn of duty there.

1972. They have taken their turn of duty for a long time, but you do not think that that is a good principle, as I understand you?—I see no objection to it, provided you do not withdraw the European garrison.

1973. Why should there be no objection to it at Aden and a very strong objection to it at Mauritius?—I excepted the Mauritius during active service or for brief periods.

1974. Do you except China and Ceylon?—No, not Ceylon, except that I have seen as useful a corps in Ceylon as we could send there. If Malays have been found to serve the purpose there, I would not bring from India our native regiments for a service which is unpopular with them.

1975. Why do you except China?—It is more distant; it is a new country, and it is unhealthy, at least where our troops are quartered; if they once get panic-stricken as to their health, the consequences will be felt for a long while. The natives of India are very chicken-hearted in those matters; and if they suffer from an epidemic, or anything of that sort, they do not get over it for a long time.

1976. Do you except Singapore and the Straits settlements?—I should have no objection to employ a general service corps at Singapore, which is so near.

1977. When you speak of general service corps, I believe the whole of the Indian army are general service corps now?—I was not aware of that; I do not see any objection to employing them in the Straits, because they are so near their homes that they could be easily relieved. I think that is about the limit, Ceylon, the Straits settlements, and Aden; but in the case of Ceylon, I think you could do better by having a corps of Malays.

1978. And the Mauritius?—The Mauritius, I really know nothing of its attraction for sepoys, but that they served there well, I believe, in the expedition sent to capture it in 1810.

1979. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you said you were prepared to hold the Cape with a Cape corps only, and the levies you could raise there?—Yes.

1980. Did you speak of that as a permanent arrangement, or did you mean only that on an emergency, if the British troops were withdrawn to Europe you would be prepared to run the risk there?—On an emergency; because, though I do not think it necessary at any time to have any large force of European regiments there, I think it is advisable that they should be there, as being good quarters for a part of the British army.

1981. Should you call the force we have had there of late years, namely, four or four and a half battalions, a large force?—Yes, I should.

1982. *Chairman.*] You only think that it is advisable that they should stay there for their own benefit, not for the benefit of the colony?—Yes, for the benefit of both; for in peace also the colony benefits by the presence of our troops. When I was there I proposed that if a reduction of the force was considered an economy, and in all respects expedient, imperial and other as well as colonial, I would reduce from six regiments, which were left when Sir George Cathcart came home to be Adjutant General, to four regiments, for a year; and then in the following year to reduce the force to two regiments, and then to adjust the whole thing upon the frontier between Cape corps and levies, if the European soldiers were all wanted to be withdrawn on account of a Russian war, for which you were then preparing.

1983. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are you aware what the force was at the time Sir George Cathcart took the government over from Sir Harry Smith, and during Sir George Cathcart's operations?—There must have been 10 or 11 regiments.

1984. Of Europeans?—Yes.

1985. What was the force of native levies?—I could not say exactly.

1986. Was it about 13,000 or 14,000 men?—No, not so much; half that, I dare say. Sir Stephen Lakeman raised a corps also; his corps was composed of Europeans.

1987. They were sailors, were they not?—Yes, and a few colonists.

1988. Do you consider them a great success?—No, an utter failure.

1989. Do you think that there was too large a proportion of Europeans for such a war as we were engaged in at that time?—No, certainly not.

1990. And to guard against the outbreak of a war, would you think that two battalions of the ordinary strength of English regiments would be sufficient?—Yes, quite sufficient. There was great provocation given to the Kaffirs at that time; you need not have had a Kaffir war. Unfortunately, the Kaffirs hold all the good pastures; and there is a tendency to trespass, and then, of course, the Kaffirs will retaliate, as they did on that occasion, and on former occasions.

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1991. You think that they are a people of a long-suffering nature, and that they never give provocation by stealing cattle in the colony?—None, without provocation. That was the way in which they showed their resentment, by cattle lifting.

1992. You think that they never showed their resentment before the provocation?—No; I had proof of that in the Orange River territory, when I had to negotiate between the Dutch boers and the Kaffir tribes; the Dutchmen admitted that they never had a difficulty with the Kaffir tribes till Sir Harry Smith went up there, and declared the sovereignty of the Queen of England over all those territories. Then, of course the position of things was altered very much indeed; there was nobody to explain what was meant, and some of the European colonists then laid hands upon lands which they held on very easy tenure from the Kaffir chiefs; they had held it a very long time, till our authorities went up there, upon a tenure which was perfectly satisfactory to both parties, and there never had been any trespass on one side or the other before. Though the Dutchman grazed his flocks there on almost a nominal rent, the right of the Kaffir to regard it still in his hunting grounds was never questioned.

1993. Do you think that the outbreak of the war in British Caffraria, in 1850 and 1851, and the massacre of those colonists near the Amatola Mountains, was entirely brought on by the colonists?—Yes, it was entirely brought on by the Kaffirs' sense of the colonists' encroachments.

1994. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do I rightly understand you to say that the frontier might be safely and cheaply left to the commando system, and that the only objection to that system is a philanthropic one?—I mean that a mistaken philanthropy imagines, on no good grounds, that the Dutch boer is addicted to exterminating Kaffirs.

1995. Would there be a very great saving to the Imperial Government if that were done?—The saving would be in not having to pay colonial charges out of the military chest for troops there. But our settlers like to have our troops, and like a Kaffir war for many reasons.

1996. Major *Anson.*] Where could the Committee obtain the facts with regard to that Sikh regiment which you said was obliged to be sent back from Burmah in order to find out what the real causes were, and when they went?—I will endeavour to obtain if you please any official record there may be in the India Office.

Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie, C.B., called in; and Examined.

Col. *K. Mackenzie*, C.B.

1997. Major *Anson.*] You were Quartermaster General to the Army in China in 1860, I think?—Yes.

1998. You had the control of the whole of the transport of the army between India and China during the time it was in China?—Yes, quite so.

1999. Did you have any great difficulties with the native soldiers?—No, I had no difficulties with the native soldiers.

2000. Did you find that the transport of the native soldiers was cheaper than that of the Europeans?—The transport of the native soldiers is cheaper, because the vessels are all taken up at so much a ton, and in vessels which will take, say, 300 Europeans, you might put 450 natives.

2001. We found the greatest possible advantage from the employment of native soldiers during that war, did we not?—I do not think we could have done so well without them.

2002. In garrisoning Hong Kong, Canton, and Shanghai afterward, when the war was over, we also found a great amount of benefit from having them there?—Certainly. I think Shanghai at one time was entirely garrisoned by native troops, with the exception of either a battery or half a battery of artillery.

2003. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Was it a battery or half a battery of artillery?—I forget which; I think it was half a battery.

2004. Major *Anson.*] As Quartermaster General, you never had any difficulty in time of peace in providing the quarters for the native force stationed at Hong Kong, Shanghai, or Canton?—I had no difficulty.

2005. They were far more easily quartered and provisioned in every way than the Europeans, were they not?—They were more easily provisioned in one way; but if you provisioned a vessel for native troops, you were obliged to put native troops in it.

2006. But as regards their quarters in China, there was no difficulty in procuring them?—Not the smallest.

2007. Do you think, as a military man, that it is a good principle in an unhealthy climate like China, to employ native soldiers, they being better adapted to the climate than Europeans?—I think so, certainly, provided there is some European artillery there.

2008. Should you have any objection as a military man to have stations like the Mauritius, China, and Singapore, garrisoned by native soldiers, with European garrison artillery?—I have never been to the Mauritius; at Singapore and China I would not.

2009. You think the artillery would require some European soldiers to support them in China?—No; provided you had European artillery there, I think native troops would do all the work that was required of them, both at the Straits and in China.

2010. You are aware that we have had nothing but native soldiers and European artillery for something like 50 years at Singapore?—Yes.

2011. And that at the present moment they are about to change that system, and have a wing of a European regiment at Singapore?—Yes.

2012. Do you think that that is a wise alteration?—I think not.

2013 Do you not think that it would be infinitely better to provide those native soldiers for work in China from our Indian army, than to establish local corps?—I have a great objection to local corps; it is always difficult to keep up the discipline of local corps; I will go so far as to say that one of our best regiments should not be kept more than 12 or 18 months at the outside in one place.

2014. *Chairman.*] Do you mean by that in one colony?—No, I mean in one locale, in one colony such as China, for instance; of course in India you can move them; but I think a regiment even in a town in Great Britain, if left there more than 12 months,

12 months, gets local ties, and altogether it is a bad arrangement.

2015. Major *Anson.*] You heard the evidence which the last witness gave in favour of the system of trusting to local levies in case of an emergency, do you think that that will be a very practicable thing?—I should be very sorry as a military man to have anything to do with them.

2016. You think that it would be far better to have native soldiers from India whenever we wanted them for the colonies than to trust to such a system as that?—I think so, certainly.

2017. Do you think with regard to the Cape itself, that it would be wise to raise several regiments of Fingoes and Kaffirs to do the work of English soldiers?—I have had no experience of those soldiers, but I should think not.

2018. It would not be nearly so safe as to have troops from India?—No, certainly not.

2019. You have commanded a regiment, I believe?—No, I never commanded a regiment.

2020. Is it your opinion that the colonial work of the British army is a great deal too heavy at present?—I think there can be no doubt of it, especially in the case of my own regiment. It went out in the time of the mutiny, and came back at the end of 1862; therefore the regiment has been little more than four years at home now, and it is going back again to India.

2021. Do you think that the amount of foreign service which the English soldier has to undertake now has a bad effect upon recruiting?—I think it has, certainly.

2022. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Which was your regiment?—The 92nd Highlanders.

2023. Colonel *North.*] Did they go out direct to India?—They went from Gibraltar overland.

2024. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do you see any possibility of decreasing the amount of work in the British army in any other way than by substituting in some of those colonies native soldiers from India for the European soldiers who are now employed there?—I see no other way, and I see no objection to that.

2025. Do you not think that in time of war it would give us a far greater hold upon the native army in case we had to withdraw a large number of European troops from India?—Yes; I think if you employ them in the way proposed in time of peace, and keep them, as it is proposed, not too long away from their homes, they would be more likely to stick to you in time of war.

2026. You think that it is more advisable, as a question of military policy, to make use of the whole of the army of India for general military purposes, than merely to keep in garrison?—I think so, certainly.

2027. Marquis of *Hastings.*] You stated that you thought that the contemplated arrangement of sending a British regiment to Singapore was a bad one; why do you think so?—I think, with the difficulty which we have in recruiting our army, it should not be frittered away in small quantities, such as a wing of a regiment at a station; you would not have 300 men out there.

2028. Where?—I refer to the wing of a regiment which, I understand, is proposed to be sent to Singapore.

2029. Are you acquainted with the climate of Singapore?—I have been there twice.

2030. It is not an unwholesome climate, is it?—I should say that it is not a very wholesome one; it is almost on the line.

2031. Your objection is not upon the ground of the unhealthiness of the climate, but upon the ground that you object to having a small force anywhere?—I object to having a small force anywhere; one objection is, because I think, when regiments go to those distant places, the men who get sick do not go home quickly; they die there, and that interferes with the recruiting of the army. If a man gets sick at Singapore he has no way of getting home quickly.

2032. Do you think that the wing of a regiment, which it is proposed to send there, a battalion of the Ceylon Rifles, is a sufficient garrison for Singapore and the other Straits Settlements?—Yes; as long as you have European artillery there, and your fleet, which, of course, will be always, more or less, in the way. The Ceylon Rifles is a local regiment. If I understand the proposal rightly, it will be sent there to remain. I think corps from India have got more military organization, and are more likely to do the work well as soldiers than any corps you could raise from a place like Ceylon.

2033. Mr. *Oliphant.*] It is a Malay regiment; it is not raised in Ceylon?—It is local in this sense: my principle is, that if soldiers do not see other soldiers they very seldom become good soldiers. If you raise people who fancy they are soldiers without seeing other soldiers, I think the chances are that they do not turn out so well.

2034. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Without mixing with other soldiers?—Without seeing other soldiers.

2035. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that Pointe de Galle is a favourable place for a wing of a European regiment to be quartered at?—I would rather see the whole than the half of a regiment stationed anywhere, especially in a colony.

2036. Do you not think that it would be more desirable to have the whole of the regiment on the top of the mountains in Ceylon at a sanatorium?—Ceylon is not a very unhealthy place, but I think it is a bad plan dividing regiments in the way it is often done.

2037. Colonel *North.*] You mentioned that if 300 of our soldiers were on board ship, you could cram 450 black soldiers on board?—No; I say that ships are taken up at so much a ton, in Calcutta, for instance; and a ship that would take 300 European soldiers would be quite large enough to take 450 natives. In the first place, the ships for the conveyance of natives have little or no fittings; that takes up a great deal of room; and besides, the natives live a great deal on deck. You are aware that there are double awnings, and the men are quite safe on deck. A British soldier requires more protection, more accommodation, and more looking after in every way.

2038. There is no regulation as to there being so many cubic feet allowed for the native troops?—Not to the extent that there is for the European troops.

2039. With regard to the employment of native troops, would you advise their being employed in European colonies like Malta and Gibraltar; do you think that that would answer?—If we had a European war, Malta and Gibraltar are two of the most important places we have, and could be most easily fed from home, but there would be no objection to have them employed in Egypt, provided troops are required there. With regard to the

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the new arrangement of conveying troops overland to India, and I suppose to China also, you may, at any moment, in case of a continental war, bring your troops either way. I think the employment of Sikhs, and other soldiers of India, in the way proposed, would make them ready to come when they were wanted, otherwise they might not be quite so ready.

2040. Mr. *Laing.*] Have you formed any idea of the comparative expense of garrisoning a place like Singapore by native troops and by Europeans?—I should say that native troops would be very much cheaper; they do not require the same buildings; in fact, they are in their own country.

2041. You would have to relieve them very much more frequently, would you not?—Yes, you would have to relieve them every three years, or thereabouts. But then they leave their wives and families behind them, whereas our soldiers take 12 per cent. of women and as many children as these women have got; that is a vast expense.

2042. Even taking into account the expense of relieving them every three years, you think that they would still come much cheaper than European troops?—I think so, certainly; if a European soldier becomes sick you cannot get him home to his own country without great expense. The system which has prevailed in India, and which prevails now, I suppose is that during certain months in the year you send European soldiers home. That system lessens the expense, but there must be a great many who, if they could get away at once, might recover, but as they cannot get away at once die in the meantime.

2043. Marquis of *Hartington.*] With regard to expense, are you aware what the garrison of the Straits Settlements has been up to the present time?—The garrison of the Straits, as far as I know, has consisted of natives. They were all natives when I was there.

2044. Do you know the amount of the force?—No, I cannot say.

2045. Do you know what the proposed garrison is?—The proposed garrison, as I understand, is a wing of a European regiment, and a corps of Malays.

2046. And some artillery?—Yes, and some European artillery.

2047. You are not aware then, that it is expected that the new garrison will be much less expensive than the old one?—That requires to be proved; if you build barracks for European troops that will make a great difference.

2048. The barracks are built?—That is a very expensive item itself. Besides that, there is bringing the sick men home, which has a very important influence on the recruiting; men like to have a certainty that if they become ill they can get away to their own country.

2049. Sir *James Fergusson.*] The climate of Singapore is exceedingly damp, is it not?—The climate of Singapore is very damp; they say it rains every day in the year there.

2050. *Chairman.*] In a military point of view, do you think that the system we pursue of dotting about our army in small detachments all over the world is advantageous for the army itself?—Certainly not.

2051. Would it not be much better, supposing the circumstances of the empire rendered it possible to do so, to mass it in large bodies at a few points?—Most certainly.

2052. Major *Anson.*] That would apply especially to the case of the West Indies; do you not think that it is a great mistake to have detachments of our troops scattered all over the West Indies?—I have no doubt of it; I have been there, and I have felt it myself.

2053. Do you not consider that it would be a much better plan, instead of pursuing the system at places like the Mauritius, which Sir George Clerk recommended at the Cape, namely, employing troops enlisted from the population itself, to employ other natives of tropical countries who would be adapted to the climate?—Yes, I think it would be much better than employing the population itself.

2054. That would save the European troops the exposure to what is to them an unhealthy climate?—Of course it would.

2055. Great stress has been laid upon the bad character of the Sikh soldiers, and our other Indian soldiers, and their propensity to loot; during our expedition to China, in 1860, there were great temptations thrown in their way in that respect, I believe?—Certainly.

2056. Did they distinguish themselves beyond either the French or the English soldiers in bad discipline, or in their propensity in that direction?—Not in the smallest degree. The French set the example, but nobody seemed to follow it to the extent they did.

2057. In fact, as far as discipline went, there was no comparison between the French army and our Sikhs?—I think not.

2058. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You have been asked a question about the West Indies; will you state the force of British infantry in the West Indies at present?—There is a regiment at Jamaica.

2059. One battalion at Jamaica?—One battalion at Jamaica, and the head quarters of a battalion at Barbadoes; I think that is all; the remaining portion of that regiment is scattered in the other Windward and Leeward Islands.

2060. There are, I think, only two battalions of British infantry in the West Indies?—Yes, and artillery.

2061. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Are there no infantry in the Bermudas?—Yes, there are; but that was, and I believe is still, in the Halifax command.

2062. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is your proposal to substitute Indian troops for Europeans confined to places eastward of India, or how far would you extend the doctrine?—I would not bring them this side of Alexandria.

2063. Will you name the stations where you would propose to employ them?—I think they might be very well employed at Hong Kong, certainly; and in all China.

2064. That is, at Hong Kong. We have no troops anywhere else in China, have we, now?—And at Japan.

2065. Would you employ native Indian troops at Japan?—I would employ them at Japan.

2066. Would you not employ European troops at Japan?—Not as long as you have artillery there, and your fleet.

2067. But the fleet is a moveable force?—I believe it has always been the theory of our Government that in case of war Hong Kong and all such places will be more or less defended by the navy. If it was so arranged that the navy, in

in going to such places, could take an extra number of marines, those men might be available if they were wanted, and they could be kept healthy on board ship.

2068. If you could induce the Admiralty to undertake our colonial garrisons?—I do not go so far as that. I only say they might send a few extra marines; that has been done already; they sent some in that way to Ireland the other day.

2069. Would you propose to withdraw the Europeans altogether, except a small detachment of artillery, from Japan?—Not a small detachment.

2070. Except a detachment of artillery?—Yes; I should like to see the artillery a larger force than it is now everywhere.

2071. What artillery, or what garrison would you maintain at Japan?—That would be a difficult question to answer, particularly with regard to artillery.

2072. Major *Anson.*] It is very difficult for anybody to know why we keep any soldiers in Japan at all, is it not?—Yes; it is, of course, not the same as one of our own colonies.

2073. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I understand you to say that you would propose to employ Oriental troops instead of Europeans in Japan. I do not ask you to discuss the policy of employing troops in Japan; but I ask how you would propose to compose the garrison there, if you withdrew the Europeans?—I would have English artillery and a native regiment.

2074. When you say English artillery, do you mean one battery of garrison artillery?—I should like to see a couple of batteries, if we could afford it.

2075. In the case of Hong Kong, would you propose to withdraw the Europeans altogether?—All, except the artillery.

2076. You propose to withdraw all except a couple of batteries of artillery, I presume?—I think Hong Kong would require more than that.

2077. How much; I believe you are well acquainted with Hong Kong?—Yes, well. But I look upon it, that the fleet could always add very much to our strength in all such places.

2078. Will you confine yourself to the garrisons; what garrison do you think it would be necessary to leave at Hong Kong if we were to withdraw the British infantry altogether, and leave one battalion of Indian native infantry there?—The garrison of Hong Kong depends very much upon what crisis there may be. I would take all the soldiers out of Hong Kong if I possibly could and put them on the opposite side.

2079. I do not mean in a time of crisis; of course that requires special remedies; but with regard to the ordinary garrison for Hong Kong, or for Hong Kong and Kowloon, speaking of it as one post, how would you constitute the garrison if you withdrew the British infantry altogether?—For every British infantryman taken away I would send a native.

2080. What force of British artillery do you think it would be necessary to leave there?—If you had to defend Hong Kong without the assistance of a fleet, you would require a very large amount of artillery.

2081. Major *Anson.*] If you had the whole of the British army quartered at Victoria, they would not be the slighest defence against a fleet unless you had a fleet in the waters there?—Exactly.

2082. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What is the ordinary garrison of Hong Kong and Kowloon?—I could not say.

2083. You said that you would propose to substitute Indian troops for European at Singapore and the Straits settlements?—They have always been there.

2084. You propose that the garrison should be exclusively composed of them with a detachment of artillery?—Yes; with plenty of artillery; that is the main point.

2085. And in the Mauritius?—I have never been to the Mauritius, but I see no objection to Indian troops going there too.

2086. Should you like to see the Mauritius garrisoned with native troops entirely, with the exception of some artillery?—I think so, with artillery. I understand that there has been a considerable amount of money spent upon building fortifications at the Mauritius. I do not suppose it is intended that we ever should send sufficient soldiers to defend these ports without the aid of the navy.

2087. You think not?—I suppose not. I mean to say that the force at the Mauritius now is not fit to do it.

2088. Do you think that the defence of the harbour of Mauritius will be rendered more difficult by the erection of more fortifications?—I do not know anything about the locale.

2089. Should you propose to employ Indian troops as a substitute for European troops at the Cape of Good Hope?—I have never been at the Cape of Good Hope. I do not know, and therefore I cannot say; but my view is to substitute Indian troops as much as possible, to lessen the hard work which our own troops have to do, especially at unhealthy places.

2090. Does the Cape come under that category?—I do not know; I can only say this much about the Cape, that there was a very fine regiment which came to China after having been to the Cape for some years, and that was the most unhealthy regiment of all the British white force there.

2091. Were they unhealthy before they left the Cape?—No; they would not have been sent if they had been.

2092. Would you propose to send Indian native troops to the West Indies instead of the European troops?—I think not; because I do not think the Indians would care about going so far away as that.

2093. You mean that they would care a good deal about going so far?—Yes; they would be averse to going to the West Indies.

2094. At any rate the cost of transport there would be much greater from India than that of sending troops from England to the West Indies?—Yes; of course it would; but then that is a large question, involving considerations of the healthiness of the West Indies.

2095. If there are to be European troops maintained there at all, I suppose you admit that the force of the garrison is now reduced to about the lowest point that it very well could be?—Yes; I consider that the troops in the West Indies cannot do much now.

2096. Mr. *Oliphant.*] When were you last in China?—I left China on the 14th of February 1861.

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2097. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do you consider that one battery of European artillery would be sufficient for every native regiment?—Yes.

2098. Then why would you require two in Japan as against one native regiment?—Because Japan is so far away, and on account of the health of the place, in case of sickness or casualties, it would take much time to replace them.

2099. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Japan is the most healthy place in the world?—I do not know that; one regiment that was there, the 20th, did not find that the case.

2100. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you not think that there is anything in the objection that artillery should not be left without the support of European troops?—I do not think they should ever take the field without the support of European troops. It is true of field artillery, but it is a very different thing behind walls, because you can make infantry of them, if you please, directly.

2101. In the case of garrison artillery, you see no objection to having a battery of European artillery at a place like the Mauritius, with only native infantry?—I would have more than one battery, because in case of casualties or sickness it would be difficult to replace them soon.

2102. Supposing you could only have one battery, would you think it objectionable to have at one place one battery of European artillery, with a native regiment as a permanent garrison in time of peace?—If you had one battery of artillery and one regiment of native troops, or one battery of artillery and one regiment of European troops, I do not think it would make much difference, as far as the troops go, for garrison duty.

2103. Major *Anson.*] That is, behind stone walls?—Yes; they would be equally effective.

Friday, 5th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Viscount Hamilton.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Sir James Fergusson.	Colonel North.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

COLONEL JAMES MITCHELL MACDONALD, called in; and Examined.

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2104. *Chairman.*] YOU belong to the Ceylon Rifle Corps, do you not?—Yes.

2105. How many years were you in Ceylon?—I joined my regiment in Ceylon in March 1831, and I have been there ever since.

2106. How long were you in the regiment?—I am still in the regiment; I have come home on medical certificate from China; I took four companies of my regiment to Hong Kong, when the 2nd battalion of the 11th Regiment were removed in consequence of sickness.

2107. Of what race is the regiment chiefly composed?—Of Malays entirely, with the exception of two companies of Sepoys.

2108. Where do the Sepoys come from?—The Sepoys originally come from Madras, but they have all been dead now for some years, and we have enlisted on the island; we have kept up the companies of Sepoys by enlistment on the island.

2109. From Madrasees who have emigrated?—Not Madrasees, a mixture; in fact, we are allowing them to die out, if possible; we have two companies remaining.

2110. What is the whole strength of the corps?—The whole strength of the corps is about 1,100, but we are below our strength; there ought to be 14 companies; some of the Malay companies are weak; perhaps there are 66 in each company.

2111. Are the Malays all drawn from the island?—They came originally from Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, most of them; now they are from the island; there are a good many soldiers' sons who have grown up there and enlisted.

2112. What pay do they receive?—They get 11 *d.* a-day.

2113. Including stoppages?—We have no stoppages; a farthing a-day, I think, is paid to the hospital, that is all, and then they have a seer of rice a day, which they pay 2 *d.* for. A seer of rice is equal to a quart; sometimes the rice is much more expensive, and the Government of the colony then pay the difference.

2114. Are those all the advantages that they get?—That is all.

2115. Is there anything in the way of clothing?—They get their clothing the same as European regiments.

2116. And pensions?—There are small pensions paid by the colony; some pensions of 7 *s.*, and some of 12 *s.*; that is about the outside; they are all paid by the colony.

2117. Is there any bounty?—Yes.

2118. What is it?—Just the same as a European's bounty.

2119. What is it?—£. 1 and a free kit.

2120. Do you increase their pay when you take them to China?—No; they get exactly the same pay; the only advantage they had in China, was that they got a ration of meat free, because the medical men thought that they were not sufficiently fed.

2121. But the pay was the same?—The pay was the same precisely. When we were there before, when I took on a wing of the regiment in 1850, there was a difference. Then the men were only receiving 9 *d.* a-day, and afterwards, when they arrived in China, they were put upon the same footing as Europeans regarding pay; that is, they received 1 *s.* a-day.

2122. They received 1 *s.* a day in China instead of 9 *d.*?—Yes; that was in 1850.

2123. Now they are only receiving 11 *d.*?—Now they are receiving 11 *d.* and a free ration of beef.

2124. Are they enlisted for general service?—Yes; for general service.

2125. Was there any discontent among them when the order to go to China was received?—Not the slightest.

2126. Do they like foreign service?—They like foreign service very well, but they do not like China; they do not like the cold; they find that they suffer in the winter.

2127. Do they dislike garrison service?—Not at all.

2128. Is there any difficulty in inducing those among them who are Hindoos to go by sea?—We have no Hindoos in the Malay companies; they are all Mahometans.

2129. None of the sepoys are Mahometans, are they?—No; not the sepoys; at least, there are a few of them.

2130. They made no difficulties, I suppose?—Not the least; we had not any difficulty; they were ready to proceed the moment they were ordered.

2131. Is the regiment entirely officered by Europeans?—By European and native officers.

2132. How high do the native officers go?—They are called captains; they are subadars and jammadars, captains and lieutenants.

2133. As I understand, the pay of the soldiers in that regiment is very much the same as the pay of the English soldier, is not it?—It is a penny a day less.

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2134. That is the whole saving upon it?—Yes; I think the European soldiers do not receive their beer money abroad.

2135. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] But then there is no free ration?—No; the Europeans get the ration for a very small sum; it is made up to them in that way.

2136. *Chairman.*] Do you find that the cost of transport is equal in the case of this corps to what it is with Europeans?—No; I do not think they require so much.

2137. They do not require so much room?—No.

2138. Do they take their wives with them?—They took their wives with them on the recent occasion; that was rather a mistake, because the women and children amounted to as many as the men themselves.

2139. Did they do that in 1850?—No; only when they went to China the other day. They went out by orders from home. There was a telegram from home to send four companies and their families; the consequence was that all the families were sent off.

2140. That was entirely a mistake in the telegram?—We suppose it was a mistake in the telegram.

2141. That was the other day?—Yes; it was all done in a great hurry.

2142. Did they take their children too?—Yes; they took the children; the women and children amounted to nearly the same number as the soldiers.

2143. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Did they stick to one wife?—Yes; they are only allowed one.

2144. Colonel *North.*] I think the number of men was 387; and altogether there were close upon 800?—There were 369 men, and there were nearly 800, including women and children; it was upwards of 700 I know.

2145. *Chairman.*] How many English officers are there to this corps?—There is a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign to each company.

2146. They are paid, I suppose, entirely out of the colonial funds?—They have what they call the island allowance paid by the Colony, and the Queen's pay is of course paid at home.

2147. Some part of this 11*d.* a-day is Queen's pay, then?—The soldiers' pay, I believe, is all paid by the Colony; I allude to the officers. We have an island allowance; for instance, an ensign gets 10*l.* a month, island allowance, and he has his Queen's pay of 5*s.* 3*d.* a day besides. A lieutenant gets, for what is called island allowance, 12*l.* 10*s.*; a captain gets 19*l.*; a major 30*l.*, and a lieutenant colonel 40*l.* a month; that is independent of the Queen's pay.

2148. Do the officers exchange out of English regiments into the Ceylon regiment?—Frequently.

2149. And backwards?—Yes; backwards too constantly.

2150. It is part of the general English service?—Yes; quite so.

2151. When you get above the regimental rank, do you join the general list of field officers?—Yes; the same as others.

2152. Do you find the men healthy in Hong Kong?—They cannot stand the cold in winter.

2153. They do not suffer from the diseases to which the Europeans are subject?—No; they generally are carried off by colds, and so forth: for example, they suffer from bronchitis, now and then; they are very well in summer, but in winter there are a great number of them laid up. Between 1850 and 1854 we lost a great number of men; the mortality was something fearful.

2154. Colonel *North.*] The mortality was much worse than that in a European regiment, was not it?—Yes; during that time.

2155. *Chairman.*] Do you know what the death-rate is or was?—No; but I could very easily ascertain it, because there is a surgeon living now in London, who was there the whole time as assistant-surgeon with the regiment. I had some conversation with him a short time ago, and he said he should be happy to give any information he could.

2156. What is his name?—His name is Dr. Croft.

2157. Have you been in action with those troops?—No; I have been in one or two little rebellions which have occurred; there was one in 1848 when Lord Torrington, I think, was there, but we had not anything much to do; the Singalese never stood for a moment.

2158. These are Singalese in your regiment, are they not?—No; they are Malays.

2159. You mean by the Singalese, the people of the island?—Yes; they are the race of the island.

2160. The Malays in the island are not numerous enough to rebel, I suppose?—No; they are very few; they are so much thought of there that the merchants and coffee-planters get hold of them and give them any amount of pay. Our men, when they take their discharge, get 3*l.*, 4*l.*, 5*l.*, and occasionally, as much as 10*l.* a month, as trustworthy men to look after the estates, and keep the keys of the stores; they can all read and write, and they are good accountants.

2161. How do they come to enlist with you at all?—We enlisted them as boys.

2162. For what term of service do you enlist them?—Now it is a 10 years' enlistment.

2163. And you never can get them unless you enlist them as boys?—Not in Ceylon; or at any rate very few; now and then you may pick up a few, but very few indeed.

2164. At what age do you take them?—When they are very young, from about seven years of age, they get half-pay; they are employed as orderlies, and so on; they learn to do the duty of soldiers, and when old enough to bear arms they are put in the ranks; these are Malay boys; we call them half-pay boys.

2165. Have you ever seen the Ceylon regiment working together either in the field or in garrison with Indian troops?—No; I have never seen them with Indian troops.

2166. Do you know anything of Indian troops?—Nothing; I have been all my life in Ceylon, with the exception of a few years in China, and there I have never been garrisoned with any Indian troops.

2167. During those rebellions, have the Malays ever shown the slightest inclination to take the side of the rebels?—Not the slightest; during the mutiny the only European regiment we had there, the 37th, went on in a hurry from Ceylon to Calcutta, and people then thought there might be some cause for fear, but there was not the slightest symptom of anything to cause alarm.

2168. Have they ever shown the slightest sympathy

sympathy with their co-religionists in the north of India?—Not the slightest.

2169. They have no communication with them?—No; they are more like Europeans; the officers mix with them; they play cricket and quoits, and all other games with them; they are quite different from any native regiment.

2170. Are they a religious people at all?—Yes; they have their priests.

2171. Do any of the Malays in the island go pilgrimages?—None of them.

2172. They never go to Mecca?—Not a man has ever gone, or asked to go.

2173. Has the sect of the Wahabees extended among them?—No.

2174. You never heard of it?—I never heard of it.

2175. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Which sect of the Mahometans do they belong to?—I do not know; their religion is Mahometan, and founded on the Koran, and they have a priest, and a mosque at each station.

2176. *Chairman.*] Do any difficulties occur about food?—No; we have not had any difficulty at all about food; we allow them to mess themselves; they eat beef, but the beef must be killed by one of their own people.

2177. On board ship how do they manage?—On board ship we take the salt provisions; for instance, fish.

2178. Salt pork?—No; they never touch pork at all; it is against the Mahometan religion, and caste; they will not even carry it. We had some of our Malays as waiters at mess, they did not seem to like even to carry a ham to the table.

2179. What cereal food do they eat, rice or wheat?—They eat nothing but rice and curry; they make a curry of almost anything, with vegetables of any description. They eat fish also, which is very plentiful, and they eat eggs and fowls.

2180. Had you any difficulty in keeping them in rice at Hong Kong, when you were in China?—Not the least. I was only there this last time for five weeks. I went there ill, and was obliged to leave.

2181. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You do recruit some of the Malays from abroad?—We have not been able to get any lately from abroad, in fact, we have not tried; we have not sent a recruiting party for some years.

2182. *Chairman.*] You had some difficulties in recruiting, had you not?—We had; the last time, there was only an officer and a few men sent, for a short time, and they got hardly any recruits. We believe that if recruiting parties were sent to Singapore, we should be able to recruit the regiment, and keep it up to the full strength. But the complaint of the Malays is, that when they leave their own country, they never return to it from Ceylon. The reason is that they are much better off in Ceylon, but the people at home fancy that it is very strange that they do not come back to their own country; that is one of the things I have heard from the recruiting officer.

2183. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Could not you get them by sending a recruiting party of Malays?—No; I do not think so; we have tried it on two or three occasions, but it has not been successful.

2184. You could not then depend upon getting more considerable supply, in order to garrison other places?—Not without having the head quarters there, and a band; they are very fond of music, and that attracts them very much. I am quite sure, if we had four or five companies at Singapore we should have no difficulty in getting recruits.

2185. Major *Anson.*] Do any of the Malays speak English?—Every one of them; they are drilled in English, and all speak it very well indeed, and there is not, I suppose, a man in the regiment that does not sign his name in English, or else he signs it it in Malay. It is an extraordinary thing, comparing them with a European regiment, where you see so many marks made by men who cannot write, whereas in our regiment there is not a man who cannot write his name, either in English or in Malay; they write a beautiful hand. They are very clever, and good accountants; that is the reason they are picked up by the merchants.

2186. There is no occasion for the officers who join the regiment to learn anything about their caste or their habits?—No; we do not interfere with their caste at all. We do not know of such a thing as the complaint, "It is against my caste," and so on; the thing is not known in the regiment. They are almost like Europeans; they mix with the European soldiers, they play together at cricket, and so on; they are quite a different class of people altogether from the natives.

2187. Do you think it would be possible to recruit Malays from Singapore for the Indian army?—No; I am afraid not; I do not think you would get sufficient. I know that Lord Clyde, on his way out to India, stayed with me at Pointe de Galle, where I was commandant, and he was very much taken with the appearance of the Malays. He said that he had not seen any native troops that he liked so much. They are small, but very hardy, and very intelligent; there is no trouble with them; and when the drill is once learned, they never forget it; they do not drink. The Sepoys we have do drink, and give a great deal of trouble; they have imaginary grievances, and are never satisfied. I have had some conversation with officers in the East India Company's service, and they have told me the same thing; they said the Sepoys had always given them trouble in that way, with some imaginary grievance or other.

2188. Do you think, in fact, that the Malays are so good that it would be very useful, if they could be got, to have them introduced into the native army in India?—Decidedly; I think they would be of use if they could be had.

2189. *Chairman.*] You would have to pay considerably for them; they do in India, I believe?—I think so; but the living, the price of rice, and everything of that kind, is very much cheaper in India. I fancy you would have to give them better pay.

2190. Major *Anson.*] Is rice cheaper in India than it is in Ceylon?—Very much; we get nearly all our rice from India. The higher portion of the island is all under coffee.

2191. *Chairman.*] How many seers do you get for a rupee?—There are 32 seers in a bushel; a bushel of rice varies in price from 6 *s.* up to 18 *s.*, and sometimes 1 *l.*, in times of scarcity; I have frequently known it 1 *l.*

2192. Six shillings a bushel is your lowest, and 18 *s.* is your highest price?—Sometimes when there is a great scarcity it is higher; only the

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other day I had letters from Ceylon saying that they were paying as much as 2 *l.* a bushel for it; that was only for a short time, till the vessels came in. On the average I should say the price is about 8 *s.* for 32 measures.

2193. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Still the expense of a Malay soldier is 11 *d.* a day, with a ration? —Yes; it is 11 *d.* a day, with one seer of rice, for which he pays 2 *d.*

2194. Major *Anson.*] He gets 9 *d.* a day and a free ration?—Yes.

2195. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you said something about a meat ration which they got gratis?—That is in China.

2196. Then it is 11 *d.* a day, and a meat ration? —In China they had that, and a little vegetable.

2197. That is more than is given to the British soldier?—I do not know what the British soldier gets; I think he gets 1 *s.* a day there, and pays a little for his rations; he gets a pound of meat and other things, which cost him 3 *d.* or 4 *d.*, but I cannot speak about that with any certainty.

2198. A soldier in the Ceylon Rifle Corps pays nothing for his ration?—He pays for that seer of rice 2 *d.*

2199. Major *Anson.*] What sort of barracks do you have in Ceylon for your men?—The barracks are very good. When I first joined the regiment they had no barracks at all; they used huts made of sticks and mud. Now the barracks are very much improved; they are made of brick upon a single floor, and covered with tiles; they are not nearly so expensive as European barracks, but still they are as comfortable.

2200. When you went to Hong Kong this last time where were you quartered?—We were quartered in the barracks that the 2nd-11th Regiment vacated two days before we arrived.

2201. The European barracks?—Yes.

2202. Your men have not, I suppose, occupied the huts at Kowloon or the native lines in Victoria that the Sepoys occupied before?—The huts at Kowloon were merely mat sheds; they have all disappeared, and the lines that were built on the Hong Kong side were merely a temporary kind of thing; they are blown down and vacated; they are quite given up.

2203. Would your men consider the accommodation that the Sepoys and Sikhs used to have, when they were there, sufficient accommodation for them?—I think they would be very well pleased with that; all they want is a room that is dry, they do not like the thatch. Now that they have been accustomed for 20 or 25 years to have comfortable barracks, of course they feel the difference very much, but you might put them in a very much cheaper building than the European barracks; you might have a large shed erected with pillars, and built in with single brick, and tiled; they would be perfectly satisfied with that, but the Europeans in China must have an up-stairs room; they do not occupy any of the lower rooms, because they are so unhealthy.

2204. Still, finding the Malays quarters, would be more expensive than finding quarters for the native troops from India?—Yes; I think it would, if they got the same description of quarters that they get now.

2205. Do you think that for service in China, a local Ceylon corps of Malays is the best description of native soldiers you can send there?—No; I have been told that the Indian troops stand the cold in the winter better than the Malays; the Malays are always in a hot climate; they are accustomed to a hot climate.

2206. The climate at Hong Kong is not so very cold, is it?—To a native of Ceylon it is very cold; in fact in the winter months, the European soldiers are dressed as they are at home; they mount guard at night, with a great coat, gloves, and so on, just the same as in England.

2207. For garrisoning a place like Singapore, do you think that it is a good plan to use only a local Ceylon corps, or would it not be better to draw troops from a large army like the Indian native army, so as to have regular relief?—I do not know; I think the Malays would do admirably there, and a great advantage of it would be, that we should be able to keep up the regiment in Ceylon.

2208. In case of any military operations having to be undertaken in that part of the world, either in China or about the Straits, you would not be able to expand a local corps sufficiently to make use of them in case of war, would you?—Where you have native troops, I think you must always have a proportion of Europeans; I would not have a place garrisoned entirely by natives; I do not think that would be at all desirable.

2209. In case of military operations having to be undertaken in that part of the world in time of war, we should have to depend very largely upon native troops; do you think you would be able to expand your Ceylon corps sufficiently for such a purpose?—I could not say.

2210. You could not increase it to 2,000 or 3,000 men, or to 4,000 or 5,000 men?—I think not with Malays, they could not be had.

2211. We should be obliged then to have recourse to the native army in India?—Yes.

2212. Do you not think that it is much better to have one large army of native troops for service in tropical climates that can be relieved continually, than to have merely local corps like the Ceylon rifles?—The proposal was, that the six or eight companies in Ceylon would relieve the Singapore companies after any fixed time; say after two or three years.

2213. Should you object to garrisoning a place like Singapore, with nothing but Malays or other native troops, and European garrison artillery?—I think there ought to be European garrison artillery. If you had a good proportion of artillery, that would do very well; but I think it would be advisable to have the wing of a regiment there.

2214. Is that opinion of yours based on the fact that there is a large Malay population at Singapore?—At Singapore there is a large Chinese population, we have more Chinese there than Malays. I suppose there are at least 25,000 or about 26,000 Chinamen at Singapore; I do not think there is anything like that number of Malays; I cannot tell exactly, I have only touched at Singapore in going to and coming from China, but in driving through the place, I was told that there were 25,000 Chinamen; the number of Malays, it struck me, was not nearly so great as the number of Chinamen.

2215. Singapore, I think, is only two or three miles from the main land; that is, from the Maylay's own country?—It is a greater distance than that.

2216. Do the Malays mix very much with the Chinese?—Not at all; they dislike each other exceedingly; I know in China I have seen several little rows between them; they hate each other.

2217. The

2217. The Malays did not like their service in China?—No; on account, I think, of the winter; they could not stand the cold.

2218. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Did you lose many men?—We lost a great many; I do not know how many we have lost this time, because I left them after being out a very short time in China.

2219. Colonel *North.*] It appears from the returns that you lost more in proportion in China than even the 11th or the 9th?—Very likely; I was only there five weeks this time; when I left I think we had about 36 or 38 in hospital; that was a week or two after we arrived.

2220. Major *Anson.*] In case of an epidemic amongst your men the loss is very serious to your regiment?—Yes.

2221. Therefore a merely local corps of that description may at any time become totally inefficient and useless?—If they have no means of recruiting, of course there is nothing else for it.

2222. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You said that you enlisted a good many regimental boys in your regiment?—Yes.

2223. Are you obliged to enlist them as boys, or do they get other employment if you allow them to grow up as men?—If you allowed them to grow up as men they would get employment as fast as possible, especially if they were educated; once they enter the school as half-pay boys, they are bound to enlist, unless they are rejected as unfit.

2224. They would not enlist if you allowed them to grow up as men?—No.

2225. You can only get them as boys?—They are sent to school, and when they become about 12 or 13 years of age they are employed and drilled in the regiment, and get half pay.

2226. Supposing you allowed them to grow up as men, should you be able to get their services then?—I think not.

2227. How have you kept up the strength of the corps which you have maintained for the last five years?—We have kept it up by enlisting boys from the school, and we now and then pick up a few Malays in the island.

2228. Are they island men?—Some are, and some are not; some come by the vessels which touch at the island; they are seamen.

2229. What has been your strength during the last few years?—I think, altogether, about 1,100.

2230. You have maintained that strength on the average?—Yes; it has been about the same; there has been very little difference.

2231. Your establishment is 1,400, I think?—Yes.

2232. At any rate, your number wanting to complete the establishment has not increased?—No; it is on the decline rather.

2233. You think that if you had a detachment of four or five companies at Singapore you would be able to recruit a good many men?—I think so. I do not think we should have any difficulty then.

2234. To what extent do you think you would be able to maintain the establishment if it was proposed to increase it?—I think there would be no difficulty in getting up a second battalion.

2235. Up to a couple of thousand men?—Perhaps not; I am induced to think that that is a large number.

2236. What number would you say?—Fifteen hundred men, I dare say. It is quite possible that you might get 2,000; I cannot speak to that.

2237. You think that you would probably be able to maintain 1,500 men?—I think so; recruiting at Singapore is the only means. If we failed in getting them at Singapore, by sending four or five companies there, the regiment must go down, it must die off; that is about the last thing to be tried.

2238. You think that it would be satisfactory to the men of the regiment to be quartered at Singapore, and to be relieved from Ceylon?—I am quite sure upon that point, because I have heard the men themselves speak of it. When I was in command of them, when I was going with four companies to China, we allowed them to land there and bathe and get some fresh provisions for themselves; they said it was their own country, and that they would like to be there; they prefer it even to Ceylon, I think.

2239. There would be no difficulty about the women and children; you would be able to arrange that?—Yes; I think that some alteration ought to be made on that point. I think only a certain number of men ought to be allowed to be married; it should be something like what it is with Europeans; so many to each company. I think it is a mistake allowing them to marry just as they like. The intention of allowing them to marry was that it was thought they would have a sufficient number of children to recruit the regiment from, and keep up the strength, which was not the case.

2240. The women and children do not live in barracks with them, do they?—No; the single men live in barracks by themselves the same as Europeans, and the married people have small huts.

2241. How are they built; by themselves?—No, they are built by the Government, but they are built in a very cheap way; the walls are perhaps about 10 or 12 feet high.

2242. Are they built of brick?—The pillars are brick, and then they are filled in with mud.

2243. What is called wattle and daub?—Yes.

2244. You expressed an opinion that it was not desirable to have a place like Singapore occupied by the Ceylon Rifles alone without any Europeans?—I think wherever there are native troops we always ought to have a proportion of Europeans with the natives.

2245. Both with the view of securing their fidelity, and with the view of making them more efficient in case of any active service being required of them?—Yes.

2246. With both those views?—Yes; with both.

2247. Singapore is the only garrison you could well undertake in addition to Ceylon, inasmuch as you would have a great difficulty in increasing the establishment largely?—I believe it is intended to have five companies; I have been led to suppose that that is the present intention. General Hodgson, who commanded in Ceylon, and also Colonel Layard, the senior colonel of the regiment, told me that it was intended to send nine companies to Singapore, of which five companies were to remain at Singapore, two companies were to be sent to Penang, one to Malacca, and, I think, one to Labuan. I think that was the arrangement, and that 500 men should be kept in Ceylon.

2248. Five companies of 100 men each?—Yes; and

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and to increase the regiment to 16 companies; in fact, we could not get the reliefs unless we had 16 companies.

2249. Is that leaving sufficient for the duties in Ceylon?—If it is intended to increase the garrison, as I am informed it is, it may be. When I left Ceylon there was only one regiment, the 2nd battalion of the 25th Regiment, and one battery of Artillery, and our own regiment there; but I am told now that they intend having two batteries of Artillery, and a wing of a regiment stationed at Point de Galle, the other wing is to be sent to Singapore with the Malays. I saw that in some of the newspapers.

2250. What works are there at Point de Galle; what fortifications are there which are of any importance to be held by European troops in time of war?—There is an old fort there which, I believe, they intend to dismantle altogether, and knock the walls down, and to have just one or two batteries only to defend the harbour.

2251. The fort is of a very insignificant character, is it not?—It is a rotten old Dutch fort.

2252. It is not much more than a field work?—No; it was merely built by the Dutch to protect themselves against the natives.

2253. Are there fortifications at any other points, at Trincomalee?—I have never been at Trincomalee, but they have got a fort there, I know. They have got one of the best docks in the world there.

2254. You do not know what the defences for the dock are?—No; but the engineers have been working at it for some time. Colonel Laffan was out there; there was a committee sent out to Ceylon to inquire about building fortifications, and so on, and Colonel Laffan was one of the committee. It is very well fortified.

2255. Whether it is defensible or not you do not know?—I have not been at Trincomalee.

2256. Colonel *North.*] What duties did your men do on the 2nd battalion, 11th Regiment, leaving Hong Kong; did they take the night duties, or what?—They took the place of the 11th.

2257. Did they perform the same duties?—Exactly the same (and in Ceylon in the same way they perform the same duties as the Europeans), with the exception that the natives had all the escort duty and all the exposure to the sun.

2258. Did your men do the work of the daily escort to the Stanley Barracks at Hong Kong; Stanley Barrack is on the other side of the island, is it not?—Yes; the Stanley Barrack is on the other side of the island.

2259. Did your men find the daily escort to it?—Yes; before our men landed, a fast boat came alongside of us, and we sent a company to Stanley with a captain and a subaltern.

2260. Did your regiment when they landed occupy the north barracks?—Yes.

2261. Did the women and children all go into those barracks, or were huts built for them?—No; that barrack was merely used for the single men; it is a beautiful building, very roomy, with punkahs, and everything else, which we did not require. The women and children put the Government to a great deal of expense; they were obliged to find godowns and houses belonging to the merchants to put the women and children in; it cost something enormous; they might almost have built barracks, they might certainly have built huts for the money.

2262. Then a great portion of the barracks was empty?—The barrack we occupied had only two large rooms; each room contained 100 men; in a different building we had a mess room, and accommodation for about four officers.

2263. The second twentieth were with you then, I believe?—Yes; a portion of them.

2264. Some of them were in Japan, and some had come from Japan?—Yes; when I was there there was a portion of them, I think two companies, at Japan; they had not accommodation for them at Hong Kong; the Murray Barrack was not sufficient for the 11th; there was a company quartered in some part of the town.

2265. In M'Gregor's godowns?—Yes.

2266. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do you consider that the Malay is more to be trusted than the ordinary Indian as an individual?—We put the greatest possible confidence in them.

2267. Can you tell me at all the proportion of boys you have enlisted in comparison with the strength of the regiment?—I could not give the slightest idea. The school consists of about 50 or 60 boys, and as they grow up they become orderlies, and as soon as they become sufficiently strong to carry a rifle they are put into the ranks.

2268. Would there be about 40 or 50?—Yes; the number would be something small.

2269. If there was a detachment at Singapore, would you be able to enlist the Malays as men, or would you go upon the same principle as you do now?—No; I think we would rather enlist men as well as boys, because they save the soldiers; they do the orderly duty, the running messages and taking letters; they do just as well as the soldiers, and they do it for just one-half the expense.

2270. In fact, you would prefer to have them as boys?—Some of our very best men have been enlisted in that way, but I would take boys if full grown Malays could be found ready to enlist. They can all read and write, and they are good accountants; they turn out first-rate clerks.

2271. There are one or two outlying detachments in Ceylon, I believe; how often are they relieved?—There are detachments, I may say, all over the island. We have generally four companies at Colombo, two companies at Point de Galle, three companies at Candy, three companies at Trincomalee, and one at Badulla; and a subaltern, with a detachment of 25 men, here and there.

2272. I think there was a company at Jafnapatam when I was there?—Yes; but it is done away with now; they were invalids; but we replaced them by Malays; there is, I believe, a company of Malays there now.

2273. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Why is it necessary to have three European officers, and also two native officers for each company?—Because there is so much detached duty they are detailed all over the island.

2274. In smaller detachments than companies?—Yes; we have some detachments consisting of 25 men. When four companies were ordered to China, they intended calling all the detachments in (I do not know whether they have done so) to Candy and Colombo; they had not men enough to do the duty.

2275. Could not those duties be as well done by police as by small detachments of soldiers?—That is what they are going to do.

2276. If

2276. If the regiment is kept together it would not be necessary to have five officers to a company, would it?—No, I do not think so.

2277. With the two native officers, would one European officer be sufficient?—I would rather have two European officers and one native officer than have two native officers and one European, because the serjeant of the company would do a good deal of the duty very well.

2278. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] As it is now, you have got two sets of officers?—We have now; we have got a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign who are Europeans, and we have a subadar and a jemadar.

2279. I suppose the fact is that the subaltern officers have very little to do?—The native officers have very little to do compared with the Europeans; the Europeans generally do nearly everything. With regard to performing their orderly duty the European officer is responsible; he goes round first, and then he sends one of the native officers in the interim, to see that all is right.

2280. Do the European officers do precisely the same routine of duty as they do in a European regiment?—Precisely the same duty, perhaps even more.

2281. Do they look after the men's kits?—Yes, they take their turn of garrison duties.

2282. What duties do the native officers perform?—They follow the European officers in a great measure.

2283. Are they merely dummies?—They have not much to do.

2284. What advantage is there in having them at all?—If they were done away with, we are afraid that the Malays would not enlist at all, because they look forward to this as a great prize.

2285. That is the advantage of it?—That is the great advantage; it is a boon conferred on old and well-conducted serjeants.

2286. When there is any active duty to be done, are they found to lead their men?—Yes: nothing could be better; you can depend upon them. Col. *J. M. Macdonald.* 5 April 1867.

2287. Those native officers have a good deal of gallantry?—Yes, they will lead the men anywhere; you can place the greatest possible reliance upon them.

2288. Viscount *Hamilton.*] The Malay does not mind wet, but he does cold, I believe?—They do not mind wet. In the rebellion, in 1848, we had them out in all weathers, and they were very useful in going into the thick woods and jungles, and getting hold of the priests and disaffected people, and bringing them in when the Europeans could not do so. I had command myself at Kornegalle. I had both Europeans and Malays under me, and I found that the Malays were best suited for the kind of work that was required; they stood the sun better than Europeans. I sent out a party of the 37th on one occasion, and one or two of them were knocked down by the sun. The Malays do all the escort duty, going about with the treasure, and the arms and ammunition. The native troops have all that duty to do; and besides, they do not require so many nights in bed as the Europeans.

2289. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The present organisation of the Ceylon Rifle Corps you think is very satisfactory?—I think so; and every European officer who has inspected them, from the time of Sir Edward Barnes to this day, has spoken in the highest terms of them; they drill beautifully; we have not much trouble with them, and crime is less than that of a European corps; they are very well behaved. The great thing is, they do not drink.

2290. Major *Anson.*] A battalion of about 700 men would have, on the average, about 30 European officers, would it not?—Yes; some of the companies are smaller than others.

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL MACPHERSON, Esq., called in; and Examined.

2291. *Chairman.*] You are from the Mauritius, I believe?—Yes.

2292. How many years have you been there?—I have been there 20 years. *A. C. Macpherson, Esq.*

2293. You were a Planter, I think?—Yes.

2294. Are you at all acquainted with Indian troops; have you ever seen them?—I have seen them in Bombay for a short time.

2295. Do you think that the garrison duties at the Mauritius could be performed by them?—Perfectly.

2296. What amount of troops have you been in the habit of having at the Mauritius?—Two regiments generally, and two batteries of artillery, besides engineers.

2297. I suppose that that is almost entirely to guard against the possibility of external danger?—Yes. There is scarcely a possibility of internal disturbance; we have never had any internal disturbance.

2298. You never heard of such a thing?—No.

2299. There is no disaffection there?—No.

2300. The coolies are very quiet people, are they not?—Yes.

2301. They are not numerous enough to be troublesome, I suppose?—Yes, they are very numerous; there are 245,000 immigrants.

2302. But they have never shown any inclination to be troublesome or to create disturbance?—No.

2303. Then the duties which fall upon the regiment for the purpose of maintaining internal order are very light indeed?—They are nothing at all.

2304. Are the regiments both stationed at one place?—No, they are in detachments; the principal one is at Port Louis, where there is a barrack; and there is another at Mahebourg; there are two small detachments besides.

2305. Are they disposed for the purpose of resisting a possible external attack?—I think not; I think they are so disposed for sanitary purposes chiefly.

2306. Then for any emergency that has arisen within the last 40 years, I suppose they have been absolutely useless there?—They have been perfectly useless; we have never had to call upon the military in any one instance.

2307. Do you know whether their cost is defrayed by the Colony?—£.44,000 is paid by the Colony; the total cost is 137,000*l.*, I think.

2308. The balance is defrayed by the Imperial Government?—Yes.

2309. Then such duty as there is now, which appears to be mainly keeping within walls, can

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be done equally well by native or by European troops?—Perfectly; but I should not think it judicious to leave Mauritius with native troops only.

2310. You think that the native troops ought to have English troops by them?—Yes, with such a large Indian population as there is there; there are 170,000 male Indian emigrants, the rest are women and children. With such a large Indian population as that I do not know how far it would be judicious to give them a chance of anything like a rebellion.

2311. Your fear would be that the native troops might sympathise with the insurgents?—Exactly if there were such; not that I anticipate anything of the kind at all.

2312. That would be rather an argument against using Indians, and in favour of using soldiers of any other race, whether European or Asiatic?—Yes, exactly; but there are a great many different sects and different classes amongst the Indians, and they do not seem to fraternise in any way.

2313. The Coolies are almost entirely from Madras, or the Valley of the Ganges, are they not?—No; a great many come from Bombay and from Scinde.

2314. Are there any Sikhs among them?—No, very rarely; there may be a few, but they do not come often, I think.

2315. Any Mahometans?—Yes; there are plenty of Lascars.

2316. From what part of India do they come?—The Lascars are chiefly from Madras, but they come also from Calcutta, and from Bengal.

2317. Are there any Mahometans from the North West?—No, I think not; they are chiefly Hindoos.

2318. Of what caste; of low caste?—I hardly understand what the castes are in India; but they are men who are very particular about their food; that seems to indicate that they are not of low caste. The Hindoos will never touch beef, and of course the Lascars will never touch pork; and there are some men I have known who never will eat anything that has had life.

2319. Do any of them object specially to fowls?—The men that I speak of would eat nothing that had life.

2320. Are there any who have a special objection to fowls, of those who would eat any living things?—No, I never heard of any.

2321. What grain do they live on?—Rice and split peas.

2322. Do you grow rice in the Mauritius?—No.

2323. Where does it come from?—Madras and Calcutta.

2324. What is about the price of it?—It is about 1½*d.* a pound.

2325. Do you at all know what that is by the seer?—It is about 9*s.* a seer.

2326. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Are the coolies in the Mauritius usually contented?—They are very contented; the rations they get are sufficient to keep them, and they can save all their wages; we are obliged to feed them.

2327. What is the feeling of the inhabitants of the Mauritius as to the maintenance of a garrison; do you think that they look upon the maintenance of a garrison as very desirable?—They think it very undesirable that they should have to pay 44,000*l.* a year for the troops.

2328. Do you think that they would rather have none at all?—No; I think that for an island like that we require some troops certainly, but one regiment would be quite sufficient; they have always been in the habit of keeping two regiments there, but on several occasions some troops have been sent away; on two occasions we have sent regiments to the Cape; and during the Indian mutiny the Governor sent both the regiments away to Bombay.

2329. Is the desire to have at least one regiment connected with the maintenance of internal order?—With a large population of that kind I think it would be desirable that there should be a certain force there.

2330. If there was only one regiment the Colonists would desire that that should be a British regiment, I suppose?—If there was to be only one regiment it ought to be British.

2331. Major *Anson.*] You have got a very large and efficient police force at the Mauritius, have you not?—Very good.

2332. They are chiefly recruited from the Malays, I believe?—No; I think they are ex-apprentices, in a great measure.

2333. There is a great mixture of all sorts, is there not?—Yes, a great mixture; there are a great many English police too; but I think there are more ex-apprentices than anything else.

2334. You would be satisfied, I suppose, with a very small European garrison, if we did employ natives?—The proof of that is, that during the Indian mutiny we sent away the two regiments, and there was only one wing of a regiment left in the island.

2335. There would be very little chance of a native, a regiment that has left its families at home in India, helping the coolies in any rioting there might be, would there?—No, I think not.

2336. In fact, the European garrison artillery in the Mauritius would be almost, if not quite, sufficient for your purposes?—Amply; a few hundred European soldiers would be all that would be wanted, with some artillery, in case of need.

2337. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You expressed an opinion that Indian troops would perform all garrison duties at the Mauritius with great satisfaction?—Yes.

3338. You modified that afterwards, and said that you should not like to have the place left without European troops?—With regard to the garrison duty, I think the native troops could perform that perfectly well.

2339. What do you mean by garrison duties?—I mean the ordinary duties which soldiers perform in garrisons.

2340. Merely mounting sentries and so forth?—Yes.

2341. But you think it would not be desirable to leave the place without European soldiers?—I think it would be rather a risk to leave a population, where the natives of India are in so great a majority, without any aid from European soldiers.

2342. Then, in fact, the native troops are not competent to perform all the garrison duties, if you would not feel secure without an English garrison?—I think it would be wrong to leave the island without any English troops at all.

2343. I presume that it is part of the object for which the English troops are there, to keep it secure for the English inhabitants?—As I mentioned, those troops have been almost altogether taken away from the island at times.

The

The Governor took upon himself in the height of the mutiny to send the two regiments to Bombay.

2344. Were they all sent away?—No; a few hundred men of one of the regiments were kept; that was the extent of the force left in the island.

2345. The Governor might be prepared to run risks in a great emergency like that, which he would not think desirable as a permanent arrangement?—Yes, quite so.

2346. Have you ever been connected with the military profession in any way?—No, except that my father and my four brothers have been in the army.

2347. But you have not been personally connected with the army?—No.

2348. Major *Anson.*] Is there any volunteer force in the Mauritius?—No; none.

2349. Viscount *Hamilton.*] What are the fortifications at the Mauritius; there is a citadel, is not there?—They have spent a very great deal of money upon the fortifications; they never seem to have finished; they begin one plan and then another.

2350. Will you describe the fortifications?—There are two forts at the entrance of the harbour of Port Louis, and there is a citadel to command the town.

2351. Does it command the harbour?—It commands the harbour also, but it is behind the town.

2352. It commands the harbour and the two forts?—It commands the two forts, the harbour and the town.

2353. Major *Anson.*] Is the citadel large?—No, not very large.

2354. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Is there any other good port in the island?—Mahebourg, that is the first town established by the Dutch.

2355. Is that as good a harbour as Port Louis?—It is a very good harbour indeed. At one time the shipping became so numerous in Port Louis, that there was hardly room for them, and then they talked of making this a port also; ships go into it perfectly well.

2356. Whereabouts is that other harbour?—On the south side.

2357. Are there any fortifications there?—No, there is an old fort which is useless.

2358. Is there any other fortification there?—There is a sort of fort at the entrance of the harbour, three miles off at Isle de la Passe.

2359. Is there any other harbour?—Nothing to speak of; when the island was taken, the troops landed at a place called Grande Bace, but there is no harbour there.

2360. What is the character of the coast there?—It is full of reefs.

2361. It is a dangerous coast?—A very dangerous coast, but the harbour of Port Louis is very easy to enter, and to go out of.

2362. It would be impossible for any enemy to make any use of that harbour so long as we have the citadel, I presume?—I think so.

2363. Then, in time of war, it might be of importance to have a small European garrison to hold that citadel, I apprehend?—Yes, I think so in time of war. The only object of having European troops, would be to keep the native troops in awe, in the event of anything occurring which we cannot forsee amongst the native population.

2364. Would there be any object gained in having native troops there now, instead of the European troops?—There is no object in having native troops.

2365. Would there be any object gained in having Indian native troops substituted for the Europeans that are now in the Mauritius?—The Government think it necessary to have two regiments there; I think one regiment might very well be a native regiment.

2366. There would be no object gained by that, would there?—There would be no particular object gained by it; Mauritius does not require for its own safeguard anything like the amount of troops kept up there.

2367. For its own safeguard against internal enemies?—Yes.

2368. You would be sorry to see it without one regiment for that purpose?—I think so.

2369. As regards our commerce, the harbour of Port Louis would be a very important one in time of war, would it not?—No doubt very important; upwards of 200,000 tons of shipping pass there regularly every year.

2370. It would be a very large economy only that would reconcile it to you then as a matter of policy to reduce the garrison, so that there would be any risk of its falling into an enemy's hands at the commencement of a war?—In case of war, I suppose it would be Imperial policy to keep up the garrison and to make it very strong, because it is a very important place in case of war. Ships come from all quarters there; it is on the route from India and from China, and to Australia too.

2371. *Chairman.*] Do you mean to say that ships go that way to India and China; do they not keep as far from the Mauritius as they can?—The vessels keep down south very much going to China, but constantly we have vessels touching there; if they get any damages, Mauritius is the only place they can go to.

2372. You are right on the top of the typhoon?—We have hurricanes.

2373. The beginning of the typhoon?—Typhoon is the name given to storms in the Chinese seas, which do not affect Mauritius.

2374. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Do ships often put in there for supplies?—Constantly; a vessel came from China the other day with a Belloochee Regiment going to India, she became leaky, and was very glad to fetch Mauritius; that is an example of the use of Mauritius.

2375. Should you be sorry to see the garrison so reduced as to run any risk of its falling into the hands of an enemy in time of war?—Of course, as an Englishman, I should be sorry to see Mauritius fall into anybody's hands but our own.

2376. I mean not as regards the policy of this country, but as regards the commerce?—The Government could not give up the Mauritius.

2377. Major *Anson.*] We should be sorry to see any colony fall into the hands of an enemy in time of war, I suppose?—No doubt.

2378. We are not always at war; and during the long years of peace, we might be as economical in our garrison at Mauritius as possible?—I think so.

2379. When war breaks out, if we find it necessary, we can always reinforce it?—There is one thing to be remembered, Mauritius may be considered a very central point; it is close to the Cape. We sent two regiments to India, and we sent a regiment to New Zealand, so that it is a very central point at which to have some troops.

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2380. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] It is not very near England for getting reinforcements if war breaks out, is it?—No, it is not; and New Zealand is still further off.

2381. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you know what force the French have at the Isle of France?—I think they have about 1,000 men.

2382. Viscount *Hamilton.*] Would the general feeling of the colonists be against a partial withdrawal of the English troops?—I think not against a partial withdrawal; but it would be against the total withdrawal of them.

2383. Major *Anson.*] Where do you get your supplies from at the Island of Mauritius?—From India.

2384. I believe the island does not support its population, does it?—It does not grow anything but sugar; it produces the money to buy the food in other countries.

2385. The produce of the island does not supply the population, does it?—We grow nothing but sugar.

2386. I believe if the sea was in the hands of an enemy, the island would be starved into submission in a very short time?—No doubt.

2387. The defence of the Mauritius depends entirely upon the presence of a fleet; if we are not masters of the sea, it does not matter what the garrison is?—No doubt if we went to war with any power that had a fleet, Mauritius would be taken and retaken more than once.

2388. Have you any idea what length of time there are supplies for in the granaries at Mauritius?—For three or four months.

2389. *Chairman.*] You have to send elsewhere for your meat, have you not?—We have to send to Madagascar; but only the Europeans eat meat, and some of the creole families; otherwise the few blacks that are remaining and the ex-apprentices very seldom want meat, they live on rice and curries.

2390. Are there black aborigines?—No, there were no aborigines in the island, they are the descendants of the old black slaves. When the island was first taken there were none on it.

2391. Major *Anson.*] In the case of our losing the command of the sea just round the Mauritius, it would be far easier to provision a garrison of native soldiers than it would be to provision a garrison of European soldiers, who depend upon meat, would it not?—There are always a large quantity of bullocks in the place, for draught. In case of emergency those could be used for food.

2392. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Have you ever been at Bourbon?—I have.

2393. How far is it from the Mauritius?—Ninety miles.

2394. Does the trade wind blow from it upon the Mauritius?—The trade wind blows from Mauritius to Bourbon.

2395. Do you happen to know what the usual force of the French garrison is there?—It is about 1,000 men.

2396. Only one battalion of infantry?—One battalion, a marine battalion.

2397. There is no good harbour there, is there?—There is no harbour, it is an open roadstead; it is extremely dangerous. All the French ships are obliged to come to Mauritius to repair.

2398. *Chairman.*] Does that country support itself, or have they not to draw their supplies from elsewhere?—They live in the same way as Mauritius; they grow very little else but sugar, and a little coffee and spices. I was asked just now with regard to troops in case of war. I think a very small force might protect the harbour of Port Louis; but there are so many other places round the island where a landing could he effected, that it would be quite impossible that a regiment could keep the island against any marine force.

2399. If any marine force could blockade the island for a couple of months, you must all surrender at discretion?—No, not in a couple of months; because in a case of that kind the supplies would be economised, just as whenever rice becomes very dear, you see the consumption fall off immediately.

2400. Could you not grow anything except sugar?—We could grow anything. I grew 30 acres of oats last year; I always do grow a little rice, a few hundred bags.

2401. It is only that the land is more valuable under sugar?—Yes.

2402. Major *Anson.*] Do you know what sum of money was spent upon these fortifications in the island of Mauritius?—Some frightful sum of money.

2403. Something like 250,000 *l.*?—I expect it is much more than that from the beginning. Certainly, since I have been there, they have altered the plan two or three times.

2404. I believe it has been stated, by Sir John Burgoyne, that it would take 6,000 men to defend those fortifications in case of war?—That shows the absurdity of it, because an enemy's fleet would not come and place itself immediately before those fortifications. The place where we landed, when we took the island in 1810, was at Grande Baile; there are no fortifications there, and all round the coast there are small places where troops could land very easily.

2405. In fact the effect of keeping 2,000 European soldiers in an island, like the Mauritius, for the purpose of a garrison is, that in all probability if the enemy did land upon the island, we should lose the services of those 2,000 men if they had to defend fortications, which would require 6,000 men to defend?—It would be impossible to fortify the island, the only defence that the island could ever have is the navy.

2406. That is the proper defence for the island?—Yes.

2407. In fact, even in time of war, you might look upon the garrison of the place as doing a sort of police duty for internal purposes?—It would be very little more.

Tuesday, 9th April 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Viscount Hamilton.
Marquis of Hartington.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

HENRY TAYLOR, Esq., called in; and Examined.

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2408. *Chairman.*] WILL you state your position in the Colonial Office?—I am a Senior Clerk.

2409. How many years have you been there?—For 43 years; I think over 43 years.

2410. Have your duties led you to an acquaintance with the way in which the coloured troops in the Colonies are working?—Yes, chiefly as to the West Indies and Mauritius. That is my division of the business in the Colonial Office.

2411. Are there any coloured troops in the Mauritius?—No, none.

2412. They only exist in the West India Islands and in Ceylon, do they?—Only in the West India Islands, the West Coast of Africa, and Ceylon; that is, there are only two coloured corps, the one of which consists of the West India regiments and the other of the Ceylon Rifle Corps, the West India regiments being Negroes, and the Ceylon Rifle Corps Malays. My business has only led me to know something about the West India regiments in the West Indies.

2413. What number of regiments are there in the West Indies?—There are four Black regiments in the West Indies and on the West Coast of Africa together.

2414. What is the strength of them?—In the whole there are four regiments, each consisting of from 700 to 800 men; you may take it at about 700 effective (for which I suppose you may reckon from 700 to 800 gross numbers), and therefore there would be about 2,800 effectives altogether.

2415. They are officered, are they not, by English officers?—Yes.

2416. Do they have the full complement of officers which an English regiment has?—I do not know that; I believe they have.

2417. Do you know what their pay is?—I do not know; I think the pay does not differ from that of other regiments.

2418. It is the same as that of the other soldiers of the Line?—I think so.

2419. Then they are in no respect cheaper than English soldiers?—I believe not at all, except in this sense, that with English soldiers you have the expense of sending them backwards and forwards to England when invalided, and also for reliefs, which you have not in the case of the West India regiments.

2420. And another advantage is, I suppose, that they are better fitted to bear the climate to which they are exposed than European troops would be?—Yes, certainly.

2421. Do you know at all what the death rate among them is?—Between two and three per cent. in the West Indies; on the West Coast of Africa four per cent. That is a rather high death-rate, considering that they are in the prime of life,

2422. I suppose the management of them is exactly the same as that of a White regiment; for instance, they do not carry their families with them, or differ in any social peculiarity from any ordinary private soldier?—Not that I know of; they perform their own fatigue duties, which white soldiers do not generally perform in the Windward and Leeward Island command.

2423. Are they supposed to be good soldiers?—That rather depends upon the purpose to which they are to be applied. It is a question upon which I am entitled to speak, not as giving my own opinion, but from the opinions of governors who have reported very largely upon the subject. Nobody doubts that they are very good and brave troops against foreign aggression. Then, as to their value as against their own race in the West Indies, in case of internal disturbances, the doubt which has arisen is principally a doubt having reference to a change in the source whence the recruits were derived. Till some 15 or 20 years ago they were recruited mainly from the cargoes of captured slavers, and from the coast of Africa.

2424. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is to say, from liberated Africans, I suppose?—Yes, liberated Africans. When that source failed, when slavers ceased to be captured in any large numbers, they had to be recruited from Creole Negroes; and then arose the question whether, being recruited from their own race in the West Indies, they would act with fidelity against their own race in those Colonies. That is a question upon which divers opinions have been maintained; and I think that if I were to give the opinion to result from the balance of opinions upon the subject, I should say that they were supposed to be good as against their own race as well as against foreign aggression, provided they were combined with white troops, or not acting in the Colony in which they had been recruited (which is mainly Barbadoes), and provided they were well officered and well handled;

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which last is, however, rather a pregnant reservation in the case of the West India regiments; because I believe the officers are apt to be deteriorated in health by serving very long on the West Coast of Africa and in the West Indies.

2425. *Chairman.*] Then this comparative inferiority of the officers, owing to the circumstances of their service, is sufficiently grave to make you doubt on the whole, whether these troops could, under such officers, be employed safely against their own countrymen?—I think they could; but I do not regard it as certain that they could; and having only derived my opinions from an examination of the opinions of governors, who are entitled to form an opinion upon such a question, I should wish just to give the Committee a sort of summary of the opinions of the governors. If you will allow me, I will begin with an opinion, given rather more at large, of a governor, who was also a military man, Colonel Ord. He had experience in the West Indies as the Lieutenant Governor of Dominica; he has been on the Gold Coast too, I think; and being an engineer officer of considerable experience, I should take his opinion as having a double value, military and civil. On the 22nd of November 1860, he was called upon to report upon the subject, and I give these extracts from his report: "As far as I am informed, the black regiments are now recruited almost exclusively from West Indian creoles. Recruiting, I believe, takes place when in Africa, but not to any considerable extent; and it appears to be the present constitution of the regiments which has led to the inference that, if it became necessary to employ them in any popular disturbance, these troops would be found indisposed to act against the native population, from which class they are recruited. I do not know exactly how this inference has been created, but if it be simply an opinion, to this moment unsupported by facts, I take leave respectfully, but strongly, to urge that the superior officers of the corps ought to be able to speak with more certainty on the point than anyone else can possibly do. I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that there ought not to be the slightest reason for entertaining such a fear. All experience goes to prove that when once a man becomes a soldier, he loses his civilian tastes and his sympathy for the class to which he belonged. No doubt is ever entertained of the readiness of British troops to act under any circumstances against the people. The Irish police are not found to hesitate, even in that country of national sympathies, when their services are called for against their countrymen, and I can see no reason why there should exist in the West India regiments, even recruited as they now are, a different spirit from that which animates others of Her Majesty's troops. If their officers will but bestow upon them" (this comes, you see, to the question of the officers) "that care and sympathy to which they are entitled, if they will cultivate that relation with them which exists between the officers and men of those regiments standing highest in our service, it may safely be affirmed they will soon acquire an influence over their men which will justify any confidence that may be placed in them. In the absence of this intercourse between officer and soldier, there can be no certainty on the part of the former how far they can rely upon their men, and a force designed for protection becomes worse than useless, perhaps dangerous."

2426. Colonel *North.*] What is the date of that report?—The date of it is the 22nd November 1860; that is about seven years, I think, after the West India regiments came to consist of men recruited in the West Indies and not in Africa or from captured Africans. That, you see, is a very strong opinion, until you come to the condition which I before alluded to.

2427. You mean the question about the officers?—Yes.

2428. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I observe that he speaks of creoles; does he mean that there is any intermixture of blood, or does he mean merely Africans born in Barbadoes?—He means Africans born in the West Indies; the word "creoles," means persons born in the West Indies, without reference to blood; a white man may be a creole, and a black man may equally be a creole.

2429. *Chairman.*] Do the natives recruited from Barbadoes speak any dialect of their own or do they speak English?—All the negroes speak a sort of dialect, but it is intelligible to those who are at all used to them.

2430. It is not a special dialect that would be known to the other negroes in other islands?—It is merely a sort of barbarous English.

2431. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] There is no expression of opinion, as I gathered from the paper you read, on the part of Colonel Ord, that the officers have not that acquaintance with their men which is considered desirable?—No, it is hardly expressed. "If their officers will but bestow upon them, &c." "they will soon acquire, &c.": you must take that for what it is worth.

2432. There is no expression of opinion there?—No. I believe that there are very good officers in the West India regiments. Officers go into the West India regiments from other regiments to get a step in promotion earlier than they otherwise would do; they remain in them a certain length of time; and some of them are of high character, and have served, I believe, with great credit. But then there are other officers who have been perhaps, in point of health, too long resident in hot climates on the coast of Africa and in the West Indies. What I propose to do now is to give a summary of the opinions of other West Indian governors upon the West India regiments, not in their own language, but so far as may be done in a few words, giving the general effect of each governor's opinions. Sir Benjamin Pine——

2433. Will you state where he was governor?—He was Lieutenant Governor of St. Christopher's, and he was also on the West Coast of Africa; he had a good deal to do with black troops; he is now administering the government of the Leeward Islands. Sir B. Pine is against the black troops if recruited in the West Indies in cases of internal tumult. Sir Charles Darling, who was Governor of Jamaica, on three occasions, in St. Lucia 1849, in Jamaica twice in 1859, had employed blacks, in 1849 recruited from Africa, in 1859 recruited from the West Indies, against negro rioters, and they behaved well, only needing to be restrained. That, I think, is a point which should be taken into account in looking into the character of black troops; it is not fidelity only which is in question, but the degree of humanity and moderation with which they would act, even against their own race. They require, according to Sir Charles, more than other troops, to be well commanded. Governor Hincks thought there was

was great hostility in Barbadoes to blacks without whites; better none than blacks only. Governor Hincks is now in this country, and I believe that you could have no better civilian witness as to military matters in the West Indies. I do not know that I agree with all his opinions, but they are the opinions of a man who is peculiarly competent, so far as a civilian can be so, to form opinions upon the subject. Governor Bayley thought that negro regiments would be trustworthy for all purposes if half or a third are African, or if many are rural and not town creoles. I believe that that is a condition which cannot be fulfilled; you must in general, I believe, recruit from the town populations in the West Indies. This Governor, like others, adds the condition that they must be commanded by officers not the worse for the tropics; and he, like Sir C. Darling, thinks that they require restraint rather than stimulation. He recommends (and this is bearing directly upon your inquiry) mixing Madrasees, as well as African blacks, with creole blacks in the same regiment.

2434. *Chairman.*] The Madrasees are of course the coolies who have been imported?—No, he did not mean that; he meant to fetch recruits from Madras.

2435. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Whose opinion have you been quoting?—The opinion of Governor Bayley; he was Governor of the Bahamas in 1861. As to that recommendation, the question would be, it seems to me, whether in the same regiment you could compact together two different black races. I do not think you could; I believe that the different black races have more of an aversion to each other than whites and blacks have to each other. They have the aversion without the respect which is felt by the negroes for the whites.

2436. *Chairman.*] Have you any practical knowledge that leads you to that conclusion. I mean has it come before you officially in any way?—I hardly know whence I get the impression; I think I may say it has. Negro troops have been employed against Yucatecan Indians in British Honduras, and there is a very bitter hatred between the negroes and the Indians, which there is not between the whites and the Indians.

2437. Would it be a hatred that would make it impossible to employ both in the same ranks?—If not impossible, I should think inexpedient; it is a matter of opinion. I do not mean to say that a conclusive opinion can be formed upon that, but I should doubt very much whether it would be expedient to employ two distinctly diverse black races in one regiment.

2438. Are there not two aspects to that hostility; if it make their co-operation in the ranks somewhat difficult, would it not also make mutiny almost impossible?—Yes; that is the view of Governor Bayley.

2439. Will you proceed with any opinions you have to read?—Governor Bayley thinks that the Madras soldiers would take root in the soil, as the Malays do in Ceylon; that they would live there and have their families. Then I have the opinion of Governor Hamilton, who was Governor in Chief of the Leeward Islands, to the effect that blacks are not trustworthy in a black and white quarrel, unless there be white troops at hand. All the opinions I have hitherto quoted were delivered in 1861; those which follow in 1865. Governor Eyre thinks that "blacks without whites at hand, would be a source of danger in many West Indian towns." That was in March 1865, previously to the outbreak in Jamaica in October, in which the blacks did act with perfect vigour and fidelity against the negroes.

2440. Was there any instance of desertion or indoor treachery on that occasion among the black troops?—None whatever; they behaved perfectly well.

2441. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] You mean the Maroons?—No, I mean the West Indian regiments; it is true of both however. When I say they behaved well, I mean in point of fidelity. They required restraint; they were disorderly, and committed outrages.

2442. *Chairman.*] I speak merely of the question of fidelity?—As to fidelity, they were perfect. The last opinion I have to quote is that of Governor Walker, the Governor in Chief of Barbadoes and the Windward Islands, who would regard a black force as, in any outbreak, merely dangerous, and requiring the control of white troops.

2443. Did he found that upon any practical experience, or was it a general judgment?—I think, only upon general impressions. Those are the opinions which I have gathered from the despatches of Governors. Then I thought you might wish to be made acquainted with any facts and instances which might either illustrate the opinions or contravene them. The first instance I have to mention of the employment of black troops against negroes is of a date when creoles may not have been numerous in the West India regiments. In 1856, the negroes throughout British Guiana rose upon the Portugese immigrants. The Portugese immigrants, to the number of many thousands, had taken the huckstering business almost entirely into their own hands; all the small shops were in the possession of these immigrants; there was a great jealousy on the part of the negroes of the Portugese; and they were incited by a man who first began to agitate upon the question of Roman Catholicism as against the Portugese immigrants, and then instigated the blacks to make it a question of plunder; and they rose throughout the Colony.

2444. Do you mean to say that the blacks rose upon a Protestant cry?—The Governor said that this man began with preaching against the Roman Catholics; but that he knew what the state of feeling was, and his real object was to incite an outbreak of the negroes against the Portuguese immigrants for purposes of plunder.

2445. Is there a strong Protestant feeling amongst the blacks?—Not at all. This man was a mere adventurer, who was bent upon mischief, and he began it in that way.

2446. Major *Anson.*] They are almost entirely Baptists, are they not?—No, I think not; they vary much in different Colonies as to creed. I should think that in British Guiana the great majority are Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist, there are not many Roman Catholics amongst the negroes, and I should think very few Baptists.

2447. *Chairman.*] Will you proceed with the instances you were citing?—The Governor, Sir P. Wodehouse, reports, that "the whole country was, it may be said, in insurrection;" and he adds, "One thing is clear, that it is a strife of races." That is very important, looking to what

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what the black troops did. The Governor applied for a reinforcement of troops to the extent of 200, to be partly white troops if possible. Two hundred men were sent from Barbadoes, but they were all black. The garrison in the Colony at the time was 484 men, who were also all black. The troops were reported as having "toiled cheerfully and perseveringly in support of the Government." Now, that is a case in which the military force was entirely black; in which it was a rising of the black population, and in which the rising was put down by the black troops without any assistance from whites. At the same time they were well led upon that occasion (Colonel Whitfield was then in command of the troops there); so that it may be considered as an instance of black troops, not wholly or perhaps mainly creoles, being available against black populations, if well led. The next instance of riots is of some which occurred in Trinidad; but I think those were hardly important enough to be worth mentioning; it was a mere town riot, and the white troops were in a large majority, so that the black troops could not have behaved ill if they had wished. It is, therefore, scarcely to the purpose. In Antigua there were riots in 1858. There were, at that time, no troops in the island, and no militia, but the riots were put down by the police.

2448. Were the police blacks?—They were riots of the blacks; and the police were black. Then comes an important instance. In St. Vincent's there were riots in 1862, which extended throughout the country. Troops were sent there from Barbadoes, but they did not come in time, and the riots had been put down, not by the black troops of the West India regiments, but simply by the police and a local force of blacks, for the most part raised at the moment. The Lieutenant Governor, in reporting the fidelity of the blacks, says, "It had a discouraging effect upon the malcontent population to find that their own race would act against them when put under white leaders." In that case, too, the blacks were ably led by the Attorney General of the island, not a military man. Those are the instances I have collected.

2449. Then, as I understand you, there is no instance of blacks having been unfaithful to their colours, when opposed to insurgents of their own race?—I believe none.

2450. Of course if they had to deal with coolies of an Indian race there could be no doubt of their fidelity?—I should think none.

2451. Mauritius is in your department, I think?—Yes, it is.

2452. There are a very large number of coolies there, are there not?—The coolies are about five-sevenths of the population, they amount to 250,000 out of a population of 350,000, I think, speaking in round numbers.

2453. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What do the other two-sevenths consist of?—I can give it to you in round numbers; it is given in detail in a paper I have here, but if you do not want it in such detail, the population is about 350,000; the coolies 250,000, the negroes 100,000, and the whites, exclusive of the garrison, 4,000.

2454. *Chairman.*] Should you think that it was possible to raise a negro regiment in Mauritius, to replace the English troops?—I have never heard it suggested before; the negroes in Mauritius are a very lazy race.

2455. They are Mozambiques, I suppose, from the east coast of Africa?—I do not know; I should think very probably that a large proportion of them are the descendants of that race.

2456. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] They are the descendants of negro slaves, are they not?—Yes. I should doubt their being willing to serve as troops. They seem to be willing to do nothing almost, except huckstering and small shop-keeping; there are a few artisans; but they will not work in the fields; they work, I suppose, in provision grounds more or less; but they have sunk almost out of notice in the population. It might be tried to raise recruits from them. I suppose it would have been tried if the military authorities had thought they could succeed, because there has been great difficulty in getting recruits for the West India regiments. An attempt was made to raise a fifth West India regiment about two or three years ago, but it did not prosper; they raised about half after much delay, and then a decision was taken to reduce the garrisons on the West Coast of Africa, and it was disbanded.

2457. *Chairman.*] Do you know from what part of India the coolies in the Mauritius mainly come?—From Bengal mainly, from Madras partly.

2458. Do you know from what portion of Bengal?—I think not very far from Calcutta, and lately, in consequence of the famine, they have been taken from Orissa. I cannot give it to you more in detail than as distinguishing those from Bengal and those from Madras.

2459. Are they a docile and peaceable population?—I think they are, very.

2460. Have they ever shown signs in any of the West Indian Colonies of revolts?—Not the least.

2461. There has absolutely been no occasion upon which it has been necessary to employ force against them there?—No. Governor Manners Sutton reported upon them in reference to the garrison of Trinidad in the year 1865, and he said that they were a very harmless and peaceable race.

2462. Then you would not look upon a rising on their part as one of the dangers against which a garrison would have to provide?—I think not. They are capable of very ferocious private crimes, such as murders; but these arise mainly from quarrels about women, inasmuch as the women are not one-third of the number of the immigrants; and I think that that is quite a thing apart from their qualities as members of the community, and their dispositions as subjects of the State.

2463. Then there would be no danger in employing East Indian troops in the Mauritius, so far as the coolie population was concerned?—I think none.

2464. And still less in employing races from other parts of India from which they had not come?—I think there would be none. I should say, however, that there was a little alarm amongst the people of Mauritius after the outbreak of the Indian mutiny. When their garrison was taken away at the time of the Indian mutiny, they felt rather nervous about the number of Indians who were in the island without any garrison to control them. I do not believe that there was really much to be feared.

2465. It was an alarm that proved to be wholly groundless, as far as the actual facts were concerned, was it not?—It was; and there was this difference between the coolies and the Indian mutineers;

mutineers; that the coolies in Mauritius have hardly any religion at all; their religion has been almost entirely effaced and obliterated.

2466. Have you not had rather a serious controversy about decapitation, in consequence of their religious scruples?—If you call that religion; superstition on that point no doubt exists among them; they do not like having their heads cut off, because they conceive that after the head is cut off, the head and the body will wander about for many ages in search of each other, before they can meet: whereas if they are hung or strangled, they think they shall pass at once into another state in all their integrity.

2467. There are no dangers of their religious feelings or their caste feelings leading to any popular disturbance?—I think not.

2468. And you do not think that any strong bond of nationality exists between them which would induce them to act together?—That I do not know; if they were induced to act I should think they would act together. But I think their circumstances make them naturally contented; they get high wages and they thrive. If the women were equal in numbers to the men they would be in a very happy and prosperous condition. I do not see why they should revolt, not having, as I believe, any adequate religious feeling to make them desirous to disconnect themselves from European dominion.

2469. I suppose the inhabitants, not only of Mauritius but of most other English Colonies, would always prefer European troops to Asiatic troops?—No doubt.

2470. Do you think that that is a feeling arising from a greater sense of security, or from a point of honour?—A greater sense of security, I think.

2471. Do you think that the people of Mauritius would be seriously alarmed if the English garrison were replaced by Asiatics?—I think they would not like it at all.

2472. Do you think that their distaste would rise to such a point as to induce them to demur to the payment which they now contribute to those troops?—I think they would consider it a fair occasion to request to be relieved from their contribution.

2473. Which would they rather have, Asiatic troops or no troops at all?—I should think they would rather have Asiatic troops than no troops at all; but I speak merely as a matter of conjecture.

2474. The question has never been put to them, and therefore any impression as to their feelings must be a matter of conjecture?—I think they would not anticipate any such measure; I do not mean with a view to internal peace; but they would bear in mind that Mauritius is within a short distance of Bourbon, where a large garrison is kept, and whence it might be very possible, in case of a war with France, to send an expeditionary force. The Mauritius people would, therefore, think it very unlikely that this country would be content to trust that island to any troops but Europeans.

2475. What is the size of the Bourbon garrison?—I cannot tell you.

2476. Is it a European garrison?—I believe so.

2477. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Can you ascertain?—I will endeavour to do so.

2478. It must be known in the Colonial Office?—No, I think not. I am not sure that I can ascertain; I am rather at a loss to know where we should find it.

2479. Will you inquire, and let us know if you are able to find it out?—I will do so. (*See* Appendix.)

2480. *Chairman.*] Have you paid any attention to the question of the defence of Mauritius in time of war; has that come before your department at all?—Yes, I had a good deal to do with it some years ago, when it was proposed to erect very extensive fortifications for the defence of Port Louis.

2481. But you have erected very expensive fortifications, have you not?—Not nearly such expensive fortifications as it was proposed to erect.

2482. How many men are now required to hold Port Louis?—The garrison consists now of from 1,800 to 2,000 men.

2483. But how many men are required to man the fortifications in case of attack?—That I do not know; but when there was a question of erecting very extensive fortifications, far more extensive than those which were afterwards decided upon, it was found, I believe, that the number of troops required to man the proposed fortifications would be far too large to make it desirable that such fortifications should be erected; and it was also found that without those extremely expensive fortifications it was in vain to hope to maintain Port Louis against an attack by troops landed in other parts of the island; that you might defend the harbour and the access to the harbour, but that you could not prevent Port Louis being taken in reverse, and that no troops that you could at all afford to keep there habitually would be sufficient to hold Port Louis against such an expeditionary force as might be sent by surprise to attack it.

2484. Then Port Louis is absolutely defenceless at the present moment?—I should say that the real security of Mauritius consists in the fact that it is not worth taking, because, being taken, it could not be kept without maritime superiority.

2485. Then what is the use of the 2,000 men?—In the event of a war they would prevent insult by a privateer or capture by a small force. But I feel I am venturing upon opinions on military matters which are not quite within my competency.

2486. With reference to the force now maintained in Mauritius and the defensibility of it, I gather your general opinion to be, that the defence of Mauritius in case of an attack would depend more upon a fleet than upon the garrison. I think the utmost extent to which you said the existing garrison would be of service in repelling an hostile attack was in the case of an accidental insult from a privateer?—Yes; a privateer or a small expeditionary force. At the same time I should say that these are military opinions which I can give rather by reflection from the opinions of military men, than from any real opinion of my own; but I rather gathered, when the question arose about those fortifications, that that was the view that would be taken, and was taken, by military authorities of some weight.

2487. Therefore it would not be a matter of very great Imperial importance whether the 2,000 men who were in that garrison were Europeans or were Asiatics, with reference to the repelling of any external attack?—No, I think not. I think that the Mauritius people would exceedingly dislike to have the Europeans exchanged for Asiatics, and that their contribution, which is, I think, 48,000*l.*

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48,000 *l.* a year, if I recollect rightly, speaking from memory, would be considered too much.

2488. What is our contribution, do you know?—I do not happen to remember it at the moment.

2489. Major *Anson.*] It appears that the Colony pays 45,000 *l.* and the Imperial Government 132,000 *l.*?—I did not remember the amounts.

2490. *Chairman.*] Is there not something besides that; do you not think that the colonists would look upon it rather from the point of view of dignity, than of actual safety; or at least that they would look upon it from the point of dignity, as well as from the point of actual safety?—I do not know. One thing is, that we have very few English there; the colonists are mainly French, and if there were to be an expeditionary force from Bourbon, there would be no Anglo-Saxon nucleus of a population for a military force to rest upon. A force could rendezvous at Bourbon, I imagine, which could be sent on an expedition to Mauritius in greater strength than any garrison, either Sikh or European, could at the moment resist. But then, on the other hand, when an expeditionary force came to be sent to retake Mauritius, it would entirely depend upon maritime superiority whether the French would not have gone to the trouble of taking it to no purpose.

2491. There is no telegraph, is there, to Bourbon?—No.

2492. There would be no means of ordering from Europe such a sudden *coup de main* as you contemplate, so as to prevent the English Government having time, in case of war, to garrison Mauritius as it might think fit?—No, I should think not.

2493. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Could they not send overland by the French line of steamers, which now runs direct to Mauritius?—Yes.

2494. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Only from Suez?—Yes, I suppose so.

2495. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has not been uncommon in former wars, I believe, to give the Governors of Colonies, notice of the probability of war, so that they might be ready to act?—No; I suppose that must depend upon the circumstances under which war broke out.

2496. *Chairman.*] At all events the whole value of keeping the garrison, in case of such a contingency as that, would depend entirely upon the probability of the declaration of war coming with such rapidity that there would be no time to garrison Mauritius afresh?—Yes.

2497. And it is apparently purely for the sake of avoiding that contingency that we keep up this European garrison there?—That we keep it up to the force at which we do keep it up. I do not think that a Colony so large and important as Mauritius in point of numbers and wealth, could be left without some garrison competent to keep the peace in cases of any disturbance, (for though serious disturbance is not probable, it is, of course possible that there may be some disturbance), or as I said before, to beat off a privateer in case of war. Some garrison would always be required, I imagine, for such an important Colony as Mauritius.

2498. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Was the European garrison withdrawn at the time of the Indian mutiny?—Almost the whole of it, I think.

2499. And was there any volunteer force raised to take its place?—Not that I recollect.

2500. Do you think that the island remained without any military force for any considerable length of time?—I think it did for some time. Perhaps not without naval protection; that I do not recollect.

2501. Major *Anson.*] Considering that we pay three times as much for the defence of the Mauritius as the colonists do, we ought to have a far greater voice in the garrison we choose to keep there, ought we not?—Yes; but then it is to be borne in mind that it is only very lately that Mauritius has been called upon to pay the amount that it now pays.

2502. Can you tell me upon what grounds they are called upon to pay 45,000 *l.* towards the expenses of the garrison?—Only, I believe, upon the grounds that they ought to be partly at the expense of their own protection, and that they were a rich Colony which could afford to pay.

2503. Was it upon the principle that the troops are there to suppress any local disturbances?—Yes, and on that ground also.

2504. With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, I see that we pay not less a sum than 289,379 *l.* for the military defence of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and that the colonists only pay 41,000 *l.* towards their share. In the case of altering the garrison, they would not have any right to dictate to us what description of troops we should send there. In your opinion, it would be a matter for this country to decide, and not for the colonists of the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes, I think so.

2505. If we considered that native regiments from India were as efficient for the work that has to be done in the Cape as European soldiers, they could hardly raise any objection to our employing them, could they?—No, I do not think that they would have any right to raise an objection.

2506. Do you think that it would be likely that they would adopt any extreme measure if we chose to alter the garrison as we thought fit?—I should think it quite possible that they might be disposed to withdraw their contribution. Of course the answer to that would be the withdrawal of military protection; but when you come to that extremity, you come to a difficulty with your Colony, which it is not easy to get over.

2507. Do you think that such a result would be likely to occur merely from the exchange of one or two regiments?—I think that Colonies which have independent legislatures, and where the power of the Crown is very small, are very much disposed to have their own way upon all questions.

2508. Even though the Imperial Government pays for their defence?—Yes. Of course, there is always in reserve the power of the Crown to withdraw the military protection; but then that is a power which cannot be exercised except in deference to some necessity almost. I think what you have to do with Colonies in which the Crown is without legal power, is very much to consult their inclinations, and negotiate with them upon the ground of not coming to any extreme difference of view or opinion.

2509. Sir *James Fergusson.*] What do you exactly mean by a Colony in which the Crown has not legal power?—I mean Colonies in which a representative legislature has been constituted, and in which the Crown's only legislative power is the power of the veto.

2510. Major *Anson.*] Is that the case with the Cape

Cape at the present moment?—Yes, that is the case at the Cape.

2511. I see, in the case of the Australian Colonies, that our military expenditure for maintaining garrisons there amounts to 170,696 *l.*, and that the colonists only contribute towards that, 43,000 *l.*; should we have any difficulty, as far as you know, with those Colonies as to withdrawing any troops that they do not pay for?—I think that the arrangement with those Colonies was made upon the footing of so much a head of the soldiers, and that if you withdraw a soldier you forfeit the contribution for that soldier. I think it was 40 *l.* a head which was to be paid by the Colonies for the troops that were employed there; 40 *l.* a head for infantry, and 70 *l.* for artillery.

2512. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Which Colony was that?—The Australian Colonies.

2513. Major *Anson.*] Would not that come to a great deal more than 43,000 *l.* in the Australian Colonies?—Not if you exclude Tasmania, which, having been so recently a convict Colony, is exempted at present from any share of the cost of its garrison. I think 70 *l.* or 80 *l.* a head is considered to be the cost of British soldiers, exclusive of the recruiting expenses, the transport, the invaliding, and the barracks; and about 100 *l.* a head inclusive of those and other items. I am speaking from recollection, and without very accurate knowledge; and indeed there has been much difficulty in finding the way to any correct computation of the cost of a soldier.

2514. Do you know that the reason we keep up that force there is at the request of the Australian people themselves?—I believe so.

2515. At their request?—I do not know whether at any particular application or request, but this was the arrangement made with the colonists, consulting their own wishes as to the troops they would desire to have.

2516. Do you suppose that if we told them that if they wanted a regiment they should have it if they paid for it, there would be any objection on their part to our not spending money for maintaining garrisons in that country?—I hardly know enough of the Australian Colonies to answer that question; I have never had anything to do with the Eastern Colonies except Mauritius in business; I should rather not express an opinion upon that point.

2517. Do you know anything about Ceylon; I see by the Parliamentary Return laid before the House this year, that Ceylon contributes 160,000 *l.* towards our military expenditure there, and that our expenditure is 157,759 *l.*; will you say whether that is a mistake or not?—I cannot explain that. In 1864–5, the total cost was about 200,000 *l.*, paid in equal portions by the Imperial and local Governments. In 1867, the Colony is to pay 150,000 *l.*; in 1868, 160,000 *l.*; this country paying the balance of the whole cost.

2518. Do you know anything about the arrangement which has been come to with regard to the Straits Settlements, now that they are taken over by this country?—I believe there is an intention to increase the Ceylon Rifle Corps, the Malayan Corps, and to send some companies of that corps to the Straits. The Straits pay the whole cost of the garrison they require, viz., 59,300 *l.* for two batteries of Royal Artillery, and six companies of Ceylon Rifles. It is intended to station there a wing of an infantry regiment; but this is for Imperial purposes, and on Imperial account.

2519. Has the question of expenditure upon that garrison been a subject of consultation between this country and the Government of the Straits Settlements?—I do not know.

2520. I suppose you do not know how much India expended upon that Colony while they had control of it?—No; I have no knowledge about the Straits Settlements.

2521. Or what revenue they derived from that Colony towards the garrison?—No; I do not know that. The Ceylon Corps is considered to be a very efficient corps, and they have no objection to be detached eastward; they can be sent, I believe, to the Straits, and they can be sent to Hong Kong. But there is no restriction as to the number of wives and families in the corps, and the consequence of that is, that moving them backwards and forwards becomes expensive if they are taken to great distances.

2522. I think you made some objection to the West Indian Corps, and said that one of the consequences of their being local corps was that the officers had to live a long time in tropical climates, and thereby became deteriorated both in health and physically in every way?—Yes, so I understand.

2523. Do you not suppose that that applies very much to a local Ceylon Corps?—I think not quite so much; I believe that the officers of the Ceylon Corps are moveable by exchanges to other regiments.

2524. So are the West Indian officers, are they not?—Not practically, I believe, to quite the same extent. But I may be mistaken.

2525. They are on the same system?—Yes, they are on the same system; but practically, I think that a large proportion of the officers of the West India regiments remain in the West India regiments, and in tropical service, either in Africa or in the West Indies, for a great length of time, if not wholly.

2526. Do you not think that that is the case also with the Ceylon regiment, as they are on exactly the same system?—I have made inquiry about that, and I understood that it was not so; that the officers were not fixed in the same way to the corps in the Ceylon Rifles; but my inquiry was not made of a military authority, so that I cannot speak with certainty.

2527. In China we have a military expenditure of something like 228,000 *l.*, and the colonists in China only contributed 15,000 *l.* towards that sum; I suppose the inhabitants of Hong Kong, therefore, would have no voice at all in the matter of what sort of garrison we should keep up in that country?—No, certainly not. Their contribution is, however, a little more than the sum you mention. It is 20,000 *l.* In a former part of my evidence, when speaking of the riots in St. Vincent's, I had meant to advert to a passage in a despatch from Lieutenant Governor Musgrave, then Lieutenant Governor of St. Vincent's, now Governor of Newfoundland, which the Committee may think it worth while to have read. The gentleman who had been the most prominent person in putting down the insurrection in St. Vincent's wrote to Lieutenant Governor Musgrave to suggest that there should be a local European corps formed at the expense of the St. Vincent's Legislature;—a small corps, which should be officered from half-pay officers of the English army, and should serve in St. Vincent's permanently. Lieutenant Governor Musgrave stated his objections thus:

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thus: "I should have great misgivings as to the possibility of preserving effective discipline in a small, entirely local, and purely military body, with nothing to do, and destitute of prestige or control, not belonging to a portion of Her Majesty's regular army."

2528. That was with reference to establishing a local corps upon the same principle as the St. Helena Corps?—I do not quite know what the principle of the St. Helena Corps was.

2529. The St. Helena Corps, I believe, is a corps raised for service in St. Helena, from Englishmen?—It did not succeed, and was abolished, I believe.

2530. Was not there a question this year, I think, in the West Indies, of a European population applying for troops when they were apprehensive of an outbreak, I think it was in Honduras, and the military authorities offered to send them some black troops, negroes, and they declined to have them?—No. There was an invasion of the Colony of Honduras,—in November last I think it was,—by the Indians, and they were met by 120 black troops, under a Major Mackay. He met them in the bush, and the black troops behaved exceedingly well; they were for about 20 minutes in conflict with the Indians; some of them were killed. Major Mackay thought that he was going to be surrounded, and ordered a retreat to be sounded, and they would not retreat; he had it sounded a second time, and at last they were persuaded to retreat. Afterwards, the retreat seemed to be rather a disorderly one; it was carried a good deal further than was thought by some people to be necessary; and there is about to be a military inquiry into the conduct of Major Mackay.

2531. There was some case of the European population applying for European soldiers, and they were offered black troops, and the colonists begged that they should not be sent; they were rather afraid of them, and would rather have none at all?—That was not in Honduras; there have never been any but black troops in Honduras for many years.

2532. *Chairman.*] It was in Demerara I think?—Yes, very likely.

2533. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you mention the date of that transaction in Honduras?—I think it was in November; it was some time last autumn.

2534. You say that a military inquiry is about to be held?—Yes, it has been ordered; the Commander of the Forces in Jamaica has been ordered to go to Honduras to conduct the inquiry into it.

2535. You were giving an account of what is supposed to have taken place on the part of the black troops; did you give it from any official report?—I have not the official report here, but I speak from recollection of an official report.

2536. From the Governor of the Colony?—From the Lieutenant Governor. There were very few officers with the garrison, and one of them was an invalid and unable to accompany the troops.

2537. I presume that it is on the report you allude to, that the inquiry has been ordered?—Yes.

2538-9. Major *Anson.*] Our expenditure in the West Indies amounts in round numbers to something like 276,000*l.*?—Yes.

2540. To which the colonists do not contribute a single farthing?—They do not contribute.

2541. And the duty which our troops have to perform there is almost entirely in the nature of a local police, is it not?—Except at Jamaica, where there is a dockyard, and a naval station, and a naval hospital.

2542. Is there a Royal dockyard in Jamaica?—Yes. Jamaica might serve as a naval base of operations, which is a distinction to be taken in the case of Jamaica from our other West Indian Colonies.

2543. With the exception of that one place, almost all the duties the British troops have to perform in the West Indies are of a sort of local police nature, are they not?—I believe so. I think the subject was fully gone into in a Committee of which the noble Lord in the chair was a member,—the Colonial Military Expenditure Committee. There is not one station in the West Indies, with the exception of Jamaica, which there could be any hope of defending against a considerable expeditionary force. All that the local garrisons can do is to beat off a privateer, and to keep peace in the Colony. They are there for the suppression of disturbances; and in case of war, for the beating off of one or two privateers.

2544. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What do you mean by police duty?—I mean military duty in the sense in which military duty is performed in this country by troops who are called to assist a civil magistrate in suppressing tumult; they are required there as well as here.

2545. Major *Anson.*] Do you agree with the opinion expressed in this paragraph of the Report of that Committee to which you have just referred: "With respect to the West Indies, it appears that about 4,200 troops (consisting of European and coloured regiments in nearly equal proportions) are now maintained there, mainly for the purpose of securing those Colonies against internal disorder; that the defence in time of war of these possessions of the British Crown, as well as of other distant Colonies, must be principally naval; and that it is for many reasons inexpedient that the duty of a local police should be performed by scattered detachments of Imperial troops at the cost of this country"?—No, I should say that I do not agree in it totally; I cannot agree in the whole of it. I think that if you are to keep those Colonies at all you must take care of them, in the sense of having some such military assistance as is necessary in support of the civil power in case of tumults and disturbances; and then as to their power of paying for it, I should think that very many of them cannot afford to pay for it; and there is another difficulty in their paying for it—that each island if required to pay for it, would expect to have a detachment within its own precincts; whereas I believe every military authority would condemn the notion of detaching a company here and a company there, or half companies, as disorganising to the army, and not consistent with military discipline.

2546. Still that is done to a very large extent in the West Indies, at the present moment?—Not to a very large extent, I think. We have a small detachment, about 150 men, in British Guiana, and another such in Trinidad, and not a very small detachment, about 500 men, in the Bahamas; all the rest are either at Jamaica or Barbadoes, which are head quarters of commands; so that it is only in two places in the West Indies that you have small detachments. In British Guiana

Guiana I think there are usually one company of whites and two of blacks, and there are two white companies in Trinidad. Those are the only places in the West Indies where there are any very small detachments.

2547. Do you not think that they might be called upon to pay some share, or to provide in some way for their own internal peace?—If you mean those Colonies where the troops are stationed, excluding those for whom they are to be also available where they are not stationed, then it would come to be a difficult question to arrange what was due from each Colony. For instance, in Barbadoes there are troops, I suppose, to the extent of about 1,100. The monthly distribution for March gives 1,017 effectives. We might call upon Barbadoes to pay for some of those 1,100 men; but Barbadoes has an independent legislature, which can do as it likes. You cannot make it pay. If you were to say, "Pay, or we shall withdraw the troops," the answer is, you would imperil not only Barbadoes, but all the islands in the Carribean Sea, which depend upon the troops at Barbadoes for detachments being sent when they require protection. Therefore Barbadoes is tolerably sure of having a garrison, more than sufficient for itself, for general West Indian purposes,—for Windward and Leeward Island purposes.

2548. Why should not those other Colonies pay a small share in prospect of the future benefit, in case of a riot, of being able to withdraw troops from Barbadoes?—I presume you mean those Colonies where you do not station troops, but which would call for troops if an emergency arose. They might be called upon to pay a share, but they would always have the answer, "The troops are distant; you do not give them to us to be on the spot when the emergency arises; all the mischief may be done before the troops arrive; we have to beat up to windward, to Barbadoes, to send word that we want them, and then the troops have to go from Barbadoes to us;" and they would probably add, "All we shall have to suffer will be suffered before they come." They would say (not very justly, but plausibly enough for their plea) that they were not worth very much to them.

2549. A proposition was once made to organise a local police force upon the principle of the Irish constabulary, I believe?—It was made by Governor Hincks; I mentioned before that his evidence would be valuable to the Committee.

2550. Do you not think that that would be a better plan than employing our own soldiers; the colonists would be obliged to pay for it themselves, then?—That is what they have to do now. Those Colonies, which are the greater in number, where no troops are stationed, have to provide for their own security by their own police, at their own cost, but still having that resource, in case of extreme and prolonged emergency, of sending to Barbadoes for troops. And St. Vincent's has just now said that it would like to have a company of British troops at its own cost, and is going to get them. But that Colony can afford to pay for them; I am afraid that the others may not be so able; very few, I am afraid, of those Colonies can afford to pay for them. It will cost St. Vincent's between 3,000 *l.* and 4,000 *l.* a year, I think; and that would come in the case of some of those Colonies to almost a fifth or sixth of their whole revenue. It would be a serious charge upon them, and I do not think they could afford it.

2551. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The chief military expenditure at the Cape is for the defence of the frontier, is not it?—Yes, I believe so; I am not conversant with Cape affairs.

2552. You do not know, then, whether the colonists would not prefer, as they did in the case of New Zealand, to manage their own internal wars?—I do not.

2553. With reference to your having stated that the force at the Mauritius and other small Colonies was sufficient to beat off a privateer, it might so happen that a squadron able to land a couple of thousand or 1,500 men might attack one of those Colonies, in which case would it not be desirable to have a garrison sufficient to beat off an attack of that kind?—Yes, I think it would be desirable to have a garrison of such strength as to beat off a small expeditionary force; such a force as might be sent by surprise from Bourbon, for instance, against Mauritius.

2554. But for instance, a French squadron cruising either in the West Indies, or in the East Indies, consisting of four or five ships, perhaps one of the line, and three or four corvettes, might land a very large force at Ceylon, or in any Colony that they happened to choose to attack, probably that would be the form which the attack would take, would it not?—Then in that case, I think that the question would be, whether we can afford to keep up permanently and habitually in a Colony, such a force as an outbreak of war might make it desirable to have there when the outbreak should take place; which I do not think we could in all our Colonies; then as then; I should think that we must rely upon meeting the emergency as it arises.

2555. Marquis of *Hartington.*] I gather from your answers to some previous questions that you would anticipate serious difficulties with some of the Colonies in the event of its being determined to send Indian instead of British troops to them?—Yes; I think those Colonies which pay for troops would consider that they ought to have British troops.

2556. And although it would of course be in the power of the Imperial Government to decide what the garrison should be in any case, you yourself would attach great weight to the feeling of the Colonies, should you not?—Yes; I should attach a good deal of weight to it; I would not defer to it implicitly.

2557. Do you think that in any case the difficulties which might arise with a Colony from their aversion to the proposed arrangements might be so great as to be almost insuperable?—I think where the Colony pays, the difficulties would be perhaps insuperable.

2558. Do you think there would be no difficulty where they do not pay?—There would be no difficulty that you need find insurmountable.

2559. For instance, in Hong Kong, where they do not pay much, would there be very great difficulty in carrying out the proposed substitution, supposing it was against the feeling of the Colony; would not the colonists be inclined to think that they no longer derived any benefit whatever from the connection with this country?—No; I should think that the aversion would not go to that extent; a good deal would depend upon what the troops proved to be when they had had experience of them; but I should not think that matters would go to that length in an Asiatic colony upon the mere name of the troops being Asiatic.

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2560. Supposing the aversion was very strong, it would be very difficult to force upon a Colony a garrison which it did not want, would it not?—I imagine that there is now no anticipation of a difficulty in sending Malayan troops from Ceylon to Hong Kong.

2561. That is in addition to an European force, it is not in substitution for it?—Yes. I apprehend, then, you were supposing a case where there should be no Europeans.

2562. If you propose to withdraw Europeans altogether, and to substitute an Asiatic force instead, would you think it right even in the case of Hong Kong, which does not contribute largely, to insist in opposition to the wishes of the colonists upon making an entire substitution of that kind?—Yes, unless they chose to pay for their preference for European troops.

2563. Then, in your opinion, it is a question of payment or non-payment?—I think that the payment would be a test of what the substantial reason for the aversion amounted to, and also of the intensity of the aversion. If they chose to pay for their preference, you would know their preference to be founded on something more than an imaginary or fanciful ground of preference.

2564. You are aware that in many cases the Colonies are now doing something for their own defence in the way of raising militia and volunteers?—Yes.

2565. I think you say you have some knowledge of the Cape?—No, I have almost no knowledge of the Cape. The West Indies and Mauritius is my field of knowledge.

2566. I believe there are no militia or volunteers raised in any of the Colonies about which you have been questioned yet?—Yes, in the West Indies there are generally corps of volunteers and militia. In Mauritius there is none. I have a return of militia and volunteer corps here.

2567. *Chairman.*] Will you put that return in?—Yes, I am afraid it is not of very late date, but it is the latest that I could procure. (*The same was handed in,* vide *Appendix.*)

2568. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Would not the substitution of Asiatic for British troops be rather a discouragement to the Colonies in the matter of raising militia and volunteers. Is not the presence of British troops rather an encouragement to them?—No, I think not; because now in Barbadoes the Governor has found very great difficulty in raising a volunteer corps or an effective militia, really on the ground that the Colonists conceived that whether they exerted themselves or not, the head quarters of the Windward and Leeward Islands' command being at Barbadoes, there would always be an adequate European force there for their purposes, that is to say, for the mere defence of Barbadoes. The force intended for the defence of the whole of the Windward and Leeward Islands having its head quarters at Barbadoes, and only two small detachments being elsewhere, namely, in Trinidad and British Guiana, it followed that the colonists thought they could afford to dispense with efforts of their own, in reliance upon that necessary presence of the British troops at the head quarters of the command.

2569. In the case of their services being required, would not a small British force be a sort of nucleus to the militia and volunteers?—No doubt it would.

2570. And without the presence of some such small force, might they not think it hardly worth their while to organise themselves in that manner. An Asiatic Force would not form a similar nucleus, I suppose?—No, hardly; but I do not think that the presence of troops would promote the formation of local volunteer or militia corps.

2571. You do not think that the presence of British troops would do so?—No; not the presence of British troops: the presence of black troops, of the troops of West India regiments, would not dispense with the formation of local volunteer and militia corps; but the presence in any adequate number of British troops would, I think, dispense in their apprehension with the necessity of forming them; it would, at any rate, tend to dispense with it; they might perhaps still be urged and induced to raise a militia or volunteer corps, as they have in the case of Barbadoes.

2572. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I wish to ask you a question, in order to make this question of the payment more clear. I presume that in those Colonies where there is a local legislature, the amount of contribution to be paid by the Colony for military expenses is passed every year by the legislature in an annual vote, in the assembly at the Cape of Good Hope for instance, and in Australia?—I do not know whether they are annual votes, or whether they are more permanent charges upon the revenue of those Colonies. In the West Indies, with which I am acquainted, there are no such votes.

2573. It is dependent at any rate upon the decision of the Assembly, the Assembly having the power of taxation in its own hands?—Yes, in the chartered Colonies, not in the Crown Colonies.

2574. In the Crown Colonies, such as Ceylon and the Mauritius, where there are no local legislatures, I presume that the amount of the military contribution to be paid is virtually arranged between the Colonial Office and the War Office in London?—No, because there always is a local legislature with a certain number of colonists in it. In the Mauritius there is a majority of unofficial colonists in the Legislative Council; it is true they are nominees of the Crown, and the Crown has a very considerable influence in the legislature; but it is not an influence which it would wish, I imagine, to push to any extreme point, so as to carry its own views against a large majority of the colonists in the legislature.

2575. I believe they call it the Council at Mauritius?—Yes.

2576. Would the Council have the power of vetoing this military contribution if they did not approve of the constitution of the garrison?—They would not have the legal power, because, although the Crown may be very unwilling to resort to such an extreme exercise of power, yet the Crown could lawfully, if it saw fit, pass an Order in Council, which would be binding upon the community of Mauritius.

2577. In Ceylon, how would the popular opinion express itself upon the subject?—It would not express itself conclusively, or, perhaps, effectively, if the Crown insisted upon a given contribution.

2578. In reality, taking Ceylon and Mauritius, is there any means of ascertaining the real views of the colonists in regard to the amount of military contribution which they pay and the military defence which they get for it?—It rather depends upon what you call the colonists;

nists; because, if all the inhabitants of a Colony were called colonists, you would have a population which cannot be supposed to have any voice at all upon any such question. But if you come to the merchants and planters, who are perhaps more commonly called the colonists, their voice would be expressed by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, who might be considered as representing their views; and in dealing with the legislature of a Colony of that kind, though the Crown may, in the last resort, have absolute power, it is a power which would not, I imagine, be pushed to any extreme legal bound or limit; there would be a certain respect evinced for any general feeling on the part of the unofficial members of the legislature, unless their feeling were a very unreasonable and unwarrantable feeling.

2579. And you are of opinion, from what you know of Mauritius, that the general feeling would be against the substitution of native troops for the European garrison?—Yes, I have no doubt of that.

2580. And you think that that feeling would be expressed through the channel you have indicated, namely, by the unofficial members of the legislature?—Yes, I do not doubt it.

2581. Mr. *Oliphant.*] In the Cape the Government is a responsible one; in Ceylon it is not a responsible Government, is not that the case?—Ceylon is a Crown Colony in the strictest sense of the word.

2582. Therefore, in the Cape, there might be a much more distinct manifestation of public opinion shown than in Ceylon?—Yes; I think with regard to the Cape, practically, you have no power, except the power of withdrawing the troops they will not pay for; that would be the real remedy.

2583. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Some Governors of the West India Islands have, I think, from what you read or stated to us, expressed an opinion that black troops are not required there?—I think that, generally speaking, the Governors are indifferent to the presence of black troops with white troops, and opposed to the presence of black troops without white troops; but I was speaking, in that case, of opinions expressed in the year 1861, which were gathered from all the Governors in that year. Since then there has come the Jamaica outbreak, and that, I think, ought to modify, and probably has to a considerable extent modified, the opinion previously entertained of the black troops; because in the Jamaica outbreak of October 1865, the black troops were employed with good effect, and with not the slightest doubt apparently of their fidelity; and when troops were called for as a reinforcement from Barbadoes, it was black troops which were sent. It is true that white troops were co-operating with them, even in St. Thomas-in-the-East; and other white troops were not far distant at Newcastle Barracks; so that the black troops had the white troops over them, even if not close upon them. However, there was never the slightest doubt apparently, or hesitation, about detaching black troops, even at the first moment of the outbreak, to protect the white inhabitants, including the women and children, from the insurgents. That, I think, ought to make a considerable change in the distrust which had been theretofore expressed as to the fidelity of the black troops.

2584. Have any Governors expressed an opinion, to your knowledge, that they could do without European troops in the West Indies?—Governor Hincks, who was Governor of Barbadoes and the Windward Islands, and is now Governor of British Guiana, has expressed an opinion that a constabulary, like the Irish constabulary, might be formed, which would dispense with European troops to a great extent.

2585. Is that constabulary to consist of Irishmen?—No. You would hear, if you summoned him before you, more distinctly from him what his views are upon the subject. I do not myself quite understand how a constabulary raised from the population of the islands would be more trusted by the whites than the black troops, raised also from the population of the islands.

2586. Did you understand his recommendation to apply to his particular island or islands, or to the West Indies generally, and altogether?—I think that at one time he applied it to the islands generally; he has lately proposed it for British Guiana specifically and separately. It was in 1861, I think, that his more extensive scheme was propounded; and we must always recollect that since the Jamaica outbreak, if there is a more favourable feeling in regard to black troops, there is also a greater fear of the populations of these islands, and the possibility of revolts and disturbances is more distinctly recognised; so that I do not know whether Governor Hincks would now go as far as he once did in his views of the extent to which a constabulary force might dispense with European troops.

2587. Have you any knowledge of any objections that have been raised by military men or others to the employment of European troops in the West Indies without any native troops?—Yes, the Horse Guards have raised strong objections to the employment of white troops without black troops. The first objection was, that the blacks were required to perform fatigue duties for the whites; but I think that objection proved to be inapplicable to the Windward and Leeward Island command, because it turned out that the white troops had a corps of military labourers to perform their fatigue duties, and that the blacks did not perform the fatigue duties for the whites, but only for themselves.

2588. I think when some of the black troops were taken away to the West Coast of Africa, there was an arrangement made to increase the number of military labourers, for the purpose of avoiding fatigue duties being thrown upon the white troops; have you any knowledge of that?—I have no knowledge of that; but according to my recollection, the taking away of the black troops would not have any effect upon the whites as to fatigue duties, because the fatigue duties for the whites were always performed, not by the black troops, but by military labourers, a corps maintained, at a considerable cost, for that purpose.

2589. There are a good many duties performed by black troops in the low parts of the islands, in parts of the islands near the water's edge, which are very unhealthy to be performed by white troops, are there not?—So it was stated, but I think our Governors in the Windward and Leeward Islands, and in British Guiana, did not agree in that statement. I think Governor Hincks, who was in British Guiana, said that guard was not mounted at any post where it was not mounted alternately by black and white troops,

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troops, without injury to either; and I think that Governor Walker said that in Barbadoes there was no post where they might not be equally employed. I recollect its being said that military labourers were necessary for the purpose of carrying their food to the sentries and guards, and for various purposes in which white soldiers would be exposed to the sun; and I made some inquiry of Governor Hamilton, who was over in this country, upon that point; and he said that Europeans in the islands habitually walked in the sun for moderate distances, and that the white troops, in his opinion, would be none the worse, but rather the better, for having some active exercise and duty to perform.

2590. Kingston and Port Royal are somewhat unhealthy ports in Jamaica, are they not?—Yes, I believe they are not very healthy. I was speaking of the Windward and Leeward Islands.

2591. Barbadoes is one of the healthiest islands of the whole of the West Indies, is it not?—Yes. I do not know whether they have found the barracks as healthy as might be expected in so healthy an island.

2592. But Kingston and Port Royal in Jamaica are unhealthy places, are they not?—Kingston and Port Royal are unhealthy places, I believe, for white troops.

2593. There are a great many duties to be performed there?—Yes, which are performed by black troops. In Jamaica I believe black troops to be very desirable for the performance of duties which white troops cannot so well perform. The white troops are in the Newcastle barracks, which are healthy, and there are duties to be performed, as you say, at Kingston and Port Royal.

2594. Which would be injurious to the health of the European troops, if they were thrown upon them?—Yes, just so.

2595. As a matter of policy, should you think it was expedient to withdraw European troops from all our West Indian possessions?—No; I should think it inexpedient.

2596. You think that it is right, as a matter of policy to maintain a small reserve force there in support of the Civil Governments of those islands?—I think so.

2597. So long as we maintain them as British possessions?—I think so.

2598. Are you of opinion that Mauritius is an important post to us for our commerce in both war and peace?—It is important to our commerce; and in war, as a military and naval station; it can hardly, however, be called a very important naval station, because, I believe, it cannot be occupied as a naval station at all times of the year; but as a military station, and a place of occasional refuge in time of war, it is important.

2599. And as a coaling depôt in time of war?—I do not think it is used as a coaling depôt.

2600. Would it not be of great importance as a coaling depôt in time of war, as being a half-way house between India and the Cape?—Perhaps it might; I do not know.

2601. Port Louis is a good harbour now during the greater part of the year, is not it?—Yes, I believe it is.

2602. Have you any knowledge as to whether there is any good harbour in the Island of Bourbon?—No good harbour, as far as I know.

2603. Can you tell the Committee what the fortifications are which exist at Port Louis?—No; I have not sufficient military knowledge to say.

2604. You do not know the names of the principal forts?—No.

2605. You do not know the number of them?—No.

2606. I suppose you scarcely know the size of them?—No.

2607. I need hardly ask the question, then, you are scarcely aware with what special object the new works have been constructed?—They, no doubt, were constructed with a view to make the town somewhat less vulnerable.

2608. They were constructed for purposes of defence, of course?—Yes.

2609. Beyond that, you do not know whether they were constructed specially for the defence of the town or the harbour, or as against a landing?—No.

2610. You stated that the population of the Mauritius was, in round numbers, 250,000 coolies, 100,000 negroes, or negro descendants, and 5,000 Europeans?—Yes, about those numbers.

2611. Of which 5,000 Europeans the most part are of French descent?—Yes. I can give you the numbers of the population with more accuracy and with a more detailed classification, thus:

1st.	Whites—	
	Not British subjects - -	2,709
	British subjects (English origin) - - - -	1,444
2nd.	Coloured—	
	French Creoles of mixed blood - - - -	10,385
3rd.	Negroes - - -	101,097
4th.	Indians and Chinese	246,049
	TOTAL - -	362,684

2612. Then of the European population there are about 1,400 in round numbers, who are British subjects by birth?—Yes, just so.

2613. Do you think that under such circumstances the maintenance of a garrison there, composed of English troops, is a prudent policy?—Yes.

2614. And would it be an imprudent policy to withdraw it and substitute for it an Asiatic force?—Yes, I think it would be imprudent to withdraw the British garrison and substitute an Asiatic force, in so important a Colony with so little of an internal support to any military force in the shape of a population of the Anglo-Saxon race.

2615. You think both with reference to its importance in time of peace as a rich Colony, and also with reference to its possible importance, in time of war, as having a pretty good harbour where harbours are rare, that it is of importance to maintain a European force there for its defence?—Yes.

Tuesday, 7th May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Lord William Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	

THE HONOURABLE MAJOR ANSON, IN THE CHAIR.

Captain WILLIAM ROBERT MENDS, R. N., C. B., called in; and Examined.

Capt. *W. R. Mends*, R.N., C.B.

7 May 1867.

2616. *Chairman.*] As the Committee wish to institute a comparison between the cost of the transport of native troops and Europeans from the different ports in India to China, and from China to India, would you be able by extending the period from five to ten years or so, to give us the cost of both the European and native troops, in each of those cases?—Certainly; we can give the entire cost from our department for many years past.

2617. Will you hand that return in to the Committee as soon as you have made it out, according to this form (*handing a Paper to the Witness*)?—Yes; I shall be able to furnish it.

Lieutenant Colonel LAWRENCE SHADWELL, called in; and Examined.

Lieut. Col. *L. Shadwell.*

2618. *Chairman.*] THIS paper which has been printed in "Appendix No. 8," was, I believe, handed in by you?—Yes; that is the original, and this is a supplementary paper of the expenses at the Cape, which was not asked for in the first instance (*producing the same*).

2619. Does the first item of your estimate, namely, "Regimental Pay and Allowances," include the twopence a day which has been recommended by the Government, on the report of the Recruiting Commission?—No; it does not.

2620. Would you put in, as an Appendix to this paper, the amount which that would come to?—Certainly, I will give the Committee the amount which the regimental pay and allowances would come to, if the troops were receiving the extra twopence a day.

2621. Under the head of "Special Allowances," what items come in?—Those are allowances to officers only; they include forage and all things of that sort.

2622. Does the item of "Regimental Pay and Allowances" include any colonial grants of money to the soldiers?—No, that is the actual regimental pay and allowances which they draw according to their respective ranks.

2623. In any of those Colonies are there any colonial allowances to the men?—Yes. The question of allowances in Australia is still unsettled.

2624. Which are not included in the return?—No, everything is included in this return; it is the whole of the actual cost.

2625. It includes the actual colonial allowances?—Yes, everything.

2626. With regard to the fourth item, the "Cost of Provisions, Forage, Transport (including Wives and Children)"; that is only the cost of transport in the Colony, is it not?—Yes, that is the internal transport.

2627. With regard to the item of "Barrack Expenses," that, I suppose, is only the annual repairs of the barracks?—That means fuel and light, lodging money and barrack furniture; nothing else.

2628. How comes the item for barrack expenses in China to be so very high?—Because there are so many hired buildings there; I particularly asked that question.

2629. There is a note explaining it?—Yes.

2630. What steps are being taken now, with regard to building barracks in China?—That question I cannot answer; the subject is entirely out of my department, but I can easily get the information for the Committee; I know that there are some papers relating to it at present in the office; I do not think anything has been actually determined; I think one item under consideration is the construction of a barrack at Kowloon.

2631. Can you hand in to the Committee any papers with reference to the building of any barracks either in that or any other part of China, in the Straits Settlements, or in Ceylon?—I can ascertain what there is in the office; at this present moment I do not know, because it is not a question which ever comes before me.

2632. With regard to the item, "Average Cost per annum of Arms, Accoutrements, Ammunition," does that only represent wear and tear?—It represents the original cost of the arms and accoutrements, spread over the term that the arms and accoutrements are supposed to last, or will last, together with the cost of maintenance.

2633. The next item is "Pay of Invalids, Time-expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the Year"; I apprehend there is no passage money included

Lieut. Col. *L. Shadwell.*

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included in that, or the cost of provisioning them on their return?—No, that is the actual pay of the men on board ship. I must tell you that this approximate estimate is framed on the supposition that a regiment goes to a colony, and is relieved in 10 years; it is over a space of 10 years; of course it very often happens that a regiment goes to three colonies in the course of its 10 years' service abroad.

2634. Does the next item, namely, "Depôt Charges (including Recruiting Expenses) Establishment of Depôt" include the bounty, the free kit, and everything?—It includes the depôt companies and everything connected with recruiting of every sort and kind; all the expenses connected with the recruits that join those particular depôts.

2635. With regard to the next item, namely, "Average Annual Charge for Pay during the Period of Relief, taking the Average Service of a Battalion abroad at 10 years," is that simply the cost of paying the troops, that is to say, the agency or the loss on exchange?—No, that is supposed to be the average annual charge for pay during that period of relief. Of course you must multiply that by 10 in order to get the whole sum.

2636. What is the actual charge intended for?—It is merely the pay which those people receive.

2637. For paying the troops?—Yes, for paying the troops.

2638. Does the item "Medical and Purveyors' Expenses" include all the hospital charges, the cost of dieting the men in hospital, and so on?—Yes, and medicines.

2639. It includes every expense of that kind?—Yes, medicines are a very small item, I should think.

2640. Will you procure from the War Office and hand in to the Committee, as soon as you possibly can, any papers connected with building barracks in China, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon?—Yes.

2641. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Stating the places at which they are to be built?—Yes; I understand that the Committee wish to know what steps are being taken to provide barracks in China, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon, specifying the places where they are to be built. The witness who will attend the Committee from the War Office on the subject will be able to state the extent of the accommodation.

2642. Colonel *North.*] Is this sum of 26,901 *l.* in China all for the hire of buildings; there is a remark at the bottom with regard to the expenditure in China for the hire of buildings being exceptionally high?—The item of barrack expenses includes the hire of buildings in China, because they have an immense quantity, an exceptional quantity, of hired buildings in China.

2643. The whole of that sum is for the hire of buildings?—No, it includes also the fuel and light, the lodging money, and the expense of barrack furniture.

2644. Is the expense of the hut which has been built in Kowloon included in that?—I do not know; that subject does not come under my official recognisance, but this item is taken to include everything which is paid for under the barrack Vote, in which the hire of buildings is included.

Tuesday, 14th May 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.
Viscount Cranborne.
Sir James Fergusson.
Marquis of Hartington.
Lord William Hay.
Captain Hayter.
Colonel Percy Herbert.
Mr. Laing.
Colonel North.
Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Vivian.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Sir ROBERT MONTGOMERY, K.C.B., called in; and further Examined.

Sir *R. Montgomery*, K.C.B.

14 May 1867.

2645. Major *Anson.*] IN answer to the last question that was put to you when you were before the Committee, you alluded to the proposal of employing Indian troops in the Colonies as one to be tried on a small scale at first. I suppose you are aware it has been constantly done, for many years past, in China, Singapore, and Aden?—I alluded to the Sikh troops. I was not aware that it had been tried with Sikh troops.

2646. With regard to all other races, it has been tried in those colonies, with troops from Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, I believe?—Do you allude to Burmah?

2647. I allude to Burmah, to Singapore, to China, and to Aden?—I was aware that it had been lately done in the case of Aden, as well as Burmah; but I was not aware that native troops had been employed in garrisoning Singapore and China.

2648. With regard to Singapore, the garrison there has been found from Bengal and Madras for the last 50 years, I believe, without any European soldiers at all, or with only a few Europeans as an exceptional thing?—Yes.

2649. You never heard of those troops ever having made complaints with regard to their caste prejudices having been offended in any way?—No, never.

2650. All the difficulties that have ever arisen in India as to employing troops beyond seas have simply arisen upon questions of infringement of their pay regulations, I believe; can you speak to that point at all?—No, I cannot; I have no experience upon it.

2651. We have got a minute here of the Marquis of Tweeddale, in which he refers to very great hardships having been undergone by the Indian troops who had been employed beyond seas in Ava and in China, in 1844, and he gives a long account of those hardships, and of their losses: he says, "The first reinforcement to the corps in Ava was supplied partly by recruits, but chiefly by volunteers from different regiments, to the number of 600; these men all knew that they were wanted to fill up the places of the sick and dead, and they were for some time at Wallajahbad, preparatory to their embarkation, yet all went forward cheerfully. The average number of sick and wounded at Wallajahbad during the same year was 470, reaching at one time to 817, of whom 105 died in hospital; the recruits had thus constantly before their eyes numbers of wretched sufferers from sickness and wounds, and had full opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the nature of the service on which they were to be employed, and of the privations to which they were likely to be exposed, yet without any bad effect; no feeling of dissatisfaction was engendered, nor did foreign service become in consequence unpopular. The recruits were still found perfectly willing to embark; upwards of 2,000 embarked in successive detachments;" do you think that that good feeling on the part of the natives in Madras and Bengal would be imitated by the natives in the Punjaub?—I suppose it would; but I might ask whether those troops received any additional pay on going to the Colonies.

2652. They received their usual batta?—I should imagine that there would be no difference between the Sikhs and the other natives.

2653. Only one case has been brought before this Committee, of discontent on the part of the Sikhs employed abroad, which was a case of a Sikh battalion raised for service in Ceylon; do you know anything with regard to that case?—Yes, I do know generally about it. I have not the details very particularly. I remember a communication being received at Lahore, which was sent by the Supreme Government to the local government of the province. It was to the effect that the Ceylon Government were desirous of raising a corps of pioneers for service in Ceylon. It appears that after the siege of Delhi, two pioneer corps were raised; they were very popular corps, and subsequently did very good service in Oude, and indeed wherever they had been they had been found very useful both as troops in garrison, and also in working about the cantonments. Apparently the Ceylon Government must have heard something of these volunteer corps, for they applied to the Government of India to have one raised for service in Ceylon. As I said before, it was intimated to me that an officer would be sent to Umritsir, to raise a pioneer corps, and that I was to afford whatever assistance the Government could fairly give, which was merely directing the district officers that they were to aid the officers who came to recruit, and to give them any assistance in their power, that is all I had to do with it. I think the officer who had charge of the recruiting was named Major McMullen; he came to Umritsir, and in a few days, or a few weeks at any rate, his regiment was filled up. The fact of the matter was, that service in the new pioneer corps was very popular, owing to the knowledge of the

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people regarding the other two pioneer corps; they supposed it was to be a similar corps; and besides that, the pay which the Ceylon Government proposed to give was very high; I think it went up for skilled artizans, from 13 to 14 rupees a month, to as much as 20 or 30 rupees. I do not exactly remember the figures, but I know they were high rates of pay; the consequence was that the Sikhs who had been a great many of them disbanded, rushed, I may say in hundreds, to enlist in this corps. The corps went down to Calcutta, and embarked there, or rather a portion of it embarked there, and was sent to Ceylon. When it arrived in Ceylon (I speak now merely from remembrance), the officers who accompanied the regiment to Ceylon were removed, and the Sikhs were broken up; 100 were sent to one place, 50 to another, and 100 to another; they were sent into the interior of the country, and they were told to work, and my remembrance is that they asked for arms; they said they had come to be soldiers; they admitted that they had come also to work, but they looked to soldiering much more than working. They were then told by the authorities that they had nothing to do with soldiering, that they had been enlisted merely to work; there was at once, of course, a complete misunderstanding, and the Sikhs I think generally refused to work. I do not know that the Ceylon Government was in a position to coerce them; but some of their own native officers tried to persuade the men to work for a few days until Major McMullen or some other officer who had come over with them, should come and explain to them what their duties were. I believe some of the gangs began to work, but they had no heart in the work, and threw it up after a few days; apparently for some time no officer came, and the Ceylon Government put them upon half rations, which to a Sikh is not at all a satisfactory thing, and after a time, what with despondency and the half rations, a good many became ill; I believe the hospital became crowded, and I think on the recommendation of the medical officers they were again put upon full rations. During this time one of those pioneers died, and some of the Sikhs took the body about, and tried to get up excitement, but they were very powerless, for they had no arms, and there was nothing that they could do; at last one of their own officers came and explained to them that they were expected to work and not to soldier; they said that they had never understood that, that it had never been told them; that they had been told that they were to have the same duties as the pioneer corps raised after the siege of Delhi, and that they would not act merely as labourers. It resulted in their all being broken up, and I think the Ceylon Government sent them to India, and gave each of them two rupees to find their way home. No doubt two rupees were quite insufficient; the whole business created a good deal of sensation in Ceylon, and also in Bengal, and the Bengal Government took a great deal of interest in the Sikhs, because they thought they were hardly treated; there had been a misunderstanding, apparently. They therefore directed all their officers wherever they found the Sikhs to give them money, and to get them conveyed up to the Punjaub. A good many of them did not reach the Punjaub, some of them went and took service at Hyderabad. I have been told that many of them were ashamed to go back, because they thought they would be laughed at by their comrades for taking service and coming back so soon. Accordingly some took service under the native chiefs at Hyderabad, and a few found their way back to the Punjaub. That, as far as I know it, is the history of the thing.

2654. If I recollect rightly, the two regiments of pioneers raised at Delhi were chiefly Musbee Sikhs, were they not?—Yes.

2655. They were actually raised as a military body?—Yes.

2656. And employed as a military body?—Yes, they were a kind of soldier workman, both for fighting and working.

2657. They were very much the same sort of corps as the English sappers and miners, only that they were not a skilled corps, of course they had to do all those duties?—Yes, they had to perform all duties of that kind.

2658. They were drilled and armed as soldiers?—Yes; they took all the duties of the cantonment.

2659. But those men who went to Ceylon had neither a uniform given them nor arms of any sort or kind; they were not recognised as soldiers?—No, they were not recognized as soldiers.

2660. Therefore it is hardly fair to look upon that case as going against the employment of Sikhs as soldiers out of India?—No, it was a misunderstanding altogether. I think the Supreme Government were a good deal annoyed about it; and the Ceylon Government, in arguing with them, said, "If you refer to our letter, you will find it was written from the Public Works Department, and you ought to have known that the pioneers were not meant to be a military corps, but only a corps for civil work."

2661. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You are aware, are you not, that there was always a pioneer corps in Ceylon, long before this occurrence, employed entirely upon the roads?—Yes.

2662. That corps never had been armed; they had always been employed upon the roads, and had gradually died out?—Yes, I think I have heard that.

2663. The Ceylon Government wanted to replace this corps by another, and assumed that the Indian Government knew the position which this old corps had held in Ceylon, and that it was not a military corps at all?—I do not think the Indian Government knew that; I would almost go as far as to say that the officers who raised them did not know it; but the district officers and the Punjaub authorities generally had not the least idea of it; some old soldiers, men who had done service in the mutiny, joined the corps as officers, and they would hardly have gone to form a body of mere labourers, I think.

2664. Major *Anson.*] You stated, speaking in regard to the pay of those Sikhs, that artificers of the first class were paid as high as 30 rupees a month, but the ordinary sapper and miner, the rank and file of the corps, apparently only received the rate of pay of *Rs.* 7. 8 *a.* a month?—I am not aware of that; I only remember from conversation with the natives that the pay was very high, in some cases as high as 20 and 30 rupees a month.

2665. Have you heard of any case lately of an endeavour being made to raise any Sikhs in the Punjaub for service in China?—Yes; Major Hutchinson, the inspector general of police for the Punjaub, a very intelligent officer, has come home, owing to sickness in his family; he has got leave only, I think, to be in England about 17 days altogether; he was staying at my house the other day, when he passed through London on his way to Bristol, and he happened

pened to mention that he had been raising 100 Sikhs for service in China. I did not then ask him any particulars, but when I received a summons to attend here, I wrote him a note, and put several questions to him. I asked him regarding the terms, and what pay they were to have, and what they were to do, and so on, and he wrote me a note, which I have here, in reply. If you would like to hear what he says, I shall be happy to read it; I could tell you the substance of it, but perhaps it would be better if you would allow me to read it; it is not very long, and there is a good deal of information in it. This is Major Hutchinson's reply: "I am afraid I cannot reply as exactly as you require, for all the arrangements were not completed before I left." (He had left, I think, about the 17th day of April). "I can only tell you the plan I proposed, and on which the local Government" (that is the Punjaub Government) "sanctioned the proceedings of the enlistment being commenced pending further reply from China." The question I put to him was, "Who asked you for them?" his answer is, "The governor of Hong Kong wrote to a young officer in my police, who is a friend of his, by name Creagh, and offered him 400 *l.* a-year if he would bring 100 Sikhs, the men to be bound to serve for, I think, seven years." Then another question I put was, "Did the Government specify any time?" He says, "The Supreme Government insisted on adequate arrangements being made to insure the comfort of the men, &c.; I proposed that the men were to enlist for a term of, say, five years, to be entitled at the end to a return passage free, unless they chose to re-enlist for a term of years. The pay, it was supposed, would be 20 to 30 rupees a month, as we did not think they would go for less, but the point had not been fully tested; I offered to make my office the channel for communication between our Sihks in China sent for police by me, and their relatives, as I felt that if I could ensure the safe receipt and despatch of letters and money to the families, &c. the men would be happy and the families also. Moreover as the families would look to the Punjaub Government for protection and help, and to some extent so would the men, for you know natives will do so, even though they take service under other Governments, I felt it absolutely necessary I should have a full certainty, by having the communication in my own hands." The next question was, "Was the enlistment popular?" His answer is, "Young Creagh told me that numbers were bothering him to go, but I think they did not quite understand that there was no war and no loot. You know China as yet makes a Sikh think of loot. However, there were confident hopes that many would go." The next question was, "Was the pay left to you?" "No, but I insisted upon adequate pay being given, and I managed that I could receive the men's remittances for their families." "How many did you send, and what pay was given?" "The Hong Kong Government only asked for 100 men, and non-commissioned officers in proportion. The pay would, I understand, be left to the Indian Government to fix, and, I think, none would go under 20 rupees a month." "What class of men went?" "Sikhs only that had not been worked out, but Creagh had permission from me to offer service to any man he liked, and he would pick out the best. All must be Sikhs, that the China Government insisted upon." In the Punjaub there are a great many soldiers perhaps quite as good as Sikhs. The Chinese Government no doubt had an idea that the Sikhs were the only men whom they ought to take; but there are a great many others who are just as good in the Punjaub. The next question was, "Did you specify anything about food?" "The general treatment as regards food, and the same arrangement on the voyage, would be made for them as is made for native troops. No difficulty there. General treatment was left to China governors. I only suggested the Indian Government should insist upon fixed points, such as pay, length of service, return passage, &c." "For how long were they enlisted? Were the duties they were to perform, defined?" "I think the term was five years; they were told police duties, but probably more of a preventive semi-military character; but all police duties, and the men know well what that means; at any rate they know in the Punjaub, for they escort treasure, as you know, and prisoners, and patrol, and pursue dacoits, and fight if needed, and watch and detect, &c." "Could you have got a large number to go, if the Government had desired it?" "I believe I could get any number if the pay is good, and the arrangement for returning in a fixed time, and for communicating with their friends, and if their own European officers go with them. That is a very important point. The chief man at any rate they should know, for they will look to him to protect them." "Was any arrangement made to pay a portion of the salary to the families left behind?" "I proposed as stated above." That is the reply to the queries I sent him, and it perhaps may bear in some degree upon your inquiry.

2666. Colonel *North.*] What is the date of that letter?—The 10th of May.

2667. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who is the writer of it?—Major Hutchinson, the inspector general of police. He has a large body of police, 15,000 or 18,000 men, under him.

2668. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Are the police in the Punjaub generally armed?—They are all armed. I think he told me that latterly they have been taking away the arms from a portion of them, but we are obliged along the frontier to have armed men, because the tribes who come down are all armed.

2669. The police have to carry arms?—Yes.

2670. *Chairman.*] What arms do they carry?—A fusee and a sword.

2671. Captain *Vivian.*] Are they drilled in bodies at all?—They are taught to form line, and countermarch, nothing more. They are very excellent men.

2672. *Chairman.*] They have no rifles?—No, they have a small short fusee; but Major Hutchinson told me that they were beginning rather to decrease the number of arms. I think I understood that there was a considerable number now without arms, but the main body still have them.

2673. Captain *Vivian.*] Are their officers military men?—They are almost all military men; there are some who are not, chiefly in the subordinate grades.

2674. Major *Anson.*] Do you happen to know the number of police in India at the present moment?—No, I cannot tell you the number, but I dare say in India altogether, in round numbers, probably 100,000; but you can get it in any of their returns.

2675. I think it appears according to that letter, that those Sikhs volunteered for service in China before any question was raised with regard

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to the pay they were to receive?—Apparently so; from this letter, I gather it was left undefined, but no doubt it was explained that they would get good pay: apparently none have been sent off yet, I suppose pending the reference to the Chinese Government.

2676. Should you not consider that a pay of 20 rupees a month was enormously high for them?—It is high; but I think it requires good pay to make them go, and be happy when they are there; I think you can get any number of Indians to go on foreign service if you give them good pay; you may not always get any class you like, but you can get any number to go if you give them good pay, or else plunder, which latter they will not have in time of peace; without that they will not be happy.

2677. *Chairman.*] The 20 rupees a month includes everything, I suppose?—It certainly, I conclude, includes everything.

2678. Major *Anson.*] All arrangements with regard to pension are included in that; there are no promises of pension besides?—No, I should imagine not.

2679. *Chairman.*] There is no bounty of any kind?—No.

2680. And they feed and clothe themselves for that?—I should think that most probably they will get a uniform from the Chinese Government; but very likely there will be a small deduction from their pay for clothing.

2681. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You are not sure that they do not give them rations besides?—No, I am not sure; in fact they have not gone there yet; the arrangement is not completed. Major Hutchinson left the arrangement incomplete; but apparently the Chinese governor is so anxious to get them that he will agree to almost any terms.

2682. *Chairman.*] I observe that the Indian Government think it necessary to take great precautions as to the treatment the natives are likely to meet with in going to another power. I suppose that is occasioned by the belief that those who are not accustomed to native races are likely to offend their prejudices?—That is quite so. The English Government in India are alive to the necessity of good treatment; and that is the ground of what I said before with reference to a tentative experiment. I am sure the employment of Indian native troops ought to be conducted entirely by the Government of India, for you observe in this case that the Government of India are insisting upon certain things; they are taking care that good treatment shall be shown to them.

2683. You think that if you left the English Colonial Governments alone, the probability is that they would not treat the Sikhs in the way in which they ought to be treated?—With every desire to do it, they have not the necessary experience.

2684. It requires very special experience, and few know how to do it?—Yes; supposing both the English Colonial Government and the Indian Government were anxiously desirous that everything should be done for the soldiers, the commanding officer of the regiment going with them would ensure good treatment.

2685. In that unfortunate Ceylon experience, if the Ceylon Government had been personally acquainted with the Sikhs of the Punjaub, it would not have proposed such an arrangement as it did propose, I apprehend?—I think it would have proposed it in a different way; it would have explained that labourers were wanted, and labourers only. I believe that, even then, they would have got any number to have gone as labourers; but unfortunately the Sikhs did not understand it under the name of soldiers. They could easily have raised any number of labourers.

2686. They would have been different persons?—Yes.

2687. Less martial?—Yes, not so martial.

2688. Major *Anson.*] In fact, they would have been more of the class of the coolies who go to the Mauritius?—Yes, more of the coolie class.

2689. Supposing all these difficulties were got over, and the Colonial Governments were instructed how to treat the Sikhs, and their own officers went with them, and looked after them, should you as a person with large experience in India, object to its being carried out, provided it was shown to be practicable?—I think that on a small scale it might be fairly tried; I think it would be a pity to extend it at once without having tried the experiment, and to make it a sort of general army question. I would much prefer, so far as my experience goes, to take one Colony or two Colonies, and send a regiment there, asking them to volunteer for that service; I believe you would have no difficulty in getting volunteers who would go, and after an experience of two or three years, the probabilities are that if the pay was good, and the climate suited them, it might become very popular, and then after that you might, if necessary, extend it to the whole army; but I certainly would not do that at first. I would make the experiment on a small scale, and by having done that, you would feel your way, and know how to work it.

2690. As a matter of course if everything went smoothly, under those circumstances you would not have any political objections to Indians going abroad?—Not on a small scale; that is, to a limited extent.

2691. Do you think it would be of advantage to the natives to see more of the world, as it were, and to leave their own country?—It depends upon what country they go to; I do not think that there would be any advantage in their coming to England to garrison a town here; but in Colonies resembling India or among races who have an affinity to the Indians, I do not see any objection to it.

2692. The mere fact of our employing them in other places besides India, would not give them an idea of the weakness of our military power, would it?—I do not think so.

2693. On the contrary, seeing our extended empire would probably give them a greater idea of our strength?—I certainly do not think that it would give them any idea of our weakness, perhaps it might rather give an idea of power.

2694. *Chairman.*] How would you think it better that they should go, in regiments specially formed for that purpose, or as a portion of the Indian army?—Bearing in mind what I have said as to a tentative experiment, I should be inclined, supposing it was determined to do it, to say to the Government of India, we want to send one or two or three regiments to a certain place, will you arrange about it, and ascertain what regiments will go. I should suppose that the Supreme Government would in that case communicate with some officer in whom they had trust and confidence in the management of Sikhs, and that officer would probably go to his regiment, and say to them, "Now, the Government of India want a regiment to go to Singapore or China, will you volunteer?" They are under a general service agreement at present, as I understand; but

but as I said before, they suppose that that is for war and not for peace; I think the probabilities are, that three-fourths of the regiment to whom that question was put would agree at once to go; probably the whole regiment would, but certainly three-fourths would go. Then, with regard to those who did not go, I would not put them in any worse position for it, so as to make their not going a punishment; but I would draft them into other regiments, giving them the same position as they had before, and even saying, where it was possible, that when the regiment came back they might join the regiment if they liked; that would be putting it on a fair footing, and there would be no difficulty in filling up the one-fourth, or one-third, or whatever the proportion might be, of the regiment that did not volunteer, from the other regiments; there would be plenty of men to go; if the experiment were tried in that way, I think it is quite possible that the foreign service might become so popular that there would be no difficulty in getting any regiment to go. Then, you might hereafter extend it to the general army if necessary; but I think you would have no difficulty in getting volunteers, and probably almost whole regiments, to go; the service, in fact, might become popular.

2695. You contemplate a high rate of pay?—This is a mere opinion of my own; I do not know very much about it; how would it do to give them their whole pay and let the rations be free? I mean, give them the rations in addition to pay.

2696. Would they care so much for that?—I think so; that would give them up a good purse; that would make it popular; I believe they get eight rupees a month; the amount of pay varies; I estimate roughly the rations cost the Government four or five rupees a month, and then if you gave them batta besides, it would make it up to about 15 rupees.

2697. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is not the batta that they would get, as a matter of course, on going on foreign service about four rupees?—I do not know exactly, but supposing the pay was eight rupees and the batta four, that is 12 rupees, the rations would cost from three to four rupees a month more, I suppose.

2698. Major *Anson.*] How much do you allow for the rations?—Of course it depends upon the cost of supplying the Colony with the particular food required; I think a Sepoy in India can generally feed himself for something under two rupees a month; it would cost more in the Colonies.

2699. In China *Rs.* 3. 8 *a.* is the estimate of the Indian Government?—It would probably come to 14 or 15 rupees a month for each Sepoy. Even if it came to that it would be very much less than the cost of a European soldier.

2700. *Chairman.*] Those regiments are officered much more cheaply than the European regiments, are they not?—Yes; they have now only five or six officers, and that would be quite enough in a colony; how far that number would be sufficient if they remained any time in a colony, and if the officers became sick and went away, I cannot say; that is a matter of detail which must be thought of.

2701. Of course the officers would be supplied, as they have always been, from India?—Yes.

2702. Captain *Vivian.*] They would be men accustomed to handle native troops?—Yes.

2703. *Chairman.*] I suppose you would lay that down as a cardinal principle that they should never be entrusted to men who were not accustomed to handle native troops?—This must never be departed from; that is quite essential.

2704. Major *Anson.*] Do you know that some two years ago the English Government called for an estimate from the Indian Government of the probable expense of a Sikh regiment in China, and that they estimated the cost of their ration money at *Rs.* 3. 8 *a.* a month?—I estimated in my own mind it would be about three or four rupees.

2705. The pay of a Sepoy is seven rupees?—Yes; but it varies with service.

2706. And the extra batta at *Rs.* 3. 8 *a.*?—My idea would be to give them the rations; I think that would make them quite contented, together with the extra batta and their own pay, and then I think you would get any number of men.

2707. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In point of fact, that is doubling the pay?—Yes, it is in fact doubling the pay.

2708. You stated that it was very desirable that the Indian Government should negotiate any transaction of this kind respecting the employment of natives of India abroad?—Yes.

2709. In the event of any similar case arising to that which occurred in Ceylon, of a body of men being engaged by a Colonial Government, and being dissatisfied with the arrangement, on their return home or on their communication with their friends, should you apprehend that any great disaffection might arise in India?—I think, if it touched their caste or religion, that would be the case.

2710. Or if they considered that faith was not kept with them?—Yes; and if it touched upon their caste or religion, of course there would be much more danger. If it was merely a matter of pay, it would cause dissatisfaction, and nothing more; but in a matter of caste or religion, it would cause very great dissatisfaction indeed; more than that, disaffection.

2711. Supposing it was merely a matter of pay and allowances, or the duties they were called upon to perform?—It would certainly cause dissatisfaction.

2712. And if they were men of a military class, who had served in the army, it might cause disaffection in some of the regiments?—It would cause dissatisfaction; I do not know that it would cause disaffection exactly. It would make foreign service unpopular.

2713. You said that you would recommend, that if native troops were to be employed in Hong Kong, or other colonial stations, a complete regiment in India should be taken, which had volunteered for the service. If that was not found practicable, would it be in any way practicable, do you suppose, to form a regiment specially for the service from volunteers from different regiments?—There would not be the least difficulty in doing that; it could be done quite easily.

2714. To serve for a certain term, and to be restored to their regiments after their individual term of service is ever?—I should suppose that that would be quite possible.

2715. It might be worth consideration?—Yes, certainly, quite so; I do not think there would be any difficulty in it.

EDWARD B. DE FONBLANQUE, Deputy Commissary General, called in; and Examined.

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2716. *Chairman.*] You have been in Ceylon, have you not?—Yes, I was there two years ago, on the commission, the report of which you have in your hand; I was a member of that commission.

2717. Have you also been in China?—I have been in China also, for two years.

2718. You are acquainted with the working of native troops in British employ?—Yes, I have had opportunities of observing it in the West Indies, in China, and in Ceylon.

2719. You are acquainted with it, not only with reference to their efficiency in the service, but also with reference to the economy of the expenditure upon them?—I am to some extent.

2720. Will you put in the documents which you furnished to that commission, respecting the relative expense of native and English troops in the various presidencies and Colonies with which you are acquainted?—I can only do it with regard to Ceylon at present.

2721. You can do it with regard to Ceylon in comparison with the Indian presidencies?—Yes; but the employment of native troops in China, when I was there, was under very exceptional circumstances, and a higher rate of pay was given during the late war than would be the case if the troops were regularly employed for garrisoning that Colony.

2722. Why was the pay higher than if they were regularly employed?—Because they were kept for a particular service; it was an exceptional thing. The Government called for volunteers, and offered greater inducements than they would do if it were a regular part of their duty.

2723. Then you believe that the fact that it was service in the field in that case was not an additional cause of attraction, and that they would serve more cheaply if they had to perform regular garrison duty in the Colonies?—I do not think they were quite aware of the nature of the service when they went to China, and the Government found it necessary to offer a money inducement, as well as the inducement of active service.

2724. You do not think that the prospect of loot attracted them?—The prospect of loot always attracts an Eastern soldier; but I think they were not sufficiently aware of the nature of the service to be much influenced by it in that case.

2725. Then you think that the inducements held out to them ought not to be taken as a measure of the inducements it would be necessary to hold out in order to get Indian troops to serve in China on garrison duty?—I think they were exceptionally high.

2726. Captain *Vivian.*] The troops were wanted in a hurry on that occasion?—Yes; they were wanted in a hurry and on an emergency, and the Government made the best terms they could to induce men to go.

2727. *Chairman.*] Have you any idea of the amount of pay that it would be necessary to give to Indian soldiers, to induce them to serve in China regularly in time of peace?—I could not give it offhand, but I think I could ascertain it.

2728. Can you put in an estimate of it?—Yes, I will do so. The Indian troops that were employed in China when I was there during the last war were Punjaubees, Belloochees, and irregular horse.

2729. You formed a high opinion of their efficiency, did you not?—Very; I think the Punjaubees and the Belloochees make the best sentries in the world.

2730. You think that their efficiency was as much shown in the ordinary garrison duty as in the fighting and the active duty generally?—It was principally in the ordinary garrison duty that it was shown. The Belloochees garrisoned Shanghai for a whole year, and they made an admirable garrison.

2731. They were quiet and well conducted?—They were quiet and well conducted, and very trustworthy.

2732. Colonel *North.*] In what year was that?—In 1860 and 1861.

2733. *Chairman.*] They gave no cause of dissatisfaction to the European residents?—None whatever.

2734. Were they acting with British troops?—Part of the time, and part of the time they were in Shanghai alone.

2735. During the time they acted with British troops, did they act in harmony with them?—Yes, perfectly. I was for a year in Tientsin; the first year we occupied it, we had Fane's Horse there, with three battalions of European infantry, and they were on the best possible terms with the European troops.

2736. Were those native troops officered by Indian or by English officers?—They were officered entirely by Indian officers. I mean by English officers in the Indian service; they had their native officers, of course, besides.

2737. Officers who were familiar with them before they came to China?—Yes; officers who had been brought up among them.

2738. On what system were they officered; on the English or the Indian system?—Fane's Horse was exceptionally officered, because it was considered a staff appointment. The officers were all placed on the staff from various regiments, and detached to Fane's Horse; but the Punjaubee troops were officered on the Indian system, and had a very much smaller number of officers than there would be with a European regiment; for instance, we had three officers to a company, and they had only one.

2739. That corps was officered on what they call the irregular system, was it not?—Fane's Horse was, but not the other native troops, not the Punjaubees.

2740. Major *Anson.*] I think there were only two infantry regiments in China officered upon the old system?—There were two regiments of Punjaubees which were so officered.

2741. There were some other infantry regiments there during the war, that were organised upon the irregular system?—That was before my time.

2742. In 1860?—I speak of after the war, when they garrisoned Shanghai.

2743. Then you were not there during the war?—I came to China just as the war was over, having been in Japan before that; I was in China during the time of the occupation of the north of China.

2744. Then the natives knew perfectly well that there was no prospect of any further loot or plunder at that time?—Yes.

2745. But they were quite satisfied to remain there?—Yes.

2746. *Chairman.*] You never heard of any dissatisfaction?—None whatever; on the contrary,

trary, I always heard that the service was very popular.

2747. Major *Anson.*] Were there any difficulties with regard to supplying them with food?—None whatever.

2748. *Chairman.*] Did any difficulties of religion ever arise?—None whatever.

2749. Colonel *North.*] Nor on board ship?—Nor on board ship; it was of course much more difficult to supply a number of troops always with the different supplies they required, than it would be to supply regiments who were fed upon one system; but there were no insuperable difficulties whatever.

2750. *Chairman.*] For garrison duties should you say that those Indian troops would be as efficient as an equal number of Englishmen?—In some respects I think they would be more efficient: for instance, to put as sentry over stores, I should always prefer a Punjaubee to an Englishman.

2751. On account of their less liability to thieving or to drinking?—Both from their less liability to thieving and to drinking; my experience is that an English soldier, placed as a guard over public property, is about the worst guard you can have.

2752. You think that for garrison duty it would be safe to replace British regiments entirely by Punjaubees?—I should think so. I would not go so far as to say "entirely," because it must depend upon the nature of the country in which they are serving: for instance, I would not have only native troops in a place like Ceylon. I think it would be desirable to have a a certain admixture of English troops always there.

2753. Should you think that such a place as Hong Kong might be garrisoned entirely by natives?—I should think it might entirely, because I think there is so little possibility of any sympathy between the two races, the Chinese and the Indians.

2754. We have had it stated in evidence that they are not equal to cope with such people as the Hong Kong pirates, and the vagabond population of that part of China; do you think that that is true?—I should hardly think it is likely, because the Hong Kong police, when I was there, were about the worst police in the world, and yet they did to a certain extent keep these pirates in order.

2755. From what race is this police force recruited?—From Manilla men, and China men from Hong Kong and the provinces; they are a mixed force of all kinds of people.

2756. They take anybody they can get, in fact, into that force?—They take anybody they can pick up; they were then very bad, but since then I believe they have been improved.

2757. In Ceylon it is the case, is it not, that the native troops cost very much more than they do in the Presidencies?—Very much more. I can give you the statistics. The regimental pay and allowances of a European infantry man in Ceylon amounts to 36 *l.*; of a European artillery man, 51 *l.*; of a native infantry man, 30 *l.*: whereas, in Bengal, a native infantry man costs 20 *l.*; in Madras, 29 *l.*; and in Bombay, 20 *l.* The pay of a European is, in Ceylon, 36 *l.*; in Bengal, 41 *l.*; in Madras, 48 *l.*; and in Bombay, 40 *l.*: but a native infantry man costs 10 *l.* a year more in Ceylon than he does in any one of the Indian Presidencies.

2758. What is the cause of that difference?—It arises from the higher rate of pay, and the more expensive establishment of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment.

2759. In officers?—Yes, in officers: they keep up a European establishment of officers which is a very large one in comparison with the Indian establishment; I mean the regimental establishment.

2760. Why is it necessary that the pay should be higher?—The Ceylon Rifle Regiment has undergone a great many changes; originally it was a very efficient and a very economical corps; but by degrees, partly owing to the wish of the commanding officers to be placed more upon a European footing, and partly from other causes, they have raised the pay of the soldier, and the general expense of the regiment to that of a European corps. Some very strong evidence was given to the Commission on that point by Major Skinner, who is the Surveyor General in Ceylon, and who was once in this regiment; probably no man in Ceylon has had more experience in relation to it. In reply to this question which was put to him, "Has the Malay Regiment much changed in its character since you knew it, and in what respect?" he said, "Yes, it has very materially changed its character since I first knew it. I joined it not long after we had given up possession of Java, from whence it had then but recently been largely recruited; it was purely Malay, and native princes were amongst its native officers. Sir E. Barnes on his arrival here from the Peninsula, and the army of occupation, pronounced it to be the very beau idéal of what native light troops should be. At his first parade of them he happened to say it was a pity that the men wore long hair, which they then wore plaited, and neatly looped up under their shakos; the men heard of it, and without any persuasion on the part of their officers, at the next parade the following day every man appeared with his hair cut. It is necessary to understand the importance which Asiatics attach to habit and custom to appreciate the significance of such an act of acquiescence in the mere wish or opinion of their general, and it deserves to be recorded to the honour of the regiment. At the time I am speaking of, the men possessed useful qualities, which I have regretted to see dying away, till they have now almost ceased to exist. They were, in any position in which they could be placed, the most self-reliant troops that could be conceived. They built their own barracks and lines with a degree of celerity and neatness which no other men could effect. They would run up their officers' bungalows or mess-houses almost free of cost to the public. Their time was nearly equally divided between fatigue duties and their drill, and no regiment could approach them in the perfection of their movements on parade. Their officers were proud of and attached to them, although they were then as free from the imputation of wearing ammunition boots and socks as an antelope, and their barracks were unencumbered with wooden cots and regimental boxes, in the necessity for or desirableness of which I could never concur; I am of opinion that no native soldier should ever be taught such artificial wants; they are, I believe, unknown in the Indian Native Army." That, I think, is the general opinion there, that the effect of the change has not only been to make them less efficient, but very much more expensive.

2761. The direction of those changes has been to assimilate them with the Europeans?—Yes.

2762. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Has not one

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change been also that there is a large proportion of Sepoys amongst them now?—The Sepoys were originally in the regiment; there were always two companies of Sepoys, I think.

2763. Does the praise bestowed upon the regiment generally apply to the Sepoys also?—No; it applies exclusively to the Malays; they endeavour now to recruit the corps as much as possible from the Malay element.

2764. *Chairman.*] Can a Malay be obtained as cheaply as an Indian soldier?—I think so, if the service were made popular; but one objection is, that the very fact of employing Sepoys and Kaffirs makes it disagreeable to the Malays; they dislike serving in a mixed regiment.

2765. What recruiting ground have we to go to for Malays?—All the Malayan archipelago, Burmah, and Siam.

2766. Do you think it would be safe to raise the Malays from countries not under British rule?—Yes, I think, perfectly so; there has been a good deal of difficulty of late in recruiting them for the Ceylon Rifles.

2767. They have had to trust almost entirely, have they not, to the children of old soldiers?—Yes, in a great measure to the half-pay boys; they have drawn very largely from them; all the evidence we could get was to the effect that if they established recruiting depôts in various parts of the Malayan archipelago, they would get recruits in sufficient numbers.

2768. And your opinion is, that they would get both a cheaper and a more efficient regiment if they returned more to Oriental customs?—Yes, but the Ceylon Rifles never could be restored to their original state now; it would be very difficult to bring them back to the old habits.

2769. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is it not exceedingly difficult to get the Malays to leave their homes?—No, I do not think the difficulty is very great if you hold out inducements to them: it was noticed, that whenever well-affected men who had got the higher rate of pensions went back to places where the Malays were settled, they always sent back recruits; but stories had got about among the Malays at home, that when the Ceylon riflemen became worn out as soldiers, they were carried into the mountains, to be eaten by tigers. Those stories were spread by men who had been discharged from the regiment on insufficient pensions, and that affected the recruiting a good deal.

2770. Major *Anson.*] I think you stated that the cost of regimental pay and allowances of European troops in Ceylon was 36 *l.* a-head?—A European infantry soldier in Ceylon cost 36 *l.*, and an artillery man 51 *l.*

2771. Does that include the pay and allowances only?—Yes, that is all; if you want the entire cost according to the capitation rates we fixed, which include all the expenses of clothing, his share of pensions, his share of transport to and from the Colony, we made out that an artillery man costs 114 *l.*, a European infantry man 99 *l.*, a native infantry man 64 *l.*, and a Lascar 53 *l.*

2772. What do you put a native soldier at, including everything?—We put a native soldier, including everything, at 64 *l.*, but then, of course, the expenses of transport and reliefs, which are a large item in the case of a European soldier, do not apply to the native soldiers.

2773. Against that 36 *l.*, representing pay and allowance, we have got here returns from the War Office, which only make it 20 *l.* a-head; can you explain the difference?—I do not think that that can be correct. My figures were the result of a very close calculation.

2774. Will you look at the return; do you think that the first item is right; 22,900 *l.* is put down as a lump sum for the regimental pay and allowances of a battalion of infantry in the Colonies?—I can form no idea what this return is taken from; but I know that my figures are correct; they are taken not from estimates, but from the actual expenditure incurred.

2775. Captain *Vivian.*] If you think that the Malay regiment has become so degenerated, on account of its being too much assimilated to the European regiments, and that it would be impossible to get it back again to its former state, what should you recommend, in the way of native troops, as a substitute for it?—I would recommend Malays certainly, for many purposes.

2776. For service in Ceylon, I mean?—For instance, I would have a Malay garrison at Singapore, which is principally composed of Chinese; and on the other hand I should not at all object to have a Chinese regiment in Ceylon; I apprehend that the Chinese would make admirable soldiers; I have seen a great deal of their qualities, not actually as soldiers, but what very nearly approaches that, as coolies attached to the army.

2777. There would be no religious difficulties in the case of the Chinese, would there?—None whatever; they are the most easily taught, trained, and fed of any men under the sun, I believe.

2778. Are they reliable as soldiers?—They are perfectly reliable if they have confidence in their officers; they have a great respect for the English now; we saw it exemplified in the case of Colonel Gordon, who turned the most untrained class of Chinamen into a perfectly disciplined army.

2779. Would you prefer Chinese troops to Sikhs for garrison service in Ceylon?—I do not say that I would prefer them to Sikhs, but I believe that there would be great difficulty in getting Sikhs to go to Ceylon after that unfortunate experiment which was alluded to this morning.

2780. Do you know anything about the details of that case?—Yes; I can give you the evidence of the same Major Skinner, part of whose evidence I read just now; he was the person entrusted with the command of this corps; but it was a very sore subject at the time the Commission took the evidence, and he makes the best of it. In reply to this question, "Did not a recent attempt to import Punjaubees from India for the Public Works Department prove a disastrous failure, and a great and useless expense to the Colony?" he said, "A thousand Sikhs were engaged for this Government out of, I think, 3,000 or 4,000 who offered their services to the Colony; 500 of them were imported, and another wing of 500 was on the point of embarking at Calcutta for Colombo. Of the 500 who were brought over here, some were tampered with, and refused to work; others went to work, but were persuaded by their comrades subsequently to refuse; we still have a few of them, who have turned out excellent workmen. The 500 who formed the right wing at Calcutta heard all the objections which had been raised by those who were in Ceylon, and still expressed their willingness to come here, and do that which the left wing had refused to do. The plea set up by the men in Ceylon was that they had been led to expect that they would be armed, and be allowed to work as the regiments

ments of sappers and miners did in their own country. On the other hand, the 500 in Calcutta stated that they knew they were engaged solely as civil pioneers, that they would be required to work upon roads if they came here, and that they were perfectly willing to come for that purpose. I consider the attempt broke down solely from the interference of people who had nothing to do with it. It is much to be lamented that it did, for that force of 1,000 Sikhs would have been an invaluable acquisition to the country. I would repeat the attempt, if I were permitted to do so, with the most perfect confidence of success. The men who remain, six or eight in number, have offered to go back to their own country to bring their relatives and friends."

2781. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who is that evidence given by?—Major Skinner, the Surveyor General in Ceylon, who was the head of the Works department there.

2782. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you know to whom that reference is made, where he speaks of persons who interfered with the enlistment?—The whole subject was one that created very strong feeling in the Colony, so much so that the military secretary was brought to a court martial for having written a letter accusing the Ceylon Government of having broken faith with those men.

2783. In fact, may it not be interpreted as being this, that those under whom the Sikhs were living, took great pains to prevent their being enlisted, in a way that would give offence?—Yes, they did certainly.

2784. Colonel *North.*] Did they not land as a battalion?—Yes.

2785. Were they told off into companies commanded by officers?—Yes; so are the men of the ordinary Pioneer Corps in Ceylon now, who are employed in very large numbers; they are all drilled as soldiers to a certain extent. We had it in evidence from Major Skinner, that he would have no objection whatever to the withdrawal of every soldier, European and native, from Ceylon, and that he would entrust the safety of the island to his pioneers.

2786. The wing of the Punjaub Corps that landed in Ceylon, landed under the impression that they were to do military duty, did they not?—So it was always understood.

2787. And faith was broken with them?—They considered that faith was broken with them, there is no doubt of that; there was some misunderstanding as to the terms upon which they were brought over; but the story I heard was that the agents who went over to India, in their zeal to secure these men for the Ceylon Government, made promises which they were not authorized to make, and that the Ceylon Government threw them over.

2788. Those unfortunate men were very ill-treated, were they not, in Ceylon?—Unquestionably they were ill-used.

2789. It was not that Major O'Brien had been tampering with them in any manner?—No, not in the least.

2790. He was one of the few that understood their language?—Yes, he was one of the few who understood their language and their ways, and he managed, when they broke out in mutiny, to make them submit.

2791. He was not in any way to blame for what occurred?—Not in the least as far as I know.

2792. You mentioned that English soldiers were the worst sentries over stores, and so on; did you speak with regard to stores of liquor, or all kinds of property?—With regard to stores of liquor I have had a great deal of experience with them, and I believe they almost invariably break in.

2793. You do not mean to say that they steal the property they are placed over?—No, but if they are placed in charge of property, they are so easily made drunk that they are not to be trusted as sentries; I do not mean that they would steal the property, and make away with it, but they would be made drunk, and it would equally get lost; they are careless sentries. I was in China when we received the indemnity money from the Chinese Government; there was no place where we could deposit it; it consisted of huge nuggets of silver in very ricketty boxes, and you could even see it through the boxes. We deposited them in an open courtyard of a house in Tientsin with two Punjaub sentries over them, and even the officers who were in charge of them found it difficult at any time of the day or night to approach those boxes, so much were the sentries on the alert.

2794. Mr. *Oliphant.*] You say that you do not think it would be advisable to leave Ceylon without European troops?—No, from what I have seen of Ceylon, I think the presence of a portion of European troops there is desirable.

2795. Which race do you think is dangerous, the Cingalese, or the Tamil population?—The Cingalese I look upon as the most opposite people to everything dangerous under the sun. An able writer on Ceylon (I forget at the moment who) describes the Cingalese as being the women of the human race.

2796. What race do you regard as dangerous in the island?—I think the other races, the Tamils, who are employed now in large numbers (I think 250,000 is the number of the resident population of Indians and Tamils) might become dangerous; their numbers are so very much in excess of those of the Europeans who employ them.

2797. You allude to the coolies?—Yes.

2798. But the whole of the northern part of the island is inhabited by the same race, the Tamil race?—Yes.

2799. We have no troops amongst them to speak of?—None except very small detachments.

2800. Probably there would be no danger to be apprehended from them; there has never been any rising on the part of the coolies, I believe?—The evidence we took in Ceylon on the subject was extremely conflicting. The planters as a class saw no necessity for troops in the island at all; but then I must tell you that the planters were the class who would be principally taxed for the support of the troops.

2801. Still they would require their protection?—They would require protection; but the evidence of almost everyone was in favour of the removal or reduction of the troops.

2802. *Chairman.*] Of all troops of all kinds?—Of all troops of all kinds; they said that they were perfectly willing to trust to themselves.

2803. Mr. *Oliphant.*] And Major Skinner's opinion was strong to that effect, was it not?—Yes, Major Skinner was of opinion that they did not want a soldier in the island. In fact, Sir Hercules Robinson told me, not in evidence, but in conversation, that if it were not for the honour of the thing, he would dispense with every soldier in the island, trusting perfectly to the people.

2804. Colonel *North.*] What report is that which you have been quoting from?—It is the "Report of the Commission appointed to inquire

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into the Military Expenditure and Establishments of Ceylon in 1865," of which I was a member. The object was to transfer all the military establishments from the Colonial to the Imperial Government, and assess the amount which the Ceylon Government was to pay for their military force, with a pretty strong hint that they were to pay everything. Consequently, it was to their interest to have as few soldiers as possible. The evidence of all the planters, and of almost all the officials, was in favour of doing away with the troops, or reducing them to a very small number.

2805. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you not think that the natives have a much greater dread of a Malay than of a European in Ceylon?—I do not think they would as soldiers; I think they are much more in the habit of being kicked and cuffed by Malays than they are by Europeans; in that sense they are more afraid of them, but not as soldiers.

2806. In the rebellion, are you aware that the Ceylon Rifle Regiment met with very little difficulty from the natives?—Yes, the natives made no stand; they are so little a warlike people.

2807. In what way do you think it would be desirable to take away the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, and replace them by others when they seem so perfectly fit to do the duty they have to do?—They do the duty very well; but they are so very expensive; it is only a question of economy.

2808. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are all the inhabitants of Ceylon of the same character?—No; the population is a very mixed one.

2809. What are the people in the neighbourhood of Candy?—They are a mountain race in contradistinction to the lowlanders.

2810. Are they a warlike race?—More so than the others. The inhabitants of Ceylon are very mixed; we had these figures given to us—"Low country Singhalese, 1,000,000; Kandyans, 400,000; Tamils (indigenous), 500,000; Tamils (immigrant), 250,000; Moormen, about 130,000."

2811. The Kandyans are a warlike race, are they not?—In comparison with the lowland Singhalese, they are.

2812. There was some rather severe fighting in the Kandyan war, was there not?—Nothing very severe, and in the late rebellion they never did anything; they never would face the soldiers.

2813. Captain *Hayter.*] Supposing this arrangement were tried, what is the maximum foreign service you would put the native troops to; how long would you make them serve?—I think in the case of a Chinaman it would be immaterial; I think, as long as he was well paid, the term of service would matter very little to him.

2814. I mean the Indian native troops, who might be employed in any of the Colonies?—I should enlist them for a term of, say, 10 years, renewable at the end of the 10 years.

2815. Do you know the strength of European officers of the Punjaub regiments?—I think it is one officer to a company, not more, whereas the Ceylon Rifles have adopted the English plan; they have got three officers to a company, and everything on the same scale.

2816. How many companies are there in that regiment?—Fourteen companies.

2817. The field officers are English, I suppose?—Yes, and in addition to that they have to every company four native officers.

2818. Would not the European officers, not having the same local ties, be less likely than the men to be dissatisfied with their change of service?—I think an English officer is so accustomed to be sent to out-of-the-way places, that he would not grumble more in one than he would in another; it would matter very little to him whether he was in Ceylon or in an out-of-the-way part of India.

2819. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You have no personal experience of Indian native troops, have you?—No, I have no personal experience of India.

2820. Major *Anson.*] With the exception of the Indian native troops in China?—Yes, I had experience of them in China, but I have had no local experience of India.

2821. *Chairman.*] Have you any knowledge of the Mauritius or the Cape?—No.

2822. You have had no experience of any other Colony except Ceylon?—I have had no experience of any other eastern Colony except Ceylon and Hong Kong; I have also served in the West Indies.

2823. Are those opinions of the planters to which you have referred, as to there not being any necessity for troops in Ceylon, on record anywhere?—They are on record in the Report of the Commissioners on Military Expenditure in Ceylon in 1865.

2824. Will you put that Report in?—I will; this is the only copy I have, but I think it could be obtained, on application, at the War Office or the Colonial Office.

2825. Colonel *North.*] Did the Committee sit in Ceylon?—Part of the Committee was sent out to Ceylon. I think you will find a good deal of information in the Report that bears immediately upon the subject of your inquiry, and you will find it a useful document. I do not know whether this inquiry refers only to the employment of Indian or Asiatic troops, but I may perhaps mention that I have had a good deal of experience of the blacks in the West India regiments; I was in the West Indies for some time.

2826. *Chairman.*] What is your opinion of them?—I formed a very high opinion of them indeed.

2827. In point of efficiency?—In point of efficiency, and in point of economy.

2828. They are not more economical, are they, than European troops?—Yes, they are, considerably.

2829. Do they take a lower rate of pay?—They have a lower rate of pay; and one of the great expenses which we have with European troops is avoided, that is, the constant reliefs, owing to sickness and mortality, among the Europeans.

2830. You mean that the blacks can be kept for any length of time?—They can be kept for any length of time, and the casualties amongst them are very few.

2831. Do you think that they could be employed at such a place as Mauritius?—I think they might be employed at Mauritius, and they might be employed at a place like Bermuda, a place which is rather destructive to European constitutions.

2832. Of what race are the troops with which you are acquainted; are they creoles or are they Africans?—When I served in Jamaica, some 10 or 12 years ago, they were recruited entirely on the west coast of Africa; but since then they have recruited among the creoles in the different islands, among the coloured men. I do not know how far that has affected their efficiency, but I know

know that when the order came out for it, it was apprehended that it might very greatly weaken their efficiency as soldiers, and that they would not be so reliable.

2833. Were those recruited on the west coast of Africa taken from the native population on land, or were they simply liberated slaves?—Both; they took volunteers; originally they were all liberated slaves, but latterly they used to recruit from the population there, and they had no difficulty in getting volunteers.

2834. Did they all undestand English?—They knew very little of English indeed; they picked up a sufficient amount of English to understand the words of command and to make themselves understood.

2835. Do the officers learn any language except English?—The officers adapt their language to that of the black soldiers; what they speak is very much the same kind of English that the Chinaman in Hong Kong speaks, what they call the "pigeon English."

2836. Do you imagine that an equally efficient soldier could be got off the east coast of Africa?—I think there would be greater difficulty there.

2837. Then there would be considerable cost of transport in garrisoning places like Singapore or Hong Kong with blacks?—Yes; but the mortality and sickness would be very much less than it is with European troops.

2838. You think that when once imported they might be kept there permanently?—I think they might be kept there permanently.

2839. They have no wives and families whom they would want to go back to?—No; they generally establish their wives and families wherever they are, and the longer you leave them at a place the more satisfied they become.

2840. Then you would have to import their wives and families too?—No, you would not have to import their wives, as you have in the case of the Malays.

2841. You believe them to be a quiet and peaceable race?—Yes, they are very docile, and become very much attached to their officers.

2842. They are not liable to outbreaks of passion, are they?—No; in all my five or six years' service in the West Indies I do not remember any outbreak except once, when a very moral commanding officer wanted to prevent their women coming into the barracks; then they broke out of the barracks and scattered themselves about the place.

2843. Then, if morality is not imposed upon them, there is no difficulty with them?—No; it can hardly be looked upon as a point of morality, because wherever they went the outgoing regiment transferred their women, who became their wives for the time.

2844. Have you ever known any outbreaks of Malays?—No, not at all, I never knew any instance of it; I believe when the Ceylon Rifles went to Hong Kong the other day, every man took his wife.

2845. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] And some two?—Yes, polygamy prevails there.

2846. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has been stated to the Committee, that that arose from a mistake?—I believe they would not have gone without their women.

2847. *Chairman.*] If the Malays were employed to garrison either Mauritius or the Cape, would they require to go home?—I think they would; I do not think the Malay would like to settle.

2848. But the African would?—The African would be very much more apt to settle in any place where he was located than the Malay would be.

2849. We have heard in England of Malays running-a-muck; is that a myth, or the reality?—I have seen Malays run-a-muck in China, and I have seen English soldiers do exactly the same thing under the same influence.

2850. Under the influence of bhang?—Under the influence of samshoo.

2851. You do not think that the Malay race is more exposed to it than any other?—No; I have seen two instances of English soldiers fairly running-a-muck. I recollect, on one occasion, an English soldier attacking half-a-dozen American officers who were coming up the street; he rushed up to them, and laid about him wildly with a bludgeon he had with him.

2852. I understand the general tenor of your evidence to be, that the English soldier, in point of docility and quietness, is not preferable to any other race, either African or Asiatic?—No, not in those points, and there is an enormous difference in the effect of climate upon the two classes.

2853. In that respect do you think that the African is more hardy than the Indian?—Yes, I think he is much more hardy; the African has the advantage of being able to stand cold as well as heat.

2854. As between the Malay and the Sikh, which has the advantage?—I should say that the Sikh has the advantage of the Malay.

2855. You say that the African stands cold as well as heat; where have you seen that tried?—In Canada, and more especially on board ship.

2856. But that is the acclimatized African?—The imported African stands it, they say, very well.

2857. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you say that the imported African stands cold?—Yes; I have heard that he becomes inured to it.

2858. Where has he been tried?—In America, in the States.

2859. When were the last Africans imported there?—It has been proved in the case of runaway slaves who have come over to Canada.

2860. When were the last Africans imported into America?—I cannot say when they are actually imported; but when they have been accustomed to nothing but hot climates, they come over to Canada, and they stand the cold there.

2861. You are aware that no slaves have been imported into the United States of America for a considerable time?—Yes.

2862. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Although the African does not die under exposure to cold, he is in a very inefficient condition as long as it lasts, is he not?—I should not say that that is so to any great extent. I have seen the Africans very jolly in the west of Canada, in the coldest winter; but the Chinaman, as you are aware, stands the cold, and seems perfectly indifferent to it.

2863. *Chairman.*] The African is a very much more efficient and muscular soldier than the Chinaman, is he not?—Yes, he is physically a much finer animal than any Eastern.

2864. We have had it in evidence that the climate to which the African regiments are exposed is fatal to their condition, and that, even when they do not die, the officers become inefficient; is that your experience?—There is a good deal of sickness amongst the officers of the West Indian regiments; I should hardly attribute it in any great measure to climate.

2865. We have heard about something more than

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than physical inefficiency; it has been stated that it affects their minds, and that they become demoralized?—Whether it is owing to climate or what, I cannot say; but it is an unfortunate fact that the officers of the West India regiments generally drink harder than any other class of officers. I remember meeting one officer who told me that he was the survivor of a batch of 11, who went out to the West Coast of Africa, and, with the exception of two who were transported, the others had all died of *delirium tremens*.

2866. What do you mean by transported?—They were tried and transported for some crime.

2867. So that out of the 11 officers, eight had died, two had been transported, and only one remained?—Yes.

2868. You have nothing but European officers in the West India regiments; there are no native officers?—Nothing but English; we have white non-commissioned officers.

2869. Mr. *Oliphant.*] With regard to the barracks in Ceylon, you are aware, perhaps, that there is going to be a change with regard to the European troops, and that one wing is to be quartered at Point de Galle. I see you recommend, in your report, Nuwara Eliya as a sanitarium, and that two companies should be quartered there; do you think it would be more desirable to have the whole wing at Nuwara Eliya?—My opinion was very strong in favour of having the whole of the white troops at Nuwara Eliya, but I was overruled by everyone. They say that it has a good effect upon the people to see white soldiers about.

2870. That was not the same people who said they did not want troops at all in Ceylon for their protection, I suppose?—When I say that I was overruled, I mean by the members of the Commission.

2871. Do you happen to know what the death-rate in Colombo was at that time?—I do not remember at the moment; it is in the evidence.

2872. In your opinion, it would be much better to have all the European troops that are necessary for the island, at Nuwara Eliya?—I think it would be well to leave the wing of a regiment in Nuwara Eliya; and the mere fact of their being in the island would have a certain moral effect, and that is really all that European troops are there for; the only object is the moral effect that they produce. Then you must have artillery; we recommended that the artillery should be increased by one battery; they of course would be in the lowlands, but the intention was to be continually changing the companies, and giving each company a turn every year in the mountains.

2873. With reference to this proposal of the Government now, to build a barrack for a wing at Point de Galle, you think it would be more advisable to have that barrack built in Nuwara Eliya?—I was very strongly of that opinion.

2874. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you know at all why the West India regiments ceased recruiting on the West Coast of Africa?—I believe the wish of the people of the West India islands to find employment originally led to it; there was a large floating population, particularly in Jamaica, who were anxious for military service, and they made an application to be allowed to enlist.

2875. Was not it the case that there was difficulty in getting men from the West Coast of Africa?—I did not hear that; it may have been so. I heard that the original cause which led to the change was the wish of the inhabitants of the islands to become soldiers.

2876. Are you aware of what has been stated before the Committee, namely, that the West Indian negro suffers very much from the climate on the West Coast of Africa when on service there?—I never heard it; I never was on service on the West Coast of Africa.

2877. You have never heard that stated when on service in the West Indies?—No, I never heard it. While on the subject of barracks, I may mention that the medical officers have given it as their opinion, that the same accommodation, in point of cubic space, should be given to native troops, that is to the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, as to the European; that is one thing which has given great dissatisfaction to the men themselves, because they are not accustomed to a large amount of cubic space, and they do not like ventilation; it is a great trial to them; they say it has injured their health; it is only another instance of the wish to assimilate the two systems, and to raise the native troops in all respects to the level of the European, even to the inconvenience of the men themselves.

2878. Mr. *Oliphant.*] That is a fancy, I suppose, on the part of the officers?—Yes; of the medical officers, in this case.

2879. *Chairman.*] Is it the medical officers who have insisted upon that?—Yes, the medical officers and the commanding officers; they have given it in evidence that a Ceylon rifleman should have exactly the same accommodation as a European, whereas formerly they ran up their own bungalows, and were much happier and better in them. They have now been taught to sleep in beds, whereas no native, even of a rank higher than a non-commissioned officer, ever sleeps on anything better than a mat; but these men get cots and hair mattresses given to them.

2880. Which do they like best?—They like their beds better, because it gives them a certain consequence.

2881. Major *Anson.*] You were Deputy Commissary General in China, I think?—I was.

2882. You stated at the commencement of your evidence that you would prefer, as far as garrison duty went, having native soldiers as sentries over your stores, to Europeans?—Yes.

2883. In China, at that time, you had charge of all the stores of the army, I suppose?—Yes; of all stores belonging to the army, as well as the money.

2884. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I will read to you the evidence which Colonel Macdonald, of the Ceylon Rifles, gave upon the subject at Question 2203: "Would your men consider the accommodation that the Sepoys and Sikhs used to have when they were there, sufficient accommodation for them?—I think they would be very well pleased with that; all that they want is a room that is dry; they do not like the thatch. Now that they have been accustomed for 20 or 25 years to have comfortable barracks, of course they feel the difference very much; but you might put them in a very much cheaper building than the European barracks; you might have a large shed erected with pillars, and built in with a single brick and tiled. They would be perfectly satisfied with that, but the Europeans in China must have an upstairs room." According to that, it would not be necessary to give them expensive barracks?—No. Of course you can teach a soldier any want; but these are all artificial wants to the native soldier, which he is very much better without; and they only put the

the Government to an enormous expense. The Malay is naturally a barefooted animal; we take pains to make him wear shoes in the Ceylon Rifles.

2885. Colonel Macdonald says the barracks "are not nearly so expensive as European barracks, but still they are as comfortable"?—The old barracks were not as expensive, but according to the plans they wish to carry out, they want to give the same space, and consequently it would be the same expense for both; the natives were formerly doubled up much more than our men, and consequently the barracks for them were less expensive.

2886. Colonel Macdonald says, "Now the barracks are very much improved; they are made of brick upon a single floor, and covered with tiles; they are not nearly so expensive as European barracks, but still they are as comfortable;" so that they may be as large and still not so expensive?—Nothing can be worse than the European barracks in Ceylon.

2887. Colonel *North.*] Have you been at Hong Kong since 1860?—I left in 1861; I have not been there since.

2888. Major *Anson.*] Do you know anything of the arrangement with regard to hutting money for the Indian troops in China and at Kowloon?—No, I do not.

2889. You do not know what allowance they received?—No, I do not; I never was quartered at Hong Kong. I was up the country always at Shanghai and Tientsin.

2890. Colonel *North.*] The expenses in China are very considerable, are they not?—Very considerable.

2891. They are more than in India?—Yes, I should think they are more than in India.

Colonel CHARLES GORDON, called in; and Examined.

2892. *Chairman.*] IN what year were you in China?—I went out in 1860.

2893. How long were you there?—Four years and a half.

2894. You had an opportunity of seeing the conduct of East Indian troops while you were there, had you not?—Yes.

2895. What was the impression that you formed of them?—The Indian troops I saw were the Loodiana regiment, and the Beeloochees, and both of those were very good, and did very good work.

2896. You saw them in the field?—Yes, I saw them in the field against the rebels; but I do not think the Madras troops were so efficient; the Madras sappers were, but not the Sepoys.

2897. Not in the field?—I do not think that the Chinese respected them much.

2898. You think the Chinese did respect the Sikhs?—Yes, undoubtedly.

2899. Do you think they are better soldiers than the Chinese?—No doubt they are better.

2900. Had you any opportunity of seeing them in garrison as well as in the field?—Yes, both.

2901. Do you think that they were good soldiers in garrison?—They were very steady, and very good sentries; they gave very little trouble.

2902. Had you any ground for thinking that they were discontented with the garrison duty?—No, I do not think so; I never heard it mentioned.

2903. They were not restive under the tediousness of it?—No; the Loodiana Regiment were taken to China on an agreement for a certain number of years; they were kept on, I think, about a year over this time. I remember some discussion about this; there was no dissatisfaction; they merely expressed a wish to go home; and some of them fell out, and stated this to the general at the half-yearly inspection.

2904. Colonel *North.*] Was that during the war?—That was at Shanghai, during the rebellion.

2905. When they were in the field?—It was at Shanghai; we were hardly in the field; we were called in the field, but it was more garrison than field duty.

2906. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] How long had they been there at the time when they expressed this dissatisfaction?—They came out to the war in 1859 with Lord Elgin's expedition.

2907. When did this take place?—This took place about 1862 or 1863; at the end of 1862, I think.

2908. They had been three years there then?—I imagine so; I am not quite sure of that.

2909. Had they agreed to come for a certain term?—They had agreed to come for the China expedition.

2910. And this was after the China expedition was concluded?—Yes; they were retained on account of the troubles with the rebels.

2911. Major *Anson.*] Was there any official correspondence on the subject?—I am not sure; I suppose there must have been the half-yearly inspection returns.

2912. It is only on rumour that you speak, is it?—I cannot speak positively, for I did not see the papers; I know it was the talk of the garrison at that time.

2913. You have had great experience of the Chinese; you commanded them, I think, for a long time in China?—Yes.

2914. Do you think that it would be possible for English officers to make good soldiers of them?—I do not think so in their own country.

2915. Do you think it would be possible to raise regiments of Chinamen for service in India?—I think from the neighbourhood of Hangkow or Pekin you would get good picked men, who, when taken to India, would make good soldiers; they would not make good soldiers in their own country, for they would get sick of it, and desert, which they could not do in India.

2916. I suppose the men that you commanded were hardly regularly enlisted soldiers, were they?—We could not make any agreement with them.

2917. You had but slight power over them, had you?—Whilst they were with us we had power over them, but not when they went to their homes; the Chinese mandarins have; but it is a power which we could never exert over them, viz., capital punishment.

2918. Do you think that the Chinese would stand the climate of India well?—Very well.

2919. *Chairman.*] What sort of pay would they require to go?—The Imperialist troops got about 26*s.* a month, nominally, but sometimes they were 20 months in arrears with their pay.

2920. Do they feed themselves?—When they are in the field or active service, the Government feed them.

Colonel *C. Gordon.*

14 May 1867.

2921. When they are in garrison do the Government feed them?—They never keep the men in what we would call garrison; they always keep them in entrenched camps.

2922. Do they feed themselves then?—No, they would be supplied at a deduction from their pay; but when they are actually in face of their enemy, they get their food for nothing.

2923. Then, practically, that 26*s.* a month, covers their pay as well as their keep?—Yes; those who served with European troops, like those who served with me, got about from 32*s.* to 34*s.* a month.

2924. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] From the Chinese Government?—Yes.

2925. *Chairman.*] I suppose they would require a little more to leave their own country?—They would require more, I think, to enter into an engagement to leave their country; that would weigh more in their minds; they would require some guarantee that they would be brought back.

2926. How many years would they be content to go for?—You would get them to go for seven years, I should think, or ten years.

2927. Colonel *North.*] Would they require a pension?—All those things would be great inducements to them, particularly the certainty of pay and of pension, which are things they do not have in their own country.

2928. Mr. *Laing.*] For how much a month do you think you could get them to go abroad for a seven years' engagement?—I could not say.

2929. Do you think that a large number could be got by paying a high price?—I should think you could get any number, say 10,000 or 12,000, by high pay.

2930. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you state your objections to the employment of Chinese troops at Hong Kong, in addition to European troops there?—I do not think that the authorities could keep them together.

2931. I mean in English pay?—I do not think they could retain them. I think that the discipline would make them discontented.

2932. *Chairman.*] You mean that they would desert?—Yes; and they would be in collusion with the low populace of Hong Kong.

2933. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Are there no races which could be employed which would not be in collusion with them?—I do not think you could trust any of the Chinese races, for their sympathies would be with the dregs of Hong Kong.

2934. Are not the Chinese Government able to employ under their own mandarins any men who are at all trustworthy?—They do it in this way; they get a surety for them, what you would called security; they take the name of the village the conscript comes from, and of the head family of the village, and of the head man of the village, and they make him surety for the conscript; but even then the men desert.

2935. *Chairman.*] What do they do to the surety if the conscript deserts?—They cut his head off, unless he pays up what they may ask.

2966. It would not be safe, I suppose, to employ Chinese at Singapore, because there are too many of their own countrymen there?—No; there are too many of their own countrymen at Singapore.

2937. You could only employ them where there are no Chinese in the neighbourhood?—Exactly; the Chinese always cling together too much for safety to other people.

2938. Mr. *Laing.*] Should you think that if you had a regiment of Chinese at a place like the Cape or Mauritius, where there is no special Chinese population, there would be any particular danger to the discipline of the regiment from the men belonging to secret societies?—No, not when away from their own country. I think they would do anything you wanted away from their own country.

2939. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do they care about having their women with them on foreign service?—I think they would accommodate themselves wherever they went.

2940. They are not so domestic as the Sikhs are?—No. Of course having their wives would be a great inducement to them to leave their country; they would go more willingly. Marriages with this soldier class are merely arrangements; it is scarcely recognized; it is not a binding thing; they can put away a wife, or take a wife, as they like, or three or four if they please.

2941. Mr. *Laing.*] How would that class of men do for service in the Colonies as regards the climate; would they stand almost any climate, either cold or hot?—Yes, and they do not eat much meat; they do on very little.

2942. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that if they are well led they are very brave, and make good soldiers against other races?—They would against other Asiatic races, I think, but not against Europeans; they would never meet them. You would get some few men to meet them, but as a rule they would not; they would fight behind works, but not in the open, against Europeans.

2943. Would they fight Indian troops, do you think, if led by English officers?—I think so; they had a great contempt for the Sepoys.

2944. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you include the Sikh regiments in that?—No, they had not a contempt for the Sikhs.

2945. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Then they drew the distinction between the different classes of Indians very clearly?—Quite; some of the Belloochees took their discharges from the Belloochee regiment, and entered into the force I had, as officers; they were capital men; in fact, if we had remained there I would have got as many more as I could.

2946. Of the Belloochee officers?—Of the Belloochee men, made officers.

2947. Chinese soldiers had confidence in them?—Yes, they liked them very much; we had no trouble with them; the Belloochees began to pick up the Chinese language very quickly.

2948. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Should you be disposed to entrust the security of Hong Kong to a garrison composed exclusively of Asiatic troops of any race whatever?—No, I think that would be unsafe.

2949. You think it would be necessary to keep some English troops there?—Yes; you must have a reserve of English troops.

2950. Mr. *Laing.*] How were your regiments officered; how many European officers had you?—We had about 22 Europeans to a regiment; that was the number of regimental officers; then there were two or three staff officers; altogether 25 officers to each regiment.

2951. To what force of natives?—Five hundred.

2952. What native officers had you?—All the non-

non-commissioned officers; the serjeants and corporals were Chinese.

2953. Then you had a very large proportion of European officers to the native force?—Yes.

2954. Was that absolutely essential to the efficiency of the force in the field?—Yes; success just depended upon whether you had them or not.

2955. If you had been upon the regular Indian footing of six or seven officers, you could not have done anything with them?—Not unless you had very superior Chinese officers, who were very rare; if you took a force of 500 men, you might get a Chinaman who would command it with a great deal of energy, and do his work well, but he must have his own way, and be allowed to decapitate when he liked, and that would not do with us.

2956. Colonel *North.*] What officers would he have?—He would pick his own men.

2957. Chinese officers?—Yes; the Imperialist forces are sometimes very good indeed.

2958. Would he have the power of decapitation without a court-martial or anything?—Yes, at a word.

2959. Mr. *Laing.*] Without being called to account, or being responsible in any way?—Yes.

2960. Then everything depends upon the native commanding officer in that case?—Yes.

Friday, 17*th May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Mr. Laing.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Viscount Hamilton.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Marquis of Hartington.	Sir William Russell.
Captain Hayter.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel Percy Herbert.	

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Field Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of CAMBRIDGE (attending by permission of the House of Lords), Examined.

H.R.H. The Duke of *Cambridge*.

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2961. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE the evidence which has been taken before this Committee has been shown to your Royal Highness?—Yes; I think I have seen most of it, if not all.

2962. Will you favour the Committee with the opinion you have formed, both from the evidence and also from your own knowledge and experience, upon the subject of our inquiry?—The evidence has not shaken my opinion, which originally was, that the proposal to substitute native for European troops was a most unadvisable arrangement.

2963. Do you come to that conclusion upon military grounds?—Upon military grounds.

2964. Do you think that it would be impossible to hold the various colonies and dependencies with native troops?—I think it would be perfectly impossible to hold any colony unless there was a fair proportion of European troops in it.

2965. You would not object to an admixture of native with European troops?—I should not object to supplementing European troops with native troops, as is the case now in colonies where the climate requires it; but I should object extremely to substituting the one for the other, because, in proportion as the native troops are increased, the European troops of the army at large must be diminished.

2966. Therefore, it is as much with reference to the numbers of the British army as a whole as with reference to the holding of individual places, that your Royal Highness objects to this proposal?—I object to it on both grounds.

2967. Do you think that it would be possible to hold such places as Singapore or the Mauritius with native troops supported merely by batteries of artillery, or should you think it necessary to have British infantry there besides?—I think it is extremely undesirable to have native troops with British artillery alone. I think there ought always to be with native troops a certain proportion of European troops, which is, I believe, the principle laid down for all the arrangements in India, because I remember when I was on the Commission which sat upon the Indian army there was one thing on which everybody was agreed, namely, that European artillery ought never to be left solely with native troops, but that there ought always to be an admixture of European troops added.

2968. You would extend that view as much to the colonies as to India?—I should.

2969. The supplementing of the garrison of Kong Hong would not meet with any objection from your Royal Highness on the ground of the climate?—I think that the climate of Hong Kong requires that there should be a proportion of native troops there, and, as you are aware, it is intended at this moment to raise a native regiment, or to arrange in some way for a native regiment to be at Hong Kong in addition to the European troops already quartered there. But even in that case the general aggregate of the European troops of the army is to be reduced to the extent of the new regiment of natives which is now going to be sent to Hong Kong. That bears out my original objection, that if you largely increase the native element in the army, you will have proportionately to reduce the European element.

2970. Would it materially diminish your objection if you could be secured against that result?—It would considerably modify it, but only to the extent of my not objecting to native troops being employed. I should still object to any colony being held by native troops without a due admixture of Europeans.

2971. Would that be on the ground that, under trying circumstances, their fidelity might be doubtful, or that you could not trust them against a foreign enemy, or that they would be distasteful to the inhabitants of the place?—I should participate in all those objections; but the great objection that I have is that you would introduce a worse article for a better, because nobody can question that a European soldier is worth a great many native soldiers; therefore, if you are obliged to reduce the number of Europeans, you get a worse article instead of a good one. Without in the least wishing to say one word against native troops, it cannot be denied that a native soldier of whatever description he may be, is an inferior military machine, if I may so express it, to a European.

2972. Supposing that all question of the diminution of the army could be put aside, would you, with reference to the security of this country, and

and the possible employment of troops in Europe, prefer that the army should be scattered about in small detachments in one colony and another, or that it should be massed in some position nearer home, where the troops could be more within reach?—If I was perfectly certain that I could mass the troops at home, and could retain them, there might be some advantage, no doubt, in having them massed; but I feel such a doubt upon that subject, that I confess I think it is much better as it is, and that I have more security of keeping the army up to an efficient state by having them scattered, than I should have if the present arrangement did not exist. Therefore, I contend that for the advantage of the army itself, it is better that they should be scattered as they are now, than that we should have too large bodies in central positions, because that arrangement I am satisfied could not be long maintained.

2973. You would still recognise that in case of a war there would be an objection, and a difficulty arising from the necessity of having to bring home small detachments across such large areas?—No, I should not; I think the detachments are all perfectly safe where they are now quartered, as long as we have the command of the sea, and that command I do not think there is much fear of our losing.

2974. Do you think they are available as well as safe?—I do; I would give you the instance of what occurred during the Indian Mutiny; that was an emergency in one of our most distant possessions; it came upon us quite unexpectedly; of course nobody knew what was going to happen, and we had nothing in the different Colonies but the ordinary garrisons, which are there at this very moment; as soon as the Mutiny broke out, the authorities in India naturally at once sent in every direction for assistance, and the Governors of the Cape, the Mauritius, and Ceylon all sent on every available man they could lay their hands on to India; and though the force so sent was in itself a small force, still the moral effect produced by the arrival of these troops before any reinforcements could come from England had, I have no doubt, a material effect in giving that new tone to the state of affairs in India, which resulted in our perfect success eventually.

2975. Putting aside the question of bringing all the troops home, assuming that the same number were kept out in those seas as are kept there now, should you prefer their being kept in as many different detachments as they are now, or should you prefer their being massed in a few great possessions or colonies?—I think they are better as they are now.

2976. Is that, even if it was established, that troops were not wanted in the Mauritius, for instance, you would yet prefer as a matter of military distribution to leave them there, rather than mass them in some other Colony?—I do not see how you could get on in the Mauritius without European troops; that is one of the important points with regard to this subject; I say that I do not think any Colony, and particularly a valuable one, like Mauritius, could be left without European troops.

2977. For defence against a foreign enemy, or for defence against the Coolies?—Both; but especially against a foreign enemy.

2978. Are you aware that the planters in Ceylon have expressed a wish to have no troops?—I was not aware of it. We had a commission which sat there last year and the year before, and there was a new arrangement proposed, but there was no proposal to take away the troops altogether.

2979. We have had Mr. Fonblanque before us who, I think, was a member of that commission, and he said, "that as soon as the planters heard that they were to pay for the troops, they expressed a desire not to have them." But from a military point of view, your Royal Highness would not coincide in that proposition?—Not at all. They pay very largely now; their contribution amounts to 119,000*l.* odd, I think, a year,

2980. Then the conclusion to which your Royal Highness comes, is, that against no sort of enemy, whether external or domestic, would you like to leave any Colony entirely or mainly dependent for its defence upon native troops?—Certainly.

2981. Major *Anson.*] With regard to the remarks your Royal Highness made about the evidence taken before the Commission which sat in 1859, as to European artillery not being employed with native troops, did not that apply more particularly to the employment of field artillery, with native troops in the field?—I have no doubt that field artillery would be a more delicate arm to deal with than garrison artillery; but I look upon artillery as almost the same, whether it is garrison or field artillery.

2982. Do you not think that a strong force of garrison artillery would be sufficient as a support for native troops employed in garrison work?—If you had a large force of garrison artillery, of course it would come to the same thing, because some of them, not being obliged to attend to their guns, might be put on garrison duty, but for that purpose you must add so largely to the artillery, which is a much more expensive arm in the mere pay and allowances of the men than the infantry, that there would not be the slightest saving, unless you put them on an equality.

2983. Does your Royal Highness consider that Hong Kong is defensible by its garrison against a foreign attack, or that it is absoluely dependent upon the fleet?—I think that the garrisons, supplemented by a portion of the fleet, in all our Colonies ought to be able to take care of those Colonies.

2984. The duty that the troops at Hong Kong have to perform is chiefly against internal disturbance, is it not?—Yes.

2985. For that purpose would not your Royal Highness consider that an inferior description of soldier to the British soldier might be sufficient?—I think that no British Colony ought to be left without British soldiers, because that is what every colonist and every Englishman looks to as his protection. Supplement them as much as you like with native troops or volunteers, but Englishmen are the nucleus round which everything else must form; and even in the case of volunteers, supposing you could raise volunteers, a nucleus of British troops with volunteers added, would be a valuable force, but a nucleus of volunteers without British troops would be of very much less avail, at all events.

2986. Does not your Royal Highness consider the service performed by English troops in China to be rather detrimental to the British Army than otherwise; for instance, a regiment coming home from China is not so efficient as a regiment you have had at home for some considerable

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siderable time?—Of course a regiment coming from a less healthy climate will always be for the moment less healthy than a regiment coming from a healthy climate, but, with that exception, I conceive that a regiment ought to come home in just as good order from China as from any other Colony.

2987. Would you not consider the British army stronger for purposes of European warfare, if it consisted of 100 battalions and had no duty to perform in China at all, than if it consisted of 101 battalions and had to garrison China?—No; I would rather have the 101 battalions and have to garrison China, because I consider that you would not be able to look upon China as a real colonial possession of the Crown or of the country, if you had not a European force there as well as a native force.

2988. We have just taken over the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government: I believe that the garrison in the Straits Settlements has hitherto, for the last 50 years always consisted of native infantry and European garrison artillery?—Yes.

2289. Does your Royal Highness think that it is absolutely necessary to alter that system which has hitherto been sufficiently efficient for its purposes?—The circumstances are altered, because it becomes a colonial possession instead of being an Indian possession. When it was an Indian possession the Indian army was in itself sufficiently strong to send a reinforcement there at any moment, which of course would have been done if there had been any danger as regards the Straits Settlements. But now that it is a colonial possession we have no right to assume that India will at once be able to send assistance to it, and we have no other assistance to give it unless we have some force there which is available at any moment. Therefore I think that the circumstances are to that extent altered, and that although the possession might be considered as safe as an offshoot from India, you can hardly consider it so when it is a colonial possession dependent upon itself without having any force in reserve to fall back upon from any of the other colonies, whether it be from China, or whether it be from Ceylon, those being the nearest colonies.

2990. Although only half a battalion of European infantry is sent for duty there, it has in reality added a whole battalion to the colonial duty of the British army, has it not?—It has and it has not. It has, certainly, to some extent, because a half battalion has to be kept there, but as a result of the Commission to which allusion has been made which has been sitting at Ceylon, the necessity almost arose of having another wing of European infantry at Ceylon; therefore, whilst we send one wing to the Straits Settlements, we are able to carry out the object which was recommended more or less by that Commission, of having an additional wing of a European regiment at Ceylon; so that your remark is correct to a certain extent, but not altogether.

2991. Did not the report of that Commission go strongly against any increase of the European force in Ceylon?—The report of that Commission left it entirely to the Imperial authorities to say what should be done with Point de Galle. The report of that Commission did not take Point de Galle into account. If, for Imperial purposes, Point de Galle were to be occupied, it was stated that that was an Imperial question, and not a colonial one, and that it must be dealt with and paid for, for Imperial purposes, by the Imperial Government. I believe the Imperial Government think that it is of importance as an Imperial question to occupy Point de Galle, and are therefore prepared to send out a wing of a regiment to occupy that post.

2992. Your Royal Highness recognises the necessity of employing native Asiatic soldiers of some description in those three colonies, China, the Straits Settlements, and Ceylon; but you object to having those soldiers sent from India from the native Indian army?—That is objectionable for this reason,—that if you send native soldiers from India with European officers on Indian pay and allowances, you must raise the pay and allowances of every officer serving with a European regiment in those colonies; and therefore, as a matter of finance, I believe it would be found very much more expensive.

2993. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Your Royal Highness does not object to that, I believe?—I do not object to it: but I do not advocate it because I consider that it would add considerably to the expense.

2994. Major *Anson.*] Do you think that it is absolutely necessary that such should be the case?—I think it is absolutely necessary; and perhaps I may be permitted with reference to that question, to point out the enormous difference in pay and allowances which would exist between an officer serving with a European regiment and an officer serving with a native regiment. A lieutenant colonel commanding in China with a European regiment at present receives per annum only 876 *l.*; and a lieutenant colonel commanding, serving with a native regiment, would receive about 1,714 *l.* I consider that the difference between 876 *l.* and 1,714 *l.* is so enormous, that it would not only place the officers serving with European troops socially in a most unfavourable position; but I think it would altogether lower the character of the one at the expense of the other, and in the wrong direction, because there is no question that 800 men of a European regiment is a much larger, and to my mind, more important charge than 800 men of a native regiment; if you pay the one officer who has charge of the most valuable force only 800 *l.* a year, and pay the other 1,700 *l.* a year, I think that is a sort of arrangement which is perfectly impossible to be maintained; hitherto as the Committee probably are aware it has been found impracticable to mix up European and Native troops without putting the officers serving with the one on the same allowance with those serving with the other, wherever they might be thrown together. I merely gave the difference of pay in the case of a lieutenant colonel; but I would observe that the same proportions run right through; a lieutenant colonel not commanding a European regiment gets 821 *l.*; a major of a European regiment gets 675 *l.*, whilst a major of a native regiment would get 789 *l.* In the case of captains there is more similarity, still the difference runs through the whole; decidedly the higher grades are very much less well paid than the others.

2995. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Does your Royal Highness hold that opinion after taking into consideration that the officer commanding a native regiment is considered a staff officer, that his pay is consolidated staff pay, that there are only six or seven European officers with one of those regiments and that the commanding officer is responsible

sible for many duties in connection with his regiment which do not devolve upon the commanding officer of a European regiment?—I do. I think you ought to maintain, wherever the two forces are joined together on service, the relative proportion of pay and allowances which they have in India. I should be satisfied if you maintained the relative pay and allowances of officers serving with European troops in India, and officers serving with native troops in India. I think there ought always to be the same relative proportion.

2996. But you do not think that the fact of the commander of a native regiment being a staff officer, would account to the European officers for the inequality of position in which they would be placed?—No, because if it does not in India, why should it elsewhere. All I ask for is, that the same relative pay and allowances should exist in any other place as do exist in India.

2997. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The Honourable Baronet's question, no doubt, alludes to the establishment of irregular regiments, which are officered by five or six officers, would your Royal Highness inform the Committee what the usual rank of the officers commanding those irregular regiments is?—That is quite accidental.

2998. Is it not often the case that the commanding officer is a captain?—I believe so; he may be a captain, a major, or a lieutenant colonel. I believe a certain proportion will be found to be captains.

2999. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] The whole native army is on the irregular system now, I believe?—Yes.

3000. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] If the officer commanding one of those regiments happened to be of a lower rank, either a captain or a major, he would be receiving a much larger rate of pay than a lieutenant colonel commanding a Queen's regiment, would he not?—There is a certain rate of pay for command, and there is a certain rate of pay attached to his position, whether he be a captain, a major, or a lieutenant colonel. The rate of pay for command is added to whatever the rate of pay may be for his position in the army, and therefore what he would receive would always be more than what an officer of corresponding rank in a European regiment would receive.

3001. Sir *James Fergusson.*] For the reason that it is staff pay?—Exactly; it is staff pay.

3002. Major *Anson.*] Would it not be looked upon in exactly the same way as the staff pay, which English officers upon the staff receive, and the regimental pay?—I do not think that it could be looked upon in that light, because the duties performed are exactly similar. The one officer is serving with a native regiment, and the other is serving with a European regiment, that is the only difference.

3003. Does not your Royal Highness consider that the officers of the English army would make this distinction between the two, that the officers belonging to the European regiments would soon be coming home to England, or that they at all events are not bound to serve abroad all their lives, whereas the officers of the Indian regiments, after they had done serving in China, for instance, would have to go back to India as their home?—I do not think you would find that that would make much difference. I do not think that you would ever find that the officers of the English army would be able to get on comfortably with the officers of the Indian army, if they were to be thrown together on different rates of pay and allowances.

3004. It is on these grounds that your Royal Highness prefers that the native troops to be employed should be a local corps raised by the English Government for the purpose of taking them from the Indian army at large?—I should be sorry to say that I prefer a local corps, because all local corps I think are very objectionable; they are generally very difficult to keep in a state of discipline; but there is so great a difficulty for the other reasons I have stated, in combining native and European troops, unless you are prepared to raise the pay and allowances of the officers of the European regiments, that rather than that there should be that discrepancy between the pay and allowances of the officers, I should prefer a local corps, though at the same time I do not like local corps; and I have little doubt that a regiment from India would be a better body of men than a local corps.

3005. If any scheme could be proposed by which the difficulty with regard to the pay regulations could be got over, your Royal Highness would prefer having recourse to the Indian native army?—Under such circumstances I should be disposed to modify my opinion as to the employment of the Indian native army, certainly.

3006. In case of a great European war, would you look to employing the soldiers of our Indian army at all?—To any extent that it is possible to use them.

3007. Both actually in the field, in places like Egypt, for instance, and as garrisons for our colonies?—Yes, most assuredly; though at the same time, of course, you would always have to be prudent as to how you used native troops in European countries; there might be some difficulty about that; I have heard that with other armies there have been difficulties in that respect; I do not know that these might not be got over; no doubt native troops could be used in a campaign in Egypt, and I think that you might find it very advantageous to employ them there.

3008. Under those circumstances, I suppose the whole of the English army which came in contact with them would have to be put upon the pay and allowance your Royal Highness has spoken of?—Certainly, when serving together.

3009. That is an additional reason, is it not, why some attempt should be made to organize some scheme by which they could be made to serve together without having to make any difference in their pay and allowances?—Of course any scheme that would bring the pay and allowances together would be an advantage; there is no doubt of it.

3010. *Chairman.*] How far would you extend that principle, would you say that if there were two corps, one English and the other native, combining in a single movement and meeting for that purpose, it would immediately be necessary to raise the pay of the officers of the English corps?—If any European corps were used in any service in any admixture with a native corps, the pay and allowances of the officers serving in the European corps ought to be the same relatively to those of the officers serving in the native corps, as they are in India.

3011. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You would not say that, supposing a force landed in Egypt from Europe, and a native force landed in Egypt from the East Indies happened to act in combination, therefore the whole English army must have its

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pay raised?—No, only when they were actually serving together.

3012. Serving together as a brigade?—Yes, as has been the case constantly in China; and invariably, whenever Indian troops have gone to China the European troops serving there have been placed upon what is called Indian pay and allowances.

3013. *Chairman.*] Does your Royal Highness remember whether that it is carried out at Aden?—Yes, certainly, it is carried out at Aden.

3014. Major *Anson.*] You assume as a matter of course that, in the case of a war, when you wanted those Indian troops, you would be able to lay your hands upon them at once, and get them to leave India and go wherever you liked?—I think in case of war soldiers will go anywhere; and though, of course, I cannot speak with any degree of authority upon that point, having had no experience of Indian troops, I should imagine, from all I have heard, that there would be at all events much less difficulty in getting the willing services of Indian troops during war than there would be during peace.

3015. I apprehend that a great many of the duties which you would call upon those troops to perform would be garrison duties; you would not take them actually before the enemy?—I have no doubt that a great proportion of the duties they would perform would be garrison duties; but that would depend upon the circumstances of the case, as to where the contest was going on, the climate, &c.; for instance, in Egypt, I see no reason why you should not largely employ native troops actively in the field, and the same with regard to eastern countries generally. If you come further away from India, I very much question whether it would be prudent to take native troops beyond their own climate, and their own habits.

3016. You would have, in all probability, to withdraw at such a time a large number of European soldiers from India?—I hope we never shall withdraw largely European troops from India.

3017. If you were hard pressed for European troops at home, do you not think it likely that you would have to withdraw some European troops from India?—I would rather raise new levies at home than bring Europeans away from India.

3018. In case such a thing as withdrawing a large force of Europeans from India did happen, it would not be a very good time to make a change in the duties that the native troops are accustomed to perform; it might be dangerous in time of war to make any innovation of that sort, might it not?—Of course that must entirely depend upon the feeling of the country at the time when it takes place; I do not apprehend that there would be more difficulty at one time than at another if there was a good feeling existing; of course if the loyalty of the troops could not be depended upon, the probability would be, even in time of peace, that if they were largely employed abroad they would show some symptoms of disaffection, which might become very inconvenient.

3019. Does not your Royal Highness consider it would be much better to organise a system of that description, and accustom the minds of the native soldiers to employment in our colonies in time of peace, than merely to begin it in time of war?—If I rightly understand, from what I have seen in the evidence, and from other sources, the feeling of the Indian army, I apprehend that the Indian army would not make much objection to being employed abroad in time of war, but that they would in time of peace; if that is a correct view, I do not think the arrangement of employing them in time of peace—I will not say against their will, but when they did not much care about it—would at all operate favourably to their employment in time of war, when they might be induced to act with greater vigour, and with a greater desire to serve the country.

3020. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Your Royal Highness, in one of your answers, said that no British colony ought to be left without British troops. I apprehend you were speaking very generally; you did not mean that every West India Island ought to have European troops, or that every colony which was not of importance ought to have them?—No; but even in the West Indies we have a nucleus of troops in the principal islands, which I conceive we require for the other islands as well; and therefore, though every individual island is not occupied, and it is not desirable that it should be, still we have the means available and at hand to send European troops to every island, if it is thought necessary.

3021. With regard to Hong Kong, I apprehend that you wish to have a reserve of a small body of Europeans kept there as a sort of inlying picket for the garrison?—I wish to have a nucleus of Europeans.

3022. Of course, a harbour like Hong Kong, which is very easily assailable, must depend for its real defence upon the operations of the fleet?—Certainly.

3023. But the fleet may be absent on duty at other ports of the very wide station it covers, and then a small garrison may be of use against some inroad or attack of an enemy's cruisers?—Yes.

3024. In the case of the Mauritius, perhaps your Royal Highness can tell the Committee, in round numbers, what the force garrisoning the Mauritius is?—There are two regiments, and two batteries of artillery.

3025. Would the number be 1,600 or 1,800 men?—About 1,600 or 1,800 men.

3026. The questions put to some witnesses who have been examined before the Committee have indicated rather a fear on the part of some members of the Committee that 1,600 or 1,800 men would be useless for all purposes of defence in the Mauritius; may I ask your Royal Highness to state what would be the views with which you would make use of so small a garrison there; you would not, of course, pretend to prevent the landing of a large force upon an island of the extent of the Mauritius; but might it not be useful to hold one or two important points, such as the harbours that would be available for maritime purposes, and deny them to an enemy; and would not so small a garrison be sufficient to deny those harbours to the enemy, if they were supported by fortifications?—Small though the garrison may be considered to be, still I contend that it is sufficiently strong within itself, with the assistance of the fleet, to hold its own, and to give support to the well-disposed portion of the inhabitants until assistance can come from elsewhere; and with that object in view, if there were, as there ought to be, and as it was intended originally that there should be, two or three strong fortified points into which that garrison could

could be thrown, there is no doubt that it could maintain its position.

3027. And to obtain possession of any permanent footing in the island would require operations on a large scale on the part of the enemy, would it not?—If we had 1,800 Europeans there, it would be necessary to bring a very large force to turn them out, in addition to a fleet; therefore I maintain that that is an adequate force to occupy, for a time, an important position such as the Mauritius, which is in itself a very valuable colony, and important also as regards our trade to and from India.

3028. There being only two ports of any note in the island of Mauritius, a force of 1,800 men in the island of Mauritius might very well deny those ports to an enemy for a considerable period in the supposed absence of the British fleet?—Certainly.

3029. Has your Royal Highness any knowledge of the losses, or have you heard any statistics of the losses, which took place to our trade in the great war with France, from cruisers and privateers coming out from the Mauritius?—As a matter of course, if we do not possess the Mauritius, the power which is in possession of the sea will avail itself of so good a harbour, and very largely cramp if not entirely destroy our trade with India, and that portion of our trade which is accessible from that port. Therefore, that very fact alone, in my opinion, renders it essential for commercial purposes that we should hold the Mauritius in such a manner that there is no risk of anybody else occupying it.

3030. The Mauritius is on the high road to India; it is on the track of our commerce, is it not?—Yes.

3031. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the Mauritius, even if no attack from an enemy was expected, considering that the population is French, who are not very well disposed towards us, and that an enormous proportion of the population are coolies, would you think that the island would be safe, merely in the possession of native troops?—Certainly not, as I think I have already stated before. I think it would be one of the worst places to give up entirely to a native garrison.

3032. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Your Royal Highness stated in answer to the questions from the noble Lord in the chair, that there were two objections to the substitution of native Asiatic troops for Europeans; one was that it necessarily involved, from your Royal Highness's knowledge of how these things are arranged, a reduction of the European army, and the other was the objection to leaving posts of importance garrisoned by native troops alone?—Yes, I did.

3033. Do you consider that either of those objections, taken separately, is quite sufficient in itself, without considering the other?—I do.

3034. Either, or both?—I consider that they are both so important, that whether it be upon one ground, or whether it be upon the other, I should object to the proposal.

3035. Sir *James Fergusson.*] If your Royal Highness objects to the substitution of native troops for English troops in the Colonies, I apprehend you would still more strongly object to the reduction of European troops in India with Oriental troops in exchange for them?—I do not see how it is possible to reduce the European garrison of India; it has been really much less increased than is generally supposed, since the period when the two armies were amalgamated; in fact, since the mutiny, I believe you will find that the increase does not amount to more than 14,000 or 15,000 Europeans. Knowing how strong the impression was, and is to this day, that at the time of the mutiny the European force serving is India was not equal to the requirements of the service, I consider that in point of numbers a mere addition of 14,000 or 15,000 men is really nothing when you come to look at the vast extent of the country to be occupied, and to the arduous and important duties which that force has to perform.

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3036. I believe that all the commanders in chief who have held office in India of late years, have considered that the European army could not possibly be reduced further, consistently with safety?—Certainly; the original schedules sent in by Lord Clyde, Lord Strathnairn, and others at that time, were far in excess of what the number has been reduced to now; and it is only recently that I saw a very important letter from Sir William Mansfield, which I believe is before the Committee, which strongly deprecates the idea of any sort of reduction below what is now the number of European troops serving in India.

3037. And your Royal Highness entirely concurs in that opinion?—Entirely; to such an extent that when a question was put to me, whether it would not be possible to make a considerable reduction of the European troops in India in case of war, I deprecated that idea most strongly; I think that every attempt should be made to raise forces at home or elsewhere in case of war, in preference to reducing any Europeans in India.

3038. Many good authorities have considered, I believe, that the India Mutiny would not have taken place had it not been for the unusual weakness of the British army in India?—That belief is strongly impressed upon the minds of many; I confess I share that opinion very strongly; and upon that ground, I say, should such a circumstance arise again as a European war, in which we required reinforcements, we ought not to look to India to get reinforcements, at all events of Europeans.

3039. Mr. *Oliphant.*] What amount of troops in Hong Kong would you consider sufficient as a nucleus?—I think a regiment of Europeans and a battery of artillery is a good nucleus for that colony to form upon. I consider that the European discipline and organisation leavens the whole body, whether it be supplemented by native troops or by local volunteers; that these are influenced by the European element, and that their discipline is ensured by their having a European corps serving with them.

3040. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It is a fact, is it not, that the two branches of the Indian army, the European and the Native branches, are fixed according to the duties required of each, and without any connection with the numerical strength of each other?—Yes, there are certain stations in India which it is considered necessary should be occupied by European troops, and it is with reference to the number of those stations that I believe the European force has been fixed as it is now.

3041. It is quite an erroneous statement, is it not, to say that if the native army was weakened still further, you would be able to dispense with European troops?—That, of course, is a question which is decided in India, and upon which I am

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not consulted; but I apprehend that, as I have just stated, the European force is calculated upon the requirements of European troops at certain stations, and not with reference to the number of natives that there may be under arms at the time; at the same time probably the Committee is aware that there is a strong impression that any reduction of the native force in India would be an impossibility.

3042. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Does your Royal Highness remember what took place upon the outbreak of the last New Zealand war, with reference to sending Sikh regiments to New Zealand?—Yes.

3043. Was it the intention of the Government to send two or three of those regiments to New Zealand?—It was at one time thought that they would send some Sikh regiments to New Zealand.

3044. Does your Royal Highness remember why that arrangement was not carried out?—First of all it was thought that there might be some difficulty in raising the regiments, and getting the men to go, but the main difficulty, as I understood, was on account of the expense, because it was thought that if the Sikhs were to be sent to New Zealand, the pay and allowances of the officers serving with them were such that you would have to raise the pay and allowances of all the officers serving with the European troops with whom they would be co-operating, and that therefore the expense would be at least as great, if not greater, than the expense of sending one or two additional European regiments.

3045. I do not know whether you remember the circumstance, but I believe it is the fact, that when the intention of sending the Sikhs became known in New Zealand, very great dissatisfaction was felt in the colony?—The colonists objected very much; that is a point which I have not yet referred to. I believe you would find that all the colonies would object very much, and I doubt whether any of the colonies would pay their quota, or their share towards the maintenance of the force, which they are now called upon in some cases, or at all events desired to pay, if the troops they were to pay for were not European troops. I think you would find that all the colonies would object strongly to paying for native troops.

3046. Mr. *Laing.*] Why does your Royal Highness think it so certain that any substitution of native for European troops in the colonies would be objected to by the colonists?—Because I think that all the colonists knowing that the European soldier is the element of strength and protection they want, would consider him superior to a native soldier, of whatever description that native soldier might be; and as they prefer paying for the best description of troops they could get, they would naturally pay willingly for a European, when they might have great hesitation in paying for a native.

3047. Supposing a European regiment to be withdrawn from a colony, and brought home, is it your Royal Highness's feeling that it is certain that the House of Commons, in some fit of economy, would reduce the army by that regiment?—From the experience I have had now for 10 years, I am satisfied that if you were to increase, as you would then do, the force at home beyond what it is now, you would be called upon to reduce that force. As an instance of this I may state that, recently, when there was an idea of raising a native regiment for Hong Kong, we were called upon to reduce the aggregate number of European troops, in order to make up for the increase which would come on to the Imperial establishment of native troops; that is to say, supposing the regiment consisted of 600 natives, we were called upon to reduce 600 Europeans.

3048. Has not the feeling a good deal changed now, is not there a strong feeling in favour of the creation of an army of reserve, and other measures to ensure our having a strong military force at home?—Yes; but an army of reserve has a very different organization from a body of troops permanently maintained. I was alluding entirely to the permanent establishment of the army. I do not think that in that point of view the present feeling with regard to an army of reserve would have any effect in preventing a corresponding reduction of Europeans, supposing you were to take natives on to your pay to a large extent.

3049. Do you not think that the present term of colonial service is so long as to be oppressive upon the British army?—I think it is long, and it is practically longer than it is intended. The object of every Secretary of State with whom I have had to deal, and of the military authorities, has been that the army should have two-thirds of its service abroad, and one-third at home; but we have never arrived at that point yet.

3050. Then it would be desirable, would it not, to diminish the amount of colonial service, if you could do so without a fear of having a reduction in the total establishment of the army?—Yes, but if the intention is carried out of bringing back those regiments that are still serving in New Zealand we shall very nearly, if not quite, have arrived at the point when the infantry will be one-third at home and two-thirds abroad; so that the object we have been striving at would in that case have been attained.

3051. To take the case of the Mauritius, which perhaps may bring to the best practical test the argument for this, if it be worth anything; there are two European regiments now, I think, in the Mauritius?—There are.

3052. Supposing an Indian regiment to be substituted for one of those European regiments, that would still leave the nucleus of a European force in the Mauritius?—Yes.

3053. Supposing a state of things to arise, such as a European war, when we found great difficulty in keeping up a sufficient European force for safety in India, might it not be very desirable to be able to withdraw a European regiment from the Mauritius and substitute an Indian regiment for it?—In time of war I should be very glad to do it, if we cannot help ourselves; but I think it would not be desirable in time of peace, because I think the colony would object to it. I think that 1,800 Europeans are not at all too many for the safety of a very important colony such as the Mauritius. I should feel more security with a garrison of 1,600 or 1,800 men, or whatever the force may be, if they were Europeans, than if they were half natives and half Europeans.

3054. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] The case put by the Honourable Member would, I apprehend, involve an immediate increase of the estimate to be laid before the House?—That is the exact point. As I apprehend the question put to me,

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it would be substituting 600 or 800 natives for 600 or 800 Europeans; therefore you must increase the estimate to that extent.

3055. Or reduce the Europeans?—Yes, because whether it be natives on Imperial pay, or native regiments lent, say by the Indian Government, from the day they leave India they would be on Imperial pay, and you would naturally increase your Imperial estimate to the extent of the numbers that you either raised for yourself, or that you were allowed to use by the Indian Government.

3056. And your Royal Highness apprehends that whatever the decision of the House of Commons might be, you would have a difficulty in getting the Secretary of State for War to propose to the House of Commons those increased estimates?—I think the Secretary of State for War would be very much indisposed to do so, certainly. The experience I have had with all the Secretaries of State I have known, leads me to think that they would not like to increase the estimates in a time of profound peace like the present, by taking on a considerable number of men who, though they be natives, would add directly to the general estimates for the army.

3057. The Belloochee Regiment now about to be raised for Hong Kong is a case in point, is it not?—Yes, that is a case in point.

3058. Major *Anson.*] Apart from the question of employing Indian troops in colonies, do you not think that the service of the army abroad in the colonies ought to be established in the proportion of two-thirds abroad, and one-third at home?—I do; I have always thought so.

3059. And that the House of Commons ought to keep up a sufficient number of troops in England to enable that to be done?—I think that is most essential; but I ought to add that I think the arrangements which are now going on, will probably, in a very short time, make us arrive at that point. It must be borne in mind that we have had some very exceptional years to deal with, and, therefore, the service in the colonies and in India, has been rather more heavy of late than it would be under ordinary circumstances, but if we once return to the due proportion, then I quite agree that the due proportion, having been adjusted, ought to be kept up by Parliament maintaining such a force as to enable the troops to serve one-third of their time at home and two-thirds of their time abroad.

3060. *Chairman.*] Looking to our extended empire, and the innumerable interests always coming into play, it is not very unlikely that we should find it necessary to increase our garrisons anywhere upon certain occasions; something might happen in China, or Japan, or the Cape of Good Hope, or Canada, that would lead to an increase of the army?—I must say that my experience is, that we have never been able to attain to the one-third of the service at home and the two-thirds abroad.

Tuesday, 21*st May* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Captain Hayter.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Laing.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Viscount Hamilton.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Marquis of Hartington.	

THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

ROSS D. MANGLES, Esq., called in; and Examined.

Ross D. Mangles, Esq.

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3061. *Chairman.*] WE understood that you had information with reference to the subject of our inquiry which you were willing to lay before the Committee?—I was desirous of giving evidence before the Committee, because I have formed, after much thought and inquiry, very strong convictions with regard to the army in India, which I was desirous to submit to Parliament and the public through this Committee. I believe that the European army in India is kept up at an unnecessary strength; quite unnecessary, that is to say, as regards the population, but yet necessary as long as we persist in maintaining so large a native army. I believe that if you were to reduce the native army considerably, you might then, with perfect safety, reduce your European army also very considerably. I am aware that it is not likely that soldiers would ever agree that any army of any description, either white or black, should be reduced, but I am quite sure that in the late mutiny there was no danger at all except from our own native soldiers. I am satisfied that there was nothing approaching to an insurrection of the people; in fact, I believe (though of course it is carrying the matter to a great length to say so) that if we had had no native soldiery at all, nothing but the police and our own European troops, we should have had no insurrection at all. A century has passed since we have had the government of India, and in no case have we been in the slightest danger (I speak it advisedly) from any insurrection of the people. We have never had any formidable insurrection, and I believe we never shall. They are a people, as I believe, very easily governed, and they are a people who, owing to circumstances, particularly the differences of religion, do not readily combine; they are a people, generally speaking, with the exception of certain tribes and castes, very timid, and very unsoldierlike; and I believe that our maintenance of the native army at the present strength causes danger, if there be any danger from the population, by keeping up a military spirit among the people. It is clear that if our native army was greatly reduced, fewer tribes and families would have kinsmen in the army; and I think that the history of all countries and of all ages teaches us how very soon even a military people not employed in war, and not kept under arms, settle down into a peaceable, agricultural, commercial, and trading people. I believe that is a matter of universal experience.

3062. Do you consider, then, that none of the native wars in which we have been engaged in India were to such an extent shared in by the population that they may be looked upon as showing hostility on the part of the people?—No, I think not.

3063. The Mahratta wars, for instance?—There is probably more nationality among the Mahrattas, with the exception of the Rajpoots, who, however, are very much divided into different clans, than among any other people in India. I speak now mainly of what I know best, which are the North-Western Provinces, Bengal, and the Punjab; and I say it deliberately and advisedly, having looked into it, that in no single case was there any rising of the people in the years 1857 and 1858 where there were not sepoys. There were many districts where the magistrate and the collector had not a single European to guard them, and nobody but their own police, where 100 insurgents might have robbed and murdered every European at the station with impunity, and robbed the public treasury; and there was not a single instance of such an occurrence. There were districts with a comparatively warlike population, for instance, the province of Behar, where there was not a European soldier, except at Dinapore (the cantonment of Patna), where there was a regiment, while the population amounted to seven millions, occupying an area of 24,000 square miles, and in no single instance did the people rise in insurrection, until, as at Arrah, three regiments of sepoy mutineers had marched into the station.

3064. Was that equally true of Oude?—No, it was not true of Oude, for this reason: the rural population of Oude were the sepoys, so to speak; they were the brothers, cousins, uncles, and fathers of the sepoys. Theirs was not an ordinary insurrection against the Government. The talookdars, I believe, did rise. That was more of the nature of a rebellion than anything else that took place in India, and it was caused by their having been recently dispossessed; but the fighting population in Oude (who certainly did not love the talookdars, and could not love them, because they had been most cruelly oppressed by them, merely rose because they were identified with the sepoys. When the sepoys were pent-up in Lucknow, the population saw

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that their only chance of rescuing them was to make common cause with them. Many of them had been sepoys, many of them were looking to be sepoys; they were the same class of men; they may be said to be the sepoys themselves.

3065. Your induction is based upon 100 years' experience, but then your experience is limited to the North-West Provinces, Bengal, and the Punjab?—No; I said that I do not know so well what happened elsewhere in the mutiny, as I do in regard to those districts; but my experience of 100 years is, of course, historical experience, and I know that there has been, during that long period, no insurrection of the people which threatened the smallest danger to the Government. If the Committee will allow me, I have an extract here which I should like to read. The most serious insurrection I am aware of in India, though I was not in India at the time, was the insurrection at Bareilly in 1816. There had been an obnoxious tax put on, and there had been some blood shed in collecting it, or in connection with it, and there was a fanatical feeling on the part of the Rohillas, who are confessedly, I suppose, after the Sikhs, the most warlike tribe in India. They were well armed in those days with matchlocks, spears, and swords, and they were and are men of reckless courage. They rose in what appeared to be a serious insurrection. Some say there were 5,000 men, some say there were as many as 12,000 men, actually in arms. We had 270 men of the 27th Regular Native Infantry, with two guns, and 150 of a provincial battalion, a sort of local militia, and we had a regiment of irregular horse; that was our whole force against the fighting men of a province. In order to show what the result was, perhaps you will allow me to read a passage from Dr. Wilson's continuation of Mill's History. He says, "The first attack was made upon the sepoys. Being formed in a square, the troops repulsed every charge, though the assailants fought with fury, some of them making their way into the square, where they were cut down or bayonetted. On his side, Captain Cunningham's Horse charged the masses of the multitude, and threw them into confusion; repulsed in their forward movements, they took up their ground in a grove defended by a low wall, but were driven out of it by the troops, who pursued them into the old town, and set fire to the huts in which they had taken shelter. This put an end to the conflict. The insurgents dispersed, leaving between 300 and 400 dead," exceeding the number of the regular troops opposed to them, "and a greater number wounded and taken prisoners. The loss of the troops was inconsiderable, 21 killed, 62 wounded." I was told when I was at Bareilly, some five or six years after the event, by an officer who took part in the conflict, that our troops were so weak that, although the historian says they formed a square, in fact they had not men enough to form a square, they formed a triangle. I instance this because I believe it to have been the most formidable insurrection of the people that ever took place in India during our rule, and you see how easily it was put down.

3066. Was there any native person of note at the head of it?—I cannot answer that.

3067. Do you not think that any insurrection which we are ever likely to have to dread will be an insurrection forming itself round some native prince as the centre?—Yes; but I think there is nothing to dread in that. We have got 130,000 native troops, and we have got from 65,000 to 70,000 Europeans to watch them (that is the great mistake we commit). I have often asked the question who are those troops to fight with? We required a large number of native troops when there were men like Scindia in power, with great armies disciplined by Frenchmen, and with a tremendous force of artillery. We needed then a large force to form line against them, but such powers no longer exist in India. I say that I have asked the question over and over again, from men who maintain an opposite opinion to mine, who are those soldiers maintained to fight against? and I have never had any answer to it.

3068. While there exist native princes of considerable power, a tolerably large force is necessary, is it not?—They are not great Powers; it is not like a disarmament of Europe, where you must conciliate every Power. We are in that position in India that in reducing our own force we should have a moral right to call upon the native princes to reduce theirs and keep them reduced.

3069. Do you think they would do so willingly?—Yes, I think they would do so willingly if they saw that we were reducing ours too; always upon that supposition.

3070. To what point do you think that the native army of India might be reduced?—It is now 130,000. I think you might strike off 30,000 or 40,000 of them, and then you might reduce 20,000 of our European force.

3071. Have you seen a Minute that has come home from Sir William Mansfield on the subject of the force in India?—No, I think not. I may have seen an abstract of it, but I have not seen the Minute itself. But Sir William Mansfield, and whoever holds the opposite opinions to mine, should have that question pressed upon him, and should be obliged to show who those men are to fight with.

3072. As far as I remember, Sir William Mansfield gives a reply to that; he states that a number of frontier stations must be maintained; that Nepaul, for instance, cannot be counted upon as permanently peaceful?—I am glad your Lordship has mentioned Nepaul, because I think that the late campaign in Oude proved, if we did not know it before, that the Nepaulese are quite powerless on the plains. They are formidable in their native mountains, where we have no business to follow them; but every soldier of whom I have asked the question, who saw them in Oude, speaks of them as quite feeble and helpless on the plains. They are as much frightened at cavalry as all highlanders are, as our own Scotch Highlanders were years ago; and I believe that a regiment of dragoons would ride over them all.

3073. Do you apply that view equally to Bhootan?—The Bhootanese fight with bows and arrows; they are most contemptible fellows.

3074. We did not find them contemptible?—They made some resistance behind a stockade, but they could not face our troops.

3075. Our troops did not face them?—A particular brigade did not face them; but it is impossible to consider them formidable enemies.

3076. As a matter of actual experience, was it not a fact that we had considerable difficulty in establishing our positions in that country?—You had the difficulties which there are in all these frontiers;

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frontiers; malaria, and snow and no or bad roads, and difficulties of that sort.

3077. A condition precedent of your policy is, that you should retire from all country which is too difficult for troops to act in?—No, I did not say that; but I think you need not follow men into their fastnesses, certainly not with large bodies of Europeans. Within a year or two there has been a disturbance in the hills lying above what are called the Northern Circars, districts of Madras, on the coast of Coromandel. Sir Henry Montgomery told me only yesterday, that they had been entirely put down by the police, without a single soldier being employed; that bears out my opinion. The views one hears expressed are almost ludicrous. Even in Parliament the other day, when your Lordship made your speech upon the Budget, I observed that Members of Parliament enlarged greatly on the danger of what they called the military police. Of course you can drill the police into a state which renders them as efficient and nearly as dangerous as native troops; but it is your own fault if you do. You have the matter in your own hands, and you may have your police drilled and disciplined up to any point you think fit, and if you think they are becoming formidable you may reduce their discipline and their efficiency. I believe that a police force would do nine-tenths of the duties which are now devolved upon native troops; and there is this great difference between a police force and a force of sepoys, that there is a brotherhood among the native soldiery; they move about from station to station, they meet and fraternise, they come in many cases from the same part of the country, and belong to the same tribes and castes. But the police force in India is generally raised in the district where it is employed, and has a knowledge of the police employed on the frontiers of the adjoining district, but nothing more. The police of Patna, for instance, know no more of the police of Meerut, and have no more connection with them, than they have with the police of Berlin or Madrid; they know nothing of them; they have no means of knowing them; there are 300 or 400 miles between them. But the native soldiers move from station to station; one regiment is stationed at Patna, and another at Meerut, and next year they change places; they meet on the road, and there is a brotherhood between them; that was the great strength of the mutiny. The native troops were all engaged in it. It appears to me quite absurd to hear how the danger of a police force enlarged upon, while at the same time nothing is said of the dangers of a large military force.

3078. Would your proposition be, that these large provinces with considerable numbers of Mohamedan or other fanatical population should be kept in check entirely by a police force?—No, I do not go to the extent of saying that there should be no native army, but I say that the present native army is much too large, and that a very much smaller number would be sufficient and that any insurrectionary movement of the people taken in time, as it ought to be, would, I think, in 99 cases out of 100, be checked by the police if it was not allowed to gather head.

3079. You must always allow for the chance of blunders, and have a sufficient military force to be able to retrieve them, must you not?—Yes, mine is not an extreme view; I do not say we could do without an army at all, far from it, but I say we should be most imprudent to reduce our European force (which I take it is the main subject which this Committee are considering) without reducing our native force. The only reason why you cannot reduce your European force is, that you persist in maintaining a very large native force.

3080. Your policy would be to reduce the military force that watches over the great cities, and to abandon the frontier posts on the north?—No.

3081. To reduce the frontier posts?—No, I do not know that I would; I should keep the bulk of my force at frontier posts, and I should keep a good portion of the rest in the large cities you speak of where there is danger; I should like a European regiment at Patna.

3082. You would dispose of Hyderabad and Gwalior by calling upon the Nizam and Scindia to disarm?—Not to disarm, but to reduce their forces as we reduce ours.

3083. Have you ever drawn out in your own mind anything like a scheme of distribution which would account for the reductions which you propose?—No, I have not; I never went further than the principle. I am satisfied that the main use of our European force is not to keep down the population, who do not as a general rule need keeping down, but to be our watch and guard against the native army; and I say, as a principle, that the smaller the native army the more likely is it to be faithful, and the larger it is the more likely it is to be the reverse.

3084. Have you ever considered the question of artillery; I believe it is now a maxim that no artillery should be in the possession of native troops?—Yes; I think that is a very wise and sound maxim.

3085. Consequently, if you reduce the British force, you must very largely reduce the artillery?—Yes, you would have a smaller force, but you need not put it into the hands of the natives on that account; there is this to be considered as regards the people of India, that every day, and every year, we are making our military arm stronger by better weapons; you have Armstrong guns, you have breach-loaders; if you believe that there is danger from the people of India, they never can acquire those arms, and I say that a company armed with breech-loaders would probably be as powerful against insurgents, as a wing of a regiment armed in the old-fashioned way; as those advantages, and all those improvements in the weapons of war must be on the side of the civilized Power, that is, on our side in India, and against the native population, even if they were disposed to rise; but as I say, we had examples in India in the last mutiny, of whole districts of warlike people who never dreamt of rising, and in some cases they took part against the sepoys. In the province of Behar, for instance, the Commissioner at Patna called in the European officers; he thought they were in great danger, and summoned them to come into Patna, leaving their stations, and among others, two very large districts in particular, Saran and Tirhoot, full of a warlike population, for many of our sepoys came from thence. The European officers left the stations; they were left in charge of native civil officers; and in neither case were the Treasuries plundered, in neither case was any person or property injured, and in both cases when the European

European civilians went back, the districts were handed to them in order.

3086. Do you assume it as a certainty that no future rebellion or mutiny will be better managed than that of 1857?—I assume this as a certainty, that even with our present native force, there never can be so formidable a mutiny from the mere reduction in the numbers of the native army, and if my opinion were to prevail, it would be still less formidable, because you would have fewer sepoys. I used the expression that the smaller the native army the more likely is it to be faithful, and the larger the reverse, because I believe that one great stimulus and encouragement to the mutiny was, that the native troops believed that they were masters of the position. They saw that there was one European regiment at Calcutta; another at Patna; there was a third divided between Lucknow and Cawnpore, and there was a fourth at Agra. In those 800 miles, there were only four European regiments. The native troops knew that, and they knew their own numbers; they knew to a man, probably, how many thousands and hundreds of thousands there were of native troops, and they believed that they were masters of the situation. That I believe was one of the great inducements to them to rise. They believed that they could crush so small a body of European troops, though they knew what sort of men they were, by their superiority in numbers.

3087. Have you ever been able to persuade Sir John Lawrence of the correctness of your views?—I am afraid not. At the same time, "*Magna est veritas et prevalebit.*' Many other people, I daresay, have the same sort of confidence in their views; but I am so certain that I am right about the matter, that I am confident that, sooner or later, my opinions will prevail.

3088. I asked you that question, for the purpose of asking this further one: there must be in the minds of men like Sir John Lawrence, holding a strong opinion upon the subject, some reason or information upon which that opinion rests; have you ever, in correspondence with him, ascertained the point on which he conceives your views to be fallacious?—No; I have written to him upon the subject, but he has not answered me.

3089. Did you discuss the matter with him when he was in England?—No, I do not know that I did. I discussed the mutiny with him, and he agreed with me entirely that it was not in any respect an insurrection of the people, that those who did rise simply followed the sepoys; but that there was no insurrection of the people, properly speaking. That is the opinion, as we know by their publications, of many intelligent and distinguished foreigners; Montalembert and De Tocqueville, for instance; they both hold that opinion very strongly. But there are some Englishmen who are so determined to believe that our government of India is very oppressive, that they will not be satisfied unless we agree with them that the outbreak in 1857 was an insurrection of the people against our intolerable tyranny. I believe that the people were with us; I am sure that the great bulk of the people, especially after they had tested what the government of the sepoys was, were with us.

3090. I forget whether I asked you to name the amount of British and native troops to which you would reduce the two armies?—The native army now consists of about 135,000 men. I think you might well strike off 30,000 or 35,000, and so reduce it to 100,000, and then you might take away 20,000 European troops.

3091. Then you would reduce the European troops to a lower point than that which they held at the outbreak of the mutiny?—No, it would not be so, certainly.

3092. We have had it frequently stated here, on the authority of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and others, that the difference between our force before the mutiny and our force existing now is not more than 13,000?—All force is relative; the British force, before the mutiny was too small, because there was then an enormous native army of 100,000 men stronger than it is at present. I should say it is a matter of proportion.

3093. Then your only remedy for the military evils that produced the mutiny would have been a reduction of the native troops; you would not have thought it necessary to reduce the English force?—I think it would be the same thing whichever you do.

3094. You regard it purely as an equation?—Yes; you had, certainly, too large a native force at that time; but if you had added 20,000 or 30,000 men to your European force, I think it very likely that the natives would not have risen at all.

3095. Then you think that, if by any happy contrivance we could get rid of our native force, we should get rid of our English force too?—No, you must not reduce me *ad absurdum* in that way. I know that no country can be ruled without an army, but an army is a great evil, and the smaller you can make that army the better; it beggars your country. Here you find great difficulty in recruiting. I am satisfied you could lessen that evil to the extent of 20,000 men, if you would begin by reducing your native troops, because all experience, I repeat, shows that you are in no danger from the people of India, and every day which adds to the excellence and precision of your warlike weapons increases your comparative superiority over people who fight with bows and arrows or matchlocks, at the best; and where are they to get breech-loaders, or Armstrong guns?

3096. You said just now, that there was some little difficulty in filling up the ranks of the native army?—No; I referred to recruiting here.

3097. Have you never heard the argument used by Indian authorities, that one of the great evils of reducing the native army is the discontent you produce among the military classes in India?—I have heard that, and I think I have answered it by anticipation. I say I think we create and foster military classes by the very fact of keeping up such large forces. I believe that the Sikhs, who are the best agriculturists in India, would, in the course of a generation, settle down into peaceable habits, and lose their military tendencies. You see that in all nations, and in all ages, it has been the case that a military people will very soon settle down into unmilitary habits. I suppose the people of England have not nearly the same military disposition that they had in times when they were liable to be called out to service, as they were in feudal times. I say that the farmers of Huntingdonshire at present are very little like Cromwell's Ironsides. I see how quiet the Highlanders are compared with what they were; they never think of war. We encourage that spirit in India, and we keep up the military classes. Before our ascendancy was established, almost

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almost every man in Hindostan, the Deccan, and the Mahratta country, was either a soldier or a robber. During the time of the breaking up of the Mogul empire the whole of India was fighting; every man was at every other man's throat. You may keep up and foster that spirit by keeping up large armies, or you may reduce it by dismissing the people to the plough and the loom.

3098. How would you deal with the case of frontier outrages; supposing the Affghans or other people from the north-west came down and committed some great outrage?—Of course I would keep a very considerable force at Peshawur, or upon the frontier.

3099. Was not there in the Umballa campaign very considerable difficulty in getting together a force large enough to make an impression?—I speak there with great humility; as your Lordship asks me the question, I must answer it. I think there was a mistake in following them into their hills. I do not think you ought to have done that.

3100. How do you propose to chastise them, if you do not follow them into their hills?—You could chastise them when you catch them in the plains giving you provocation.

3101. Then you must keep continual watch?—No doubt; you must be very watchful. I think it would be very likely that you could, if you tried it, hire one of the tribes to chastise the other, which would be better still.

3102. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the reduction of 20,000 European troops which you mentioned, if you only reduced 30,000 of the natives, do you not think that that would be a very large proportion of Europeans to reduce in comparison with the natives?—No, for the reason I have stated; because I think that if the natives knew that they were weaker they would be less likely to give you trouble.

3103. Major *Anson.*] With respect to your remarks about the causes of the mutiny, all the fortified places in India at the time were also in the hands of the native army, were they not?—Yes, they were.

3104. In the case of Oude, we had just annexed the province, and the talookdars, the great landed proprietors there, had never given allegiance to anybody before hardly?—They were very bad subjects to the king, no doubt.

3105. They all held independent forts, from which they plundered their neighbours, and I think we captured something like 300 of them in one campaign?—Yes, the country was studded with forts.

3106. And therefore Oude was in a totally different position altogether to the rest of India?—Quite so. It is quite clear why the talookdars were dissatisfied; they had reason to be dissatisfied, for, right or wrong, the land settlement had been very unfavourable to them. I do not say whether it was right or wrong, but they had great reason to be dissatisfied with it; however, I am quite sure that their countrymen, the people of Oude, I mean the fighting population, would never have risen except because the quarrel was in fact their own quarrel.

3107. There is very little doubt, as you say, that the lesson we learnt from the mutiny was to be very careful about the native army, and to have a great dread of a preponderance of the native army?—Yes, I apprehend there is no other cause for fear in India. There are wild tribes, the Santals and the Bheels, and there are frontier dangers, but there are after all only two frontiers to be watched, the Peshawur and the Bhootan frontier. The Himalayahs are quite impassable, and the people beyond our frontier are not disposed to trouble us at all except at those points I have mentioned.

3108. *Chairman.*] And the Burmese frontier?—I think we are much more likely to invade the Burmese than they are to invade us.

3109. You have had two wars there?—Yes; I was in the first Burmese campaign. I may say of them what I said of the Bhootans: they were a miserable enemy; they never could face us for a moment. The only difficulties were the difficulties of the country; our troops were fed on salt provisions. We had no means of carriage, and there were no roads. These were the only difficulties; it was not the enemy; and so it was in Bhootan. In the particular case alluded to by the noble Chairman, there was great mismanagement; I believe they cut off our water, and of course we were obliged to come away then.

3110. Major *Anson.*] You think our military system in India, in fact, at the present moment is a wrong one?—I think it is wrong in this respect, that we keep up an unnecessarily large native army. Having this large native army, we are obliged in prudence to maintain a large European force; I would not on any account reduce the European force without reducing the native force in the first instance.

3111. In time of peace that is bad enough, but in time of war would you apprehend the withdrawal of large numbers of European soldiers if we had a war in Europe?—There would be a great temptation to the Imperial Government to withdraw European troops from India.

3112. More especially, now that they are all Queen's regiments?—Yes, exactly; they could not withdraw the Company's regiments in former days, but they would reduce them, no doubt, in any future war; and I think they might safely reduce them, but only if they had reduced the native force.

3113. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge said that he did not think they would withdraw any European soldiers from India; but do you not think it is extremely probable when the time came, and they wanted troops, that they would do so?—The inducement would be very great. If we were fighting upon the Continent, and met with any reverse, I think the inducement would be too strong to be resisted to take 10,000 or 20,000 European troops from India.

3114. That would be the time, of all others, when the native force, finding the European force in India reduced, would take the opportunity of rising against us?—Certainly it would.

3115. Do you not think it would be a far wiser plan to endeavour to turn the warlike energies of such races as there are in India to the defence of the empire away from India, where there would be no danger to us?—I have no doubt that the Sikhs would willingly take service in that way; I think the rates of pay would be a difficulty, but I think the Sikhs would go anywhere where they could get fighting and plunder.

3116. Apart from the question of pay, you think it would be a wise thing to make use of them where they could be no danger to us?—I think it would. If there was what the Americans call any "difficulty" in Egypt, they might be

very

very useful there. I think you might send a large force there, and, led by English officers, I think they would be a match for any troops in the world.

3117. Do you not think you might also find them very useful for doing garrison duty in our colonies?—I do not know about that; the Sikhs are a restless people; they like fighting, and they like plunder; I do not think they would like garrison duty much.

3118. They never have shown any objection to it yet, have they?—They have never had any.

3119. In China?—They had fighting there.

3120. After the fighting was over?—If they thought it was going to last a short time, they might bear it; but they are a restless people.

3121. Other tribes, of whom we have made soldiers, have been very useful in garrison duty; in the Straits Settlements, at Aden and in China, they have done their work very well?—No doubt they have; they would do so.

3122. Do you think that that was a wrong system which we adopted then, to employ those troops in those colonies?—No, I do not think so at all.

3123. I believe the Indian Government adopts that system still at Aden, and there is no reason, is there, why, if they employ Indian troops at Aden, they should not employ them in the Mauritius, for instance?—No; I do not know why they should not.

3124. Politically, you think that there would not be the smallest objection to doing so?—I do not think there would.

3125. On the contrary, you think it would be rather advisable to do so?—They must be classes who do not object to going to sea, or regiments enlisted for general service.

3126. The Indian regiments are all enlisted for general service now, are they not?—Yes, I think they are.

3127. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, in his evidence, admitted that in all probability it would be very advisable to employ those soldiers out of India in time of war; do you not think that it would be rather a dangerous time, when you were hard pressed at home, to commence any new system with your native soldiers in India; and would it not be much more advisable to begin it gradually in time of peace?—It would be much more advisable to commence it in time of peace, no doubt.

3128. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] All the evidence which has hitherto been given before the Committee has stated that the number of European troops employed in India is regulated rather with reference to the military requirements of the country than for the purpose of watching the native army; are we to understand that that is not your opinion?—That is clearly not my opinion. I do not see the military acquirements of the country, with the exception of those that the noble Chairman has mentioned, our frontier stations espicially; I think that the military requirements of the country are otherwise exceedingly small. I have no fear whatever; from the experience of 100 years, of any danger from any of the population; we have less danger now than before, because we have disarmed them in a great measure; they have no gunners, they have no practised artillerymen, and we have the daily increasing superiority of our improved arms. Therefore, I cannot see for what purpose the European troops are maintained except to watch the native army. The chief lesson that the mutiny has taught me, and I believe has taught most thinking men, that which it has taught Sir John Lawrence, to my knowledge, is, that our great danger, so preponderating a danger that it may be called our sole danger, is from our native troops. Therefore I suppose that, seeing no danger in any other quarter, the European troops are maintained that we may be upon our guard against the native troops.

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3129. Let me recall to your recollection one very important and necessary element of danger which always must exist in India, the simple fact of a Mahometan population, the Mahometan being by nature an enemy of the Christian?—I am afraid it would take rather a long time to go into that subject, but I am quite prepared to do so. I disbelieve it; I think that we are in error in supposing that. Just as we should be wrong, in fact, in supposing that every man who calls himself a Christian is governed by Christian motives entirely, in all his thoughts, words, and actions; so we are utterly wrong in supposing that all Mahometans are necessarily inimical to Christians. In the late mutiny many of our staunchest friends and supporters were Mahometans; I could name you instances over and over again, of hundreds and thousands of Mahometans who were faithful. I was told by the highest authority, that two-thirds of the native troops who marched down from the Punjab to assist us in the capture of Delhi, and who rendered the most essential service there, were Mahometans; they came and fought on our side, the Guides and the other men of the Punjab also, with the greatest fidelity and gallantry; I could bring to your knowledge scores of such instances.

3130. Where Mahometans are placed under European or English guidance, it is very possible that that may be the case, and that the feelings of religion are then to a very considerable degree modified; but still I must bring it to your recollection, that whenever we have Mahometan nationalities as opposed to Christian nationalities, the Mahometan prejudice comes out with the greatest virulence. We may take the case of Algeria; from the very commencement there has been an implacable, and undying enmity between the two races there, which exists to this time; it has been exactly the same with the Mahometan provinces of Russia. The very rebellion which has been quoted at Bareilly was essentially a Mahometan rebellion; it was raised by a Mahometan fanatic, who placed himself at the head of it, and it was on that ground that the insurrection attained such formidable proportions. I think from your Indian experience you must know that we always have looked upon the Mahometan element as one of excessive danger?—I think it has always been very much exaggerated, and my opinion of that exaggeration has gathered force from the experience of what I heard, and read during the mutiny. If I had time, and you had patience, I could give you hundreds of cases where Mahometan soldiers, and other individuals, behaved in the staunchest way towards us in that mutiny; but it is enough to mention the single fact that two-thirds, I am told, (I think it was Sir Robert Montgomery who told me, I know I had it on the highest authority) of the soldiers who marched down and gave their blood and their lives for us at Delhi were Mahometans.

3131. I was mentioning to you that in that

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case there was no religious fanaticism involved; the mutiny was not a Mahometan mutiny; we should never have obtained them if it had been otherwise?—I will give you the proof of a case where it was a Mahometan mutiny. There were a number of Wahabees at Patna, as you know; they formed a conspiracy, subscribed money, and fostered the very insurrection beyond the frontier which the noble Chairman spoke of; they were detected in it, and some of them were hung; but the man who denounced them was a Mahometan police officer in the Punjab, who found reason to suspect that this conspiracy was going on. He laid the case before a magistrate, but he had not sufficient evidence at the time to induce the magistrate to act upon it. Accordingly this Mahometan sent his son into the Sitana country, where he obtained evidence sufficient for these men's conviction. The son came back, and the father laid the case again before the magistrate; the men were tried, convicted, and executed upon this Mahometan's evidence, this being really a religious war, a real crusade against the Christians.

3132. *Chairman.*] Was the Mahometan a Wahabee?—No, he was not a Wahabee, but he was a Mahometan.

3133. Is not it true that the Wahabees are extending very largely throughout India?—They may or may not be; I do not know.

3134. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] With respect to the reduction of our European force in India, has it ever occurred to you that the gradual approach of the Russian frontier is an element of consideration in this question?—I have not much apprehension of a Russian invasion of India; but, supposing it to be so, I say that we could, if need were, send troops from England to Bombay and Peshawur much faster than the Russians could march from the Sea of Aral to meet us.

3135. I am not talking of a Russian invasion, but of the gradual approach and absorption year by year of territory, which is taking place before our eyes every day; when our territories march with each other, do you think it will then be prudent to avail ourselves of that time to reduce our army by 20,000 men?—I think it will be a long time before the Russian frontier marches with ours.

3136. *Chairman.*] When the territories do march, you will be prepared to revise the establishment?—Yes; I think we could send troops to India faster than they could march them through Affghanistan.

3137. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Besides the actual frontiers you have mentioned of Bhootan and Peshawur, we have considerable frontiers by sea upon which we may be required to act, such as Abyssinia, Turkey, Egypt, and Persia, which are all frontiers where troops from India may be required to act at any time?—Just so; I think those would be the very places where we could send some of our superfluous native troops to; but as to Abyssinia, with the present means of communication, it is nearer to England than to India.

3138. As to the reduction of the native army, the question is whether we must consider that it is merely with reference to the immediate frontier we are to maintain either our European or our native army; or whether we must not take into consideration our frontier beyond sea, where Imperial purposes may require both European and native troops to be employed?—It would be very easy to augment them, and raise second battalions if necessary.

3139. I will not go now into the question of the mutiny at all; it is a very long question; I merely would like to ask you, in reference to your observation that it was only where troops were present that an insurrection took place, whether it has not occurred to you that in all cases of insurrection it is necessarily the military element which originates and bears the brunt of the insurrection; the agricultural population never take arms in the first instance, but it is the military element that first comes into the field, and necessarily so, is it not?—We have happily in this country very little experience of insurrections at all; but, for example, in the Highlands in 1715 and 1745 there were no military to rise; it was the population who rose in those cases.

3140. The chiefs and the retainers of the chiefs were all military?—So you may say the population were military; they were not trained soldiers, we have happily very little experience of that. Another case occurs to me, namely, the insurrection in La Vendée, in France, in the great French Revolution; they were not soldiers who rose, they were the agricultural population.

3141. They were retainers, almost all of them?—There were thousands of them. They could not all of them have been retainers. Again, in Poland, in the late insurrection, there were no soldiers to rise; it was the population, the peasantry, that rose, I believe.

3142. No; I believe the soldiers rose?—No regiments mutinied that I know of.

3143. With regard to Oude, do you not consider the war in Oude really to have been an insurrection, in the regular sense of the word, not a mutiny?—I think it was, but I think it may be accounted for. The causes were peculiar. I will admit that that was an insurrection; but Oude was a newly-acquired territory then, and there was that peculiar cause which I stated, which was that the whole population were, in fact, sepoys.

3144. Major *Anson.*] Two-thirds of the men employed by those native princes, the talookdars, in Oude, were our own sepoys, I believe?—Very many were, no doubt; but the whole population were the brothers, the fathers, the sons, the cousins, and the brothers-in-law of the sepoys; they were the same people.

3145. During the siege of Delhi, it is notorious that if the population of the country had joined in with the sepoys, we could not have held our position there a week?—Yes; there are strong facts connected with the mutiny which tell in the same direction. During the time that we were shut up in Agra there were civil officers riding about the country, and a small band of volunteers in the middle of the Doab holding their own, having no fear whatever of the population, and only being obliged every now and then to get out of the way of the sepoy regiments which were marching to Delhi. After the victory of General Adrian Hope, who was sent out by Sir Colin Campbell from Futtyghur, and routed the enemy there, Mr. Charles Raikes, the Civil Commissioner, who was with the force, says that in the native correspondence which was found in the rebel camp, there were letters denouncing the whole Hindoo population of that part of the country as being in league with the English. Mr. Raikes said that two Civil officers, whom he named, came in, who had been for weeks

weeks riding about the country, and said they found that in the villages they were everywhere well received. I believe that there was hardly a case of any men who tried to get from any of the neighbouring districts to Agra, who did not get safely across hundreds of miles of country. The present Sir Francis Outram carried his mother behind him on a pony; he carried Lady Outram for 100 or 200 miles into Agra in that way in perfect safety.

3146. Sir *James Fergusson.*] All that only proves that it was not an insurrection, but a mutiny; it does not follow that the circumstances would be the same if there were a chance of insurrection in the country?—I do not believe that the elements of insurrection exist. It appears to me that it is little short of madness, if you are satisfied that it was our native army which rose against us, and which alone put us in any real difficulty, that you should insist upon still keeping up not so formidable certainly, but a very formidable native army. Danger for danger, I believe you are in much more danger from a regiment of native soldiers than you are from a million of the cultivators, the artisans, and the peasantry of the country.

3147. Major *Anson.*] There is another fact which is worth mentioning. During the whole of the war in India in 1857, 1858 and 1859, although we marched over the whole of the North-western Provinces and Oude, we never had the slightest difficulty in getting any amount of supplies for our army from the people themselves; did you ever hear of any difficulty of that sort?—No, I did not.

3148. Sir *James Fergusson.*] You said you thought a very small force of Europeans would suffice, because a company of English soldiers armed with breech-loaders would be a match for almost any number of natives?—Yes.

3149. Does not that presume that our enemies, whoever they are, are concentrated. If you reduced your European force very low, and you had to deal with a number of forces scattered about the country, your smallness in numbers would be very injuriously felt?—The proportions would be the same; I believe all the advantages of superior weapons would be on our side, and that that is, and must be, a continually increasing advantage.

3150. We reckon upon that at any rate; the European force in India is already in extreme disproportion to the population of the country, under any circumstances any force we had must be exceedingly small in any place?—I repudiate altogether the belief that we are in any danger from the population of the country; we have the experience of a century, and we never have been in danger. If ever the population would have risen against us, surely they would have risen against us when they had the encouragement of a large army of their own countrymen, drilled, and disciplined, and supplied with weapons of all sorts; surely they would have taken advantage of that opportunity if they were disposed to rise.

3151. You said you thought the present European force altogether unnecessary provided the native army was smaller; but you recognise that there are certain places where there must be European regiments kept, such as Patna?—Yes.

3152. Is it not the case that the European troops are scattered over India, with especial reference to the necessity of guarding similar places?—Some of them are, but there are many places where they might be dispensed with, if you had not native troops.

3153. Is it not the case that the European force in India is divided in comparatively small detachments all over the country, with an especial view to the duties to be performed at the particular posts where they are placed?—Of course they have been placed judiciously, that I have no doubt of, from the character of those who have had the placing of them, but they are not scattered; nothing below half a regiment is stationed at any place.

3154. I mean they are stationed, a wing here and a wing there, one regiment in one place, and another in another, all with especial reference to the necessities of the posts at which they are placed?—With reference to the supposed necessities, no doubt.

3155. Has it ever entered into the minds of military authorities in India to place a European regiment, say at Agra, because there is a native regiment there; is it not placed there because they think there is a necessity for a European regiment at that place, and then there is a native regiment put there also, to do the duties which would be very severe upon the European soldier?—No doubt, there must be a certain native force kept up to do what you may call sun duties, and to act as the light troops did with the Roman Legions in case of war; but I do not think the authorities have sufficiently estimated the fact of what is the real danger to our Government in India.

3156. I quite understand your view, what I want to ask is this—has any military authority in India ever placed European regiments at particular posts on account of the number of native troops there already; has not it been always that the European troops are supposed to be wanted for the duties of the post, and that the native regiments are there to help them?—Yes; I suppose you are right as to their views; I do not think they see and feel sufficiently what, I believe, to be the real danger.

3157. You would reckon reliefs from England to meet any possible attack from without, but have you considered that if the European force in England is greatly reduced, you would not have British soldiers in England to send?—Before the Russians could put you in any real danger, you might raise any number of troops.

3158. Then you must depend upon the facility with which you could raise troops in England specially?—Yes, I think so; I think you might as well be at war as keeping up a large army because at some distant date you may have war.

3159. Captain *Hayter.*] Would you state again the strength of the European garrison in India?—It is between 60,000 and 70,000, I think, at this moment.

3160. Are we to understand that that is the actual or the nominal strength?—I should suppose the actual strength is about 60,000, and the nominal strength 70,000.

3161. The nominal strength is 70,000, and the actual 65,000, is not it?—Yes; I speak from memory.

3162. Then the proportion between the two armies, after the reduction you propose, would be as nearly as possible the same, would it not?—Yes.

3163. That is to say, you would reduce the 70,000 men to 50,000, and the 135,000 men to 100,000?—Yes.

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3164. Which is within 5,000 men the same proportion?—Yes.

3165. Are you aware that the objection to such an arrangement by the military authorities in this country is based upon the very probable contingency that, after the reduction of the mixed garrison in India, the House of Commons would in equal ratio reduce the strength of the Imperial army?—No.

3166. That was stated by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge?—I do not think that is a reason why you should not do what you believe to be right, because other people will do what you believe to be wrong.

3167. Then you do not consider that objection fatal to any proposal for the reduction of the native and European armies in India?—Certainly not.

3168. Colonel *North.*] With regard to the Sikhs you propose to employ them?—I did not propose it; I was asked whether I thought they might be employed. It was no proposition of mine.

3169. From the evidence we have had, it appears that all the native troops require to be relieved every three years, and that you cannot get them to remain in any colony beyond that time, because they want to get back to their families?—I think they would bear a longer expatriation than that.

3170. I think you said their pay must be increased, and their other allowances?—Yes.

3171. That would place the cost of them very much on a par with the cost of European troops?—Yes; the advantages, I take it, would be very much the reduction of the strain upon the country in getting men, that would be the great advantage. I should not look to a pecuniary advantage. With regard to the military police, I should like to say one word more. There is a great disposition (indeed I saw it, as I said, in the last debate upon India in the House of Commons) to talk with great fear of a military police as being a very dangerous element in India. Now, Sir Henry Montgomery gave me an extract from a letter from Mr. Robinson, the inspector general of police at Madras, a very able officer indeed, in which he says what I should like to place on record: "The discussion in Parliament anent police shows that there is an impression that our police in India is military in its character and dangerous, and the form of return sent by the clerk of the House of Commons is framed on this supposition. I need scarcely say that there is no military tone or character in ours" (that is in the Madras police), "either as respects organisation or administration, indeed far too much is made of errors in this respect committed in some places. A police never can be made military or formidable, though folly in that direction may make them very inferior, or even useless as police." I think there is a very great deal of truth in that.

Lieutenant General the Right Hon. Sir HENRY STORKS, G.C.B., called in; and Examined.

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3172. *Chairman.*] WHAT is your opinion with reference to the employment of Indian troops in those of our colonies with which you are acquainted?—If I am to understand, by employing Indian troops in the colonies, that they are to take the place of British troops, I think that it would be a very dangerous experiment.

3173. To any extent?—To any considerable extent. Perhaps it might be practicable and desirable to employ them to assist the British troops in some colonies.

3174. On what do you ground your opinion that it would be a dangerous experiment to employ them in place of British troops?—Because I do not think that the colony would have the same confidence in them as in British troops, nor would it be in the same state of security. Perhaps if your Lordship would refer to particular colonies, I could illustrate better what I mean.

3175. Are you familiar with the Cape of Good Hope?—I have served at the Cape of Good Hope.

3176. Would Indian troops be incompetent to maintain the frontier against the Caffres?—I do not say that they would be incompetent, but I do not think they would do it as well as a small body of British troops, supplemented by native levies if further assistance were required.

3177. You do not think that a saving in point of money would be obtained by employing them instead of British troops?—No, I think not, if I rightly understand that the Indian troops have a higher rate of pay and allowances than the British troops.

3178. Not the troops?—But the officers have, I think.

3179. Major *Anson.*] Have you gone carefully into the question of the comparative expense of English and native troops?—No; I know that there is a difference in the pay and allowances of the officers; and I apprehend that if you had Indian troops doing duty with British troops, the British officers would look for the same increase of pay; they would expect to have the same rate of pay as the officers serving with the Indian troops were receiving.

3180. *Chairman.*] I did not ask the question so much with reference to the comparative expense, as to the point of whether you imagined that an equal efficiency could be obtained without employing a much larger number of Indian troops to that which is at present obtained with our English troops; you do not think that for the purposes of frontier defence, an equal number of Indian troops to that of the British troops now employed would be adequate to the purpose?—I do not.

3181. Do you think that it would have to be largely increased in order to gain the present efficiency?—Yes; I think you would require a considerable increase of force; I should think that the climate of the Cape of Good Hope would be also very much against an Indian force.

3182. On what account?—On account of the cold.

3183. Some of the Indian troops are capable of standing cold, are they not?—Yes; some from the north of India are.

3184. Then, so far as you would wish non-European troops to be employed in the Cape of Good Hope at all, you would prefer that they should be raised on the spot?—I should.

3185. What experience have you had of South African troops?—I think that the native levies, which we had during the Caffre war under the command of English officers, did very well; I think what were called the Burghers, who were a sort of volunteers, did very badly.

3186. They were Dutch, were they not?—They were Dutch and English settlers at the Cape. Some of our Hottentot levies did very well,

well, and some of the Fingoe levies also did very well, for there is a great enmity existing between the Fingoes and the Caffres; the Caffre police has also done very well, I am informed, since the war of 1853.

3187. The Fingoes are physically very strong men, are they not?—Yes; I think they are as fine a race almost as the Caffres.

3188. Did they behave well in the field?—Yes, very well.

3189. Was their discipline good?—They were under English officers, who of course exacted discipline from them; they obeyed orders, and they did not desert.

3190. Is there much difficulty in keeping them from riot and misconduct?—No, I think not.

3191. Is it your opinion that they might be exported as local troops with advantage, that they might be used, for instance, at such a colony as the Mauritius?—No, certainly not.

3192. On what ground?—I do not know that they would go in the first place.

3193. That would be a question of money, I suppose?—No, I am not so sure of that; I think that they have very strong feelings on the subject of country, and they have a great dislike to the water, that is to crossing the sea.

3194. They have a great dislike to going to sea?—Yes, I think so. In all the intercourse which I have had with them, they have always expressed that feeling; and the Mauritius, I should think, would be a place very ill suited to have such a force.

3195. Would they not be competent to maintain order there?—I do not consider that it is a question so much of order; I think it is a political and military question as regards the Mauritius.

3196. What is the political aspect of it?—I look upon the Mauritius as our great stronghold in the Indian seas, in a smaller degree, but in the same way as I look upon Malta as our great stronghold in the Mediterranean.

3197. Do you think that the garrison which we should maintain at the Mauritius, would be sufficient to withstand any serious attempt to reduce the island?—The garrison there now is about 1,500 or 1,600 men, I think. When we took the Mauritius in 1810, the French had a considerable force there, with about 300 guns in position in different parts of the island; we landed in the North, and marched straight upon Port Louis, and after one or two days the garrison capitulated; the conduct of the French general in command of the garrison was approved by the Emperor; he was afterwards employed in Spain, and I think was killed there; it was General Decden, but Port Louis in those days was in a very different state to what it is now. As England is a great naval power, the object of any general in command at the Mauritius would be, I apprehend, supposing we had lost the command of the sea for a time, to hold out as long as he could with his garrison until he was relieved. Large sums of money have been spent upon the port and fortifications at Port Louis, and I should say that those fortifications would enable a determined officer to hold out for a considerable time.

3198. With a garrison of 1,800 men?—He might do a good deal with that force and with the assistance of such local means as he could get there. No doubt he would be able to raise men, and he would raise as many as he could get to do the work of the garrison. There is a large Indian population of coolies in the island, and he would probably get as many of those as he could to relieve the garrison of fatigue and other duties of a like description, but I should think it very doubtful if Mauritius would ever be besieged *secundum artem*.

3199. You look upon the garrison of the Mauritius as perpetually maintained there in expectation of a possible war?—It is a great possession. Any one who reads the account of what took place at the end of the last century and the beginning of this, will see the injury which was done to our commerce at that time by the French holding the Mauritius; there is a very strong French feeling in the island, although the French inhabitants of the Mauritius are very glad to be under English rule, as regards their commercial transactions.

3200. Do you think that it would be likely, or even possible, that the Mauritius should be reduced by any naval force of any foreign power before we found means to relieve it?—I do not know what force the French could bring against us there. The French have got Bourbon, which is close by. There is no harbour there certainly, but they have a considerable force there, and they are also trying to make settlements or to have a port in Madagascar; all, I suppose, ultimately with a view of looking after English commerce in those seas.

3201. Supposing that the political question were set aside, that is to say, supposing the possibility of a foreign war were set aside, should you think that coloured troops were adequate to maintain order in the Mauritius?—I should think that any troops almost would do. I do not apprehend that there would be much difficulty of that kind. Of course it would be very desirable to have a portion of English troops there.

3202. You look upon the garrison of the Mauritius as mainly political, as mainly military, in fact?—Yes, I look upon the Mauritius as a great military station. There is a great difference between English colonies proper, that is to say, colonies founded by Englishmen, such as Australia, and those which have been acquired by conquest or cession, and originally colonised by foreigners, which is the case with almost all our colonies; it would be more proper to call them foreign possessions; English colonies is not the proper term for those which are of foreign origin. In those cases, of course, we have difficulties which we do not meet with in colonies of British origin. The Cape of Good Hope was originally a foreign settlement, with the exception of the frontier part of it. The Mauritius is a colony of foreign origin; it was settled by the French. Ceylon was originally Dutch; and so we may go on.

3203. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] And Malta?—Yes, you may include both Malta and Gibraltar.

3204. *Chairman.*] After what you have said about the Mauritius, it is needless to ask you whether you would like to have coloured troops in Malta?—Certainly not. I have just come from Malta, and I should be very sorry to see coloured troops there.

3205. You would not like any?—No, not any beyond those we have. We have a regiment called the Malta Fencibles, and that is a regiment which it is very difficult to keep complete.

3206. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Do you go the length

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length of saying that if your European regiments were very weak, you would not like to have them supplemented by native troops?—No; I would rather have them supplemented than not. The garrison of Malta is 6,000 men now. I think it certainly ought to be 10,000, if there is anything approaching to a war. We have in Malta 5,930 of all ranks; and the establishment is 6,294 of all ranks.

3207. *Chairman.*] If there was any difficulty about getting English troops, I suppose there is a good deal of work in the garrison that could be done by coloured troops?—Certainly, I should be very glad to have their assistance as supplementing the English troops, always supposing that we could feed them.

3208. Major *Anson.*] You could feed them rather easier than you could English troops, could you not?—I do not know about Indian troops; I should think that there would be great difficulty in feeding them.

3209. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] What would you say to Sikhs?—They have not the prejudices of caste which the Hindoos have.

3210. Major *Anson.*] The wants of the native soldiers are much fewer, and they do not eat so much as the Europeans?—No; and the Sikhs have not the difficulties of caste which you have to deal with in the case of Hindoos.

3211. You said, I think, that you would object to the use of native Indian soldiers at the frontier of the Cape, that they would not be up to their work there; do you think that they would not be able to compete with the Hottentots or the natives of South Africa in the field?—I do not think that they would be so useful; but my opinion is not worth much as regards that, because I never served in India, and I do not know much about Indian troops beyond what I have heard or read.

3212. Do you base that opinion upon their not being able to do so much work as English soldiers, or upon their not being so brave, or upon their not standing the climate?—I think that the climate would be much against them.

3213. Is that your only objection?—I should prefer to have English troops myself if I had to work that country.

3214. In time of peace do you not think that the cheaper material (supposing that the native troops are cheaper) would do the ordinary work at the Cape equally as well as the English soldiers?—I should be very much inclined to let the colonists at the Cape take care of themselves. I think that what we ought to look to is more the Cape proper, so to say, than the frontier. Of course a Caffre war is always a very popular thing in the colony, amongst certain classes who profit very largely by it. The settlers on the frontiers are in rather isolated positions, because they have large tracts of country for sheep farming. At the same time, when I was at the Cape, they professed their readiness to take care of themselves if they had been permitted to do so.

3215. Whether they took care of themselves or not, in a money point of view, still they would call upon us to find the troops for them, would they not?—They do now, because we will not allow them to pursue the Dutch system, the commando system, as they call it, which was for the settlers to meet together, and make a raid together against the Caffres, and eat up the Caffres; probably they were more savage than the Caffres themselves. That was the old Dutch system.

3216. Do you think that in a military point of view it is absolutely necessary to keep up the garrison which we have at the Cape at the present moment?—The garrison now at the Cape is 4,536 men of all ranks, including officers. Looking at the present policy as regards the Cape, I should say that the garrison is not too small.

3217. Then you do not consider that the troops there would be of the slightest use for service elsewhere, if required; you do not think that you would be able to send troops from the Cape to India, in case of any disturbances in India?—I do, because troops were sent from the Cape to India during the mutiny.

3218. What number of men were there at the Cape at that time?—I have not got the numbers of the force exactly.

3219. Were there as many as 9,000 men?—Probably there were, but I cannot answer that question off-hand.

3220. They did not at that time reduce the garrison of the Cape below what it is at present, did they?—No; because they were very apprehensive of another Caffre war at the time; but I think that another great advantage of having European troops at those different stations or colonies is, that they can mutually assist each other. We saw an instance of that recently, when a regiment went from Halifax to Jamaica, and another portion of a regiment was sent from Barbadoes to Jamaica. In the same way, when the Mutiny broke out in India, troops were sent to India from the Mauritius, from Ceylon, and from the Cape of Good Hope.

3221. The large number of places we have to find garrisons for really finds the work for the British army, does it not?—So long as you have British commerce all over the world you must have certain harbours and depôts for its assistance, and you must have these places defended and garrisoned.

3222. If officers who had had experience of the Indian native soldiers considered that they were quite equal to the work to be performed at the Cape against the Hottentots or against the Caffres, should you have any objection to employ them?—I should be very glad to have them to supplement English soldiers, but I should not like to have a force of Indian troops and no other force there.

3223. With regard to the Mauritius, what length of time do you suppose the island of the Mauritius could hold out, supposing an enemy's fleet had the command of the sea?—With what garrison?

3224. With the garrison that is there now?—I am supposing that all the fortifications were finished, then with a garrison of 1,800 men I should think the officer in command ought to hold out for from three weeks to a month.

3225. He could not hold out much longer than that on account of the provisions, could he?—I do not know what provisions they have. We are naturally very dependent at Mauritius for our meat upon Madagascar. There is always a supply of salt meat kept; I think there is enough for three months, but I cannot say exactly.

3226. When the fortifications are finished, I believe it is the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne that they will require something like 6,000 men

to

to hold them efficiently?—They will require probably more than 1,800.

3227. Supposing we were engaged in a European war (I do not mean such a war as the last Russian war), and that we were hard pressed, should we be able to fill up our garrisons at Malta, Gibraltar, and the Mauritius and all those places, from the troops at home, or should we not find it very convenient to be able to draw troops from India to reinforce those garrisons?—Supposing we had an army in the field, or had to send troops to those places?

3228. In all probability if we were engaged in a European war we might have some army in the field; in Egypt, for instance?—Taking places like Malta and Gibraltar, what we want there is principally artillerymen.

3229. Taking Mauritius, do you suppose we could send 6,000 men from England to fill up the garrison of Mauritius at such a time?—No, certainly not; all the commanding officer there could do would be to make the best fight he could till help came.

3230. Therefore he would be very glad to be able to send to India for men?—Certainly, or to do anything he could to reinforce the garrison; the officer there would, no doubt, have all the work he could done by natives, whom he would hire, and keep his soldiers for the active parts of the duty, and to act as gunners.

3231. Have you ever heard that the natives of India make the most excellent gunners?—Yes, as field artillery.

3232. And garrison artillery?—Yes, I have always heard that they are very good gunners, particularly in field artillery; for garrison artillery strong men are required. I do not know whether the natives of India are men of great muscular power; they are, I believe, fine tall men, but for moving large guns we require strong men.

3233. Supposing, again, that the native soldier is very much cheaper than the European soldier, should you see any objection to having a regiment of European soldiers and a regiment of native soldiers at the Mauritius in time of peace?—I should not be inclined to reduce the force at the Mauritius as regards British troops.

3234. Not in time of peace?—Not in time of peace. I think the garrison of the Mauritius at this moment, is at a minimum; we have two batteries of artillery, two companies of engineers, and two regiments of infantry.

3235. You would not substitute a regiment of natives for a regiment of Europeans?—No.

3236. Is that on account of the importance of the place?—Yes; and I think also, as regards the inhabitants, that, politically, the garrison there ought to be a British garrison. Of course, an officer would be very glad to have another regiment even of Indian troops, but I would not reduce the British force below what it is now.

3237. Do you consider that the command of the Mauritius is of very much greater importance to us than that of the Straits Settlement of Singapore?—I do not know that it is of greater importance; I am sure it is of equal importance.

3238. Yet we have always hitherto been perfectly contented with the garrison in the Straits Settlements, which has consisted of European garrison artillery, and two regiments of native infantry; that regiment has always done its work very efficiently?—You must remember that all the commerce of India which goes round the Cape, passes in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mauritius. Mauritius played a most important part at the end of the last century and the beginning of this, in the days of Dupleix, the Bailli de Suffren, and Dida Bourdonnaye.

3239. Take another place, Aden. I think everybody would admit that that is the most important place we have next to Malta and Gibraltar, commanding, as it does, the entrance to the Red Sea; the garrison there has always been a mixed one of Europeans and natives, and no injury has ever resulted from that politically?—I should not like to see the garrison of Aden entirely native. I suppose you would not propose that.

3240. I do not propose that the garrison of the Mauritius should be entirely native, I propose to assimilate it to that of Aden?—Aden is very near Bombay.

3241. Is it much nearer Bombay than the Mauritius is?—I should think it was, perhaps, about the same distance, but the same amount of commerce does not pass by Aden as passes by the Mauritius. Besides that, we are dealing with a large French population in the Mauritius, and we have got Bourbon close by us. If one might be allowed to look back to the past, I think it was a great mistake on our part not to keep Bourbon.

3242. In a military point of view, you would sooner see Mauritius in the hands of the French than Aden, would you not?—I should be very sorry to see either of them in the hands of the French. But the French holding Bourbon gives them a great advantage, and there is a good deal of French feeling in the Mauritius. I do not know any place where there is so strong a national feeling as there is in the Mauritius towards France. I have lived with those people, and know their feelings.

3243. Do you object to the employment of native Indian troops in China?—I have never served in China.

3244. Could you tell me what the garrison of Gibraltar would be in time of war?—No. I can give you the strength of the garrison of Gibraltar at this moment. It is 4,805 of all ranks; the establishment is 4,983.

3245. What should you suppose is the proper garrison for it in time of war?—I should think that the garrison of Gibraltar ought to be at least 7,000 men; I should say so. I do not know Gibraltar well. I have been at Gibraltar, but I have never served there.

3246. Then you would have 22,000 men for the Mediterranean garrison alone?—You know the works at Gibraltar and the works at Malta are of very great extent. Now at Malta, in consequence of the new docks, and other great naval works which are going on there, there is a new project of defence, which of course will require a good many men to man the works.

3247. Looking to the enormous amount of duties which have to be performed by the English army, and the enormous garrisons we have got to keep up in India, in Canada, and in our numerous colonies and possessions, do you not think that it would be most useful to organise, in time of peace, a system by which you might be able to supplement those garrisons in time of war by efficient men from India?—Yes, I should think it would, to supplement them.

3248. Do you not think that it would be far more advisable to do it in time of peace than to leave

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leave it till war came, and run the risk of having a disturbance with the population of India in consequence?—Every preparation for war ought certainly to be made in time of peace.

3249. You think, in case of war, that it would be useful to have those men?—Certainly. Take the case of Canada; I should think the defence of Canada ought mainly to consist of the Canadians; a large force of militia, assisted probably by a small force of British troops. Our present force in Canada is 12,082 men; and when you look at the extent of Canada, you cannot consider that a large force.

3250. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] You know Mauritius personally, do you not?—I was there for three years.

3251. Do you know anything of the coolie population there?—Yes.

3252. What character do they bear; are they quiet?—They are very quiet, very well-behaved, and very industrious.

3253. Would it be possible to raise levies from them, for the purpose of supplementing the European garrison in time of war?—I should certainly do it if I commanded at Mauritius; I do not know that I should make fighting men of them, but I should endeavour to assist the garrison by making use of them for garrison duties.

3254. Are there any local levies at present employed from the inhabitants, whether French or coolies?—None.

3255. And you think that in time of war, certainly, if we were at war with the French, for instance, it would not be safe to rely upon the French population?—No, I think not.

3256. In fact, you think it would rather be necessary to take precautionary measures?—I think they have a very strong national feeling towards France; I think they are attached to England for their interest's sake. Mauritius has become a very great place, in consequence of the quantity of sugar they make and grow, owing to the facilities afforded by labour from India; that is the great advantage the Mauritius has over the West Indies.

3257. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Do you think that there would be any advantage in substituting Asiatic troops for the black troops, in the West Indies?—No, I think not.

3258. Would there be any disadvantage?—I think they would be less suited to the country than the black troops are, the black troops are very fine troops.

3259. You think that the black troops are perfectly fitted for the duty they have to perform in the West Indies?—I think they perform the duty very well. There is a regiment of white troops in Barbadoes, and there is a regiment of white troops in Jamaica; I should be very sorry to see large places like Barbadoes and Jamaica with black troops alone, and I am quite sure that all the white inhabitants would.

3260. It would never occur to you to substitute Asiatic troops for the black troops?—No, never.

3261. And you would have the same opinion with regard to the garrison kept up on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes; I think the negroes, that is to say, the present black troops, are the best suited for that duty.

3262. You would have no objection to supplementing the garrison of Malta by Asiatic troops in time of war?—No; I should be glad to have any troops there that would increase my force.

3263. Do you think that there would be a very serious objection to the employment of Asiatic troops in Malta as part of the permanent garrison?—Yes; I should not like them as part of the permanent garrison.

3264. Would you mind having a certain number of Asiatic troops in addition to the present garrison?—I should not be inclined to object to it, because the duties in Malta are very severe, and of course having a larger force the duties would come lighter on the troops, and they would be better done.

3265. You do not know of any social or moral reasons why part of the garrison should not consist of Asiatics?—I do not think it would be a popular thing in Malta.

3266. Do you think it might lead to any very inconvenient results?—The population of Malta is a very large one in a very confined space, and I think that there might be great inconveniences arising from it; inconveniences on the score probably of religion more than anything else. The Maltese are an extremely good people; they are very much attached to their religion, and they are very intolerant, I think, as regards the religion of other people, and probably they would be more than intolerant as regards Mahomedans and Hindoos.

3267. At any rate, in your opinion, any Asiatic troops employed in Malta ought to be in addition to, not in substitution for, any part of the present garrison?—Certainly, I think the garrison of Malta is at the minimum; it is 6,000 men.

3268. I understand your opinion to be the same with reference to the Cape. You would not reduce the present garrison of the Cape, consisting of about 4,000 men?—No, I would not reduce the present garrison of 4,000 men, supposing that the present policy as regards the Cape is maintained. If you say to the colonists that you leave them to settle their own affairs, the chances are you might reduce the garrison.

3269. In the Mauritius also you would not reduce the present force of two battalions?—No, certainly not.

3270. I think you said you did not know China?—I have never been in China.

3271. With regard to an answer you gave Major Anson, have you reason to suppose that if it was desired to use Asiatic troops in time of war, there would be any difficulty in obtaining their services?—I should think not.

3272. Have you not always understood that they have been very willing to volunteer to serve for actual service?—I have always understood that the Sikhs from the north of India have been.

3273. Then you would not attach very much importance to the consideration of organising a system during the time of peace of using Asiatic troops?—I should like always to see the system which you are going to employ during war organised during peace, because I am sure that nothing is done well which is done in a hurry, which it would be if such a system were organised on the spur of the moment when hostilities were commencing.

3274. Do you apprehend that there would be very much difficulty in organising a system under which the Asiatic troops would be employed in time of war?—I should think not; I should think Asiatic troops might be employed with great advantage,

vantage, supposing for instance we had to send a force to Egypt.

3275. Colonel *North.*] Do you think that those colonies which pay for the troops would be satisfied to receive native troops in place of Europeans?—No, I am sure they would not; you refer, I suppose, to Australia.

3276. *Chairman.*] Does not the Mauritius pay?—The Mauritius pays in the shape of colonial allowances to the troops; I do not know the exact amount of the total sum that they pay, but it is a very considerable sum.

3277. Colonel *North.*] We have heard also with regard to the employment of native troops, that they must be commanded by officers who have been accustomed to command them, and that serious difficulties might arise if officers were attached to them who had not been accustomed to command them?—I should think that would be the case, first of all, because the officers attached to them require to know the language; I consider that it is a great inconvenience for officers to command men without being able to talk to them.

3278. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The objection to leaving the colonists at the Cape to look after their own frontier wars, is chiefly philanthropic, is it not?—I think so.

3279. Do you think that it is a well-founded philanthropy?—I am not prepared to answer that question.

3280. Do you think really that very serious cruelties would arise from leaving them to themselves; do you think that it would make any great difference?—I think the Caffres would have a bad time of it.

3281. Do you think that we are justified in keeping a large garrison there, at a very increased expense, on account of the assumed cruelties, or possible cruelties, that might be committed?—I am not prepared to answer that question.

3282. Captain *Hayter.*] If you desired to increase the garrison of the Cape, would it not be the most natural mode of doing so, to raise a local corps like the Cape Mounted Rifles, or to add to that corps?—The Cape Mounted Rifles behaved ill in the war of 1853, for the greater part of them deserted, and went over to the enemy; but the native levies that we had in my day, when I was at the Cape, in the war of 1846, 1847, and 1848, behaved very well; so did the Cape Mounted Rifles; they behaved very well indeed then.

3283. If you could raise native levies, you would save the transport by doing so?—Yes; and you might disband them again, when the war was over. As I say, they behaved very well when I was there; they were commanded by English officers; by Colonel Hogg, who is dead, and Colonel Bourchier, of the Engineers. In fact, they could work the country, which our own men could not.

3284. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Is there no South African race which you think would be available for recruiting for general service regiments?—I think not.

3285. Do you think that there is any colonial race from which it would be desirable to add to the strength of the army, general service regiments, recruited anywhere?—No; I think the Canadian regiment which we raised in 1857, has been a very expensive regiment, and an inefficient regiment, too; not inefficient as regards the men, because they were remarkably fine men. I had the regiment a long time under my command, but it was an expensive regiment, and I do not think it answered; it was not a good arrangement.

3286. Captain *Hayter.*] With regard to the Mediterranean garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar, does not it almost entirely depend upon whether your fleet have the command of the sea?—Yes; if you lost the command of the sea, of course we should be blockaded in Malta; but looking at the naval preponderance of England, I do not think that anybody would ever come and try to take Malta *secundum artem.* They might, however, make a dash at Malta, and, so far as the defences of Malta go now, they might do a great deal of injury; they might land and burn the dockyard, and insult us, and go away. I do not think that that is a position in which a great place like Malta ought to be left; but the works which will be ultimately carried out will, I think, put it out of the power of any power to do that.

3287. That would all occur only in the event of a great European war?—Yes.

3288. In which case the garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar would be strengthened in other ways than from Indian troops?—I suppose they would be strengthened from home. I have always said that a garrison of 6,000 men was the very smallest number, even in time of peace, for Malta; I fixed the strength of the garrison at 10,000 in time of war.

3289. Looking at the opinions you have expressed as to the Mediterranean garrisons, is it not your opinion that the object of this inquiry ought to be limited altogether to the colonial dependencies in the eastern seas?—Yes; perhaps so.

3290. You are opposed altogether to the employment of native troops at the Cape?—I should have no objection to the employment of native troops at the Cape to assist the British troops there; at the same time, if I wanted an additional force at the Cape, I would rather raise it on the spot from local levies.

3291. *Chairman.*] But you would prefer to have no troops at all at the Cape?—As far as the frontier goes.

3292. Captain *Hayter.*] You would rather have local levies than native troops?—Yes, for a Caffre war; and I contemplate no other reason for having a force at the Cape except to keep the Caffres down.

3293. Major *Anson.*] You said, in answer to the Marquis of Hartington, that you thought there would be no difficulty, in case of war, in getting native troops from India; you have not a large knowledge and experience of the character of the Indian troops, I believe?—No, I know very little about them.

3294. Do you happen to know of a case that occurred some years ago when the Indian Government wanted to garrison Pegu, they tried to send some regiments from Calcutta who were not accustomed to the idea of foreign service, and they were unable to do so, so they were obliged to have recourse to Madras, where the troops were accustomed to the idea of crossing the sea, and taking foreign garrison duty?—I have heard of it, but I have no knowledge of it.

3295. Do you not think that that would be very much the case?—I always understood that the Sikhs from the north of India would go anywhere.

Lieut. Gen. The Right Hon. Sir *H. Storks*, G.C.B.

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3296. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Of course, as a soldier, you would be glad to see the colonial service of the British army reduced, would you not?—Yes, naturally.

3297. Do you think that, supposing through the employment of Asiatic troops nine or ten English battalions were relieved of colonial service, the army would be likely permanently to get the benefit of it?—No; I think they would be reduced at once.

3298. Major *Anson.*] By how much would they be reduced, by the number of regiments relieved of colonial duty?—Yes; I should think they would be reduced by the 10 battalions, or whatever the number might be that were relieved.

3299. Do you not consider that that would be a great gain?—No, I do not consider that it would be a gain, if there were that diminution in the number of battalions.

3300. Would you not think it a great gain for the British army to have its duties reduced as much as possible?—I cannot contemplate the benefit which the British army would gain from having the number of its battalions reduced from 120 to 110.

3301. Not if you saw that the duties were reduced in proportion?—No; I would rather see 120 battalions than 110.

3302. Then I will ask you the same question that I asked his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge the other day, remembering that the climate of Hong Kong is the most unhealthy climate in the world, do you think that the British army is stronger, consisting of 101 battalions, and having to find a regiment for duty at Hong Kong, than it would be with 100 battalions, without having to find a regiment for that duty?—I would rather have the 101 battalions than the 100, even finding a regiment for that duty. We had 4,000 men in the Ionian Islands who were set at liberty by the cession of those islands to Greece; and although we did not reduce four battalions, we reduced 4,000 men. I think if you refer to the Army Estimates for 1865, you will find a reduction of 4,000 men.

3303. Then you consider that our military position is stronger for all purposes of war, having to maintain a garrison in China, than if we had not to maintain a garrison in China, without entering into the question of whether we ought to have it there or not?—I do not think that is a question that I can answer as it is put. Of course the battalion in China would not be available for service in Europe in the event of a European war.

3304. Supposing you relieved your garrison in China, and brought it home, and next month a war broke out in Europe, do you think that the men of that battalion would be able to take the field at once, in point of health?—Yes; I should think that with the voyage they would pick up a good deal between China and England; at any rate I should put them in line if I wanted them. I would send them to the army.

3305. Do you not think that they would be more likely to fill the hospital than anything else, looking to the general effect of the climate of China upon the constitution of the English soldier?—China is a very unhealthy place, certainly, and our troops have suffered there very much; but I do not think the effect would be what you describe.

3306. Captain *Hayter.*] What is the length of the voyage from China to England, coming round the Cape?—About 100 or 110 days.

3307. That would make a considerable difference in their health, would it not?—Yes; a battalion disembarking is not like the same one that embarked.

3308. Colonel *North.*] In confirmation of your opinion, are you aware that when a native battalion was raised the other day of 600 rank and file for the Straits Settlements, the same number of European soldiers were ordered to be reduced?—I think there was a reduction.

Major General Orfeur Cavenagh, called in; and Examined.

Major Gen. *O. Cavenagh.*

3309. Major *Anson.*] You were, until very recently, Governor at Singapore, I believe?—Yes.

3310. During what years were you Governor there?—From the year 1859 until the present year.

3311. During the whole time you were Governor there, you had a garrison of native soldiers?—Yes; we had a garrison of native soldiers with European artillery.

3312. Did you ever make any complaints to the Indian Government upon the nature of the garrison?—Not as regards the preservation of internal peace, but I did certainly consider that in time of war the native troops should be backed by European troops, because it was an important settlement to hold.

3313. In time of peace, you had no objection?—None at all.

3314. Of course, if war had broken out, there would have been no difficulty whatever in sending Europeans from India to supplement the garrison?—The difficulty would be, whether India could supply the European troops.

3315. You would not have a greater difficulty in getting European troops from India now than you had three or four years ago, or at any time before the Straits Settlements were taken over by the Colonial from the Indian Government?—The only question would be a question of finance. Three or four years ago, if I had sent for troops from India, I should not have had to pay for them, but if Colonel Ord were to send for troops from India, certainly India would not pay for them.

3316. You did not find any inconvenience from native soldiers as a garrison?—Not the slightest.

3317. They were well behaved?—Yes.

3318. As well-behaved as the European soldiers?—As a general rule native soldiers are better behaved than Europeans, because there is less drinking amongst them.

3319. They got on well, I suppose, with the European artillery?—Very well.

3320. Did you see any great inferiority, on the part of the natives, to the Chinamen at Singapore?—No; the Chinaman is stouter than the Madras sepoy, but I do not think he would be a better man than the Bengal sepoy or the Sikh. In fact, the Chinamen were afraid of the Sikhs.

3321. You have a very large Chinese population

tion at Singapore, have you not?—Yes, about 80,000.

3322. They are rather a rough lot, are they not?—They are inclined to be turbulent.

3323. You have never been apprehensive of any outbreak as long as you had native soldiers; you never wished for European soldiers?—No; I felt perfectly satisfied that I could overawe them with the troops I had with the European Artillery.

3324. Sir *James Fergusson.*] I think you have seen a good deal of the Malay troops?—Not of the Malay troops, because we have no Malay troops. I have seen a good deal of the Malay population of course.

3325. Have you not seen something of the Ceylon Rifles recruited from the Malays?—I should hardly be justified in saying that I have seen a good deal of them, but I was in Ceylon for some time in 1850.

3326. Do you think that many recruits could be got amongst the Malay population of the Straits for the Ceylon Rifles?—No, certainly not.

3327. From what does the indisposition to take service arise?—In the first place the Malay is a great deal too comfortable to like military service, and in the next place he is a great deal too indolent to undertake the regular duties which you would require from a soldier.

3328. Colonel *North.*] Can you state what were the pay and allowances of the native troops you had at Singapore?—They received, in addition to the ordinary pay, full batta and the usual rations.

3329. What is the full batta?—One rupee eight annas.

3330. Did they receive any allowances of clothing?—No, we gave none. At Labuan, a station which though not under my government was so far connected with it that we had to superintend the military arrangements, they did give them extra clothing because it was so unhealthy.

3331. Did the native troops you had bring their families to Singapore?—No, only a few of them. I was very anxious that more should do so, but very few of them did.

3332. Might they have done so if they had chosen?—No; we had a correspondence with the Madras Government upon the subject; they asked us what provision we would make for the sepoys' families; and in our reply we said we should be happy to do everything in our power to meet the wishes of the Madras Government, and to build lines for those reported as willing to come over, but only a few came.

3333. Did they look to going back at the end of three years?—Yes, I think so, from the fact of their being separated from their wives and families; I do not think they would if their wives and families came with them. My servants in Singapore were all natives of India, yet they were with us all the time we were in Singapore, and I left some of them with the new Governor.

3334. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that it would be desirable to employ Indian native troops for Imperial purposes, to a greater extent than is now the case?—I think the native army should be organized and regulated more with a view to possible Imperial requirements and not merely to the requirements of India itself; it should be an integral part of the Imperial army, and capable of being sent wherever Her Majesty might choose to order it to proceed.

3335. To any Colony?—Yes, to any Colony; but, as a general rule, not to be employed westward of the Cape.

3336. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Who is to pay for the excess of the army maintained over the requirements of India, until it is employed in the Colonies?—I apprehend, that if the Indian army were employed in China, the Hong Kong Government would of course pay its proper share; and in the same way if it were employed in the Straits Settlements, Ceylon or the Mauritius, those Colonies would bear their proportion of the expense.

3337. Did you not say that it should not be employed in the Colonies until it was wanted?—No; I said that the Indian troops ought not to be employed westward of the Cape, except in case of emergency.

3338. *Chairman.*] I understood you to say, that the strength of the Indian army was to be maintained at such and such a point, more with reference to the possibility of its being wanted than to actual requirements?—No; because you might reduce the strength of your regiments, and be able to expand it again when an emergency arose; at present we have no system to meet emergencies.

3339. No elasticity?—No elasticity; we can get men, but to have efficient regiments you must have organization, and we have none.

3340. You would like to have a larger skeleton of an army than we have now?—I should like to see a more efficient skeleton of an army; I think our present army is entirely without organization.

3341. You refer to the present system?—Yes, the new system.

3342. Is Singapore a place which might be easily taken by a *coup de main* from the sea?—One could not possibly defend Singapore from a *coup de main*, because it is an island and open in every direction; but I see no reason why we should not hold Fort Canning until it was relieved by the fleet.

3343. Is the force that is now at Singapore sufficient to hold Fort Canning?—To hold Fort Canning against a European Power, I should myself prefer to have a portion of my troops Europeans.

3344. The present force at Singapore is European, is not it?—Yes, if you allude to the force which is now going there, I think it is sufficient; it is supplemented with natives at present, but apparently there are in future to be no natives there, or only about 200 natives.

3345. Setting aside the possibility of an attack from a European Power, do you think that the present garrison at Singapore is required for purposes of internal police?—Not the European portion of the infantry; if you retained a native regiment it would be sufficient.

3346. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you agree with Mr. Mangles with regard to decreasing the native army in India?—So many years have elapsed since I have actually been in India and visited a military station, that I should feel some hesitation in expressing a very decided opinion; but I think it possible that if the army were rendered more efficient, it might be subjected to some reduction, but not to a very great reduction.

3347. Captain *Hayter.*] In what respect, more efficient?

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efficient?—I consider that the present regiments are useless for real service.

3348. You mean the native troops?—The native troops as at present officered and organised.

3349. *Chairman.*] For want of officers?—For want of officers and for want of the connection between the officers and the men which formerly existed, but has ceased to exist.

3350. In fact, you are hostile to the irregular system?—No, I am not hostile to the irregular system, for I served the greater part of my active military career with irregulars; but I am hostile to it as a system for the whole army.

3351. Major *Anson.*] You have not got the pick of the officers, as you had in former days?—No; in former days we prided ourselves on being selected; now every officer is an irregular officer.

3352. It is not every English officer who is adapted to the irregular system, is it?—No; moreover it must be remembered that by the old system no man became old at the head of irregulars, because directly he became a field officer he generally went back to his corps in the line; so that we were always either captains or subalterns in the irregulars.

3353. *Chairman.*] Have you ever served in China?—No, I have never served in China.

3354. Major *Anson.*] What is your opinion upon enlisting Chinamen for service in India, and having one or two Chinese regiments at the Hill stations; do you think that that is a bad principle?—I believe officers who are more acquainted than I am with the Chinese as soldiers are averse to it. I only judge of them as a peaceful population. Certainly, they are most energetic and active; but they have great powers of combination, and they might use those powers against their officers.

3355. They are not likely to do that in India, away from their own people, are they?—I should doubt whether they would be likely to have the attachment to their officers which formerly did exist amongst the native races; the Chinamen would in fact look down upon their own officers, instead of looking up to them.

3356. They generally do look down upon all Englishmen, do they not?—Yes; they have a large amount of self-conceit.

3357. Do you think it would have a bad political effect upon India?—Politically, I should think not.

3358. The natives of India would look upon it with perfect indifference, whatever troops we used?—Yes.

3359. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that it increases the prestige of the empire amongst the natives, for natives to be regularly taken to garrison Colonies?—Certainly; I think that every native soldier who returns from a foreign country, is impressud with a sense of our power which he had not when he left India.

3360. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Did not the Straits Settlements pay anything for the garrison maintained there?—We did not pay any actual contribution, but all the excess of our payments went to the Government of India, and, as a rule, we may have paid from 60,000 *l.* to 70,000 *l.*

3361. That was the excess?—That was the excess of our receipts over expenditure; but the Supreme Government paid some items of expenditure which were never submitted to us, therefore we had no control over them, such as the pensions of officers, and their pay when in Europe.

3362. Were you cognizant of all the negotiations that went on with regard to the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian Government to the Colonial Government?—I do not quite understand the question. If you mean, was I cognisant of any recent correspondence, I can only say that I received no correspondence at all till I was superseded.

3363. You received no correspondence with regard to the transfer?—Not as to the actual circumstances under which the change would be effected. Of course I was aware that for the last eight years the transfer of the Straits Settlements has been under consideration. I was myself upon a Commission appointed to report upon the military force of the Straits Settlements.

3364. Are you aware of any representation which was ever made by the European residents as to the costliness and comparative inefficiency of the garrison?—Yes; I am quite aware that a great deal of that sort of thing was represented in petitions, simply under the impression that they would not be called upon to pay any portion whatever of the military expenditure if the natives were relieved by Europeans.

3365. You are not of the same opinion, I believe?—No.

3366. You do not think that the garrison was particularly costly?—I do not think that the garrison was costly, nor do I think that it was excessive.

3367. And you think it was efficient?—Perfectly so; but we were debited with large sums in the Indian accounts, with which we were not fairly chargeable; we were debited with them in consequence of Labuan, which is a very costly garrison.

3368. Are you aware that some portion of the European residents wished to have no garrison at all, except a force of artillery?—No, I think, if I remember right, that the greater part of the residents were of opinion that there should be a portion of Europeans, either marine artillery or marines, and a local corps of natives.

3369. Were the greater part of the European residents averse to the system of having native regiments as a part of the garrison?—I doubt whether they thought much about it; the simple question was the idea of getting off taxation.

3370. Major *Anson.*] Then, if I understand right, the Colony of the Straits Settlements paid the whole cost of their garrison, and sent some 70,000 *l.* or 80,000 *l.* back to India?—No, that is what we paid. The local Government simply exercised control over the civil receipts and expenditure. For the military we made advances to the Madras Government, and those advances were from 60,000 *l.* to 70,000 *l.*, in fact the whole of our balance; but we had to draw upon India besides, because we had to furnish Labuan, which was, as I have stated, a very expensive and costly garrison.

3371. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Did you ever see any calculation of the actual cost of the garrison to the Indian Government?—Yes; in the correspondence between myself and the Indian Government, they sent me down a memorandum, (but I had not the power of testing its accuracy), in which it was, I think, estimated at 86,000 *l.*, but that included Labuan, which of course ought not to have been a charge upon the Straits Settlements.

3372. Major *Anson.*] Did that 86,000 *l.* include the two regiments of native infantry, and the two batteries of artillery, or the one battery of artillery?—It included everything, even the pensions to the troops.

3373. Will you hand that Paper in to the Committee?—I have got the Paper here; it is in the correspondence of the Government.

3374. Where would it be; in the Colonial Office?—I fancy it will only be in the records of the Supreme Government. It included the two companies at Labuan.

3375. Mr. *Oliphant.*] The amount which Singapore pays under the new arrangement is 58,000 *l.*, is it not?—£. 58,800 *l.* I think it is, under the new arrangement.

3376. What do you think the expense will be of keeping the present Indian establishment there until they can be relieved, as they are to be, by the new arrangement?—The question is a difficult one to answer, because I have no actual details before me of the expenditure; it is simply a statement made in a letter from the Indian Government, to the effect that this was the actual sum expended; but a great deal of our expenditure at Singapore was incurred on account of Labuan, though I believe it was debited against the Straits. For instance, there are two companies on duty at Labuan; in the event of a man dying or becoming sick, we had to send a healthy man at once to fill up the vacancy, and, in the latter case, to keep the sick man in hospital, maintain him one or two months inefficient at Singapore, and eventually, perhaps, to pay his passage back to Madras.

3377. What I wanted to get at was, what would be the total expense of the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian to the Colonial Government, which would come out of the Imperial treasury, in consequence of the delay that would occur in the change of the Indian garrison for the Imperial garrison?—I should think it would be from 15,000 *l.* to 20,000 *l.*

3378. Would that expense have been saved had more notice been given on making the transfer?—I think that the expense might have been saved if more notice had been given, because they might have retained only one regiment, and performed the civil duties by some police corps, or armed police.

Friday, 12th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Captain Hayter.
Viscount Cranborne.	Colonel North.
Sir James Fergusson.	Mr. Oliphant.
Lord William Hay.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable Lord STRATHNAIRN, attending by permission of the House of Peers, Examined.

Right Hon. Lord *Strathnairn.*

12 July 1867.

3379. *Chairman.*] HAS your Lordship seen the evidence which has been laid before this Committee?—Not the whole of it.

3380. But have you seen sufficient to enable you to form a judgment on the subject?—On a good deal of it.

3381. May I ask you generally, what your opinion is as to the questions which have been referred to the Committee, and which are dealt with in the evidence?—I think as a principle, political and military, it is very expedient that Indian troops should serve out of India, but as regards other considerations, there are a great many I think which are against their doing so. The great evil in the case of the Indian troops is caste, because it interferes so materially with discipline, and I think the more they serve out of India, the more is caste, I may say, rubbed away and made to disappear. That has been the experience of the French with regard to their Algerian troops; there are no traces of caste amongst them. I was told so the other day by a very good judge, General Trochu. They are in barracks, and fed exactly like French troops, except with the general understanding that certain things forbidden by their religion do not form part of their rations. For instance, if they do not like grease, they give them some substitute in the shape of a sweet. They do not take their women with them, and they have their own religious worship. There is one battalion of them at Paris, and they do the duty well; they do not come at all in contact with any European observances or feeling. The spahis or cavalry did not succeed so well, says General Trochu, because they are native proprietors, or mounted men, not regular troops, who give military service for holding lands; they sent them back to Algeria.

3382. Do you know at all, on economical grounds, how the French experiment has succeeded; whether it saves the Treasury, or whether it is an expense to the Treasury?—I cannot say; I have no data to go upon. As regards Indian troops, I think a higher class of man, generally speaking, enlists in India than in England, particularly the inhabitants of the Punjaub and Oudh. He has more to do with land, generally speaking, and I think that service out of their country and completely under English control is a guarantee for their good conduct. They would become more English and civilised in feeling, not so apt to believe the ridiculous reports which at times convulse India sometimes. Lord Canning told me that he had such an opinion of the danger of those reports, that he did not know of any element so much in favour of revolution as they were. This occurred in 1862, after the mutiny, when we had gained complete power over India. The movement of Dost Mahomed against Herat gave rise to the wildest reports that Russia was going to march against him. The whole of the north of India, I may say down to Dinapore, was agitated with these reports; so much so that a sort of panic seized the European inhabitants, and the natives universally believed that Feroze Shah had actually marched through the Bholam Pass on his route to Kurrachee. These reports lasted four or five months; they affected the moneyed interest, and created a political panic. Native troops, especially the officers, except men of low caste, being often of a respectable class, would be less apt to rise against us, if native regiments served out of India; I think that for the reasons stated it would have a good effect, and would go far to do away with those native prejudices, for such they are when they not connected with religion.

3383. Did you, in your experience, find that those prejudices were a serious obstacle to military discipline?—In some respects; lately they have been modified or have disappeared. I never would allow, as far as I was concerned, any prejudice to interfere with discipline or with an order; but I saw great traces of it in Bengal, far more than in Bombay, of which I will give one instance: In the campaign, I was going round the camp one day, and stopped to speak to an officer of the irregular cavalry, who had been sent out to make a reconnaisance. He said that if I would come into his tent, he would show me his report and a rough map which he had made. I dismounted, and told the sowar, or native orderly, to hold my horse. The officer looked very much confused, and said, "If you will allow me, I will hold your horse;" he would not let the orderly hold the horse simply because that orderly thought that it was a disgrace to him, and that it would discredit

credit him in the eyes of his comrades to hold a Christian's horse, although I was the general officer in command. In Bengal a man was tried by court martial by my order for refusing to hold the horse of the brigade major; he was on duty at the general officer's quarters, and he refused to hold the horse of the brigade major, who came up with an order; the man was found guilty.

3384. At what date was that?—That was about 1862 or 1863. It may be said that, in Bengal generally, the feeling of caste is more considered by the Civil Government, and therefore, as can easily be imagined, by the natives, than in Madras, where there is none of it hardly, or in Bombay. The sowar I spoke of was not in a Bombay regiment; he belonged to the Hydrabad Cavalry.

3385. What is the state of things in the Punjaub and the North Western Provinces?—The Sikhs, as you are aware, are Hindoo Protestants. They protest against what they consider the prejudices and the more than prejudices of the Hindoos, and they have not nearly so many caste feelings as the Hindoos of Hindostan, but they also have their feelings. When a Sikh regiment was ordered to embark at Kurrachee for China, the quartermaster general of the Bombay Service complained to me that he had great difficulty in supplying it with a particular oil, which they must have for their hair; they never cut their hair from the day they are born, they must have a particular oil for it, otherwise they are not satisfied; and there were also some little peculiarities as to their food which gave him trouble. Again, the Loodiana regiment, when they were going to China, refused to drink water which had been pumped for them by the sailors of the Royal Navy, because they considered it contaminated. However, that regiment had not a good commanding officer, and was not in proper discipline. This occurred, as I have said, in a Loodiana regiment, south of the Sutledge, and these Sikhs are not considered so much as the other Sikhs.

3386. Then you think, for the general purpose of educating the native mind, such a change, if it were otherwise possible, would be desirable?—I think so.

3387. You mentioned that you saw objections to it in detail; will you state what those objections are?—There are objections which I think serious. One is, that we have only to refer to history to see that Parliament in this country have always been prone to reduce the army. Whether it is the insular position of this country which induces the belief we shall not be attacked, and that it is against our interests to interfere in foreign wars, I cannot say; but the distaste of the people of England, which is of course represented by their representatives, for standing armies and preparation for war is undeniable. We have never organised as yet for war at any period of our history that I have heard of. Consequently, if by substituting native for British troops abroad, there would be a reserve of the latter at home, Parliament would reduce them, which would be fatal. I cannot fancy anything worse than reducing the British army by substituting for them native soldiers.

3388. You deprecate the reduction of the British army, and you think that this would lead to it?—Yes.

3389. Are there any other objections which you see to the plan; do you think there would be a saving of expense, or the reverse?—I think there would be a saving of expense. I have details which show that a native regiment only costs 18,000 *l.* a year, whereas a British regiment costs 60,000 *l.* Allowing that native troops, when serving out of India, get 3 ½ rupees battah a month, and some rations, still I think there would be a saving; there are fewer officers. The officers on the irregular system are much higher paid, but on the whole, if the high rates of pension of British troops are taken into consideration, there would be a saving. When the Government of India required Indian regiments for China, they called upon them to volunteer, although they were on general service terms, had taken the oath to serve anywhere, which I consider very prejudicial to discipline. It is an anomaly to make a man swear that he will go anywhere, and then ask him to serve out of India; the effect upon that man's mind is very bad; it makes him think lightly of the value of the oath that he has taken. Colonel Probart told me that some of his native officers said to him, "Why do the Government ask us; it is a foolish thing asking us to volunteer when we have sworn to go anywhere." When I commanded the Poonah Division in the Bombay Presidency, the 3rd and 5th regiments under me got their orders one night for China, and marched the next morning like an English regiment; they were halted for a few days near Bombay, and embarked cheering as they went up the ship's side; they were a good regiment in every point of view; there was no demur or doubt about their going; I believe it was the same when Bombay troops went to Persia. I do not think there was any volunteering.

3391. And you think there would be no difficulty with the other soldiers with whom they served and the population among whom they might come?—I think there would not; for instance, in the case of the West India regiment there is a very large number of European residents in the West Indies, and I do not see any great difference, or even so much, in this case as in that of a Sikh regiment serving in the West Indies; a Sikh adapts himself readily to circumstances; the Sikhs in Calcutta do not come into collision with the European residents there, or with the large European communities in other parts of India, such as Agra and Lucknow: but certainly I do not think that the regiments in Bengal are prepared for such a change, both as regards women and other things. On the other hand, they are now putting them into barracks in Bengal; they have given up the hut system, which they had till very lately. The huts were not visited individually by the orderly officer, but the quartermaster was answerable for their cleanliness.

3392. Major *Anson.*] Is that system done away with now?—The principle of putting them into barracks has been accepted, I believe.

3393. *Chairman.*] Do you think that such places as Ceylon, or Singapore, or Hong Kong, could be held entirely by Indian troops?—No; certainly not. I never would station Indian soldiers alone, they work much better with English soldiers. The fact is, that although not naturally sympathetic, practically they work well together. In a campaign, in a well-disciplined force, it almost amounts to friendship between them

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them. The 81st, an Irish regiment, and the 25th Bombay regiment, who were under me, and they were exactly like comrades; and so were the 60th Rifles and the 1st Gourkas; the Gourkas imitated the 60th, and would share their rations or their duties with them; the best feeling existed between them.

3394. Then you would not be content that the natives at such places as I have named, should be supported only by Artillery?—No; it is the case at Singapore; we have batteries there with native troops, but the arrangement, I think, is objectionable; I would always have English and natives together; they get on very well together.

3395. If the natives were so employed, they would require frequent relief, would they not?—Yes; a native soldier requires leave for various reasons; if any man has a little land left him, he wishes to see it, or he is to marry, or wishes to see one of his sons or daughters married, I would do what I could to meet his wishes in this or in any other respect. The Sikhs and the Hindoos are very fond of home, and of going to see their relations occasionally.

3396. Do not you think that in a military point of view, there is this objection with so small an army as the British Army, to have it scattered about in small detachments in different quarters of the world, which would make it very difficult on an emergency to collect it?—As long as we are strong on the sea, I think that it assists us; the Mauritius and the Cape of Good Hope support India; if it had not been for the Cape of Good Hope we should not have had above 700 British soldiers in Bombay at the time of the mutiny. When the 33rd arrived there, it caused an ovation amongst the inhabitants. I think that the very fact of our holding those distant possessions shows that we are very strong on the sea; I would not say that we are omnipotent on the sea, but the fact of our having those distant possessions shows that we are very strong upon the sea; and as long as that is the case those possessions assist us very materially, the troops there being interchangeable. We sent troops to New Zealand from Australia, and in India we were assisted most materially by troops from outside in 1857 and 1858. The arrival of British troops at Calcutta from Hong Kong at a critical time of the mutiny had the best results.

3397. Do you mean by impressing the natives with an idea of our strength?—Yes; but not only the moral, but the material effect was of greatest service.

3398. Even if you could be secure against the interference of Parliament in the way of reduction, you yet would not like to see our British Colonies east of the Cape held exclusively by Indian troops?—No; it is better that European and native troops should always serve together. I think that the inhabitants would object very much to Indian soldiers alone. I think that at the Mauritius they would not mind seeing an English regiment and a very good Indian regiment, because the discipline of those Indian regiments is very good, as shown by the returns; sometimes in a year, there is not more than one or two courts martial in a native regiment; possibly the inhabitants at first starting might not like it, but when they saw that those Indian regiments were orderly, well-behaved men, and above all very good soldiers, who would protect them in case of need, I think that any feeling of that sort would disappear; but the native must always be combined with English troops.

3399. Do you think that Mauritius is a place which ought to be always held in strength?—Yes.

3400. What object do you imagine it to serve, in a military point of view?—It is on the route to India and Australia; it assists the Cape, India, and our power in all that part of the world.

3401. Mr. *Oliphant.*] Do you think that it would be desirable to employ in India troops raised or recruited from other races, for instance, the Chinese or Malays, so as to relieve the number of English troops employed in that country?—I would not wish to diminish the number of English troops. I think that they are lower in number than they ought to be, considering the great reductions to which they are liable from disease in India; sometimes a regiment loses half its number by cholera, the other half, being under choleraic influences, is more or less inefficient.

3402. Would it be desirable to reduce the number of Indian troops, and substitute for the amount of reduced, regiments raised either in Africa, from Mozambique or the Kaffir races, or from China, or from the West Indies; and then to make them interchangeable, so as to render our tenure of India more safe?—It would certainly have that effect, they would not be subject to Indian political influences of an unfavourable description. Objections exist to the employment of mercenaries in India, but the Affghans and Goorkhas whom we employ are mercenaries because not under British rule. At any rate, the condition should be that such troops should be commanded by selected officers and under perfect discipline. I think that it would be a good plan to try as an experiment the exchange of West Indian troops with Indian troops. Evidence which I read shows that some gentlemen of experience do not entertain a favourable opinion of the West Indian regiments, not so much on account of their individual qualities as on the general principle that they are local; one gentleman said that the best officers were very old, and that some of them who had performed distinguished services, were now not able to do so, from illness and the effects of climate. For many reasons I think that local regiments are always inferior; thus West Indian troops would be interchangeable with Indian.

3403. So as to have them all for Imperial service?—Yes; for service in any part of the world. I would utilise India as much as possible. No doubt three or four Sikh regiments in the West Indies would have an excellent effect. As I said before, I have the highest opinion of them, and I am convinced that they would do any duty required of them; and they would not have homogeneous feelings with the inhabitants, which it is always desirable to avoid. It is not politic to control a nationality by soldiers of the same nationality when it can be avoided.

3404. If you were to introduce this system of interchanging in tropical Colonies troops raised in tropical Colonies, could not you then begin to reduce the amount of European troops employed in tropical Colonies?—I would not reduce them, because the prestige of European troops is everything. I think the prestige not only acts upon the inhabitants, but upon the native troops. In times of political ferment and exaggerated reports,

ports, a native soldier might be influenced by feelings of nationality; but when he sees an English regiment, or a number of English regiments, near him, those thoughts do not influence him, the sight of them acts as a preventive.

3405. In a Colony like Hong Kong, for instance, where there are such great disadvantages of climate, are they not more than counterbalanced by the mere effect of our prestige upon the population of Hong Kong, which is a very mongrel population; do not you think that the West Indian regiments could perfectly well hold Hong Kong supported by the fleet?—It is better that the garrison should be a mixed one, of British and native. The fleet might go away. I think that if good and elevated barracks were constructed at Hong Kong, on proper principles of ventilation, and the duty were not too heavy, or the men thought they were not too much crowded, the climate would not be so injurious to European soldiers as it is now; I believe that Calcutta is quite as unhealthy as Hong Kong, and indeed more so in certain months. The average of sick-rate ran up once to 27 per cent.; but now, owing to the sanitary precautions which I have noticed and which have been adopted, it has fallen to about 7 or 8 per cent. The great thing is not to overwork them by drill or give them too much night duty; I do not think it would be prudent to leave Hong Kong with native troops and British Artillery only.

3406. Colonel *North.*] You stated just now that you think this system might be tried in the West Indies; do you think it would answer at Gibraltar or Malta, for instance?—As I stated before, the Bengal regiments have not been tried in that way. To put them at once in the midst of a European community, I think, would not be advisable. The men take the oath to serve abroad, but the Government of India always ask them to volunteer; which is a practical proof that the standard of discipline which exists in Bombay has not been required in Bengal. The effect of this difference on their minds is not favourable to discipline. As I said before, in Bombay the regiments are ordered on, not asked to volunteer for, foreign service, and they obey.

3407. Are you of opinion that they would require to be removed every three years?—Yes; every three years I think; but after the native troops had been accustomed to service out of India, the term might be prolonged; furlough, for the reasons previously stated, being granted them as much as possible.

3408. Would not that very much diminish the saving?—It would.

3409. We have it in evidence that there were nearly 600 or 800 men ordered to form as a garrison for the straits; but the Duke of Cambridge stated that he was called upon at once to reduce the number, and not to man it with British troops?—Yes; that just confirms what I have just stated; I think it is quite inevitable myself; the whole question depends upon this consideration.

3410. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Supposing that it were decided to send a few regiments to assist the European garrisons in some of our Colonies; do you think, as a matter of military discipline, that it would be advisable to select regiments, or to make foreign service come on the regular roster of the army?—I would not select regiments, and I advised Lord Elgin in this sense in 1863. Sir Charles Wood wrote out that he wished to have 2,000 men to serve in New Zealand, and his idea was to send those Sikh regiments. I ventured to observe to Lord Elgin, that, as commander in chief, my duty was to preserve the *esprit de corps* of the army, which is a very important element, and I thought that it would have a mortifying effect on the Hindoo regiments, who are essentially Hindoo and not Sikh, always to ask the Sikhs to volunteer, as if they were the only fighting regiments. Those Hindoo regiments have now selected officers; they are in high order and they have done very well. I have confidence in them, and I should strongly recommend that they should form part of the expedition; it is no use having an army, and to mistrust them.

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3411. You think that their foreign service should come on the regular roster of the ordinary regiments?—Yes, I think so. I do not mean to say that there should not be a selection if there was some severe struggle going on, but that the superiority of one class of troops to another should not be put forward as a principle: there can be no doubt that the Sikh is superior (and that is equally the opinion of every experienced officer) to every other soldier in India. He is cool and temperate in attack, and equally so in retreat; he does not lose his head; he has a good feeling towards the English, and he always volunteers. When Colonel Sarel endeavoured to penetrate from China to India, four Sikh soldiers immediately volunteered to accompany him: the Christian Missionaries persuaded Colonel Sarel after he had advanced a long way to return, because the undertaking was impossible, the Chinese intending to cut off their supplies; the Sikh soldiers were much mortified, and said that if he would go on to India, they had 60 rounds in their pouch, and were certain that they could carry him through. Those men may be taken as representing, generally speaking, good Sikhs: as soon as they came back to India, I promoted them all to be native officers of regiments.

3412. With regard to regiments exclusively formed of Mahomedans, we know that they would be free from all caste prejudice in respect of foreign service; but do you think it would be advisable to employ them in foreign countries were the inhabitants were Mahomedans, as for instance, at Aden or in Egypt, the troops that would be sent from India being of the same creed as that of the country?—There you must exercise discretion, but we have no infantry; exclusively Mahomedans. I have always stated to the Government, that one guarantee for the safety of India was the mixed composition of the army. The matter was for some time under consideration, whether the mixture should be by what is called brigade or regimental mixture: but the principle was fully admitted that it was a great guarantee of safety that the composition of the native army should be decidedly mixed as much as possible.

3413. Would that apply to the frontier service corps?—There they are not under the commander in chief. There are a good many Mahomedans amongst the regiments of that force, but they are mixed with others, Sikhs, Ghoorkas, and some Hindoos. In the Umbayla operations, the conduct of those Punjaub regiments was most distinguished; nothing could be better, generally speaking, with one or two exceptions; but, as a principle, as I said before, I do not think it is humane to the men themselves to control a nationality by a nationality if you

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can possibly avoid it, and as a policy it is not wise.

3414. Captain *Hayter.*] In a case like the Jamaica insurrection, supposing it had spread further, would you have liked to trust to Sikh soldiers to put it down?—Yes, certainly; I do not say anything in disparagement of the West India regiments; they are not homogeneous generally, but I believe blacks from Africa, and not natives of Jamaica.

3415. Major *Anson.*] They used to be raised, used they not, from the West Coast of Africa, but of late years they have been recruited entirely from the small islands?—Then, as I said before, this is another reason for prefering a Sikh regiment; I think it would be better for themselves and the Government.

3416. Captain *Hayter.*] My question was rather with reference to the inhabitants, as to how the troops would behave towards them?—It all depends upon whether they are well disciplined. If you mean to inquire whether they would be cruel or not, I do not think they would; with selected officers their discipline is as good as it possibly can be, and certainly one of the chief elements of discipline is not to injure an unarmed man, or to plunder.

3417. In a military point of view, you would rather trust them than a West India regiment?—Yes, certainly; I think also the West India regiments would be considerably improved by serving out of the West Indies. I think you will recollect the evidence of one or two gentlemen who did not seem to speak very favourably of those regiments. Some papers also were sent to me with the evidence of Mr. Henry Taylor, of the Colonial Office; I do not know him myself, but his evidence has made me think that the local character of their regiment has had a bad influence upon them.

3418. It is the opinion of their own officers, is it not?—I think that locality hurts a regiment more than anything; they get listless, have not the same hope of a career, and lose their *esprit de corps.*

3419. So that an advantage in that respect would be gained by the exchange of Indian troops with the West Indian garrisons?—I think you might, with advantage, send West Indian regiments to Bombay, and Bombay regiments to the West Indies; I do not see any objection; on the contrary, I think it would have a very good effect. I think the inhabitants of the West India islands would be much less likely to entertain bad intentions if they had amongst them Bombay regiments, which are uncommonly good, than if they had some of their own friends with whom they were in daily intercourse. This appears to me perfectly natural.

3420. Major *Anson.*] Is not this your chief objection to the employment of those Indian troops in the Colonies, that it would lead to the withdrawal of the European troops from those Colonies, and their diminution when they arrive in this country?—Yes.

3421. In time of war you would be willing to employ those native troops to any extent, would you not, wherever they possibly could be employed?—Yes; the regiments of the Bengal Cavalry are, I think, as good cavalry as can be seen anywhere; they go across country like fox-hunters, and are very light weighted; they are about three or four stone lighter than European cavalry.

3422. Do you think that if a war were to break out in Europe, and we were very hard pressed at home, that would be a very advisable time to commence a new system with respect to those natives, and to take them out of the country?—No; I do not think that any great change is good on the eve or in the midst of a war. As I said before, the system has prevailed in Bengal of asking regiments to volunteer when they may be ordered under their terms of general service. The Government did not like to order them in 1863 to go New Zealand. Lord Elgin said that he agreed with me in my view of the matter, but that his orders were that they should be asked to volunteer. The principle that I laid down was that it was bad to ask a soldier who was on terms of general service to go anywhere. This is the oath of the recruit: "I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will be faithful to Her Majesty the Queen, and will go wherever I am ordered, by land or by sea, and will obey every command." If you ask a man, "Will you go?" and allow that man to say that he will not go, and moreover, give him a great many inducements to go, which is done, I consider this very prejudicial to discipline.

3423. If we were to allow that oath to remain as a dead letter for 10 or 12 years, and never employ them beyond the seas, do not you think they would be very apt to look upon it as an infringement of their rights if they were ordered to go?—I think so; I think it would be better to accustom them to go. If there is any change, it would be better to commence it prudently on a small scale, and see, as you go on, how it succeeds.

3424. In Colonies like the Mauritius, in case of war, you would require, would you not, a great many more soldiers to defend the place than you have at the present moment?—Yes; it is a very difficult place to defend. Port Louis could be taken in the rear.

3425. In that case you would require a very large garrison, because a small garrison would be of no use in a place like the Mauritius?—Precisely so.

3426. And the only means by which they could obtain reinforcements in case of war would be by having native troops from India?—The Cape of Good Hope might not be able to send them.

3427. In a time of war, might not the Cape be threatened at the same time as the Mauritius?—Yes. The army of India now is so reduced that difficulties would attend the detachment of troops from India; in fact, they are reduced below what they ought to be. The duties are so severe upon them, that the men have only sometimes two or three nights a week in bed, and three nights is an exception. I was obliged to write to the Government of India very earnestly upon the subject. The men of the native regiments, especially in the Peshawur Division, got sick, and would not re-engage; their very hard duties made the service so distateful to them, that they took their discharge, which the Indian soldier can do after three years' service by giving proper notice.

3428. Of course if you are to find extra duties for the native army, you will have to increase the native army?—Yes.

3429. There would be no objection to doing that, if you located the native army by themselves?—Native troops should never be located by themselves. I think that the native army

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ought to be increased; they have no reserve; when the Umbayla operations took place, we were obliged to denude the frontiers imprudently to make up the force.

3430. In case of war, you would anticipate, would you not, having to use those native soldiers, not merely actively in the field before the enemy, but also as part of the garrison of the Colonies?—Yes. They are most useful for some duties.

3431. With regard to the fact of our having European soldiers in the Colonies being a support to India at the commencement of the Indian Mutiny, our garrison at the Cape was something like 11,000 men, was it not, which enabled you to draw troops from there?—Yes; still that increased garrison was owing to the increased disturbances there; but if the country is quite quiet, it could afford to assist another Colony.

3432. With the means which you have of communication with England now, you would always be able, would you not, to get reinforcements from England quicker than from the Cape?—That depends upon the state of affairs in Europe; the passage through Egypt might be very difficult, if not impossible. It is impossible to speculate upon the safety of the sea route, because even if we were very strong on the sea, the fleet might be called elsewhere, and some roving ships might render the communications unsafe.

3433. You do not think that the great military and political advantages which you would expect to be derived by India from the proposal, would counterbalance the dangers of the reduction of the British army as it exists at present?—No, I do not; I think nothing would. The British army is reduced to the lowest point, and too low; the regiments now do not get five years at home; they have 10 years' service abroad, but they do not have the benefit of five years' service at home.

3434. Do you consider that five years is the very least that they ought to have at home, and 10 years abroad?—Yes; it is good for recruiting, and good for the men and officers also; it is a fair turn of home service after 10 years in bad climates, and sometimes not very agreeable stations.

3435. There is one other objection besides the reduction of the English army that has been made, which is the difference of pay between the two services; do you think that that would be a very serious objection to the proposal?—At first sight it appears so, but we have a difference of pay in our own service. The Royal Engineers have double pay; the Horse Artillery have more pay than the field batteries, and there are a great many exceptional rates of pay. I do not think that that is a valid objection; and I think the best practical proof of this would be that if the officers of British regiments serving with officers of Indian regiments, were asked whether they would exchange with the Indian officers, they would not. Therefore I do not think that an officer who enjoys so many advantages in his own service that he will not exchange with those in another service, can complain of any difference in the rates of pay; officers of English regiments can exchange with officers of the Indian Staff Corps. Those officers also are staff officers, and they have greater responsibility than in English regiments; there are only six of them to a regiment, and they are all strictly selected officers; at least they were so; and the irregular service never can prosper unless they are strictly selected, as regards their merits as officers.

3436. With regard to your considering that it is absolutely essential to have European soldiers with natives, in China, for instance, the Indian army as it is constituted at present, have always been found to be quite efficient against organized Chinese troops in the field without the assistance of European soldiers, have they not?—But they had British troops, including artillery, on their right and left.

3437. Do not you think, from your experience, that the difference lies more in the discipline that is maintained in the corps, and the quality of the officers who have the command of those regiments?—Yes; certainly I had under me quite a first-rate regiment, the 25th Bombay Infantry, and also the 24th. The former regiment had the most opportunities of being engaged; I trusted them in the worst posts and with the hardest work.

3438. All the regular corps that were existing in India up to within the last few years originally came from the Punjaub, did they not?—They were not all Punjaub regiments.

3439. And they had the great advantage of having all their officers selected from the East Indian army?—Yes.

3440. If you took the same pains with the whole of the army to secure such discipline as you have in those regiments, do not you think they would be almost as good soldiers as those who came from the Punjaub?—There is a great deal in the *esprit de corps* of a regiment. This 25th Regiment had been at Meanee and had distinguished themselves much there, and they had a great regimental spirit amongst them; but still I cannot say that I think a native Hindoostanee has the fighting element in him that a Sikh has. He is worked up, he is imitative and emulative; you draw out those qualities, and he does well. I had under me regiments of cavalry and infantry of the Hyderabad Contingent, and I have known instances of great devotion and courage amongst native officers and men. I once sent a picket of Hyderabad cavalry to watch a ford on the river Betwah, as the enemy I thought were trying to turn my left and relieve Jhansi; up to the last the picket watched the ford, counting every gun and almost every horse and man; they were nearly all killed or wounded in doing so, and the native officer himself came in very severely wounded at last. But if it is a question of the nature of the men, certainly I think that the Sikhs, except the Goorkhas, have no equal as regards fighting qualities, and I believe that every Indian officer will bear me out in that opinion.

3441. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It is by no means certain, is it, that you could command in the army such a supply of officers with those peculiar qualities, as would suffice to make every regiment that which a few Sikh regiments have been made?—I think it is; I think that the class of English officers would be quite sufficient if you only reward their merit.

3442. You would not be afraid of being able to find a sufficient number of first-rate officers to make their regiments as good as a few Sikh regiments?—I would not have the least apprehension on that subject.

3443. Major *Anson.*] Is not this all that you have to do, to keep the officers up to the mark, and induce them to look more carefully after the discipline of the army?—Yes; I think that the reward of selection is quite enough to make them qualified thoroughly for it, and the proof of that

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is that all through the Indian campaign there was no dearth of candidates, and worthy candidates.

3444. *Chairman.*] I deduce from your evidence generally, that the only strong ground upon which you would advocate trying this experiment, is the education of the natives themselves; but to that if it was possible you would attach very great importance?—No; I think I have said that it is very important to utilise all the means at our disposal, whether Indian or any other, and to make them interchangeable; I do not think that that is the only advantage.

3445. Then would you be willing to reduce, though not entirely to withdraw, the British force from certain of our dependencies, for the purpose of substituting for them Indian troops?—No, certainly not; I would not reduce the English element on any account.

3446. Then the only mode in which you would propose to utilise the Indian force would be by increasing the force at various of our dependencies, that augmentation consisting entirely of Indians?—No; I think it would be good policy to utilise our Indian force by letting them serve abroad, as a general principle; that, I think, would be utilising our great military resources in India. I think that the principle is very good, but the objections are what I have stated, and I do not think that the Bengal troops are so well prepared for service in European countries as the Bombay army are; but Indian should always be mixed with British troops, and I would on no account employ native troops out of India, if this would entail any reduction whatever of British troops.

3447. But any employment of Indians in the Colonies must be in addition to, and not in supercession of, the existing British garrisons?—No; in exchange of part of them. For instance, supposing the two English regiments at Hong Kong exchange a native with one of the English regiments; there would be then at Hong Kong one British and one native regiment. The desideratum is to avoid subjecting British troops to a tropical climate and sun disease, and for that reason I think it would be extemely desirable to associate on the same service, in tropical climates, native troops with British; but then I would not think it advisable to entrust any of our Colonies exclusively to native troops, for the very reasons I have stated.

3448. But supposing you were secure against any general reduction of the army, you would have no objection to reduce *pro tanto* the British garrison at Hong Kong and substitute a portion of the native Indian troops?—No, certainly not; I think it would be very desirable. The more the English soldier is relieved from diseases of tropical climates, which diminish his efficiency and shorten his life, the better.

3449. Sir *James Fergusson.*] It has been stated before this Committee, that the number of troops in India might be reduced, because there is no necessity for keeping up so many; and other witnesses have said that the number of European troops is regulated according to the nature of the native army; I would ask you whether that is so, or whether it is not that the number of troops is regulated in accordance with the duties required, and from no other consideration?—The number of troops is regulated by the state of the country. The proportion before the mutiny was five to two, now it is very nearly two to one: I think that is a very good proportion, because the English troops may be any day very much diminished by cholera or Indian diseases.

3450. But, in point of fact, the strength of the army is determined solely by the duties required of the men?—Yes, certainly; the duties are extremely hard, as I said; for instance, the ordinary duties, regimental guards, pickets, escorts, treasury guards for the civil authorities in all the stations; the civil authorities require a guard for treasuries, and gaols, and the mint; for there is a long list of guards at Calcutta which would surprise you. The duties of the native army in India are necessarily very severe; even if we had not the slightest idea of a revolt or an invasion, the mere ordinary garrison duties are very severe. There are only about 42,000 men for Bengal to defend a line of 1,200 or 1,300 miles from Calcutta to Peshawur.

3451. *Chairman.*] Have you any papers which you desire to put in?—No. If anything should occur to me, perhaps I may be allowed to send it in.

Tuesday, 23rd July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Colonel PercyHerbert.
Viscount Cranborne.	Mr. Laing.
Sir James Fergusson.	Colonel North.
Viscount Hamilton.	Sir Henry Rawlinson.
Lord William Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Captain Hayter.	

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BALFOUR, called in; and Examined.

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3452. *Chairman.*] HAVE you seen any of the evidence given before this Committee?—Yes, I have looked over a portion of the evidence; I think a greater part of it.

3453. Have you formed an opinion upon the subjects referred to the Committee?—I have for a long time past entertained very strong opinions with regard to the employment of sepoys out of India.

3454. Will you be kind enough to give your opinions on the subject to the Committee?—Perhaps it will be useful for me to mention my experience with regard to foreign service, in order to enable the Committee to judge to what extent my evidence is of any value. I embarked on foreign service with native troops within a few months after I joined my head-quarters after leaving the Military College.

3455. In what year was that?—At the end of 1826; I had then about 150 native artillerymen under my charge. We were six months on the voyage to Penang, which was our destination.

3456. Where from?—From Madras. I was then sent on to Singapore in command of a detachment of European artillerymen and gun Lascars attached. The Government then decided on relieving the European artillerymen at Singapore, and I was sent to Malacca to command the native artillery at that station, a senior officer to myself taking the command of the force of artillery at Singapore. I returned to Singapore again in command of the artillery, and was there for some months and was then removed to Penang, to command the European artillery. I returned to Madras after some months of command there, and within a few months afterwards was sent over to Malacca in command of reinforcements of European and native artillery. I remained there after the service was over. We had then operations against the Malays in the interior of Malacca. I was subsequently employed both on the general staff of the artillery and on the general staff of the Madras army, which gave me some considerable opportunities of seeing the working of the foreign service of the Madras army, it being one of the most important parts of the duty of the Adjutant General's department. I proceeded to China in 1840, as a staff officer of the Madras troops, and as staff officer of the artillery, with a force which remained there until the end of the operations, and as consul at Shanghai. I had then an opportunity of seeing the native troops at Chusan, and hearing the statement of how the native troops conducted themselves in China during the whole of the time I remained as consul there. I returned home, and then proceeded to Madras, where I was appointed a member of the Military Board of Madras, which was a Board formed similar to the Ordnance Board of England, and had control over all the departments of the army, excepting as regards the direct pay of the troops and the discipline of the troops; those two points being excluded from the control of the Military Board. The foreign service relations of the Madras army necessarily came more or less under the notice of that Board. The expedition to Burmah in 1852, was also under the control of that Board. Subsequently in 1859, I was appointed a member of the Military Finance Commission, and afterwards chief of the Military Finance Department of India. In that position I had necessarily experience of the whole of the foreign service, of the whole of the Indian army, both of the Bengal and Madras army; and in various ways I had the means of obtaining some information connected with the foreign service of the sepoys. Lord Canning in 1860, desired me to go down to Burmah to inquire especially into the whole of the arrangements connected with the native troops, and the general arrangements connected with the European troops. In those various offices, therefore, I have had some means of obtaining information connected with the foreign service of the native troops.

3457. What is the opinion that you have formed with respect to the capacity of the native troops to serve abroad?—My opinion with regard to the native troops, is exceedingly favourable to their efficiency in all respects, provided the Government will take those measures which will ensure their efficiency whilst on foreign service.

3458. Will you describe the measures which you think should be taken for that purpose?—I think first of all that it is of great importance that the officers of the sepoys should be sufficiently numerous to look after their discipline and well-being, in a manner which is probably more called

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for on foreign service than when the men are serving in India, often with their families around them.

3459. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you confine your remarks to the sepoys?—I confine myself entirely to the sepoys.

3460. Major *Anson.*] You mean the natives of India generally?—Yes, the natives of India generally.

3461. Captain *Vivian.*] Of all classes?—Yes.

3462. *Chairman.*] By officers, I suppose you mean European officers?—Entirely European officers; in speaking of officers I would wish it to be understood that I speak of European officers, for I consider them to be the soul and life of the Asiatic troops.

3463. Are there any other measures besides the appointment of a sufficient number of officers which you think important for the native troops on foreign service?—I think it is of great importance that the duty required from native troops whilst on foreign service should be within the powers of the men to perform. This, of course, applies equally as much to the European soldiers as to the native soldiers. That remarkable evidence which was given before Colonel North's Committee of last year I think is a good illustration of the way in which Europeans may be worked to death, by having duties thrown upon them which might and ought to be placed upon other parties. I had occasion to call the attention of the Government of India to the necessity of attending to the health of the sepoys in the Straits and in Malacca, consequent on reports being sent to me by the Inspector General of Hospitals, wherein he said that he found that the natives, both in Burmah and in Singapore, were so severely worked as to fill the hospitals, and to send the men over to India as invalids.

3464. What species of work had they to do?—Chiefly guards, treasury guards, and police guards of every kind which might with great propriety, and ought to have been undertaken by policemen.

3465. Are policemen cheaper than native soldiers in those Colonies?—In the course of my examination into the military finance of India, I have had occasion to go minutely into the question of the relative cost of native soldiers and policemen, and the calculations I have made most satisfactorily prove, and indeed the Government acted upon those calculations, that the cost of an efficient policeman was not equal to half the cost of a sepoy. It may possibly be within the recollection of this Committee that various inquiries were made into the police of India; the Police Commission sitting at Calcutta called upon me for a report upon the subject of the employment of soldiers and police, and it is contained in this Report of the Police Commission (*producing a paper*), and upon this the Government of India acted, and issued the following resolution, which, if the Committee wish, I shall be very happy to read to them. "The Honourable the President in Council entirely concurs in the principle advocated by the Military Finance Commission, namely, that regular soldiers should not be employed on duties of mere watchmen, and is of opinion that the enforcement of this rule should be commenced at once at every military station throughout India, and his Excellency the Commander in Chief should be requested to issue the necessary orders to the military authority in each district, or the officer commanding at each station, to take measures at the earliest possible period to relieve every military guard in cantonments, except those required for purely military purposes, for which not mere watchmen but disciplined military sentries are on purely military grounds considered necessary, and to arrange with the civil authorities for the substitution of police guards of departments, whether commissariat public works or others, requiring such special police guard, having to pay for the same, or being debited with the expense."

3466. Then your view is, that if this principle was more extensively acted upon, and police substituted for soldiers wherever military reasons did not forbid it, the Indian soldiers would be more healthy and more efficient?—I am decidedly of that opinion, and I would add that I never would have been a party to urge on the Government of India to the extent I did if I had not received from the Government of India a positive assurance that they would invariably relieve the soldiers from those various duties which wore the men out, and rendered the service naturally distasteful.

3467. Do I rightly gather from that answer that they have not fulfilled the expectation you entertained?—I judge from the evidence I heard Lord Strathnairn give, just as he was closing it, when he referred strongly to the number of escort guards and various other duties still required from the native soldiers of India; that they had not that rest and that repose which was necessary, and moreover that they had not that number of native soldiers which was necessary for carrying on the public duties; I also observe in a letter from Sir William Mansfield, the Commander in Chief in India, now before this Committee, that he also refers to those duties being still severe.

3468. You imagine that escorts of treasure or stores could be always done by the police?—They could be entirely done by the police to this extent. I recommended, and the Government approved of the recommendations, that when soldiers were required for defence they ought invariably to be employed on all such operations, but that the duty of watchers should invariably be performed by another class of men, who would do it more effectually and at a far cheaper rate than that at which you could get soldiers to perform it.

3469. Are there any other points which you think ought to be attended to, especially in the treatment of native soldiers serving in foreign parts?—My impression is strong, that much of the distaste connected with the foreign service has been occasioned, especially as regards the Madras army, by the various meddlings which have taken place at various times with the conditions upon which the soldiers have gone on foreign service. You have before this Committee, I think, at all events Sir James Fergusson has moved for, an exceedingly good minute of the Marquis of Tweeddale's. I can hardly add any information beyond that which that minute supplies. I think that in that instance, I may say in every instance where distaste was shown by native troops to proceed on foreign service, it was due to some difficulty occasioned by an interference of the Government with the pay and advantages and other allowances to which the sepoys considered themselves entitled. Indeed, I may mention that it is my conviction that on the occasion of almost all those mutinies, excepting probably the great one of 1857,

1857, those excitements had been occasioned mainly by questions involved in the pay and allowances of the sepoys.

3470. The point to be kept in view is to adhere strictly to the engagement, whatever it is, that has been made with those men before they embark?—I quite agree to that, and I would add also that you should not make changes connected with the pay and allowances of the soldiers which from time immemorial they have considered themselves entitled to expect.

3471. Is there any other point which you desire to mention with reference to the treatment of native soldiers serving abroad?—I would also mention that it is of great importance that in requiring native soldiers to embark on foreign service that you should keep the demand within reasonable limits, and not, as in the case of the Madras army, go beyond those limits.

3472. Do you mean the demand for soldiers, or the work imposed upon them?—I mean the number of regiments sent on foreign service. I do not say this on my own authority, because the Commander in Chief of the Madras army, whose report we quoted in 1860, distinctly pointed out the excess to which the calls upon the Madras army for foreign service had been made.

3473. To what extent do you think it would be a saving in point of expense to substitute native for English soldiers?—The calculation which was made in India was as nearly as possible to reckon the expense of one European soldier as equal to that of four natives. I think that that ratio is altered by the foreign service, and that you are perfectly safe in considering that one European soldier will be equal in point of expense to two natives on foreign service.

3474. Would you include in that estimate the fact that a native must be relieved oftener than a European, on account of his attachment to his home?—Yes, I include that and every possible expense you can be put to. You have before you an exceedingly good estimate furnished by the officer who succeeded me in the Military Finance Department of India, wherein he shows clearly that the cost of a native soldier would be equal to about 550 rupees per man. That includes every cost which you can possibly incur, excepting that for general command; that portion of the charge is omitted from that estimate. That estimate is, moreover, exceedingly high in reference to the economy with which you could conduct the service; for instance, the charge in that estimate for the expense of passage is far beyond anything which I can possibly suppose could arise. The formation of the cadres, for instance, which you have in that estimate, is exceedingly heavy for 1,200 sepoys; he proposes forming them into 16 companies; the depôt strength which he proposes to keep up for maintaining that force is also exceedingly heavy, and beyond what I believe the requirements to be.

3475. Do you calculate the cost of passage for a native as being as great as the cost of passage for a British soldier?—No, not nearly so high.

3476. What would be the proportion?—I should say that a European soldier would cost probably half as much again as a native soldier; if you take one-fifth more than the natives cost going to China, I think you would be safe in that calculation.

3477. To what circumstances do you attribute that difference?—The space required for a European soldier is much more than half as much again compared to that which is allowed to a native soldier.

3478. Is that in consequence of the inability of Englishmen to bear the heat?—It is partly from that; I believe myself, however, that there is in reality no good reason for it, excepting that natives manage to sleep together and manage to lie upon the deck of a vessel much more easily than European soldiers.

3479. In short, the Englismen would complain and the natives would not?—The hammocks of the European soldiers would occupy more space between decks.

3480. Is the European soldier a bigger man?—Not at all, nor does it appear at all reasonable that he should require more space; but the practice is to allow a sepoy six square feet, and to allow an European soldier at least nine square feet of space.

3481. Has the fact that the European soldier lives more upon meat than the native, anything to do with it?—No. I think there is no connection between those facts; it is simply a practice which the Government have got into; I merely mention the routine. I have never myself seen much inconvenience resulting from the difference of space, and the native soldier does not seem to regard with jealousy that speciality which is given to the European soldier. I have been on board of transports where both Europeans and natives had been mixed together, and nothing could equal the harmony which prevailed between the two classes.

3482. With reference to hospital expenses, are native soldiers more or less costly than Europeans?—They are infinitely less costly.

3483. Both in respect of the number that have to go in, and the treatment they require in hospital?—In the treatment they require, and the food they receive, and in other ways. They are well adapted for recovery if you can provide them with sufficient support.

3484. Have you formed any opinion as to the military question of intrusting places of importance either to natives solely, or to natives only supported by English artillery?—That is a question of opinion, of course. My opinion is simply like that of any other officer, and it must be taken for what it is worth; it is not so good as that of many officers who are at least as able to give a military opinion as I am. But I would mention to you a fact with regard to the Straits, of which I have some knowledge from 1826. When I went to that part of the world until now, the three settlements, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, have been held in entire safety, and for many years they were held with only 50 European artillerymen in the three places, that number being stationed at Penang. The native artillery were two companies in strength, and the regiments of infantry were two in number. One company of native artillery was withdrawn, because they required the services of the native artillery in Burmah. The Madras native army could not supply the number necessary for the two garrisons, and they therefore sent over a company of European artillery to garrison the Straits, instead of the native artillery. Hence arises the fact of your having had until lately a company of European artillery at Singapore. A change is now about to be made; you are to send three batteries of European artillery, a wing of a regiment, and, I believe, eight companies of the Ceylon Rifles there.

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3485. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you state the garrison of those places you mentioned, Penang, Singapore, and Malacca; what force of sepoys was kept there?—Two regiments of infantry, two companies of native artillery, and half a company of European artillery.

3486. In the three places?—In the three places, Penang, Malacca, and Singapore.

3487. *Chairman.*] And there was never any apprehension felt that that garrison was in an insecure condition?—On the contrary, the affairs of those three settlements have been conducted with the utmost degree of quietude. You have never heard in England of anything happening in the three places; you have never had any trouble with them. In 1842 we unfortuately got involved in a rebellion by a native chief, about 40 miles from Malacca, and although it required six months to overcome him, and it was an exceedingly difficult work to cut through the dense jungles of the Malay peninsula, and although the whole of the neighbouring parts of the peninsula poured in assistance to this native chief, yet two wings of native infantry and a small detachment of European artillery were quite sufficient to overcome the opposition that was raised against them. Stockades of the most formidable description were raised in the night by the Malays, but they were stormed and successfully captured with ease, entirely by the native infantry. It is quite true that the regiment which bore the brunt of it was one of the oldest of our Madras regiments, which was exceedingly well officered, yet the sepoys followed their officers exceedingly well, and overcame every opposition.

3488. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Who was the enemy?—He was a chief, calling himself the Pongoloo of Naning.

3489. What was the character of the men brought against our forces?—Malays.

3490. *Chairman.*] They were rather good soldiers?—They were exceedingly good soldiers.

3491. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Had they any amount of discipline?—All the Malays are, more or less, able to act together. I have no hesitation in saying that many of those men who were employed against the troops, must have been employed on piratical operations; they were always accustomed to carry cuisses, and quite ready to use them.

3492. They were accustomed to arms?—They were accustomed to carry cuisses, and were well supplied with firelocks.

3493. Speaking as a military man, should you say they had any pretence to discipline?—I look upon all these Asiatic troops, the Burmese and Malays, and so forth, as having more or less of discipline; their disregard of life and bravery enable them to act together, and induce them to combine; then again, if you regard the habits of the Malays, they are almost all accustomed to go on board ship, or on board of their prows.

3494. Major *Anson.*] At all events, they are the same class of enemy that the European troops would have to act against?—They are quite the same class of men in every respect.

3495. *Chairman.*] Have you seen native troops acting in the field on any other occasion by themselves?—We had an affair on the banks of the Tampoota in 1839, against a Wahabee chief of great fame, surrounded by a band of as fine a body of Arabs, Candaharese, and Punjaubese and northern men of India as could be got together.

3496. How did they get there?—You are aware that the Nizam has from time immemorial invariably had great bands about him; it was one of those remarkable things that have occurred in India, but which are little known in this country; it was one of these plots which constantly existed in India. The Nabob of Canool raised up an immense storehouse of guns, ammunition, and gunpowder and warlike stores to an amazing amount, and the Nizam's brother, who was subsequently confined in Golconda, was appointed to be Commander in Chief of the Army of the Faith; hence it was that the Nabob of Canool got about him this band, under the leader Shah-wallyhan, a man six feet six inches in stature, and singularly looked up to and respected; he stood the fight, and his men also.

3497. And you saw native troops in the field against this man?—Yes; on that occasion we had 450 rank and file of native infantry, and 88 rank and file of European infantry, four guns, a troop of European cavalry, and a squadron of native cavalry, and the band of the Nabob was defeated and destroyed nearly to a man.

3498. Have you ever seen native troops acting entirely without European soldiers?—No; I never have.

3499. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In what year was this?—It was in 1839.

3500. Major *Anson.*] Were you in the operations in China, before Nankin?—Yes; I was engaged to the last in the operations before Nankin, and I recollect a circumstance which happened on that occasion, which I may mention to you, namely, that the main force that was sent to press Nankin was chiefly composed of native infantry and European artillery; the force before Nankin, reserved by Sir Hugh Gough to storm the place was kept on board ship, to be landed when the breaches were made, and a brigade was sent down under the command of Lord Saltoun, Sir Hope Grant being then the brigade major of Lord Saltoun's brigade; the chief portion of the force was composed of infantry, if my recollection serves me rightly; we had 16 companies of native infantry there, and two companies of European infantry; the 98th Regiment, under the late Lord Clyde, was about five miles in our rear, but they had been so destroyed by the passage out from England, that they were quite unfit for any operations in the field. I believe I am quite right about this; I had the means subsequently of ascertaining the fact, and on that occasion it so happened that I was sent by the Plenipotentiary to Sir Hugh Gough, to press on the movement against Nankin, which was known to be regarded with great jealousy by Ke-ying; I have no hesitation in saying that that pressure on that day against Nankin, was the chief cause of the treaty of Nankin being concluded; I beg the Committee will understand that there were no operations, it was simply the occupation of the heights overlooking a great portion of the city of Nankin which induced Ke-ying to report to the emperor that pressure had been put upon him to bring about the treaty.

3501. *Chairman.*] Do you think that there would be any difficulty on the part of the natives of India themselves, if it was proposed to them, to employ them on foreign service?—I think the Marquis of Tweeddale's minute gives a very good idea of it; I was looking at it this morning, and I think the remarks which he

makes there are corroborated entirely by what has come within my own experience, that the difficulty is the embarkation on board ship, not the distance, or the place you sent them to, so much as getting them across the sough at Madras; of course, I speak of Madras, which has been the chief place to supply troops from India for foreign service.

3502. You know nothing of the Sikhs?—Merely that I saw them in 1860, when they were embarking for China.

3503. An apprehension has been expressed that the treatment to which the native troops might possibly be subjected at the hands of inexperienced officers, if they served in foreign parts, might create discontent amongst the native populations themselves in India, when the soldiers came home; what is your opinion upon that?—I have no doubt that the treatment which the native soldiers received on foreign service would have a great effect upon the enlistment into the service afterwards; for instance, with regard to the Madras army, which perhaps would be as good an indication as any,—this is my report (*producing a paper*), if it is of any value I will put it before the Committee; in it I strongly remonstrate against the mode in which the sepoys were being treated, at Singapore, with regard to the guards. This report of mine was based upon certain detailed reports; it also bears upon the food of the European soldiers. I think the important point, with regard to the employment of sepoys on foreign service, is simply that you should establish a positive regulation respecting the police duties, and the various detailed employments which Colonel North's Committee so strongly brought out, with regard to China; if you could prevent those duties from being imposed upon the native troops, I think, myself, that there could be no possible objection to the employment of native soldiers on foreign service.

3504. Have you ever observed, on the part of the colonists in the English settlements where they have been employed, any repugnance to their presence?—I have no hesitation in saying that there would be great repugnance to them; you have induced the colonists to feel that repugnance by your present arrangements. Take, for instance, the case of the Mauritius, it so happens that I am connected with a company which is deeply interested in that little island; now it would be greatly to the disadvantage of that colony to have the European soldiers, who are there at present, changed for native troops.

3505. In what way would it be a disadvantage?—It would be a disadvantage in this respect, that the expenditure on account of these European troops is of some importance in the island; the colonists are called upon to pay a contribution, to the Imperial Government for these troops, to a vastly greater amount than they could possibly be called upon to pay if they had a voice in forming their own garrison. You have got a garrison, for instance, in that little island, of 2,000 European soldiers; that is to say, you have got a soldier to every one-third of an acre of land in that little island.

3506. Are there only 6,000 acres in the island?—No; there are 250,000; I mean to every 200 acres; a small space of 120 feet by 120 feet is the space covered by each soldier.

3507. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Have you any return of the troops quartered in the Mauritius?—You have got it before you; there are 1,950. I hope you will understand that I speak in round numbers. I am not desirous to exaggerate; but you can bring them up to 2,500, or bring them down to 1,500, according as you keep the establishment complete or not.

3508. Lord *William Hay.*] How much does the island pay?—They are now paying 45,000 *l.*

3509. How many soldiers does that cover?—You have various statements before you: I think none of them can be relied on. You have the troops, in 1858, valued at two-thirds of the sum you now put down for more than double that strength; but if you will take the calculation at 100 *l.* per soldier, which I think is not very far from the mark in those Colonies, then you will be able to approximate very nearly to the real cost of a European soldier in the Mauritius and in Ceylon.

3510. *Chairman.*] Then they pay about a quarter of the expense?—They pay for about a quarter of the garrison which the Government see fit to keep there.

3511. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is taking it at 100 *l.* per man per annum?—100 *l.* per annum per soldier.

3512. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] May I ask how you arrive at this expense of 100 *l.* per man per year?—If you will take these reports, from 1850 to 1858, of the War Office, I think you will get as fair a calculation as you can possibly desire of the estimated cost of the European soldiers in the different Colonies (*handing in some papers*).

3513. I do not see anything about per head here?—If you look at the final column and divide the sum you see there by the number of soldiers, you will get the figures per head.

3514. *Chairman.*] But, if this contribution of 45,000 *l.* is so great a burden to the colonists in the Mauritius, I do not quite understand why they should be unwilling to have it lessened by the employment of the cheaper native troops, instead of the more expensive European troops?—I think myself that the force you would require at the Mauritius, if you rate it according to Ceylon, would be 100 European soldiers, and about 300 or 400 native soliers.

3515. That is your idea of the garrison that would be necessary?—It is not my idea of what is necessary, I only deduce it from the proportion which the force in Ceylon bears to the whole area, and to the population of Ceylon; that force also is very nearly the same as what you have in India, with reference to the population and the area of that country.

3516. That is taking the area and the population together?—Yes; taking the area and the population together; but upon that point I would wish to speak with great deference. I have never yet seen any distribution statement of the troops prepared on any satisfactory basis. I have seen many statements connected with the Indian troops, and have taken part in the distribution, so as to arrive at some idea as to the number of troops you would require for India, but of all the statements which have been prepared, and I suppose every Commander in Chief in India has prepared one, none has been more carefully prepared than that of Lord William Bentinck; he took an immense deal of trouble to prepare one. I think the conclusion at which Sir Charles Metcalfe and the Government of India arrived, with regard to Lord William Bentinck's valuable paper was, that you ought to keep up as great an army as you can possibly

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pay for, and that it is no use aggregating a force here and a force there; it all comes to nothing, because in the end it is simply a question, can you provide the money to pay for them? I am sure that the Honourable Member for Wick, who took such a distinguished part connected with the Indian military finances, and gave so much of his time to that subject during the short period he was administering the finances of India, will bear me out in saying that his desire, and that of the Viceroy of India, as well as of Sir Bartle Frere, was simply to keep up as large a force as the finances of India could bear. The Honourable Member to whom I allude is now present in this Committee, and I would frankly appeal to him with regard to the result. I do not remember on any one occasion that he ever desired to cut down the army unnecessarily; my recollection is, that he was quite willing to keep it up in the highest state of efficiency, and to as large an extent as he could possibly provide the funds for. I believe that Mr. Laing's idea was simply this, if we could manage to keep your military expenditure within 12,000,000 *l.*, or 12,500,000 *l.*, we had done everything which could possibly be desired connected with the finances of India.

3517. Mr. *Laing.*] You mean that, taking station by station, a good case could be made out for the necessity of the presence of troops at a great many more stations than you could afford financially to keep them in?—Yes; you have expressed very clearly, and very soundly, the view which I should be very glad indeed to express.

3518. *Chairman.*] You would be inclined to extend that to the Colonies, would you not?—I should say that you ought to extend it to the Colonies.

3519. You can always find reasons for having soldiers, if you can find money for them?—I never saw a Commander in Chief who was not able to provide duty for double the force he had at any station under his command. I think that is the general rule with regard to military officers, and for a good reason. You will find that the civil authorities are always perfectly willing to put upon the troops any amount of police duty which the military commanding officer will take. It is so in India, in Ceylon, and in China. In the Mauritius the police happen to be very good, and that is not the case there. But that system saves the Civil Department from expenditure which they would otherwise incur, and an essential point of a military officer is this, that he will render obedience to the civil power, so that the last thing that a military commanding officer ever thinks of doing is to raise an objection to any demand that is made upon him for the employment of his soldiers. Therefore, in the way which Mr. Laing has justly expressed it, you can raise up reasons to any extent you like for doubling or trebling the force whenever you may please to consider it necessary.

3520. And you believe that principle to be of universal application, and not limited simply to India?—I believe it to be of universal application, and I have strong reasons for saying that. There is a matter which I will mention to the Committee with reference to this subject. I have had some little experience in India, and also last year I had the honour of being employed on the Recruiting Commission in this country, and I was struck particularly with the way in which we have been going on for some considerable time, with regard to our army. I have never seen any objections raised at any time to the employment of our army away from England, but I took up the returns for the last year we had before us in that commission, and I found this state of things; I will only mention one point. On the first of January 1854, we had of effectives 48,114 rank and file of infantry of the Line employed out of the kingdom; that includes both India and the Colonies. For the relief of that body we had 44,992 at home, that is to say, we had an equal number at home to what we had abroad.

3521. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] At what period was that?—In 1854, just before the Crimean war. I have the returns for the other years; I will take any other year you like. I have got the 1st of June 1851, or the 1st of January 1846; I have left blank columns to fill up some of those years, which I can do if you choose. I will now give you the establishment. As an establishment you had 51,680 who ought to have been abroad; and you ought to have had 51,720 at home, but evidently in that year you were far below your numbers. Now, on the 1st of June 1866, which is the latest time for which we had the Adjutant General's Return before the Recruiting Commission, you had 71,148 out of the kingdom, against 41,962 at home; that is to say, you had nearly double the strength out of the kingdom compared with the means of relieving them from those you had at home.

3522. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That is 71,000 between India and the Colonies?—Yes.

3523. Major *Anson.*] In the last number, 41,962 of those we had at home on the 1st of June 1866, you include also the Guards, do you not?—Not now; I mention only the infantry of the Line.

3524. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Is that including also the Indian and colonial depôts?—The 41,962 includes the Indian and colonial depôts. I may mention also (and this is a very serious matter) that excluding the depôts, which I will give you the number of, the thing that startled me most of all was this, you had actually only 28,792 infantry of the Line, that is to say, regimental men, at home.

3525. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] To relieve 71,000 men?—The others were composed of depôts. I was never more startled in my life than when I took these figures out of the returns; they were not made use of in the Recruiting Commission, because it was found that although the Commission from the Queen gave the Commissioners power to inquire into the organisation of the army, the restrictions of the Secretary of State prevented that question being gone into, so that the question of recruiting merely was taken up. If you glance at that paper for the last two years, that will show what I am alluding to (*handing in a paper*).

3526. Captain *Hayter.*] That gives 13,000 for the depôts?—Yes; 4,000 for the colonial depôts, and 9,000 for the Indian depôts.

3527. Sir *James Fergusson.*] Those depôts of reserves at home are liable to constant demand for extraordinary services, are they not?—They are simply intended to feed the troops abroad.

3528. But, as a matter of fact, they are called upon nearly every year to supply demands for forces

forces which were unexpected? — The object simply is to keep up the troops abroad.

3529. Supposing anything occurs in Canada or New Zealand, or elsewhere, they are frequently called upon for extraordinary service, are they not?—Never, I believe; that is why I draw a distinction. That 28,000 infantry of the Line is the only force you have got to meet these demands; the depôts are not more than sufficient to do what they have to do.

3530. I meant this, the troops at home, the total of which you have given, are constantly called upon for other services besides the ordinary reliefs?—Never.

3531. You have stated the total number of troops on service, and the number of those at home for their relief?—Yes; I will exemplify my view in this way: inasmuch as the establishment in India, for instance, on the 1st of June 1866 was 41,080 rank and file infantry of the Line, the effectives in India were only 39,256; therefore you are keeping up a most expensive force in India of officers and non-commissioned officers equal to the supply of three or four regiments, in consequence of the depôts at home which were then 8,246 strong being unable to keep up the establishment in India with the men necessary for carrying on the duties there; therefore the two depôts, which were then 4,222 of the regiments in the colonies, and 8,426 of the regiments in India, were insufficient to supply those forces abroad with the numbers which the Government had thought fit to fix as being necessary for the defence of those places.

3532. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you said that on the 1st of June 1866, the effectives were 2,000 odd under their establishment?—Yes, in India.

3533. And you said that that was because the depôts were unable to supply those 2,000?—You can assign any other reason for it you like, but inasmuch as you were keeping up an exceedingly expensive establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers, it was unwise not to have your depôts so strong as to be able to keep up the maximum strength of effectives.

3534. Is not it the case that the depôts in this country send out the men to India later than the month of June?—That is so, and that is the reason why I took the month of June 1866, instead of the 1st of January. I have also got here the 1st of January 1865. If you take the 1st of January, and then again the 1st of June of a year, you have then a very fair criterion to go by, but if I had taken the return for the 1st of January alone, I should then have shown the minimum force at home, whereas I was desirous of showing the maximum force at home, in order to bear out my argument connected with the great demand for troops abroad.

3535. And if you had taken the date of the 1st of January, you would equally have shown the maximum number in India, which would have militated against you?—No, I should have had equally the same argument, because it would have shown a smaller force at home, to meet the large force in India.

3536. What was the force on the 1st of January preceding the 1st of June, which you have given us?—This will be a very good answer to it. On the 1st of January 1866, you had 87,547 effective infantry of the line, of all ranks, abroad, and in India, and you had only 45,694 at home.

3537. What I wanted to ask was this: you showed that on the 1st of June 1866, there was a certain number, namely, 41,000 odd, which was the establishment in India of rank and file?—Yes.

3538. And that the effectives were 39,000, or about 2,000 less than that establishment in round numbers?—I did.

3539. You argued from that, as I understood you, that the depôts were unable to supply those wants; I wanted to know what was the deficiency of the effectives compared with the establishment on the 1st of January preceding?—I have not put it down here; it is a very considerable labour to get this out, but I will fill that up in my evidence, and give it you with great pleasure.

3540. You are aware, of course, that the recruits go out from the depôts in the autumn?—Yes, I am aware of that.

3541. You made a statement before with regard to the depôts not being in your opinion apparently very efficient as a home defence; perhaps you would state, for the information of the Committee, whether those depôts are not composed principally of very young recruits, and soldiers who have returned home non-effective?—I will. Perhaps you will permit me, instead of giving my own opinion, to give the evidence of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge on that subject. I need not say the great respect we all feel for his Royal Highness, but the clearness and fullness with which he gave his evidence before the Royal Commission struck me particularly. This is the evidence he gave before the Recruiting Commission: "We do not know what we are to do in sending regiments to India, because some of the finest men, if they will not take on, have to be kept at home. For instance, the 36th Regiment went abroad two years ago; they were one of the finest regiments that we had at home; they had not been in the Crimea, and they were perfectly contented men; still the men did not choose to re-engage; and I think that 130 or 140 men were left at home. There was more than the establishment in the depôt, and consequently we could not take a single recruit till all those men had served for 10 years. The regiment was at that moment under the establishment, as it is now" (that was nearly two years afterwards), "because we have never been able to make up the losses occasioned by these 130 men, whom we could neither employ in India, nor with good effect at home at the depôt. That happens continually in the service, and the difficulty of sending regiments under these circumstances abroad is something which cannot be told; and I think that we ought to have authority to send men who have a shorter period unexpired than 18 months, perhaps 6 or 8 months may be desirable; and my belief is that many of those men, if they once embarked, would re-engage." The conclusion which his Royal Highness drew from that was against the limited service Act. That is not the conclusion which I came to, because on looking over the establishment and the strengths of the regiments in India, which, if you wish it, I can put in, you will find that almost all are below their strength. Therefore the reasoning which his Royal Highness applied to one regiment, though perfectly correct and sound, was strictly speaking general for all regiments; it was not true of one regiment going abroad only, but of all the regiments

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then serving in India. Very few of them were kept up to their established strength.

3542. Major *Anson.*] It is notorious that for years past the actual strength in India has been far below the established strength, is it not?—I can answer that question fairly, because Mr. Laing is aware of the repeated representations, I may say, that were made by Lord Canning's Government during the time that he was Finance Minister of India, complaining very seriously of the remarkable difference between the established and the effective strength; and I may say that it is a cause of great and unnecessary expense to that country in maintaining establishments of officers for regiments, which is in reality the expensive part, and not keeping up the rank and file of the regiments, which is the least expensive of all, to the full numbers. If that had been done, it would have enabled you to have dispensed with several regiments from India.

3543. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That opinion would go in the direction of having fewer battalions, but a greater proportion of rank and file?—That is exactly the conclusion which Lord Canning's Government came to; and I think it is the conclusion which everyone acquainted with actual service would desire, namely, that you should keep as few men in the field as you possibly can; and you ought to consider service in all those colonies, and in India in particular, as entirely services in the field; and you should multiply your reserves to any extent that is necessary to keep the force there efficient and complete, but diminish the number of men who are exposed to many different kinds of casualties, to as few as possible in the field.

3544. That was not exactly the point to which I asked you to direct your attention; I understand the result of the statement you have just made to the Committee to be, that in your opinion it would be better to have a smaller number of battalions, with a greater number of rank and file in each?—Yes; on the grounds I stated.

3545. I think you ascribed the great cost of the army in India, in a great measure, to the disproportionate number of battalions as compared with the number of rank and file in each?—Yes, that is the case; and if you desire to have this confidential memorandum which Lord Canning desired me to prepare two or three months before Mr. Laing came out to India, I shall be happy to put it in, wherein I urged that very strongly; and I believe Lord Canning fully and entirely adopted it, and it was the principle upon which Mr. Laing afterwards acted—to diminish the number of battalions in India to the fewest possible. For instance, you had an establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers equal to 1,200 rank and file of infantry; I think you have brought them down now to 750 rank and file of infantry. In this memorandum I urged very strongly that, instead of having 56 or 60 regiments of infantry, which was one-third in fact more than you wanted, you should have only 40 regiments. Lord Canning went most carefully over this memorandum, and devoted many hours to the examination of it, I being present; and he finally gave his entire concurrence to the principle which I laid down, that instead of having 56 or 60 regiments of the Line, 40 regiments in India would be quite sufficient for the garrison of India.

3546. Those 40 regiments having the same number of rank and file which are now distributed over the 60?—Yes, as it was at that day. You are aware that the diminution of the strength of the infantry has been very considerable since that date, and the European force is now 10,000 below what it was at the time when Mr. Laing formed his calculations with reference to the finances of India; but the number of regiments diminished has only been four since that period.

3547. The diminution having been in the rank and file?—Entirely, or almost entirely, in the rank and file.

3548. When you stated the desire of successive Commanders in Chief to have been in effect that they should have as many troops as the finances of India could bear, you did not mean to imply that in your opinion there are more troops in India than are necessary for the protection of the country, I suppose?—Yes, I do most decidedly say that the whole difficulty which Mr. Laing had to deal with in order to bring the finance into order, which he did, was to bring the number of troops within what we could pay for. At that time we were urging more and more reductions, but it was then considered to be perfectly impossible to reduce, but since then reductions have taken place to the extent of 10,000.

3549. Then am I right in understanding your opinion to be that the army in India is greater at this moment than there is any military necessity for?—I think so; I think you should look only to the finances; I think the information which is now coming home from India to the Board is exactly the same thing for which Mr. Laing so nobly contended, and in which Lord Canning fully concurred with him; it is this (but Mr. Laing is here to speak for himself, and will no doubt do so): that there are taxes now being placed upon the people of India which I hold to be in the highest degree dangerous, and if I mistake not, and Mr. Laing will, perhaps, kindly correct me if I am wrong, I think Lord Canning said that rather than impose those taxes upon the people of India he would run the risk of holding India with 40,000 European troops.

3550. The considerations you now speak of are financial considerations; namely, that the taxation of India is oppressive; but I want to ask you your opinion upon military considerations; do I understand you to state distinctly that in your opinion the forces which are now maintained by the Government of India are greater than there is any military necessity for?—I must reply to that in this way: if, in order to maintain the army, you give rise to those feelings which are occasioned in India by those taxes, no European force which you can send from England, and no native force which you can keep up in that country, will ever be able to overcome the opposion which those classes who are affected by that taxation will bring against you. It is quite true that I am a soldier, but it is equally true that I have been engaged for some years past in some important situations under the Government; and I think where I have been employed and selected, as I was by the Government of India for important public duties, I ought not to shut my eyes and my ears to considerations which will bear most seriously upon the efficiency and the power of our military forces in India.

3551. Those considerations would actuate you to urge very strongly the reduction of the army to

to the lowest limit compatible with safety?—They would.

3552. As your opinion is expressed in a military sense, can you tell the Committee as closely as possible, in what parts of India you think there is an unnecessary military force kept up?—I would ask the Committee not to take my opinion, but to take the opinion of an exceedingly able Governor General, who gave his devoted attention to the subject of the army, and I must say this for him, having read very many of his papers, which have never been published, that no man could have devoted himself more thoroughly to entering into the details of any affair than the Marquis of Dalhousie did. I ask you to read up his Minute of 1854, wherein he specifies distinctly the strength of the European infantry which he would require for the defence of India. You may call in question the reasons which he gives there, but I think that there are very few men who are qualified by experience, by knowledge, and by dangers, such as those he went through, to contend against the Marquis of Dalhousie in the reasoning which he then gave.

3553. Is not it the case that the Marquis of Dalhousie, in 1854, considered that the army in India at that time was below what it ought to be?—He did; it was exceedingly dangerously reduced. I look upon the same dangers which he then pointed out as likely to arise, as being the cause of the great evils which we are now suffering from. I believe that if his advice had been followed then, we never should have had that great mutiny; we should never have had occasion for the employment of the great European force which we now have; and more than that, we should never have had in subsequent times, those vast and unexampled changes in the military organisation of India, which you have had in the last few years. In that Minute of the Marquis of Dalhousie's, he gave you station by station, where he would require European regiments to be stationed, and he came to the conclusion, after all his experience, that 35 regiments of European infantry were quite sufficient for the garrison of India. I may also remind the Committee, that we have been legislating with regard to the force in India, upon very false data, with regard to their duties.

3554. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You stated that Lord Dalhousie considered 35 regiments sufficient; what force did he consider should be maintained?—They should be regiments of 1,000 strong.

3555. Thirty-five regiments of 1,000 strong?—Yes.

3556. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That was before the annexation of Oude, was it not?—That was just as the annexation of Oude was taking place.

3557. The annexation of Oude took place in 1856, therefore it was two years before that event occurred?—Yes, it would be so; I will look at the Minute, and correct the date of it if it is wrong.

3558. You would adopt the opinion laid down by Lord Dalhousie in 1854, that 35 full battalions of European infantry are sufficient, and you give it as your opinion that that force would be sufficient at the present time, without condescending to details?—I will simply answer that question by saying that I adopt Lord Dalhousie's estimate, and I adopt the stations. I have gone over it myself when in India, and when I had occasion to submit my information to the Board, which I was frequently called upon to do, and to give my reasons for many of the recommendations I had to make. I adopt that Minute of Lord Dalhousie in all its integrity.

3559. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Do you not think that the events which have happened between that time and the present have altered the state of things with regard to the force which should be maintained in India; we have had the mutiny since then?—You have never had before you the actual force in India at the time of the mutiny. You have had two statements before this Committee, one by Colonel Norman, and one by Sir William Mansfield, that at the time of the mutiny there were 45,000 European troops in India. Now, in this confidential memorandum which I gave in to Lord Canning in November 1860, I made out that you had only 37,091 non-commissioned rank and file of artillery, infantry, and cavalry; that was the total number of effective Europeans in India.

3560. Sir *James Fergusson.*] In what year was that?—When I was writing in 1860 I had all the returns before me, and I prepared for Lord Canning a statement of the European and native forces in India in 1857, with a view to base the calculations of the expenditure of the future army in India upon this fact.

3561. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Was not the 45,000 the establishment and your figures the effective?—Yes, it is a difference between the effective and the establishment, which is an important thing; I was going to call the attention of the Committee to that. Sir William Mansfield and Colonel Norman both made references in such a manner as to say that you have only got now 16,000 European troops more than you had on the 1st of May 1857 in India. They also show in various ways that at one time they speak of the establishment (because it is only supposition that the 45,000 men was the establishment) and at another time they speak of the effectives, so that they contrast the establishment in the one year with the effectives in another year, which is not a usual mode of comparing.

3562. Sir *James Fergusson.*] But was not the disparity between the establishment and the effectives in 1857 altogether peculiar; did not it arise from the fact that after the Crimean war the ordinary reinforcements did not come out to the regiments in India?—The answer to that is simply this, I think you had ample means at home to have supplied India with the full establishment; I think from the correspondence which took place with regard to it, that there was apparently no want of men at home, especially considering that there were large reductions in the Crimean army; I think you could easily have supplied India with the effective strength necessary for its defence.

3563. Is not it historically true that two regiments of cavalry (we are talking of infantry) were withdrawn from India in 1854 to go to the Crimea?—They were.

3564. That the ordinary reinforcements of regiments in India did not come out for two years previous to the mutiny?—Yes.

3565. And that a certain number of European troops were sent to Persia also?—I answer that question by saying that the 10th Hussars, and the 12th Dragoons, I think, were the two regiments that went from India; the former went from Bombay, and the latter from Madras; the 12th went to the Crimea; indeed I believe both did, and

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and served and kept remarkably healthy; then they went home to England, where they arrived in January 1857. Four months before the mutiny broke out the regiments had all come home from the Crimea, therefore there was no want of troops at home, either as respects the number of regiments, or the number of men; besides that, the army was then subject to great reductions.

3566. Still, as a fact, they did not come out?—You are pressing me to say that the people at home did not do their duty, and that is what I do not want to say.

3567. As a historical fact, and in order to show how far the return of 1857 is a trustworthy criterion, I want you to admit, as I think you will do, that the state of the army in 1857 was altogether abnormal?—I cannot admit it, and will not; it was entirely owing to the want of effort to send them out.

3568. As a matter of fact they were not sent out; is not it the case, that as a matter of fact, the establishments in India were not kept up?—I quite admit that.

3569. So that there being that disparity between establishments and effectives in 1857, the actual effective force of European troops in 1857 was hardly a fair criterion?—I quite admit that; but besides only having 37,500 effective European non-commissioned officers' rank and file, in India on the 1st of May 1857, we had 5,000 and upwards up in the Persian Gulf, away from India.

3570. *Chairman.*] Out of this 37,500?—Yes; 5,000 out of the 37,500; I will take for purposes of contrast the most economical government we have had in India for the last 40 years, which was Lord William Bentinck's government; on the 1st of May 1857 we had within 10,000 European non-commissioned rank and file of the strength we had on the 1st of May 1837, that was just before the Affghanistan war, and therefore the time between those two dates was, as Sir Henry Rawlinson well knows, the most economical time for military expenditure we have ever had; on the 1st of May 1857 we had upwards of 20,000 European soldiers stationed in localities which were not in the possession of the Government of India 20 years before, on the 1st of May 1837; therefore, in 1857, we were actually occupying the old territories which we had held 20 years before with a force of about 15,000 European soldiers.

3571. Sir *James Fergusson.*] That was in 1857?—Yes, on the 1st of May 1857.

3572. Just when the mutiny broke out?—Yes.

3573. Would not the moral of that be, that you had an insufficient force there then?—The moral is, that Sir Charles Metcalfe and Lord William Bentinck, and all those men, distinctly said we were insufficiently provided with European troops, but Lord William Bentinck and Sir Charles Metcalfe also, in excellent Minutes which they wrote then, distinctly recommended that whatever the desire might be of statesmen in India, the necessity of being able to pay for troops was the great counteracting power which prevented you from having more troops than you had.

3574. Mr. *Laing.*] I think I understand you to say, that a force of 35 complete regiments, of 1,000 men each, was Lord Dalhousie's estimate of the requisite force for India, is that so?—Yes.

3575. What total European force would that mean; what addition would you have to make to that number for the proper complements of artillery and cavalry?—The European cavalry in India has rarely been thought of much real importance in service, and you will find upon the whole that the conclusions arrived at by most of the statesmen who have considered the subject of the European force are, that four or five regiments or so, something within 3,000 European cavalry, is a force which is amply sufficient for India. It is an exceeding expensive force to employ in the field; it is difficult, also, for the commissariat, as you are aware, to provide the means of moving European cavalry, and, therefore, it has always been held to be very desirable indeed to reduce that branch of the army to the lowest possible footing. Taking 3,000 European cavalry as the maximum strength, we now proceed to the artillery.

3576. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is this what you would propose?—I am mentioning what most statesmen would recommend.

3577. Three thousand cavalry sounds a very small force; how many regiments do you say?—Say five regiments.

3578. Is that five regiments of 600 sabres each?—Yes, five regiments of 600 sabres each.

3579. Mr. *Laing.*] What would the artillery be?—It depends entirely upon the opinion which has changed with regard to the artillery. You are aware, that an idea has come up that you shall now have no native artillery. In former days, it was thought quite safe to employ native artillery. The consequence was, that you had only 6,500 European artillerymen; so that with the 35,000 infantry, and say 10,000 cavalry and artillery together, you would have about 45,000 European non-commissioned rank and file of all arms; and if anyone would take the trouble to look at the map of India, and to post that European strength in different localities where danger was likely to arise, I think he would find that in most of these stations that force would have been sufficient to have provided the necessary strength for the protection of the country.

3580. What force of European artillery have we at present in India?—We have got now between 10,000 and 12,000; there have been changes of late, of which I have not sufficiently made myself master to be able to speak upon the subject, but I should say we have now 10,000 European artillerymen.

3581. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Do you say that that is excessive, taking your estimate of five regiments of cavalry of 600 sabres, amounting to 3,000 men, and 35 regiments of infantry of 1,000 each, that is 35,000?—It is a matter of opinion; I have formed a different opinion altogether; with regard to the native artillery, I have never entered into that, and I do not know that it is necessary for me to express an opinion upon it. I think they proved themselves, during the mutiny, quite as trustworthy as any other branch of the army; in fact, on several occasions, the artillery, particularly my own regiment, behaved exceedingly well throughout the mutiny; they never once deserted us. I believe the same thing could be effected in future. I believe, myself, that there is no service to which you can turn the natives of India which would be more acceptible to them than the artillery; and I believe, myself, that they are just as staunch to the British power as any other portion of the army. But, apart from this view of mine, if you say

say that no native artillery shall be employed, then I admit that 10,000 European artillerymen is not very excessive with reference to the number of guns you require for the army of India.

3582. Then we may put the artillery at 10,000?—Yes.

3583. Mr. *Laing.*] Assuming you are not to employ native artillery largely, at any rate you would have about 50,000 British troops, as I understand you, composed in this way: 3,000 cavalry, 10,000 artillery, and 35,000 infantry, making, in round numbers, 50,000?—Yes, 50,000 men is what I have long thought an amply sufficient force for securing the safety of India.

3584. That is irrespective of officers?—Yes.

3585. What is the present effective force?—The present effective force, as near as I can make out, is 61,000; I will correct the exact figures afterwards; but you may take the effective force, for the present, at 61,000; I think it is about 2,000 below the establishment.

3586. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] That is rank and file, exclusive of officers?—Yes, non-commissioned rank and file exclusive of officers. Sir William Mansfield's letter, you will see, mentions it as being 61,257.

3587. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is that the memorial establishment?—He calls it the fixed establishment. The army estimates of this year give a greater strength than 61,000; I think they give 62,000, but there is not much difference.

3588. Mr. *Laing.*] That was the establishment?—Yes.

3589. *Chairman.*] Sixty-one thousand is the establishment?—Sixty-one thousand two hundred and fifty-seven. Sir William Mansfield says that the effective force is always 6 per cent. below the establishment; that is nearly 4,000 men.

3590. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You say the establishment this year is 61,000 odd?—Yes.

3591. Mr. *Laing.*] According to that view, we have about 7,000 or 8,000 effectives in India more than you think would be required?—We have effective officers and non-commissioned officers for 12,000 men more than that number of rank and file; with these new transports you will have 10,000 rank and file more than the 50,000.

3592. What is the comparative expense of the officers and non-commissioned officers of a regiment, and of the rank and file?—The pay of the officers of a regiment, of course, varies to some extent with the establishment of rank and file; but with 950 rank and file, you will generally find the pay of the officers more than two-thirds more than the amount of pay of the non-commissioned rank and file. I think that is the proportion; but I will correct those figures in my evidence.

3593. Then is your argument this, that even if you assume 60,000 Europeons to be requisite for the security of India, India is put to an unnecessary expense owing to the regiment being too small, and not being kept up to their full establishments, and a large useless expense being consequently incurred in officers?—I do not wish to convert this into a question of military expenditure, because you yourself decided the question that as long as the expenditure was kept within 12,000,000 *l.*, India could safely pay that sum, but if you remember, my argument was that we are now employing abroad a vastly larger amount of force than the security of the country requires, and than the power of keeping up that force abroad can fairly bear.

3594. The expenditure in India is now very considerably above 12,000,000 *l.*, is it not?—It is considerably above 12,000,000 *l.*

3595. And you think that they are obliged to impose unpopular taxes in India, because the system under which our European army is supplied from this country is unnecessarily expensive?—I thought so at the time, when I was serving under your directions in India. I thought that the arguments which the Viceroy and yourself and Sir Bartle Frere all used, that it was very desirable to avoid imposing unpopular taxes were well founded, and I think so still, and the experience since then has fully proved the correctness of the views you then acted upon, that it was far better to risk a good deal for the sake of having such an army in India as you could pay without the necessity of imposing taxes, which would create discontent, and raise up enmity amongst a class of men by whom we have hitherto been looked up to with great respect.

3596. Do you think that if India were free to raise and organize the greater portion of the European force she required in her own way, that is to say, in the least expensive way, and that most suitable for the country, she could provide herself with an army for an expense not exceeding 12,000,000 *l.* a-year?—I have no hesitation in saying that she could very easily do so.

3597. Looking at the immediate effect of this measure, of native troops serving in the colonies, from an Indian point of view, I suppose it must be a question mainly of keeping up the largest available reserve of European force for India, in case of emergency?—That was one of the views I had in contemplation when I drew up this memorandum. It often appeared to me to be a strange thing that in the various operations we have been carrying on, the force in India should have been drawn upon as it has been. Take, for instance, the expedition to China in 1840; at that very time we were terribly pressed in Affghanistan; at that very time also, if I remember rightly, you had four or five European regiments between the Mauritius and Ceylon, and although we sent one regiment from Ceylon and took it from the Indian establishment, to go to China, yet we could easily have occupied Ceylon and Mauritius with native troops, and sent a much larger force than we did to China, to bring about the peace which was effected at Nankin.

3598. At present, if I understand you rightly, you say that even in time of profound peace, while we keep up these establishments in India and the colonies, we have only 28,000 odd effective rank and file left at home to meet all the emergencies of the service?—I do, plus the strength in the depôts.

3599. And that the strength in the depôts, even now in a time of profound peace, is insufficient to feed the regiments serving abroad as they ought to be fed?—I believe that the strength of the depôts is insufficient. The Commander in Chief has borne testimony to the difficulty he finds in sending men abroad to fill up the regiments serving abroad, as he would desire as an efficient military body.

3600. Then do you consider that if the least strain came upon our resources, if there were a European war in which we were pressed, India might incur

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incur a very great danger from an insufficient European force being kept up there?—Yes, you have the experience of the Crimean war, when in spite of the strongest remonstrances of Lord Dalhouse (and no man could write more strongly than he did) the Government withdrew European troops from India, and it was with the utmost degree of difficulty that he could ever get the Government at home to allow European regiments of the Indian army to be raised for the purpose of replacing those regiments which the Imperial Government thought fit to withdraw for the events in Europe. I therefore look upon it that there will on all future occasions be the same liability, but in an increased ratio, because of the small amount of resources you have at home, and the large extent of resources you have in India.

3601. *Chairman.*] Will you hand in the Marquis of Dalhousie's Minute?—I will. (*The same was handed in,* vide *Appendix.*)

3602. Mr. *Laing.*] Do you consider it clear that in case of a European war, especially a protracted European war, we should be exposed to a most imminent risk in India of seeing the European force brought down, not merely below its present strength, but below even that which Lord Dalhousie thought requisite?—I think no one who has looked to past events can doubt that the first consideration of the Government here will be the safety of the heart of the empire.

3603. Under the former system you had a certain reserve, or nucleus of a European force in the local European army, had you not, and in case of any emergency at home that would not have been affected?—At the time of the mutiny you had a local force of upwards of 14,500 men, and that was capable of being increased with the utmost possible ease, without any or much augmentation, at all events, of the cadres, to nearly 20,000.

3604. I want to see how you will meet what has been perhaps the main objection urged to this proposal, namely, that this European regiment in the Mauritius, Ceylon, &c. are really in case of emergency available as a reserve for India, and if now, in time of peace, you supply their places by native troops, and bring them home to England, the probability is that they will be reduced, and then you would lose that reserve which you now have for India in those colonies?—I meet that question in this simple manner, that in the first operations against China in 1840 you only withdrew one regiment from these two islands, that one being from Ceylon, for the purpose of going to China, although we were then engaged in oporations in Affghanistan, which were approaching to a crisis; Sir Henry Rawlinson can speak infinitely better than I can upon that point, still the Government at home, although the war in China was entirely an Imperial question, forced India, or called upon India to supply a European force, which was necessary for the war in that country; after our disasters in Affghanistan, and when the Government of India were hard pressed for European troops, none of the European force was withdrawn from China; on the contrary, I think, if I remember right, one regiment of European infantry and some artillery came on to China to reinforce us, besides a large force of native troops, so that practically, when we have had any real difficulty, I have not found that Ceylon or Mauritius were drawn upon until this great event of the mutiny of 1857, then, no doubt, they were drawn upon largely.

3605. In the Mutiny, what number of regiments did we get in fact to aid India in its emergency from those colonies?—We got one regiment from Mauritius, and one from Ceylon, and I forget the force from the Cape; I am told that it was three regiments from the Cape. At that time we had, I think, seven regiments up the Persian Gulf; that was also an Imperial question; so that in reality the troops that came out from home to go on to China under Lord Elgin, and the troops taken from the Mauritius, the Cape, and Ceylon, were not in excess of the force which we had sent to Persia for an entirely Imperial question.

3606. I want to see how you meet this objection; in point of fact we did get five regiments to aid India from those colonies, but supposing this measure had been in operation, and that instead of those five European regiments you had either had corps locally raised or native corps from India in the colonies, and those five regiments had been sent home or disbanded, and the army reduced to that extent, you could not have got them to aid the army in India?—Neither would you have sent seven regiments from India to the Persian Gulf.

3607. Apart from the expedition to the Persian Gulf, looking to the future, supposing this measure were adopted, and that four or five European regiments now in Mauritius, Ceylon, and the Cape were removed, and Indian native regiments sent there in place of them, do you not think that when the European regiments were sent home to England they might possibly be disbanded, and then you would not have them as a reserve for India if a pressure should come?—I think I can best answer that in this way: look at what happened in the Mutiny. We stood the fight with Delhi with the European force we had in the North-West Provinces. Not a single soldier that came from the Mauritius, from Ceylon, or from the Cape, or from China, was of the slightest avail in the capture of Delhi. Therefore India was self-reliant then, and I think that India must on all occasions be self-reliant. I think the operations are so rapid in India, that you have not time to call in reserves from distant parts; each locality must stand or fall by the means which it has at its command to meet the emergency. I would also submit for your consideration that if the force had not gone to Persia the result would have been very different. Lord Canning, in one of his minutes very shortly before the outbreak, pointed out in strong language the great danger he was incurring in parting with another regiment from India. I think that if the force which we sent from India had been retained, and if the establishment which we ought to have had in India had been complete, you might have had outbreaks from the mutiny of sepoys, but those outbreaks would have been put down with a promptness which would have prevented the army of Bengal from mutinying to the extent they did. I would also remind you of one very important fact with reference to the Persian expedition, namely, that one regiment, the 1st Madras Fusiliers, under their gallant Colonel Neil, were fortunately recalled from the Persian Gulf by a telegram from Bombay. Cruisers were sent out in every direction to stop them in their progress up the Persian Gulf; they were stopped, they came back, and landed at Madras,

Madras, and it was not many days before they were pressed on to Bengal. I think you will allow that that one regiment alone did most important service in reference to the salvation of the provinces of the lower part of Bengal. Therefore, if we had had the other regiments which were employed away in Persia, I think myself that India would not have gone through the terrible ordeal she did in 1857.

3608. Admitting that India was to a certain extent sacrificed to imperial objects, I am afraid, looking forward to the future, we must look forward to the possibility of the same kind of thing occurring; I want to see what is the best thing to be done as a practical measure for the security of India; I wish to state the objection clearly to you, because I am sure that if anybody can answer the objection you can; I want to have the objection answered; for my own mind I take the objection to be this, that if in time of peace you replace a certain number of European regiments in these Colonies by native troops, unless you can be sure of keeping of those European regiments when they have been sent home to England, you will not have them for a reserve for India as you had in the Mutiny of 1857?—I would submit that it is a matter of opinion. It is a very difficult problem to solve, no doubt; but I submit to this Committee that you have never had in India yet any operation in the field in which, however small the European force has been, you have not been able to overcome your enemy. We have never been defeated in the field yet, that I can recall to my recollection at this moment. You have had great slaughter in actions, but in the long time that we can look back to in our experience of India, you will always find that a few Europeans have done marvellous things in the field, and it really is a very remarkable thing to say, but the fact is that in proportion as you diminish the European force in the field, it appears to me that that small force acquires a vigour and a power which are not to be equalled on the fields of Europe. I do not mention this as my own experience, but it is the experience of the Duke of Wellington and of Lord Ellenborough, both of whom are, of course, men entitled to the highest respect for their knowledge connected with Eastern affairs. The Duke of Wellington himself, in more than one of his despatches, especially when writing from Spain (I remember it well, although I cannot quote the exact words), said that a small body of European soldiers in India seemed to be able to do that which a force much larger in number could not do. And there is no doubt, as all of us who have had experience in the East have seen, that European soldiers in proportion as they are diminished in number, and as the numbers of the natives round about them are increased, seem to acquire on the parade ground and turn out and move with a degree of firmness and solidity, which I have never seen equalled by any European force in England. It is in that light, therefore, that I think myself that, having based your army upon a proper organisation in India, and having made up your mind that you can pay, and having resolved to keep the force in the highest state of efficiency, seeing to it that every man is kept in the best possible state of health and trained to the highest degree of perfection, you ought to leave India to herself, and simply let them be prepared for all eventualities. I am quite convinced if you keep 50,000 European soldiers in India, and prevent the great mass of the population in India from being roused to opposition against you by oppressive or unjust measures, that force together with a native army would be quite ample to maintain India in peace and quietness. But if you tax the country heavily and wrongly, and if you carry on your government badly, I do not believe that any amount of European or native force will ever enable you to hold India.

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3609. Looking forward to the permanent safety of India, in a military point of view, which of the two would you prefer, the re-establishment of a permanent local European force, officered by a special body of officers, trained for service in the country, or a system by which native troops should be sent abroad to the Colonies to supplement the Queen's European troops, and you should trust for your supply of European troops in India to having Queen's regiments sent there as at present?—I hold the present system, by which you are controlling the army of India, to be an exceedingly unwise one; you have neither amalgamated the Indian with the imperial army, nor have you made the Indian army a separate and independent body of men. The remarkable difference between the two systems, I think, is shown in this wise, that when the change of the Government took place, in 1858, the Commander in Chief made a demand upon the Secretary of State, through General Peel, who was at the head of the War Department, that the whole Indian army should be given over to him, as the Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's forces. Lord Stanley, on that occasion, after taking the advice of his law officers, declined to accede to that demand, and intimated that the opinion of the law officers was decidedly that the army of India could be maintained in all its integrity as a separate army from the imperial army, and that it required no change. Since then, however, you have gone to a hybrid system; you have taken away the whole European force of India which makes the army of India respectable, and you have made it a portion of the Imperial army, and you have left the native army of India to be a separate army under the Secretary of State for India. I hold that to be a very vicious principle; and I think that now you should either resort to the principle of placing the whole native force, equally with the European force, under the superintending eye of the Commander in Chief, or you should fall back upon the old system of having a separate army for India, that army being composed of different branches of the service, in due proportion, to make the whole army one mass, and to make the army respectable. Of course, as an old Indian officer, I cannot but look back to the remarkable degree of efficiency which the army in India presented, and to the advantage which I think the Government of India possessed in having a vast body of officers, upon whom they could draw to any extent for any duty they required to have performed; those officers being men trained up in the East, who went to India without any desire to return to England until they had retired from the service in India, and having all the *esprit de corps* which a large army gives. When I look back to that army, in spite of the defects which surrounded it, and there were many defects, I think myself that it is greatly to be regretted, for the reasons I have given, that we should ever have parted with such a vast machine as that for the present objection-

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able, and I will say dangerous, position in which you have placed the army of India.

3610. At present are you not living upon your capital, as it were, by working up the officers who had been created under the old system, and not training up new ones to replace them?—I believe you are going forward in a very remarkable way, to the great danger of India; you had a large body of officers left after supplying the five or six officers who were considered necessary for each regiment of native troops: there are a large number of these officers ready, and still available, in case of necessity; but I say that, remembering the difficulties of raising up officers and the number of men who fall short of that efficiency which you must always expect in a body of men, I do not myself see how you can ever expect to obtain from the Imperial army either the number of officers, or the number of trained officers, which you must eventually look forward to needing in case of any necessity arising in the East.

3611. Ten or 15 years will pretty well see out the present generation of old Indian officers, will it not?—I think at present you have very few subalterns of the old Indian army left.

3612. Then the real trial of the present system will come when your old school of officers is exhausted?—Yes; and in a time of war or a time of emergency it is utterly impossible, labour as you will, to provide them on a sudden; all who have had occasion to be engaged during emergencies in India know perfectly well that it is almost impossible on a sudden emergency to raise up those means which you require in the field; and I look upon it in another point of view also; I do not think myself, from all I have read and from all I have seen, that there is much difference between one native of the East and another; some may have more peculiar advantages, but the difference is not so great as to prevent you from seeing that it is the European officers who are the life and soul of Asiatic troops, and that all the organisation in the world, the irregular organisations, or what ever you choose to call them, are nothing in comparison with the European leadership; it is the white faces leading on the black men that makes an efficient soldiery, and in proportion as those officers are trained and attentive to their duties, and in proportion as they attend to their men, so will the efficiency of the native soldiers be in the field.

3613. When the black regiments have gone abroad for service in the field, we have been obliged to supplement the number of white officers very largely, I think?—Yes, on every occasion; when the native troops went to China the first thing that was done was to add a large number of officers, who were selected for their great experience and great knowledge, to those regiments that went to Pekin.

3614. Especially in the case of the native regiments going abroad on foreign service, would it not be quite essential that they should have officers with them who were well known to the men, and well acquainted with their feelings and prejudices?—Yes: the difference between a regiment in which the men know the officers and the officers the men, and a regiment in which the contrary is the case, is something enormous. I was an Adjutant of native artillery for nearly 10 years; although I was frequently absent from my duties, I did not resign my adjutancy until I was appointed consul at Shanghai; during that time I had frequent opportunities of knowing the feelings and wishes of the native soldiers; and I have had great experience also among other natives, and I have been able to contrast the treatment of soldiers by their officers in some regiments with those in others, and I have observed that there is a marvellous difference between the promptness and efficiency in every way of a regiment where the men were well looked after by their officers, especially where they had officers of some degree of standing and military knowledge, and a regiment which was not in that condition; the difference is something which I cannot possibly describe.

3615. Therefore you would think it a source of very considerable danger if you were sending native troops largely out of India to garrison distant Colonies, unless you were quite sure of having a good supply of regimental officers with them who were both thoroughly well acquainted with India and its habits, and had been connected with the regiment for a considerable time?—Yes; you have got a remarkable illustration of that in these papers which have been laid before the Committee. This paper shows the cost of employing two Sikh regiments in China, which illustrates the argument in a strong manner; it must have been sent in, I think, whilst Colonel Norman was Military Secretary in Calcutta. It was sent in by the officer who succeeded me in the Military Finance Department. It shows the establishment and the cost of the two regiments to be employed in China. You will see that it is proposed that there should be 26 officers employed with 12,000 sepoys.

3616. Colonel *North.*] Those would be European officers?—Yes, we are now speaking entirely of European officers; that is what was conceived to be the proportion in Calcutta, because, from the appearance of the document, I can have no doubt that the instructions were issued to the Military Finance Department, giving them the establishment in order for that department simply to prepare the cost.

3617. Mr. *Laing.*] Then, do I correctly gather the substance of your opinion to be that you see great danger for the future of India as long as you have not got a large permanent local European force, and a machinery for training up a large body of European officers specially for Indian service?—I do, decidedly.

3618. As long as you continue to follow the present system of trusting for your European force to the ordinary Queen's army, do you not think that there is considerable force in the objection, that simply to substitute for the European regiments in the China native regiments, and to bring the European regiments home and probably disband them, would be rather to add to the dangers of India than to diminish them?—With regard to the last part of the question, I might reply to it in this wise, that I think so far from disbanding the regiments you bring home, you should take every means you can to increase the available forces at home; for instance, only about two years ago you reduced no less than two companies from every regiment of infantry of the Line, but so far from reducing these two companies, I think it would have been politic at that time to have kept up those two companies. I think also that it would be politic if you can possibly bring home the cadres of regiments, to do so, to any extent you can, and if you do bring them home, it would be advisable to maintain them

them in all their integrity, for the purpose of training young recruits in the event of any sudden emergency requiring them. Instead of having, as at the present moment, only 42 regiments in the United Kingdom, or 34 as you had four years ago, I think myself that you should never be content until you have at least 90, or I will say 80 regiments at home, and the other regiments sent abroad kept up to the full extent at which they can be maintained, the depôt at home acting as a sort of nucleus for feeding the regiments abroad; then you would have a force for meeting eventualities. You should have a large number of cadre regiments at home; I would not care how much you reduced those cadre regiments. I think the rank and file should be reduced to the smallest number, so long as you keep up the officers and non-commissioned officers, trained in the highest degree of perfection. Therefore what you suggest in your question, namely, disbanding the regiments on their return home, does not necessarily follow, from what I submit for your consideration, namely, that it is advisable to diminish the numbers abroad, but to have large resources at home.

3619. You would rather draw in as many forces as possible from the outlying colonies, in order to keep up a large reserve at home?—Yes, I maintain that from a central position you can more readily supply the means of reinforcing the distant parts of the empire, than you can by keeping regiments located in the colonies for those eventualities.

3620. Colonel *North.*] Are you not aware that within the last few months, when a native force was organised to garrison the Straits Settlements, his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was directed to reduce man for man of our troops for those who were sent there?—Of course the House of Commons, and the Secretary of State, will do anything they please, but I think it is much to be regretted that there is not a line drawn between the duties of the different departments. When Mr. Laing was the Finance Minister of India, he was quite content to maintain the efficiency of the army in the highest possible state, provided the expense was kept within a certain limit. That is one point in which I have always admired the wisdom of Mr. Laing with reference to his financial arrangements. He contented himself with knowing to what extent the troops would cost money, leaving it to the departments to maintain the force in its highest state of efficiency. I think, myself, that most of those orders are issued by the department as a financial measure, but I think that they enter into details as to the mode of carrying out the system, which might be left to the departments which are more experienced in the details. And it is in this light that I have looked upon the objections raised in the House of Commons, and I suppose that the ministers only speak that which they think the House of Commons will wish. I have always considered that it would be far better to say you shall only spend so much for your military expenditure, leaving that expenditure to be appropriated in the way most suitable to the army, and most likely to make it efficient. I am sure if you fixed upon a sum of money as the sum to be expended from the military force of the empire, you could bring down the army to a strength which would keep the expenditure within the limit.

3621. Mr. *Laing.*] If you were to bring home the 10,000 men, or any part of the 10,000 men, who you think could be spared from India, that would at once cause an increase in the military estimates at home, would it not; you must either disband your force to that extent, or have an increase in the army estimates at home?—My impression is strong, that you might bring the military expenditure at home, even if you brought home and maintained those 10,000 men, within the present sum which is allowed for the army, and that, therefore, if this sum can be spared by the Treasury, you might allow the departments concerned to maintain the force in that form which would be likely to be efficient for military purposes, and yet capable of being expended in case of necessity.

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3622. But until we get that reform in military finance at home, if you bring home the troops from India you cast the whole cost of them on the English Army Estimates; and if you bring home the troops from the English Colonies, you lose the Colonial contributions, so that in either case you tend to increase the Army Estimates, and if the House of Commons, or the Treasury, are unwilling to increase the estimates, the only alternative is to reduce the force?—I would observe, that the contribution from the Colonies is a matter of no importance. I do not think it has ever been 300,000*l.* in any one year.

3623. It probably does not cover the increased expense of keeping the troops in the Colonies, instead of keeping them at home?—I believe that that very contribution is the cause of unnecessary expense being incurred in the employment of European troops abroad.

3624. If Indian troops were sent to replace European regiments in the Colonies, the expense, I presume, must be borne by England and the Colony jointly?—That is, as you know, a mere matter of account, and can be easily arranged. At present the expense of the force in Labuan is very easily settled; the Government of England pays 40*l.* per man for the native troops employed at Labuan; it is entered in the Army Estimates regularly every year, and it is a matter of adjustment between the Secretary of State for India and the Treasury at Home. There is no difficulty in settling a matter of that kind; you have only to agree upon what the cost shall be, and then it becomes a mere matter of account and adjustment.

3625. Colonel *North.*] If the native troops were sent, say, to the Mauritius, to the Cape, and to Ceylon, and if the result was to be what has already taken place in other cases, that the English troops were to be reduced man for man for the natives sent out there, would that meet with your approval?—No; on the contrary. I think before you came in I had referred to that. I would remind the Committee that I did not introduce this as a finance question, but as one involving the interests of the empire, considering that the distribution of the troops at the present moment was so much inferior to what it was in 1854, that we have now double the force abroad which we had in 1854. It was as a purely military question of reserves that I advocated the bringing home of as many regiments as you could.

3626. Captain *Hayter.*] Supposing these Indian troops were employed in garrisons abroad, would it be possible for the Supreme Government of India so to define their duties that there should be no difficulties arising afterwards; I ask the question with reference to a case in which some

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some Sikhs were sent to Ceylon, and were afterwards employed, not in military duty, but in road making, and the whole arrangement broke down? —It is the same question which Colonel North's Committee so clearly and well brought out; and Colonel North's report upon the employment of the troops in China is an exceedingly good paper to have before us with regard to the mistaken mode in which you employ troops. You go and scatter the commissariat stores, the ordnance stores, the naval stores, the treasuries, and every kind of store you can possibly think of, and for every store so scattered you require a European guard. The consequence is, you have your European soldiers dying off by hundreds. Therefore I pressed very strongly upon the Supreme Government of India to draw up and order to be carried out a regulation, which is not carried out yet, laying down the difference between guarding and protecting all establishments, which is one thing, and the means of watching them as policemen would do, which is another thing. For instance, in this country you have now, with great advantage, in the last 20 years introduced a large force of police to watch the dockyards. I think before that system was established you had several hundred men on guard daily to protect your arsenals and dockyards. The substitution of the police for them has incurred some expense, but nothing in comparison with the cost which you did incur by employing soldiers to do the duty which the police are now known to do with far more efficiency than the soldiers ever did before. Therefore, if you send native soldiers, or even European soldiers, to the colonies, I think General Peel's recommendation to the Government in 1859 was a very wise one, that you should not allow your troops ever to be employed in performing those duties in the Colonies which it was the bounden duty of the Colonies to do by means of their own police. But in many places—for instance, both in Singapore and in Burmah (as it was when I went down there in 1860), and likewise from Colonel North's Committee, you will find that many duties were taken up by the soldiers which ought to have been confided to the police. Therefore, if you kept your European soldiers solely as military men in those colonies, I do not myself see that you could ever fall into any mistake with regard to the duties to be performed.

3627. Is not that a question rather between the military authorities as to what amount of duty the soldiers are to do, than a question for the Civil Government?—As I have already stated to the Committee, the last thing that a commanding officer ever does is to object to demands made upon him by the civil power; you will find that the last thing a commanding officer, if he receives a requisition from the civil authority ever does, is to say I will not obey; he complies with the requisition as a matter of course, and receives it as an order to be obeyed; the consequence is that you will rarely or never find a commanding officer objecting to the employment of his men upon guards.

3628. Supposing these duties to be defined between the Supreme Government of India and the government of the colony, the troops need not be employed upon any duty which is not military duty; but the police duties are regarded in those colonies as military duties, and the Sikhs were employed upon work which was distasteful to them as soldiers?—I think there was some mistake about the Sikhs; they were brought down from the Punjaub, not to be soldiers in Ceylon, but to be employed on the roads as labourers, and I think there was some misunderstanding; either they were deceived by the officer who enlisted them, or some misconception arose in their minds, and hence, when they arrived in Ceylon, and were turned to duties which they were either misinformed upon before they entered the service, or did not choose to perform when they were in Ceylon, they were discontented?—I believe these were the facts of the case.

3629. Would you tell me whether you are prepared, having sent the native troops to a colony to leave the entire garrison in the hands of the native regiments, excepting the artillery?—Surely, we have done it repeatedly, and what harm will these men do by mutinising?

3630. You must understand that that is in direct contradiction to what Lord Strathnairn's evidence was?—Every man has his opinion; that is my opinion. I was in the Straits with natives for years, and I never knew of a mutiny among them. Lord Strathnairn was never, I believe, in command of natives; but he must know that Mhow, where there was one of the most dangerous mutinies we ever had, and which he occupied immediately, had been left for years with natives only, and that many other garrisons had been left for years simply with native infantry. There were three regiments of natives and a weak company of artillery, in a wretched little redoubt built in 1819, which I had frequently condemned as utterly worthless, but which had been kept up; and that little place was simply occupied by artillery, and held out with great success. Saugor also was occupied by the Madras Ordnance Department, which was under me at the time of the mutiny; there was a wretched fort there that held out against four regiments of sepoys. Then Nagpore for many years was left entirely to the occupation of native troops, and many other parts of India were left to the occupation of native troops. And the singular thing with regard to mutinies in India is this, that all the mutinies, or rather the greatest mutinies you have ever had in India have been in those places where the European troops have been the strongest. That is a very remarkable thing. In my own Presidency we have had many mutinies; the mutiny of Travancore, the mutiny of Murra, and the mutiny of Hyderabad; and each of those confirms my remark. And in Bengal the greatest mutiny of all was at Meerut. There was no part of India so well supplied with European troops of all branches as Meerut was; you had a force there of Europeans which would have been sufficient, and was sufficient, for you to have overcome 20,000 or 30,000 native troops, which they eventually did.

3631. Sir *James Fegusson.*] The only reason they did not put down the mutiny at Meerut was that the troops were not used; was not that the case?—The remarkable thing, I say, is, that the places where the mutinies have been most prevalent have been the very places where the force of European troops was the largest.

3632. In those cases they have been promptly suppressed?—The mutinies at Travancore and Hyderabad were not promptly suppressed.

3633. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What do you say to the case of Dellore?—There was a large force of Europeans there, the 69th Regiment.

3634. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] Is it your impression

pression from that, that the presence of an European force irritates the natives?—No; the natives never calculate, as you are aware.

3635. Captain *Hayter.*] With regard to the colonial garrisons, Lord Strathnairn's opinion is that the presence of one European regiment has a good effect not only upon the population, but upon the rest of the garrison?—Take the case of Mauritius, the population of which is composed of a great variety of races, the men there have no interest in muntinising. Then take Singapore: the population there is composed also of classes of every kind; there are Arabs, and Malays, and Chinese, and a very various population. I have sat down to dinner, 40 years ago, with about 15 races; I think there were 10 European races at the table. And in like manner with regard to the natives in India, there are different races of every kind.

3636. Irrespective of the garrison, do you think that the inhabitants of the Colonies would be equally well satisfied with the native troops?—No; I have already mentioned the difficulty in that respect. You have now raised up a feeling which you will find great difficulty in overcoming. These colonists are now told to pay subsidies for the forces maintained there, and what they pay is based upon a calculation of the strength of the European force in each colony. Therefore they will naturally, and I think with very great reason, say, "Why should we have natives sent here?" First of all, there is no question but what they are an inferior force. I am not praising the native soldier as being in any way equal or to be compared to the European soldier; but I say that the natives are a good and useful force so long as they are well cared for. That force, nevertheless, is an inferior force, and you can hardly expect the people of Mauritius, of the Cape, of Ceylon, or of Singapore, to say, "We would rather have natives than Europeans." They will cry out for Europeans, no doubt. That is one of the difficulties which has to be overcome in arranging for the garrisoning of these places by means of native soldiers.

3637. With regard to the depôts, is the system the same in the India depôts, of the men only going to their own regiments, according to the English system; in the English depôts, which are amalgamated now into the depôt battalion, the men only go to their own regiments, as you are probably aware?—The Royal Commission of last year has recommended a change in that respect, and there is an Act now passing through both Houses of Parliament to effect that change; but every soldier in the British army is enlisted for a particular regiment.

3638. He enlists for a particular regiment now?—Yes; when the Bill is passed he will not enlist for a particular regiment, but at present not even Her Majesty can transfer that soldier from the regiment for which he has enlisted to another without the man's consent: therefore the whole system has been that of regimental establishments. But if you remember, our Commission recommended that a change should take place, that a man should be enlisted for the service generally, but that having been once posted to a particular regiment, he should be in the same position as he was before, that he is not to be removed from that regiment without his own consent.

3639. Is that the same with the Indian regiments?—The old system of the European Army of India was this, that the men enlisted for the infantry and the artillery, and were draughted off into the sappers as engineers, and I believe also into the cavalry, as the authorities might see fit: having once joined the artillery or those branches, they were not transferred usually, unless it was for some strong reason: the men were given their option, for instance, instead of discharging any artillerymen whom it was not necessary to keep, the option was given to him of discharge or serving in the infantry. The service was in such favour that the men generally preferred taking service in the infantry to taking their discharge.

3640. If general service is introduced, as is proposed, that which you think would be the most advisable system would be much more easily carried out, would it not?—It was to meet this general objection on the part of the Commander in Chief that the Commission was induced to make this recommendation. He said that particular depôts were strong in recruits, and that other depôts were not strong in recruits, and that he could not therefore transfer a man from one depôt to another depôt, or to another regiment, without the man's consent: and that that consent was never obtained except by offering a bounty to the soldier, I think of 1 *l.* or 2 *l.*, to induce him to volunteer for a particular regiment: hence the Recruiting Commission recommended two things; they recommended first, that the men should be allowed to enlist for service generally at first, and that they should be formed into large depôts, and that the Commander in Chief should have at his disposal a considerable depôt in excess of the fixed establishment of the army, with a view to enabling him to fill up a particular regiment from the general service depôt. But these rules have been only partially carried out as yet; however, if a man is once posted to a particular regiment, he is not to be removable without his own consent.

3641. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] You have spoken with great admiration of the Minute of Lord Dalhousie, of 1854 and 1855; are you of opinion that that is applicable to the present requirements of India?—I used that Minute in India, and I have no reason whatever for departing from it; the stations which are mentioned there are still in existence; we have not made much change in the territory under the Government of India since that date; I will look at the point which Sir James Fergusson mentioned, about the annexation of Oude, and see the exact date; but there was only one regiment employed extra in consequence of Oude being occupied in that way. If you will put red points upon the map, representing the places which Lord Dalhousie fixed upon as the places requiring European infantry, I think your own great experience connected with India will enable you to decide whether Lord Dalhousie's recommendations were soundly based or not. These are matters upon which it is difficult to form an opinion, and every man forms his opinion according to the experience he has had.

3642. Do you not think that the experience we have had of the events of the mutiny should have a great influence upon the question?—On the contrary, I think we have been freed from many difficulties in consequence of the mutiny. The mutiny was a terrible calamity to all of us; but I think we got rid of many erroneous ideas,

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with regard to the natives of India, by means of it; so far from its weakening us, I think we are stronger than we were before.

3643. You do not think that we need more Indian troops there now than we did before?—No; I will mention another matter, the proportion of Europeans to natives, which is a matter of importance as regards the native army; no doubt if you increase the relative numbers of any particular portion of the army, you will raise up jealousies or suspicions in the other branches which are not so favoured. The remarkable thing is this: that, in 1837, you had barely five natives to one European soldier, whereas when the mutiny broke out I have no hesitation in saying that you had at least eight natives to every European soldier; that increase was largely in the Bengal Presidency, where the greatest danger arose, and where we suffered most; and the least proportionate increase was in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies; in these presidencies the difference was not nearly so great. You have never had before you, in the fullest extent, the actual strength of the native troops in India at the time of the mutiny; all the returns which have been given to you are incomplete. My calculation is, that you had about 300,000 native soldiers in India, or nearly that number, at the time of the mutiny.

3644. To how many Europeans?—You had 256,000 effective natives against 37,091 Europeans; whilst, on the one hand, I exclude the European officers from the number of Europeans I have given, on the other hand I exclude the European officers from the native soldiers, but I include the native officers. It is very usual to say native officers, non-commissioned rank and file, whereas it is the ordinary custom to say European non-commissioned rank and file. The native officers, you know, are not many, and therefore it is a usual thing to include them, but I could very easily, if necessary, give the exact figures without them.

3645. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] They will not materially alter the proportions?—No; therefore in the whole of India you had upwards of eight natives to every European soldier, and if you take Bengal, I have no hesitation in saying that you had 10 natives to every European soldier. Now you have got rid of 133,000 natives.

3646. Major *Anson.*] Should I be wrong in saying that the number of natives in the Bengal Presidency alone, including the irregular commands under the Governor General, was 190,000 men; you must take into account also the forces of the native princes under the Government of Bengal?—I have here an original paper, it is a memorandum given by Sir William Mansfield to General Wilson, when he was up the country; that is, 47,000 men; they are usually not shown in the returns of the native troops, but these belong to the Bengal Presidency.

3647. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] I should like to ask you with regard to the excess of Europeans which you consider there is at present; you put it down at 10,000; that is Lord Dalhousie's estimate, as compared with the present effective force, allowing for 5,000 European artillery, instead of natives; if this saving was effected by the reduction of 10,000 Europeans, do you suppose that they would have to be replaced by natve levies?—No.

3648. Do you think that the whole army of India, native and European together, might be reduced by the 5,000 Europeans whom you would withdraw; or would you replace them with natives?—I would not replace them with natives; my impression was rather that you would cut down particularly the native infantry very low; it has been cut down since I left; but I never myself thought that 90,000 privates of native infantry were too much for India; that was the establishment that I always thought a good establishment to go by. If they are kept in that proportion, the other branches of the service being also reared up in proportion to that number, you would be able to make a very efficient army, provided you kept those native infantry to their own military duties, free from all those multifarious duties to which Lord Strathnairn referred. Under those circumstances you might keep the native army in a state of high discipline. I have already looked upon those guards as objectionable; and almost the last words Lord Clyde said to me before he left India were, of all things, to remind Lord Canning that he had promised carefully to withdraw all the small detachments of Europeans, and to keep the native troops well together in battalions, and not to scatter them in small guards away from their European officers, getting into indiscipline and bad habits, and mistaken ideas. It was with that view that I have always argued that you ought to maintain the natives and the Europeans in the smallest possible numbers, and that that organization was the best suited to the wants of India which would enable you to maintain discipline in the highest possible degree. I have always looked upon it that it was mainly the indiscipline of the Bengal army that led especially to the mutiny; and if the men had been kept together more than they were, and if the regiments had been kept under discipline more, I do not think you would have had the mutiny to the extent you had.

3649. You offered some very important suggestions with reference to the future of India, especially with regard to the military organization. I think you said that you would suggest that either the native army should be attached to the Home Government as the European army is; or that the native and European armies of India as a whole, should be formed into a local service, something on the footing of the old service; that I believe is what you suggested?—Yes.

3650. Have you considered that subject at all carefully; have you formed any definite plan with regard to the formation of this local service, as to its dependence upon the Home Government, and its organization, the means of supply and reliefs, and questions of that kind?—A paper was moved for about two years ago, of reports from the Military Finance Commission, of which I was a member, and of which General Jameson, who is now at the India Office, was the President. We were called upon when at Bombay, by the Government of India, to report upon the changes in the organization and the formation of a staff corps for India. We were not able for 10 months to report upon the subject, but in May 1860 we sent in our report, and in it we condemned the staff corps, and assigned our reasons for that view, saying that it was not a suitable thing.

3651. That was before the amalgamation, was it not?—It was a year and a half before the amalgamation; that report has in many respects been borne out by events, as being thoroughly sound in the statements we made; we then submitted various considerations for the improvement of

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of the then existing organization of the army of India; of course, since I have been at home here, I have necessarily been forced into discussions with various parties, but I have never been called upon officially excepting by the Commission over which General Aicheson presided, and by Lord Strathnairn's Transport Committee, to express opinions on the whole organization of the army of India; but necessarily I have been obliged to give my attention and my consideration to the subject, and I have endeavoured to keep myself acquainted with the changes which have been going on.

3652. And you are in favour of the notion of reforming a local army of India, distinct from the Royal Army, but equally under the Crown?—I think that few of those who have had experience of India in former days can have any doubt with regard to the policy of that, that it is in every way advisable to give to the Government of India, being the immense empire that it is, its own power and its own army, and to supply us with the great resources which you are so well aware were obtained by the Government of India in former times from their army, I think that the wisest way would have been to have searched out quietly and calmly the great defects which existed in the army of India, because it is of no use concealing the fact that defects existed, and to have carried out a remedy for those defects. But this much I will say, and your own experience will enable you to judge how far I am right, if you had taken as much care of your regiments and of your officers for those regiments, as you did in taking officers away from those regiments for the new staff duties, I think you would have had an army in India unparalleled in the world; you had a high degree of military training there; officers in India give themselves up to their profession to an extent which you never see in Europe, or in any other pursuit; they have no other employment, they have nothing else to turn their attention away from their duties, and therefore the officers in India devote themselves to their duties in a marvellously great degree; but if you had removed from the army many men who were either incompetent from age, from knowledge, from power of body, or from power of mind, and if you had made arrangements by which the best officers could have been kept with the army, and above all, if you had supplied that army with the number of officers equal to those you withdrew for the staff, I have no hesitation in saying that you would then have had that Indian army in a very different state from what the army in India is now.

3653. With regard to the European portion of that army, you remember under the old system that a very small proportion was under the Indian Government, the greater portion was temporarily supplied from the Crown; under the new system you propose, you would have the whole of the Europeans belonging to the local army, do you think that you would be able to recruit sufficiently for the purpose of maintaining that army?—Yes; because both in the recruiting commission of last year, and that of 1859 and 1860, the thing which struck us more than anything else was this, whilst the Imperial Army could not get recruits, the Indian Army were invariably supplied with recruits; that was distinctly reported in the previous commission, and if I had not been an old Indian officer, I am sure Lord Dalhousie, the President of the Commission, would have been very glad indeed to have recorded that opinion himself; as it is, if you read the report, you will find that in many respects the Indian service was stated to have been exceedingly popular.

3654. The demand was, however, more limited in former times than it would be under the new system?—The strange thing was that in 1858 and 1859 we sent home 10,000 European soldiers who refused to be transferred to the army while you kept them in the European army, but very few European soldiers comparatively, and then, when the amalgamation was effected, out of 18,000 soldiers of the native army, 17,500 came over with the bounty which a commission which I served upon in Calcutta advised the Government to give the soldiers, and you have never heard a murmur with reference to that local force. The bounty was given them by our advice, and the soldiers took it, and you have no discontent whatever. It cost the Government 160,000 *l.*, whereas the previous discharge of the 10,000 men cost the Government at least 1,000,000 *l.* Then, in a year and a half you had a vast force assembled in India by the recruiting of the Indian establishments in this country. I may mention also to you that which is notorious, I believe; I do not unnecessarily refer to private conversations. I have no hesitation in saying that General Wetherall, the adjutant general of the army, distinctly stated in conversation (it may not be worth much) that one drawback to the Indian army was that the Indian army took away the recruits from the English army; and more than that, for years and years the Indian army was not allowed to recruit in any part of the country except London. By degrees the Indian recruiting establishments were extended, first to one place and then to another, until at last the Indian army were allowed to have six establishments; but originally the Indian recruiting was confined to London. Moreover, I may also remind you that in the last century, after India had been conquered by our own gallant European troops, because it is to our own Europeans, aided by natives, that we owe the conquest of India, we had 12 European regiments belonging to India in the last century, and they were popular, and therefore it is absurd to say that it would be difficult to obtain men. I believe myself that there is a class of the population here which is always desirous of going to India. The minds of the people of Scotland are certainly favourable to India, and whilst they look upon their sons going into the English army as men lost to them for life, they look upon their sons entering the Indian army as men going out to a place where they may rise in standing in the world. I think there is also another point of view in which you might look upon it; the marines, for instance, obtain a class of men whom the army do not get, and do not take. I think it would be even now a wise measure if you allowed that class of the population to be drawn upon for the Indian army, instead of having, as you see here in all our establishments, as I heard last year, a great difficulty in recruiting the army, for which difficulty, indeed, our commission was assembled. You could have, as you invariably had in the Indian army, the depôts filled with men ready to go out whenever the Government required them.

3655. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I gather from your remarks, that you are very much opposed to the system of employing the troops in India

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on treasure escorts, and such duties as that?—Yes.

3656. I do not know what the system is now, but a few years ago was not it sometimes the case, that there were as many as five guards over treasure in one cantonment?—I think at Meerut alone, when the Governor General gave me the power of passing bills for police to guard treasures, I passed seven different bills for seven different treasuries.

3657. Major *Anson.*] Was that at Meerut alone?—Yes, at Meerut alone. I speak from recollection, of course. I passed the bills with Mr. Laing's approval, and, of course, I took immediate measures to order the whole of the cash in these treasuries to be deposited in one head quarter treasury. I think Mr. Laing will bear witness to the immense advantage we derived from that in all India. Nothing was more effectual than for us to call up the cash balances belonging to the establishment. The whole of these cash balances were then deposited in the Civil Treasuries, and Mr. Laing was then able to say what amount of available cash he had at his command. We cut it down as far as possible, and, except Tessore, I do not think we had any military treasuries where more than 10,000*l.* were left. Tessore, as Sir Henry Rawlinson well knows, is difficult of approach during the monsoon. We were obliged to keep 60,000*l.* there, I think, in order to meet the expenses of the troops during those months in which they could not get a supply of money.

3658. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] In 1857, when I was commanding at Cawnpore, there were five treasuries; there was the pension paymaster, the commissariat, the regimental paymaster, and so on. I know there were five altogether?—Yes, very likely.

3659. I suppose that was the case in a great many stations?—In every station in India the same thing existed.

3660. Meerut, of course, was an exceptionally large case?—Yes.

3661. That state of things is remedied now, is it?—If the orders are carried out it is. The Military Finance Department has the power of paying the bills for the police employed as guards for those treasuries, and up to the time of my departure I enforced that with the greatest degree of strictness.

3662. You stated, in the early part of your evidence, that six square feet were allowed to a sepoy on board ship, and that nine square feet were allowed to a European. I did not gather whether there was any sufficient reason for that, or whether it was merely that a native was worse treated than a European as a matter of economy?—No, I do not think so. I was a member of the Madras Marine Board for several years, and all the contracts for shipping were made by that board, and every ship was examined by a marine officer subordinate to the board, and examined by the quartermaster general.

3663. And nine feet was considered absolutely necessary for the health of Europeans?—To tell the truth, I do not think in the eastern seas it signifies very much what the space is; unless you crowd them to an enormous extent, you will have men in those seas sleeping on deck. I have been on board a good many transports, and I never found that either the six feet or the nine feet was wrong.

3664. You never found nine feet too much for a European?—No, nor too little; I do not think it is intentional, or based upon any reason; but I have never found any practical inconvenience arising from it.

3665. Major *Anson.*] The natives have different habits altogether to the Europeans, have they not; they have not the slightest objection to half a dozen of them huddling together?—No.

3666. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You do not think it important as a question of health?—With sea air no question of health arises.

3667. I suppose troops suffer from being crowded on board ship, just as everybody else does?—I have been very much crowded; but, if care is taken to keep the decks open, there is no harm in it.

3668. Suppose you have bad weather, and are obliged to stay down below?—That is bad, certainly; I have been on board ship when the hatches were fastened down, and then it was terrible.

3669. That is not unusual, is it?—I have been in typhoons, in China, when we have had it.

3670. During the monsoon there is a great deal of bad weather, is not there?—No; it is not bad weather, for, being steady, you know what to do; it is the battening down of the hatches that is objectionable. I have been on board ship when the hatches were battened down, and then, whether you have few or many on board, all men battened down in that way would cry out; but, with fair weather, in the tropics you know there is not very much space required.

3671. You gave us an account of some rather interesting operations, in 1839, against a native chief, with a combined force of Europeans and natives, in which you, I think, were personally engaged?—Yes.

3672. You have had no experience of native troops without the support of Europeans?—No; personally I have had none whatever.

3673. Except in those cases where they were attacking our own troops?—I was not engaged then.

3674. You alluded to some, I think, at Mhow?—I alluded to the Mhow affair, where a weak company of artillery stood against three native regiments, and they were quite sufficient; the natives did not withstand them. At Saugor, also, a weak company of artillery, and a small ordnance department were quite sufficient to withstand four regiments.

3675. That may give us a measure of what their value would be against an European enemy, unless they were largely supported by European troops?—That is a curious problem; I have asked questions about it of those who have been engaged with natives. I put the question to a very intelligent officer, who was a prisoner with the Sikhs in 1849; he was made prisoner when the Punjaub was overrun, and he and another officer were tied to the guns and threatened with death. I asked him what his impressions were, with regard to the natives, and his reply, I think, was a very fair measure of what Asiatic troops are. He said that the Sikh soldiers, who had only one or two European officers; in fact no European officers at all, appeared to be as much terrified when the Pandies came against them, led by European officers, as the Pandies appeared to be terrified when they were attacked by the Sikhs, led by European officers; and that the

whole difference appeared to be in the leading of the European officers.

3676. It is a question of leading?—Yes.

3677. I think it was said by them: "If you will only give us the Sahibs, we will be able to fight the Sikhs"?—Yes.

3678. Native troops are, of course, inferior to Europeans, and you said you apprehended that the colonists would object to pay for them on that score, if they were employed in the Colonies?—I do not think I put it in that form; I put it thus: that inasmuch as they are now paying for European troops, and the garrisons of the colonies are composed now entirely of European troops, the colonists would naturally say, "Why should you thrust upon us an inferior description of troops, when we are paying for a superior description of troops?"

3679. Are there any of the colonies where they pay for the whole expense of the troops?—I would answer that question also by saying that in the Mauritius they are paying, I should myself say, for the full amount of the military force which they can possibly require for the protection of that small island. They are not paying the full cost of the troops now located there, because they are 2,000 in number; and that island, according to Sir John Burgoyne, would require 6,000 European troops to garrison the place and to occupy the forts which have been built by the Imperial Government, in the event of a European war taking place.

3680. When did Sir John Burgoyne give that evidence?—In 1861.

3681. Sir *Henry Rawlinson.*] They are paying 17,000 *l.*, I think?—It has been increased to 45,000 *l.*; they used to pay 17,000 *l.* in 1858, but they are now paying 45,000 *l.* in 1866–67; the contributions of both Mauritius and Ceylon have been increased.

3682. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Is there any case where the colonists are paying for the whole of the troops quartered in the colony?—I look upon Singapore as a fair illustration.

3683. I should like to keep to the Mauritius for the present; at the Mauritius they do not pay for the whole?—They pay about from one-third to one-fourth of the cost of the troops now located there.

3684. Then you went on to say, just now, that you considered that they paid for that amount of troops which was necessary for the protection of that small island?—Yes.

3685. Which you placed at about 1,000 men, I think?—I place it at even much less than that.

3686. What would you place it at?—I should think 600 men would be quite ample for a small island like that.

3687. When you say "a sufficient protection for that small island," in what sense do you use the word "protection"?—I mean internal protection, solely apart from Imperial considerations.

3688. Do you mean for the defence of the island?—Merely internally.

3689. You think that if the colonists there have to pay the 45,000 *l.* a year, they will prefer having English troops to troops from amongst the natives of India?—Undoubtedly.

3690. You expressed an opinion, I think, that the troops in the Mauritius ought to be composed of native troops, and ought to be in some sort of way a reserve for the Indian forces in India?—I did not wish to convey that; I thought myself that India, with its large army, and especially an army formed as Sir Henry Rawlinson has mentioned, could with ease supply to these small islands a very good and useful military force; and this would save England from the necessity of sending out valuable European troops to occupy garrisons which can be held equally efficiently, and as safely, by an inferior force, if I may so call it, and a force more easily raised than our Europeans can possibly be.

3691. At whose cost would that force be maintained?—The cost of that small force would be infinitely less than the cost of the present force; and if it were formed with reference to the wants of the island, the sum now paid would be equal to providing that small force.

3692. You apprehend that the colonists there would object very strongly to paying that money for that force, if I understand you rightly?—They would raise that objection which all the colonies who do pay money now raise; Ceylon now raises it very strongly. Those two islands which are the most prosperous in the Eastern seas, namely, Ceylon and Mauritius, are called upon to make contributions by the Imperial Government for military forces, because their funds are in good order, to a far greater extent than the expense which any other colony is called upon to bear.

3693. In Mauritius there is no serious complaint that we have heard against paying a proportion of the expenses of the garrison?—Except that they have been obliged to tax every kind of necessary; they have taxed the wine which has been hitherto free from taxes; they have taxed almost everything they could possibly do, and they are now preparing to tax the rice which is coming in to support the immense population which is employed in the cultivation of sugar in the island.

3694. Is that owing to the increase of the contribution to the English Government, or to the expenditure of money in various ways in the island?—To both. The 45,000 *l.* which they pay now for the military contribution, and the 120,000 *l.* which Ceylon pays, would enable the Governments to take off from the articles which they now tax either the whole of the duties, or else a considerable portion of them. In Ceylon the people have been crying out, and representations have been made to Parliament here very strongly, that the rice imported from India is taxed in Ceylon for the purpose of carrying on the Government, and 120,000 *l.* is more than sufficient to take off that tax on rice.

3695. However, you consider that the colonists would object to paying the sum they are paying now, if they had the inferior native troops substituted for the European troops in the garrison?—I think they would justly, and with great good reason, raise an objection to it; why should they be taxed; why should the planters of the Mauritius, who raise sugar there, be taxed heavily as they are now for the sugar which they make, when Jamaica, Barbadoes, and these West Indian Islands, who equally raise sugar, are free from that taxation. They say justly that they have received no favours from England, that the sugar they make is finer than the West Indian sugar, and yet the taxation upon their sugar was the highest possible rate you could levy here; whereas the taxation upon West Indian sugar was two-thirds the sum which it is upon the Mauritius sugar, and yet because they

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themselves can find funds there you go and take from those colonists money for the support of the military forces which you do not take from the West India Islands.

3696. All those arguments would apply equally to the present contribution they are paying. My question was whether they would object more strongly to the present contribution which they pay, if they had the native troops of India substituted for European troops?—I think it is conclusive that they would.

3697. Will you explain to me why you think that the British public would be better satisfied to pay for these troops, as the cost of course would fall upon them if they go the Mauritius, instead of having their own troops employed, which of course are more to be relied upon in case of difficulty arising?—I argued thus, that you have got now in the very heart of your empire an insufficient force available for the purpose of keeping up those troops, and that in the event of any necessity arising, not only India, but Mauritius, Ceylon, and other colonies, would be drained of European troops for the purpose of maintaining the defence of the empire. My first recommendation was based mainly upon that consideration, that it is wise for you to make arrangements in time of peace which in time of war you must make, and that therefore it is better now to do it than to wait until events arise which force you, as was the case in India, to withdraw troops at the time when the Governor General of India considered it most dangerous to do so.

3698. Major *Anson.*] Colonel Percy Herbert has apparently divided the expense of the force in the Mauritius into two parts, one being the 45,000 *l.* which would represent what may be called the army of Mauritius itself, that is the force maintained for the purposes of the colonists themselves, and the rest being for Imperial purposes; in that army which they provide for their own defence, with the 45,000 *l.*, what right have they to employ auxiliary troops, which Englishmen in the Mauritius would be, if they pay 45,000 *l.* for soldiers, and those soldiers are Englishmen, they may be called auxiliary troops in that respect, may they not?—Yes.

3699. If we were to say to them, we decline to send our regiments to the Mauritius, you must find your own army, would they not probably have to recruit from the natives of India, that is to say, from the coolie population of the island?—Yes, they do so now. The police is a very efficient body, and it is composed of natives of India who have been brought there as immigrants.

3700. So far for the force supposed to be devoted to the purposes of the Mauritius people themselves: now, with regard to the remainder of the force maintained there for Imperial purposes, I take it that we have a perfect right, without reference to the Colony, to employ whatever force we think most suitable and advantageous for the purpose?—Yes, quite so. That sum of 45,000 *l.* is based upon some proportion which it bears to the 150,000 *l.* or 170,000 *l.*, the expense of the present military force. Therefore if you employ another force which is cheaper, the Mauritius people will certainly have a right to say, "Do not tax us more in proportion than you do other colonies."

3701. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You stated that a force of something like 600 men was quite sufficient for the defence of Mauritius; have you any personal knowledge of Mauritius?—No.

3702. You spoke of it, of course, merely for internal defence?—Yes.

3703. No doubt it would be sufficient for that purpose?—Yes.

3704. I suppose you are of opinion, with other witnesses who have been before us, that the Mauritius is a very important post to this country, as a halting place on the way to India; as a coaling depôt, in fact?—Yes, as a coaling depôt, I think it is; but I think that the reasoning upon which the Imperial Government is acting is obsolete; and Sir John Burgoyne particularly with his vast knowledge, going back so many years as he does to times before any of us were born, I think, is applying the reasoning of the last century to the present state of affairs with regard to the East. In his evidence before the Colonial Committee of 1861, he brings in the fact that we lost 7,000,000 *l.* sterling by privateering in the last century. Now it is a very remarkable fact that the enterprising French captain who caused us the most loss, instead of going to the Mauritius to refit, went and occupied Nagwa, on the Tennasserim coast, a position which we took from the Burmese in the war of 1826, when we found there the defences and batteries thrown up by that captain to defend his ships whilst they were being refitted, against any attack made by our vessels. It was our perfect ignorance of that remarkable peninsula that enabled him to take refuge there. The place which he occupied is a very noble harbour. That French captain went actually into the Bay of Bengal and took refuge there, and refitted his vessels, therefore it was not the Mauritius that gave him support against our vessels. No doubt the Mauritius did give support to enemies' vessels, but our main losses were occasioned by our not having occupied that coast on the opposite side of the Bay of Bengal. We do now occupy it, and the civil administration there is now in full force as much as in any part of India.

3705. Still, as a military man, are you not of opinion that the Mauritius, by its position, is a valuable post for coaling and for victualling?—Restricting my reply to the simple question of its being a coaling depôt, I admit that it is of some use; but I do not think myself that it is of that great use which people are inclined to ascribe to it; for this reason, that there are many other places which we could establish for the purposes of coaling depôts, which would not entail upon us the necessity of having a large civil government, as we have in an island like Mauritius.

3706. Is that any expense to us?—It is not any expense to us, but it is an important consideration, because we are obliged to defend that island, by reason of the large population which is there located. If you look to the question of a coaling depôt in the simplest possible form of what that means, I think you could establish a coaling depôt in some other island where it would be equally as useful to us as the Mauritius would be.

3707. Will you mention any place that would be suitable for that purpose?—Dograths and Sachetties. At the former I think a sergeant of police is stationed, and that is the extent of our civil administration in that island. There are 10,000 or 15,000 people there.

3708. There is some advantage, is not there, in denying such a place as Mauritius to an enemy?—I look upon the command of the seas as an essential point for that purpose. We may

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as well expect to fly as to hold the Mauritius unless we have the command of the seas. It is useless for us to disguise from ourselves that the command of the sea is necessary for keeping these islands. You, having been out in the East, are well aware of that.

3709. Supposing that we cannot hold that island without the command of the seas, yet in the event of a naval war, is not it a post of very considerable importance to us for the purpose of supplying and refitting our cruisers, and so forth?—I will admit that much, that it is an exceedingly useful port in the Eastern seas, and that a great number of ships do go into Port Louis. Vessels are very liable to be dismasted in a typhoon in those seas, and they come in great numbers to take refuge in Port Louis and get repaired; so much so, that they have got employment for three docks there. In that respect it is of importance, undoubtedly.

3710. Those docks, I suppose, would enable a small man-of-war to refit?—Yes; we have occasionally a large vessel refitted there, in fact.

3711. *Chairman.*] Has a vessel any business to be in the path of the typhoon unless it is going to the Mauritius?—Yes; many vessels which are not going to the Mauritius are dismasted and blown to the island. No doubt it is advantageous as a maritime post in that respect.

3712. What course does the typhoon lie in?—I forget now. I would not undertake to say in regard to it, but there is no doubt that vessels bound to the Cape do go into the Mauritius.

3713. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You complain that the regiments in India are kept very much under their establishment?—Yes.

3714. But you say that the force in India is altogether too large?—Yes.

3715. And you say that that will cause danger by increased taxation?—Yes.

3716. Will you just specify briefly which are the taxes that you specially allude to?—Mr. Laing has very fully reported upon them, and they are all before the House of Commons; they are taxes upon trades and professions. As Mr. Laing justly said, they involved the taxation of 20,000,000 of people.

3717. Mr. *Laing.*] You mean the income tax and the license tax?—No, they have put on the old taxes which you refused to put on.

3718. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] What taxes are there?—There are the income tax, which was partly in operation when Mr. Laing was there, and which Sir Charles Trevelyan took off; there are also new taxes, which Mr. Laing, under Lord Canning's Government, refused to carry out, though hard pressed by Sir Charles Wood to do it; those are what they call the taxes on trades and professions.

3719. Can you tell the Committee, roughly, what amount those specially obnoxious taxes bring in to the Government of India?—In the Madras Presidency, they had a tax upon trades and professions in operation for many years, and it brought in, I think, a very insignificent sum.

3720. Mr. *Laing.*] We may take it generally, that from a million to a million and a half sterling economised in the expenditure would just make the difference of being obliged, or not obliged, to put on those taxes?—Yes, I quite agree to that.

3721. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You said that the force in the Marquis of Dalhousie's time was dangerously small, and the force which you spoke of as being requisite for India was 3,000 cavalry, 35,000 infantry, and 10,000 artillery, upon the supposition that the artillery was to be European. That amounts to 48,000; you put it in round numbers as 50,000 men?—Yes.

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3722. You stated that the force now is considerably too large, did you not?—Yes.

3723. I think you stated that the actual number was not more than 58,000 men?—About 58,000, taking Sir William Mansfield's statement.

3724. But there can be no question about it; he gave the establishment, and you took off the average deduction; was not that so?—I would explain that; I accept Sir William Mansfield's statement to that effect; but, in 1862, Sir Charles Wood issued an instruction to send out 5 per cent. in excess of the establishment, 10 per cent. being the calculated ratio of the casualties in the year, so that to make them equal on the whole year round, you require that 5 per cent. in excess of the fixed establishment should be sent out to India, and I am not aware of any change in that order, though, of course, my ignorance is not a proof of its not having been changed. Therefore, I accept Sir William Mansfield's statement, that a change of policy has taken place, and that instead of the army of India being kept up to its full maximum establishment, it is now allowed to fall below that establishment, by reason of all the casualties which take place in the establishment being supplied once a year, whereas if the excess of 5 per cent. had been kept up, he would, upon the average of the year, have had the establishment the same.

3725. That leaves a difference of only 8,000 between your figures of what you think is requisite, and what is actually there?—Yes; I corrected that deficiency of 8,000 rank and file by saying also that that branch of the military force which was the least expensive of all, I mean the soldiers, was kept below its establishment, whilst the most expensive of all, the officers and non-commissioned officers, was kept up to the full maximum establishment required by the organisation; so that you have been unnecessarily keeping up an organisation which is exceedingly expensive for India.

3726. By whom is the establishment in India fixed; has not the Indian Government a good deal of influence in fixing the force of each battalion?—On the contrary, I had occasion to make some representations, which having been taken up by the Government of India, of course became those of the Government of India, and not mine; but Sir Charles Wood expressed his displeasure that I should make any representations. As I said, they were not mine, because when Mr. Laing, and Sir Bartle Frere, and Lord Canning approved of any suggestions, I think they were theirs; but I think the Government of India was frequently told to mind their own business.

3727. I mean, not the Government of India out there, but the Secretary of State for India in this country?—I am sorry to say that there has been a long correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Horse Guards and the Secretary of State for War; I think you will find that the ideas of the Home Government were mainly allowed to operate in fixing the force, and that the strength of the

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depôts has been maintained entirely to meet the views of the Home Government.

3728. That is to say, that the Home Government protested against the depôts being kept at so low an ebb as they had been, as being insufficient to maintain the force out in India?—I believe if you were to double the depôts upon the present organisation, you would find them insufficient.

3729. Am I to understand that the Government of India, represented by the Secretary of State for India, has no influence in fixing the establishment of the regiments in India who are to compose the force occupying India?—I can only speak from my limited means of knowledge; I have not access to all the official documents, but I have now for many years past been giving attention to that subject, and I must frankly say to you that the influence of the Government of India has been very limited in that respect.

3730. Have you no knowledge of its having been exercised in order to reduce the establishment of the regiments that are serving in India below what was proposed by the military authorities in this country?—You are all aware that the English Government refused to take back troops.

3731. I speak of the establishment of the regiments serving in India; is not it a fact that the Indian Government, represented by the Secretary of State for India, have put a pressure upon the Home Government to send those regiments out in the weak state in which you describe them to be inefficient?—Taking the establishment of the regiments varying from time to time, as they have varied, the influence of the Home Government representative of India, that is to say, the Board of Control and the Secretary of State for India has been listened to very slightly in fixing those establishments; I think that influences have been at work, which have prevented the alteration of the establishments of the regiments; I do not believe that at the present moment the Indian Government here, or any Secretary of State, would ever have willingly consented to an establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers being maintained, for, say, 800 rank and file, when that establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers is equal to 1,200 rank and file.

3732. That is not my question; I have not asked you whether the Indian Government would object to the number of officers being maintained at the present strength, but whether the influence of the Indian Government has not been used to cause the strength of the rank and file of the regiments to be reduced to what it is now, as far as your knowledge goes?—Then I had better say I do not know; I have no official knowledge; I can only speak from the traditions of the Indian Government.

3733. I do not say official knowledge; have you any knowledge?—I have no knowledge of the direct action of the Secretary of State for India with the military authorities here.

3734. Has it ever come to your knowledge that any recommendations have been made by the Indian Government, or any demands, to have fewer battalions and to make them stronger, as you have advocated?—I have a knowledge that Lord Canning did approve of the memorandum which I gave in in November 1860, in favour of maintaining the strength to the maximum establishment possible, so as to diminish the number of cadres of regiments in India; I am also aware from the displeasure which Sir Charles Wood, now Lord Halifax, expressed to me upon my return home in 1862, with regard to my recommendations, that that was a portion of the advice which he considered to be uncalled for.

3735. Then it did not meet with the support of the Government of India in this country?—I judge from the conversation of Sir Charles Wood that he left those matters very much to be disposed of by the Secretary of State for War, and the Commander in Chief.

3736. Before the mutiny, was not there a question between the Indian and the Imperial Governments, with reference to increasing the force in India; was it not the case that the Indian Government wished to increase the local European force, and that the Home Government preferred to increase the number of Queen's troops?—No; they gave an increase of three regiments of Europeans, which raised them up to nine regiments of Europeans in India. Lord Dalhousie also proposed that additional Europeans should be raised by disbanding the native regiments, two native regiments being disbanded for every additional European regiment to be raised. That permission was refused, although they gave three additional European regiments without any disbanding of native regiments; that was in 1854.

3737. You spoke of the English cavalry as not having been of much use in India; was not it considerably engaged in the Punjaub wars?—What I meant was this, that the whole cost of a European cavalry soldier is immediately doubled on taking the field; it is an exceedingly troublesome arm to provide with supplies, and therefore it is that, although on all occasions, I need not say, the European cavalry have behaved with marked bravery and never been wanting, still it has not been a force which the Indian Government or the Commander in Chief were much in favour of maintaining in India, and if I mistake not, I think Lord Dalhousie was quite willing to have parted with the two regiments of cavalry. I will correct that on referring to the documents, if necessary, but I think after he sent away the 10th and 12th Regiments he was quite willing to give two more regiments from India for the war in the Crimea; however, as a general rule, the increasing of the force of European cavalry has not been for many years in favour with the Indian Government.

3738. There have been many occasions during our occupation of India when the European dragoons have been of great value, have there not?—Yes; it is not in that sense that I speak. A European squadron will go through any force.

3739. They were very valuable in the Punjaub war, were they not?—Yes.

3740. They did some extraordinarily good service in the campaigns under the Duke of Wellington, did they not?—Yes; the 19th Regiment charged a mass of cavalry at Assaye, in a manner that no other regiment has ever done.

3741. And again, in the operations against Scindiah and Holkar they were very valuable, were they not?—In the last war the three regiments of cavalry which General Lake lead, and the 789 European infantry soldiers he had, went against any amount of force, guns and all. It

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was not from undervaluing the European cavalry that I said what I did, but it was merely as being so expensive a force.

3742. They are so expensive that you would not have more than you could employ well?—No.

3743. You said also, speaking of the cost of a regiment of infantry, that the pay of the officers of a regiment of 950 rank and file, was two-thirds that of the men; I presume you meant pay and allowances?—It is about two-thirds. I will fill in the exact figures with regard to it.

3744. Does not that include barrack accommodation in the case of the officers?—No; you are aware that an European officer has no barrack accommodation.

3745. But do not his pay and allowances include barrack accommodation?—Yes.

3746. Does not it, therefore, include barrack accommodation in the case of the officers, and exclude it in the case of the men?—Yes. I am talking now merely of the number of rupees given to the officers and that given to the men.

3747. The number of rupees given to the officers includes horse accommodation, travelling, and tentage?—Yes.

3748. Whereas those items are all extra in the case of the men?—Yes; I am merely talking of the actual money paid, respectively, direct to the officers and direct to the men.

3749. That by no means represents the proportionate expenses of the two, does it?—Not at all; the proportion of the officers probably would be about one-fifth of the whole expenditure of a European force.

3750. I think you stated, also, that one objection, which you had to the present system of having two armies of royal troops was, that the force of Europeans in India would be removed in the event of an European war?—Yes.

3751. You would not object to that; if you have 8,000 too many now, you would allow us to take 8,000 away?—If you confined yourself to the 8,000 I would not object; but I am afraid you would go to the extent of 20,000.

3752. In your considerations, have you not been guided very much by the fact that you consider that you can always draw upon England for troops, in the case of an emergency in India?—I think it is solely due to this: although many instances can be brought forward where England has been called upon to supply extra European troops, I think those demands have been mainly increased by reason of the Government of India not having at their command a separate army altogether.

3753. Of Europeans?—Yes; however I do not think it is right for me to imply that England has not been essential in supplying the means of conquering India; there is no use in gainsaying that, for all the operations which have been going on in India, England has poured forth her soldiers. What I meant to say was, that the greatest danger is, not in contending with the force which you have at your disposal in England, but of having the force in India greatly reduced by the heart of the empire being endangered. I am afraid India will be endangered in case of any remarkable events occurring which will force the Imperial Government to make a great drain upon the Indian force.

3754. If you increase the force to meet any events that may occur in India and the Colonies, India especially, the whole expense of that increase will fall upon the Imperial funds?—My view is, that India is quite willing to pay, and ought to pay, for the expense of every increased force she receives. I believe, in proportion as you manage her finances well, so will you be able to pay for any troops which you keep up in England for the purposes of India. The stronger your reserves, and the more efficient and powerful those reserves, the more efficient is the force in India. It is for that reason that I want you to observe that I do not think that the reserves kept in England now are either efficient for maintaining the force in India, or properly sufficient.

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3755. Then you would think it a perfectly fair and reasonable thing if the European force in India is reduced to as low an ebb as it can be properly reduced to in ordinary times, that a certain reserve should be kept up in England for Indian purposes, at Indian expense?—Not in the way in which the authorities in England think fit to keep the reserves at present. The Duke of Cambridge has said that the depôts in India cannot supply the requirements.

3756. I am not speaking of the depôts; of course there must be small depôts here to drill the recruits for the respective regiments in India; but what I want to put to you is whether it would not be fair, in your view, that a certain number of effective regiments should be maintained here at the expense of the Indian revenues?—I do say decidedly so; but I object to Imperial considerations swaying in the organization of the force; I will give you a remarkable fact to exemplify that; you are aware that a capitation tax has lately been placed upon India of 10 *l.* for every efficient man; Lord Canning took me up to Barrackpore, and for three days he entered into that question, and Mr. Laing also took it up with regard to the depôts, and, after three days he authorised me to consent to it; the plea upon which that 10 *l.* capitation was mainly based was, for the purpose of maintaining the depôts in England in a good position, and up to a high standard. The plea which was then urged was that the soldiers who would be furnished by this country, if the contribution was paid, would be drilled, and in the highest degree efficient, and that they would be sent out to India as trained soldiers, fit to take the field, and fit for every kind of duty in India. Now, it so happened that last year I went into that question upon the recruiting commission, and you will find that a portion of our report is, that far from that condition being fulfilled (we were obliged to report it in the quiet manner in which Royal Commissions should report), the recruits sent out to India were neither of the age proper for service in that country, nor were they sufficiently drilled to join the establishment, therefore, I think that has a strong bearing on the subject; you have no confidence that in this case the arrangements made between the Imperial Government and India will be fairly and honestly carried out.

3757. You are referring again to the question of the troops at the depôts; my question applied, distinctly, only to the question of maintaining efficient regiments here at the expense of the Indian Government, as a reserve for India in case of emergency; I think you said "Yes," and then diverted to the depôts?—I am afraid of my views being misunderstood; I frankly say that, I think, India ought to bear the burden of her wants, whatever she may require; but then

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India ought to have a voice in those arrangements. I merely mention that in one instance, which I had proof of, the man who ought to have been trained at the depôts, because their cost was borne by India, had not been so trained, and, therefore, we have no confidence that if a regiment was kept up as a reserve for India here, that regiment would not be sent away to-morrow to Canada, or any other place where an emergency required troops to be sent; and, therefore, India would have no certainty of having, in case of need, the regiment she had paid for.

3758. That is your only objection, otherwise you think it a fair arrangement, if it could be fairly carried out?—I think India ought to pay for every man she requires for her defence; she is wealthy enough, and, with good management, could do it.

3759. Inasmuch as the reliefs must always come from England, and inasmuch as a number of regiments are constantly occupied in going to India and coming back again, independently of the garrison of India, and you must also be ready to meet emergencies in India, would it be fair that a certain proportion of the army at home should be maintained at the expense of the revenues of India, they being efficient regiments and ready for service, the same as the other regiments?—I think that India ought to pay for any reserve which is deemed by Indian administrators to be needed for the support of India, and provided that the arrangement is honestly and fairly carried out. As far as my opinion goes, I think that India ought to pay for everything she requires.

3760. Mr. *Laing.*] All you mean is merely this: that as the House of Commons happens to sit in London, and not at Calcutta, there is always a tendency, more or less, to ease the English estimates at the cost of the Indian?—Yes, that is all.

3761. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] I think you are a strong advocate for reverting to the old system of a local European force for India?—Perhaps I did not mention sufficiently strongly that that European force ought to be of sufficient strength to make it a respectable army. I think that formerly the force was not large enough to give experience and knowledge to the officers. I hold that similar training, and experience, and knowledge of military discipline, to what officers of European troops possess, may be gained by serving with European soldiers, and that influence would be exceedingly valuable if it were brought to bear upon the officers of the native troops; and, in that way, I have always thought that, if we had our Europeans officered by the same class of men as the officers of the native troops, the military *esprit* and military knowledge of how to manage troops, which the officers of the native army would acquire, would be most valuable to that army.

3762. Taking it in round numbers that your European force in India should be 50,000 men, would you propose that the whole of that should be a local army?—No; I think Lord Canning's proportion was a very good one, viz., 30,000 locals, and 20,000 auxiliaries.

3763. By auxiliaries you mean Queen's troops?—Yes, of the regular Imperial army.

3764. Is not there this inconvenience in having a large force of Europeans, that the same thing might recur again of a difference between the troops and the Government upon some question of pay and allowances, and that you might have them mutinying, as they did in 1858?—I will state to you what was done in 1861. Lord Canning put me upon the Amalgamation Commission to reduce the instructions from home to order. The first question that we had to consider was that of bringing home the European force. There were three artillerymen on the commission, of whom Sir William Eyre and myself were two. The question was as to the European soldiers being deprived of what they had been accustomed to in India, and the accustomed conditions of the service being changed; for instance, whenever their term of service expired after the 10 years or 14 years, or whatever the term might be, or when they were taken on again in any form, they received a bounty.

3765. Whenever they were transferred from one regiment to another?—No; because they were transferred occasionally in the ordinary course of things; it was chiefly when their 14 years' service was expired, and there were separate bounties given to those soldiers on taking on. A soldier after 14 years' service was entitled to send in a warning certificate saying that he would or would not take on; if he took on with the service he received a bounty. In 1861 the question was raised how to get the 18,000 soldiers of the local army to take on; we proposed that a bounty should be given to those that took on; that bounty was approved of by the Government and sanctioned by the Commander in Chief, and it was alone sufficient to induce nearly the whole of the 18,000 soldiers to come over. I am perfectly satisfied that in 1858 the measures taken against the local army never would have been taken against the Imperial soldiers. I believe that the principle upon which the Horse Guards and Her Majesty's Government have always acted has been to respect the rights and claims of European soldiers, and that they have never, on any other occasion, infringed them in the manner in which they attempted to infringe the rights which the soldier had, or thought he had, in 1858.

3766. You are aware that the law officers of the Crown gave it as their opinion that the soldiers were enlisted to serve the Queen, and that the terms of their enlistment were not changed; and that they were called upon to do what was perfectly within the terms of their enlistment?—I am quite aware of that.

3767. And also that the oath of the soldier was, that he was sworn to serve the Queen, as well as to obey the orders of the East India Company?—Yes.

3768. In the event of so large a proportion of the European force in India being the local army, as you propose, is there any danger of questions, upon the subject of pay and allowances, between the troops and the Government, producing a mutiny similar to that in 1858?—I have, myself, no apprehension upon the subject. With care and attention, on the part of the Government, equal to that which the Government at home pay to their soldiers, I am perfectly convinced that the European soldier in the local army in India would be as faithful and as true to his colours as any Queen's soldier.

3769. Do you think that corps raised for local service are as easily maintained in a state of complete efficiency as regiments which are moved from

from one place to another?—I would have wished to have a larger force maintained, and to get more experienced officers in India than we used to do; but I add, that of the four regiments that went before Delhi, two were Company's regiments and two were Queen's regiments, the 52nd being one of them. They equally performed service as gallant as you could desire. The losses by death were equally great, and yet as regards efficiency, at the end of the time the two Company's regiments were much stronger than the two regiments of the Queen's Army. The 52nd Regiment, under Colonel Campbell, as good a regiment as you could desire, marched away with 118 rank and file under the colours, and there was not one of the two regiments of the Company's army that did not march away with double that strength. Therefore I maintain that in India the local troops have certainly been efficient, and there has been no great crime in the case of the local European regiments; they have been, in some respects, inferior to the regular regiments coming from England, but only in some respects. I remember when General Goodwin saw the two Company's regiments who were at Rangoon, and compared them with the regiments of the Queen's Army, he said that he had never seen such fine men. Sir Hope Grant has also given evidence before a Committee in regard to the fineness of the men. I would simply add, that the courts martial will show very fairly in favour of the local European troops.

Maj. Gen. *G. Balfour.*

23 July 1867.

Friday, 26th July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Major Anson.	Lord William Hay.
Viscount Cranborne.	Captain Hayter.
Sir James Fergusson.	Colonel Percy Herbert.
Viscount Hamilton.	

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, IN THE CHAIR.

Major General GEORGE BALFOUR, called in; and further Examined.

Major Gen. *G. Balfour.*

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3770. Major *Anson.*] ONE of the great objections taken to the scheme of the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies is the difference between the scale of pay and allowances to Indian officers and European officers; have you any remarks to make on that question?—It is as well to explain, that in India the system upon which the Government have proceeded from time immemorial, has been to give to the Indian officers a certain quantity of silver, and to debar them from taking advantage of the public service in adding to their means in any way; and the consequence is that house rent, servants, and everything are included in the number of rupees which the officers get. In contrast with that, the system of the English army has been to supply officers, and indeed men, with almost everything that is wanted in kind, and to give the smallest amount of money to the officers. I have, however, on many occasions made comparisons between the relative cost of the officers of the Indian army and those of the British army, and I have come to the very decided opinion that it is in no way either more economical, or more efficient, to supply the officers with articles in kind, in contradistinction to giving them silver. My own belief is strong, that if you look to the relative cost of the troops in the Colonies, you will find, taking China, Ceylon, and perhaps the Mauritius (those three places I can speak of), that the relative cost of the troops there is below the average cost of European troops in India. If the Committee will permit me, I will ask them to receive this statement; it is one that has been printed in a paper which has been laid before Parliament, and it is very desirable that you should have an official statement, and not my bare opinion; it is one taken from the Report of the Military Finance Department, made by my successor, after I left India. It is one of the best statements, next to the French, that I have ever seen given with regard to the cost of the European troops; it has also a short summary of the cost of native troops; the whole of the data are stated in this Report in the Colonies, and as it will serve as a model in other respects, I will hand it in. It is with regard to the cost of troops in India itself, but it involves a portion of the troops serving in the Straits of Burmah.

3771. Does it show the distinction?—No, it does not show the distinction; it takes the Indian establishment as a whole; the average cost per man both for European and Native troops is given. I put this in with regard to the statement which you have annually placed before you in the War Office Estimates; from that statement so placed before Parliament, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain any information with regard to the real cost of troops in the Colonies. You have not any figures given you with regard to the numbers in the Colonies, and therefore you are at a loss to guess what proportion the different charges bear to the numbers of the different arms and branches of the service. Now I would particularly refer to Hong Kong, for instance; that is a Colony of a very extensive nature. I can speak of the barracks that I saw myself, at the time when I passed through from Shanghai, 20 years ago. The chief engineer invited me to inspect the barracks for the officers, and I was struck with the cost to the Government of those quarters for officers. The contrast was the greater, because at that very time a regiment of native infantry was stationed at Hong Kong, and the officers were receiving Indian allowance and tentage, which covered the house rent. I satisfied myself that, taking the relative systems of paying in money and providing quarters, the money system is infinitely the more economical to the Government. Mixing, as I did for a few days, with the officers of the native infantry, I found them infinitely more comfortable than they could be in the apparently fine barracks supplied to the officers of the European force.

3772. Can you state whether the officers at that time in the European force were placed on Indian pay and allowances?—It was in that year that an effort was made to withdraw the native troops from China, on purpose to bring back the troops stationed there to the English system of supplying them in kind. I did, on my arrival in this country, express a strong opinion that they would do that infinitely more economically by the change than they would by giving the officers the allowances they had been accustomed to get in India.

3773. Living at the Colonies, especially in China, is becoming very expensive, and no doubt the

the pay of the officers is far below what would enable them to live comfortably, is it not?—Yes; at all those settlements the expense of living is exceedingly high; I first went out to Singapore in the year 1826; living was very high, so much so that the Government were forced to give, in addition to the Indian allowances, the island allowance to aid the officers; in China particularly no one can mix with the merchants without seeing their great luxury and wealth, and the expenditure they incur, and the consequence is that the officers of the English army appear at a great disadvantage in contrast with the society in which they move.

3774. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] Will you state to the Committee the amount of the island allowance?—I have got a table of that, showing the scale: a subaltern has 120 rupees for island allowance at Singapore, but from that they deduct what they call the tentage, leaving therefore 70 rupees in excess of what he had before received; the net allowance is 70 rupees for a subaltern, or nearly 8 *l.* at that time, but it is not more than 7 *l.* now; then the island allowance is 105 rupees, or 10 *l.* 10 *s.* for a captain, and 130 rupees for a major, that is in addition to the other sum.

3775. Major *Anson.*] You do not think that adopting the Indian system in those Colonies where the English officer is considerably underpaid now would lead to a large additional expense in maintaining our troops?—No; on the contrary, I believe that you would indirectly save money in many ways; for instance, with regard to the staff and the establishments, those especially bring up the cost of the army, and not the money which you may reasonably give either to the officers or to the men. In the East, especially where you must have establishments and followers, the establishments swell up the expenses; in any case you might safely give the money whenever you can possibly reduce the establishment. Let me remind the Committee that the Ceylon expenditure at the present moment is very much based on the Indian one; in fact, the Ceylon expenditure of the present day is simply converting the various allowances given in India to the troops originally located in that island into a round sum; the relative position of the officers in Ceylon and the officers in India is very much the same.

3776. What are the allowances given to the officers in the Mauritius in addition to the ordinary pay?—There was formerly an allowance which was a little more than in Ceylon, which has been lately changed in consequence of the island having ceased to contribute to the direct support of the troops, and the whole of the money which the islands, both Ceylon and the Mauritius, now pay is paid direct into the Imperial Treasury. I cannot tell you what they are, but they have been very much reduced; and I am very sorry to say that the officers have been obliged to shut up the mess at the Mauritius in consequence of that reduction; I think a measure of that kind interfering with what is so necessary for the well-being of a regiment is very deeply to be regretted, and any saving which the Government may fancy they would make does not counterbalance the great evil of changing the regimental system of the army.

3777. A great deal has been said with regard to our troops in the Colonies being used as a reserve for India; and great stress has been laid before this Committee upon the fact that in the year 1857 they obtained reinforcements from those Colonies in time to assist in the suppression of the mutiny; can you state whether the troops which they received in India started first from England, or from the Cape of Good Hope, in the year 1857, in consequence of the mutiny?—My impression is strong, and the dates would confirm or gainsay it, that the assistance was first started from this country; and if I remember rightly, the troops from this country actually arrived there before the troops from the Cape of Good Hope. It would seem ungrateful to say that the troops from the Cape were of no use, because it has been recorded that they were of great use; but my conviction is strong that the necessary assistance could have been obtained from this country to the full extent required.

3778. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] You do not mean to say that the troops from the Mauritius and Ceylon did not arrive in India before the troops which were sent out from this country?—I said the Cape of Good Hope. I omitted Ceylon; they took away the 37th Regiment from Ceylon.

3779. Major *Anson.*] Do you recollect what the garrison of the Cape was at that time?—The garrison of the Cape at the time of the Indian mutiny was between 4,000 and 6,000 men, if I recollect rightly.

3780. It was 11,000, was it not?—It was very strong at all events; I know that they parted with the troops with the greatest possible ease.

3781. But if they could only spare three regiments from the Cape at that time, with a force of 11,000, it is not likely that they would be able to send a very large reinforcement at the present time to India, supposing that anything happened to call for that reinforcement, with only a garrison of 4,000 men?—My conviction is very strong that really you ought not to lock up a single soldier in any one of those places for any emergencies in India. I think that India should provide for itself, and, in fact, that all those Colonies, China and Singapore, and all those places, ought to have a force sufficient to overcome any risings which might be expected to take place.

3782. It seems almost absurd, does it not, that a great power like India should depend for its safety upon reinforcements from small Colonies scattered all over the world?—All that I have observed in the administration of Indian affairs proves that they can make their own arrangements. Moreover, I will say this (and the past history of India proves it), that India has given fully as much support to the Imperial Government in carrying out the measures which they have ordered as those islands have ever given to India. I do not believe myself that you could have carried on the operations in China without assistance from India.

3783. I gather from your evidence that you are decidedly of opinion that the neck of the mutiny in the year 1857 was broken before a single soldier arrived in India from abroad?—Decidedly so; it has not been so broadly asserted as that, because it looks as if you were denying to this country the credit of the assistance which was given; but looking at the events at Delhi, and the noble stand which that small band of soldiers made, and looking at the success of their operations, I think the capture of Delhi in September 1857 was the greatest blow which the discontented population received in India. At all events, I can speak for Hyderabad; that

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was the most dangerous part of the empire except Delhi; and the fall of Delhi entirely prevented any designs at Hyderabad being carried out there, which an immense number of Arabs and bands of armed men had always entertained against our power to be put in force at some day or other.

3784. Lord *William Hay.*] When did the first regiment land in Calcutta?—The Madras Fusiliers were the first to get there, and the 37th Regiment was the next, I think.

3785. I mean from abroad?—The 37th Regiment came from Ceylon, and that was the one that succeeded the Fusiliers.

3786. When did they arrive?—The Fusiliers could not possibly have got there before the middle of June.

3787. Colonel *Percy Herbert.*] When did the regiments of the China expedition arrive?—I do not think they got there before the end of August 1857.

3788. Lord *William Hay.*] Did not their arrival have a material influence on the issue of the mutiny, by holding in check the rebels in the South of India; in Gwalior, for instance?—Not, certainly, Gwalior, because that contingent came down upon us from Cawnpore.

3789. Not until some time after the fall of Delhi?—The question asked of me was this: Was not the neck of the mutiny broken by the means then existing in India; and I say, Yes.

3790. Yes; but the neck of the mutiny was broken by the fall of Delhi, was it not?—Yes.

3791. The arrival of those troops from abroad began long before the fall of Delhi, and must have had a good effect, must it not?—In trampling down the mutiny, and putting out the embers of it, no doubt. The satisfactory state which India was brought to in the year 1860, was occasioned by the arrival of an immense force from England. It quenched every effort made by the different native chiefs to keep up opposition to us.

3792. But what I mean is this; did not several regiments arrive from abroad long before it can be said that the neck of the mutiny was broken?—I hold that the fall of Delhi was the breaking of the neck of the mutiny; it thrilled throughout the country.

3793. That was on the 14th of September?—It came to Madras while I was there, and they felt the throbs of it throughout the empire.

3794. But the first regiment arrived in June or July?—They had no effect on the fall of Delhi; but I should wish to say that the troops that came from England were of course invaluable to India.

3795. Major *Anson.*] The reason why I ask that question is, that although those troops from the Colonies had been used on a great emergency for India, you consider that the emergency was over in India by the time they got there in 1857?—I quite agree to that. I never heard up to that time that troops were maintained for that purpose in the Colony. I have never seen any Indian officer or administrator who ever entertained that idea; the idea has been prevalent since the mutiny, but it did not exist before; and I think it is a military mistake to make arrangements for the Colonies, so as to provide for events in India.

3796. There is no doubt that altering the destination of the troops that were then on their way to China was very useful for India; but do you not consider that it may have had a very bad effect on the minds of the Chinese?—At the time I thought so. My experience leads me to say that any signs of weakness that we have ever shown in the management of our affairs with respect to that country have always been a cause of great trouble to us. I do not say that now for the first time, because in 1847, when Lord Palmerston wished me to return to China, and offered me great inducements, I refused to go back, unless the Government made up their minds to come to a distinct understanding with the Chinese with regard to Canton. If the Government in the year 1847 had resolutely come to a determination that they would not allow the mismanagement of the Chinese to exist any longer, that would have given me the power to carry out what I was commissioned myself to do, and the subsequent danger by our disputes with the Chinese would not have happened. The necessary thing in China is never to show any signs of weakness. Whatever threats you make you should well consider them first; but having made those threats, you should enforce them to the fullest extent. I have no doubt when the Chinese heard that we could not send troops, then with all the Asiatic conceit which that fine nation has, they supposed that we were reduced to great weakness, and we have many enemies in China who are quite willing to make that plain to the Chinese.

3797. Do you think it would be of more use to India itself, if you were able to send your native troops to those Colonies than to have European troops there on the chance of their being brought to India in case of emergency?—I have always considered that the sending away of native troops on foreign service from India may be made beneficial in the highest degree to the discipline of the native army. I mentioned in my last day's evidence, that I was anxious in the extreme to have a larger European force as a component part of the Indian army, and that I thought it would be useful in training up the officers to that kind of discipline which is necessary in European regiments. I would say that the necessity of attending to the sepoys on foreign service is so much greater when abroad than in India, that if you can get officers to attend to their duties in that respect, you would add very much to their knowledge, and enable them to enforce discipline more strictly than ever. I would like, for my own character as much as anything, to explain that there is a remark in a reply of Colonel Merewether's which is exceedingly applicable to native troops. It is that you require to have strict discipline for native troops. He is an officer who has had peculiar opportunities of judging; he has been all his life on foreign service in Scinde. And the discipline which General Jacobs introduced into his fine force was very much the same kind of discipline that you require to have on foreign service. I would strongly advise that, as giving the Indian army a wider field; the more widely you can spread their services, the more likely they are to be efficient.

3798. Any shortcomings, or any laxity in their discipline, is more likely to be observed by taking them out of the sphere of Indian life, and putting them elsewhere?—Yes; and I would say, from having been an adjutant for many years of a native battalion of Artillery, that with the European troops any laxity becomes apparent in a very short time. In India, on the contrary, with

with the sepoys, that laxity may remain for months smouldering, and never become visible until something takes places of a violent nature. But on foreign service it is not possible to happen without its being as quickly brought to notice as it is with regard to European troops.

3799. Do you not think that we ought to look on the discipline of the army in India with as much anxiety, if not more anxiety, than we look on the discipline of the army at home?—It has been a source of regret to see with what indifference that fine army of India has been hitherto regarded. There has been a jealousy and an indifference, which, considering our Asiatic power and the immense importance to this country of India, and the dangers which are coming upon us from Russia, it has been a matter of deep regret to many who have considered the subject, to see with what indifference the sepoy army is looked at.

3800. You do not anticipate any difficulty whatever in employing those troops, judging from the manner in which they have been before this employed in foreign countries, do you?—I cannot myself enter into the doubts and hesitation which I observe are entertained by many; but the fact is, that I am a Madras officer myself, and I have never seen reason to expect any difficulty. I have had, as adjutant, as heavy trials as most adjutants to provide men for foreign service. I have even been obliged to force poor fellows who have returned for a few months, to go back again for foreign service; I made them every compensation of, course. But with regard to these difficulties, the remarks of the Marquis of Tweeddale's excellent Minute apply. That Minute, which has been moved for lately, gives full information connected with the Madras army for more than 100 years, and except in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, the armies have never been found wanting; I took up the only Return laid before Parliament that I could find, and I would present to you here the number of Madras and Bombay troops that were on foreign service at the time of the mutiny; namely, 20,670 native non-commissioned officers, and men. That will show the extent to which those armies were taken at that time for foreign duties.

3801. Will you mention the sum total in any one year?—That was on the 1st of April 1857; we had then 20,670 native troops employed out of India on that day. I have merely extracted this myself; it is subject to correction, but I believe it is correct enough to be received by this Committee, if not perfectly correct.

3802. Without reference to the extent to which that proposal is carried and leaving that to the Executive, you think that the principle ought to be enforced?—I think so, in any of those Colonies. In those seas, you might with great propriety entertain the idea of occupying them partly by native troops; in fact, as we have hitherto been doing in the Straits.

3803. With regard to those Straits, the honourable Member for Oxfordshire asked you a question, if you had heard when it was proposed to raise a regiment of Indian troops for the Straits Settlements, that the authorities in this country had to reduce an equivalent number of men from the English army; is not it the fact, that before we took over the Straits Settlements the whole of the military expenditure of the Straits was found by itself?—The accounts of the Straits Settlements, after paying all the civil charges of every kind, showed a sum of money as a surplus which has been hitherto considered fully equal to the expenses of the troops located there; and I have no doubt myself, that if those Straits Settlements had been called upon to pay directly the money into the military treasury, the surplus would have been sufficient to pay those charges.

3804. When we took over the government of the Straits Settlements, I think we also made them pay the sum total of their military expenditure, did we not?—I am told that the sum which has been calculated is 59,900 *l.*; it is within a fraction of 60,000 *l.*; but I have no hesitation in saying that if a garrison to the extent which I see named in this paper is supplied to those Straits, you will not pay that garrison, or anything like it; it is three batteries of artillery, the wing of a regiment, and eight companies, I think, of the Ceylon Rifle Corps.

3805. Was not that done by way of not incurring any extra expense for the garrison of Singapore?—That was the ground on which it was done; but I repeat to you that I think the garrison would certainly cost much more than the available revenues in the Straits.

3806. But if that is the possibility on which we are going, how came it that, because they raised a certain number of men for service in the Straits Settlements which the Straits Settlements were to pay for, we reduced a certain number of men in the English army which this country was to pay for?—That is a political question which I cannot answer; but having regard to the result of the inquiries on the Recruiting Commission last year, I would strongly submit that you have never been denuded to such a great degree as you are now; and so far from reducing the army it would be better to consider how you could collect your forces now in hand, instead of spreading them all over the world in settlements which are totally unworthy of being occupied by European troops. I would not send a single man more than Mr. Crauford asked for. He is a man of great experience and of great knowledge, passing over an immense number of years; a man who formed Singapore, and who knows it from the time it was a jungle. All he asked for was 200 European artillerymen to occupy the forts, and an undertaking on behalf of the people of Singapore that they would provide efficient constabulary, organised and equipped in an efficient manner, so as to relieve the European troops from every ordinary duty, and simply require their presence in the forts, as rallying points in case of any unexpected emergency. With all his knowledge of the Malay character, he considered that that army was sufficient for the purpose.

3807. You know, I suppose, that we have increased the garrison at Ceylon by the wing of a regiment at Point de Galle?—Yes.

3808. Do you not think it probable that the fact of their sending European soldiers to the Straits Settlements gave them an excuse for finding that it was necessary to have a European garrison at Point de Galle?—I believe it was in consequence of sending a European force to Singapore that the troops in Ceylon were increased. I have never been able to understand the necessity of increasing the force in Ceylon.

3809. For purely garrison purposes, such as the troops have to do with in the Mauritius say, in times of peace there would not be the slightest necessity to increase the garrison, would there,

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because you substitute a regiment of natives for a regiment of Europeans?—On the contrary, I believe that if you leave the Mauritius and Ceylon to do that which General Peel so wisely recommended in the year 1859,—that the Colonies shall be called on to say what force they would wish, and if they objected to contribute to the expenses in some fixed proportion,—you would find in the Mauritius and Ceylon that the colonists would voluntarily offer to reduce the force. I believe, if you left the Mauritius to themselves, and said, "What military force would you like, and you will have to pay one-third or one-fourth of the expense?" that instead of having 2,000 men, they would be content with only 500.

3810. For the work which they would have to do in case of war, do you consider that a mixed native and European force would not form an efficient garrison?—I think that would be quite equally efficient. Supposing Sir John Burgoyne's view of the defence of the Mauritius is correct, and that you require 6,000 men for that little spot in the Indian Ocean, I am perfectly satisfied that a better force you could not have, or one more suitable for the island and more suitable for the supplies, than having a mixed garrison. First of all, the population themselves would be useful to the native troops in many ways; the supplies obtainable in the island would be exceedingly useful; but I do not believe myself, that you could ever occupy the Island of Mauritius a single month, unless you had command of the sea. The Island of Mauritius is fed almost week by week; so little is cultivation carried on, that supplies are poured in from Madagascar and the Cape, and all parts. The garrison, taken as a garrison only, would be starved in a fortnight.

3811. You have expressed your opinion that any system which you would think advisable in times of war, ought to be carried out in times of peace?—I should say certainly, in all parts, both England and India, you ought to have as few changes, when a war breaks out, as possible.

3812. Especially in dealing with the difficult question of what the army of India may have been accustomed to; I suppose that making a change in the duties which they have been accustomed to, would be a very dangerous experiment?—Yes, the less stir, the less anxiety, and the less change you make, the better; the more you make it a matter of regular routine the better it is for the Asiatic, because, whenever you stir his mind up, he begins to form ideas opposite to your own.

3813. Do you see any very great objection to employing the native soldiers; I will not say constantly, but merely so as to give them an idea that they might be called on to serve, say, in Malta or Gibraltar?—I have never served at Malta in that way, but I would rather not. If operations had to be carried on in Egypt, you could scarcely employ a more suitable force than that of 20,000 or 30,000 sepoys; in fact, I have had men serving under my orders, who have been employed in Egypt under General Baird, and they spoke in no way whatever of its being an extraordinary country; they seem to take it as a matter of course. In fact, the system which we pursue in India of very early parades in the morning, was carried on in Egypt in the same manner; I have known officers who had served in Egypt, and they spoke of it as a matter of course. The difficulties which they described of going up the Red Sea we have of course overcome now, but there was nothing particularly different in the service in Egypt from the service in India.

3814. It has been argued that, if you were to employ those men in times of peace, you would also employ them in times of war; but if you let the General Service Act fall into abeyance for a certain number of years, do you not consider that you might have some difficulty with the native troops?—I have been reading the evidence which has been given before this Committee, and I am at a loss to understand how, in the face of this general order, issued in the year 1856, it can possibly be argued that you have not the right to send the native troops on foreign service. I hold in my hand the general order which was issued on the 25th of July 1856. It is a very comprehensive order indeed, and in fact it recites the conditions under which the Bengal Sepoys had formerly served, and that it is not desirable that the Madras and Bombay army should not be allowed on any condition to furnish troops for foreign service.

3815. *Chairman.*] Will you kindly read the operative clauses of that order?—The operative clauses are: "It has been the practice of the Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond the sea; and, therefore, whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart. It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the Native Artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of Native Infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th, and 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited. The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, wherever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India. Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps to serve beyond sea. The readiness with which they have done this is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government. But it has become very inconvenient to Government, and it is hurtful to the State, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the State beyond sea, and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service. For this reason, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of Light Cavalry, of Irregular Cavalry, of Infantry of the Line, or for the Khelak-i-Ghilzie, Ferozepore, and Loodianah regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not, at the time of his enlistment, distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company, or beyond them." With this order before me,

me, it has appeared to me very strange that any hesitation should ever be expressed. The fact is, there was a very injudicious system, which Lord Strathnairn referred to, of forming volunteer regiments for service beyond the seas; and on every occasion when the Government wanted men to go, the first consideration was promotion; it was very beneficial for the native army of Bengal that those promotions should take place; and hence it is that you have never been wanting in the Bengal army of volunteers. The five regiments which went to Java were promoted because they had been kept on service too long.

3816. But you think that is a bad system, because it implies that you cannot force them to go, if you wish it?—As a soldier, I object decidedly that you should ever be placed in a position to have to solicit the will of the soldier. If the officers are not to command, it is better to be without an army; but Lord Strathnairn's evidence on that point is of great importance. He thought it objectionable that you should select a few volunteer regiments, as was proposed, because at other times you would not be able to command the service of our other regiments.

3817. Do you consider that the late proposal to raise troops for China and the Straits Settlements as a distinct service would also have a very bad effect with regard to the native troops, looking upon the service as binding?—To go and raise special regiments as has been proposed is, in my opinion, highly objectionable. I had a proposal before me to raise a regiment for Singapore, and I strongly advised Lord Canning's Government not to accept it. I handed up a statement of the relative cost, and I showed that there was no advantage, so far as money went; that I could not see how it was possible to carry on a good system of discipline, having regiments constantly kept in the Straits. When I first went to the Straits, the first thing I saw was a great number of men in the local regiments undergoing corporal punishment, that state of things arising simply from a want of discipline. I have never been able to recommend any system by which you localise regiments. I think the Indian army, with some 150 native regiments, is capable of supplying a good force without the necessity of raising special corps.

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3818. *Chairman.*] Is there anything that you wish to add to your evidence?—I wish to refer the Committee to two minutes of Lord Dalhousie's and one of Lord Canning's, which bear on the same question. There is a strange force in the remarks of the Committee of 1853, and it is important in this light, that the distrust which so many statesmen have entertained with regard to deprivation of the means for the defence of India is very strongly marked there, and these reports are very little known. Colonel Herbert asked me a question with regard to relative cost in the United Kingdom and abroad, at different dates. I have prepared a table for January 1865: the honourable Member said I had done it for the 1st of June; it is my habit not to prepare statements that tell in my favour, but this new statement tells more in favour of my argument than the other did. This statement appears to me to be very important, as showing how we are scattering our troops at this moment, and how necessary it is that attention should be given to that subject (vide *Appendix*). Colonel Herbert also asked me a question with regard to the relative cost of the officers in reference to the other ranks. My argument went to the fact that the present organisation was a most expensive one, and that the changes now making were not beneficial. I have done what the honourable Member desired; I have taken the 53 regiments that were in India in 1865–66 from official papers, showing the whole cost of those 53 regiments. So far as the direct payment of money made to the regiments, irrespective of rations, clothing, and barracks, and other articles contributed by the Government goes, the whole cost is as nearly as possible 2,000,000 *l.* sterling. The pay of the officers is 92 lacs of rupees. The direct pay of non-commissioned officers and men is 75 lacs of rupees; that also bears on the evidence which I have given with regard to the point that I have always found that economy is the result of true efficiency.

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QUESTIONS.

1. WHAT is your opinion as to the expediency of substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in time of peace?

2. State in which of our Colonial possessions you would propose to employ them.

3. Have you any special knowledge, from residence, of the Colonies referred to by you?—If so, state it.

4. If it were determined to employ natives of India for service in the following Colonies, what races would be best adapted for such a duty :—

a. South Africa.
b. Mauritius.
c. Ceylon.
d. Straits Settlements.
e. China.
f. Malta.
g. Gibraltar.
h. West Indies.
i. New Zealand.

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5. What arrangements with respect to reliefs would be necessary, supposing them to be employed in any of the Colonies named in the last question?

6. State whether there are any special difficulties that would hinder the races you have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea, either in respect to religious prejudices or social habits; and whether those difficulties are insuperable in their nature, or could be overcome by an increase of the advantages offered to the soldier?

7. What amount of pay and other advantages, over and above those at present enjoyed by the soldiers of the native Indian army, would, in your opinion, be necessary to procure native troops for such a service?

8. Would native Indian troops be a sufficient garrison in the above-named Colonies in time of peace—

a. Wholly unsupported by British troops?
b. Supported by British garrison artillery only?
c. If not, what proportion of British infantry would be necessary to support them?

9. Would they afford thus entirely, or partially unsupported, sufficient protection to the Cape Colony against the frontier tribes; or against internal disturbances in the following Colonies:—

a. South Africa.
b. Mauritius.
c. Ceylon.
d. Hong Kong.
e. West Indies.

10. What is your opinion of the expediency of employing Indian troops in these Colonies in time of war, either in substitution for Europeans or as a supplement to them?

11. Could they be sufficiently relied upon for such a service as materially to lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war?

12. Would they be capable of protecting the above Colonies against an attack by a civilised Power as adequately as the existing garrisons? And if not, in what proportion do you think that it would be necessary to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons in order to attain that object?

13. In case of pressure at home, would it be more advantageous to withdraw European regiments that might be wanted in England, from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India, or to withdraw them from India?

14. Would the effect of garrison service in these Colonies in time of peace upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier after his return to India be advantageous, or otherwise?

15. Would it be better—

a. In the interests of India—
b. In the interests of the Colonies above named—

to take for such a service regiments from the native Indian army according to their turn; or to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service?

16. Are you of opinion that the presence of British troops in neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of an emergency?

17. State from what Colonies troops could be withdrawn in such a case; and whether it would be easier to obtain reinforcements from England than from those Colonies.

18. Would Indian troops, in your judgment, be more efficient for the protection of—

a. South Africa,
b. Mauritius,
c. Ceylon,
d. Hong Kong,
e. West Indies,

against either external or internal danger, than troops locally raised from the native populations in or near those Colonies; and would their greater efficiency, if any, counterbalance the greater cost which the transport of the Indian troops from India would involve?

19. Do native soldiers recruited since 1856 believe that they are practically liable to service beyond seas; and if not, would it be desirable to enforce the obligation imposed upon them by their present terms of enlistment?

20. If so, do you think the present a favourable moment for effecting such a change?

21. Now that India belongs to the Crown, do you think that the native army would draw a distinction between service in Aden and Burmah, and the Mauritius and China; and, if so, what distinction would they draw?

22. Give, so far as you know them, any cases of discontent that have come to your knowledge in consequence of the employment of native soldiers on Colonial duty or beyond the seas, whether in territories belonging to the Government of India for the time being or to the Crown, and give the causes of such discontent.

23. State whether you think that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would tend to give to it more of the character and feeling of an Imperial army; and whether, in your opinion, such a result would be desirable.

24. Would it be possible, or desirable, to recruit from the native population of the Colony in which you reside, regiments for general service?

25. State your opinion as to the policy of employing, either in India or in the Colonies, troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian, distinguishing between considerations of a military, civil, and political character.

ANSWERS.

ANSWERS of the Right Hon. Sir *J. L. Lawrence*, Bart., G.C.B., Viceroy and Governor General of India.

1. I THINK that this would only be expedient to a very moderate extent, and ought to be limited to colonies of an oriental climate and type. Considering how few are the English troops in such colonies, I would rather advocate that these troops should be in addition to, than in substitution for, the English troops, so as to enable the authorities to keep the latter in the most salubrious positions, and to save them from as much exposure in times of peace as may be practicable.

2. In time of peace, I would only employ native troops, if actually required, in the Straits Settlements and in China; but, as a temporary measure, during war, they might also be sent to Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Northern Coast of Africa, the Coast of Arabia, and Egypt.

3. I have very little personal knowlege of the colonies, but I have been at the Cape and in Ceylon.

4. I do not advocate the sending Indian troops to any places except those which I have named; but if it be decided to employ such troops in any, or all of the colonies mentioned, I am of opinion that the most suitable races would be Mahomedans, such as the Beloochees of Sind, the Pathans of the interior of the Punjab and of the Punjab frontier, the Mahomedans of the interior of the Punjab and of the North-west Provinces. All should be volunteers for the special duty.

I do not think that men of the Hindoo races, such as Seikhs, Ghorkas, Rajpoots, Brahmins, or the like, are well suited for colonial service; but if any volunteered for such service, and were in all respects fitted for the duties of a soldier, I would not reject them.

I mention Mahomedans as best suited for colonial service, because they have no religious or social prejudices against going across the seas; and they can also readily accommodate themselves to the circumstances of a foreign life. Hindoos, on the other hand, have a strong feeling against travelling by sea, and have many difficulties and prejudices to overcome in so doing. In other respects, the Seikh, from his martial qualities and strong constitution, is well adapted to a colonial life.

I have no doubt, however, that many Mahomedans and Seikhs would volunteer for colonial service; the want of military employment being very strongly felt in India, more particularly at the present time. I think, however, that gradually such service, in times of peace, would cease to be popular.

5. I think that all corps so employed should be relieved every three years. To do this, it would be necessary to have double the number of corps enlisted for such service, so that one corps might be in India near their homes, while another was in a colony, supposing that regiments specially raised for foreign service are only so employed.

6. I have already replied to this question; the difficulties of colonial service in the minds of native soldiers of India could, no doubt to a considerable extent, be overcome by increased advantages.

7. The native troops who went to China during the last war in that country received full rations free, besides Indian pay and full batta. A statement of the cost of a native infantry in China is attached to this paper, and the same scale would apply to any other colony. But I am not prepared to say that even this would make the service popular, particularly for troops raised expressly for this employment.

8. I would in no case place Indian troops in a colony without British soldiers. And I would not consider that British garrison artillery would suffice. The proportion of British troops to native soldiers should not be less than one-half, but rather more.

9. I consider that native troops, such as I have described, would afford sufficient protection to the Colonies named both from frontier tribes and internal enemies, when joined with British troops.

10. I would prefer employing native Indian troops in the Colonies in time of war, rather than in time of peace, if they were limited to those places I have named, and as a supplement to British troops.

11. Subject to my limitation, they might be relied on, to the extent suggested, if well managed and well commanded. But the extent of relief would scarcely be of consequence to the resources of Great Britain, if properly organised.

12. I do not consider that either a native garrison, or one composed partly of native and partly of British troops in a colony would be as effective against the attack of a civilised power as an equal number of British troops. On such occasions there would always be also more or less distrust of the native troops, which of itself would be a cause of weakness. On an expedition, on the contrary, a mixed force would, I believe, prove more efficient than if composed solely of English soldiers.

I could not say in what proportion a garrison should be increased when partly composed of native troops, so as to render it as effective as at present. This would of course depend on the quality of the native troops thus employed, their fighting qualities being so different.

13. It would not in my judgment be expedient to reduce the British troops either in India or in the Colonies to any appreciable extent, in the event of any pressure at home. In India, China, Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Straits Settlements, the circumstance that England was in danger would act on these countries and colonies. But South Africa and New Zealand ought, in such a contingency, to be able to spare a portion of their British troops, supplying their place by volunteers of English race.

With due deference I would here say that if England desires to retain a firm hold of her Asiatic and African Colonies in times of danger, and also to be safe at home, she must make adequate arrangements by wise measures for this object; she ought not to look to India or these Colonies for any important assistance, though no

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doubt the authorities in these countries would do all in their power loyally to assist her.

Of the two alternatives, it would probably be better to withdraw some British troops at such times from India than from colonies of an Oriental character. Much would, however, depend on the state of feeling at the time in India.

14. I do not think that the effect of garrison service in these colonies in time of peace would have much influence one way or the other on the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier. If well treated and contented, the general effect might be considered beneficial, otherwise the case would be reversed. I do not consider, however, that the result of service in a colony of a European population would be good, for the native soldier would there gradually learn a good deal to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and which might lessen his estimate of European institutions and habits. On the other hand, in a colony, the main population of which was Oriental, the evils which he would find would be similar in character to those which he was accustomed to in his own country.

15. It would be better for the colonies on the whole to raise regiments especially and exclusively for colonial service, rather than by turn to supply them from the Indian army generally,—

First. Because in that case the men would all be volunteers; and,

Secondly. Because, as a body, they would be better suited to such service. On the other hand, to the Government of India it would be convenient that these regiments, if few in number, were taken from the native Indian army. Hitherto the Madras army has furnished two regiments for the Straits, and the Bombay army for a time one, and sometimes two, for China.

16. I do not think that this is of much importance to the defence of India, if the country has a sufficient garrison of its own.

17. The only colonies which could readily supply British troops for India in an emergency would be Ceylon, China, and the Mauritius. But these colonies, perhaps, with the exception of the last-named one, with their present garrisons, could hardly with safety spare any appreciable body.

18. With a suitable proportion of British troops in each colony, I should consider that native troops raised in these colonies, or in their vicinity, in moderate numbers, ought to be more efficient for service in them, than Indian troops, but probably they would not be considered so trustworthy. Service in South Africa and the West Indies would surely prove very unpopular with Indian troops, and even in Hong Kong and Ceylon such service would in the long run be distasteful; but not to the extent that it would be in the other places.

19. I do not think that the native troops of this Presidency generally think that they are liable to service beyond seas, nor would it be desirable to enforce this obligation. On the contrary, it would in my opinion, be extremely imprudent to do so. General service, in their minds, means service on the continent of India and the adjoining countries.

20. This question is answered in the preceding one. I am not in favour of any change; but if one must be made, this is as good an opportunity as any other which is likely to occur.

21. The native troops in such a matter would not be influenced by the circumstance that India belongs to the Crown. Service in Aden and Burmah is employment in the vicinity of India; while service in the Mauritius and China is employment at a considerable distance from their own country, and, in the case of the Mauritius, a novelty. The number of native troops at Aden also is so small as hardly to be of any account.

22. The only case of the kind of which I have heard was at Java, shortly after the conquest of that island, during the war with France. The details I don't know; but I have understood that a good deal of discontent was at that time expressed by the Indian troops who were kept there in garrison. Indian troops from the Bengal Presidency have been so little employed beyond seas, that it is impossible to judge from actual occurrences what would be the effect of such employment on their minds. But these troops, as well as those of the old native army of Bengal, do not like service even in India and the adjacent countries at a long distance from their homes, more especially as regards the majority of the present army, in times of peace. Service in Burmah, in Assam, and even in Bengal Proper, is not popular among either the native soldiers of the Punjab and that border, or among those of Hindoostan. The Madras native soldier is much more accustomed to such service, and so are to some extent those of the Bombay Army; but even as regards the former, there has, in general, been a pressure put upon the authorities to bring back native regiments from China, as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities.

23. I do not think that such employment would have much effect in this way. I do not myself see what the native soldier is likely to gain by such employment.

24. This question does not appear to apply to India.

25. I am not in favour of employing Chinese, Malays, Africans, or other races not Indian, in India. Such troops would be very distasteful to our Indian troops, as showing our distrust of them, and as giving away to strangers employment which is much coveted by themselves; and it would not engender much confidence among our own countrymen. Of the different races enumerated, perhaps African soldiers would prove the most suitable. Such men, however, would probably become Mahomedans in course of time, and gradually fraternise more or less with those of India.

As regards the Colonies, perhaps a small number of Chinese and Malays might be employed with advantage in South Africa, and African troops in China and Ceylon. But I have little doubt that English Colonists, in times of commotion, would only repose confidence in British soldiers.

I have now replied, to the best of my ability, to the questions which have been put to me; but I think it right to add a few remarks bearing on this very important subject: first, as to the number and composition of the troops which are required for the secure tenure of India; and, secondly, as regards the policy of employing native Indian troops in British colonies.

On the first point, I am very strongly of opinion that no important reduction in the strength of the British force now allowed for India, would be politic. The actual returns of that force are now below 60,000 rank and file. We can, indeed,

deed, spare some Artillery, and one regiment of cavalry, and, if necessary, two regiments of infantry; but I would prefer retaining the latter.

For a few months, for an expedition in any emergency, we could manage to do without 3,000 or 4,000 British troops, but not more. In the event of a war in Europe, in which England was engaged, particularly if hardly pressed, no doubt the influence of such circumstances would extend to, and be felt in India.

No Asiatic or African troops could, with advantage, be substituted for any of the British troops; none could supply their place satisfactorily; on none would the confidence of Englishmen in India be placed in times of commotion and great danger. The British troops are necessary in India in considerable strength, not only for their fighting powers, but for the value of their very presence. They overawe our enemies, and give confidence to our friends and supporters. At all times have the European population in India been liable to sudden panics, and especially so since the mutiny of 1857. Such panics are, it is evident, calculated to do much mischief; they spread over India, and extend to Europe, and bring the Government of India into disrepute; they are only to be allayed by the presence of English troops in sufficient force, in good strategic and centrical positions.

It is, I consider, a very serious, but a very general error, that the number of native troops now maintained in India is much too large; and that, but for this system, the strength of the British troops could be largely reduced. This is undoubtedly a mistake. If we had fewer native troops in India, we must either overwork the English regiments, or add to their strength. No doubt the British troops act as a counterpoise to the native forces; but this is no evidence that we could do with much fewer of the latter.

The fact is, that the area of India is so vast and so diversified, its population so numerous, its frontier so extensive, and in many parts so accessible to predatory attack, that the number of British and native troops which are maintained for the security of our power in India, only suffice for the work, owing to the high qualities of these troops, the great efficiency of their equipment, the large resources at their command, and the beneficient character of the civil and political administration of the country. Even with these advantages, it must also be admitted, that the docile and gentle character of the mass of the population, and their general respect for authority have much to do with the success of our rule, and the order and obedience which are maintained.

It has been said that a British force of moderate strength could march from one end of India to another, with little danger of much opposition; and no doubt this is true; but to hold so great an area as we now do, to overawe and subject so mighty a population, even with the best system of government which may be practicable, must, in the nature of things, require what appears to be a large physical force.

The higher are the physical and moral qualities of our native troops, the more we draw on the northern races of India and the border countries for such soldiers, the more necessary it must be to have a fair proportion of English soldiers. On the other hand, if we prefer numbers to quality as regards the native troops, the case will hardly be different. It was mainly the great number of our native troops in 1857, the vast disproportion between them and the British troops, that led to that disastrous outbreak. As bearing on this question of the number and composition of the army required to hold India, I shall forward with my reply, copy of a memorandum which Colonel Norman, the Military Secretary to the Government of India has drawn up, in answer to a late work by Colonel Sir Henry Havelock. In Colonel Norman's views I fully concur. App. No. 1.

As regards the employment of Indian native troops in British Colonies, I do not think that much can be done with advantage. The climate of those peopled by English and European races would often prove ungenial and insalubrious. The social condition of things would also be quite unsuited to them. Neither would the English colonists like Indian troops, nor would these soldiers feel happy with such a population. The case would be different with people of the Oriental type; but in colonies of that kind, the distance from their homes, the long voyages which in most cases would be necessary, would greatly militate against the advantages of such service. While thus employed, the native soldier would long to visit his home. The want of military employment among the martial races of the country is now so great, that many will volunteer for such service, while I am by no means sure that it will long continue popular. On the whole, I would say, if such troops are required, their employment in the Colonies I have indicated, should be tried, in the first instance, at any rate, on a very moderate scale.

The mode in which native troops destined for colonial service shall be raised and officered, is a point of much importance. It would hardly be expedient that they should be entertained by officers who have little knowledge of the people of India, and practically independent of the Government of this country; while perhaps the opposite system would not be acceptable to the authorities in England.

Then, again, the officers of such corps should be men who have been accustomed to native troops, and who not only understand their language, but who have a sympathy and respect for them, and such officers would naturally expect to retain Indian pay and allowances; for these reasons, it will probably be the best course to take such regiments from the Government of India, rather than to raise regiments for such service, even though, on the whole, the quality of such troops may prove inferior to that which might be raised by careful selection.

Further, it must be borne in mind that we cannot spare permanently from India more than three or four native regiments; while that, if such regiments be raised especially for service beyond seas, we will have to reduce an equal number of native regiments, thus leading to discontent, as only one-half of the former should be at the same time in the colonies. Should the expense also of the new corps prove greater than that of the same number on the present Establishment in India, the Government of England ought to bear the additional cost.

Lastly, it is quite possible that some cause of discontent might give rise to ill-feeling among the native troops in the Colonies, which would certainly re-act very strongly on those in India, and might lead to the latter in their turn, demurring to embark for such service.

John Lawrence,
27 May 1867. Govr. Genl. of India

App. No. 1.

(No. 1500 B.)

Statement of the Cost of Sikh Troops in India.

Memorandum.

With reference to Military Department letter, No. 132, of 4th March last, and to Schedule No. 98, Case 1, the papers relating to which are herewith returned, the undersigned begs to submit the statements called for of the estimated cost of two Sikh regiments of the present established strength, if employed in China.

2. The cost during employment would be nearly the same, whether the regiments were taken from the regular establishment or specially raised for such service; the only difference would be, that in the latter case the bulk of the privates would be short-service men. In the non-effective charges this would be more than counterbalanced, as the amount of the gratuities payable on discharge would exceed the value of the pensions entailed by an ordinary term of service.

3. The actual amount payable in China, for the full strength employed in that country, is shown in Statement A., aggregating 5,68,626 rupees for the two regiments, and includes pay, extra batta, ration money, hutting money, and half-passage money, and also sea provisions to and fro.

4. This would give an average of *Rs.* 399. 3., or, say, in round numbers 400 rupees for each native commissioned or non-commissioned officer and private.

5. Statement B. shows the amount payable in India for the same body, for clothing, half-passage money, and sea provisions, &c., as also for the maintenance of a depôt for each regiment, equal to the strength of a company, so as to admit of the corps being kept at their full establishment abroad. The wear and tear of equipments is likewise included, based on the regulated period of duration, together with the cost of the annual supply of ammunition and medical stores.

6. The total of these charges is 1,76,979 rupees, which, for the full establishment, would give an average of *Rs.* 124. 2. per man, of all grades.

7. Lastly, Statement C. exhibits the non-effective charges; viz., an estimate of the proportion of pensions and gratuities fairly chargeable to the Imperial Government, as also transport charges in India, to and from port of embarkation, and extra furlough allowances for three months, a boon to which the men might be fairly considered entitled after a tour of foreign service, together with a sum of 5,000 rupees per regiment for contingencies. The total of these charges would be 24,011 rupees per regiment, or an average of *Rs.* 33. 7. per man.

8. The undersigned, on the foregoing data, would suggest that if the Imperial Government bore all the charges payable in China for pay, rations, hutting money, and half the passage money, and sea provisions included in Statement A., an annual capitation sum of 125 rupees per man on the average strength in China, for the effective services payable in India, and of 35 rupees for non-effective services, would cover all certain charges, and allow a fair margin for unforeseen contingencies, whilst such an arrangement would materially simplify the adjustment of the expenditure.

9. It will be noted that the establishment of European officers is in excess of that allowed in India, but it corresponds in a great measure to that which has been sanctioned on former occasions; viz., one officer per company in addition to the Staff.

10. As regards passage and hutting money, the calculation is made on a triennial relief; but, in addition to passage for the whole corps, passage to and fro annually for 10 per cent. of strength, to allow for men invalided and on sick leave and to replace them, has been provided for, as also for two European officers per regiment annually.

11. The rates assumed, and two-thirds those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which, it is considered, would afford a fair average, and cover the freight of clothing, ammunition, &c.; and the calculation has been made, that half of the passage money and sea provisions would be paid in China and half in India.

12. In the allowance for clothing, provision is made for a cost of trousers annually, as also for a pair of ankle boots, all of which may be considered as necessary for service in China.

13. The money ration has been calculated at the ordinary rate of *Rs.* 3. 8. for each fighting man, and *Rs.* 2. 8. for establishment followers.

(signed) *A. Broome*, Colonel,
Accountant General,
Military Department.

Military Department, Accountant's Branch,
7 January 1865.

ESTIMATE of the ANNUAL COST that would devolve upon the British Government by the Employment in *China* of the Two existing Regiments of *Sikh* Infantry.

STATEMENT (A.)

CHARGES payable in CHINA.

	Military Pay.	Staff Salary.	Total per Mensem for 1 Regiment.
I. European Officers:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Commandant	640 14 –	600 – –	1,240 14 –
1 Second in command	374 1 6	270 – –	644 1 6
1 Adjutant	225 12 –	200 – –	425 12 –
1 Quartermaster	225 12 –	150 – –	375 12 –
8 Doing-duty officers	225 12 –	100 – –	2,606 – –
1 Medical officer	– –	– –	600 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	– –	5,892 7 6

	Pay.	Extra Batta.	Total per Mensem for 1 Regiment.
II. Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men:			
8 { 2 Subadars	100 – –	15 – –	230 – –
8 { 2 - ditto	80 – –	15 – –	190 – –
8 { 4 - ditto	67 – –	15 – –	328 – –
8 { 4 Jemadars	35 – –	7 8 –	170 – –
8 { 4 - ditto	30 – –	7 8 –	150 – –
40 Havildars	14 – –	5 – –	760 – –
40 Naicks	12 – –	5 – –	680 – –
16 Drummers	7 – –	3 8 –	168 – –
600 { 100 Sepoys	9 – –	3 8 –	1,250 – –
600 { 200 ditto	8 – –	3 8 –	2,300 – –
600 { 300 ditto	7 – –	3 8 –	3,150 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	– –	9,376 – –

	Pay.	Extra Batta and Extra Allowance on Foreign Service.	Total per Mensem for 1 Regiment.
III. Educational Staff:			
1 Moonshee	20 – –	3 8 –	23 8 –
1 Grunthee	10 – –	3 8 –	13 8 –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	– –	37 – –
IV. Native Followers:			
1 Tindal	9 8 –	3 8 –	13 – –
4 Lascars	5 12 –	2 8 –	33 – –
16 Bhistees	5 – –	2 8 –	120 – –
8 Sweepers	4 – –	– –	32 – –
16 Cooks	5 – –	– –	80 – –
1 Chowdry	11 – –	3 8 –	14 8 –
1 Mutsuddy	5 – –	3 8 –	8 8 –
2 Weighmen	3 – –	3 8 –	13 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	– –	314 – –
V. Medical and Hospital Establishment:			
2 Native doctors { 1 on	20 – –	5 – –	45 – –
2 Native doctors { 1 on	15 – –		
2 Cooks	4 – –	1 – –	10 – –
2 Bhistees	4 – –	1 – –	10 – –
1 Head sweeper	6 – –	1 – –	7 – –
4 Sweepers	4 – –	1 – –	20 – –
1 Goorgah	4 – –	1 – –	5 – –
1 Shop coolie	5 – –	1 – –	6 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	– –	103 – –

	Rates.	Total per Mensem for 1 Regiment.
VI. Contract and other Allowances:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Adjutant's allowance	50 – –	50 – –
8 Company payment allowance	20 – –	160 – –
1 Repair of camp equipage	25 – –	25 – –
1 School shed	5 – –	5 – –
1 Butts and targets	4 – –	4 – –
1 Subadar major's allowance	25 – –	25 – –
1 Drill havildar	5 – –	5 – –
1 Drill naick	2 8 –	2 8 –
8 Pay havildars	5 – –	40 – –
8 Colour havildars	2 – –	16 – –
1 Drum major	7 – –	7 – –
1 Fife major	5 – –	5 – –
1 Mess allowance	100 – –	100 – –
1 Band	100 – –	100 – –
Order of merit pay	50 – –	50 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	594 8 –
Ration Money:		
712 Native commissioned and non-commissioned rank and file	3 8 –	2,492 – –
56 Non-combatants	2 8 –	140 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	2,632 – –
Field establishment of dooley bearers	– –	488 – –
Half-passage money to and fro for two officers annually	– –	1,480 – –
Ditto, for 10 per cent. sick annually	– –	8,540 – –
Board ship provision equipment for ditto	– –	1,450 – –
TOTAL Annual Expenditure for 1 Regiment *Rs.*	– –	2,44,713 10 –
Hutting Money:		
8 Subadars	30 – –	240 – –
8 Jemadars	15 – –	120 – –
80 Havildars and naicks	10 – –	800 – –
616 Drummers and sepoys	3 – –	1,848 – –
Non-combatants	– –	160 – –
Half of passage money to and from for an entire regiment, to be relieved every three years	– –	1,01,164 – –
Board ship provision and equipment for ditto	– –	14,470 – –
TOTAL *Rs.*	– –	1,18,802 – –
Proportion for 1 Year	– –	39,600 – –
GRAND TOTAL of Annual Charges for 1 Regiment, payable in China	– –	2,84,313 10 –
Ditto - ditto - for 2 Regiments *Rs.*	– –	5,68,626 4 –

ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost that would devolve upon the British Government, &c.—*continued.*

STATEMENT (B.)

	Rate.	Total.
Clothing:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
8 Subadars	17 – 9	136 6 –
8 Jemadars	15 15 4	127 10 8
40 Havildars	11 2 –	445 – –
40 Naicks	9 – 10	362 1 4
1 Drum major	14 12 11	14 12 11
1 Fife major	11 2 –	11 2 –
614 Drummers and sepoys	9 – 4	5,538 12 8
Boots for all ranks	5 – –	3,560 – –
TOTAL – – – *Rs.*	– –	10,195 13 7
Half-passage money for two officers annually	– –	1,480 – –
Half-passage money for 10 per cent. sick annually	– –	8,540 – –
Board ship provision and equipment for ditto	– –	1,450 – –
Proportion of passage money for one year for the whole corps	– –	33,721 – –
Ditto – of board ship provision and equipment	– –	4,823 – –
TOTAL – – – *Rs.*	– –	50,014 – –
Depôt Charges:		
1 Lieutenant in charge	325 12 –	325 12 –
1 Subadar	80 – –	80 – –
1 Jemadar	35 – –	35 – –
5 Havildars	14 – –	70 – –
5 Naicks	12 – –	60 – –
2 Drummers	7 – –	14 – –
75 Sepoys	7 – –	525 – –

	Rate.	Total.
Non-Combatants:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Lascar	5 12 –	5 12 –
2 Bhistees	5 – –	10 – –
2 Sweepers	4 – –	8 – –
2 Cooks	5 – –	10 – –
1 Mutsuddy	5 – –	5 – –
2 Weighmen	3 – –	6 – –
Medical and Hospital Establishment:		
1 Medical charge	30 – –	30 – –
1 Native doctor	20 – –	20 – –
1 Cook	4 – –	4 – –
1 Bhistee	4 – –	4 – –
1 Sweeper	4 – –	4 – –
1 Coolie	5 – –	5 –
Non-Effective Allowances:		
1 Company payment allowance	20 – –	20 – –
1 Repair of camp equipage	2 8 –	2 8 –
1 Butts and targets	4 – –	4 – –
1 Drill naick	5 – –	5 – –
1 Pay havildar	5 – –	5 – –
TOTAL Pay and Allowances of Depôt	– –	1,258 – –
Ditto – per annum – – – *Rs.*	– –	15,096 – –
Wear and tear of arms and accoutrements	– –	4,358 – –
Wear and tear of camp equipage	– –	428 – –
Annual expenditure of ammunition, &c.	– –	5,876 – –
Annual expenditure of medical stores	– –	1,352 – –
Clothing for depôt company	– –	1,170 – –
TOTAL of STATEMENT B. – – –	– –	88,489 13 7
TOTAL for 2 Corps – – – *Rs.*	– –	1,76,979 11 2

STATEMENT (C.)

	Annual Amount.
Non-Effective Charges:	*Rs. a. p.*
Pensions and gratuities	1,720 – –
Annual proportion of transport charges in India	11,573 – –
Ditto – – – of three months' leave, pay to the corps on relief after three years	5,718 – –
Contingencies	5,000 – –
TOTAL of STATEMENT (C.)	24,011 – –
TOTAL for 2 Corps – – – – – *Rs.*	48,022 – –

(signed) *A. Broome*, Colonel,
Accountant General, Military Department.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel *Norman* on Sir Henry Havelock's Book, referred to in Reply to the 25th Question. App. No. 1.

THE object of that portion of Sir Henry Havelock's book which relates to India is to show,—

I.—That we have too many British troops in India under any circumstances; but that the reduction which is now feasible could be carried to a greater extent by substituting a force of mounted riflemen for some of our present troops; and in arguing on this matter he assumes that we maintain our present force of British soldier here to provide a reserve force for England.

II.—That by adopting his views, India would be held not only more cheaply than at present, but in far more security. Sir Henry actually asserting (*see* page 31) that the establishment of a body of mounted riflemen in sufficient numbers would secure us at once and for ever against the contingency of another revolt in India; and the sufficient numbers are elsewhere shown to mean about 7,890 men.

III.—That the saving of expense by adopting his proposals would enable England to maintain a reserve force at home.

IV.—That the native army in India is too large, and should be reduced.

In drawing out these arguments, Sir Henry falls into various errors which seriously damage their force, while, on other grounds, his views appear unsound on several points.

I will not allude here to his system of a home reserve, or of special enlistments for India (*see* page 15); but the latter would be of difficult application as the roster and even periods of foreign service must always be liable to derangement when exigencies arise for the employment of troops in different parts of the world; just as of late we have seen the formerly insignificant force in New Zealand raised for a time to ten regiments, again to be reduced to one, while the force in British North America has been nearly quadrupled.

To proceed to the purely Indian part of the book, it seems necessary, in the first place, to protest against the assumption put forth by Sir H. Havelock, that the present British Force in India is maintained at what he considers an excessive amount, solely to provide a reserve for England; this is quite an error. The question of what amount of British Force will suffice for India, has been carefully gone into in the most minute manner by the various Governors General, Commanders-in-Chief, and other of the most competent authorities in India, and has been fixed on the most extended information with reference to the wants of India alone; and, as circumstances change from year to year (I may say every year since 1859), reductions have been made where they seem feasible on Indian grounds, and on Indian grounds alone.

The army in India is believed to be not a man in excess of our wants; though, doubtless for a campaign, a few thousand British soldiers with a respectable native force might be temporarily spared for what may be called semi-Indian purposes in China, Japan, or Egypt.

But then Sir H. Havelock's estimate of the force in India is so erroneous that his argument as to excess, even on his own grounds, breaks down.

At page 115 he quotes the British Force in India as 73,000 men. The present actual strength of non-commissioned officers, drummers, farriers and privates, is under 59,000, although the establishment is 62,000. This includes, of course, sick men, men about to be invalided, and men recovering their strength at convalescent depôts, so that probably not more than 50,000 cavalry, artillery and infantry could be turned out in all India (including Burmah and Aden) to-morrow; that is, 50,000 men fit for the field.

Sir Henry's proposals, indeed, extend to the reduction of 20,000 men, leaving us with 53,000; but as we have barely 60,000 men, the force he considers proper for India would only involve a reduction of 7,000 men.

Whether we have too many troops or not in India must, to a certain extent, be a matter of opinion; but certainly the weight of authority is entirely against Sir H. Havelock; while, as above shown, a reference to actual facts proves that admitting his views to be correct as to the actual force needed, the reduction would only amount to a third of what he proposes.

To proceed to the second point, viz., that by adopting Sir Henry's views, India would be held not only more cheaply but far more securely than at present, the security being gained by the employment of 15 small regiments of mounted riflemen as part of our British army in India:—

The idea of any sufficient saving arising from Sir H. Havelock's proposals may be at once dismissed, as his calculations on this head are erroneous.

His estimate at page 31, that a reduction of even 18,000 men in India would allow 2,500,000*l.* to be applied to other purposes, is strangely inaccurate.

He states that 68,000 men (exclusive of officers) in India cost 15,774,456*l.*, but the real fact is that this 15,774,456*l.* maintains not only the whole British army in India but the depôts in England, alluded to at page 30 by Sir H. Havelock, and amounting to 9,000 or 10,000 men, a native army of 124,000 men, all the staff establishments, cattle and equipment for the united British and native army in India, and the heavy pension list and non-effective charges of the Indian army, enormously heavy just now in proportion to the strength of the army, owing to special inducements having been held out to officers to retire on the reduction of a large proportion of the native army, besides a large contribution towards the non-effective charges of the British army.

The saving really to be effected would be comparatively small, as shown in a Statement appended to this paper; so that, in point of fact, Sir H. Havelock's proposals would reduce the army by several thousand British soldiers, and make no sufficient saving available for the reserve to be kept in England.

Thus, one of the main objects of the book, that of providing a reserve army at home, will fail to be met by the very proposals purposely made to meet that object.

This, therefore, disposes of the third point, viz., that a sum could be made available from India, by the adoption of his views, which would maintain a large home reserve.

But we have still to meet part of the second argument, viz., that with a force constituted as he proposes,

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proposes, we would hold India far more securely than at present, and render revolt impossible.

This desirable end is to be attained by the employment of about 8,000 mounted riflemen, in place of a much larger force of British cavalry and infantry; I say cavalry and infantry, for his estimate of cavalry and horse artillery for India is only 6,000; and as we have 3,000 horse artillery, and I do not perceive that he proposes a reduction in this arm, and as we have 5,000 cavalry at present, I assume that 2,000 are to be reduced. If, however, Sir Henry means to retain the present force of cavalry as well as 8,000 mounted riflemen as part of his 53,000, the total cost under his proposals would be considerably larger than the cost of the present army.

I will now proceed to the arguments used to show the alleged great advantages to arise from the use of a force of mounted riflemen; but before doing this I would observe that I think this description of force would be useful in India to a certain extent, and an experiment might be tried of employing two or three regiments in substitution of a similar number of our present dragoons. In fact, they could be our present dragoons, altered as to arms and equipment, and trained to act on foot when wanted. The expediency of officering such troops from the officers "doing general duty" will be doubted by many in India (see page 202).

To suppose that we would reap such advantages from a force of this description, as Sir H. Havelock imagines, is, I think, out of the question; but to show this we must examine the subject in detail.

In the first place, there are vast tracts of country in India, such as the mountains to which our campaigns have of late years been confined, where mounted riflemen would be useless; where, in fact, they could not act, and where their horses would perish for want of forage; so in Assam and Burmah, and parts of Bengal, mounted troops could not move during the greater part of the year, and the horses would, for the most part, die from exposure and climate.

Then, again, India is so vast that, even if fifteen regiments of mounted rifles were posted in the most judicious manner, revolt might break out at places far distant from the nearest corps, and where railways are not even thought of.

Again for protecting lines of railway, if in case of insurrection people are bent on destroying railways, we can never keep them uninjured by any force of mounted riflemen; and, in fact, for this purpose, good British troops would be of no more use than the cheaper and more abundant element of good native cavalry.

On the Calcutta and Delhi line, a line of a thousand miles, with branch railways running off at various points, could the whole force of mounted rifles for all India, say 6,000 effective men (for Sir H. Havelock's force must be subject, as all other forces are, to considerable deductions for sickness, &c.) secure us against removals of rails, &c., which can be quietly effected at any point, at night, by a few men?

The powers of rapid movement supposed to be possessed by mounted riflemen will not bear close examination. Mounted riflemen, like other British troops, require food and comforts of a nature not to be had, save from the Commissariat; and provision must be made to carry these comforts, and to carry those who fall sick or may be wounded.

Of course, for an enterprise lasting for three or four days everything might be carried by the men, or be dispensed with; but, for a longer period, baggage animals and doolies, or ambulances, must be taken, and with these, or even I may say without these, 20 miles a day would not be maintained for many days.

The feat of 5,000 riflemen riding from one end of India to the other at the rate of 25 miles a day (stated to be possible, at page 112), carrying all before them, is simply impossible.

This march would last for a hundred days; and supposing they carried all before them, including forts, &c., what time would have been left to clear the country on the flanks of the line of march? What possible impression would have been made by such a mode of campaigning? What would have become of the sick and wounded, of the numerous lame horses (for every one who has served knows that, even on a second day's 25-miles' march, many horses will have fallen lame, or will have sore backs, out of 5,000)? How are the grass-cutters to obtain grass if day after day they have to march 25 miles; and how are meat, rum, and bread to be obtained for the men?

Any such style of movement would be impracticable; still less "the power of moving over the surface of India at a uniform rate of 30 or 40 miles a day continuously," or that where "14,000 men (cavalry and horse artillery) are able to move 30 miles a day for weeks together." Has Sir H. Havelock ever seen or read of such movements?

It is quite certain that no force of British troops in India could move continuously for more than 20 miles a day, and after ten days they certainly would require a halt, even if going at this rate.

Native troops can do more, as they have less incumbrances; but, even by these, I believe the best march on authentic record (not alluded to by Sir H. Havelock), that of the guide cavalry and infantry from Murdan to Delhi only averaged about 26¾ miles a day for 22 days, and this was in a country the resources of which were entirely at their disposal, aided by a settled British civil administration; the corps, moreover, being full of zeal to reach Delhi, and commanded by a very active officer.

It may be noted that the celebrated march of cavalry and horse artillery under General Smith in 1805, so praised and thought so much of by Sir H. Havelock (see page 140), was made at an average of only 16¾ miles a day, a rate that was over and over again exceeded by forces of all arms during 1857-58. Lord Lake is quoted as having got over 405 miles in 43 days. Why, this is the rate of ordinary relief marching! It seems very clear that the mounted riflemen would not be able to move for a continuance any faster than our troops can at present.

Sir H. Havelock finds fault with the size of our Native army, and thinks it might be reduced from 135,000 (it is about 124,000, including the Hyderabad contingent) to 80,000. Probably he is not well informed as to the heavy duties that devolve on it, notwitstanding reductions of guards, escorts, &c. Nor is he aware how difficult it is for our border campaigns to get together, anywhere, more than 5,000 or 6,000 men. Very competent authorities, with good means of forming a judgment, believe that our Native as well as our European force is at a minimum, and that a reduction of either British or Natives would have to be followed by an increase of the other description

tion of force; so nicely are the duties and requirements of the public service balanced.

Sir H. Havelock's allusion to the French having only some 10,200 Natives in Algeria seems unfortunate as an argument for our doing with fewer than we have, as it appears that, with such a small province, a limited frontier compared to that of India, no Native states with armies in the heart of their territory, and the possibility of in a week having a reinforcement of 20,000 or 30,000 men from Marseilles and Toulon, they keep 65,000 to 70,000 French troops. I take it that if we had Algiers, and held it on the Indian system, we should probably have 30,000 Natives and 15,000 British soldiers at the outside, instead of 80,000 men, of whom seven-eighths are Europeans.

In truth, though we hold India, I believe with a sufficiently secure grasp, it costs England nothing, while Algiers is, and probably ever will be, a drain on France.

I purposely abstain here from remarking on Sir Henry Havelock's criticisms on various Indian wars; but would observe that some of his strictures appear open to easy reply, founded as they are on inaccurate statements of facts, of which I will give but two specimens.

At page 160 he says that Lord Clyde had at Lucknow nearly 3,600 most efficient native cavalry. The returns published in G. O. show that, of all ranks, the native cavalry under Lord Clyde at the commencement of the siege amounted to 1,997, joined on the 4th March by 397 under General Franks, a total of 2,394 instead of 3,600, and Sir H. Havelock ought to know that some of these were hardly trained and certainly not most efficient.

Again in an account of the affair in the Raptee on the 31st December 1858 (to which exception may be taken on other grounds), he says the force engaged was "about ten horsed guns, the 7th Hussars, the 6th Carabineers, about 1,200 excellent native horse (amongst them Hughes's splendid regiment of Irregulars, the 1st Punjab Cavalry)," &c.

From this it would be believed that two regiments of British cavalry were present, say 800 sabres, or 2,000 cavalry in all, and ten horsed guns. In reality there were only six horsed guns with Lord Clyde's column; the Carabineers had but one squadron, three squadrons being in quite a different part of the country, and 50 men detached with another column, while the native cavalry consisted only of Hughes's regiment and a small detachment of Hodson's horse under Sir H. Havelock himself.

Thus there were barely 1,000 sabres in the field instead of 2000, as would be gathered from Sir Henry's book.

Before concluding, however, I would say that it seems odd that Sir H. Havelock should have failed to refer to the Camel corps formed by Lord Clyde in 1858, and which, for campaigning purposes, was most useful. It was composed of 400 camels, each camel having a driver, armed with a carbine. For each camel there was also a soldier who, in a few days, became quite accustomed to the camel's motion, and could stand the longest marches with little fatigue. Two hundred admirable soldiers of the Rifle Brigade, and 200 Punjab Infantry made up this corps of 400 men, besides drivers.

Under an active and intelligent commander, the corps made some extraordinary marches; and, as provision for the men's comfort could be carried on the camels, while no forage was necessary to be taken for the animals, the powers of movement of such a corps were far superior to any that could be expected of mounted riflemen.

The 400 drivers could at all times protect the animals, and 400 excellent infantry were thus capable of being brought fifty miles in a night and thrown into action without leaving a man with the animals that carried them. A record of the marches of this corps would be most interesting; but at the end of the war it was not thought desirable to keep it up in time of peace. At the battle of Calpee it bore a conspicuous part, and it rendered other valuable service.

Such a corps, or several such corps, doubtless, would be formed again when wanted, and would, I think, be at least equal in value to any mounted rifle regiments.

17 May 1867. *H. W. N.*

RELATIVE COST of a British Force of 53,000 Men (including Officers) proposed for India by Sir H. Havelock, and the present Army of 60,000 Men.

	£ per ann.
Cost of Sir H. Havelock's Force:	
20 Batteries of Horse Artillery, 3,000 men, average cost 19,480 *l.* per battery	396,600
44 Horse field batteries, 6,600 men, 17,680 *l.* per battery	777,920
7 Heavy field batteries, 560 men, 12,560 *l.* per battery	87,920
60 Garrison batteries, 4,800 men, 8,323 *l.* per battery	499,380
7 Regiments cavalry, 3,451 men, 68,836 *l.* per corps	481,852
15 Regiments mounted Riflemen, 7,395 men, 68,836 *l.* per regiment	1,032,540
30 Regiments British infantry, 26,970 men, 80,100 *l.* per regiment	2,403,000
52,776 Officers and men, at	5,679,212
Add cost of 224 mounted Riflemen, at 80 *l.* per annum, to complete to 53,000 men	17,920
Add annual cost of remounts, to keep up 5,700 additional horses on Indian estalishment, 684 horses, at 60 *l.* each	41,040
£.	5,738,172
Cost of present British Force in India:	
20 Batteries Horse Artillery, 3,000 men	396,600
44 Horse field batteries, 6,600 men	777,920
7 Heavy field batteries, 560 men	87,920
24 Garrison batteries, 1,920 men	199,752
11 Regiments British cavalry, 5,423 men	757,196
52 Regiments British infantry, 46,748 men	4,165,200
64,251 Officers and men, for	6,384,588
Deduct, say 4,000 non-commissioned officers and men wanting to complete, at the low average of 60 *l.* each	240,000
£.	6,144,588

Apparent less cost of Sir H. Havelock's force, 406,416 *l.*, instead of 2,500,000 *l.*; and on the other side it must be recollected that there would be a first outlay of probably 600,000 *l.* to mount, arm, and equip the Mounted Rifles, while the decrease of 7,000 men would reduce the Indian payment to the British Exchequer for the maintenance of depôts, &c., by 94,500 *l.* annually.

NOTE.

In neither calculation have I added the cost of the head quarter staff of brigades of Artillery, which I do not exactly know.

To simplify calculations I have estimated the corps of Mounted Rifles at the present strength of cavalry regiments, viz. 493 men, and have added 224 men to make up 53,000. This slight deviation from Sir H. Havelock's numbers of riflemen makes the calculation more favourable to him.

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He estimates for 12,000 field and garrison artillery. By counting only the present strength of field artillery out of the 12,000, the calculation is more favourable to him than if the present proportions of field and garrison artillery were preserved.

I have estimated for seven regiments of cavalry, under the view taken at page 4 of the memorandum.

In all cases I have estimated for the capitation allowances paid to the British Government for maintenance of depôts, for pensions, &c.

My estimate, besides capitation allowance, covers (for all ranks) pay and allowances, cost of followers, commissariat charges, feed of cattle, medical and hospital charges, clothing, barrack and ordnance charges, and all miscellaneous expenses; but not the cost of purchasing or providing horses or other cattle.

17 May 1867. *H. W. N.*

ANSWERS of His Excellency General Sir *W. R. Mansfield*, K. C. B. and G. C. S. I., Commander in Chief in India.

1. My opinion is very decidedly against the proposal.

2. I would not employ them at all except in settlements of an Indian or Chinese character.

3. I have no experience of colonies planted by British settlers. But I served formerly in the Mediterranean.

4.—(*a.*) Men from the Punjaub, but none should be so employed.
(*b.*) Bombay regiments.
(*c.*) Either Bombay or Madras regiments.
(*d.*) - - ditto - - ditto.
(*e.*) - - ditto - - ditto.
(*f.*) (*g.*) (*h.*) (*i.*) I consider all these out of the question for any of the Indian races in time of peace

5. They should be relieved regularly every three years.

6. I do not believe in any insuperable religious difficulties. But there are many things in the habits, motives and impulses of natives which might easily alienate British colonists from them and cause blood feuds between the colonists and the sepoys. For instance, revenge on a wife for infidelity taking the form of mutilation; assaults on prostitutes of British blood for assumed infidelity or misconduct; anti-conservancy habits. If native troops were called out to aid the civil power in putting down a riot, they would never be forgiven either in South Africa or New Zealand.

7. I should think it would be necessary to give about nine (9) rupees a month to the private soldiers, with free rations. I rather think they enjoyed some such rates when serving in Hong Kong.

8. As I cannot conceive any measure more strangely impolitic than the use of native troops in European or British colonial garrisons, I have a difficulty in answering the question. If, however, they should be employed, the rule should be followed which is observed in India, viz., to keep the proportion of Europeans and natives about equal, the artillery being British.

9. Never having served in these colonies, it is better for me not to commit myself to a reply.

10. For service in the field it is possible that a proportion might do useful service as a supplement, but certainly not in entire substitution for European troops.

11. No, I think not, except in the East, *e. g.*, Persia, China, and so forth.

12. No; I do not think that any increase in the numerical strength of garrisons could compensate for the capital error of substituting Indian sepoys for British soldiers.

13. This is a question which can only be answered at the time with regard to the present circumstances of India and the colonies. It would, with the exception of Indian and Chinese stations, be better to depend on volunteer forces or special corps raised in the colonies than on Indian troops.

14. In all probability his loyalty would not be affected by it after his return. But there is no doubt that the original detachment on such service would be distasteful to the vast majority of the men.

15. I think that in the interests of both it would be better to take regiments from India according to such orders as the Government of India might deem it expedient to issue. This would give the means of relief and of discontinuing the experiment without much difficulty or expense if it failed. The Government of India would besides, I should think, strongly object to the raising of soldiers in India on terms and rates differing from those of its own armies, or under any authority but its own. Such measures must be viewed with relation to the impressions they would create on the existing Indian armies, as also on the mind of the classes from which the sepoys come.

16 and 17. India should not again be left in a state which can render such a case of emergency possible. Probably troops might be spared from the Cape, but, according to existing arrangements, I know of no other source.

18. I have little doubt of the superior expediency of raising local troops in South Africa, Ceylon, and the West Indies. Perhaps for Hong Kong Indian regiments would be better than locally raised regiments. I cannot answer as to Mauritius.

19 and 20. There is now no limitation in the sense of these questions, but I should think the employment of them as proposed extremely impolitic except in Chinese or Indian stations, as before said.

21. Yes. China is essentially foreign service, whereas Aden and Burmah are recognised by the troops as part of India, as being under the Indian Government.

22. I cannot give instances in detail; but every one knows the aversion of the Indian to cross the water, more especially in the case of the Hindoos, who fast, as it were, the whole time that they are at sea. They are, besides, separated from their families, and during the term of such service their domestic relations would be entirely broken up.

23. No;

23. No; I am not aware that any such result is desirable. The distinction established by the question does not however enter into the heads of the native sepoys.

25. I am against all such proposals. It should be recollected that Indian populations consist of numerous rival races and religious castes. If you cannot have a sufficient army, you must ensure the country by political measures through the population of it, and not attempt to introduce mongrel foreigners. To do the latter, would be a certain indication in the minds of the population of India, that that which is so often alleged in the public prints had come to pass, viz., that our resources were dwindling, and our prestige had departed from us.

In conclusion, I would say that, after a most serious domestic convulsion, the object of which was to drive the British out of India, the country was finally reduced to order at the end of 1859, with the result of the temporary disruption of those feelings of regard for the British rule, which in many parts had existed for a century. It cannot be believed that the feelings of animosity generated by the struggle have yet been altogether allayed. On the contrary, signs are not wanting that such is not the case. We cannot hope for anything else till a generation shall have passed away. In the meantime, we must hold the country strongly; and we must on no account lessen our influence, or weaken the idea of our prestige and resources by entertaining such notions as those suggested by these questions.

W. R. Mansfield,
General.

Head-quarters, Simla,
27 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Sir *Henry Durand.*

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. With reference to Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4, I have no acquaintance with any of the Colonies specified in question 4, except such very superficial knowledge of them as a short residence at the Cape many years ago, and frequent voyages to and from England afford to a passenger at Gibraltar, Malta, and Ceylon. Of the Mauritius, China, the West Indies, and New Zealand, I have no practical knowledge whatever.

6. With respect to Question 6, quite independently of considerations of creed, race, and moral habits, there is one point common to every race in India, which is greatly opposed to their permanent employment as mercenary troops out of India, or out of the countries bordering India, and within easy reach of its shores, such as Burmah. The practice of early marriages is, it may be said, universal, and although there may be differences in the degree to which wives and families are actually present with the native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in their military cantonments in India, it is merely a question of degree. They are nearly all married men, with families dependent upon them for support; and much moral turpitude attaches to the sepoy who neglects the maintenance of his family. They may be always with the soldier, as in the Madras Army, or more partially so in the Bombay Army, or, comparatively speaking, rarely so in the Bengal army; this is a point depending much on the habits of the particular army, and the districts and races from which recruits are drawn, as also on the areas over which the cantonments of the various armies are dotted, and on reliefs and the distances marched over; still, the normal fact remains the same, and pervades the whole, namely, that the responsibility of wives and families lies, as a rule, upon the whole body of our native troops, and that their social habits and feelings have, on this point, to be met either by the families being with the men, or by frequent and long furloughs to their homes. This is a condition essentially different from the present constitution of our own European army, and it is one of those radical conditions which render all comparison difficult. Where such a condition exists incidentally, to a certain extent, as in armies formed on the Prussian system, the necessity of accepting the considerations it imposes is met by the short periods of service, and the arrangements which seldom call out the second and third lines, or reserves, save in case of absolute urgency. Now this is a very material consideration, and one imperatively essential prominently to keep in view, when the idea of employing Indian troops at a distance from India is discussed. No Indian experience is required in order to give weight to to such a vital consideration, and any Members of the Select Committee who have a practical acquaintance with the feelings of Prussian or French married conscripts of the line, are as able to form a judgment as an officer of Indian experience, except that the latter superadds a knowledge of points of character due to creed and caste, which greatly intensify the dislike of the Mussulman, the Hindoo, and the Sikh, to protracted service beyond seas. Those who know French troops, or indeed any European troops but our own English line, must be aware of the feelings with which they embark for service beyond seas, and of the aversion they entertain to ship-board. French officers make no secret of the fact as one which is a point of remarkable difference between the French and the English soldier. Intensify this feeling fifty-fold, and you have the measure of the Mussulman's aversion to being long separated from his family; intensify the feeling a hundred-fold, and it may approach the deep disgust and sense of defilement with which, from a caste point of view, the Hindoo regards board-a-ship life, and service beyond seas, and separation from his family. The aversion of the Sikh, if of a respectable village family, is hardly less than that of the Mussulman; of any of these three main classes of our native subjects, the "Free Lances," or material for such, are very small in number as compared with former times. This is a consequence of the peace, the internal peace and good order of the empire, the security to life and property, and the greatly increased value of land; the old state of things and the habits it engendered, has passed away; but even when the Mahrattas under the Bhonsla, Holkar, or Scindia could sweep with hordes over the country, or the Pindarees pass over it like locusts destroying everything, the "Free Lances" of all these worthies had India for their field, not lands beyond the ocean, and in no country in the world, considering

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considering the extent of its coasts, and the great value of its products, has the spirit of adventure at sea been so little developed as in India. Its agricultural millions are essentially a land loving people, and the sea, or service beyond seas, repugnant to their social habits, to their creeds, caste feelings, and every aspiration of their lives, for the present, or, in the case of the Hindoo, for the future. Except the off-scourings of the cities, the "budmashes" of towns or cantonments, not by any means fit material for soldiery, I know of no class whose repugnance to protracted service beyond seas could be compensated really by such an increase of advantages to the soldier as would be within reason, and not render their employment more costly and troublesome than is at all contemplated by those who propose the measure. The scum of our cities and cantonments is not worth enlisting at any price; they are worthless; and even "budmashes" would demand pay and advantages quite disproportionate to the value of their services, for in peace they would be a nuisance, and in war a weakness.

7. Nothing but actual experience would enable any answer to be given to Question 7.

8. Knowing nothing of the colonies I am unable to offer an opinion on Question 8, except, that wherever you have British artillery it should have a support of British infantry, and not be left to the sole support of native troops. For the foregoing reason, ignorance of the colonies—

9. I can offer no opinion on Question 9.

10. With regard to Questions 10 and 11, we have employed native troops in Egypt, the Mauritius, and China in time of war; and if properly organized I see no reason why native troops should not again be made useful, when associated with European troops, for active operations in any of those quarters, although their aversion is great to protracted service, mere garrison service, beyond seas, under the emergency of war, with its prospects of rewards, promotion, and foreign service claims, the feeling is different, it is regarded as an exceptional incidence of their contract, a necessity which justifies Government in employing regiments beyond sea, and which, when the regiments are not too long absent from India, confers renown and credit, besides usually being accompanied by more solid advantages. In hot countries, native troops properly officered, may be of great utility as auxiliaries to the European troops; much of the wearing fatigue duties of an army can be better taken in hot countries by the native than by the European troops. The mere friction of war in trying climates falls heavily on English troops, and much of this destructive friction can be avoided where native troops are a component of the force. Their utility in this respect is great, quite independently of their fighting power or value.

12. With regard to Question 12, I cannot conceive any British colony left to depend for its defence entirely on mercenary native troops.

13. So many and very various considerations are volved in Question 13, that it would take much time and writing to reply in a suitable manner. Much must depend on circumstances whether one or other alternative were had recourse to. The nature and danger of the pressure at home, the sphere and character of the war, actual or impending, the special risk incurred by particular colonies, the state of this vast Indian empire at the time, the command we might have of the sea generally, of the Levant specially, our position with regard to Egypt and the Suez route, all these circumstances would bear on the question, and have to be weighed. As a rule, if England were in vital peril, the withdrawal of troops from India would, probably, prove too slow a process to meet the emergency.

14. With respect to Question 14, my previous reply to Question 6 will have shown that the expatriation of native regiments for garrison service in the Colonies would not, in my opinion, prove popular with our native troops, or their connections in India; therefore, so far as loyalty depends on the measures of Government being acceptable to the people, it hardly seems likely, considering the possibility of Colonial Governments occasionally failing to understand the temper, prejudices, and peculiarities of native troops from India, that the result should be increase of loyalty here. Every cause of discontent which arose in a Colony would be echoed and exaggerated by their relatives in India, and its Government would, though powerless to interfere, be held responsible for the treatment its native subjects met with when beyond its control.

15. In reply to Question 15, I must remark that India has no native troops redundant, and that to introduce a system of Colonial service and of Colonial reliefs, would necessitate a large increase to the Indian armies, and many consequent sources of augmented expenditure which the Colonial military budgets would not meet. Moreover, such a system of Colonial service and reliefs would render our service very unpopular, and commanding officers would find the recruiting more difficult than it is at present; for the men know that at the expiration of three years they can now obtain their discharge if they please, and do so to an extent of which commanding officers complain much; but such a facility for obtaining discharge could not endure compatibly with a system of Colonial service and reliefs except at great cost and inconvenience if maintained, great discontent and distrust if abrogated. I am therefore of opinion that it would be better to raise regiments in India exclusively for Colonial service, and quite distinct from our existing Indian armies, the present organisation of which is, in my opinion, unsuited to Colonial service. The British Government could organize and officer these regiments as it pleased, and would have to bear all the expenses of raising, of furloughs, of pensions, &c. I do not think either course advisable; but of the two the raising fresh regiments, unhampered by the traditions of our native armies, unsaddled with native commissioned officers, and having to conform to a system which must mould and adapt itself to the exigencies of a distinct service, seems far the most preferable course. Her Majesty's European regiments who have served or are serving in India could provide the nucleus of European officers, having some acquaintance with native soldier classes, on which to build up, gradually, such fresh regiments; it must be fully understood that the experiment would be a serious one.

16, 17. On more than one occasion, India has had to apply to neighbouring Colonies for the immediate assistance of European troops; and therefore

therefore Question 16 must be answered in the affirmative. At that time, however, the dispatch of troops through Egypt had not been arranged, and therefore regiments could be drawn from the Mauritius, or the Cape sooner than from England. Now, if no pressure were on England, and the Suez route open, reinforcements can be more speedily obtained from England. A telegraph message to Malta, or Gibraltar, or England, could set regiments moving for India in very short time.

18. I have but slight knowledge of South Africa or its races, nor do I know the estimation in which the Cape Mounted Rifles were held; except as settlers in our own provinces on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, I have had no opportunity of judging of the Chinese or Malays. The question how the Chinese or mixed Tartar and Chinese of the northern coasts of China would stand our discipline is a problem untried; but they are represented as being fine men in some of the provinces, and there should be fair material for native troops on that coast. Both in South Africa, and on the coast of China, the experiment of raising native troops from the native populations in or near those Colonies, seems preferable to that of introducing Colonial service and Colonial reliefs into our native armies, or of raising fresh regiments in India for Colonial service. In reply to Question 18, therefore, I should say that the advantages, if it can be safely done, of raising a few corps in South Africa, and on the coast of China, are very great.

19, 20. I have already answered Question 19, when I stated that the native soldier regards his liability to service beyond seas as an incident to which under his contract he is bound; but as being one practically limited to the emergencies of war, our native armies being so reduced as barely to meet the requirements of our occupation of India. In case of war, the obligation would have to be enforced, and their utility in hot countries as auxiliaries to European troops, has already been touched upon; but except for war, and beyond the ordinary reliefs in British Burma, Aden, and the Straits, it is not desirable to enforce the obligation with our weak armies.

21. In reply to Question 21, I do not think that the fact of India being directly under the Crown, instead of indirectly as formerly was the case, makes the smallest difference in the feeling of native troops towards service beyond seas.

22. In reply to Question 22, I must observe that beyond a reluctance on the part of some Madras regiments to embark for China on the occurrence of the first war in China, and a reluctance on the part of a Bengal regiment to embark for Burmah in the time of Lord Dalhousie, I have known no instances of discontent; on neither occasion was the reluctance very serious, or insurmountable.

23, 24. With regard to Question 23, it must be borne in mind that India is a vast empire, and that its races having more or less the feeling of the fact, are apt to consider that the sovereignty of this country when acquired, of itself confers an Imperial diadem. Service in petty Colonies would most assuredly lower, rather than raise their idea of our power. They can understand England ruling India, and holding it in part with native troops, for this is in strict accordance with the practice and traditions of former conquerors; but the poverty of resources in men which calls for the occupation by native troops of distant Colonies, like the Mauritius, Hong Kong, West Indies, &c., can produce but one effect, and that an effect far from favourable to their sense of our military means and power which cannot find men for what they will regard as dwarf territories.

25. I have answered Question 25 previously. It is a matter which actual experiment can alone prove. As far as India is concerned, the feeling of our native armies since 1857, is that they are not trusted; and the introduction of Chinese, African, or Malay troops, would augment this feeling, and do harm. In India we are better without such foreign troops, upon which no greater reliance could be placed than upon our own Indian races, whom it is not good policy thus to alienate. Nor would the substitution of such troops enable us materially to reduce our English garrison. If the magnitude of the Indian empire, the millions it contains, and the growing wealth of the country are considered, the European garrison of India is in my opinion moderate, and not more than a country like England can and should bear without murmur. On the contrary, what with the alienation of the Indian troops, and the resentments that might crop up, besides the peculiar temper of Chinese, Africans, and Malays, which renders them in some respects more difficult to manage than Indians, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, we should be compelled to maintain an equal, if not superior, European force to watch the experiment.

H. Durand.

Simla, 29 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Sir *R. Temple*, Hydrabad.

1. I AM decidedly in favour of making the experiment of substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in time of peace. The measure would afford some, though not great relief to the English army in time of peace. The system thus established could be expanded in time of war, so as to form an appreciable, though not very considerable, addition to our military resources, and if good Indian troops were selected, as I believe they might be for this service, then the circumstance would add something to our national prestige in the estimation of other military countries.

2. I would propose to employ, to a limited extent, Indian troops in Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, China, New Zealand, Mauritius, South Africa, Malta and Gibraltar; but I would not propose to employ them in Australia, because they would probably not get on well with the colonists; and I feel doubts about employing them in the West Indies. I speak with diffidence, but I should fear there might arise ill blood be-

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tween them and the coloured races; and their morale and ideas might deteriorate from the political influences of those regions. The British North American possessions are doubtless out of the question.

3. I have not any special knowledge from residence of any of the Colonies.

4. This question relates to the races of India who might be best employed as soldiers in the following Colonies, viz.:

a. South Africa.
b. Mauritius.
c. Ceylon.
d. Straits Settlements.
e. China.
f. Malta.
g. Gibraltar.
h. West Indies.
i. New Zealand.

I believe that Madras regiments could always be employed in Ceylon and the Straits Settlements, perhaps also in the Mauritius; they have, as is well known, been already employed in the Straits Settlements; but I would not recommend them for employment in any other of the Colonies. The Madras troops are drawn from the southern portion of the Indian Peninsula, of Teloogoo and Tamil speaking races. Bombay troops have already been employed in China, and might be permanently so employed; perhaps also they might be employed in the Mauritius. The Bombay troops are drawn from the Western Deccan and coast districts, that is, from Mahratta races, partly also from Goojerat and from Central India, with a mixture also of Hindoostanees.

As already stated, I cannot recommend any class of Indian troops as suited for the West Indies. There remain South Africa, New Zealand, Malta, Gibraltar. For employment in these I would propose Punjaubee troops, and besides them I know of no races in India adapted for such a duty. The Punjaubees would also be well suited for service in China; indeed, as is well known, they did good service there in the last war. Having served in various capacities in the Punjaub, I have necessarily a special knowledge of that province and people. By Punjaubees are meant not only Sikhs, but Mahomedans, natives of the Punjaub and especially of the Trans-Indus frontier. I have for years past heard military officers both of the Royal army and the late Company's army, who had seen the Punjaubees on service and in action, speak in the highest terms of the soldierly qualities of these troops. Indeed, I never heard but one opinion expressed on this subject. In physical power and endurance, owing to the severer climate wherein they are born, and in martial spirit, owing to a variety of circumstances, they altogether surpass all other Indian races. Especially also they can well bear frost and even snow. In New Zealand and in South Africa they would render capital service, in such wars as those which have of late years occurred in those regions. In Malta and Gibraltar they could certainly take a part of the garrison duty. Their bearing and appearance would be such as might well bear to be exhibited before European nations. And if their appearance were to be thus approved of, then the consideration that there must be plenty more where they came from, might add something to our repute as a military empire. In time of need they would not equal the Zouaves, but they might not be much inferior to Turkish troops. Even in such a war as the Crimean war, a small contingent of Punjaubee troops would not be much less valuable than a Turkish contingent. If well managed and cared for, the Punjaubees would stand much inclement weather and climate. And in the event of operations in Egypt, a body of Punjaubee troops would be useful auxiliaries to the British troops, even in the face of an European enemy. I assume in this answer that the troops to be employed would be infantry; but, if required, the Punjaubee cavalry would go to any country where the infantry went. As is well known, in the last China war the Punjaub horse did excellently well up to the very walls of Pekin. I should here, perhaps, allude to the Hyderabad contingent under my control. Though a very fine body of irregular troops, they would not (so far as I can learn) be suited for service in the colonies. Though they comprise many races, still the majority are Deccanee; and their ideas and traditions are all bound up with the Deccan itself.

5. The reliefs would have to be at short intervals not exceeding two years. The affording of frequent reliefs indeed is the main, if not the only practical, difficulty in this matter. If this could not be managed, or if to manage it would prove too expensive, then the whole scheme would fall to the ground. The well-assured certainty of frequent reliefs would be particularly essential. Though eager to go to distant places for a time, for excitement, for enterprise, for advantage and for hard work in which they might take interest, the Punjaubees are not patient of monotony. They even soon tire of uneventful service in Bengal Proper. With the steam transport services, now existing and now further organized with a view to military reliefs, there could be no difficulty whatever in respect to Indian troops serving in the Mediterranean. Probably similar facilities could be secured in regard to China.

As regards New Zealand and South Africa and the Mauritius, there might be more of difficulty, but it would probably not be insuperable. The reasons necessitating frequency of relief are probably too well known to require mention here. It may be added that the Punjaubee and the Bombay troops would be without their families. The Madrassee troops would have their families with them; and with the Madras army the intervals of relief have always been much longer than with the other Indian armies.

6. There are no special difficulties whatever in respect to the races mentioned in Answer 4. Advantages would certainly have to be allowed, and some expense would be necessary; but probably not any such expense as would counterbalance or seriously detract from the advantages of the plan.

In a word, I should say that the Punjaubees would go with pleasure anywhere, provided they thought the expedition would not last too long and would afford excitment and advantage.

7. Sepoys employed on service out of India should have, extra to their pay, batta of *Rs.* 1. 8. each per mensem, and free rations; this is granted to the Madras troops when on service in Burmah, China, or the Straits. This is the lowest scale of remuneration which I could suggest. I cannot, of course, tell what the rations would cost in the colonies, but taking an average at one-half the Indian rate of European rations, which might suffice

suffice for Indian troops anywhere, the extra cost to an Indian battalion of 1,000 men of all ranks would be, per mensem:

	For 1 Man per Mensem. Rs. a. p.	For 1,000 Men per Mensem. Rs. a. p.
Batta	1 8 –	1,500 – –
Rations	3 4 –	3,250 – –
Total	Rs. 4 12 –	4,750 – –

Or, per annum - Rs. 57,000, or £. 5,750.

These figures represent nothing more than an approximation; but the aggregate does not seem great, while, on the other hand, the rate per man would be a sensible addition to the sepoy's income as an inducement to go on distant service.

8. Indian troops would not be a sufficient garrison in time of peace in the colonies above mentioned, either (*a*) wholly unsupported by British troops or (*b*) supported by English garrison artillery only. The proportion of English troops necessary to support them would vary in different colonies. Speaking roundly, I should say that in the Mediterranean one-fourth of the garrison might be Indian; in New Zealand and South Africa one-half (assuming that one of the main troubles in these two colonies will be from native tribes); in China and the Mauritius one-third; in Ceylon two-thirds. The only exception would be the Straits Settlements, where probably Indian troops supported by English garrison Artillery might suffice.

9. I should think Indian troops only partially supported (but not entirely unsupported) would suffice to suppress internal disturbances in Ceylon, the Mauritius and Hong Kong. Under the same conditions Punjaubee troops would be able to cope with Kaffirs in South Africa or with Maories in New Zealand. But I do not think that the last-named work should be entrusted to any Indian troops except Punjaubees.

10. I should think it quite expedient to employ Indian troops in the Colonies mentioned in the foregoing answers as supplementary or as auxiliaries to the English troops. I hesitate to recommend such employment in substitution of English troops, to any large extent, but this might be done to some slight extent.

11. They could not be relied on in such a service, as to materially lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war. They might do so to some slight extent, perhaps. In time of peace a total strength of ten or twelve thousand Indian troops might be employed out in India in the places above described. In a general war with European Powers, the above strength might be increased to fifteen or sixteen thousand. But this would partly depend on our power and position at the time. If we were waging a doubtful or at all a losing contest in any part of the world, then the case under discussion becomes altered as regards Indian troops.

12. They would not be able to protect the Colonies above-mentioned as well as the existing garrisons, and therefore some increase of numbers would be necessary in a mixed English and Indian garrison, as compared with a purely English garrison; but not to such an extent as to neutralise or impair the advantages of the measure.

In South Africa there appear, according to the latest Army List, to be

4	British Regiments	- 4,000	men of all ranks.
5	„ in New Zealand	5,000	„
2	„ in China -	- 2,000	„
1	„ in Ceylon	- 1,000	„
2	„ in Mauritius	- 2,000	„
4	„ in Malta -	- 4,000	„
4	„ in Gibraltar	- 4,000	„

On these data I should suppose that the present English garrison, contrasted with a mixed garrison of English and Indian troops, might be something as follows, numerically, including men of all ranks:

Colony.	Number of Regiments.	Present Strength, English.	Proposed Strength. English.	Proposed Strength. Indian.	Proposed Strength. Total.	Saving of English.	Increase of Strength proposed over present.
South Africa	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
New Zealand	5	5,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	2,000	—
China	2	2,000	1,500	1,000	2,500	500	500
Ceylon	1	1,000	500	1,000	1,500	500	500
Mauritius	2	2,000	1,000	2,000	3,000	1,000	1,000
Malta	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
Gibraltar	4	4,000	3,000	2,000	5,000	1,000	1,000
Total	22	22,000	15,000	12,000	27,000	7,000	5,000

N.B.—The Straits Settlements are omitted from the above calculation, as no British infantry are stationed there.

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This increase in total strength would not cause any increase of expenditure, because Indian troops are so much less expensive than English. There would indeed, on the contrary, be some saving of expense by the arrangement.

13. Inasmuch as our English garrison in India is, or ought to be, no more than what is really necessary, the thought of English regiments being withdrawn from India, in case of pressure at home, cannot be contemplated, save with serious concern. Writing in India, I must say that if such pressure arose, it were better to withdraw English regiments from the Colonies, filling up their places by Indian troops, than to withdraw English regiments from India; but then, on the other hand, if the Colonies in particular were threatened by an European enemy, any considerable substitution of Indian for English troops might not be practicable there.

14. The effect of service in the Colonies above named would no doubt enlarge the ideas of the Indian troops employed. It has been thought, in 1857 and subsequent years, that to employ Indian sepoys in a great variety of distant stations imperializes their minds, so to speak, and renders them less amenable to the dominant influence of their European masters. But in the case now put, I hardly see that any prejudicial effect would be produced; and even, on the contrary, sepoys might after such service return home with some notion of our world-wide power.

15. In answer to this question, I should say that for this Colonial service the best plan would be to select regiments composed of the particular races required, which corps might possess the requisite qualities, and might be imbued with the spirit that is needed for such a duty. It would be practicable, and also desirable, to ascertain beforehand whether the corps selected would be for the most part volunteers for the work. This mode would be preferable, as regards efficiency, to either of the modes proposed in the question, namely, taking regiments from the Indian army according to their turn, or raising fresh regiments in India for Colonial service. In this point of view it would be better, both in the interests of India and in the interests of the Colonies. Indeed, assuming that Punjaubees are mainly to be the troops employed, I do not perceive how any plan could be perfectly arranged by the roster of turn, because in the Bengal army the Punjaubee regiments are not numbered consecutively, but bear various numbers scattered about in the list. Moreover, some of the regiments most likely to be chosen would be those of the Punjaub irregular force, which are not in the Bengal regular army at all.

16. I do not think that the presence of British troops in the neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of emergency. Some assistance was indeed derived in this way in 1857. (I do not include the China force at that time so fortunately diverted from its destination.) But nothing material could, as a rule, be reckoned on.

17. Understanding that the English troops in the Colonies are or will be kept at only such strength as is absolutely required, I could not venture to name any Colony whence reinforcements could be expected for India in time of need.

18. I am not able to answer this question with confidence, not having personal knowledge of the Colonies; but I should suppose that well-selected Indian troops would be much superior for the defence internal or external of these Colonies than any levies that could be raised from the local population. Indian troops are known to be capable of attaining a high state of organisation and discipline. Probably the same could not be said of native levies raised locally in the Colonies; with a few exceptions, at all events; and if there be this superiority on the part of Indian troops, it would be worth the incurring of the extra cost of transport in order to obtain them.

19. I apprehend that native soldiers on enlistment give little thought to the obligation they have now incurred of foreign service. If this were found to be the case, then I would try to avoid having to enforce the obligation, however clear it might be. A few discontented men might make the duty of foreign service unpopular with the corps generally. I understand that in the Madras army the sepoys whose regiments are ordered on foreign service, are usually, as a matter of grace, permitted to have the option of leaving the regiment if they do not like to accompany it, and no inconvenience seems to arise from this indulgence.

20. I would not alter the present system. I would continue to enlist them for general service anywhere, but I would try to avoid having to make them go on important service beyond the seas against their will; especially if, as I should hope, it be possible by offering inducements and by selecting regiments, to get men to go willingly.

21. I should not think the Indian troops would now draw any distinction between service in Aden and Burmah on the one hand and China and the Mauritius on the other. They certainly would go to China without hesitation; indeed they have gone in recent times and have won distinction there. I am not so positive about the Mauritius, but inasmuch as thousands of Indian labourers go there annually, it seems probable that Indian troops would go there, too, without difficulty.

22. I have seldom heard of any instances of discontent of the native army when employed on colonial duties beyond the seas. I except, of course, the cases of the Bengal sepoys objecting to go to Burmah, as those instances are well known. I do not know that the sepoys made any objection when they were sent to Egypt, at the beginning of this century.

23. I certainly think that the employment on colonial service of troops belonging to the Indian army would tend somewhat to give it the feeling of an imperial army. Such a result has at times, since 1857, been regarded as objectionable. But in this case, for the reason given in my answer to Question 14, I should not regard the objection as serious.

24. As I am in India this question which relates solely to those residing in the Colonies, is not answerable by me.

25. I am not in favour of employing in India troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian. In the period following 1857, this was frequently proposed in India. It was thought that non-Indian troops would be equally inured to Asiatic heat, and just as good as Indian troops; while being removed so far from their homes, they would be more bound to us, and would serve as a check on the Indian troops. I believe

I believe, however, that now this notion is nearly, perhaps entirely, abandoned. I suppose that as a military body, such non-Indian troops would be inferior to Indian troops, and would be more expensive and more troublesome to manage. On the other hand, the non-Indian troops would not really be more reliable; but would, on the contrary, join the Indians if the latter turned against us or otherwise went wrong. Chinese troops might not perhaps coalesce with the Indian; but the Indo-Chinese, the Malays, the non-Indian Asiatics, the Africans, could not be trusted. There are now African and Arabian troops at Hyderabad. No person of any experience on the British side would place any particular reliance on the above named, in any Indian mutiny or rebellion.

Conclusion.

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Having thus answered the several questions put, I would add that, as the proposed measure is of a novel and experimental character, I have recommended its adoption to only a limited extent at first. If it be tentatively worked, there will be no harm done even if it fail. But if it succeed, then it could be further developed hereafter.

(signed) *R. Temple*,
British Resident
at the Court of Hyderabad.

The Residency, Hyderabad,
30 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Merewether*, C.B., Resident, *Aden*.

1. Carried out to a certain extent, it would be a most politic move. Besides relieving the English army of the heavy drain upon it which now exists, it would place the Colonies in a better position, should an European war break out, than they otherwise would be; because, in the event of such occurring, every English soldier that could possibly be taken, would be withdrawn. The Indian troops would then be something left.

2. In the Eastern Colonies, that is Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, China, and the Cape. For New Zealand, under the improved state of affairs there, I should think there would be no difficulty in raising soldiers on the spot, well suited for the purpose required. Malta and Gibraltar, I consider should always be held by English troops alone. The West Indies are provided for already in the West India regiments, which might be increased if required. Further, the great distance from India would be objectionable in arranging details.

3. None.

4. I would specify none. The Indian army might be increased to meet the new wants, and regiments would take their tour of colonial duty. Men should be enlisted for general service, without any distinction and without any reference to caste or persuasion. They should be taken merely for their physical fitness for a soldier's life.

5. A regular systematic course of reliefs every three years, the regiments leaving their families and other impediments at fixed head-quarters, or at certain established depôts. The fixed head-quarter system would be the preferable of the two, if it could be generally introduced, and I see no reason why it should not be.

6. I know no special difficulties whatever as regards the classes in India who would enlist for general service, and the supply would be plentiful. Difficulties were encountered formerly in India, but they originated as much, indeed almost entirely, from the faulty management of the men, not from the men themselves. Extra allowances would have to be given to the men serving abroad, in the same manner as was granted to the 3rd, 5th, 22nd, and Belooch Regiments of the Bombay army lately in China.

7. Replied to in previous answer.

8. Not having any personal knowledge of the colonies, or of their requirements, it is difficult to answer this question; but speaking generally I should say that where two English regiments are now located, one might be withdrawn, and its place supplied by one or two native Indian regiments, according to the amount of duty required of them. In some of the places, such as Ceylon, and some of the minor stations in China, native troops might be with advantage used alone. Artillery would have to be kept up in all stations as in peace time now. There is an objection with some to training native Indian artillery again, to which I in nowise hold. It would be a good opportunity to revive Indian native artillery by sending some batteries to the Colonies. These will form a good nucleus when the Indian local army has to be reorganised, as which, sooner or later, it will have to be.

9. I think so, certainly.

10. As a supplement to Europeans in time of war, the advantage would be found very great. It would be cheaper. It would allow of the Europeans being relieved of much duty which is now found to tell heavily upon them, but for which the natives are far better suited. It would economise the most expensive material, the European soldier, and it would place so many more men at the disposal of the Home Government. The chequered brigade, one European and two native regiments, forms a most effective force; would be excellent against any Asiatic enemy, and I think would not be found wanting when opposed to an European one.

11. Certainly.

12. The Indian makes an excellent soldier when well commanded and strictly disciplined; when treated for their qualifications as soldiers, not as Bhramins, or what not, the Indian annals show instances of military spirit, endurance, and courage, which will bear comparison with any in the world. Merely to quote a few within the last half century. I would mention the last storm of Bhuolpoor, when a Bengal native regiment led; the battles of Korregaum, Scetabundee, Meanee, Guzerat. In the last-mentioned, natives led the cavalry attack against a very superior force, supported by English dragoons. The purposed garrisons would be as adequate as existing garrisons; but I should conclude, if the war extended to the Colonies, extra provision would have to be made.

13. Want of personal knowledge of the requirements of the Colonies prevents my answering this question

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question fully. But with regard to India, I would observe, that when once the maximum European force is fixed for that country, none of the English army should on any account be withdrawn from it, unless they are replaced at once by others, to form an European local army.

14. Decidedly advantageous. It would enlarge their experience, and confirm them in the feeling that they are soldiers of the State, ready to serve anywhere.

15. It would be better for both interests, until the Colonies can provide for themselves within their own limits, that regiments should be taken from India in their turn, the Indian army being increased to meet the greater demand.

16. Now that troops are about to be sent regularly overland, India would be reinforced from England more easily and more quickly than from any of the Colonies. The presence of European troops in the Colonies for this purpose is therefore immaterial.

17. Replied to in the above.

18. Certainly, as far as we can judge from experience as regards South Africa and Ceylon. The attempt to raise local troops in both these places has been tried and failed. In Mauritius I should imagine equal difficulty would be experienced as in Africa or Ceylon. In Hong Kong, I have been told, the material at present available is quite unsuited to the purpose. The West Indies seem to be provided for already. For the four first, then, it would appear indispensably necessary; and the saving in having native troops in place of European would more than pay the cost of transport. The Europeans would equally have to be relieved with the natives, and at a much greater cost.

19. I am not quite certain how this stands with regard to the native army in Bengal; but in Bombay, the soldiers are enlisted for general service, and are ready and willing to proceed beyond seas, or anywhere. In 1860, when the 3rd and 5th W. I. were ordered to China, the announcement that they were to go was received with acclamation.

20. The rule, if it does not exist, should certainly be introduced and adhered to, that troops should be enlisted to go wherever they are ordered, and the exigencies of the service required them to be. I know of no reason why it should not be done.

21. No; I do not.

22. From personal knowledge, I can give no cases. But the records of India, show that regiments in Bengal and some few in Madras objected to go to Burmah, and China in the former, because they considered they were not enlisted to serve anywhere out of India. They equally refused to go to Scind or Affghanistan. Till a few years ago, there were regiments in the old Bengal army who were styled volunteer regiments, because the men entered them with the understanding they were to serve out of India. I believe, however, even these did not prove a bit more willing when the time came for them to go. But this was owing to a faulty system which allowed the men to consider, or feel they had a choice in the matter. It is to be hoped such a mistake will never be fallen into again. Men should only be taken who enter the army to obey orders and go where they are bid.

23. I think it would have a very excellent effect in raising the morals of the men, and it could not fail to be of benefit by enlarging their experience.

24. The Arabs and Somallees (an African race), who form the mass of the population at Aden, are as they exist now utterly unsuited for soldiers. The Arabs are active and energetic, but they would not conform to discipline. The Somallees are the laziest most useless people on the face of the earth. A body of mounted police being required for this station, I found it necessary to recommend they should be raised in and sent from India. They could not be found at Aden.

25. Having no personal experience of these races, I can give no opinion, beyond what appears generally in the answers given above.

W. L. Merewether, Lieutenant Colonel,
Resident, Aden.

Aden Residency,
20 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Colonel Sir *Herbert Edwardes*, K.C.B.

1. This question must be looked at from two points; firstly, what is expedient for England? secondly, what is expedient for India? With regard to England, I should say that any arrangement which would economise even a single British battalion would be expedient. I have no doubt that improving the condition of the British soldier would quickly do away with the difficulties of recruiting. But, supposing this to be done, and recruits to be abundant, who would use up his best material when second best would do? Turning to India, I do not consider it a wise policy for our empire there to open new military careers for the native races. What we want is to settle the population down to peaceful pursuits, so that in a few generations they may become disused to arms. The break-up of the Sikh power in the wars of 1845-6, and 1848-9, sent thousands of soldiers in the Punjab sulkily back to the plough, whence Runjeet Singh had, only a generation before, with great difficulty drawn their fathers. These men and their sons were the treasure-house from which we mainly drew the large Punjab levies of 1857; and it may be said that this was well for us. As it happened, it was; but they would have been equally available against us. Under the circumstances, they were invaluable to us in putting down the old Sepoy army; but that object having been effected, we must take care that the remedy is not as bad as the disease. It is quite sufficient to draw on the Sikhs, the border Pathans, and other martial races of the Punjab, for as many soldiers as we actually require to keep up the balance of races in our new native army in India, without turning whole races once more into soldiers by profession. So with the Poorbeas, who were the main body of the old Sepoy army. They have now passed, or are passing, through the wretchedness of transition from a century of hereditary soldiering to a future

future of agriculture. I would strongly deprecate any disturbance of the process, even if they would enlist in any numbers, to cross the sea, which, being high caste, and full of prejudice, they probably would not. Now, comparing these considerations of what is good for England and what is good for India, it is obvious that a large part of the problem before Parliament is how to diminish the British garrison in India, and I should conclude that whatever policy disarms the people of India diminishes the necessity for a European garrison; and *vice versâ*. On the whole, therefore, it seems expedient to substitute Indian troops for British to a moderate extent, in a few pressing tropical colonies, but certainly not to carry out the policy on a great scale beyond the Indian seas.

2. China, the Straits, Ceylon, and Mauritius.

3. I have not lived in any of the Colonies which I have named above. I have touched several times at Ceylon; and, from having served in India since the beginning of 1841, of course I have some knowledge of all these adjacent countries.

4. (*a*). South Africa.—I should have thought local races could be found here well suited to oppose those who annoy the Colony. The divisions of barbarians can always be turned to account. But if it be determined to draw on India, I would recommend half Hindoos and half Mahommedans, from the Bombay Presidency, accustomed to see their countrymen go to Aden, and come back again. The Bheels, if they would go, are a race well suited to bush-fighting. There is a large body of Eurasians in India, to whom the Cape climate would be permanently suited. A corps of these might be raised, and made locals. Recruits could be supplied, when wanted, from India.

(*b*.) *Mauritius.*—Mauritius is well suited by climate to natives of India, who go there freely as hired labourers, to cultivate sugar; stay periods of five or ten years, and return with large savings to India. Many seem to stay there for good, and I understand that they now form a moiety of the 400,000 total population of the island. These coolies come chiefly from the hill tribes of Bengal and Orissa, and the Tamils of the Madras coast.

The Orissa men would not make soldiers, but the Tamels form a good class of the Madras native army; and I should think a corps could be raised out of these on the spot, and constantly recruited, without the trouble of bringing men from India. They should be balanced by an equal number of Mahommedans from the Madras Presidency.

Mauritius is said to have good fortifications, and natives fight almost as well as Europeans behind works.

I believe there are no Aborigines in Mauritius, from whom a local corps could be raised.

(*c*.) *Ceylon.*—In Ceylon, the races are cognate with those of the southern coast of India; the climate is similar, and the distance small. In the Ceylon rifles, I believe there are many Malays (a race introduced into the island as mercenaries, by the Dutch), and that they do well.

But they are Mahommedans, and should be balanced by other races. I do not know whether any Kandians from the Ceylon hills have been enlisted, or would enlist, but if possible, they should be, as they are said to be a fine highland race.

The Telingas of Madras and the Dekhan, are well suited to service in Ceylon; at one time, they conquered it.

(*d*.) *Straits Settlement.*—All the races which supply the Madras army, are accustomed to serve in the Straits settlements, but I should think it would be good policy also, to have some Malays of the country.

(*e*.) *China.*—In China, also, the Madras military races have been accustomed to serve cheerfully, and this is half the battle. As a rule, the Indians of the interior and upper provinces, dislike foreign service, and especially the sea, so that they should be last resorted to. Belooches, from Sindh, would be well suited to China. I should not advocate raising local corps of Chinese, because they are not our own subjects. As a race, too, they are notorious for secret conspiracy.

(*f*.) *Malta.*

(*g*.) *Gibraltar.*—My judgment would be decidedly against bringing Indian troops to Europe. It is quite enough to take them to the Indian and China seas, and among Buddhists, Mahommedans, Hindoos, and Kaffirs.

But should Parliament resolve on such a measure, then all that remains, is to bring the robustest races who can be induced to come, and I would recommend men of the Punjaub and its border, half Mahommedans and half Sikhs.

(*h*.) *West Indies.*—The special objection to sending Indian troops to the West Indies, is the great distance. But Indian coolies have gone there as sugar labourers, and if the measure be determined on at all, Madras coast Hindoos would go the most cheerfully.

(*i*.) *New Zealand.*—Here I would object, not only to the distance, but to the needlessness of sending to India for auxiliaries; and I would strongly recommend the policy so successful in India, of raising regiments from the natives of the country. The Maorees are a most martial race, and to keep them always as enemies, is not making the best use of them. At first sight, it may seem unlikely that Maorees would fight for us against their own countrymen, but those who have dealt with wild races, know the contrary. Not only does all experience in India prove it, but I would appeal to the experience of the late war in New Zealand, in which the Han-hau fanatics 200 strong, made an expedition to exterminate the Europeans in the settlement of Wanganni, were encountered by a body of friendly natives, and after a severe fight, were all either killed or dispersed. Subsequent to this, a small colonial force, with the help of a friendly native contingent, expelled the Han-haus from the east coast, and seizied and carried to Aukland 30 or 40 natives implicated in the murder of the missionary Volkner. In fact, the powerful element of religion comes in aid of policy, in New Zealand, as it does not do in India. Christian Maorees would naturally take service with us, and be elevated in doing so; and the two races would be drawn more together. Again, the Maorees are at least equal, and probably superior, to the best races in India, in soldierly qualities. To bring Indians against them, would be as aggravating as enlisting them on one side would be tranquillising to the Colony.

5. The Indian troops in Colonies would require to be relieved as a rule, every three years, as the Madras troops used to be in China, the Straits, Burmah, &c., and the arrangements for making those reliefs would turn upon the way in which Question 15 may be decided. If a Colonial regi-

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ment be borrowed from the Indian native army, an extra regiment will be kept up in that army, and regularly relieved in its turn. If the Colony wish to have a local corps, and can get it, it will be necessary to let one-third of the men go on furlough every year; and the corps must be one-third stronger and more costly in consequence. The native officers on furlough would then recruit for the regiment. But I do not think that any of the races of India, except Eurasians, would enlist to be made locals in any other Colony than Ceylon, which is really a fragment of their own country.

6. I have only named those races which have been accustomed for years to cross the sea on service, or would be likely to consent to do so. As a general remark, all the races of India dislike foreign service and crossing the sea; but most of them will go for a consideration. The high caste men of Oudd and the north-west provinces of Bengal refuse, in bodies, to go to sea, as they say it breaks their caste; but even these men, as individuals, when enlisted in the Bombay and Madras armies, and cut off from social prejudices, go everywhere, and do everything with their comrades, though they may talk a little about it, to keep up their own dignity. I have heard a Madras officer of experience relate his amusement and surprise at catching a high caste Hindoostanee native officer buying a "sheep's head and trotters" in the bazaar in China, because he could no longer stand the climate without animal food. When laughed at, he laughed too, and said "When I get back to Hindostan I can make it all right again with the Brahmins."

7. Experience has long shown that the terms granted by the Madras Government to its sepoys when on foreign service, quite content the men. The details can be readily got from the India Office; but the general features of the arrangement are:—

1. Provision for regular payments to the soldier's families left behind.

2. Pensions to ditto, in case of casualties abroad.

3. Free rations, in excess of Indian pay.

4. Stated reliefs.

8. In all the Colonies in the Indian and China seas, which seem to me suited for Indian garrisons, I think the Indian system, to which the natives are accustomed, should be adhered to, of having a nucleus of British troops, more or less, according to the Colony, even in times of peace. You cannot tell when war may arise in such places as the Cape and China; and the system on which you intend to fight, must be kept up in peace, if only in skeleton. I would always keep the guns in the hands of Europeans; and in other arms, one European to three native soldiers.

9. Yes; three Indian regiments brigaded with one British, and backed by British artillery, are good against all comers.

10. *See* answer to No. 9.

11. Ditto, ditto.

12. No one would pretend that any coloured troops in the world, whether Indians or others, are equal to British soldiers. Therefore, if you substitute black troops for white, you must have more of them. Where it is a question of open field, I would say three for one. Where it is the defence of fortifications, two for one.

13. This would depend much on the quarter from which the pressure came. If we were at war with Russia we could not withdraw British troops from India; for Russia is very wisely closing her Asiatic frontier on our own. The only object which could repay her for all the trouble she is taking, is to have a check upon us in case of another war. When that war comes, we shall find that we are no longer free in India to turn our attention and our resources to the Baltic and the Black Sea. We shall find unaccountable intrigues springing up in the native courts of India; and if the war lasts long enough, we shall find our frontier alight, and Central Asia in commotion. Again, if the European enemy be a great maritime power, we could not denude the Colonies of British troops; though otherwise we could do so. The true policy would seem to be this, to establish in peace a system that would stand in war; to lead each Colony to undertake its own defence as far as practicable; to enlist local races as the groundwork of local defence; to back these with the minimum of British troops (*i. e.* the maximum you could spare in war), and then if necessary, and not otherwise, supplement these with Indian auxiliaries. Our home resources would then be so economised, that we could draw on them for all the demands of a European war, without making the alarm vibrate to the outer edges of the Empire, by calling home battalions from India and the Colonies.

14. This is entirely a question of treatment. The service itself must always go against the grain of the natives of India; but if it be made profitable, and not too long, so that when the soldiers return home again they may find they have saved more money than they could have done in India, there will be nothing but good feeling about it.

15. In my answer to Question 5, I have expressed my opinion that there is little choice in this matter, as it is not probable that any natives of India (unless it be Eurasians), would accept permanent service in any Colony except Ceylon. Eurasians might agree to be localised at the Cape, or in China, or indeed, anywhere. There are other obvious difficulties in such an arrangement; the greater expense entailed by furloughs and recruiting, and the officering of the local corps. On the whole I think it quite practicable for the Colonies I have named in Answer 2, to borrow regiments regularly from India, and adjust the accounts; but impracticable to raise and maintain Indian regiments of their own.

16. If the British garrison of India be kept up to its standard, this should be sufficient to meet all emergencies. In 1857, we had so few European troops in India, that we were obliged to call on the Cape for assistance. But the contingency of helping India ought not to be an argument for keeping in any colony more British troops than the colony itself requires.

17. As a question of time, Ceylon, the Straits, China, and perhaps Mauritius, could send reinforcements to India, sooner than to England.

18. From my answer to Question 4, it will be

be seen that I strongly advocate the policy of enlisting the races of the country, which has pacified many of the most troublesome parts of India. This policy is at once the easiest, cheapest, justest, and most efficient.

19. In considering this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are three presidencies, and three native armies in India. In the Bombay and Madras armies, I believe general service has always been both the theory and the practice; and notably so in the Madras army, which has habitually taken the garrison duty of China, the Straits, and the Pegu Provinces. But in the Bengal army caste and prejudice ran high, and to get the native troops on general service was always a matter of volunteering and coaxing. Previous to 1856, there were a few regiments in the Bengal native army called volunteer corps, who had accepted the conditions of general service. And in 1856, Lord Canning ordered that all future enlistments throughout the Bengal Presidency should be for general service. In the reorganisation of the native army after the mutiny of 1857, general service was, I believe, the basis; and this is so recent, that no native soldier can be unaware of it. But, having been employed on purely civil and political duties during the three years (1862, 1863, 1864) that I have been in India since the new army was organised, I am unable to speak to the feeling of the men upon this point. Terms, however, have a tendency to become obsolete if not enforced; and with the exception of Colonel Probyn's and Colonel Fane's regiments of Punjab Cavalry, who took such a distinguished part in the last China war, I cannot call to mind that any native troops from Bengal have crossed the sea. Referring to the Army List for January 1867, I find, that whereas the Madras Native Army had sent six battalions across the sea to garrisons in the Straits and the Pegu provinces, the Bombay army had sent only one to Aden, and the Bengal army not one. When then it is remembered that the Pegu provinces are a part of the Bengal Presidency, it does not look well for the general service principle in the Bengal army, that the Madras troops are still taking the sea duties. No doubt there are some good reasons for it, but they would have to be inquired into before this 19th Question could be answered satisfactorily.

20. The fewer changes you make in Indian armies the better; but if any have to be made, a time of peace like the present, is of course the best for making them; especially while there is a Governor General on the spot like Sir John Lawrence, who knows the native troops.

21. If the men like it, and see an advantage in it, they will draw no distinction. If they don't like it they will soon find a distinction, that China is further than Burmah, and Mauritius further than Aden. As far as I understand, going across the sea, has always been reconciled to the Madras troops by pecuniary advantages.

22. The only case strictly in point which I can remember during my service (*i.e.* since January 1841), was that of a corps of Sikh pioneers, raised in the Punjab about 1859, by Captain O'Brien, for service in the Crown colony of Ceylon. When they reached Ceylon, there proved to be a misunderstanding as to the duties on which they were to be employed. My impression is, that the Sikhs expected to be military pioneers, but found they were required only as an organised corps of labourers on the roads. A hot dispute arose as to the terms of enlistment, ending in insubordination and commotion.

Public opinion was greatly divided about the merits of the case. Reports of harsh and unfair treatment reach the men's homes in the Punjab, and coming just after the great services of the Sikh race in the Sepoy war of 1857, created uneasiness for the time, and the experiment was dropped. The cause of the failure was a want of full understanding beforehand. The mutiny of the Bengal regiments, and discontent of some Madras regiments when ordered to Sindh, after its annexation in 1843–44, though not so literally in point, is really as much to the purpose; because what they quarrelled about was going to a distant and, to them, quite foreign country without being paid extra for it. The moral of which is, that any service far from their own homes is, in itself, distasteful to the natives of India. The reasons are obvious: Firstly, the men have to leave their families behind, and to provide for them respectably in their absence, which is difficult, precarious, and expensive. Secondly, the change of climate is feared. Thirdly, so is association with alien races and religions, and where it is a question of crossing the sea, the difficulty increases in the ratio of caste. Fourthly, furlough, which is a much-prized privilege, becomes almost impracticable. To surmount these difficulties, therefore, some solid compensation must be given.

(I have not mentioned the Barrackpore mutiny of 1824, because it was before my time; but we all know that it was caused by a mixed fear of losing caste by going to sea, and disgust at an unhealthy foreign service.)

23. Whatever raised the sentiment of loyalty to the Crown in the native army would of course be desirable. But I do not think foreign and distant service, in strange climes, would have that effect. Quite the contrary. We have only to look at home, and inquire with what feelings foreign service is regarded by our own British troops and officers, though they are supported by every sentiment of patriotism.

24. Answer not required.

25. Both in India and the Colonies, the first economical and conciliatory policy is to enlist as far as possible the people of the country. Safety can generally be given to it, by balancing local races, religions, and interests. Neglect of this precaution gave such serious proportions to the Sepoy mutiny of 1857. The Bengal army had become a great brotherhood. Even then, we raised a new native army from other martial races at our disposal, and thus enabled the handful of Europeans in the country to break the neck of the mutiny before reinforcements came from England. Local races, too, are always the most efficient. Until quite lately, the difficulty in India was to find employment; and it would have been highly unjust and impolitic to import Africans, or other foreigners. Many things have combined to work a great change in this respect. The war of 1857 finished what Clive began in 1757. It settled the question of supremacy in India. All classes accepted the fact, and settled down to the arts of peace. Lord Dalhousie's great system of railroads began to come into play, at once absorbing labour, and opening fallow districts. The introduction of

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tea cultivation, the call for cotton in consequence of the American war, and the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown, have all produced a rush of European enterprise. The result is a great development of both trade and agriculture, and a wonderful rise in the prices of produce and labour.

Still, I do not anticipate that there will ever be a scarcity of recruits for the native army; and I am quite sure that no other coloured races would prove more docile and loyal in our hands than our own native subjects in India.

Herbert B. Edwards,
Ventnor, Isle of Wight, Colonel.
14 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Major General *Hodgson*, Commanding Troops in *Ceylon.*

1. I AM of opinion that substituting Indian for English troops in our Colonies would be perfect madness, a moral suicide. Any magazines, forts, or artillery entrusted to them would be turned against us sooner or later; any moment might see our Colonies exposed to mutiny, devastation, and bloodshed. The only form in which they should be employed are as police, and even then they must be well watched by Europeans.

2. Not in one as a substitute.

3. I have special knowledge of many Colonies, but I would not trust the protection, internal or external, of a single one to natives of India.

4. Should it be finally determined upon to employ natives of India in place of Europeans in any of the Colonies named in Question No. 4, the consequences would, in my opinion, be so certainly fatal that I must decline specifying any race to commence the experiment with. Whatever the race, the fatal result would be merely a question of time and opportunity.

5. Supposing the determination carried out, these native troops must be scrupulously relieved every three years at the very least. They are very suspicious, and the slightest delay would produce serious evil, however good their conduct until then.

6. I do not consider that religious prejudices would operate in any great degree, social habits probably would. Any increased advantages would assuredly lead at some critical moment to a further demand.

7. Wherever they might go they would regard themselves as our protectors, and, as mere mercenaries, would place the highest price on their services. They would require the same pay and advantages as European soldiers, perhaps more, as they would believe themselves indispensable, and that we were bankrupt in soldiers of our own race. They would insist upon no limit to women and children, and if persuaded to embark without them on a sacred pledge of being relieved at the end of three years, and of their families during that period being supported by Government, they would ere long become discontented, from which there will be but one step to revolt.

8.—(*a.*) Certainly not.
(*b.*) Certainly not; far better be without British artillery, if unsupported by British infantry.
(*c.*) Just as many European troops as if there were no natives at all.

9. With a large number of European officers and non-commissioned officers, they might perhaps do some service against frontier savages, or a pusillanimous race like the Cingalese, especially if there was a prospect of pillage, but in cases of internal disturbances generally they would be as little to be trusted as the inhabitants.

10. To employ them as a substitute would be fatal, and as a supplement they would cause anxiety, instead of giving a feeling of security. If I demanded 5,000 Europeans to defend a position, and were asked how many I should require if 2,000 natives of India were sent, I should ask for 6,000 Europeans instead of 5,000.

11. Certainly not; no pay, no indulgence, no privilege, no conciliation can acquire for us their love or loyalty. Alien to us in colour, creed, and race, without one feeling in common, they have proved by the late mutiny that they regard us with unmitigated hatred, and that they cannot be relied upon.

12. Assuredly not; not if they were five to one; not if commanded by the best officers in Europe; not if led by the Sovereign in person.

13. Our military force in the Colonies is so small that it could be of little use there in the event of a war; its certain capture would add to the disaster. The Colonies may be said to be defenceless; troops are maintained chiefly for local purposes; I am of opinion, therefore, that, in the event of a great pressure at home, it would be advisable to withdraw the troops from the Colonies, not, however, filling their places by natives from India, but leaving the Colonies to their own resources.

14. Certainly not; he would be discontented and insubordiate while serving, and return to his native country with foreign vices added to his own, and probably a great deal of dangerous knowledge.

15. It would be better to raise fresh regiments in India specially for colonial service, and then they could make no complaints, as their position would be clearly defined at the period of enlistment, whereas regiments already formed might declare they had been entrapped from their original engagement.

16. The knowledge that there are British troops in the neighbouring Colonies would never prevent one of those sudden risings to which Asiatics are so prone; neither would it prevent a deep-laid conspiracy. They are only to be checked by the sight of a powerful and avenging arm upon the spot. Reduced, moreover, as the military force is in all the neighbouring Colonies, and which is well known in India, the fear of anything that could be sent would produce no practical effect.

17. I know of no Colony from whence 200 men could be conveniently withdrawn; certainly not from those where I command, Ceylon, Singapore, and the Straits.

I do not mean to imply that the withdrawal of a couple of hundred men would lead to an outbreak, but all proper military duty would collapse; the attempt to carry it on would entail such a pressure

pressure upon the troops that the loss of life among them would be great; in fact, all that makes a military body would be destroyed.

These are considerations which do not weigh with colonists in their clamour for military reductions. They are blind to all military considerations.

A few months ago there were riots in Ceylon owing to fears of a famine, and had the arrival of rice been delayed 24 hours there would assuredly have been an outbreak, in which event I must have allowed all but the capital towns to be pillaged; I could not have spared one man from head quarters. Other colonists are similarly situated; how, therefore, could British troops under such circumstances be of the slightest importance for the defence of India, in case of an emergency?

18. I utterly object to the employment of Indian troops in any of the places named; they would increase external or internal danger. Dangerous as is a purely local force, better trust to it than to natives from India.

19 and 20. I have no cognizance.

21. The Bombay and Madras troops have for many years served at Aden, Burmah, and in the Straits Settlements; they might not object to China, but they would probably consider the Mauritius too foreign.

22. I have no knowledge.

23. It would not be profitable to give to a native Indian army the character and feeling of an Imperial army. Their patriotism and loyalty are not for us. Their belief in the stability of our power is not as strong as formerly, and to hatred of us will be added contempt if they believe we cannot find soldiers of our own race.

24. Utterly impossible, either for general or local service; I once saw a native corps raised here, but it soon collapsed amidst the jeers of the people themselves.

25. I see no objection to employing in India troops of races not Indian, but no advantage would be gained thereby. Native troops of any race or clime would combine against us if there should not be a preponderating European force at hand. An army for India, though composed of races not Indian, could never be a substitute for Europeans; it could be merely a supplement, and must be of equal strength with the present army.

Chinese, Malay, African, or other race not Indian, could not with safety be employed in any Colony without a European force amounting to at least one-third of their number, and under all circumstances native troops of whatever race should be armed with an inferior weapon to that in the hands of the European troops on the spot. If the latter have breech loaders, the former should merely have the ordinary rifle.

Studholm Hodgson,
Major General,
Commanding H. M. Forces in Ceylon.

Ceylon, 26 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Sir *J. Gaspard Le Marchant,* K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Madras Army.

1. I THINK it most inexpedient; but if it were so decided, then in the Colonies within the Tropics, if not too far removed, and where there is never any extreme cold, the native troops of the Madras Presidency might be employed, provided distinctly that they are accompanied by a proper complement of European officers, but not with the few laid down for the existing organisation of the native army.

2. Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and Hong Kong.

I have omitted the West Indies, solely, however, on account of the distance from India. The passage would be extremely long and tedious, the men would suffer in health from their long confinement, and the changed nature of the food for so protracted a period, and the want of frequent and quick communication with their families and relations would also be an insuperable difficulty.

3. No, with the exception of the Straits Settlements, which have hitherto been garrisoned by the Madras Army under my command.

4. The classes from which the Madras infantry is recruited, are the best adapted for military duty in the Colonies specified in Answer 2. The high caste Hindoos, such as Rajhpoots, &c., would not be likely to enlist for such service. Beloochees and Sikhs would only answer for warlike operations when plunder can be obtained.

5. If Madras regiments are so employed, they would expect to be relieved at the expiration of "*three*" years' service away from their homes.

6. I should apprehend no special difficulties. The advantages now enjoyed by the native troops of this Presidency would, I think, be all that are required, namely, rations and batta, with pensions to the heirs of the men who die when on such service, or after their return, from disease contracted on the said service. The Madras regulations on this point are complete, and should be "scrupulously" observed.

7. In my opinion, the pay and advantages above mentioned (Answer 6), are sufficient. If there is any idea, however, of enlisting men specially for service in the Colonies without stipulating for their periodical relief triennially, the terms upon which the Pegu Sappers battalion was raised might induce some natives to enlist, but it would be to a very limited extent, probably not more than sufficient for two corps; and those who would be willing to enter such service would be men of bad character, who would take advantage of the opportunity to get out of the country.

8. I think it would be very impolitic to leave such troops by themselves in Colonies in which they had never previously served, until at all events they had acquired confidence in themselves, and a knowledge of the people. The support of a proportion of British infantry would be necessary, except perhaps in the Straits Settlements, where eventually artillery might suffice.

The proportion of British infantry and artillery must depend on local circumstances.

9. Only if duly supported by British troops, and in the Colonies mentioned in Answer No. 2.

10. Not

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10. Not in substitution certainly, but as a supplement to British troops, occasions might arise, when it could be done with advantage; this system is pursued in India in all foreign wars.

11. Yes; I think they could.

12. Native troops, by themselves, would be inadequate; and for such portion of the British garrison as may be replaced by native troops, at the very least two of the latter should be substituted for every one of the former withdrawn.

13. The former would, undoubtedly, be preferable; in such case the European force in India ought not to be weakened.

14. Such service would not affect the native soldier's loyalty or original disposition in any way.

15. The Madras Presidency would have to be chiefly depended upon for troops for Colonial service; and it is very doubtful whether a sufficient number of recruits could be enlisted specially and exclusively to form regiments with reliefs for such service; it would therefore be necessary to take regiments from the Indian army, according to their turn; but with the "present number" of Madras regiments the service for the Colonies could not be undertaken. The temper of the army would not bear to be harassed unduly with tours of foreign service.

16. The proximity of European troops must have a certain moral effect; but little absolute assistance could be looked for from them. During the great mutiny this was very practically illustrated, when but few were obtained from the Colonies before they were replaced from home. Those that first arrived were diverted while on their passage to China, at Singapore.

17. They could be now obtained from England more easily than elsewhere, except Ceylon, which probably would not be able to spare any of its garrison.

18. It must be chiefly a local question how far troops raised upon the spot can be wholly relied on to act against their own races in cases of internal disturbances. Against external enemies troops raised on the spot might prove in every way efficient; but, again, it requires a knowledge of the population of the Colony itself, and local experience to speak decidedly on this point.

19. The Madras native soldier knows that he is liable to service beyond seas.

20. Answered by preceding Question No. 19.

21. The Madras troops would be as willing to serve at the Mauritius or China (as they have already done at the latter place) as they now are to go to Burmah and the Straits, provided they are sent on the same terms.

I may here add, that jealousy would doubtless arise between the European officers of the Royal troops and those of the Indian army, should they be serving together on Colonial duty, in consequence of the marked disparity of the Colonial allowances of the former, as compared with the more liberal pay of the Eastern officers.

22. I personally know of none as "the consequence" of employment beyond seas.

Instances of insubordination and discontent in this army have almost invariably arisen on questions of pay and allowances.

23. Nothing of the kind; they are essentially mercenaries, and care little whether they serve the Crown or not. If the choice were now given them they would prefer to revert to what they consider the good old days of the Honourable Company.

24. See Answer No. 7, as regards Southern India.

25. It would be inexpedient, on every account, to employ such in India. Further, I doubt the practicability of embodying any force from those nations in sufficient strength or numbers to render them efficient or of importance. I have only recently returned from a tour of inspection through Singapore, the other Straits Settlements, and Burmah; Malays cannot be found even to supply the Rifle regiment in Ceylon.

The Chinese have physical and other qualities to recommend them, but these again are marred by the difficulty of the language, and the ineradicable taint of "Secret Societies," which prevail universally amongst them, and render them ineligible from its dangerous consequences for enrolment as troops.

(signed) *J. Gaspard Le Marchant,*
Commander in Chief, Madras Army.

Head-quarters, Ootacamund,
10 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Sir *Henry Barkly*, K. C. B., Governor of the Mauritius.

1. To a limited extent, and subject to certain restrictions, I think it might advantageously be done.

2. The West Indian Colonies, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, China, Mauritius, Natal, Cape of Good Hope, and, perhaps, New Zealand.

3. I was Governor of British Guiana, 1848–53, of Jamaica from 1853–56, and of Mauritius from 1863–67.

I have visited the Cape and Ceylon.

4, 5. For the West Indies, Mauritius, and other Colonies, containing a large population of Indian immigrants, the troops employed should in my opinion be Sikhs, Goorkas, or others of different creeds or proclivities to those of the natives of India who emigrate.

In Mauritius especially, I should strongly deprecate the employment of a sepoy regiment, as there are a quarter of a million Hindoos in the island.

6. I am not aware of any. Regiments of Beloochees touched here last year on their way back from China, and seemed to get on well in the place.

8. No. I should not advocate the leaving of native troops entirely, without the example and check of a certain number of British soldiers. I do not think artillery would suffice for this purpose.

In

In Mauritius, one regiment of the line instead of two as now, would be essential. In Jamaica also, a European regiment should always be kept in reserve at Newcastle. In British Guiana, I believe there are now no white troops.

9. Yes, if supported as above.

10. Supported by a sufficient number of British troops, I have no doubt they would be efficient.

11. I think so. I am under the impression that sepoys formed a portion of the force which captured Mauritius.

12. As far as garrison work went they might, the Sikhs, in particular, being excellent gunners; but in the open field they could not, of course, be so much depended on as Europeans.

13. This is a question of degree. England, no doubt, must be the first consideration, India next, and then the Colonies, according to their value and capabilities for self-defence. It would be unwise under any circumstances to leave India short of British troops.

14. Advantageous as giving him an idea of the extent and power of British rule, and lessening the great ignorance stated to prevail in India on that subject.

15. I should say, to raise special regiments with a distinct understanding that they were liable to Colonial service. It would be better probably to begin by limiting the service to the Eastern Colonies.

16, 17. It certainly proved so during the mutiny. Regiments from Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape, and, I believe, even Australia, reached India sooner than any aid from England.

It may be different when a well-arranged relief system is established in regular steam transports *viâ* the Red Sea, but is it prudent to reckon upon that route being under all contingencies available?

18, 19. I cannot venture to pronounce any opinion as to South Africa; but with reference to the other Colonies named, I should say decidedly yes, with a slight reservation only as to native African troops in the West Indies, which, as far as I can judge, are quite as efficient in case either of external or internal danger, and probably more so in the West Indies, than Indian troops would be.

They are, however, fiercer and more cruel in warfare, and I believe that as the slave trade declines, and captures are fewer, it becomes more and more difficult to obtain recruits for our West India regiments, and if it becomes necessary to recruit largely from the Creole population of the West Indies, such regiments might, in case of internal disturbance, become dangerous.

(signed) *Henry Barkly.*

Government House, Mauritius,
5 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Colonel *H. St. George Ord*, C. B., R. E., Governor of the Straits Settlements.

1, 2, 3. My acquaintance with Indian troops is so slight that I do not feel competent to offer any opinion as to the expediency of substituting them for English troops in the Colonies in time of peace.

4. In the Straits Settlements I understand the low caste natives of Southern India are found to be very well adapted for duty as soldiers.

5, 6. They require to be relieved about once in every three years, but I believe that if it were desired to establish a local force, arrangements might be made for securing their services for longer periods, probably, in some cases, as long as was desirable, by permitting their families to accompany them.

7. No difficulties are found to exist to the employment of natives of Southern India in the Straits Settlements, and I have recommended to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that I may be permitted to organise a force of armed police in substitution of a small force of Ceylon Rifles, which it has been proposed to allocate for the service of the settlements.

8. I should not like to rely solely on native infantry in the Straits Settlements, but I believe that the European force which has been appropriated for their defence, viz., half a regiment of infantry and two batteries of garrison R. A., to be quite sufficient.

25. I have long been of opinion, and have advocated in communications to the Colonial and War Departments, the employment of Africans in the West Indies and Bermuda. I am satisfied that under proper arrangements, which I have defined, they might, to a great extent, supply the place of European troops. They can perform all garrison duties better than the latter, and in most cases would be as useful in the suppression of internal disorder. They would not be capable of protecting a Colony against an attack by a civilized force; but, from their capability of resisting exposure to the sun and night air, they would be very useful auxiliaries to European troops under such circumstances. I should be very glad to have the services of such a force in the Straits Settlements, but I presume the expense of transport would be an obstacle to their employment.

(signed) *H. St. George Ord,*
Governor.

Singapore, 21 June 1867.

App. No. 1. ANSWERS of Sir *Richard Graves MacDonnell*, C.B., Governor of Hong Kong.

1. In Colonies where white troops suffer from heat, such as Ceylon, the Straits, and Hong Kong, the principal part of ordinary garrison duty might be performed by Indian troops, composed of Sikhs and the hill tribes: there should not, however, be less than a battalion of English troops at Hong Kong, with a full battery of British royal artillery.

The injurious effects of night-duty upon European troops in the tropics cannot be over-estimated; moreover, the comforts required by western constitutions in these exhaustive climates, do not seem to come within the reach of present pay and allowances. The substitution of Indian for English troops, with the restriction above mentioned, would, therefore, probably be a decided improvement.

2. I can only suggest the above Colonies, because, though I have administered a government in the West Indies, and believe that Indian troops, of the quality alluded to in Reply No. 1, would be, for many reasons, preferable to negro regiments, I question if Her Majesty's Government has any serious plans on that subject, while the expense would probably prevent any change in the present arrangement for the West Indies.

3. I administered the government of St. Vincent, in the West Indies; have travelled in Ceylon; passed through the Straits Settlements, and am Governor in Chief of Hong Kong.

4. I think, as before stated, that the Sikh and hill tribes should alone be employed; it seems to me throwing money away to raise such corps as the Ceylon Rifles and Gun Lascars. I could rout the whole force (upwards of 400 men) with 115 Sikhs whom I lately caused to be raised in the Punjaub, for service in the Hong Kong police. Only recently some Chinese thieves broke open a powder magazine here, containing 48 tons of powder, watched by two sentries of the Ceylon Rifles, and carried off several of the heavy metal cases containing the powder, having first opened the cases, and emptied on the floor of the magazine the inclosed bags of powder. The thieves appear to have intended to melt the cases (which have since been recovered), and use them for coining false money. I drew the attention of the general to this very disgraceful negligence of two sentries, and there has been an inquiry, resulting in the substitution of European sentries at that post.

In fact, troops like the Ceylon Rifles and the Gun Lascars now in garrison here, are only of use where no real danger is apprehended, and where it is not essential to repose thorough confidence in their watchfulness or courage; they are given to opium-eating, and quite disqualify themselves thereby for duty.

5. I cannot undertake to do more than suggest that, for reasons of policy, a longer stay than four years of the same body of native troops in the same place does not seem expedient.

6. I have experience of Sikhs and natives from Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras; a little attention to their comfort in certain small matters connected with rations and cooking supplies will surmount the special difficulties alluded to.

7. I cannot answer this definitely; but am certain that to have good troops they must be contented, and that they will not be contented unless liberally treated. The pay in the police force here, with allowance for rations and clothes, may be regarded as equivalent, in the case of a private, to 3*l.* per mensem.

8. Native Indian troops would not alone be sufficient at Hong Kong in times of peace, nor, I believe, in any other Colony; the heart of the force should be British. Here, as above stated, one European battalion is, in my opinion as Governor, absolutely essential. The greater the number of Indian troops employed in addition, the less fatiguing will be the garrison duty to the British soldiers. Six hundred (600) native Indian troops, in addition to the English battalion and artillery would suffice. Here there is always a risk of hostilities.

10, 11. Good Indian troops have frequently behaved well both in India and China, and would again be a material aid here, as supplementary, and only as supplementary. Nothing is a substitute for British troops in moments of actual danger and emergency.

12. This question is for a military man; but I suggest that the proportion of British troops maintained in any British Colony should always be adequate to bear the brunt of either attack or defence in the event of actual hostilities.

13. Supposing the number of European regiments in the Colonies to be not in excess of the force necessary (as stated in reply No. 8), it would seem at once more advantageous and more expeditious to draw upon India for home requirements.

14. From what I see here of the willingness of the Sikhs who have already served in China, to continue service there, and from the general bearing of the men, I think their loyalty has been improved by Colonial service.

15. This is a difficult question; but having had experience of local corps, I must say that I object to them as having no "*esprit du corps*," and offering a narrow and dreary field of service. Even if a regiment was to be specially raised for Colonial service, it should still be one of the regiments of the Indian army, and its officers members of the Indian service. I trust that grave consideration will be given to the subject before more local corps are raised, such as the Cape Corps and the Ceylon Rifles; they necessarily degenerate in every way after a short time.

16. No; it is unlikely any force would be employed during peace in the Colonies, over and above what is required for ordinary service. In an emergency of an extensive kind, I could send to India the European battalion stationed here, and increase the police force, but such a course would not be safe.

17. I think the telegraph would bring reinforcements first from Europe.

18. I cannot speak as to South Africa; but I certainly consider that in all the other Colonies mentioned, and more especially at Hong Kong, Indian troops would be far superior, for reasons of policy, to any troops enlisted in those Colonies.

19, 20. I cannot

19, 20. I cannot answer these questions from my own knowledge.

21, 22, 23. I see no difficulty—though, of course, my opinion on that subject carries little personal weight—in removing the Indian army to service in climates of suitable character, and by liberal treatment making it feel more an Imperial force. Those who have served here liked it. It might be very important to popularise Colonial service with the Indian officers and soldiers, and I believe it quite practicable to do so.

24. Impossible, of course, to recruit for any portion of Her Majesty's forces at Hong Kong.

25. Chinese soldiers would not answer at all. I cannot speak personally of many Malays, except from specimens in the Ceylon Rifles; I should not rely on them in either civil or military emergencies. The African negro is brave, and physically strong; I have been more than once in action with him; but the experiment in his case has been tried by former West Indian regiments, and others can give evidence more in point on that subject. App. No. 1.

(signed) *Richard Graves MacDonnell*,
Governor.

ANSWERS of Sir *H. G. R. Robinson*, Governor of Ceylon.

1. I AM of opinion that Native Indian Troops may be employed with advantage in many of our Colonies, in which there are indigenous Native populations, as a supplement to Europeans, but not in entire substitution for them, either in time of peace or war. The proportion of Native to British Infantry should not be greater than three to one, and British garrison artillery should always be supported by British infantry.

2. I would employ them in,—

Hong Kong and China.
The Straits Settlements.
Ceylon.
Mauritius.
South Africa.
New Zealand, and the
West Indies.

3. I have administered several West Indian governments, as well as those of Hong Kong and Ceylon, and have also been employed on special service in the Straits Settlements.

4. The Seiks and other warlike tribes in Upper India, who could probably be enlisted in considerable numbers for this service, make very good soldiers, and might be employed with advantage in all the places specified in Answer 2. I doubt whether Native troops could be effectively employed in garrison service in such places as Malta or Gibraltar. Malays make excellent soldiers, but they are difficult to get, and their social habits are inconvenient, from the number of women and children, and the aged and infirm, who are dependent on them for subsistence, and cling to them for protection and support. The Caffre regiments formerly in Ceylon are understood to have been good soldiers so long as they could be kept sober. But of all Oriental races that I have met with, the Chinese have always appeared to me to possess in the highest degree the attributes of good soldiers. They are equally brave as the Seiks, and at the same time steadier and less excitable and impulsive. They have no fear of death; are not cowed by defeat; and if well disciplined and well led, would, I believe, be found inferior only to European troops. Their cost, however, would be far above that of any Indian Native troops, and, probably, but little below that of British infantry.

The Natives of Southern India and of Ceylon do not appear to me to possess any of the essential qualities of a soldier.

5. If Indian troops were sent to the Colonies, they would carry with them Indian pay and allowances, which would then have to be given to the other troops in the command. I assume, therefore, that if the proposal were carried out, Natives would be specially enlisted for colonial service. In such case they should not be employed in any Colony for more than five years at a time. They should then be moved to another station, and they should be granted leave to visit their homes, say once in every six or seven years, which might be the means also of inducing others to enlist, and so of keeping up the force.

6. I know of no prejudices, religious or otherwise, which would hinder the races I have named from undertaking military service beyond sea.

7. The cost of living varies so much in the different Colonies I have named, that in the event of a special force being raised for colonial service, I would suggest a free ration being part of the engagement. The pay and allowances which would have to be offered in addition, would depend upon the condition of the labour market from which it was determined to draw the supply for such a service.

8. Replied to in Answers 1 and 2.

9. Replied to in Answers 1 and 2.

Native Indian troops alone would certainly not afford sufficient protection against internal disturbances in Ceylon.

10. Replied to in Answer 1.

11. Yes. They could no doubt be relied on, when brought into discipline, to lighten the strain on the resources of Great Britain in time of war; but not to a greater extent than that indicated in Answer 1. In my opinion, any Native force should be held in check by Europeans.

12. The permanent defence of our Colonies depends upon the naval superiority of the mother country, and upon her retaining command of the seas. In none of the Colonies named are garrisons maintained of sufficient strength to repel, in the event of our losing the supremacy of the sea, any regularly organised naval and military expedition which might be fitted out against them by any first-class power; nor would it be within the resources of Great Britain to place its Colonies in a state of defence which would guard them against such a contingency. But while retaining

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command of the sea generally, it is quite possible that we might be overpowered for a moment at any particular point, and the danger which is most to be apprehended by our Colonies, and which alone it is possible to guard against, is an attack upon some important point by a small force of the enemy which had either run the gauntlet, or escaped the vigilance of our cruisers. An attack of such a kind would be made, I apprehend, not with the view of holding the position assailed, but to deal a blow at our power and prestige, and to destroy our establishments. The possession of Trincomalee, for example, is of great value to a power possessing command of the sea; but if taken by a small force during the temporary absence of our vessels, and occupied by a power not having command of the sea, we should either recapture it or blockade the port, and in either case so much of the enemy's force would be rendered harmless till the end of the war. All that can be done therefore in the way of rendering a Colony like Ceylon secure from aggression, is to place important positions like Trincomalie, Colombo, and Galle in such a state of defence as will prevent their being entirely at the mercy of a hostile frigate or two which might make a dash at them during the temporary absence of our squadron in another part of the station. For protection against such an attack, it would not be possible to compensate by an addition to the Native troops for the withdrawal of any portion of the existing European garrison of Ceylon without infringing the proportions laid down in Answer 1. For example, the garrison of Ceylon, as laid down by the military commission, is 800 European infantry, 200 artillery, and 900 Natives; total 1,900. If the European infantry were reduced to 500, the Natives could only be increased to 1,500, or 3 to 1, and the garrison would then consist of 500 European infantry, 200 artillery, and 1,500 Natives; total 2,200, against 1,900 before, or a substitution of 600 Natives for 300 Europeans, which would not be an equivalent, at all events, in repelling an attack by a civilised power. I am disposed to think, however, that in garrisons in which there may at present be no native troops, and in which therefore it may be possible to substitute three Natives for each European infantry soldier, such an increase might be adequate even in the case of a foreign attack. For example, if an existing garrison consisted of two European regiments of 1,000 each, and three Native regiments of 1,000 each were substituted for one of the European regiments, the new garrison of 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 Natives would, I think, be capable of repelling a foreign attack as effectually as the existing garrison of 2,000 Europeans.

13. This would depend very much upon the strength of the European force in India and the several Colonies. If the pressure at home were urgent, they would, I suppose, be withdrawn from whatever quarter they could be soonest obtained, without regard to either Indian or Colonial considerations.

14. The effect of Colonial service upon the native soldier would probably be advantageous. If well paid and well cared for, his loyalty would be strengthened, and his intelligence would be enlarged by an acquaintance with other countries besides his own.

15. It would, in my opinion, for the reason I have already given in Answer 5, be better to raise fresh native troops specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. Experience has shown the presence of British troops in the neighbouring Colonies to have been of the most material importance to the defence of India in cases of emergency.

17. Having regard to the facilities now afforded by the telegraph between India and England, and by the new system of transport through Egypt, large reinforcements could be obtained from England in a much shorter time than formerly. Small detachments could, no doubt, be drawn, in the event of any very pressing emergency, from Ceylon, the Straits, and China in less time than from England, but they would have to be replaced immediately by reinforcements from England.

18. Troops locally raised from the native populations of Ceylon would, as already observed, be wholly inefficient for the protection of Ceylon against either external or internal danger.

19. The Malay soldier has never objected to serve beyond the seas, and it was a great disappointment to the whole of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment that they were not sent on to India during the mutiny.

23. I have no doubt that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would give to it more of the character and feeling of an Imperial army and be attended with advantageous results to itself, but I have already expressed the opinion that in a financial point of view it would probably be found more economical to raise separate native corps specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

24, 25. It would not be possible to recruit regiments for general service from the native populations of Ceylon, but I know of no objection to the employment of troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, or African races, in any of the Colonies named under the restrictions as regards relative numbers specified in Answer 1.

Hercules G. R. Robinson,
Governor, Ceylon.

The Pavilion, Kandy,
Ceylon, 28th June 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General *Grant*, Governor and Commander in Chief, Malta.

1. In my opinion it would be very inexpedient.

2. If employed at all, Ceylon, Straits Settlements (local), China, New Zealand, Cape.

3. I never have resided in any of our Colonies.

4. If it should be determined to employ Natives of India in our Colonies, Sikhs and Mahomedans of the countries beyond the Indus would be best fitted for the duty.

5. I feel persuaded that none of the races of India would consent to expatriate themselves for a longer period than three years at the utmost.

6. Many special difficulties, I am confident, would arise, both in respect to religious prejudices and social habits, and I do not think that the difficulties could be overcome by any advantages that could be offered.

7. I do

7. I do not believe that the Natives of India would consent to accept employment in the Colonies for any lengthened period; but if they did, they would certainly stipulate for relief every three years, and for the usual furlough to visit their homes during that period. An increase of at least 50 per cent. to the ordinary rates of pay and allowances would also be required, and, above all, they would require that their religious prejudices and feelings should be carefully protected.

8, 9. My replies to the previous questions answer these queries.

10. If Native troops are employed in the Colonies in time of war, it could only be, having a due regard to safety and efficiency, as a supplement to Europeans.

11. I do not think they could, but certainly only as a supplement to British troops.

12. Certainly not.

13. I am not prepared to say what might be the effect upon the Colonies of withdrawing British regiments from them, and filling up their places with Native soldiers from India. But the Natives of India of all classes are so suspicious and credulous, that I should anticipate the worst effects to accrue from any attempt on the part of the Government to employ them permanently on foreign service, and I strongly hold that the British force in India never should be under seventy thousand (70,000) non-commissioned rank and file of all arms.

14. Very disadvantageous, in my opinion.

15. Of the two evils, the least would be to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. The presence of British troops in neighbouring Colonies is of material importance to the defence of India in case of an emergency; for example, the providential circumstance of the force intended for China being within reach, saved India at the commencement of the mutiny. And I ascribe the adherence of the Sikhs to our cause throughout the mutiny; 1st, to the presence in the Punjaub at that critical period of the only British force of any magnitude at our disposal in India; 2ndly, to the wise foresight of the Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, whose first act on annexing the Punjaub was effectually to disarm the whole population. Of the countless stores of cannon of all calibres, of matchlocks, and arms of all descriptions, with which the country teemed previous to the annexation, not one was left in the possession of the people; so effectually was the disarming carried out, that even their swords were taken from them. Had their former vast supplies of arms been available, and had the Punjaub been denuded of British troops like every other part of India, the Sikhs, I feel convinced, would have made common cause with the mutineers. They do not love us, no native of India does; but they fear us, and we shall find them docile subjects as long as we have a large British force in the country, and abstain from interfering directly or indirectly with their religious prejudices and feelings. When these are assailed, or, which is the same thing, when they think they are in danger of being so, they never hesitate at any sacrifice to protect their faith. Experience proves too that the black man will always band with the black man against the white.

Notwithstanding their unceasing wars, and seemingly implacable animosity towards one another, the Affghans, with their ruler, the head of the Mahomedan religion, took part with the Sikhs against us in the last Punjaub campaign, and, despite their intense hatred of the Mahomedan race, was not the Mahomedan King of Delhi the chosen sovereign of the Hindoos who composed the majority of the insurgents during the mutiny? And again, during the recent insurrection in Jamaica, "Colour for colour," was the gathering cry amongst the Natives. So it has ever been, and so it ever will be, and in India, and in all our Colonies, a proportion of British troops must be, I conceive, our chief safeguard.

17. From England, now that the overland route for the conveyance of troops is about to be efficiently established, and that we can reckon on the militia and volunteer forces of the country for efficient auxiliary support to the troops of the line.

18. For every reason I should prefer raising troops for employment in the Colonies from the local population.

19. I am convinced that they do not believe it in the Bengal Presidency, and that, practically, recruits nominally enlisted for general service do not consider themselves obliged to proceed on foreign service. I always considered the General Order of 1856 a grave error, and one of the many causes to which the mutiny may be ascribed.

20. The change can only be effected by raising regiments for "general service." Enlisting recruits for regiments not originally raised for general service will be practically inoperative.

21. I do not think that the transfer of India to the Crown would have any effect on the native mind in those respects. Service beyond sea is always disliked by the native army of India. I know it is so in Bengal and Madras; and I believe, from all I have heard, that the tour of duty at Aden is distasteful to the native soldiers of the Bombay army.

22. The records in the India Office will exhibit numberless proofs of the noted dislike of the Bengal native soldier to proceed on service beyond sea; and I know that in the Madras native army service in Burmah is looked upon with great dread and abhorrence, notwithstanding the high rate of pay and the promise of the term of absence from their families never being protracted beyond three years.

23. I do not think that the employment of the native Indian army in the British Colonies would tend to give to it the character or feeling of an imperial army; nor, if it had this effect, should I consider such a result at all desirable.

24. It would be possible, I conceive, to recruit from the native population of a colony for local service, and I should consider that measure liable to less objection than the employment of natives of India in our Colonial possessions.

25. I have already stated, and I think adduced ample proof in support of my opinion, that, sinking all animosities of race, colour, and religion, the black man will always unite with the black against the white man; wherefore, on all considerations, military, civil, and political, I am strongly

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strongly opposed to the employment, save from the local population when absolutely necessary, either in India or the Colonies, of Asiatic troops. We must always have a native army in India to take those duties which, from exposure to the climate, would be injurious to the health of Europeans; but, in time of peace, let the native army be purely local; and, for field service abroad, call for volunteers, and they will always be forthcoming, as they were for Egypt, Ceylon, the Mauritius, Burmah, and China. I would urge that the employment of natives of India, and all coloured races, should be strictly confined to the cavalry and infantry branches, never on artillery duties of any description; and let it be a fixed and unalterable rule to place all arsenals, magazines, war materiel of every sort, and principal Commissariat depôts, under the protection of British soldiers.

It was the possession of the Delhi magazine and arsenal, with its large stores of ammunition and materiel of war of all kinds, which mainly enabled the mutineers to protract the struggle as they did. Notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of every Commander-in-chief, from Lord Hastings to Lord Gough and Sir Charles Napier, the grand arsenal for the Upper Provinces was persistently maintained at Delhi without a single British soldier nearer to that station than Meerut, upwards of 40 miles distant. A tenable post, such as was the magazine at Delhi, held by even a small detachment of British soldiers, would have formed a safe refuge for all the Europeans at the station who were so ruthlessly butchered; and the preservation of our stores of materiel, which would have been insured, would have effectually crippled the mutineers, and brought their resistance to a speedy termination.

(signed) *Jas. Grant*,
Lieut. General.

The Palace, Malta,
16 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Major General *Guy*, Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in China and Japan.

1. The partial substitution of Indian for English troops in some of our Colonies is, in my opinion, extremely desirable.

2. In Mauritius, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China.

3. A residence of nearly 10 years in Mauritius, and two years and eight months in China, convince me that the employment of Indian troops in the Colonies above mentioned would be attended with great advantage, by affording relief to European soldiers from garrison duties in those exhausting climates.

4. I consider the Sikhs superior to all other Indian troops; the Beloochees, Punjabee Mussulmen, and men from the Peshawur frontier, also make excellent soldiers when properly officered.

5. Men of the races above named, might be induced to serve in the Colonies for five years, if the terms offered to them were sufficiently advantageous; as a rule, the natives of India object to serve for a long period out of their own country, as many of them are married, and they prefer not to take their families with them.

6. There are no special difficulties or religious prejudices of a nature to prevent the races above-named from undertaking garrison duty beyond sea, if sufficiently remunerated for their services. A fine body of Sikhs, 120 men, have lately arrived at Hong Kong, for enrolment in the police force of the Colony. The terms of service, and rates of pay, are as follow:—

1. Engaged for five years certain, with option of re-engaging for another term of five years.

2. A free passage back to India, but no bonus or gratuity at the expiration of the first term of service.

3. After 10 years' service, they are entitled to a pension equal to a quarter of the average salary for the last three years' service.

4. The rate of pay agreed to is 20 rupees per mensem, with the understanding that they are to be formed into three grades at 20, 25, and 30 rupees per month respectively, with clothing and quarters, but without rations; the Governor has, however, gratuitously granted five rupees additional for expenses of living.

7. I think the pay and allowances granted to the gun lascars at this station, viz., 13 rupees per month, with clothing, quarters, and free rations, would induce the Indian races to engage for service in the Colonies for a period of five years.

8. No.
(*a.*) No.
(*b.*) No.
(*c.*) A proportion of at least one-third British infantry as a support to native troops.

9. Not having served in South Africa, I do not offer an opinion as to the requirements at that station. In the other Colonies referred to, I think ample protection would be afforded by good Indian troops against internal disturbances, supported by British troops as before described.

10. In time of war it would not be safe to substitute Indian troops entirely for Europeans in the Colonies; as a supplement, however, to British troops, Indians might be employed in such proportion as would materially relieve the Europeans from the ordinary garrison duties.

11. I think that Sikhs employed as above would be very efficient, and, to a certain extent, might lighten the strain on the military resources of Great Britain in time of war.

12. They would not. Two native corps, at least, should be substituted for one European regiment.

13. If India were in a tranquil state, I should prefer, as a temporary measure, to withdraw a limited number of European regiments from India. I do not think the number of British troops in many of our Colonies could be safely reduced in time of war, but this question would no doubt be decided by the actual state of India at the time.

14. I think it would produce an advantageous effect upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier.

15. I think

15. I think the best plan would be to raise fresh regiments in India, specially and exclusively for Colonial service.

16. Certainly, in a case of emergency; this was exemplified during the late Indian mutiny.

17. From Mauritius, Ceylon, and Straits Settlements; but it would be preferable, if time admitted, to obtain reinforcements from England.

18. Indian troops, in my opinion, would be more efficient, and their greater efficiency would counterbalance the extra cost which the transport of troops from India would involve.

19, 20. I think not; neither would it, in my opinion, be desirable to enforce the obligation upon them.

21. I am not prepared to answer this question.

22. I have never heard of any cases of discontent referred to in this question.

23. I think the native troops employed in the Colonies would acquire the feeling and character of an Imperial army, and such a result would no doubt be desirable.

24. This is a most important consideration. From all I have seen and heard of Chinese, particularly of the valuable services rendered by a corps of these men, attached to the British army during the late operations in China, I have not the least doubt that it would be very advantageous to employ corps of Chinese *out of their own country*; in India, for instance, their services would be very efficient, and, in case of British regiments being required for European service, corps of Chinese would be the best possible substitute for them in India, as they would act as a check upon the native troops.

25. Well-disciplined and well-officered corps of Chinese would doubtless be very efficient for service in some of the Colonies, viz., the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, and Ceylon.

I am not aware of any objections that could be raised to this plan.

(signed) *P. M. N. Guy,*
Major General, Comm. H. M.'s Forces
in China and Japan.

ANSWERS from Colonel *Browne*, Commanding the Troops, Natal.

1. Not favourable, unless supported by Europeans.

2. Those eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

3. Commanded the garrisons of Hong Kong and Japan for three years; am now in command in Natal; have served in East Indies.

4. Sikhs or Belooches would probably be the best suited for any of these.

5. Regimental reliefs from three to five years.

6. None that cannot readily be met.

7. None; unless in the shape of provision for their families.

8. I am of opinion that they would not, unless supported by British troops, both Royal Artillery and Infantry.
The support required depends much on local circumstances, 1 to 2 might generally suffice.

9. Not if unsupported; a proportion of British troops will always be necessary.

10. Not favourable, unless largely supported by British.

11. Yes; in relief of British troops performing ordinary duties.

12. I do not consider that, under any circumstances, they could be relied upon without support of Europeans.

13. India would supply regiments in far less time than they could possibly be relieved and withdrawn from the Colonies. It might not be prudent at such a time to extend the protection of the Colonies to native troops.

14. Probably advantageous, if well treated.

15. Regular relief from India would be preferable, and in view of preceding questions might be productive of valuable results; the periods of relief should be short.

16. The possession of the Cape and Straits Settlements must affect India to some extent.

17. If the Red Sea is open, assistance could be obtained easier from England. The Cape and China are next.

18. I do not think that any native troops can be relied upon unless in the presence of Europeans; regiments from India, regularly relieved, would be in every respect preferable to local levies, whose loyalty might at times be doubtful.

19, 20. I am not prepared to say.

23. I think so, and that such a feeling would carry with it increased attachment and loyalty.

24. Not at present.

25. In a military sense, good troops may be made of all these races. I do not see that any serious objection could arise from a "civil" point of view.
Politically, the introduction of such troops might give rise to jealousies, and would probably tend to lower the standard of respect in which the British laws are held.
With reference to Questions 1, 10, 18, 24, I beg to enclose some remarks from the Colonial Secretary for Native Affairs, who has great experience of this Colony.

W. Browne, Colonel, 20th,
Commanding Troops, Natal.

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1. In a Colony like Natal, whose native population is so overwhelming in point of numbers in comparison with the whites, it appears to be both inexpedient and unwise to add to the coloured force, not in apprehension of any disloyalty among the Indian troops, but that their prestige would be less with the native inhabitants, who look with very little respect upon the Indian population already introduced into Natal as labourers; it is therefore probable that the effect of the presence of such troops in a proportion much greater than white troops would, in time of peace, furnish a temptation to the natives to do that which otherwise they might not have attempted.

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10. In time of war there can be no doubt that the employing of Indian troops, supplementary to European, would be effective.

18. It is but natural to suppose that Indian troops would be less likely to make common cause against the Government, with a population between which and themselves no common bonds of sympathy exist, than troops raised from that population itself; and although I believe that a most effective force might be raised in the Colony of Natal, always thoroughly reliable if officered by white commissioned and non-commissioned officers, against any external danger, I cannot but believe also that in the nature of things they would be less reliable for the suppression of internal disturbance.

24. I think not at present, but I believe it will be possible in a few years.

T. Shepstone.

Pietermaritzburg, Natal,
20 June 1867.

From Lieutenant General *Douglas*, Lieutenant Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

Sir, Graham's Town, July 1867.

In returning these queries, I am unable, from my little knowledge of the races in our Indian possessions, to afford information of any value in regard to the main question raised by these queries; viz., whether it would be advisable to employ any of these races in the military occupation of this Colony, in consideration of their special fitness for military service in this rather exceptionally circumstanced Colonial possession. I am in a position, however, from my knowledge of this frontier, to offer an opinion as to whether this replacing the European troops by any Asiatic levies, whether belonging to the army of India or raised especially for service in this Colony, is calculated to meet the requirements of our peculiar position; and I am decidedly of opinion that Asiatic troops are not suited to the special necessities of the Cape of Good Hope; necessities which are divisible into two distinct categories, viz., Imperial and Colonial. The former has reference to the defence of the western portion of the Colony, comprising Cape Town and the Peninsula, which contains the anchorage and naval arsenal of Simon's Bay, for offence upon, and shelter of, the immense commerce from the eastward, which, on the voyage to Europe and America, sights the eastern coast of this Colony.

The latter relates to the protection of the widely scattered European population, intersected by native tribes, possessing tribal rights, who have been placed in their present location by the Imperial Government, not by the Colonial Governors, that is to say, by the Governors of the Cape of Good Hope, in their separate and distinct capacity as High Commissioners of Her Majesty, constituting a state of things which if (as apprehended by the colonists) containing the elements of danger to the European population, it behoves the Imperial Government alone to provide all reasonable means for effecting both the feeling of security and the reality of safety.

Query No. 16 seems to me to justify my expressing my opinion how this may be effected, in a manner important to the financial benefit as well as to the defence of our Indian possessions; viz., by continuing the system, which has now largely prevailed for some time past, of constituting the Cape of Good Hope a connecting military link between England and her eastern possessions, in the matter of reliefs.

At no place could reinforcements of troops destined for the defence of India be more economically maintained than at the Cape; from no place could they be more conveniently or expeditiously transported to Indian ports; at no place short of the United Kingdom could troops who have suffered from service in India be reasonably expected to recruit more quickly and perfectly in health than here. Experience in the cases of the 99th, 67th, 2-20th, and 2-11th regiments from China, appear to me to be conclusive upon this subject. On the other hand, it is to be presumed that the result of sending the 2-10th and 96th regiments from here to India has been satisfactory, or it would not have been subsequently determined to send the 1-9th regiment from here to Ceylon and Singapore.

Let me put a case. If one British regiment from each Indian Presidency were maintained here on Indian account, the saving in their maintenance would be very considerable, their transport to India rapid, and their replacement practicable, by a force partly native and partly European (the latter consisting of men requiring a temporary absence from India, to be formed into a depôt or provincial battalion), might serve for the purpose of frontier protection, or against internal troubles here, should circumstances be such at the Cape as not to permit the safeguard of this frontier to the burgher force, which ought now to be placed on an effective footing.

I have faith in the suggestion to maintain, and even to carry out further, the system latterly adopted in regard to the Cape of Good Hope being the connecting military link between England and her eastern possessions; and this is in the twofold consideration of affording reinforcements for the defence of India on the one hand, or of the United Kingdom on the other, whither the reinforcements of troops (who will have been maintained cheaply in the meantime) can be transported from South Africa in 28 or 30 days.

There is, moreover, reason to apprehend that, if the troops were withdrawn from the Cape, they might not continue to be available for the defence of the United Kingdom, for the simple reason that any pressure to reduce the military Estimates might result in the sudden decision to reduce such additional regiments in excess of the home garrisons heretofore kept up, under circumstances which shall appear to hold out the promise of peace in Europe.

To illustrate the latter supposed case, I would invite attention to the results of sending from here the regiment named in the margin, to the Crimea, and of those sent from hence as reinforcements to India in the great mutiny. It will be easy to ascertain whether the services of these regiments were such as to justify the opinion, that the Cape of Good Hope is, in point of climate, a good place for preserving the health of troops in a condition to fit them for general active service.

Regiments.	Time in S. Africa.
To the Crimea.	
1st Batt. Rifle Br.	7 years.
To India.	
1-6th	11 years.
1-13th	$1\frac{5}{12}$
31st	$\frac{3}{12}$
2-60th	$6\frac{7}{12}$
73rd	12
80th	$1\frac{2}{12}$
89th	$\frac{11}{12}$

There

There can be no question in regard to the time required to convey regiments from here to India or the United Kingdom; and the comparative cost of maintenance of troops in South Africa, India, and in England, can be readily ascertained by reference to the War Office.

If such reference issue in the results I expect, there would still remain one other source of expenditure of which to consider the fair mode of providing; and I venture to throw out the suggestion that this Colony might perhaps be able and willing to pay a fair amount for the transport of troops kept here for Colonial purposes; that is to say, for the protection of the frontier against native troubles.

I have, &c.
R. P. Douglas,
Lieutenant General.

Charles Eales, Esq.,
House of Commons.

ANSWERS.

1. I think that the garrisons of all places should be suited for times of war, and as this query implies a doubt upon this subject, I do not think it expedient under such circumstances.

2. In the Mauritius; but as a portion of its garrison for times of war, as of peace, and in smaller proportions in South Africa and St. Helena.

3. Yes, of the Mauritius, as a Company's officer in 29th regiment, and aide-de-camp to Sir C. Colville for upwards of six years, as commander of the forces in South Africa and St. Helena.

4. Not in a position, from my antecedent services, to suggest any special races.

5. The ordinary arrangements, under which troops should not be left too long in one place.

7. Not acquainted with the rates of pay of Indian army; but I must state that any Asiatic troops should be well paid, or they would become a great embarrassment. Rice-eating Asiatics would have to be fed upon imported food. The constant droughts in South Africa forbid the hope of growing the grain for these races.

8. (*a.*) Not so, in my opinion; to guard against internal native troubles in South Africa.
(*b.*) Idem.
(*c.*) At least one-half. The peninsula, which contains the naval arsenal of Simon's Town, and the only safe anchorage in north-west winds for vessels which make the coast of the Cape of Good Hope on the homeward voyage, should be jealously guarded by the best of our troops, *i. e.*, by regulars of the British army.

9. Partially they might against the frontier tribes, who would, in my opinion, hold Asiatic troops in less dread than Europeans. The Kaffirs think themselves to be at least equal to any Colonial races.

10. If South Africa cannot be wholly garrisoned by Europeans, they may be supplemented by Indian troops for time of war. But to be maintained with due regard to the peace of this community, Indian troops should be accompanied by their wives and families, and this would lead to expense and embarrassment; and a disregard of this would probably lead to worse results.

11. I can offer no opinion.

12. In my opinion, certainly not. I can perceive nothing in the history of Indian wars to lead me to the conclusion that the Asiatic races are equal to the British as soldiers. I am of opinion that at the Cape of Good Hope Asiatics should not exceed the proportions of one-half, and that, hence, the numerical strength of the garrisons would have to be increased in order to maintain existing efficiency.

13. A difficult, almost impossible, query to answer. The expediency must depend upon the condition of matters at both extremes.

14. Cannot offer an opinion.

15. The adoption of purely Colonial regiments would not, in my opinion, be advisable.

16. Yes.

17. South Africa.

18. South African troops could not be raised nor depended upon.

19. No natives of South Africa lately enlisted. They proved an utter failure at the Cape.

24. Neither possible nor desirable.

35. I can give no opinion, but I do not think that the Cape Legislature would consent to pay for any of these races as soldiers.

R. P. Douglas, Lt. General,
and Lt. Governor, Cape of Good Hope.

Graham's Town,
8 July 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant General Sir *R. Napier*, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay.

1. ANY substitution of Indian for English troops in our Colonies, in order to relieve the British people from performing a part of the military duty of the empire in time of peace, would be highly objectionable.

The population of Great Britain can well afford the number of men required for the military service of the empire in time of peace, and they will be forthcoming, if a sufficient inducement is held out to them. At present the soldier's condition is in many respects inferior to that of the working classes of similar status. When he (the pensioner) is discharged without pension, or retires on an insufficient one, with few inducements to maintain a good character, he too often occupies a very low place amongst the civil working population.

I should consider inexpedient any substitution of Indian troops which would relieve the country from the necessity of making the British soldier's condition what it ought to be, in order to bring sufficient numbers to the ranks.

But the employment of a few regiments of Indian troops in our Colonies might be very advantageous as an experimental measure, in order to train them gradually to take their place with British forces in other than Asiatic fields of warfare. If employed in the large Colonies, in doing duty with English troops, they would feel a pride in being associated with them, and would emulate them in all military spirit, proficiency, and discipline.

Should the experiment be found to answer, it might be continued until each Presidency has a

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number of regiments that has served in Europe, and would be prepared in time of war to give a powerful contingent as auxiliaries to our European forces.

It is doubtful if the Indian regiments would be cheaper than English ones, as they would have to be clothed and fed, in addition to their pay, and would require more frequent reliefs. In India the native soldier lives cheaply, but in a cold climate he would require meat, and at least as much clothing as the British soldier.

I think that even in our European Colonies their orderly habits, and patient obedience and good humour, would soon win the goodwill of the people; but if they were viewed with prejudice and dislike, they would feel it very much, and the service would become generally distasteful.

The soldiers of our native army throughout India are nominally enlisted for general service, excepting the remnant of the old Bengal army, but they accept this as meaning service in our Eastern possession and adjacent countries, and I think it would be necessary to give them the option of serving in Europe. In Bengal even, for service in China, it was thought necessary to call for volunteer regiments; I think it was an error, but having been done, it has settled the precedent for that Presidency. The Bombay and Madras regiments have gone to China as a matter of duty, without question.

In the first instance, the regiments which might be taken for foreign (that is, English Colonial) service, might be volunteers; but should the experiment be found to answer, and to be satisfactory on both sides, the necessity of calling for volunteers at each relief might be obviated, by forming in each Presidency a foreign legion, into which selected native regiments would be admitted on application; the distribution of these regiments would continue precisely as at present, but they should have a distinct and attractive dress, with some special badge of an ornamental character; no additional pay in India, but on embarking for Europe each man should receive a sufficient gratuity or bounty, to leave with his family if he desired it; and the foreign service pay, rations, and clothing, should be given from the day of embarkation.

These foreign legions of each Presidency would furnish regiments in regular rotation for Colonial service, European or Foreign, so that in course of time each army would have a number of regiments that had actually served in our Colonies, and others that would be prepared to do so; and thus a valuable contingent of 30,000 or 40,000 men could be rapidly furnished from India, to take their place in the field with a British force, or to reinforce our Colonies, and release a portion of British regiments for the home service.

I feel sure that the Indian regiments, properly selected, would be very proud of their association with British troops, would benefit by it in military spirit and loyalty to the empire; they would be more closely united to us in feeling. They would, of course, look for the increase of pay which they have had in our Eastern Colonies, in addition to their food and clothing, and some further consideration might be given for service in Europe; the difficulty of the measure would rest in the fact of the difference in allowances of the officers with native Indian regiments, compared to those of British regiments. If this objection were insuperable, it would preclude all Colonial service with British troops. But the difficulty must have been overcome when an Indian and a British force met in Egypt, in the Mauritius, and in Java.

2. In time of peace. South Africa, Mauritius, China, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand.

3. China.

4. Sikhs, Hindustanees, Mahomedans, Punjaub Pathans, Rohillas, North West Frontier Hill Tribes, Goorkhas, Maharattas.

The Bombay regiments of mixed races have always done well on foreign service; our Bengal troops formerly served in the Mauritius and Java, and more recently did well in China.

5. At first, reliefs every three or four years.

6. There are no difficulties that could not and have not been easily overcome by a very little management, which would still be necessary under any advantages offered to the soldier.

7. The same pay as now given on foreign service; free rations and warm clothing; free passage back in case of invaliding.

I would add one year of European service to count as two years for pension, and no discharge from unfitness produced from service without some pension.

8. (*a.*) No.

(*b.*) No; a small support of British troops, in proportion of one British to two natives.

(*c.*) Generally one British to two natives; but in time of war, no doubt, additional strength might be given by adding more native troops, where an increase of British troops might not be available.

9. Considering the general result of our warfare with British troops against the Caffre tribes, I should consider an equal portion of British and Indian troops to be necessary, but I have no doubt that our best Punjab regiments or Goorkhas would meet the Caffre on equal terms.

General Nott's division in Affghanistan is a memorable example of what a force composed almost exclusively of native troops could do; still the moral support of a portion of British troops is always desirable; I would say the same in regard to internal disturbances.

10. As a supplement to British troops their services would be most valuable. In times of great emergency they might be substituted entirely for British troops, and would, I believe, fully justify the confidence placed in them; but it is always desirable, both for political considerations and on grounds of general prudence, to have a portion of Europeans.

11. I believe they could be made to form a most useful auxiliary force to Great Britain in time of war, if gradually prepared for it by some such process as I have described.

12. I do not think that any number of Asiatics would entirely compensate for the absence of Europeans; but if a Colony were considered fully garrisoned in time of war by two European corps, one European and two native corps of equal strength would add very materially to their security; the one European regiment would always be held available for the point of danger, and natives would fight side by side with it, after a little comradeship, with a pride and confidence which nothing else could give; as long as the European would

would stand, the native would stand or fall by him.

13. Certainly draw from th Colonies, and supply the vacancies with Indian regiments.

14. Most advantageous, if he should have been fairly and considerately treated.

15. I have replied to this in answering No. 1.

16. The Overland transit has rendered the presence of British troops in the Eastern Colonies of less importance: as long as the European force in India is not further reduced, I do not apprehend any emergency that could not be met with sufficient promptitude now that the main lines of railway are connected.

17. Ceylon is the only Colony that could send a support sooner than the Mediterranean; but if Egypt were closed, of course South Africa and he Mauritius would be looked to.

18. Certainly, in all but South Africa; I have no knowledge of the local troops of that Colony.

19. If the employment of Indian troops were confined to the Eastern Colonies the Madras and Bombay armies would take the duty as a matter of course, and no volunteering would be required. With regard to the Bengal army, any service to which the regiments have not been accustomed would require either volunteering or the employment of certain regiments which are known to have no objection to such duty.

Many regiments of all the Presidencies would be fit for ordinary Colonial service; but the severer kinds of service, such as in the North of China, New Zealand, South Africa, would be better suited to the harder northern races.

I believe there is so good a spirit in the Indian army generally (I can speak of Bengal and Bombay, but I am not acquainted with Madras), that any prospect of field service, anywhere, would be received with the greatest satisfaction by many regiments, irrespective of the increased pay; but many interests connected with their families, their share in their village farms, &c., depend on the pay of the native soldiers, and it is for these, and not for personal expenditure and indulgence, that higher pay becomes a necessity when on foreign service.

20. The change could only be effected safely by some such measure as I have indicated.

21. The armies of Madras and Bombay would draw none; the Bengal army would do so now; but, for war, many regiments would volunteer for any service.

22. The Bengal 47th Regiment was destroyed about 1824 or 1825, for refusing to march to Burmah; but it is believed that the origin of the discontent arose from want of consideration on the part of the Government of the day.

The mutiny of the Bengal regiments in Sindh is matter of history; dislike to the service rose to mutiny on account of reduction of pay.

The sufferings of Hindoos of high caste on board ship are always great, and a little want of consideration may make them intolerable; but they have often been borne with exemplary patience and cheerfulness.

Nothing could have been better than the spirit of the troops that went to China; they eagerly adopted every device to meet or cover the demands of their creed.

23. Certainly; employment in company with British troops, especially in Europe, would give the army more of an Imperial character, and be most desirable.

25. I am not prepared to give an opinion on this question.

(signed) *R. Napier*, L. G.,
Commander in Chief, Bombay.

The following Answers are from the Commanding Officers of certain Regiments in the Bombay Army, and were transmitted to the Committee, with the accompanying Letter, by Lieutenant General Sir Robert Napier, Commander in Chief, Bombay.

Sir, Poona, 8 July 1867.

I HEREWITH enclose replies to the questions contained in your communication of the 18th of April. It appeared to me that the opinions on the several questions of certain experienced commanding officers of native regiments would be valuable to the Committee. The replies were sent to me, at my desire, confidentially, and under no expectation that they would go beyond my office; but the officers concerned have consented to their being communicated to the Committee. It should be noted that these officers have experience only, with one or two exceptions, of the regiments of this Presidency, and are not acquainted with the more hardy and warlike races of the north-west frontier.

I am, &c.
(signed) *R. Napier*, Lieut. General.

C. Eales, Esq., &c.
House of Commons.

ANSWERS of Colonel *Sherbrooke Gell*, Deputy Quartermaster General of the Bombay Army.

1. INDIAN troops, of the description hereafter specified, may, I think, be employed with advantage, in time of peace, as a substitute for British troops in those Colonies of which the former have some knowledge traditionally, or by experience, in which, either physically, or mentally, and morally, they have the advantage of the occupants whom they are expected to coerce, and in which the climate is one suited to their habits and origin. They would in such localities, I am of opinion, be found a well conducted, inoffensive, temperate, and easily satisfied garrison, easy to manage, inexpensive as compared to British troops. Trustworthy as guards, with a soldierly spirit, sufficiently capable, as soldiers, to be relied upon in all ordinary emergencies, having great

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powers of patient endurance, and would be very unlikely whilst on foreign service to cabal with occupants of Colonies against their masters. Still it never should be forgotten that they are mercenary troops, that they serve, not because they love an idle, roving, adventurous life, but, as they say themselves, "pait-ki-waste," for the belly; and, therefore, that the fault of mercenaries is their impatience of any diminution or irregularity in the issue of the remuneration they have been led to expect.

2. The Bombay army generally, in which each regiment, with the exception of two class regiments, comprises in its ranks, in greater or less numbers, all those races who, in Hindoostan, embrace the profession of arms, is adapted for duty in the following Colonies:—

Mauritius.
Ceylon.
The Straits Settlements.
China.

Class regiments of Sikhs, Belooches, or Hill men from the north-west frontiers, might be useful in time of war in South Africa or New Zealand, but should be removed immediately the war was over. Malta and Gibraltar are not, in my opinion, adapted to the peculiarities of native troops of any class, and the West Indies are too far off to make it either profitable or advisable to employ these troops from this country. In effect, I would confine them to Asiatic limits, which, as Mauritius is largely cultivated by coolie emigration, would comprise that island.

3. It has been the custom to relieve native troops in China, and latterly, in Aden, every two years. I consider it of great importance, in establishing a new system for native troops, to adhere to any rule which is founded on custom; and as I do not believe that Colonial service would be palatable to the Indian army for any reason other than the opportunity it gives them of amassing more money than they could do on home service, to deprive them for a longer period than two years of the privileges of furlough, which are so liberally given in India, and so highly appreciated, and of intercourse with their families, should, I think, be avoided.

4. I do not think that the religious prejudices of Indian troops have been, or would be, any bar to their employment in the Asiatic Colonies. A long sea voyage is, of course, trying to those castes whose religion prohibits cooking on board, and are consequently obliged to subsist on parched grain, &c.; but this hardship is very much mitigated by the fact that rations on board ship are free; and I have known it voluntarily and cheerfully encountered for the sake of the advantages to be obtained by service in China. The social disabilities, such as separation from their families, is one that does not press very heavily on Indian troops, who have great facilities afforded them by Government in subsisting their families during absence. Bengal Sepoys, almost invariably, by choice and from custom, used never to permit their wives to enter the regimental lines for the whole period of their service, keeping them at their own villages, and making regular remittances for their subsistence. I am not of opinion that there are any insuperable difficulties on this score. The amount of prostitution caused by it is singularly small; nor are native troops in general likely to form permanent alliances with the women they meet in Colonies; I believe some of the Belooch Battalion did so to a small extent; but in line regiment almost all are married at an early age, or have prospects of such connection in their own country.

5. The advantages enjoyed by the Bombay troops lately on service in China were, I believe, successful in making that on the whole a popular service, though the Sepoys there employed had to put up with much discomfort.

These advantages were free quarters and free rations, extra pay to the amount of one penny and one farthing a day, some addition to their under-clothing (*see* S. O., page 90), flannel drawers and shirt, shoes, blankets, and a canteen. Those in the north of China received also gratis a flannel frock and service pantaloons; all were able, and most of them did save the whole of their pay. On return to Bombay, a double per centage, viz., 20 instead of 10 per cent., were allowed to proceed on furlough. Like advantages would, I think, make Colonial service within the limits I have named, as to locality and period of absence, far from unpopular.

It is true that there was some difficulty in procuring recruits for some regiments of natives whilst in China, but other causes peculiar to native troops produced this result.

In order to keep the two regiments of which I speak up to their full strength, volunteers from the army at large were called for. In my own regiment, and in the one quartered in the same cantonment, when they were aware of the advantages held out, a large number of volunteers came forward, and had they been able to go by companies so as to keep together, or to return to their respective regiments after the termination of the service, they would have been more than willing to go. But becoming aware that the transfer to other regiments would be permanent, that the vacancies caused by their departure would be filled up, and that they were leaving for good the officers whom they knew, and the relations and friends who were their comrades, to hold in a new regiment the position of strangers, they gradually withdrew their names, and eventually, I think, three or four from each regiment took advantage of the opportunity. These, I feel sure, were the true reasons, not because sufficient inducement was not afforded or the service was unpopular.

6. With the exception of the Cape Colony and South Africa, for reasons hereafter detailed, Indian troops would, I think, entirely unsupported, be sufficient protection against internal disturbances in the Mauritius, Ceylon, and Hong Kong (and the West Indies, if they were not so far off); but they must be properly armed with the best weapon procurable, not as they now are with a percussion smooth-bore muzzle loader.

With respect to the Cape and South Africa, Sikhs, Puthans, Beloochees, and Hill tribes might perhaps be employed with advantage against Kaffirs, though I doubt it; but the nature of the warfare—bush fighting in a close country, the stamp of enemy are unencumbered Kaffirs of very superior physical capacity, with great activity—would be a very formidable opponent to men who require to fight under the eye of their European officers, of which the number now given is far too small to do more than exercise in general superintendence, makes me doubt whether any Indian troops would be relied upon either at the Cape or

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in New Zealand to meet the natives of those Colonies in warfare.

7. I think, in time of war, with the chance of meeting a European, for supposing that there was a deficiency of British material for duty in the Colonies, that it would be highly expedient and economical to supplement the British garrisons with Indian troops; but though I am of opinion that they might be relied upon and would do good service, yet I would not substitute them entirely for English troops.

8. Yes, I am of opinion that Indian troops, in certain proportions, might be so sufficiently reliable for Colonial duty as to allow of a reduction of the ordinary garrison to be effected.

9. I do not think that Indian troops would, man for man, under all circumstances, be as capable of protecting a Colony against a civilized power as are garrisons composed of Europeans only. The Indians want the physical power, the dogged courage of Englishmen, and perhaps no numbers, in very emergent and trying cases, when such qualities alone are required to ensure success, can compensate for their absence; still, in certain proportions and for ordinary circumstances, when endurance, faithfulness, temperance, obedience, and discipline are of any avail, Sepoys, armed with weapons on a par with their antagonists and friends, would be an efficient substitute. If a garrison in time of war required a strength of 1,000 British troops, I should say that that number of Indians, with 250 English troops, would be very nearly, if not quite, an equivalent. The Sepoys, fully appreciating both the strength and the weakness of their fairer skinned comrades, would rely upon them for sure support in moments of difficulty, and think it only fair that all the more laborious duty and the inferior food should fall to their own share; whilst the Europeans, occupying the position of *corps d'élite*, would be nursed, taken care of, and held in reserve for the supreme moment, when, I think, they also would fight under better circumstances and with more bravery than they would have done as the components of a garrison entirely British.

10. I think it would be more politic, in case of pressure for troops from England, to withdraw a portion of the British garrisons in the Colonies, replacing them with a due proportion of Indian troops, than to draw English troops from this country. The natives of this country have not now to learn for the first time that from one cause or another their aid is required to supplement our home forces; as long as the British army in India is kept up to its normal strength, so long are the conditions, in their eyes, under which we hold the country not greatly dissimilar, either in peace or war with a foreign foe. That strength they are aware is sufficient to put down rebellion, and the chances of combination with the foreign enemy at the opportune moment are remote; the one is a present fact, the other a distant contingency. Should, however, a hostile civilized Power succeed in landing a force within our Indian boundaries, our strength to resist would be greater by having English troops with which to meet them, in a country so decidedly held by the sword as India is, than by having an equivalent or an additional number of native troops, who, if false to us, would be fighting on their own soil.

The temptations to be unfaithful, to strike for their own lands, for their own rule, would be greater if they saw our enemies arrayed against us in India, than if they witnessed the same thing in a Colony, when, probably, other counterbalancing circumstances might exist; nor should it be forgotten that the employment of native troops abroad enables us to employ a larger number of our more turbulent races in this country.

11. The effect of foreign service, such as that in China, upon native troops after their return, is, I believe, highly beneficial. Whilst abroad they are relieved in some measure from the depressing enslaving power of caste. Edges are smoothed down, mutual benefits encouraged; but more than all, the English officer becomes better acquainted with and better known by his men; he occupies a place nearer their affections when in a distant land among strangers than he does when they are at home and he is abroad; they have more in common with him than with those amongst whom their sojourn is limited, who in all likelihood cannot speak their language, and who probably do not regard them with very friendly eyes.

I do not think that the Sepoy looks much to secondary causes, yet the extent of our power must have some sensible meaning even to him; and I believe it is an admitted fact that Indian troops who have seen foreign service, either in war or peace, are more rough and ready soldiers, more intelligent, and very much more loyal than those who have not had this advantage.

12. I think it would be more advisable that service in the Colonies should be carried out by rolster from the line, than by special corps raised solely for Colonial service.

In the latter case the period of service would necessarily be very limited, entailing a large number of ineffectives as recruits, and also men on furlough, thus necessitating the employment of a larger number, and consequently, on the score of economy, it would be a measure detrimental to interests of the Colony. I think it is more than doubtful that the special corps would not maintain so high a state of discipline, not improbably that they would suffer in health by being so long removed from the country of their birth. At times, too, local causes might render it difficult to obtain recruits; and I think I have already shown that in the interests of India, as inseparably united to the best interests of her native army, would be best consulted by employing it in the Colonies within the limits I have specified.

13. Yes, I believe native soldiers—the Bombay army—are fully aware that they are liable to serve beyond the sea. Still I think there are, in their opinions, limits to this sea, that they would be very much astonished if required to serve in the Mediterranean, or in the West Indies, on garrison duty. Within Asiatic limits they would now go, as they have gone, without a murmur, even if the service was unpopular, which, with the advantages referred to, would not, I think, be the case.

14. But to call on Indian troops to serve in New Zealand, the West Indies, the Mediterranean, at the present moment, would not, I think, be prudent.

The amalgamation, with its changes, is still too recent; they are, too, lately learning to serve with a not unfrequent change of officers, a change abhorrent to their peculiarities, and altogether I think, that though in many ways the amalgamation was

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an era from which their position began to improve, yet they have not yet learned to look on the new arrangements as stable; and, consequently, it seems to me that native troops are not yet, if they ever will be, in a condition fit to be experimented upon.

15. I do not think any distinction would be drawn by native troops between what are now Colonies of the Crown and what were dependencies of India under the East India Company, so long as Asiatic limits were not exceeded.

16. I know of no cases of discontent caused by Colonial service amongst the natives of the Indian army; I have heard their European officers, who served in China, complain of their miserably inadequate quarters whilst there, and for which they had to pay a high rate of house rent.

17. Employment within the limits I have named would not, I think, give to the Indian army an Imperial character. They would still regard themselves as belonging to the Presidency in which they were recruited.

It would no doubt raise their moral status to be able to feel an interest in the success of the Imperial army. I do not think, however, it is attainable at present.

18. The three classes named have each a marked military disability. The Chinese want active courage. The Malays have a proud, sulky, revengeful temper, easily provoked, difficult to allay. The African is quarrelsome, and incapable of attaining a high state of discipline.

In civil life they would be bad subjects. The Chinese are exceedingly immoral and filthy in their tastes, of a cruel disposition.

The Malays would inspire dread and dislike, from their reckless ferocity on small provocation, their too ready resort to the creese, and their improvident habits; the African, from his drunken, disorderly conduct, his proneness to women, debauch, and intrigue.

Consequently, the advantages to be gained by the employment of such troops in India, in a political point of view, as being entirely unconnected with the people of this country, an advantage of no very extended or reliable character, considering that two of them are Mahomedans in religion, would be more than counterbalanced by the distaste to our rule which disgust, contempt, and dread of their peculiarities would engender in those of our Indian subjects amongst whom they were employed.

(signed) *John S. Gell*, Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster General
of the Bombay Army.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Thacker*, Commanding the Marine Battalion.

1. I CONSIDER it inexpedient to entirely substitute Indian troops for English in our Colonies in time of peace, but I think they would form a desirable supplement to European troops, say in the proportion of two-thirds natives to one-third Europeans.

2. If so determined, I consider the following races would be best adapted for such duty:—

A. Sikhs, Punjaubees, Pathans, Beloochees,
B. Mussulmans, and such castes of Hindoos as
C. are employed in the Bombay and Madras
D. armies, are, in my opinion, capable of serving
E. in any of these Colonies. I am not suffi-
F. ciently acquainted with the constitution of
G. many of the Bengal regiments to pronounce
H. an opinion as to their general adaptability for
I. Colonial service.

3. I do not think that native troops would like to serve out of India for a longer period than three or four years at a time. The question as to the general system of relief is one which I am not competent to answer.

4. I am not aware of any special difficulties that would hinder the races I have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea. Many Bombay and Madras regiments have served in China, Aden, and elsewhere; and there has been no difficulty when the men have been liberally and fairly dealt with.

5. The present rates of pay, batta, rations, and family pensions, together with the warm clothing granted to the native troops of the Bombay army when on service beyond the seas, would, I think, amply suffice to procure troops for such service.

6. I think they would, if partially supported.

7. In time of war, I would in no case substitute Indian for European troops, but Indian troops would form an excellent supplement to Europeans.

8. I think so.

9. I think not. I would form the garrisons in the proportion of two-thirds Europeans and one-third natives.

10. Whenever European regiments are urgently required at home, they will probably be equally required in India. I would therefore withdraw such European troops as could be spared from the Colonies, and supplement the remaining Europeans with Indian troops.

11. I think highly advantageous. I have never seen native troops which have been employed beyond the seas which have not been improved in these respects from contact with other races and an acquaintance with other countries; such service expands their minds, tends to destroy petty prejudices, and gives them an idea of the extent of our power. The 3rd, 5th, 22nd Regiments, Native Infantry, and Belooch Battalion of the Bombay army, are, I think, generally considered to have benefited by their service in China; and the 21st Regiment Native Infantry, or Marine Battalion, which has served in nearly all parts of our Eastern possessions, is extremely handy and useful.

12. I see no reason why, in the interests of both A. and B. regiments of the existing Indian army should not take service in the Colonies, according to their turn. I would not raise regiments especially and exclusively for the Colonies, as I believe such regiments would not be willing to serve out of India for a longer period at a time, or for less pay, &c., than existing regiments. The regiments of the existing Indian army would require to be better armed, and to have more European officers attached to them, before they could perform Colonial service efficiently.

13. I believe

13. I believe so. Probably, however, some Bengal troops may imagine such service beyond sea was intended only in time of war, when their services might be urgently required, and never understood it to mean protracted service in the Colonies in times of peace. Bombay and Madras troops have for years served in Aden, China, Burmah, and elsewhere, and I should say fully understand their liability to serve in what are generally considered our Eastern possessions; but I doubt if even they would consider service in the West Indies, New Zealand, Gibraltar, and Malta, as coming within the terms of their engagement. I should not, therefore, consider it prudent to enforce such service in these Colonies.

14. But I believe it is a favourable time to sound the feelings of the native troops generally as to their readiness to serve in the Colonies named in Question No. 2. The conditions of such service should be most fully explained to them, as regards pay, batta, rations, pensions to families, warm clothing, and period of foreign service; and I think Government would find that the races I have named in Answer No. 2, and the whole of the regiments composing the Bombay and Madras armies, would engage for Colonial service.

15. I do not think they would make any such distinction. It has not been made hitherto by the Bombay and Madras armies as regards China, and I do not think there would be any objection to service in the Mauritius, where so many natives of India are employed as labourers.

16. The only case of discontent within my experience, that I can remember, was that of the 47th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, which objected to proceed to Aden about 25 years ago, in consequence of what it considered was a breach of faith on the part of Government with regard to some item of batta, rations, or family pensions; I forget which. I was Brigade Major at Aden for seven years, viz., from 1855 to 1861, and never heard of any discontent on the part of the Bombay or Madras troops quartered there during that or any former period; on the contrary, they were well satisfied, and invariably returned to India with a considerable sum of money, which they had saved during their tour of foreign service.

17. I think so, and that such a result would be highly desirable.

18. This is a very comprehensive and important question, and one which I do not consider myself competent to answer, with my limited knowledge of Chinese, Malays, Africans, and other races not Indian.

Note.—I consider the West Indies as too distant to be occupied by Indian troops, either efficiently or economically.

The above replies are forwarded to the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in compliance with Colonel Dillon's Memorandum, dated Mahableshwer, 24th May 1867.

(signed) *S. Thacker*, Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 21st Regt. N. I., or
Bombay, M. Battalion.
11 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Adams*, Commanding 13th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. Highly desirable.

2. I would recommend only South Africa, Ceylon, Mauritius, Straits Settlements, and China, to be garrisoned by Indian troops, which should be composed of the mixed races generally enlisted for the Bombay army.

3. A regiment should be relieved on the completion of five years' service; after two years a furlough should be granted, for a period of one year, to 10 per cent., with a free passage to and fro.

4. There may be certain prejudices to overcome; but if the families are allowed to accompany the men, and increased advantages offered, they would not be insuperable.

5. The pay should be the same as that of the British soldiers, with ration money, or rations when supplies are not procurable in the market; the families to be placed on the same footing with those of European troops.

6. Would not recommend the Cape Colony to be denuded of European troops; neither should South Africa, Mauritius, Ceylon, and Hong Kong be entirely unsupported by European troops.

7. As a supplement to European troops, in the proportion of two-thirds native to one-third European, I consider they would be employed with advantages.

8. Yes, perfectly so; if aided by European troops.

9. Yes; if armed as British soldiers, and with the same complement of European officers, as under the old organisation, the garrison should be increased one-third, including a small proportion of British troops.

10. I consider it would be more advantageous to partially withdraw the European troops from the Colonies, filling up their places with native soldiers from India.

11. Advantageous, rather than otherwise, as I think it would tend to dispel many of their prejudices, as well as enlighten the mind of the native soldiers.

12. Take the regiments of native infantry according to their turn of duty for foreign service.

13. They are aware they are liable to be called on to serve beyond seas; but it would be advisable to inform them of the increased advantages they would derive, and allow them to volunteer for such service.

14. Yes; the present time is as favourable as any other.

15. Sepoys being averse to sea voyage in general, the distinction they would draw between service in Aden and Burmah and the Mauritius and China would be the relative distance of each.

16. None have come to my knowledge personally, but I am aware several instances of discontent are recorded in history, arising chiefly from a misunderstanding regarding their allowances.

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17. Not answered.

18. In a military point, it would be objectionable to entertain Chinese and Malays as soldiers, on account of their unruly dispositions, but Africans and other races, in a political point of view, might with advantage be employed in India and the Colonies; but I would not recommend any regiment to be composed of any one race.

(signed) *H. A. Adams*, Colonel
Commanding 13th Regiment,
Native Infantry.

Camp, Kolapore,
31 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Campbell*, Commanding 3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

1. I AM of opinion that, in time of peace the substitution of native troops for English in our Colonies would be very inexpedient and distasteful to the colonists as well as to the native troops, and attended with no advantage socially, or in a military or political point of view.

2. If it were determined to employ them, I think the races north of the Indus would be the best for all the Colonies, except Ceylon, China, and the Mauritius, to which places any native regiment might be sent.

3. The regiments should not be absent from India more than three years; and a company should be left in India as a depôt, with which the families who did not return to their own villages could remain, also the weakly and old men who are likely soon to invalid. They should always be transported in steamers, as the long sea voyage is very distasteful to Hindoos.

4. I know of no special difficulties. They should have the pay and advantages laid down by the regulations for them when proceeding on foreign service.

5. If they are relieved every three years regularly, I think that no advantages over and above those at present enjoyed by native troops when on foreign service would be necessary. But troops who had to remain away from India for a longer period would not be procured without nearly double the pay at present enjoyed by native troops in India.

6. I think, so far as I can judge, that they would not afford sufficient protection unsupported in any of the Colonies except Ceylon.

7. I think they may be employed in time of war as a supplement to European troops, and would prove a very valuable auxiliary force.

8. They are to be relied on for such service, in my opinion, provided they are supported by Europeans, volunteers, militia, or regular troops. But they should be armed with the best weapon procurable, and be organised and officered on the same system as the Ceylon Rifle Regiment and the West Indian regiments.

9. They would not be capable of protecting the Colonies against an attack by the civilized powers as adequately as the existing European garrisons; it would be necessary to increase the numerical strength of the garrisons in the proportion of two to one of the northern races, viz., Punjaubees, Sikhs, and Beloochees, and three to one of the native infantry, as at present in the Bombay army.

10. It would be more advantageous to withdraw European troops from the Colonies, filling up their places by native troops, in the proportion I have mentioned.

11. I think it would be advantageous, so far as it would improve their minds and ideas, and give them an enlarged view of the extent of Her Majesty's dominions, and of the power of the Government they serve.

12. I think it would be better for the interests of both, that regiments should be raised specially for Colonial service.

13. The native troops are perfectly aware that they are liable to serve beyond seas, but they don't expect to be called on, except in time of war, or some great emergency.

14. There appears to me to be no necessity to effect any change; they perfectly understand the terms of their enlistment, and have only to be ordered when required.

15. I don't think they would draw any political distinction—they would draw a local distinction—because to Aden they can take their families, and are generally conveyed in steamers, and they have frequent opportunities of getting away on leave, either on urgent private affairs, or in case of sickness, which they would not have at the other places named; besides, Aden is a very short sea voyage compared with the voyage to the other places.

16. No such causes of discontent have come to my knowledge. The 3rd Regiment Native Infantry went most cheerfully to China, and were satisfied with the advantages given them, and with the arrangement made for their families. The objection is made on account of the sea voyage, which is disliked by Hindoos, who are particular about their water, and who do not cook on board a ship. To men who can cook, and who will take meat and grog rations, there can exist no objection, except that which is common to most men who are obliged to be separated from their families; but this is soon overcome, provided separation only lasts for two or three years, and the family remittances are regularly paid.

17. I think that no such feeling exists, or would be likely to exist in the native army; they know they serve the British Government and are paid regularly, and they look to their local government and their immediate superiors for all advantages, and not beyond.

18. I have had no experience with troops composed of these races; I think it would be objectionable to employ regiments entirely recruited from these races, especially Malays, who are bigoted Mahomedans, of whom throughout India we already have enough. For the Colonies it would be different. The Ceylon Rifle Regiment, and the West India and African regiments appear to answer very well, and have the credit of being good soldiers.

(signed) *E. Campbell*, Lieut. Col.,
Commanding 3rd Regiment, N. I.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Field*, Commanding 10th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

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1. I SHOULD be strongly in favour of the employment of sepoys on garrison duty in the Colonies, if our covenant with the native army was not opposed to the measure; the effect of such service on the men would, in all respects, be good and wholesome; it would remove them for a season from Braminical influences, break through the prejudices of caste, and give them enlarged ideas of the British dominion and power, and at the same time foster in them a manly and self-reliant spirit.

Under the present terms of enlistment, it would not be expedient to substitute Indian for English troops, for although the oath of allegiance sets forth that the sepoy will go wherever ordered, yet it is understood to apply to service in time of war only, and not to garrison duty in time of peace.

2. Men of all the races found in the native army could perform service in the Colonies, and no particular adaptability need be looked for, especially for employment in Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China. For service in South Africa, and the other stations, the best adapted would be the Seiks and Mahomedans, and next to them, Purwarrees and other low caste men.

3. The sepoys would be without their families, and it would be therefore necessary that the reliefs should take place after two, or at the most three years.

4. No special difficulties with respect to religious prejudices or social habits would be experienced; the advantages of superior pay, &c. would counterbalance all such.

5. The same pay, rations, &c. which have been usual when native regiments have been serving in China; and in addition I would suggest, that the year's service abroad should count as two years towards pension.

6. They would, unsupported, do well all the service that might be required of them at the Cape against frontier tribes, if armed with rifle, and likewise be able to quell internal disturbances when employed in the other Colonies.

7. It would not be wise to employ them thus in substitution for European troops; but as a supplement to them they would do well.

8. Yes; but they must be efficiently armed.

9. Certainly not, and no increase in the strength of the garrison would compensate for the want of European troops; under the circumstances mentioned, native troops should only be used as a supplement to Europeans.

10. It would be better to send native troops to the Colonies, rather than withdraw European troops from India; but in time of war, as before remarked, European must be associated with native troops for the protection of the Colonies.

11. I believe it would be in all respects advantageous; and inasmuch as it would raise the sepoy in his own estimation, it would tend also to improve the spirit of the native army.

12. I consider it would be better, both in the interests of India, and also for the Colonies, that the native regiments should take their turn for employment abroad, rather than that new regiments should be raised exclusively for such duty.

13. They believe that they are liable for service beyond seas, but not for garrison duty in the Colonies in time of peace.

14. It would not be desirable at the present time to attempt to enforce such an obligation upon them.

15. I can only speak regarding Aden, which is looked upon as a station for garrison duty to which each regiment is liable to be sent in its turn.

The Mauritius and China are looked upon as foreign service.

16. No cases of discontent have come to my knowledge in consequence of the employment of native soldiers on Colonial service.

17. I think it would tend to produce this impression, and the same would be wholesome in its effect upon the minds of the native soldiers.

18. The employment of native foreign troops in India would be viewed with great jealousy by our native soldiers, and might be expected to lead to disturbances between them and the strangers. Such a policy would work injuriously also, by leading the native army as well as the people of the country to the conclusion that the Government no longer placed the same confidence as before in the native soldiers of India.

(signed) *J. Field*, Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding 10th Regiment, N. I.

Mahableshwer,
28 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieutenant Colonel *Taylor*, Commanding 5th Bombay Native Light Infantry.

1. I CONSIDER it will be highly advantageous if the native army be employed in the Colonies, but I would always keep a proportion of European troops as well.

2. From the experience I derived when the regiment under my command was in China (over three years), where we were stationed with Seiks and Beloochees, I should say that a Bombay regiment of mixed castes is just as well adapted for this duty as either of the above-mentioned castes. I found our men stood the climate of China (both hot and cold) equally as well, and we certainly had fewer sick. If the men are well cared for (as they were in China), and have good rations, well housed and clothed, they will do the work well. I should recommend the scale of rations being altered, and meat issued on this duty. I answer this question from what I observed of the regiment under my command in China; we are a mixed regiment, but a large proportion of the men are Mahrattas.

3. Experience would show this: at first, regiments might be relieved after three or four years' service; a lengthened service must be deprecated,

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from the fact that the men would be unable to take their families with them.

4. There are none that I am aware of: regiments are always available for foreign service; they would, in the same way, be available for garrison duty or foreign service.

5. I would recommend pay and batta, free rations, and all other advantages now given to regiments embarking for foreign service being continued; I would likewise recommend that every man be provided yearly with a pair of English boots (gratis), and that all articles of regimental necessaries be supplied to him by Government, at a fair cost, as the price of these articles will be, it is presumed, more expensive there than in India.

6. I would, as before mentioned, keep a proportion of European troops; after-experience would decide the number.

If native troops, well armed with the best weapon, they will do good service.

In China, I found the men did all that was required of them. I am not sufficiently acquainted with South Africa and the West Indies to answer that part of the question.

7. In case of emergency they might be altogether employed; but I should always prefer having European troops as well.

8. Yes.

9. No, certainly not.

If unsupported by Europeans, their numbers must be largely increased; at-least two-thirds more.

10. Withdraw them from the Colonies.

11. I consider it would be most highly advantageous. A native regiment going on foreign service to a civilised country returns a different regiment—the moral and tone of the regiment is highly improved—the men lose in a great manner their narrow and bigoted ideas. I consider a tour of foreign service the making of a native regiment.

12. I would, in this instance, withdraw them from the Colonies in preference to India. I do not think that it would be possible to raise regiments for exclusive duty in the Colonies, as I do not think you would be able to obtain the men if you did; I think the difficulties in keeping them up to their full strength, would be insuperable.

13. Certainly they do. *Vide* Articles of War for Native Troops, c. 1, Enlistments and Discharge, p. 3. Every man on enlistment takes an oath he will go wherever ordered by land or sea.

16. I do not think they would draw any distinction as all service beyond sea is looked on as foreign service.

17. Yes; I think it would, and I consider it a measure highly desirable.

18. It would be advantageous to employ these troops (if procurable) both in India and the Colonies.

The Chinese would make excellent soldiers, as they are fine and brave men, but I do not think they would enlist. I would not enlist Malays, as they are proverbially treacherous.

The African, from all I hear, makes a good soldier; but I have no personal knowledge of this race; I feel diffident in expressing an opinion.

(signed) *J. Taylor*, Lt. Col.,
Commg. 5th Regt. N. L. I.

Belgaum,
1 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Major *Little*, Commanding 25th Bombay Native Light Infantry.

1. I CONSIDER that Indian might be substituted for English troops in some of our Colonies in time of peace; by some I would mean all those mentioned in Question 2, excepting "Malta, Gibraltar, and the West Indies."

4. Seiks, Punjaubees, Patans, Purdasees, Mahomedans, Mahrattas, Christians, and Jews, in fact, a mixture of all races, such as the Bombay army is now composed.

5. I do not consider myself now competent to give an opinion as to the arrangement which would be necessary to be made with respect to reliefs; but I would venture to suggest that no regiment should be kept away from India for more than three years.

6. I consider that no difficulties would be raised to render the races above mentioned from undertaking garrison service beyond sea.

7. I do not think that any other advantages than those now granted to soldiers of the Indian army when on foreign service would be required to procure native troops for such service.

8. I think they should be supported.

9. I consider that Indian troops might be employed with great advantage to the State in time of war as a supplement to European troops.

11. Most certainly.

12. No; but the proportion I would recommend for garrison duty should be one-third European, and two-thirds native. In time of war two-thirds European and one-third native. I am also strongly of opinion that a better description of arm should be issued to the native army, and two Europea officers given to each company.

13. In case of pressure at home, I consider it would be more advantageous to withdraw troops from the Colonies, supplying their places by native soldiers from India, than to withdraw European troops from India.

14. I consider that the effect of garrison service in the Colonies in time of peace would be highly advantageous as regards the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier on his return to India, for he would carry home to his friends enlightenment as regards the extent (hitherto but little known) of the British dominions; he would there meet relations who had very probably served in other Colonies far distant from where he had served, and hence would the power and greatness of England be better known; many other reasons might be quoted, but this one point I consider would have greater weight in the minds of the native of India than almost any other.

15. I think it would be better for the interests of India to take regiments according to turn, than to raise fresh ones for such a service.

I think also for the interests of the Colonies such a system would be preferable.

19. The native soldiers recruited since 1856 are fully

fully aware that they are liable to serve beyond sea; but were they not so I consider it would be desirable to enforce the obligation imposed on them by their present terms of enlistment.

20. Yes, I think the present would be a favourable moment to effect such a change.

21. I do not think that the native soldier would draw any distinction between service in Aden and Burmah, and the Mauritius and China.

22. I knew of no such case.

23. I think the employment of the native army of India in some of the Colonies would tend to give it more of the character of an Imperial army, and I consider such a result would be highly desirable.

24 & 25. At the present moment I do not consider myself competent to answer these questions.

(signed) *A. B. Little*, Major
Commg. 25th Regt., N.L.I.

ANSWERS of Major *Beville*, Commanding 1st Belooch Battalion.

1. Looking only on the effect it would have on the native troops, I think it would answer admirably, improving those employed, tending to rouse their pride, and at once stamping them as superior troops to those not so selected.

Politically considered, I do not think they should be employed in the Colonies named, save Ceylon, the Straits, China, and the Mauritius; they should not be employed where the bulk of the population is white (Africa, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand), or where the land is owned and the country ruled by its white settlers (West Indies), nor entrusted with the defence of important fortresses (Malta, Gibraltar), liable to attack from first-class European powers.

2. Belooches, Patans, Sikhs, Punjaubees; I am not acquainted with the native troops in the Madras Presidency.

3. The answer to this depends very much on whether the State proposes to allow families to accompany the regiment. If the men had the option, under certain arrangements, for their families being rationed at fixed rates, I think absence from India might extend to seven years, otherwise three years; but, again, very much would depend as to what furlough, if any, would be allowed to the men during such absence.

4. I consider there are no special difficulties that would hinder the races I have named from being so employed.

I know the 1st Belooches would hail with delight an order to proceed to Japan or the Mauritius.

5. No increase of pay, but men to be liberally rationed and well provided with clothing, bedding, quarters, &c. All remittances to their families to be remitted free of loss in exchange, and their correspondence "franked."

6. Well officered and properly armed, they would afford full protection to the Colonies named.

7. They would be a most valuable supplement to European troops; but even alone I believe they would render good service.

8. Most certainly.

9. This is, in fact, comparing them with European troops; the answer must be in the negative.

One-half, or perhaps two-thirds, might be composed of natives.

10. Withdraw them from Colonies, relieving them by native regiments; India cannot afford for many a day to lose a single European regiment.

11. Advantageous; the resources and power of England would become better known in India.

12. (*a.*) Government will in the first instance select the races deemed most fitted for colonial service; the terms and conditions will be fully explained. To all regiments in the service, recruited from the races selected, the option of volunteering should be given, either exclusively for Colonial service or for certain tours, to be relieved in turn.

If more regiments are required, I think it might be advisable to raise them specially for Colonial service; but I deem this a fitting opportunity for recording my opinion that Government must alter the enlistment for life system if they hope to obtain native troops generally for Colonial service.

(*b.*) I do not feel competent to give an opinion.

13, 14. I consider that if it was *bonâ fide* for "field service" they would not think of repudiating their liability; but I doubt, if merely for the purpose of garrisoning the Colonies named, they* would consider themselves liable for such service; I should not consider it desirable to enforce the latter obligation. It would be putting an interpretation on the 1st Art. of War (Act No. xxix. of 61), which I believe was never intended to be conveyed.

* I refer to regiments generally.

15. If they did draw a distinction, it would be in favour of Aden and Mauritius.

16. I have never heard of discontent; I have heard men of the Belooch regiments, who served in China, express disappointment at the nature of their service, as they had great expectation of seeing field service when they left India.

While complaining of the great cold and damp, they always gratefully acknowledged the care taken of them.

17. It might, perhaps; but doubtful.

18. Without a personal knowledge of the races named, it is difficult to give an opinion on the subject.

(signed) *H. Beville*,
Major Commandant,
1st Belooch Regiment.

Kurachee,
11 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Captain *Nicholett*, Commander, 2nd Belooch Battalion.

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1. That native troops might be substituted in European troops with great advantage to both European and native armies; to the European in saving the men from serving in unhealthy climates, and also in preventing necessity of sending English troops so far away from Europe and locking them up to the native army; in raising the tone of the army by showing confidence in it, in opening the men's minds, and in sending them back to India better impressed with the power of England and extent of her dominions.

All other powers that have native troops in their pay use them for imperial purposes; Russia has Cossacks and Circassians, France Turcos and Indegines, whom both made available in European wars; and there is no reason that I can see, except prejudice, why England, which has a resource in India of unlimited extent, including in the north and adjacent countries races quite equal to the southern races of Europe, and perhaps superior, should not make better use of them for imperial purposes also.

2. The best men in all service are the Northern Indian races; they are free from prejudices, more warlike, and better adapted to stand changes of climate than the more southern races.

The 2nd Belooch Regiment is composed of Sindees, Beloochees, Brahoors, Affghans, including the inhabitants of the Khybur and hills north of Peshawur, Sikhs and a few Hindoostanee Mussulmen, Hindoos, Jews, African Seedees, &c. &c.; they were in China in time of peace, so far as our operations went, so that there was no plunder to be got. In fact, they garrisoned Shanghai for three years, having a part of the time a detachment in Japan.

The regiment stood the service remarkably well; it suffered nothing from the cold; the men were cheerful, and, though glad to return to meet their families, many of them now would be glad to return to China.

Regiments composed of these races, or some of them, should certainly be sent to the following Colonies:—

South Africa, China, Malta, Gibraltar, New Zealand,

because in Africa, China, and New Zealand the natives are of a more formidable character, and Gibraltar and Malta should have the best troops and those with least prejudices. In Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Straits, inferior troops would do, such as are composed of the Hindoos and less powerful men of Southern India.

Northern Indian regiments, also, should be sent to the West Indies, as the voyage is long, and troops with fewest prejudices should go, and probably Hindoos would not like it; but these Colonies are so far off that it would be hardly worth while to garrison them from India at all, on account of the reliefs.

3. Reliefs should take place at most every four years, and the regiment should be brought back straight to India. A native regiment always has a large number of women and children who must be left behind, and to whom the men wish to return.

In time probably this might be changed, either by allowing men to volunteer from other regiments into the regiments going abroad, and drafting the married people who did not wish to go, to other regiments, or by introducing a shorter period of service, and so inducing a man to put off his marriage until his service was over; but as the service stands at present, and until service in the Colonies becomes a well-known routine, the reliefs should be as frequent as possible.

As none of the Colonies mentioned, except the West Indies, are so far off, that regiments serving in them could not be relieved from Bombay, Calcutta, or Kurrachee, in three months, it is probable that the new transport steamers might be able to carry out such reliefs between the cold weathers, when they would not be required for the overland reliefs. Reliefs should always be carried out by steamers, as the men much dislike the tedium of sailing ships.

4. There are no such difficulties. The 2nd Belooch Regiment in China were quartered in a large joss-house turned into barracks; they drew their rations from the Commissariat, they will eat and drink with Europeans, in fact, there is no obstacle to their being employed abroad. Mussulmen, of course, would not eat pork, nor Sikhs and Hindoos beef; but if this caused inconvenience, the men could always draw the money, and provide themselves.

5. The 2nd Belooch Regiment received no more pay in China than they do; indeed, the highest amount for a private, including good conduct money, being 10½ rupees per month; but they had liberal rations and warm clothing, which enabled them to remit money to their families, and they were perfectly contented. The ration was worth in China, when things were dear, about eight rupees a month.

The supply of warm clothing was but fair, as a native soldier has to provide all his necessaries at an expense of between 40 and 50 rupees, and to keep them up, and receives no bounty on enlistment.

6. The troops that kept the Peshawer frontier for a series of years, would, I should say, perfectly protect the Cape Colony against Caffirs; they would deal with any internal disturbance in Ceylon, Hong Kong, or the West Indies; and though at the Cape and Mauritius, they might meet Dutch Boors and French Creoles, yet as native troops have beaten both these races at Java and the Mauritius, they would, no doubt, do the same again.

7. I believe the best native troops might be used with great advantage in time of war; but of course the present organisation would not do against European troops. They should never be used as a substitute entirely for Europeans; but no doubt by employing them, you might dispense with these to a great extent; troops are so easily raised in India, and the supply of men so abundant, that any one of the Colonies mentioned, except the West Indies, could be flooded with them in a few weeks in such numbers as would make an attack by any force that an European power could despatch to such a distance, quite hopeless.

8. The best Indian troops are, I should say, superior to those of the southern natives of Europe, the men are more powerful and larger limbed; individually, they will readily face an Englishman, and I have known a Punjaubee fight an English soldier for half an hour. The way in which

which these people faced the English army on the Sutlej and in the campaign of 1848–9, gives every reason to suppose that they would face European troops. It is a mistake to suppose these races have any dread of an European as such. The English are their masters, and have a great prestige amongst them, but they have no very great respect for other Europeans. The 2nd Belooch Regiment met French troops in China, and were on an expedition with them; and from what I have heard, I am sure they would face them, if required. I conclude, therefore, that they might materially lighten the strain in Great Britain in time of war.

9. Not adequately, certainly, for if so, Indian troops would be as good as English, which against an European enemy they are not likely to be; for instance, no Asiatic troops would probably have stood so long the fire of Waterloo; but neither would many European nations.

However, as in case of a war, no one would be likely to attack us, except the French or Americans, whose troops are but little inferior to the British, I think an increase of one-half should be given, and here I understand that the native troops should be of the best quality, armed with the best weapons, and well officered by European officers.

N. B.—This question is a difficult one to answer; but I ground my opinion on the accounts of the Sikh wars of 1845–6. The Sikh troops there were not very superior in numbers to the British, and though they had in some of the actions a much superior artillery, still they had no European regiments or officers, and their generals could not manœuvre them. At Aliwal they had 15,000; Sir Harry Smith, 11,000, and he manœuvred skilfully, which they could not. Considering therefore the small odds on the Sikh side, Sir Harry Smith's advantages in Europeans and generalship, the Sikhs appear to have shown a fighting power which would warrant the above estimate.

10. Withdraw them from the Colonies certainly, and replace them by natives from India. If you take them from India, you may have a rebellion and lose the country; but if you lose a Colony, you may take it again from India at any time, if it is in the Indian seas; besides, by sending the native troops abroad, you reduce the proportion between the two armies in India, and they being quite in your power abroad, would be hostages for the good behaviour of their friends and relations serving in India.

Another consideration is this: once establish as a principle that India is to take its share in the common defence of the empire, and your power is almost unlimited; if you find it necessary to withdraw the few thousands that garrison the Colonies, you may throw a hundred thousand natives into them; India would easily supply them; you only want officers.

11. I believe so, in every respect, if he was well treated, and not troubled and looked down upon. They are very proud of having seen foreign countries, and like to talk about them; they get Europeanised; I have heard men of the 2nd Belooch Regiment talk very intelligently about China, Ceylon, Japan, and the Mauritius, which latter place some of them touched at on the way home, and where many of them say they would like to go again.

In saying this, I do not allude to Hindoo regiments; they have more prejudices to get over, and I know little about them, as the few we have very soon lose them, and are no criterion.

12. In the interests of both parties, it would be better to send regiments in their turn. It is doubtful if men would enlist for exclusive service in the Colonies, without much higher pay, and there would be difficulty in recruiting a regiment a little by itself; it goes at once; the men know one another, and take their house with them, but it is a very different thing to catch a raw recruit, and to get him to face the sea, to go to an unknown land.

When the 2nd Belooch Regiment was in China, I was commanding the 1st Regiment in Hyderabad, a number of men were required for the 2nd, but not a single recruit could be got throughout Sind. I was ordered to call for volunteers, and 250 men came forward, of whom 115 went; it is true each man got a bounty of 20 rupees, but such a bounty would not have got recruits.

If it should be decided to send the Sikhs and Punjabee regiments only, it would probably be necessary to raise some, but that is not for me to say. I only advert to it with reference to the reliefs, as the turn should not come round too often at first; eventually, probably, men would not be sorry to leave India again, after having been back from foreign service a few years; but it would be well to accustom the army to the change gradually.

13. Native troops know perfectly well that they are bound to go anywhere, and I have no reason to suppose they would be unwilling to do so. The 2nd Belooch Regiment went willingly, and as a matter of course, to China in 1862, though they did not know they would get anything more than their ordinary pay. Madras troops go to the Straits and Labuan, the 5th and 22nd Bombay Infantry went to China, and several regiments to Persia in 1857; and I never heard that they thought of its being anything but a matter of course.

14. Answered above.

15. I doubt if the Indian army ever did draw any distinction between Crown Colonies and Indian possessions; it all belonged to the Sirkar. If a native soldier went to China, he probably never inquired who Hong Kong belonged to. I never met a native soldier who knew what the "Company" meant; they know perfectly now, that everything belongs to the Queen.

16. I have never personally known such a case. I have heard that a Madras regiment, some years ago, when in Bombay for the purpose of being sent to Aden, showed a disinclination to go, and was made to do so, but it was before I came to India. A Bengal regiment refused to embark for Burmah in the last war, and was sent by land. I presume the causes were in both cases a disinclination to go to sea, and in the first case, perhaps, to going to Aden, but if it was, it soon wore off, as native troops of Madras as well as Bombay have gone there since as a matter of course.

17. No doubt such employment would give the Indian Army an Imperial character, which would be a most desirable thing to do, as it would increase its *esprit de corps*, and render it more faithful and to be depended on.

As long as the army sees nothing beyond India it remains neither more nor less than a militia. A native soldier knows all about India by hearsay, and wherever he goes he finds the country and people not foreign to him; if a Mussulman, he finds

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people of the same religion and manners as himself; if a Hindoo, the same; he sees a governor occasionally, and certain indications of British power, but his own atmosphere is not changed; the ideas that he has been brought up with remain in him; he is ignorant and credulous as ever, and just as likely to listen to the silly stories of designing men, such as drove him mad in 1857.

But take the same men abroad, let them see the power of England at Malta and Gibraltar, the fortresses and fleet, transport them in men of war, a more imposing emblem of power than anything else, send them to England itself, keep them away for a few years from their village ideas and feelings, and accustom them to totally different ones, let them feel that they are really of use, that they are really helping British soldiers to defend the empire, and I feel convinced that even if they are never to be employed in European warfare the benefit of such a treatment would be incalculable in securing the loyalty of the native army in India; opportunity, too, might be taken to introduce the sons of Indian nobles, who would educate themselves for it so as to be fit associates for British officers, like the Arab officers in the French, and the Circassian and other foreign officers in the Russian service; such men would be looked up to by those below them, and, associating with English officers, and with minds expanded by education and foreign travel, would identify themselves with the English rule, and form a link between it and the army, the value of which cannot be over-estimated.

18. You can get better troops in India than either Chinese, Malays, or Africans, and they come from your own dominions, which the others do not; you know the home of a native of India, and can find out his family, which is a certain guarantee for his respectability.

Politically speaking, if there is any truth in the argument that England should not trust the defence of her Colonies to Indian troops, though raised from a part of the British empire, it applies still more forcibly to troops entirely mercenary and subjects of other potentates; it would be humiliating to owe the safety of our Colonies to subjects of the Emperor of China, the Rajah of Burni, or the Sultan of Muscat or Zanzebar.

(signed) *G. Nicholett,*
Captain Commandant 29th or
2nd Belooch Regiment.

Hydrabad,
7 June 1867.

ANSWERS of Colonel *Beale,* Commanding 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.

1. That they should not be entirely substituted; a small body of British infantry should also be present, and British artillery of course.

2. (*a.*) Mahrattas from Dekhun and Konkun, Purwarrees and Mochees, and Sikhs, and a few Mahomedans and native Christians.
(*b.*) Ditto - - ditto.
(*c.*) Ditto - - ditto.
(*d.*) Ditto - - ditto.
(*e.*) Chiefly Sikhs and Beloochees.
(*f.*) Ditto - - ditto.
(*g.*) Ditto - - ditto.
(*h.*) As above first mentioned.
(*i.*) Chiefly Sikhs and Beloochees.

3. This would depend on whether raised for Colonial service or furnished from the present native Indian army. In any case five years should be the limit, and always in steam transports.

4. In the existing regiments by far the greater part of the men are married, and this would be a difficulty. Regiments being expressly raised for Colonial service single men would mostly be entertained. Religious prejudices are to be overcome, and the first objection also, by offer of superior pension on retirement at a fixed period of service, say 15 years, without stipulating that a man be pronounced unfit prior to sanctioning such pension.

5. The pay allowed in India, together with batta and free rations, with a fixed and on conditional period of service, say 15 years, for pension for a private not less than five rupees, and other ranks in proportion.

6. They might be efficiently officered, but I consider there should always be present a handful of British troops.

7. That in time of war they may always be employed as a supplement to Europeans, the number of which latter might be proportionably decreased and withdrawn for service elsewhere.

8. Whenever it is known to the regiments composing the native Indian army that war is the cause of their being called on to cross the sea, I believe they will always be found ready, and can be relied on to the extent of materially aiding the Government.

9. Supported by only a small number of British soldiers, I believe in such cases they would be found equal to the ocasion, if equally well armed, with every enemy that might appear.

10. Both might be done, from India sparingly, from the Colonies liberally, leaving a small band of Europeans as a rallying point, and supplying the place of the rest with native Indian troops.

11. As a general thing the native of India is rather indifferent about such things, but by degrees they would of course appreciate the power of the country under which they serve; solid advantages derived to themselves would be a primary consideration with them.

12. Constituted as the regiments now are it would be better to raise regiments specially for Colonial service; at some future time, it might be declared that, from a specified date, not less than 10 years hence, all regiments will take their turns of foreign service, the advantages before established being equally applicable to them.

13. The terms of enlistment referred to are clear; all native Indian soldiers of the Bombay Presidency considered themselves liable for active field service beyond sea, and were most willing for it previous to the date referred to; it admits of some doubt whether they believed they would be employed on garrison duty whenever required in British Colonies unless under extraordinary circumstances.

14. No.

15. Greater distance is one distinction; no sudden employment of the native Indian army generally on tour in the British Colonies should be carried

carried out: special corps should be raised for the purpose at first.

16. I do not consider the service (garrison duty) in China was popular with the 22nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. They left India expecting to see field service. But I believe the chief reason for their not liking the service was the peculiar way in which they were housed in long sheds with a breadth to each man of 3 feet of surface by some 7½ in length. This, for 2½ years, it must be admitted, was trying, and long absence from their families, about 560 of them being married men; but I never heard any expression of discontent from them. Their pay, with batta was sufficient, as they had rations free, and these were ample and very good.

App. No. 1.

(signed) *E. C. Beale,*
Colonel Commandant,
22nd Regiment B. N. I.

Poonah,
29 May 1867.

ANSWERS of Lieut. Colonel Sir *Henry Green*, C.B., K.C.S.I., Commandant in Chief, Sind Frontier Field Forces.

1. I AM of opinion that the general substitution of Indian native troops in our Colonies would be inexpedient either in time of peace or war.

2. If it were determined to employ native Indian troops, I consider that no particular race should be selected for any of the Colonies named, but that men should be enlisted without regard to tribe or race, having been first clearly informed of their proposed destination, and all the conditions of the Service upon which they are to be employed, and which latter should be most faithfully adhered to.

3. Reliefs should take place every three or four years.

4. If the men were enlisted, as proposed, in reply to Question 2, I do not see why any difficulties should arise.

5. The pay would have to be regulated according to the price of articles of consumption in the Colony in which the men might be stationed, unless they were fed by the State, which latter proceeding would be liable to cause difficulties, and probably much discontent.

6. I am decidedly of opinion that native Indian troops of any description would fail, if employed unsupported against the frontier tribes of the Cape Colony, or against internal disturbances in the Colonies named, but that if supported in the proportion of one British regiment to two natives, they might be of service in Ceylon and Hong Kong.

7. My opinion is, that they would not give satisfaction under either of the conditions named.

8. I think not.

9. Decidedly not. No numerical strength would make up for the withdrawal of garrisons composed of British soldiers.

10. Either course will be equally liable to lead to disaster.

11. I do not think that the native of India understands the meaning of the word loyal, in the sense that an European does; so long as we are successful in arms, and pay him well and regularly, he will be true to us, provided no severe religious pressure is brought to bear upon him; but he behaves well more from a feeling of self-interest than that of loyalty or gratitude.

12. I think that it would be better to raise fresh regiments exclusively for Colonial service.

13. Native soldiers recruited since 1856, understand that they are liable for service beyond the seas, but not for any lengthened period, and only in case of war.

14. The native soldiers would begin to consider where their employment beyond the seas would be likely to stop. Service at Aden and Burma is most unpopular amongst native troops, and China and the Mauritius would be equally so.

16. I am not quite certain of the year, but I think that it was between 1841 and 1845 that a Madras native regiment in Bombay, *en route* to Aden, refused to embark. Many similar instances can, I believe, be found on the records, both of the Bengal and Madras armies.

The real cause in all these instances, I believe, to have been the dislike to proceed beyond the seas.

17. I do not think that the employment of the Native Indian Army, as proposed, would in any way affect its feeling, with regard to being an Imperial Army, or that any real advantage would accrue by that feeling being instilled into it.

18. I am averse to the employment in India, as soldiers, of natives of other countries, when we have such a selection of material at hand; but I see no reason why Chinese, Malays, and Africans should not be employed in the Colonies in the same manner as the Indian army is in India. I have been given to understand that the Chinese make good soldiers, and if such be the case, a contingent might be raised to assist the British garrison in that Colony, and the same might be done wherever materiel exists for the purpose. Both the Ceylon rifles, composed of Malays and the West Indian regiments of Africans have, I believe, been found to answer, and such being the case, I see no reason for employing Native Indian troops, who would be far more costly, and from being unaccustomed to the climate, and manners and customs of the people, must be less useful.

(signed) *Henry Green,* Lieut. Col.
Commandant Sind Frontier
Field Force.

Jacobabad,
4 June 1867.

App. No. 1.

ANSWERS of Colonel *Schneider*, Commanding Second Regiment, Grenadiers, Native Infantry.

1. I THINK it would be unwise to substitute Indian for English troops in our Colonies in time of peace, except as auxiliary troops. I doubt whether native regiments would be very effective for Colonial service under the present system of officering them.

2. If it were determined to employ natives of India in the Colonies here specified, as a general rule only men recruited from the northern parts of India, such as Belochees, Sikhs, Punjaubee, Mahomedans, and Ghoorkas should be selected for foreign service. Men from southern India, particularly Hindoos, the majority of whom do not eat meat, would probably be unable to endure the rigour of climates such as I understand may be met with in South Africa, New Zealand, &c.

3. The reliefs should be made every three years, and invariably by steamers instead of sailing transports.

4. I believe there are no difficulties that would render the races I have named from undertaking garrison service that could not be overcome by the offer of increased advantages for such service.

5. The present pay, with the addition of "double or donation batta." Free rations would also have to be issued, as in China and at Aden, together with an ample supply of warm clothing, boots, and woollen socks.

6. It would be a very hazardous experiment to rely entirely on Indian troops in their present organization for protection to the Cape Colony against the frontier tribes, or against internal disturbances in the other Colonies herein named: they should be well supported.

7. It would not do to employ Indian troops in the Colonies referred to in the preceding question as a substitution for Europeans. They might be employed to supplement them.

8. Only as a supplement to British troops. It is apprehended that the bare fact of its being known that Indian troops were employed in the place of British troops might of itself invite an attack in time of war.

9. Certainly not. No increase of numerical strength would, in my opinion, compensate for the loss of the moral effect caused by the presence of British troops.

10. It would be better to withdraw European regiments from some of our Colonies. There might be danger in reducing such garrisons as Malta and Gibraltar, which are in the vicinity of the great European Powers. Portions of garrisons withdrawn from distant Colonies might be replaced with Indian troops.

11. The loyalty of the native soldier is not diminished by foreign service. It shows him the power of the Government he serves, and in that respect must do good. He also has less regard for caste prejudices, and thus becomes a more efficient soldier.

12. It would be better, both in the interests of India and of the Colonies, if native troops are to be employed, that fresh regiments should be specially raised and officered for Colonial service. Government would thus secure, by volunteering and enlistment, a picked body of native soldiers, all of whom would thoroughly understand what was expected of them.

13. It is quite understood by the native soldier that he is required by his affirmation, to go wherever he is ordered, by land or sea. I have no doubt that every regiment in this Presidency would respond to the call of foreign service, placing entire faith in the "Sirkar" that they would not be sacrificed by being required to serve in climates which by nature they are physically incapable of enduring. No possible advantage could accrue to Government by requiring its native soldiers to serve in countries unsuited to them.

14. Answered in the above reply.

15. I do not think that any distinction would be drawn, going across the sea or "Kala Paurier" is all they recognise wherever it may be; and provided they could withstand the effects of climate, and pay, rations, and clothing were sufficient, they would go where ordered.

16. I know of no such discontent having occurred, though I think that Kaye, in his "History of the Sepoy War," refers to this subject.

17. I do not think the sepoys of the native Indian army have any feeling on the subject of becoming part of an imperial army. On being pensioned or discharged, they revert to the population, and to their original calling as cultivators of the soil, thinking nothing further on, but little of the part.

18. If troops other than British are to be employed in our Colonies, it may not signify as far as those Colonies are concerned, whether they be recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other tribes not Indian, provided they are well commanded and amply officered by British officers accustomed to deal with native troops. But I would remark, that I have always understood the three races above mentioned to be difficult to manage, and it may be regarded as a certainty that, unless supplemented with British troops, they would give trouble, and cause dissatisfaction among the colonists.

As there is no difficulty in providing native soldiers for service in India, I do not see that any advantage would follow from employing in it races not Indian, except as a matter of policy to set one race in antagonism to another, on the supposition that it would provide against the chances of another mutiny. On the other hand, the *esprit* of the native army in India might be humbled by the introduction of foreign troops other than those of their conquerors, by whose side they take a pride in serving, and with whom they have consolidated our empire in India. To the inhabitants of India themselves, there can be but little doubt the employment of Chinese, Malays, and Africans, or other races not Indian, in the place of their countrymen, would be regarded with the greatest jealousy and dissatisfaction. We have only to remember that the feelings obtained a few years back in the Nizam's territory, when Rohileas and Arabs were extensively employed there, to judge how distasteful it would be to native residing in British territory, to see the races such as are under notice, forming a part of the Indian army.

(signed) *J. W. Schneider*,
Colonel Commanding 2nd Grenadier Regiment, N. I.

Surat, 10 June 1867.

App. No. 1.

ANSWERS of Major *Thomson*, Commander, 26th Regiment, Native Infantry.

ANSWERS respectfully submitted by Major G. L. Thomson, commanding Her Majesty's 26th Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, to certain confidential Questions forwarded to him by the Military Secretary to his Excellency Sir R. Napier, K.C.B., Commander in Chief, Bombay Army, as to the advisability of employing Indian Troops in the British Colonies.

1. ADVISABLE to a certain extent.

2. Most of the regiments, as at present recruited in the Bombay army (with a few additional Punjaub men), if efficiently officered, would be suitable for any of the Colonies named.

3. Not to be detained longer than three or four years at a time on Colonial service. But whatever period may be fixed upon by Government for their absence from India, should be strictly adhered to. The troops in transit should be kept at sea for as short a time as possible, on account of their caste, as they suffer more than Europeans.

4. None but what might be easily overcome, if proper arrangements are made for cooking, &c. for the different castes, and by an increase of pay and other advantages.

5. It is difficult to say, as so much would depend on the cost of provisions and other necessaries in the different Colonies, but sufficient ought to be granted to enable them to make remittances to their families in India.
In Persia they had pay, batta, and rations, and every man made considerable savings; they were thoroughly contented, and considered that Government had behaved generously to them.

6. They would do so, if efficiently commanded by an adequate number of European officers, with whom they were well acquainted, and had confidence in.

7. Most advisable as a supplement in the five Colonies named, if properly officered and armed with modern weapons.

8. I can truly say, I think they can be relied upon, as during the mutinies of 1857, 1858, and 1859, they were fully tried, more especially those men under my immediate command at Nassick and Trimbuck, as these places were the hot-beds of intrigue and discontent, and contained the relations and friends of the Nana Sahib, and also rebels of the Peait and other States; but a different mode than at present, of officering the regiments, would be required.

9. Certainly not, against a well-disciplined European or North American army. Two natives to one European would be required for garrison.

10. I think it would be better to withdraw European troops from the other Colonies named, filling up their places with Indian regiments to a certain extent, than withdraw European regiments from India, as was done during the Crimean war.

11. Decidedly advantageous, as it would not only do the native soldier good, but his experience of the power of Great Britain would be beneficially impressed on all those with whom he came in contact after his return to India.

12. It would be better, in my opinion, to take them according to roster, than raise new regiments exclusively for Colonial service, as I think it would be most difficult to get native soldiers to leave India for any long period.

13. All men on enlistment are made fully aware that they are liable for service beyond the seas.

14. As stated above, the troops being liable for foreign service no change is required.

15. I do not think they would draw any distinction.

16. I have never heard of any, except that a regiment sent to China was considered hardly used on account of its being detained there for a longer period than was at first intended.

17. Yes, I think so, and would be most beneficial in every way.

18. I do not think it would be politic to have the races named recruited for service in India, as I do not consider sufficient reliance could be placed on them, for they might easily be induced to turn against us, and their being brought into our Indian army would disgust the military races of India.

(signed) *G. L. Thomson*,
Major Commanding Her Majesty's
26th Regiment, Bombay N.I.

Camp Baroda, 15 June 1867.

Appendix, No. 2.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel *Norman*, 9 March 1867.

(A.)

MEMORANDUM of Composition of the NATIVE ARMY as respects Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of its principal Branches.

	NATIVES OF INDIA, EXCLUSIVE OF PUNJAUB.											PUNJAUB.				TRANS-INDUS OR PERSIAN.				HILL TRIBES.		
	Christians.	Mahomedans.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Tamils.	Jats.	Telingas or Gentoos.	Mahrattas.	Bheels.	Parwarees.	Other Castes.	Mahomedans.	Hindoos.	Sikhs.	Maybees.	Affghans.	Border Tribes.	Belloochees.	Persians.	Goorkhas.	Dogras.	Other Hill Men.
Bengal Cavalry, 19 regiments.	13	2,542	404	543	–	688	2	2	–	–	159	717	204	1,745	19	329	441	147	21	2	341	31
Native Infantry Bengal Army, 49 regiments.	283	2,539	2,622	3,924	–	1,070	–	66	–	–	4,953	2,889	774	4,850	1,719	507	664	29	36	3,319	1,346	986
Punjaub Cavalry, five regiments.	–	669	31	113	–	2	–	–	–	–	26	267	71	718	6	188	177	33	16	–	76	–
Punjaub Infantry, 12 regiments, including Guide Corps.	5	193	103	60	–	53	–	–	–	–	57	1,629	228	2,521	6	806	1,047	16	66	538	1,009	341
Madras Infantry, 40 regiments. (*b*)	1,546	10,056	(*a*)936	–	2,781	–	10,117	287	–	–	1,656	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bombay Cavalry, seven regiments. (*c*)	–	2,369	220	238	–	7	–	527	–	–	–	55	6	63	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bombay Infantry, 30 regiments. (*d*)	245	1,851	1,320	1,030	–	43	230	7,493	5	3,245	3,697	560	106	253	2	224	118	568	99	6	3	1

(*a*) Rajpoots and Brahmins are included under one head in the Madras Returns.
(*b*) The four regiments Madras Cavalry are nearly all Mahomedans.
(*c*) Thirty-nine men Bombay Cavalry unclassified.
(*d*) Also 246 Jews in the Bombay Infantry.

(B.)

BENGAL.

PAY and Allowances and Charges for different Corps, exclusive of Commissariat, Clothing, Ordnance and Barrack Charges, Capitation Allowance, &c.

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	
A Battery Horse Artillery (151 men) - -	94,994	11	–	per annum.
A Light Field Battery (151 men) - - -	78,723	12	6	„
A Heavy Field Battery (82 men) - - -	58,142	10	–	„
A Garrison Battery (80 men) - - - -	38,619	2	3	„
A Regiment Dragoons (493 men) - - -	358,091	11	6	„
A Regiment Native Cavalry (465 men) - -	238,128	12	–	„
A Regiment British Infantry (899 men) - -	340,619	7	8	„
A Regiment Native Infantry (720 men) - -	138,132	12	–	„

There are some slight deviations from this rule in the other Presidencies.

Appendix, No. 3.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Pears*.

App. No. 3.

EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Consultation for January 1865.

(No. 615.)

MEMORANDUM, No. 1500 B.

WITH reference to Military Department Letter, No. 132, of 4th March last, and to Schedule No. 98, Case 1, the papers relating to which are herewith returned, the undersigned begs to submit the statement called for of the estimated cost of two Sikh regiments of the present established strength, if employed in China.

2. The cost during employment would be nearly the same whether the regiments were taken from the regular establishment or specially raised for such service; the only difference would be that in the latter case the bulk of the privates would be short-service men. In the non-effective charges this would be more than counterbalanced, as the amount of the gratuities payable on discharge would exceed the value of the pensions entailed by an ordinary term of service.

3. The actual amount payable in China for the full strength employed in that country is shown in Statement (A.), aggregating 5,68,626 rupees for the two regiments, and includes pay, extra batta, ration money, hutting money, and half-passage money, and also sea provisions to and fro.

4. This would give an average of *Rs.* 399. 3., or say, in round numbers, 400 rupees, for each Native commissioned or non-commissioned officer and private.

5. Statement (B.) shows the amount payable in India for the same body for clothing, half-passage money, and sea provisions, &c., as also for the maintenance of a depôt for each regiment equal to the strength of a company, so as to admit of the corps being kept at their full establishment abroad. The wear and tear of equipments is likewise included, based on the regulated period of duration, together with the cost of the annual supply of ammunition and medical stores.

6. The total of these charges is 1,76,979 rupees, which, for the full establishment, would give an average of *Rs.* 124. 2. per man of all grades.

7. Lastly, Statement (C.) exhibits the non-effective charges, viz., an estimate of the proportion of pensions and gratuities fairly chargeable to the Imperial Government, as also transport charges in India to and from port of embarkation, and extra furlough allowances for three months, a boon to which the men might be fairly considered entitled after a tour of foreign service, together with a sum of 5,000 rupees per regiment for contingencies. The total of these charges would be 24,011 rupees per regiment, or an average of *Rs.* 33. 7. per man.

8. The undersigned, on the foregoing data, would suggest that if the Imperial Government bore all the charges payable in China for pay, rations, hutting money, and half the passage money and sea provisions included in Statement (A.), an annual capitation sum of 125 rupees per man on the average strength in China for the effective services, payable in India, and of 35 rupees for non-effective services, would cover all certain charges, and allow a fair margin for unforeseen contingencies, whilst such an arrangement would materially simplify the adjustment of the expenditure.

9. It will be noted that the establishment of European officers is in excess of that allowed in India, but it corresponds in a great measure to that which has been sanctioned on former occasions, viz., one officer per company, in addition to the staff.

App. No. 3.

10. As regards passage and hutting money, the calculation is made on a triennial relief, but in addition to passage for the whole corps, passage to and fro annually for 10 per cent. of strength to allow for men invalided and on sick leave and to replace them, has been provided for, as also for two European officers per regiment annually.

11. The rates assumed are two-thirds those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which it is considered would afford a fair average, and cover the freight of clothing, ammunition, &c.; and the calculation has been made that half of the passage money and sea provisions would be paid in China and half in India.

12. In the allowance for clothing, provision is made for a cost of trousers annually, as also for a pair of ankle boots, all of which may be considered as necessary for service in China.

13. The money ration has been calculated at the ordinary rate of *Rs.* 3. 8. for each fighting man, and *Rs.* 2. 8. for establishment followers.

(signed) *A. Broome*, Colonel,
Accountant General,
Military Department.

Military Department, Account Branch,
7 January 1865.

ESTIMATE of the ANNUAL COST that would devolve upon the BRITISH GOVERNMENT by the Employment in *China* of the Two existing Regiments of SIKH INFANTRY.

STATEMENT (A.)—CHARGES PAYABLE IN CHINA.

	Military Pay.	Staff Salary.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
I. European Officers:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Commandant	640 14 –	600 – –	1,240 14 –
1 Second in command	374 1 6	270 – –	644 1 6
1 Adjutant	225 12 –	200 – –	425 12 –
1 Quartermaster	225 12 –	150 – –	375 12 –
8 Doing-duty officers	225 12 –	100 – –	2,606 – –
1 Medical officer	– –	– –	600 – –
TOTAL	– –	– –	5,892 7 6

	Pay.	Extra Batta.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
II. Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
8 { 2 Subadars	100 – –	15 – –	230 – –
8 { 2 „	80 – –	15 – –	190 – –
8 { 4 „	67 – –	15 – –	328 – –
8 { 4 „	35 – –	7 8 –	170 – –
8 { 4 „	30 – –	7 8 –	150 – –
40 Havildars	14 – –	5 – –	760 – –
40 Naicks	12 – –	5 – –	680 – –
16 Drummers	7 – –	3 8 –	168 – –
600 { 100 Sepoys	9 – –	3 8 –	1,250 – –
600 { 200 „	8 – –	3 8 –	2,300 – –
600 { 300 „	7 – –	3 8 –	3,150 – –
TOTAL	– –	–	9,376 – –

App. No. 3.

STATEMENT (A.)—Charges Payable in China—*continued.*

	Pay.	Extra Batta and Extra Allowances on Foreign Service.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
III. Educational Staff:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Moonshee	20 – –	3 8 –	23 8 –
1 Grunthee	10 – –	3 8 –	13 8 –
TOTAL	–	–	37 – –
IV. Native Followers:			
1 Tindal	9 8 –	3 8 –	13 – –
4 Lascars	5 12 –	2 8 –	33 – –
16 Bhistees	5 – –	2 8 –	120 – –
8 Sweepers	4 – –	–	32 – –
16 Cooks	5 – –	–	80 – –
1 Chowdry	11 – –	3 8 –	14 8 –
1 Nutsuddy	5 – –	3 8 –	8 8 –
2 Weighmen	3 – –	3 8 –	13 – –
TOTAL	–	–	314 – –
V. Medical and Hospital Establishment:			
2 Native Doctors	1 on 20 – – 1 on 15 – –	5 – –	45 – –
2 Cooks	4 – –	1 – –	10 – –
2 Bhistees	4 – –	1 – –	10 – –
1 Head Sweeper	6 – –	1 – –	7 – –
4 Sweepers	4 – –	1 – –	20 – –
1 Goorzah	4 – –	1 – –	5 – –
1 Shop cooley	5 – –	1 – –	6 – –
TOTAL	–	–	103 – –

	Rates.	Total per Mensem for One Regiment.
VI. Contract and other Allowances:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Adjutant's allowance	50 – –	50 – –
8 Company payment allowance	20 – –	160 – –
1 Repair of camp equipage	25 – –	25 – –
1 School shed	5 – –	5 – –
1 Butts and targets	4 – –	4 – –
1 Subadar major's allowance	25 – –	25 – –
1 Drill havildar	5 – –	5 – –
1 Drill naick	2 8 –	2 8 –
8 Pay havildars	5 – –	40 – –
8 Color havildars	2 – –	16 – –
1 Drum major	7 – –	7 – –
1 Fife major	5 – –	5 – –
1 Mess allowance	100 – –	100 – –
1 Band „	100 – –	100 – –
Order of merit pay	50 – –	50 – –
TOTAL	–	594 8 –

App. No. 3.

STATEMENT (A.)—Charges Payable in China—*continued.*

	Rates.			Total per Mensem for One Regiment.		
VI. Contract and other Allowances—*continued.*						
Ration Money:	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
712 Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Rank and File	3	8	–	2,492	–	–
56 Non-combatants	2	8	–	140	–	–
TOTAL	–		–	2,632	–	–
Field Establishment of dooley bearers	–		–	488	–	–
Half passage money, to and fro, for two officers, annually	–		–	1,480	–	–
Ditto – for ten per cent. sick, annually	–		–	8,540	–	–
Boardship provision, equipment for ditto	–		–	1,450	–	–
Total Annual Expenditure for one Regiment	–		–	2,44,713	10	–
Hutting Money:						
8 Subadars	30	–	–	240	–	–
8 Jemadars	15	–	–	120	–	–
80 Havildars and Naicks	10	–	–	800	–	–
616 Drummers and Sepoys	3	–	–	1,848	–	–
Non-combatants	–		–	160	–	–
Half of passage money, to and from, for an entire regiment to be relieved every three years	–		–	1,01,164	–	–
Boardship provision and equipment for ditto	–		–	14,470	–	–
TOTAL	–		–	1,18,802	–	–
Proportion for one Year	–		–	39,600	–	–
GRAND TOTAL of Annual Charges for One Regiment, payable in China	–		–	2,84,313	10	–
Ditto – ditto – for Two Regiments	–		–	5,68,626	4	–

STATEMENT (B.)

	Rate.			Total.		
Clothing:	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*	*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
8 Subadars	17	–	9	136	6	–
8 Jemadars	15	15	4	127	10	8
40 Havildars	11	2	–	445	–	–
40 Naicks	9	–	10	362	1	4
1 Drum Major	14	12	11	14	12	11
1 Fife Major	11	2	–	11	2	–
614 Drummers and Sepoys	9	–	4	5,538	12	8
Boots for all ranks	5	–	–	3,560	–	–
TOTAL	–		–	10,195	13	7
Half passage money for 2 officers, annually	–		–	1,480	–	–
Half passage money for 10 per cent sick, annually	–		–	8,540	–	–
Board ship provision, and equipment for ditto	–		–	1,450	–	–
Proportion of passage money for one year for the whole corps	–		–	33,721	–	–
Ditto of boardship provision and equipment	–		–	4,823	–	–
TOTAL	–		–	50,014	–	–
Depôt Charges:						
1 Lieutenant in charge	325	12	–	325	12	–
1 Subadar	80	–	–	80	–	–
1 Jemadar	35	–	–	35	–	–
5 Havildars	14	–	–	70	–	–
5 Naicks	12	–	–	60	–	–
2 Drummers	7	–	–	14	–	–
75 Sepoys	7	–	–	525	–	–

App. No. 3.

STATEMENT (B.)—Charges Payable in China—*continued.*

	Rate.	Total.
Non-Combatants:	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
1 Lascar	5 12 –	5 12 –
2 Bhistees	5 – –	10 – –
2 Sweepers	4 – –	8 – –
2 Cooks	5 – –	10 – –
1 Mutsuddy	5 – –	5 – –
2 Weighmen	3 – –	6 – –
Medical and Hospital Establishment:		
1 Medical Charge	30 – –	30 – –
1 Native Doctor	20 – –	20 – –
1 Cook	4 – –	4 – –
1 Bhistee	4 – –	4 – –
1 Sweeper	4 – –	4 – –
1 Coolie	5 – –	5 – –
Non-effective Allowances:		
1 Company Payment Allowance	20 – –	20 – –
1 Repair of Camp Equipage	2 8 –	2 8 –
1 Butts and Targets	4 – –	4 – –
1 Drill Naick	5 – –	5 – –
1 Pay Havildar	5 – –	5 – –
Total Pay and Allowances of Depôt	– –	1,258 – –
Ditto per Annum	– –	15,096 – –
Wear and tear of Arms and Accoutrements	– –	4,358 – –
Wear and tear of Camp Equipage	– –	428 – –
Annual expenditure of Ammunition, &c.	– –	5,876 – –
Annual expenditure of Medical Stores	– –	1,352 – –
Clothing for Depôt Company	– –	1,170 – –
Total of Statement (B.)	– –	88,489 13 7
Total for Two Corps	– –	1,76,979 11 2

STATEMENT (C.)

	Annual Amount.
Non-effective Charges:	*Rs. a. p.*
Pensions and Gratuities	1,720 – –
Annual proportion of Transport Charges in India	11,573 – –
,, of three months' leave Pay to the Corps on relief after three years	5,718 – –
Contingencies	5,000 – –
Total of Statement (C.) *Rs.*	24,011 – –
Total for Two Corps *Rs.*	48,022 – –

India Office, Military Department,
22 March 1867.

(signed) *A. Broome*, Colonel,
Accountant-General, Military Department.

App. No. 3.

STATEMENT showing the SICKNESS and MORTALITY among the NATIVE TROOPS in *Burmah* and Port *Blair*, for the Years 1864 and 1865.

Year.	Strength.	Admitted into Hospital.	Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.
1864 - - -	2,751	2,714	46	16·80 per 1,000
1865 - - -	2,577	2,150	34	13·20 „

STATEMENT taken from the Sanitary Reports of the Army Medical Department presented to Parliament, showing the SICKNESS and MORTALITY among the NATIVE TROOPS serving in *China* during the Second War, and the Regiments garrisoning *Hong Kong* and *Shanghai* subsequently.

Year.	Strength.	Admitted.	Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths.
1859 - - -	2,009	3,283	109	*53·73 per 1,000
1860 - - -	5,275	11,180	168	31·85 „
1861 - - -	3,128	3,958	82	28·45 „
1862 - - -	1,725	2,500	41	23·77 „
1863 - - -	1,562	1,842	31	19·85 „
1864 - - -	1,553	1,683	40	25·75 „

* The deaths amongst the Natives invalided to India are not included.

India Office, Military Department,
23 March 1867.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS received from the Horse Guards.

App. No. 4. RETURN of the MOVEMENT of REGIMENTS during the last 20 Years to and from *India*, the *Cape*, and all Colonies East of the *Cape*, and of the Time passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs.	mos.
57th Foot	Australia	March 1825	March 1831	6	0
	India	March 1831	Sept. 1846	15	6
			Total	21	6
31st Foot	India	Feb. 1825	Dec. 1846	21	10
39th Foot	Australia	July 1826	July 1832	6	0
	India	July 1832	June 1847	14	11
			Total	20	11
9th Foot, 1st Battalion	Mauritius	Nov. 1832	Oct. 1835	2	11
	India	Oct. 1835	July 1847	11	9
			Total	14	8
62nd Foot	India	June 1830	July 1847	17	1
17th Foot, 1st Battalion	Australia	June 1830	March 1836	5	9
	India	March 1836	Aug. 1847	11	5
			Total	17	2
63rd Foot	Australia	Oct. 1828	Dec. 1833	5	2
	India	Dec. 1833	Aug. 1847	13	8
			Total	18	10

Note.—The date *first* shown in the service of each regiment is intended to mark the period of embarkation from this country, and the date *last* shown, as the time of the return to this country.

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	mos.
12th Foot, 1st Battalion	Mauritius	Aug. 1837	Mar. 1848	10	7
35th Foot	Mauritius	Jan. 1837	April 1848	11	3
27th Foot	Cape	May 1835	April 1848	12	11
90th Foot	Ceylon	Nov. 1835	Feb. 1846	10	3
	Cape	Feb. 1846	April 1848	2	2
			Total	12	5
91st Foot	St. Helena	Nov. 1835	June 1839	3	7
	Cape	June 1839	April 1848	8	10
			Total	12	5
21st Foot, 1st Battalion	Australia	Mar. 1833	Feb. 1839	5	11
	India	Feb. 1839	May 1848	9	3
			Total	15	2
28th Foot	Australia	July 1835	June 1842	6	11
	India	June 1842	May 1848	5	11
			Total	12	10
50th Foot	Australia	June 1834	Jan. 1841	6	7
	India	Jan. 1841	June 1848	7	5
			Total	14	—
4th Foot, 1st Battalion	Australia	Oct. 1831	Aug. 1837	5	10
	India	Aug. 1837	Sept. 1848	11	1
			Total	16	11
95th Foot	Ceylon	Oct. 1838	Mar. 1847	8	5
	China	Mar. 1847	Aug. 1850	3	5
			Total	11	10
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion	Malta	Nov. 1840	Mar. 1843	2	4
	Ionian Islands	Mar. 1843	Aug. 1846	3	5
	Cape	Aug. 1846	Aug. 1850	4	0
			Total	9	9
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion	Cape	Jan. 1852	Jan. 1854	2	0
18th Foot, 1st Battalion	Ceylon	Jan. 1837	May 1840	3	4
	China	May 1840	Nov. 1847	7	6
	India	Nov. 1847	May 1854	6	6
			Total	17	4

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	mos.
80th Foot	Australia	Dec. 1836	Aug. 1844	7	8
	India	Aug. 1844	June 1854	9	10
			Total	17	6
94th Foot	Ceylon	Oct. 1838	April 1839	0	6
	India	April 1839	June 1854	15	2
			Total	15	8
51st Foot	Tasmania	July 1838	Aug. 1846	8	1
	India	Aug. 1846	Aug. 1854	8	0
			Total	16	1
96th Foot	Australia	Nov. 1840	Jan. 1843	2	2
	Tasmania	Jan. 1843	Feb. 1849	6	1
	India	Feb. 1849	April 1855	6	2
			Total	14	5
15th Foot, 1st Battalion	Ceylon	Sept. 1845	May 1855	9	8
98th Foot	China	Dec. 1841	July 1846	4	7
	India	July 1846	May 1855	8	10
			Total	13	5
22nd Foot, 1st Battalion	India	Jan. 1841	July 1855	14	6
25th Foot, 1st Battalion	Cape	Dec. 1839	Aug. 1842	2	8
	India	Aug. 1842	Aug. 1855	13	0
			Total	15	8
11th Foot, 1st Battalion	Australia	July 1845	Jan. 1847	1	6
	Tasmania	Jan. 1847	Aug. 1848	1	7
	Australia	Aug. 1848	Feb. 1858	9	6
			Total	12	7
12th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Cape	Nov. 1842	May 1843	0	6
	Mauritius	May 1843	Aug. 1851	8	3
	Cape	Aug. 1851	Sept. 1858	7	1
			Total	15	10

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	mos.
58th Foot	Australia	May 1844	April 1845	0	11
	New Zealand	April 1845	Dec. 1846	1	8
	Australia	Dec. 1846	June 1847	0	6
	New Zealand	June 1847	March 1859	11	9
			Total	14	10
45th Foot	Cape	Feb. 1843	June 1859	16	4
10th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	April 1842	July 1859	17	3
86th Foot	India	April 1842	Aug. 1859	17	4
32nd Foot	India	May 1846	Aug. 1859	13	3
84th Foot	India	April 1842	Sept. 1859	17	5
78th Foot	India	April 1842	Jan. 1857	14	9
	Persia	Jan. 1857	May 1857	0	4
	India	May 1857	Sept. 1859	2	4
			Total	17	5
29th Foot	India	April 1842	Sept. 1859	17	5
60th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	July 1845	Aug. 1860	15	1
53rd Foot	India	August 1844	Aug. 1860	16	0
8th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	April 1846	Sept. 1860	14	5
61st Foot	India	July 1845	June 1859	13	11
	Mauritius	June 1859	Sept. 1860	1	3
			Total	15	2
3rd Foot, 1st Battalion	Malta	April 1851	Nov. 1854	3	7
	Greece	Nov. 1854	Mar. 1855	0	4
	Malta	March 1855	April 1855	0	1
	Crimea	April 1855	May 1856	1	1
	Ionian Isles	May 1856	Nov. 1858	2	6
	India	Nov. 1858	Nov. 1859	1	0
	China	Nov. 1859	April 1861	1	5
			Total	10	0
1st Foot, 2nd Battalion	Ionian Isles	Jan. 1853	April 1855	2	3
	Crimea	April 1855	June 1856	1	2
	Malta	June 1856	May 1857	0	11
	Gibraltar	May 1857	July 1858	1	2
	China	July 1858	April 1861	2	9
			Total	8	3

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
2nd Foot, 1st Battalion	Cape	June 1851	March 1860	8	9
	China	March 1860	May 1861	1	2
			Total	9	11
87th Foot	India	April 1849	April 1860	11	0
	China	April 1860	June 1861	1	2
			Total	12	2
5th Foot, 1st Battalion	Mauritius	July 1847	May 1857	9	10
	India	May 1857	July 1861	4	2
			Total	14	0
37th Foot	Ceylon	Nov. 1846	Oct. 1857	10	11
	India	Oct. 1857	July 1861	3	9
			Total	14	8
24th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	May 1846	July 1861	15	2
73rd Foot	Monte Video	Sept. 1845	July 1846	0	10
	Cape	July 1846	March 1858	11	8
	India	March 1858	Aug. 1861	3	5
			Total	15	11
64th Foot	India	Jan. 1849	Nov. 1856	7	10
	Persia	Nov. 1856	May 1857	0	6
	India	May 1857	Sept. 1861	4	4
			Total	12	8
59th Foot	China	June 1849	Nov. 1858	9	5
	Cape	Nov. 1858	Dec. 1861	3	1
			Total	12	6
60th Foot, 2nd Battalion	Cape	July 1851	April 1858	6	9
	India	April 1858	Feb. 1860	1	10
	China	Feb. 1860	Feb. 1862	2	0
			Total	10	7
83rd Foot	India	Jan. 1849	May 1862	13	4
6th Foot, 1st Battalion	Cape	Aug. 1846	Dec. 1857	11	4
	India	Dec. 1857	May 1862	4	5
			Total	15	9
75th Foot	India	May 1849	June 1862	13	1

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
92nd Foot	Ionian Isles	March 1851	March 1853	2	0
	Gibraltar	March 1853	Aug. 1855	2	5
	Crimea	Aug. 1855	May 1856	0	9
	Gibraltar	May 1856	Jan. 1858	1	8
	India	Jan. 1858	May 1863	5	4
			Total	12	2
85th Foot	Mauritius	Jan. 1853	May 1856	3	4
	Cape	May 1856	June 1863	7	1
			Total	10	5
31st Foot	Ionian Isles	Jan. 1853	May 1855	2	4
	Crimea	May 1855	June 1856	1	1
	Malta	June 1856	April 1857	0	10
	Gibraltar	April 1857	May 1858	1	1
	Cape	May 1858	Oct. 1858	0	5
	India	Oct. 1858	Feb. 1860	1	4
	China	Feb. 1860	Nov. 1863	3	9
			Total	10	10
13th Foot, 1st Battalion	Gibraltar	May 1851	June 1855	4	1
	Crimea	June 1855	May 1856	0	11
	Gibraltar	May 1856	Aug. 1856	0	3
	Cape	Aug. 1856	Aug. 1857	1	0
	India	Aug. 1857	April 1864	6	8
			Total	12	11
69th Foot	India	Nov. 1857	May 1864	6	6
74th Foot	Cape	March 1851	Nov. 1853	2	8
	India	Nov. 1853	June 1864	10	7
			Total	13	3
28th Foot	Malta	Feb. 1854	April 1854	0	2
	Turkey	April 1854	Aug. 1854	0	4
	Crimea	Aug. 1854	May 1856	1	9
	Malta	May 1856	Oct. 1858	2	5
	India	Oct. 1858	March 1865	6	5
			Total	11	9
52nd Foot	India	June 1853	March 1865	11	9
48th Foot	Ionian Isles	Feb. 1853	April 1855	2	2
	Crimea	April 1855	May 1856	1	1
	Malta	May 1856	Aug. 1857	1	3
	Gibraltar	Aug. 1857	Sept. 1858	1	1
	India	Sept. 1858	April 1865	6	7
			Total	12	2
71st Foot	Ionian Isles	March 1853	Jan. 1855	1	10
	Crimea	Jan. 1855	June 1856	1	5
	Malta	June 1856	Jan. 1858	1	7
	India	Jan. 1858	May 1865	7	4
			Total	12	2

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
66th Foot	India	Aug. 1857	June 1865	7	10
89th Foot	Gibraltar	April 1854	Dec. 1854	0	8
	Crimea	Dec. 1854	May 1856	1	5
	Gibraltar	May 1856	Aug. 1856	0	3
	Cape	Aug. 1856	Aug. 1857	1	0
	India	Aug. 1857	Aug. 1865	8	0
			Total	11	4
81st Foot	India	July 1853	Aug. 1865	12	1
65th Foot	New Zealand	May 1846	Jan. 1866	19	8
72nd Foot	India	Sept. 1857	Feb. 1866	8	5
56th Foot	India	Aug. 1857	March 1866	8	7
44th Foot	India	Aug. 1857	March 1860	2	7
	China	March 1860	Oct. 1861	1	7
	India	Oct. 1861	March 1866	4	5
			Total	8	7
70th Foot	India	Jan. 1849	Feb. 1861	12	1
	New Zealand	Feb. 1861	Mar. 1866	5	1
			Total	17	2
54th Foot	India	Aug. 1857	April 1866	8	8
18th Foot, 1st Battalion	India	Nov. 1857	May 1866	8	6
68th Foot	India	Dec. 1857	Nov. 1863	5	11
	New Zealand	Nov. 1863	June 1866	2	7
			Total	8	6
80th Foot	Cape	July 1856	Nov. 1857	1	4
	India	Nov. 1857	June 1866	8	7
			Total	9	11
43rd Foot	Cape	Oct. 1851	Dec. 1853	2	2
	India	Dec. 1853	Oct. 1863	9	10
	New Zealand	Oct. 1863	July 1866	2	9
			Total	14	9

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
40th Foot	Australia	July 1852	July 1860	8	0
	New Zealand	July 1860	Sept. 1866	6	2
			Total	14	2
67th Foot	India	Sept. 1858	Sept. 1859	1	0
	China	Sept. 1859	July 1865	5	10
	Cape	July 1865	Sept. 1866	1	2
			Total	8	0

Regiments now Abroad.—Service made up to March 1867.

57th Foot (expected home in 1867).	Ionian Isles	Feb. 1853	Sept. 1854	1	7
	Crimea	Sept. 1854	May 1856	1	8
	Malta	May 1856	May 1858	2	0
	India	May 1858	Nov. 1860	2	6
	New Zealand	Nov. 1860	March 1867	6	4
			Total	14	1
12th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Australia	July 1854	Jan. 1857	2	6
	Tasmania	Jan. 1857	April 1858	1	3
	Australia	April 1858	Sept. 1863	5	5
	New Zealand	Sept. 1863	March 1867	3	6
			Total	12	8
27th Foot expected home, 1867–68).	India	July 1854	Mar. 1867	12	8
35th Foot (expected home, 1867–68).	India	Aug. 1854	Mar. 1867	12	7
46th Foot (expected home, 1868–69).	Crimea	Oct. 1854	May 1856	1	7
	Ionian Isles	May 1856	Sept. 1858	2	4
	India	Sept. 1858	Mar. 1867	8	6
			Total	12	5
91st Foot (expected home, 1868–69).	Malta	Dec. 1854	March 1855	0	3
	Greece	Mar. 1855	Feb. 1857	1	11
	Ionian Isles	Feb. 1857	Sept. 1858	1	7
	India	Sept. 1858	March 1867	8	6
			Total	12	3
33rd Foot (expected home, 1868–69).	Mauritius	Feb. 1857	July 1857	0	5
	India	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
			Total	10	1
90th Foot (expected home, 1868–69).	India	April 1857	March 1867	9	11

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
82nd Foot (expected home, 1868–69).	India - - -	May 1857	March 1867	9	10
4th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1869–70).	Mauritius - -	May 1857	Nov. 1858	1	6
	India - - -	Nov. 1858	March 1867	8	4
			Total -	9	10
23rd Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1869–70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9	9
93rd Foot (expected home, 1869–70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9	9
77th Foot (expected home, 1869–70).	Australia - -	June 1857	April 1858	0	10
	India - - -	April 1858	March 1867	8	11
			Total -	9	9
95th Foot (expected home, 1869–70).	India - - -	June 1857	March 1867	9	9
50th Foot (expected home, 1869 or 1870).	Ceylon - - -	July 1857	Oct. 1863	6	3
	New Zealand - -	Oct. 1863	Oct. 1866	3	0
	Australia - -	Oct. 1866	Mar. 1867	0	5
			Total -	9	8
88th Foot (expected home, 1870–71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
7th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870–71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
Rifle Brigade, 3rd Battalion (expected home, 1871–72).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
1st Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870–71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
19th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1870–71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
79th Foot (expected home, 1870–71).	India - - -	July 1857	March 1867	9	8
38th Foot (expected home, 1871–72).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
20th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
97th Foot (expected home, 1867).	India - - -	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
Rifle Brigade, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1868–69).	India	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
34th Foot (expected home 1867).	India	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
60th Foot, 3rd Battalion (expected home, 1871–72).	India	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
42nd Foot (expected home, 1867–68).	India	Aug. 1857	March 1867	9	7
94th Foot (expected home, 1867–68).	India	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9	5
98th Foot (on passage home)	India	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9	5
51st Foot (on passage home)	India	Oct. 1857	March 1867	9	5
5th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Mauritius	Aug. 1858	April 1863	4	8
	Cape	April 1863	March 1867	3	11
			Total	8	7
99th Foot (expected home in 1870).	India	Sept. 1858	Feb. 1860	1	5
	China	Feb. 1860	Feb. 1865	5	0
	Cape	Feb. 1865	March 1867	2	1
			Total	8	6
9th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1868).	Ionian Isles	Oct. 1858	June 1864	5	8
	Gibraltar	June 1864	Nov. 1864	0	5
	China	Nov. 1864	April 1866	1	5
	Japan	April 1866	March 1867	0	11
			Total	8	5
13th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Cape	Feb. 1859	March 1863	4	1
	Mauritius	Mar. 1863	March 1867	4	0
			Total	8	1
22nd Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Malta	May 1859	July 1865	6	2
	Mauritius	July 1865	March 1867	1	8
			Total	7	10
10th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1871–72).	Cape	Jan. 1860	Dec. 1864	4	11
	India	Dec. 1864	March 1867	2	3
			Total	7	2
9th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1870).	Ionian Isles	Jan 1860	June 1864	4	5
	Gibraltar	June 1864	Aug. 1865	1	2
	Cape	Aug. 1865	March 1867	1	7
			Total	7	2
24th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871–72).	Mauritius	March 1860	Oct. 1865	5	7
	Burmah	Oct. 1865	March 1867	1	5
			Total	7	0
14th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1870).	New Zealand	Sept. 1860	Oct. 1866	6	1
	Australia	Oct. 1866	March 1867	0	5
			Total	6	6

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
11th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871).	Cape	July 1861	April 1865	3	9
	China	April 1865	May 1866	1	1
	Cape	May 1866	March 1867	0	10
			Total	5	8
96 h Foot (expected home, 1873–74).	Cape	Feb. 1863	Nov. 1865	2	9
	India	Nov. 1865	March 1867	1	4
			Total	4	1
18th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	New Zealand	April 1863	March 1867	3	11
21st Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1874–75).	India	July 1863	March 1867	3	8
20th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	India	July 1863	Nov. 1863	0	4
	China	Nov. 1863	June 1864	0	7
	Japan	June 1864	May 1866	1	11
	China	May 1866	March 1867	0	10
			Total	3	8
25th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1873).	Ceylon	July 1863	March 1867	3	8
36th Foot (expected home in 1874–75).	India	Aug. 1863	March 1867	3	7
19th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1874–75).	India	Aug. 1863	March 1867	3	7
76th Foot (expected home, 1874–75).	India	Oct. 1863	March 1867	3	5
55th Foot (expected home, 1874–75).	India	Nov. 1863	March 1867	3	4
11th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home, 1875–76).	India	July 1864	March 1867	2	8
12th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home, 1875–76).	India	July 1864	March 1867	2	8
58th Foot (expected home, 1875–76).	India	July 1864	March 1867	2	8
45th Foot (expected home, 1875–76).	India	July 1864	March 1867	2	8
10th Foot, 1st Battalion (expected home in 1874).	Cape	Sept. 1864	March 1867	2	6
41st Foot (expected home, 1875–76).	India	July 1865	March 1867	1	8
26th Foot (expected home, 1876–77).	India	July 1865	March 1867	1	8
49th Foot (expected home, 1876–77).	India	Aug. 1865	March 1867	1	7

Quarter Master General's Office, Horse Guards,
18 March 1867.

J. Hope Grant,
Quarter Master General.

App. No. 4.

WEST INDIES.

ADDENDA to Return dated 18th March.

RETURN of the MOVEMENT of REGIMENTS, during the last 20 Years, to and from the *West Indies* and the *Bermudas*, and of the Time Passed by each Regiment included in the above Return at each Station during that period.

CORPS.	STATION.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
77th Foot	Malta	Nov. 1837	Feb. 1842	4	3
	Ionian Isles	Feb. 1842	Jan. 1843	0	11
	Jamaica	Jan. 1843	Jan. 1846	3	0
	Nova Scotia	Jan. 1846	Sept. 1846	0	8
	Canada	Sept. 1846	June 1848	1	9
				10	7
71st Foot	Canada	April 1838	Oct. 1843	5	6
	West Indies	Oct. 1843	Jan. 1847	3	3
				8	9
23rd Foot, 1st Battalion	Nova Scotia	May 1838	Oct. 1840	2	5
	Canada	Oct. 1840	Sept. 1843	2	11
	West Indies	Sept. 1843	Mar. 1847	3	6
	Nova Scotia	March 1847	Oct. 1848	1	7
				10	5
48th Foot	Gibraltar	Sept. 1838	Jan. 1844	5	4
	Jamaica	Jan. 1844	April 1847	3	3
				8	7
7th Foot, 1st Battalion	Gibraltar	Nov. 1839	Dec. 1844	5	1
	West Indies	Dec. 1844	April 1848	3	4
	Nova Scotia	April 1848	June 1850	2	2
				10	7
1st Foot, 1st Battalion	Gibraltar	Nov. 1839	Feb. 1846	6	3
	West Indies	Feb. 1846	April 1848	2	2
	Nova Scotia	April 1848	Aug. 1851	3	4
				11	9
38th Foot	Ionian Isles	Sept. 1840	March 1843	2	6
	Gibraltar	Mar. 1843	Nov. 1845	2	8
	Jamaica	Nov. 1845	March 1848	2	4
	Nova Scotia	Mar. 1848	Aug. 1851	3	5
				10	11
88th Foot	Malta	Dec. 1840	Jan. 1847	6	1
	West Indies	Jan. 1847	May 1850	3	4
	Nova Scotia	May 1850	July 1851	1	2
				10	7
42nd Foot	Ionian Isles	Jan. 1841	Feb. 1843	2	1
	Malta	Feb. 1843	Feb. 1847	4	0
	Bermuda	Feb. 1847	June 1851	4	4
	Nova Scotia	June 1851	June 1852	1	0
				11	5

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
20th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Bermuda - -	Sept. 1841	April 1847	5	7
	Nova Scotia - -	April 1847	Sept. 1847	0	5
	Canada - - -	Sept. 1847	July 1853	5	10
			Total -	11	10
72nd Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	Nov. 1844	Feb. 1848	3	3
	West Indies - -	Feb. 1848	July 1851	3	5
	Nova Scotia - -	July 1851	Oct. 1854	3	3
			Total -	9	11
66th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	July 1845	Jan. 1848	2	6
	West Indies - -	Jan. 1848	May 1851	3	4
	Canada - - -	May 1851	Oct. 1854	3	5
			Total -	9	3
54th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	Oct. 1845	Dec. 1846	1	2
	Malta - - -	Dec. 1846	Dec. 1847	1	0
	West Indies - -	Dec. 1847	June 1851	3	6
	Canada - - -	June 1851	Oct. 1854	3	4
			Total -	9	0
19th Foot, 1st Battalion -	Malta - - -	Sept. 1840	Jan. 1843	2	4
	Ionian Isles - -	Jan. 1843	Dec. 1845	2	11
	West Indies - -	Dec. 1845	April 1848	2	4
	Canada - - -	April 1848	July 1851	3	3
			Total -	10	10
34th Foot - - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Oct. 1845	March 1848	2	5
	Gibraltar - - -	March 1848	March 1850	2	0
	West Indies - -	March 1850	June 1853	3	3
			Total -	7	8
16th Foot, 1st Battalion - -	Gibraltar - -	Jan. 1846	March 1847	1	2
	Ionian Isles - -	March 1847	April 1851	4	1
	Jamaica - - -	April 1851	Sept. 1854	3	5
	Canada - - -	Sept. 1854	July 1857	2	10
			Total -	11	6
56th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	Dec. 1846	May 1851	4	5
	Bermuda - - -	May 1851	Jan. 1855	3	8
			Total -	8	1
36th Foot - - - -	Ionian Isles - -	Jan. 1847	March 1851	4	2
	West Indies - -	March 1851	Sept. 1854	3	6
	Jamaica - - -	Sept. 1854	July 1857	2	10
			Total -	10	6
69th Foot - - - -	Malta - - -	Nov. 1847	April 1851	3	5
	West Indies - -	April 1851	May 1857	6	1
			Total -	9	6
67th Foot - - - -	Gibraltar - -	Jan. 1848	June 1851	3	5
	West Indies - -	June 1851	March 1857	5	9
			Total -	9	2

App. No. 4.

Corps.	Station.	From	To	Yrs.	ms.
26th Foot	Gibraltar	Mar. 1850	April 1853	3	1
	Canada	April 1853	Nov. 1854	1	7
	Bermuda	Nov. 1854	Nov. 1859	5	0
			Total	9	8
39th Foot	Gibraltar	April 1854	Dec. 1854	0	8
	Crimea	Dec. 1854	May 1856	1	5
	Canada	May 1856	Oct. 1859	3	5
	Bermuda	Oct. 1859	Aug. 1864	4	10
			Total	10	4
14th Foot, 1st Battalion	Malta	April 1854	Jan. 1855	0	9
	Crimea	Jan. 1855	June 1856	1	5
	Malta	June 1856	Aug. 1858	2	2
	Ionian Isles	Aug. 1858	Feb. 1860	1	6
	Jamaica	Feb. 1860	May 1864	4	3
			Total	10	1
21st Foot, 1st Battalion	Crimea	Aug. 1854	May 1856	1	9
	Malta	May 1856	Mar. 1860	3	10
	West Indies	Mar. 1860	Aug. 1864	4	5
			Total	10	0
49th Foot	Barbados	Feb. 1857	May 1860	3	3
41st Foot	Jamaica	April 1857	May 1860	3	1
2nd Foot, 2nd Battalion	Malta	Feb. 1858	Aug. 1858	0	6
	Ionian Isles	Aug. 1858	June 1862	3	10
	Gibraltar	June 1862	June 1864	2	0
	Bermuda	June 1864	Nov. 1866	2	5
			Total	8	9
3rd Foot, 2nd Battalion	Malta	April 1858	June 1862	4	2
	Gibraltar	June 1862	June 1864	2	0
	Barbados	June 1864	June 1866	2	0
			Total	8	2

Regiments still Abroad.

6th Foot. 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1867).	Gibraltar	May 1858	June 1862	4	1
	Ionian Isles	June 1862	Mar. 1864	1	9
	Jamaica	Mar. 1864	Mar. 1867	3	0
			Total	8	10
16th Foot, 2nd Battalion (expected home in 1871).	Nova Scotia	Dec. 1861	May 1866	5	5
	Barbados	May 1866	Mar. 1867	0	10
			Total	6	3
61st Foot (expected home in 1876).	Bermuda	Oct. 1866	Mar. 1867	0	5

Horse Guards,
20 March 1867.

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER handed in by Lieutenant General Sir *Hope Grant.*

RETURN of the Number of TROOPS in the COLONIES and DEPENDENCIES borne on the Strength of the ARMY.

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops (Officers and Men) borne on Strength of Imperial Army.					
	Cavalry of the Line.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	TOTAL.
COLONIES PROPER:						
North American:						
Canada	504	8,449	1,095	1,848	221	12,117
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick	-	2,903	-	488	204	3,595
Newfoundland	-	-	199	95	-	294
British Columbia	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil.
*Australian Colonies:**						
New South Wales	-	356	-	111	9	476
Victoria	-	488	-	111	-	599
South Australia	-	185	-	-	-	185
Tasmania	-	282	-	-	2	284
Queensland	-	91	-	-	-	91
New Zealand*	Military Train, 292	2,083	-	-	-	2,375
South African Colonies:						
Cape of Good Hope,† Natal, and British Kaffaria	-	3,511	491	152	213	4,367
Ceylon‡	-	880	853	88	5	1,826
Mauritius	-	1,464	-	244	133	1,841
West Indies:						
Jamaica	-	772	700	91	3	1,566
Honduras	-	-	504	1	-	505
Windward and Leeward Islands, comprising Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana	-	754	456	104	5	1,319
	504	22,218	4,298	3,333	795	31,440
Straits Settlements, Force to be about	-	400	740	220	-	1,360

* The force in Australia and New Zealand is to consist of three regiments only, about 2,700; all other troops to be withdrawn.
† The force at the Cape is to be reduced by one regiment of infantry.
‡ The force at Ceylon is to be increased by half a regiment of British infantry and one battery of artillery; the other half of the regiment being in the Straits.

DEPENDENCIES.	Number of Troops (Officers and Men) borne on Strength of Imperial Army.					
	Cavalry of the Line.	Infantry of the Line.	Colonial Corps.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Total.
Military Garrisons, Naval Stations, Convict Depôts, and Dependencies maintained chiefly for Objects of Imperial Policy.						
Mediteranean:						
Malta	-	4,299	619	815	187	5,920
Gibraltar	-	3,784	-	811	304	4,899
Ionian Islands	-	-	-	Nil.	—	—
Hong Kong	-	822	450	85	34	1,391
Japan	-	735	-	57	-	792
St. Helena	-	204	-	71	72	347
Bermuda *	-	822	-	187	310	1,319
Bahamas	-	-	473	-	1	474
Falklands	-	-	-	Nil.	—	—
Western Australia	-	-	-	Nil.	—	—
Labuan—Force to be two Companies Ceylon Rifles, out of the Force for the Straits Settlements	—	—	—	—	—	—
West African Settlements:						
Sierra Leone	-	-	590	-	-	590
Gambia	-	-	203	-	-	203
Gold Coast and Lagos	-	-	357	-	-	357
	—	10,666	2,692	2,026	908	16,292
Gross Total	504	32,884	6,990	5,359	1,703	47,732

* The Force at Bermuda is to be increased by one Regiment of Infantry, to be taken from New Brunswick, which will be thereby reduced one Regiment of Infantry.

Horse Guards,
28 March 1867.

J. Hope Grant,
Quartermaster General.

Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER handed in by Mr. *Taylor*, 9 April 1867.

RETURN of the Local Militia, Volunteers, and Military Police in the West Indian Colonies, actually Embodied and Effective.

COLONY.	Description of Forces.	Number of Officers and Men.	Field Guns.	Date of Return.	REMARKS.
Bahama Islands	Militia Artillery	169	5	Aug. 1862.	
Turk's Islands	Volunteers, Infantry	88	–	July 1862.	
	„ Artillery	33	3		
	Militia	55	–		
Jamaica	Volunteers, Infantry	304	–	June 1863	*Jamaica.*—The Militia numbers 22 regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and eight companies of artillery, or 4,991 men in all, but has not been called out or drilled since 1849.
	„ Cavalry	336	–		
	„ Artillery	27	–		
Virgin Islands	Volunteer Militia	100	–	1860.	
Antigua	Militia, Infantry	55	–	Oct. 1864	*Antigua.*—From Note to October last Return, it appears that the "artillary and infantry have for some time been virtually disbanded."
	„ Yeomanry	74	–		
	„ Artillery	23	2		
Montserrat	None	None.	–		
Dominica	Militia, Rifles, and Artillery.	203	3	Jan. 1864	Parade once a month.
Grenada	Militia	37	–	Jan. 1864	*Grenada.*—The term of service of the Militia having expired in 1862, there are now only 37 officers. In 1862 there were 300 riflemen and 65 gunners.
	Military Police	30	–		
Nevis	Volunteers, Infantry	116	–	July 1863.	
	Police	9	2		
St. Kitt's	Volunteer Artillery	36	2	July 1862.	
	Militia, Infantry	103	–		
	„ Yeomanry	105	–		
Barbados	Volunteers, Infantry	174	–	July 1864	The Militia, 1,033 men, exists on paper only.
	„ Yeomanry	337	–		
	„ Artillery	158	10		
St. Vincent	Volunteers, Infantry	108	–	June 1864.	
	Militia, Infantry	121	–		
	„ Cavalry	49	–		
	„ Artillery	53	4		
	Police	50	–		
St. Lucia	Military Police	48	–	June 1864.	
Tobago	Neither Militia nor Volunteers.	–	–	Aug. 1864.	
Trinidad	- ditto - ditto	–	–	May 1863.	
Honduras	Nil	–	–	July 1862	A Volunteer force has now been formed in Honduras; total number, 175; 30 of these are artillery.
British Guiana	Militia, Infantry	324	–	Jan. 1864.	
	„ Cavalry	9	–		
	„ Artillery	78	–		

SUMMARY.

West Indian Colonies.	Volunteers, Infantry	790	–
	„ Cavalry	673	–
	„ Artillery	254	15
	Total	1,717	15
	Militia, Infantry	1,016	–
	„ Cavalry	241	–
	„ Artillery	398	11
	Total	1,655	11
	Military Police	137	2
	Grand Total	3,509	28

Topographical Department, War Office, 2 January 1865.

(signed) *F. Miller*, Major, R. A.

Appendix, No. 7.

PAPERS handed in by Captain *Mends*, R.N. App. No. 7.

EXTRACT from the REGULATIONS for HER MAJESTY'S TRANSPORT SERVICE.

ARTICLE 132.

THE regulated number of women (with their children) allowed to embark with troops, and for whom free conveyance will be provided, is as follows, viz. :—

To and from Foreign Stations.

1. The wives of the regimental staff serjeants.

2. The wives of the serjeants in each troop, battery, or company, in the following proportion, viz. :—

2 out of 4 or 5 serjeants.
3 out of 6 or 7 ,,
4 out of 8 ,,

3. The wives of all other non-commissioned officers and men in the proportion of 4 to 60 men; or, should a larger number of men be embarked, then in the proportion of 6 to 100 men.

4. When troops are embarked for India, China, Australia, or New Zealand, the total number of women (with their children) for whom free conveyance will be provided, will be 12 to 100 men, including staff serjeants and all others.

(signed) *W. R. Mends*,
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

App. No. 7.

ESTIMATE prepared in the TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT of the COMPARATIVE EXPENSE of the OVERLAND and CAPE ROUTES between *England* and *India*, for Conveyance of 14,400 Soldiers, with Officers and Families (concurred in by the Secretary of State for India).

PARTICULARS.		Overland Route.	Cape Route.
		£.	£.
Total expense of Cape route, 399,978 *l.*	Freight of men, women, and children outward, at 10 *l.* 1 *s.* 5 *d.* per adult	- -	87,475
	Ditto - - ditto - homeward, at 28 *l.* 6 *s.* 4 *d.* per adult	- -	227,156
	Passage of officers outward, at 100 *l.* 9 *s.* 6 *d.*	- -	33,559
	Ditto - - ditto - homeward, at 127 *l.* 2 *s.* 10 *d.*	- -	35,600
	Medical comforts	- -	5,821
	Bedding	12,510	10,367
Working expenses of Overland route, 209,014 *l.*	Wear and tear	46,406	—
	Wages and victuals	43,893	—
	Coals	62,820	—
	Mess of military officers	9,225	—
	Victualling of men, women, and children	30,621	—
	Wages and victuals, wear and tear, and coals for tugs, and wages of boatmen	3,539	—
Charges upon capital and insurance account, 71,595 *l.*	Annual charge for replacement of capital (1,007,034 *l.*) in 25 years	34,195	—
	Average interest upon amount of unredeemed capital at 5 per cent.	22,228	—
	Insurance upon the average value of ships, tugs, and boats, at 5 per cent. per annum	15,172	—
Additional charges, 35,575 *l.*	Transit of the Isthmus	25,575	—
	Expense of management; being for establishments at Home and Abroad, under the control of the Director of Transports	10,000	—
	TOTAL Amount of Working Expenses and Charges on Capital £.	316,184	—
	Cost of Cape Route (computed on data furnished by India Office)	- -	399,978
	Per Adult £.	18 5 —	23 1 9
	Difference in favour of Overland Route £.	4 16 9*	

* The above rate of 4 *l.* 16 *s.* 9 *d.* per adult is equal to 5 *l.* 16 *s.* 5 *d. per soldier* (including officers, women, and children), and is irrespective of mess and ration stoppages.

W. R. Mends,
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

App. No. 7.

RETURN of the Net Cost per SOLDIER of the TRANSPORT of TROOPS with Officers and Families between the undermentioned Stations and *Great Britain*, after deducting the regulated Mess and Ration Stoppages; in Hired Ships, based on the Payments made for the Numbers conveyed during Five Years; and, in Her Majesty's Troop Ships, on the Cost of the Conveyance of a Battalion with Officers and Families, including the Cost of Coals, Wages and Victuals for the Crew, and a per-centage charge (at the rate of Eight per Cent. per Annum) for wear and tear of a Troop Ship of the "Tamar" class, calculated for the Average Period of Voyage.

STATIONS.	Average Days' Voyage.		Cost of Transport per Soldier.			
			OUT.		HOME.	
	For Hired Sailing Ships.	For Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	In Hired Ships.*	In Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	In Hired Ships.	In Her Majesty's Troop Ships.
			£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
West Indies	40	22	†19 18 8	4 13 7	†35 12 5	5 13 10
Mauritius	85	60	14 8 6	15 6 1	33 5 –	17 2 1
Ceylon	105	75	19 17 10	19 16 3	38 4 4	22 – –
Straits Settlements	105	80	no case	14 19 –	no case	17 13 3
China (*see* Note)	125	90	21 16 4	23 18 9	29 2 –	27 – 8
Japan	145	100	no case	26 9 6	no case	29 11 4
Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand	100 out 90 home	80	16 16 1	12 12 3	22 13 3	15 1 5

The transport of troops from Great Britain to India is not included, it having hitherto been undertaken by the Indian Government; but an estimate of the cost of this service by the Overland and Cape routes is annexed.

* Should these vessels make an empty voyage home the cost would be increased.

† These rates are high, steam conveyance having been employed, and the troops proceeding *viâ* Gibraltar.

NOTE.

With the exception of the engagement (not included in the above statement) of the "Far East" steamer, and "White Adder," for the conveyance of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment from Hong Kong to the Cape, calling at Mauritius, and of other troops from the Cape to England, the homeward engagements in China show no marked variations from the average rate of 29 *l.* 2 *s.* per soldier.

The "Far East" and "White Adder" cost, on the numbers embarked at Hong Kong, 55 *l.* 4 *s.* 3 *d.* per soldier, but this is on the presumption that the same freight would have been demanded for the direct voyage to England. The rate also includes a payment for 200 men short embarked.

App. No. 7.

RETURN of Numbers of EUROPEAN and NATIVE INDIAN TROOPS conveyed in Hired Ships between *India* and *China* during Five Years, and of the Cost per Soldier of all Expenses of Transport.

		Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Rate per Soldier.
						£. s. d.
From Bombay to Hong Kong -	Europeans	–	–	–	–	—
	Natives -	11	849	–	–	8 13 3
„ Calcutta to Hong Kong -	Europeans	36	820	84	95	33 19 8*
	Natives -	–	–	–	–	—
„ Hong Kong to Bombay	Europeans	27	1,070	2	2	15 – 9
	Natives -	16	1,735	1	2	9 12 10
„ Shanghai to Bombay -	Europeans	–	–	–	–	—
	Natives -	13	1,282	13	26	13 18 7

* This rate is exceptionally high, it having been necessary to engage a steamer for the service.

The mess and ration stoppages of the European troops have been abated.

W. R. Mends, Director of Transport Services.

SUMMARY.

The average cost of conveyance by sailing vessel between India and Hong Kong may be taken as follows, viz.:—

	£.	s.	d.	
For Natives - - - - -	9	10	–	per soldier.
„ Europeans - - - - -	15	–	–	„ „

The cost of conveying native troops between India and Shanghai is about 14 *l.*, and for Europeans it is considered that it would be about 22 *l.* per soldier.

W. R. Mends, Director of Transport Services.

App. No. 7.

ESTIMATE of the Cost for Transport of a Battalion to *Hong Kong* from *England* in a Hired Sailing Ship, for a Voyage of 125 Days, and for the following Numbers:

38 Officers.	87 Women.
750 Men.	160 Children.

	£.
For freight	7,746
„ mess	2,375
„ victualling	7,794
„ fittings	471
„ bedding	458
£.	18,844
Abate mess and ration stoppages	3,175
or 20 *l.* 17 *s.* 10 *d.* per soldier £.	15,669

ESTIMATE of the Cost of the same Service by H. M. Troop Ship "Tamar," for a Voyage of 90 Days.

	£.
For mess of officers	1,282
„ victualling of troops	5,237
„ bedding for troops	458
„ wages and victuals of the crew	3,452
„ wear and tear, at 8 per cent. per annum on first cost	2,076
„ coals	7,733
£.	20,238
Abate mess and ration stoppages	2,286
or 23 *l.* 18 *s.* 9 *d.* per soldier £.	17,952

Note.—Should the vessel make an empty voyage home, the cost would be increased.

W. R. Mends,
Director of Transport Services, Admiralty.

Appendix, No. 8.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Shadwell.*

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost of maintaining a Battalion of Infantry, consisting of 788 all Ranks, at the following Stations East of the Cape.

	Australia.*	Tasmania.	New Zealand.†	China.‡	Mauritius.	Ceylon.*	West Indies.	Jamaica.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Regimental Pay and Allowances.	22,900	22,900	22,900	(*a*)23,100	22,900	22,900	22,900	22,900
Military Labourers - -	- -	- -	- -	735	840	- -	2,262	730
Special Allowances - -	2,080	2,080	2,080	7,665	5,000	7,152	1,450	1,450
Cost of Provisions, Forage, Transport (including Wives and Children).	4,992	6,716	9,950	9,566	4,708	12,980	10,506	8,447
Clothing - - - - -	2,624	2,624	2,624	2,595	2,640	2,640	2,632	2,632
Barrack Expenses - -	4,790	4,104	6,566	26,901	3,695	3,254	3,452	3,452
Divine Service and Martial Law.	225	225	225	357	355	258	272	335
Medical and Purveyor's Expenses.	1,350	1,350	(*b*) 2,100	4,815	2,650	5,730	3,558	3,565
Educational Expenses - -	185	185	185	185	(*c*) 250	(*c*) 250	(*c*) 200	(*c*) 225
Average Cost per Annum of Arms, Accoutrements, Ammunition.	548	548	548	548	548	548	548	548
£.	39,694	40,732	47,178	76,467	43,586	55,712	47,780	44,284
Pay of Invalids, Time-Expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the Year.	500	500	457	660	360	556	134	123
Depôt Charges (including *Recruiting Expenses*), Establishment of Depôt, 140 all Ranks.	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648	6,648
£.	46,842	47,880	54,283	83,775	50,594	62,916	54,562	51,055
Pay of a Battalion for the period of the Voyage *to and from* the several Colonies.	10,036	10,036	10,036	11,292	7,526	9,408	2,760	2,760
Average *Annual* Charge for Pay during the period of Relief, taking the Average Service of a Battalion abroad at 10 Years.	1,003	1,003	1,003	1,129	752	940	276	276

(*a*) One additional Assistant Surgeon.

(*b*) Two additional Assistant Surgeons.

(*c*) Detached Schools at these Stations.

* Arrangements have only recently been completed, by which various expenses hitherto paid direct by these Colonies, will become chargeable to Imperial Funds; the information possessed at the War Office as to the exact expenditure for these services is not definite, as no accounts including the new charges have as yet been received. As the special allowances to be granted in Australia in future have not been determined upon, a sum on their account has been included, calculated at the same rate as that granted for Tasmania and New Zealand.

† As this Colony has for several years past been in a constant state of disturbance, the expenditure recently incurred there scarcely affords satisfactory data for an estimate of normal expenditure for provisions and barrack services.

‡ The expenditure in China for hire of buildings pending the construction of barracks and other arrangements is at present exceptionally high, and is the cause of the excessive charge for barrack expenses.

Note.—The Straits Settlements (Singapore) have not been included, as no returns of expenditure of any kind have been received; it is expected, however, that the expenditure will be about the same as at Ceylon.

April 1867. *William Brown,* Accountant General, War Office.

Appendix, No. 9.

PAPER handed in by Colonel *Shadwell.*

App. No. 9.

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE of the Annual Cost of Maintaining a BATTALION of EUROPEAN INFANTRY, consisting of 788 All Ranks, at the Cape of Good Hope.

	£.
Regimental Pay and Allowances	22,900
Military Labourers	—
Special Allowances	1,040
Cost of Provisions, Forage Transport (including wives and children)	5,332
Clothing	2,575
Barrack Expenses	3,857
Divine Service and Martial Law	280
Medical and Purveyors' Expenses	1,752
Educational Expenses	185
Average Cost per Annum of Arms, Ammunition, and of their maintenance	548
	38,469
Pay of Invalids, Time-expired Men, and Drafts on Passage during the year	235
Depôt Charges, including Recruiting Expenses	6,648
	45,352
Pay of a Battalion for the period of the Voyage to and from the Colony	4,642
Average Annual Charge for Pay during Relief, taking the average period of service of a Battalion abroad at 10 years	464

War Office,
7 May 1867.

W. Brown,
Accountant General.

Appendix, No. 10.

PAPER put in by Mr. *H. Taylor.*

App. No. 10. EXTRACT from "Notices sur les Colonies Francaises" publicés par ordre de S. Exc. le Marquis de *Chasseloup-Jaubat,* Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies.

LES forces militaires de la Réunion se composent des troupes de la garnison et des milices locales.

L'effectif de la garnison est de 46 officiers et de 1,124 sous-officiers et soldats, répartis entre divers détachements d'infanterie et d'artillerie de la marine, de disciplinaires des Colonies, de génie, et de gendarmerie Coloniale.

Voici la composition de ces divers corps :—

Etat-major.—Un lieutenant de vaisseau, attaché à l'état-major général; 1 capitaine d'infanterie de marine, adjudant de place à Saint-Denis.

Génie.—Un chef de bataillon directeur; 1 lieutenant, et 3 gardes du génie; une compagnie indigène d'ouvriers du génie composée de 3 officiers et de 93 sous-officiers et soldats. Total: 8 officiers, 93 sous-officiers et soldats.

Artillerie de la Marine.—Un chef d'escadron directeur; un sous-chef ouvrier d'état; un garde d'artillerie de 1re classe; un maître armurier; une batterie d'artillerie de marine, composée de 4 officiers et de 96 sous-officiers et soldats; une section de canonniers ouvriers composée d'un officier et de 45 ouvriers. Total: 8 officiers et 144 sous-officiers et soldats.

Infanterie de Marine (4e régiment).—Un lieutenant colonel; 1 chef de bataillon; 1 capitaine major; 1 capitaine adjudant-major; 1 chirurgien aide-major; 1 lieutenant officier payeur; 1 sous-lieutenant chargé de l'habillement; 4 compagnies, chacune de 114 hommes, dont 3 officiers*. Total, 19 officiers et 444 sous-officiers et soldats.

Disciplinaires des Colonies.—Une compagnie composée de 5 officiers et de 281 sous officiers et soldats.

Gendarmerie Coloniale.—Une compagnie composée de 4 officiers et 162 sous-officiers et soldats, dont 90 à cheval, 67 à pied, et 5 enfants de troupe.

Milice.—L'effectif de la milice s'élevait en 1862 à 9,970 hommes, dont 295 officiers.

* * * * * * *

Station Maritime.—La Station locale de la Réunion se compose de trois bâtiments de l'état le Lynx, aviso à hélice, de 150 chevaux et de 2 canons; les goëlettes à voiles la Turquoise et la Perle, armées chacune de 2 canons.

La Réunion est aussi le centre de la division navale des côtes orientales d'Afrique.

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* Une cinquième compagnie qui compte à la Réunion est détachées dans les îles de Mayotte, Nossi-Bé et Sainte Marie de Madagascar.

Appendix, No. 11.

PAPER put in by Sir *James Fergusson*.

App. No. 11.

COPY of a LETTER from the Adjutant General to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir, Head Quarters, Calcutta, 18 March 1867.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 302, of the 8th instant, I have the honour, by desire of the Commander in Chief, to submit his Excellency's remarks regarding the possibility of reduction of the army in India, in which, it is understood, the armies of Bombay and Madras, British and Native, are included, as well as that of the Presidency of Bengal.

2. Much time will be required to collect and reduce the returns demanded in your letter of the 1st February, which refers more particulary to questions affected by the report of the Royal Commission on recruiting.

3. The subject, however, of your letter of the 8th March, now under reply, admits of a large treatment, on consideration of the principles according to which the empire of British India is held. For this purpose round numbers, which are readily available, will suffice.

4. His Excellency would commence by the statement of certain simple facts. The British army in India, taken as a whole, numbers about 61,000 men. This figure includes the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of the British corps, and the British officers in military service on the staff and with Native corps. The Native force, including the armies under the three Commanders in Chief and the forces under the several Governments, amounts to about 122,000 men. Thus in all, we have a mixed force of about 183,000 men, there being two natives to one British soldier.

The gross nominal strength, or the sanctioned establishment of British non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, is 61,257. The nominal establishment is never permitted to be exceeded, under the orders of the Secretary of State for India.

This being so, the practical consequence is obvious, that real or actual strength is never equal to nominal strength in an army, which, serving at a distance from England, receives its recruits but once a year. The causes of decrease, namely, death, invaliding, and discharge, are constant, and the results appear in the Returns from month to month.

Consequently, with rare exceptions, Her Majesty's regiments in India are always more or less incomplete in numbers, or in other words, below their nominal strength.

This is even seen in the regiments just arrived from England, and notably so in the case of those which came this year, some of them being among the weakest corps now in India.

It is therefore perfectly safe on an average of months, to reckon the actual strength of the British army in India at about six per cent. below the nominal or sanctioned establishment.

This has been done by the Commander in Chief for the purpose of this letter, in order that there may be no possible delusion with regard to the real facts which should be in the mind of Government with respect to the question put to his Excellency for report, and the military strength the Government has to rely on.

The result is, that the figure 61,000 is found sufficient to represent the average or actual strength of the British forces proper in India throughout the year, the same including the officers with native corps and on the staff, as well as those serving with British regiments.

5. In the year before the war of the mutiny, which was also a year of peace, the forces stood as follows:—

British force about -	45,000 men,	including all officers with British and Native regiments.
Native force in Presidency of Bengal, about - - -	160,000 „	
Ditto in Madras -	57,265 „	
Ditto in Bombay -	38,850 „	
	301,115	

Consequently there has been a gross diminution of armed men in the peace establishment of India, if the years 1856 and 1867 be compared, amounting to about 118,000 men.

6. If we decompose the items, we find on the other hand, that there is an actual increase on the establishment of 16,000 men, while the Native establishment is diminished by 134,000 men.

7. In other words, the increase of 16,000 British soldiers is placed against a decrease of 134,000 Natives.

8. I should mention that the Bengal Native army, including those under the Commander in Chief, as well as those under Government, stands at - 65,659 per last returns.

The Madras at - - 31,524 „

The Bombay at - - 25,345 „

122,528*

This excludes the Hyderabad Contingent of 8,000 men, which is not strictly speaking part of the British army, as it is paid for by the Nizam, and maintains the peace of His Highness' territories. It is not included in the Statement of Native Forces in para. 5.

* This is the total strength. But with respect to armed strength in cantonments, we must recollect that the system of the Native Indian armies in time of peace permits of a large privilege of furlough, which weakens the regiments by 10 per cent. for periods varying from six to nine months. The effective strength is further diminished by the per-centage represented by the recruits, which may be represented at six per cent.

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9. His Excellency would ask the Government now to consider the area which is thus guarded by an army of about 183,000 men, and the conditions under which the troops are posted.

10. Attention to the map is requested.

11. Peshawur is in the 71st degree of east longitude, whereas Debroghur, which is a military station also, on the confines of Assam, is in the 95th degree of east longitude.

12. Again, Peshawur is in the 34th degree of north latitude, and Cape Cormorin is in the 8th degree of north latitude.

13. In addition to the area thus roughly illustrated, the Indian armies provide garrisons for the provinces lately wrested from Burmah, as also a garrison for the important post of Aden, on the coast of Arabia. They have hitherto found garrisons for the Straits Settlements, including two batteries Royal Artillery, and two Native Infantry regiments. The latter return to India, and the batteries will now be struck off the Indian establishment.

14. If we consider the conditions under which the army is posted, the most remarkable facts of frontiers and distances present themselves. Thus, on the west and north-west, stretching from Beloochistan in the south to Peshawur and Huzarah in the north, along the entire length of the Indus, our outlying regiments, including the force at Jacobabad, the several stations occupied by the Punjab force, and the great garrison of Peshawur, are constantly fronting hostile tribes, which, but for the presence of those troops, would harry our territorities without ceasing.

15. There cannot be a doubt that any native power holding such a frontier would employ at least 100,000 men for the purpose, whereas the work is done by our soldiers in numbers not much exceeding 20,000, made up as follows—

The Garrison of Peshawur - - - - - - - -	6,763
The Punjab Force - - - - - - - -	11,912
The Scinde Horse - - - - - - - -	1,506
The 30th Native Infantry, Bombay Army - - - -	708
Total - - -	20,889

16. The out-posts thus described find their supports at long distances, at Rawul Pindee in the North, at Mooltan in the South of the Punjab, and at Hyderabad and Kurrachee in Scinde.

17. His Excellency further observes that besides the mountain tribes, we have to consider the semi-hostile Government of Affghanistan, that country from which have proceeded the numerous Mahomedan invasions of India.

18. His Excellency is confident that the Government of India will agree in his opinion, that any relaxation of grasp of our frontiers on the North-West would be followed by inroads from Affghanistan, the Government of India being thus landed in an Affghan war, which would compel it, however pacifically inclined, ultimately to undertake the permanent occupation of Affghanistan.

19. Sir William Mansfield inclines strongly to the belief, that when we consider the manner in which we maintain the security of our North-West frontier, and the necessary supports to which allusion has been made, we are not merely preserving order in a recently conquered country filled with a warlike population, we are not solely keeping the police of a rugged mountainous frontier, along which every man is a warrior from his youth, but we are also staving off foreign war, which, if it ever breaks out in that direction, can hardly fail to lead to territorial extension in an uncivilized and poor country, the latter being, as his Excellency understands, entirely opposed to the existing policy of Her Majesty's Government.

20. The Northern frontier, which looks more especially to the kingdom of Nepal does not display the warlike development which, as shown above, is indispensable in the North-West.

21. Nevertheless, it must be recollected that an accident occurring to one single minister in Nepal might possibly be attended with great political change, rendering an armed attitude necessary on our part. In the meantime, Nepal is watched from the military stations lying adjacent to the East India Railway, and the Ganges, the forces in those stations maintaining the peace of the districts and the great cities of Hindustan, according to the object set forth by Government in its distribution of the troops.

22. If we travel eastward in the consideration of our frontier, his Excellency would remind Government, that whether with regard to Bhootan or to the wild tribes lying east and south of it, it has been found necessary, within the last two years, to place the Eastern frontier on a more military footing than had hitherto prevailed.

23. This was a consequence not only of the disturbances of the Bhooteas, but also of the very unruly conduct of the tribes of the Kossyah Hills, and those lying North of the Brahmapootra.

Brahmapootra. Our villagers, in those distant, but very extensive districts, are constantly exposed to raids and plundering, while, on the other hand, our tea planters are spreading over the land. That frontier extends from Darjeeling to Debrogurh, a distance of not less than 700 miles as the crow flies. But with regard to existing communications, a measurement of miles conveys no idea of the distances and the difficulties to be overcome between the two points. Some five native regiments, with two batteries of native and Eurasian artillery possessing mountain guns, are employed in all, in support of the frontier police, the details of the occupation of the frontier having been settled in consultation last year by their Excellencies the Governor General and Commander in Chief, and his Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. The support of the frontier out-posts is in Calcutta itself, the communication being maintained by rail as far as Kooshteah, and then by the Brahmapootra.

24. It may be as well to mention here, that with the exception of the Peshawur Garrison and the supports at Mooltan and Rawul Pindee, the British troops proper are not employed in the system of frontier defence, unless war actually breaks out. The native troops are used for this purpose alone, because they are more fit for it, and are less liable to suffer from the necessary exposure to climate, &c.

25. Before dismissing the question of frontier defence, his Excellency would briefly allude to the Burmese Provinces, the troops there stationed being required, not only for the support of the British Government in the provinces themselves, but also to hold a check on the Court of Mandalay, and prevent the recurrence of a Burmese war. Although small in numbers, the forces under the Chief Commissioner of Burmah operate on the mind of Mandalay, as the garrisons of Peshawur and Rawul Pindee on the Ameer of Cabul.

26. His Excellency would now turn to considerations of a different character, but perhaps even of more importance than those to which he has as yet invited the notice of the Governor General in Council.

27. It will be in the recollection of Government, that before the conquest of the Punjab, the provinces of Bengal and the North-West were held as strongly by British troops as they are in the present day.

28. Thus, 25 years ago there was a strong British force at Calcutta and Dum-Dum, British troops occupied Berhampore, Dinapore, Ghazeepore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Agra, and Meerut, in large proportions of all the arms.

29. Subsequently to the annexation of the Punjab, some of these stations ceased to have any British troops, whilst the garrisons of all were greatly weakened. The head quarters of the artillery quitted Dum-Dum; Berhampore, Ghazeepore, and Allahabad were left without British troops; the regiment of British Dragoons left Cawnpore; Meerut was reduced by one British regiment.

30. Afterwards, when Oude was annexed, Cawnpore, instead of having 2,500 British troops as it had in former days, was, his Excellency believes, reduced to four companies of British infantry. Oude, though annexed, received, as his Excellency understands, the head quarters and six companies of a British regiment in all.

31. Without venturing to describe the causes which led to the insurrection and mutiny of 1857, it is clear to his Excellency that what had been considered the necessary means of demonstration till 1846 of British strength proper, in the North-Western provinces and Behar, ceased to be so considered after that year, the climax of the change of policy in the maintenance of a due proportion of British soldiers, with the large force of Native regiments in Oude and the old provinces, having been reached subsequently to the annexation of the former.

32. His Excellency would now draw attention once more to the figures stated in paragraphs 4 and 5. It appears that, according to existing establishments and real averages, we have an actual British force stronger by 16,000 men than we had in 1856, that being the year immediately preceding the mutiny, one of peace establishment, and also one in which, as shown above, the Government of India had reached the climax of non-demonstration of white faces in the vast tract stretching through Behar, the Doab, Rohilcund and Oude.

33. It is also necessary at this stage to advert to the fact of the enormous area comprised in the Gwalior territories, in Bundlekund, in the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, in Malwa, and in Rajpootana, which were absolutely devoid of British troops, notwithstanding that a great portion of the country was held by Princes more or less mediatized, but who possessed standing armies, and throughout whose territories the population was armed.

34. The only representation of British power was to be found in British agents and Native regiments, some belonging to the regular army, but the larger proportion of them being contingents of irregular troops under different denominations.

35. In 1857–58, the whole of that system broke up. The Native regiments and contingents had turned against us. Some of the Native Princes threw off their allegiance to the British Empire and met us in the field. Scindia was deposed by his insurgent troops, and afterwards reinstated by our arms. After a two years' campaign the vast area was

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again reduced to order, and security taken for the future by placing garrisons of British soldiers where they had not been seen before, viz., at Morar, Jhansi, Nowgong, Jubbulpore, Saugor and Mhow, the number of Native troops having been reduced to a bare minimum.

36. In like manner, when the war of the mutiny came to an end, the errors of too great confidence in native loyalty as briefly illustrated above, were repaired. The provinces which had been entirely denuded of British troops, in which consequently the military mutiny swelled to the proportion of civil war, British Government and administration having been for a time swept away, were occupied properly. British garrisons were given to Benares, to Allahabad, to Cawnpore, to the several stations in Rohilcund, and Oude. Although the numbers thus allotted are not nearly so great as they were at the termination of hostilities in 1859,* a constant reduction having been in progress since that date, the country is, his Excellency thinks, now occupied in a sufficient manner.

37. It is this occupation which accounts chiefly for the difference in the amount of British force of 16,000 men, as shown in figures of 1867 and 1856.

38. His Excellency cannot believe, with the recent experience of the difficulties of 1857–58–59, that any thinking statesman could possibly revert to the military policy of the year preceding the mutiny. For that policy trusted to an occupation of India by means of an enormous Native army, without a sufficient demonstration of British forces proper, by which the people in certain vast and warlike districts could be reminded of the existence of British power.

39. In support of the above, his Excellency would briefly recapitulate the additional British forces thus distributed in great cities and countries, which, under the old and now broken up system, were entrusted to Native troops. Hazareebagh and Berhampore one regiment of infantry; Benares one regiment of cavalry, one wing of infantry; Cawnpore one regiment British infantry, instead of four companies as before the mutiny; Oude four regiments of British infantry and one regiment of cavalry, instead of one regiment of infantry as before the mutiny; Delhi, one wing British infantry; Bareilly one regiment British infantry; Shajehanpore one wing British infantry; Moradabad one wing British infantry; Roorkee one wing British infantry; Gwalior two regiments British infantry, and one of British cavalry; Jhansi one regiment British infantry, the regiment there stationed ultimately to go to Nowgong; Nagode, Jubbulpore, and Saugor, two regiments British infantry; Nusseerabad one regiment British infantry; Neemuch, one wing British infantry; Mhow one regiment British cavalry and one of British infantry.

40. Yet after all what does the addition amount to? Four regiments of cavalry and 16 regiments of infantry, the establishment of the individual regiments being now much less than in the former times.

Note.—The nominal establishment of non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the several corps of the different arms, is—

Cavalry	460
Artillery	145
Infantry	860

41. There is one other item of calculation, which has to be considered when we investigate the full meaning of the additional British forces, as compared with those of the days preceding the mutiny.

42. About six years ago, it was determined, after the most prolonged consultation between the Secretary of State and the several Governments of India, that the experience of 1857 forbad the entrusting of artillery to native hands; accordingly the field artillery required for this empire, amounting to about 426 guns, is now entirely manned by British soldiers. Before the mutiny, the natives constituted probably three-fourths of the artillery force.

43. His Excellency has, he believes, now accounted for the difference of the European force as shown in the years 1856 and 1867.

44. It has often been stated in newspapers, and it has even been argued by men of authority in England, that we keep up an European army in India for the purpose of doing nothing; or if it does anything, that it is maintained to overawe a great unwieldy native army.

45. Yet the figures above cited show that the Native forces of all descriptions have been diminished by 134,000 men since 1856.

46. One chief employment of the Native army of the present day has been displayed in the necessary guard of the frontiers.

47. Another use is shown in the necessity of having at least one Native regiment in the vicinity of large cities, in which our policy, according to the reasoning above given, demands the presence of a British regiment proper. Many duties of guards, detachments, treasure parties, and so forth, are taken almost exclusively by the Native troops, for the purpose of encouraging health and life among the Europeans, whose constitution is unequal to the consequent exposures and fatigues in the climate of the plains of India.

48. Accordingly, if we except the hill stations, wherever we see one such British regiment, the purposes of administration require the presence of a Native one also.

49. There

* In 1861 the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the British regiments serving in India, amounted to 82,156.
In the previous year, 1860, the strength stood at 94,829.
These figures are taken from the Report of the Royal Sanitary Commission.

49. There are a few stations in out-of-the-way districts in Bengal on our side of India, in Bombay in the west, and Burmah in the extreme east, in which a certain demonstration of military force is required, but where, for obvious reasons of climate and economy, it would not only be inconvenient, but extremely unwise and extravagant to employ Her Majesty's British regiments.

50. His Excellency could name several such stations under this presidency, and the stations in Kattywar, Guzerat, Candeish, and Dharwar, in the Presidency of Bombay.

51. His Excellency is not so well acquainted with the Presidency of Madras, but it may be presumed that there are stations of similar character occupied by the native army in Madras, which the government of that presidency would be unwilling to see denuded.

52. His Excellency is reminded by reference to the two minor presidencies, that it would seem hazardous to reduce the European strength, which, if investigated, appears not to exceed what existed previous to 1856.

53. Thus, the difference of what was maintained in the Bombay Presidency, in the comparison of 1856 and 1867, is, as shown above, all devoted to what is called the Mhow Division, or in other words, Malwa and Rajpootana; in the stations of Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad. The Mhow division is a division of the Bombay army, although the country occupied by it is under the Governor General's agents.

54. In like manner it would appear, although his Excellency is not sure about it, that the extra British regiments now borne on the rolls of the Madras Presidency are devoted to Burmah, and not to Madras proper.

55. But in any case, it is to be recollected, that ten British regiments now, according to present strength, are not more than equal to eight regiments of the strength allowed to a British corps before the two last reductions in the rank and file.

56. It is therefore certain that, in the two minor presidencies, the European force is not greater than it was before the mutinies.

57. His Excellency therefore thinks that a case is made out, which entirely bars the entertainment of the notion that the army in India, whether European or native, admits of any considerable reduction.

58. On the contrary, Sir William Mansfield cannot divest himself of the strong opinion, that it is one of the most extraordinary facts in the history of modern administration and politics, that it should be possible to hold the vast area of India, with all the frontier requirements, and to preserve the most absolute internal tranquillity not only in our own territories, but among our dependent allies, by such a body as 183,000 men, of whom one-third only is recruited in the foreign country which effected the conquest.

59. It may be asserted with perfect safety, that such results of diminished military numbers in the occupation of India were impossible in former days. They have only become practicable in consequence of an improved communication on the rivers and coasts by means of steam-vessels, and through the completion of a large railway system. But for the latter, we must have still maintained a native force of considerable dimensions, not equal to that organized in 1856, but far larger than what is now found to suffice.

60. The character of the facts and the truth of the argument are displayed still more clearly, when it is recollected, that in addition to the maintenance of order amongst our own subjects, and on our frontier, we have to watch with a careful eye the limited sovereignties of the numerous native states, many of which have armed bodies at their disposal, and would be hostile if they dared, and all of which require to be awed into good behaviour.

61. It is to be observed that the notion of good behaviour of the native states and governments, includes not only abstinence from offence against us, but from internecine war between themselves.

62. As was seen in the north in Behar, the Doab, and Rohilcund, in 1857, so was it remarked in the southern Mahratta country in the south of India at the same time, that the military spirit of the people is not dead, and that it requires but opportunity to blaze up and be extremely dangerous.

63. The like will hardly be denied with respect to the Punjab, which was recently conquered, which is ready to furnish soldiers for all India, and whose late military traditions must still afford the themes of conversation in every village.

64. Such are the general considerations which his Excellency would lay before the Government of India.

65. Before closing this letter, Sir William Mansfield would allude to certain matters of detail.

66. His Excellency, in his place in Council, having been requested by the Governor General in 1865, to review the military establishments for the purpose of curtailing expenditure, he submitted, with a scheme for the reduction of the rank and file in the cavalry and

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infantry, the same having been effected, a plan for the reduction of expense in the artillery arm, which still remains in abeyance.

67. His Excellency did not consider this plan one of positive reduction of artillery strength, but rather one of modification of establishments, which, whilst diminishing the number of batteries, would have added greatly to the efficiency of all that were retained.

68. By the diminution of the number of batteries, a corresponding and not inconsiderable decrease would have been effected in the staff and the officers of the artillery in India. But there would have been but little reduction in the rank and file, which, according to his Excellency's plan, would have remained about the same as it is now in the Bengal Presidency, with a slight numerical decrease in the two minor presidencies.

69. His Excellency has always held an opinion, in common, he believes, with good artillery officers, that artillery differs in an important respect from the other arms, viz., that while you can afford to have skeleton regiments in time of peace, which are easily filled by recruits on the approach of war, it is bad policy to have skeleton batteries of artillery. The reasons of this are obvious; a certain number of men are required to work each gun; if the number of gunners barely suffices for the number of guns, a sickly season, or one sharp skirmish, renders the battery comparatively useless. And again, whereas you can make an infantry soldier in three months, and a cavalry soldier in nine, it takes three years to make an instructed gunner.

70. It is an undoubted fact that the present establishment of the field battery is a skeleton one. The same is true of the garrison battery in India. Artillery officers are unanimous in this view of their batteries. It may then be safely asserted that the existing establishments of single batteries are simply inadequate, except for mere parade purposes.

71. His Excellency therefore considered in 1865, and he still adheres to his opinion, that the modification alluded to would be advantageous; and that, while expense would be reduced if it were effected, the general efficiency of the army in India would certainly not be impaired, with regard to what is required of the artillery in peace and war.

72. With respect to native infantry and cavalry, it is believed to be impossible to effect even the slightest reduction in the army in Bengal.

73. His Excellency considers that we are absolutely without reserve. When we had to find the troops for the little Bhootan war, there was much difficulty in affording regiments for the purpose, and we were even obliged to weaken the force on the Punjab frontier. This was hardly a safe proceeding.

74. His Excellency was also compelled to suggest to Government the expediency of adding to the strength of regiments proceeding to Bhootan, which was done. On the other hand it may be observed that there is a slight reserve in the Madras and Bombay armies.

75. The Straits Settlements having been made over to the Colonies, the Secretary of State has announced that the two Madras native infantry regiments, now at Singapore and Penang, are to return to India.

76. Many authorities believe that some further reduction besides those two regiments is possible. His Excellency is disposed to concur in this view. It is probable therefore that the Madras authorities on a final review of the subject might not object to the reduction of four regiments of native infantry, and perhaps one of native cavalry.

77. In like manner, it may be said of Bombay, that the army of that presidency admits of the reduction of two regiments of native infantry. This was allowed by the Bombay authorities when two regiments returned from China in 1862-63.

78. His Excellency is aware that the late Governor of Bombay objected to the reduction of those two regiments—an objection which Sir William Mansfield himself supported on grounds of general policy, while as Commander in Chief of that presidency he admitted the reduction to be feasible.

79. Whilst, as in duty bound, his Excellency has thus indicated in what direction a slender reduction may be operated, Sir William Mansfield would suggest that it is open to question whether such a measure be one of good policy with regard to the numerous changes and reductions operated in the armies of Madras and Bombay during the last few years.

80. It is evident, he thinks, throughout the arguments pursued in this letter, that, taken as a whole, the native armies in India stand at a strangely low figure.

81. His Excellency need not remind the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council that, during the last 25 years, we have had frequent wars in China and a war with Persia.

82. We cannot be certain that similar exigencies may not arise again, thus causing demands on the forces of the two southern presidencies, at very short notice. The Bengal army, if required to furnish native regiments for foreign service, would certainly be obliged to raise men.

83. His

83. His Excellency would therefore hint that it is for Government to decide which is the more politic, viz., to trust to what the future may bring forth, and to cut down the two armies of Madras and Bombay to such an extent as has been suggested as possible, no reserve being left for contingencies; or to continue to act on the views which were believed to be sound in 1863. App. No. 11.

84. His Excellency would be inclined to recommend the preservation of the existing establishment, but that one regiment from the Bombay Presidency be offered to the Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies for service at Hong Kong, and that it be suggested that, instead of raising new troops for the Straits Settlements, the Madras Government should be invited to find what may be required for Singapore and Penang, according to the practice hitherto observed, the expense of these corps being borne by the respective Colonies while employed under Colonial Government.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. E. Longden,*
Colonel, Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 12.

PAPERS received from the War Office.

ANNUAL COST of granting 2*d.* a Day EXTRA PAY to the NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS and MEN of a BATTALION of INFANTRY, 788 all Ranks. App No. 12.

50 Non-Commissioned Officers 20 Trumpeters and Drummers 680 Rank and File - - -	750 Men, at 2*d.* a day -	£. 2,281

Depôt, consisting of 134 Men, at 2*d.* a day - - - - £. 408

War Office,
May 1867.

W. Brown,
Accountant General.

Appendix, No. 13.

PAPERS put in by Mr. *Fonblanque*.

EXTRACTS from the APPENDIX to the REPORT of the COMMISSIONERS appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into the MILITARY EXPENDITURE and ESTABLISHMENTS of *Ceylon*, 1865.

Appendix (B).

EXTRACT from the "Mauritius Blue Book" for 1864.

COLONIAL ALLOWANCES.

THE Officers of Her Majesty's Forces in the Mauritius receive pecuniary allowances paid from the Colonial Treasury, in lieu of all the ordinary allowances, which at other stations they receive in money or in kind. These allowances were established at the capture of the island in 1810, and were modified and altered from the 1st May 1858, according to Despatch, No. 40, dated 5th October 1857, and published in this colony on the 20th April 1858.

THE following is the SCHEDULE now in force:—

SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES.	Amount per Mensem. £. s. d.
Staff.	
Inclusive of lodging money, as these officers are not provided with Quarters.	
Major General commanding the Forces.	125 – –
Assistant Military Secretary, Aide-de-Camp — Each as Captain	26 4 8
Deputy Quarter Master General, Lieutenant Colonel.	39 17 10
Deputy Commissary General — after five years' service, Colonel.	43 8 3
Deputy Commissary General — under five years' service, Lieutenant Colonel.	36 17 10
Assistant Commissary General, Major.	29 17 10
Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Captain.	20 4 8
Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary General, Lieutenant.	13 11 7
Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, Lieutenant Colonel.	36 17 10
Staff Surgeon Major, Lieutenant Colonel.	34 17 10
Staff Surgeon, Major	29 17 10
Staff Assistant Surgeon — after six years' service, Captain.	20 4 8
Staff Assistant Surgeon — under six years' service, Lieutenant.	13 11 7
Purveyor to the Forces, Lieutenant	15 11 7
Purveyor or other clerks, Ensign	13 11 7
Dispenser to the Forces, Subaltern	13 11 7
Exclusive of lodging allowances, these officers being provided with Quarters.	
Deputy Military Storekeeper, Major.	20 17 10
Barrack Master, Major	20 17 10
Military Store Clerk	8 11 7
Clerk of Works, Royal Engineer Department, Lieutenant.	13 16 7
Clerk, Royal Engineer Department, Ensign.	8 11 7

SCHEDULE OF ALLOWANCES.	Amount per Mensem. £. s. d.
Regimental Officers.	
Exclusive of lodging allowance.	
Colonel Commanding	30 8 3
Lieutenant Colonel Commanding	23 17 7
Major	20 17 7
Captain and Paymaster	13 4 8
Lieutenant	8 11 7
Ensign	8 11 7
Adjutant	13 16 7
Surgeon, as Major	20 17 7
Assistant Surgeon, after six years' service, as Captain.	13 4 8
Ditto Lieutenant	8 11 7
Quartermaster	13 16 7
Regimental school	– 8 4
Paymaster Serjeant	1 4 –

Regimental or Garrison Schoolmasters, 1st class, 4*s.* per diem.
Ditto — ditto — ditto — 2nd class, 2*s.* ditto.
Ditto — ditto — ditto — 2*s.* ditto.
Ditto — ditto — ditto — 1*s.* ditto.
Clerk to the Military Chaplain — 16*s.* per mensem.

When Public Quarters are not provided, the following will be the Scale on account of Lodging money:—

Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel — 11*s.* per mensem.
Major — 9*s.* ditto.
Captain — 7*s.* ditto.
Subaltern — 5*s.* ditto.

With 2*l.* additional on account of lodging, on account of departure.

An Officer for each horse he is required to keep is entitled to 3*l.* per month for Forage (provided such horse or horses be not already included in the above scale), and 2*l.* 5*s.* for each civil servant, as well as 1*l.* 10*s.* 5*d.*, as provision allowance for a fourth servant, when such servant is allowed by Royal warrant.

Command Allowance.

The Officer Commanding at Mahebourg 8*s.* per mensem.
Each Officer Commanding a Corps or Post (except Mahebourg), 5*l.* per mensem.

Recapitulation of the Military Expenditure during the year ended 31st December 1864.

	£. s. d.
By Great Britain	105,252 18 5
By the Colony	32,258 12 11
TOTAL £.	137,511 11 4

Appendix (B a).

App. No. 13.

SCALE in Detail of Colonial Allowances received by Officers serving with the Troops at Mauritius.

RANK.	Provisions.	Fuel and Light.	Forage.	Servants.	Rank Allowance.	Lodging Money.	TOTAL per Mensem.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d
Major General Commanding.	Fixed allowance -		–	- -	- -	–	125 – –
Colonel - - -	1 10 5	1 12 5	6	8 5 5	13 1 –	11	41 8 3
Lieutenant Colonel -	1 10 5	1 12 5	6	6 15 –	8 – –	11	34 17 10
Major - - -	1 10 5	1 12 5	3	6 15 –	8 – –	9	29 17 10
Captain - - -	1 10 5	1 4 3	–	4 10 –	6 – –	7	20 4 8
Lieutenant and Ensign	1 10 5	– 16 2	–	2 5 –	4 – –	5	13 11 7
Adjutant - - -	1 10 5	– 16 2	3	4 10 –	4 – –	5	18 16 7
Quartermaster - -	1 10 5	– 16 2	3	4 10 –	4 – –	5	18 16 7

REMARKS.

Lodging money is only drawn when officers are not provided with public quarters.
Heads of Department draw 2 *l.* additional under the head of lodging money.
Officers of the Staff draw 3 *l.* for each horse allowed by the regulations.
When a Subaltern is mounted he draws 2 *l.* 5 *s.* for an additional servant.
Officers entitled to four servants are allowed 1 *l.* 10 *s.* 5 *d.*, only for the fourth servant.
Officers in command of Corps and in command of stations, are allowed 5 *l.* per month as command allowance.
The Commandant at Mahebourg receives 8 *l.* per month in lieu of 5 *l.* as command allowance.
Departmental officers draw according to their relative army rank.

Appendix (D.)

REPORT on the *Ceylon* Commissariat Department, by *W. D. Bernard*, Deputy Commissary General, August 1865.

SECTION II.

32. HAVING thus far given a general sketch of the origin of the Ceylon Commissariat Department, and of the various modifications which it has undergone, until it has at length assumed overgrown proportions, and finds itself involved in complicated duties, in which military and civil requirements are so intimately blended as to have become almost inseparable, I proceed to point out what precise military duties it really now performs, and what civil duties would remain still to be provided for, if, under a new organisation, the military were altogether to be separated from the civil portion of the Commissariat. Military Duties.

MILITARY DUTIES.

THESE consist first in the provisioning of all European troops in the island according to the authorised local scale, as noted in the margin. Of the articles named in that scale, the fresh beef and bread are obtained under annual contracts for each station separately, and therefore the advertising for, and settling the terms of all those contracts devolves upon the Deputy Commissary General, who himself is the sole party to the contracts on behalf of the local Government. But salt provisions (beef and pork) are obtained by the local Government, through the Crown agents of the colony in London, from the Naval Victualling Yard at Deptford. All charges connected with the receipt of these (including five per cent. to the Naval Department in England), and all losses upon the issues, and by wastages or deterioration, are borne by the colony. Biscuit is generally made in the colony, but not of very good quality. It is also sometimes obtained from Madras.

1½ lbs. fresh meat, or 1 lb. salt meat.
1 lb. of bread, or ¾ lbs. biscuit, or ⅞ quart rice.
½ pint, or 4 oz. rice.
1 oz. salt.
½ oz. tea, or 1½. oz. coffee.
1½ oz. sugar.

33. The other articles named in the scale are generally purchased in Colombo without contracts, for the prices fluctuate much, and the qualities of the articles vary at different periods, so that it is usually found more advantageous to purchase them by samples from time to time, making the best bargain that the state of the market will permit, than to attempt

App. No. 13.

attempt to enter into fixed contracts, which dealers will only undertake upon extravagant terms calculated upon contingencies the most adverse to government. At Trincomalee and Galle, contracts for rice have sometimes been made, the demands not being large; but Kandy, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, and Kornegalle, are all supplied with rice, for native as well as European troops, from Colombo, which is the chief market of the island. Purchases of rice are made here according to the wholesale prices specially reported weekly by the Customs Department to the Deputy Commissary General, with a fair addition for the cost of delivery, wastage by dust, and remeasuring, &c. The fluctuations in the prices of the chief articles of food within the last three years are given in Table IX. Salt for all purposes is obtained chiefly at Colombo from the Government salt store at Putlam, during the favourable season once, or at most twice a year, in the proportion of about 10 tons at a time, at a cost of 4 *s.* 8 *d.* per cwt., besides the expense of freight by coasting vessels, delivery, &c.

34. Until within the last few years, the provisioning of European military hospitals devolved also upon the Commissariat, but this duty has now been transferred to the Military Purveyor's Department, although all articles of equipment, bedding, clothing, fuel, &c., are still provided by the Commissariat, as will hereafter appear.

35. The ration returns of detachments and corps are made up by the Commissariat, and the settlement of accounts and recovery of stoppages is also conducted by this department, although the money recovered is credited by the treasurer in the colonial accounts and not by the Commissary. The difference between the cost of the rations and the amount of the stoppages, or clear total loss upon the provisioning of the troops, is borne by the colony.

See Table.

The statements of wastages in store and on transport are prepared by the Commissariat half-yearly, and are submitted for the sanction of the governor; but there is no distinction made between wastages for military and civil purposes.

36. With regard to native troops, they provision themselves entirely, except in the single article of rice, which is supplied to them by the Commissariat in all parts of the island, at the fixed recovery of 2 *d.* per quart or 5 *s.* 4 *d.* a bushel, whatever the actual cost of it may be. That cost, inclusive of the expense of transport and loss by wastage, varies at the present time from 7 *s.* 6 *d.* or even 8 *s.* a bushel (the rate of the best white rice in Colombo) to 15 *s.* 9 *d.* and 16 *s.* 6 *d.* in Badulla. Every man's wife (and there are nearly half as many as there are men) receives one pint of rice daily free of charge, and every half-pay boy, of whom there are 80, receives one quart of rice daily, which is paid for at the same rate as the issues to the men, viz., 2 *d.* a quart. The transport of the rice to stations in the interior and to the barracks in Colombo, and the recovery of the amounts due by the men at all stations, rest with the Commissary, who credits the amounts in his monthly cash accounts. Formerly the native troops purchased their own rice, recovering from the Commissariat the difference in money between the average price of best rice in the bazar, as certified monthly by the commanding officer, and the 2 *d.* per quart to which the liability of the soldier for the expense of his rice was limited. That practice was altered about four years ago, chiefly owing to the great increase in the cost of rice.

Appendices to the Report of the Deputy Commissary General.

No. 3.

Return of Rations issued to the European Troops in *Ceylon* during the Month of May 1865, showing the Number and Cost of Rations issued to the Men, Women, and Children respectively, together with the Amount of Stoppages recovered from the Troops and the Loss to Government.

Colombo.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 12,969 rations to men at 10½ *d.* per ration	553	17	8½	To stoppages on 12,969 men's rations at 3½ *d.* per ration.	189	2	7½
„ 535 rations to women at 5⅓ *d.* per ration	32	7	3⅔				
„ 541 rations to children above seven years at 3 5/12 *d.* per ration.	7	14	5/12	Loss to Government	426	8	9
„ 1,986 rations to children under seven years at 2 5/16 *d.* per ration.	21	4	1⅛				
Total £.	615	11	4	Total £.	615	11	4

Trincomalee.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 3,954 rations to men at 11½ *d.* per ration	189	9	3	To stoppages on 3,954 men's rations at 3½ *d.* per ration.	57	13	3
„ 279 rations to women	6	13	8¼				
„ 62 rations to children above seven years at 2 *d.* per ration.	–	10	4	Loss to Government	141	4	7
„ 372 rations to children under seven years at 1 7/16 *d.* per ration.	2	4	6¾				
Total £.	198	17	10	Total £.	198	17	10

Galle.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 2,123 rations to men at $14\frac{1000}{1123}$ d. per ration	128	–	2	To stoppage on 2,123 men's rations at $3\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	30	19	2
„ 124 rations to women at $7\frac{15}{62}$ d. per ration	3	14	10	Loss to Government	103	8	11
„ 62 rations to children above seven years at $4\frac{53}{62}$ d. per ration.	1	5	–				
„ 93 rations to children under seven years at $3\frac{58}{93}$ d. per ration.	1	8	1				
Total £.	134	8	1	Total £.	134	8	1

Kandy.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 4,003 rations to men at 1 s. $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per ration	205	14	$1\frac{3}{4}$	To stoppage on 4,003 men's rations at $3\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	58	7	$6\frac{1}{2}$
„ 327 rations to women at $6\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	8	8	$-\frac{1}{4}$				
„ 172 rations to children above seven years at $4\frac{1}{9}$ d. per ration.	2	18	11	Loss to Government	164	14	$6\frac{1}{2}$
„ 471 rations to children under seven years at $3\frac{1}{12}$ d. per ration.	6	1	–				
Total £.	223	2	1	Total £.	223	2	1

Nuwara Eliya.

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
By 2,040 rations to men at 1 s. 7 d. per ration	161	10	–	To stoppage on 2,040 men's rations at $3\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	29	15	–
„ 93 rations to women at $9\frac{1}{2}$ d. per ration	3	13	7				
„ 124 rations to children under seven years at $4\frac{3}{4}$ d. per ration.	2	9	1	Loss to Government	137	17	8
Total £.	167	12	8	Total £.	167	12	8

	£.	s.	d.
For one month—Total loss to Government	973	14	5
Total average annual loss, about	11,000	–	–

No. 4.

Cost of the Rations of Food of a European Soldier per Day for 1865 at each Station.

	Colombo.	Trincomalee.	Galle.	Kandy.	Nuwara Eliya.
	d.	d.	d.	d.	d.
$1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. beef	$5\frac{11}{16}$	$6\frac{3}{4}$	$8\frac{5}{8}$	$5\frac{66}{112}$	$9\frac{3}{4}$
1 lb. bread	3	3	4	$4\frac{1}{8}$	7*
4 oz. rice	$-\frac{10}{16}$	$-\frac{10}{16}$	$-\frac{3}{16}$	$-\frac{3}{4}$	$-\frac{13}{16}$
1 oz. salt	$-\frac{1}{32}$	$-\frac{1}{32}$	$-\frac{1}{16}$	$-\frac{1}{16}$	$-\frac{1}{16}$
$\frac{1}{4}$ oz. tea or $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz. coffee	$-\frac{9}{16}$	$-\frac{9}{16}$	$-\frac{9}{16}$	$-\frac{9}{16}$	$-\frac{12}{16}$
$1\frac{1}{2}$ oz. sugar	$-\frac{6}{16}$	$-\frac{15}{32}$	$-\frac{15}{32}$	$-\frac{8}{16}$	$-\frac{10}{16}$
Total Rations	$10\frac{9}{32}$	$11\frac{14}{32}$	$14\frac{9}{32}$	12	19

* Including cost of transport from Kandy to Nuwara Eliya.

	s.	d.
(1) Average cost of a man's ration	1	1
($\frac{1}{2}$) Average cost of a woman's ration	–	$6\frac{1}{2}$
($\frac{1}{3}$) Average cost of a child's ration above seven	–	$4\frac{1}{3}$
($\frac{1}{4}$) Average cost of a child's ration under seven	–	$3\frac{1}{4}$

In addition to the above, 3 lbs. of firewood are issued for each man's ration, and in proportion to the women and children also free of charge.

No. 5.

Cost of Rice issued to Native Troops throughout the Island, showing the Rate per Bushel at each Station, Cost per Man per Diem, and Total Cost for One Month (May 1865), also the Amount recovered and Loss to Government.

	At Colombo.	Trincomalee.	Galle.	Kandy.	Badulla.	Kornegalle.	Jaffna.	Hambantotte.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
Rate per bushel average	7 8	7 6	7 3	10 –	16 –	10 –	7 6	9 –
Proportionate cost per man per diem (1 quart).	– 3	– $2\frac{13}{16}$	– $2\frac{23}{32}$	– $3\frac{3}{4}$	– 6	– $3\frac{3}{4}$	– $2\frac{13}{16}$	– $3\frac{3}{4}$

At Colombo:

	£.	s.	d.
By issued 630 bushels 23 quarters of rice at 7 s. 8 d. per bushel.	241	15	6
£.	241	15	6

	£.	s.	d.
To amount recovered from the men at 2 d. per ration	142	19	8
Loss to Government	98	15	10
£.	241	15	6

App. No. 13.

No. 16.

Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery, Military Store Department, and Gun Lascars Corps.

SCHEDULE of "Colonial Pay and Allowances" authorised to be paid by the Commissariat in 1864, and the present Strength of the different Corps.

Colonial Pay and Allowances.	Fixed Establishment.	Provisional Salaries.	TOTAL.
EUROPEAN TROOPS.			
Royal Artillery.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Salaries:			
1 Lieutenant Colonel	480 – –	—	—
Command allowance	90 – –	—	—
2 Captains, at 228 *l.* each	456 – –	—	—
3 Lieutenants, at 150 *l.* each	450 – –	—	—
1 Adjutant and quartermaster	186 – –	—	—
4 Pioneers, at 9 *l.* each	36 – –	—	—
			1,698 – –
Contingencies:			
Petty expenses	– –	– –	5 – –
TOTAL, Royal Artillery £.	– –	– –	1,730 – –

Present Strength and Cost (in August 1865).

	£. s. d.
1 Lieutenant Colonel	480 – –
Command allowance	90 – –
1 Captain	228 – –
1 Lieutenant	150 – –
1 Adjutant	186 – –
TOTAL £.	1,134 – –

Royal Engineers.			
Salaries:			
1 Lieutenant Colonel	480 – –	—	—
Command Allowance	90 – –	—	—
2 Captains, at 228 *l.* each	456 – –	—	—
Command allowance to commanding engineer, Kandy	180 – –	—	—
4 Lieutenants, at 150 *l.* each	600 – –	—	—
			1,806 – –
Contingencies:			
Petty expenses	– –	– –	5 – –
TOTAL, Royal Engineers £.	– –	– –	1,811 – –

Present Strength and Cost (in August 1855).

	£. s. d.
1 Lieutenant Colonel	480 – –
Command Allowance	90 – –
1 Captain	228 – –
Commanding Kandy	180 – –
2 Lieutenants	300 – –
TOTAL £.	1,278 – –

Salaries. **Royal Engineer Establishment.**			
Colombo:			
1 Assistant Royal Engineer, at 7 *s.* 6 *d.* a day	– –	137 5 –*	—
Head Clerk	120 – –	—	—
2 Clerks, at 75 *l.* each	150 – –	—	—
2 Ditto, 50 *l.* „	100 – –	—	—
Draftsman	75 – –	—	—
Superintendent and Interpreter	90 – –	—	—
2 Assistant Superintendents, at 36 *l.* each	72 – –	—	—
Master Carpenter	48 – –	—	—
Ditto Mason	48 – –	—	—
Peon protecting military ground from trespass by cattle	10 16 –	—	—
Messenger	10 16 –	—	—
Kandy:			
2 Superintendents at 36 *l.* 12 *s.* each, or 2 *s.* a day	73 4 –	—	—
Master Smith	45 – –	—	—
Ditto Carpenter	45 – –	—	—
Ditto Mason	45 – –	—	—
1 Additional Superintendent	– –	60 – –†	—
Extra Clerk, at 3 *s.* a day	– –	54 18 –†	—
Galle:			
1 Peon protecting military ground from cattle	9 – –	– –	—
	941 16 –	252 3 –	—
Contingencies:			1,193 19 –
Postage of letters to and from India by contract packet; bookbinder for stitching papers and binding books, and petty expenses.	– –	– –	15 – –
TOTAL, Royal Engineer Department £.	– –	– –	1,208 19 –

* Now chargeable against the military contribution. † Now transferred to the fixed establishment of the Colony.

Appendix (E.)

DOCUMENTS showing the Cost and Organisation of Indian Native Regiments, the Comparative Cost of European and Native Regiments, the Amount and Mode of Payment of Non-effective Charges, and the Rates of Indian Allowances.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

Account Branch, dated 23rd September 1865.—No. 892, D.

MEMORANDUM.

PAPERS received with case 2 of schedule No. 99, case 1 of schedule No. 118, and case 2 of schedule No. 141, are herewith returned.

2. In the communications from the Ceylon Government, information is sought on the following specified points:—

I. The organisation in officers and men of native regiments in infantry and artillery, and the source or sources from which they are recruited.

II. The comparative cost of native and European regiments in infantry and artillery.

III. The amount and mode of payment to the Imperial Government on account of non-effective charges, and especially the mode in which the Government of India is assessed on account of sea transport of drafts, invalids and reliefs, arms and ammunition, and clothing charges at home for depôts and recruiting, &c.

IV. The rates of Indian garrison or half batta allowances.

3. As regards heading I., two manuscript statements are attached, marked A. and B. The establishment for the infantry regiment in statement A, is that obtaining in this presidency, including the second doing duty officer recently authorised for each native corps, and the revised establishment of weighmen laid down in Government General Order No. 839 of 1865. For the artillery the establishment given is that of a light field battery of the Punjab Irregular Force, with four pieces of ordnance.

4. The undersigned notices that the account branch is not called upon for information as to the sources from which the native army is recruited.

5. The information under heading II. will be found contained in the printed statement submitted by the undersigned in August last, copy of which is also herewith forwarded.

6. With reference to the next point, the undersigned would observe, that non-effective charges on account of native troops are disbursed locally and borne entirely by the Indian Government, but a capitation rate of 3 *l.* 10 *s.* per man based on the average number in India, during 12 months, is paid annually to the Imperial Government for the none effective charges of the British troops serving in India, in addition to a capitation rate of 10 *l.* per man per annum to reimburse the Imperial Government for all expenses incurred on account of regiments and drafts for service in India, and for maintaining them until arrival in this country. The payment is made by the Indian Treasury at home.

7. The transport charges on account of drafts, time expired men, invalids and reliefs, are borne entirely by the Indian Government, but the disbursement is made both in India and at home; according to the existing arrangement one-third of the amount for homeward passage is payable in India for both officers and men, and one-third for officers, and two-thirds for men, on account of outward passage; the remainder in each case is payable in England, but is charged against the Indian revenues.

8. The charges on account of arms and ammunition and clothing for the depôts of regiments on the Indian establishment are borne by the Imperial Government out of the capitation rate of 10 *l.* per man paid by the Indian Government, but on the men coming out to India such charges fall on the revenues of this country.

9. The garrison or half batta allowances of each grade of the several branches of the European army in India, will be found in the statements marked C. and D., but as these rates of pay have practically ceased to exist since the 1st January last, except as regards staff corps pay, which is equivalent to the infantry garrison rates, the undersigned has given in juxtaposition under each branch of the service the field rates of pay which are now drawn by all officers.

10. As regards any other information connected with organisation or rates of pay, the undersigned would refer to the detailed appendices attached to the military budget estimates of each presidency for the current official year, a copy of which might, if the Government deem it desirable, be furnished to the Ceylon Government.

(signed) *Arthur Broome*, Colonel,
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

(True Copy.) *H. Burne*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Secretary
to the Government of India.

App. No. 13.

(A.)—STATEMENT showing the Detail of the Establishment and Cost of a Regiment of Native Infantry in the *Bengal* Presidency.

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Commandant	1		- - -	640 14 -	A.
Second in command and wing officer	1		- - -	374 1 6	B.
Wing officer	1		- - -	374 1 6	B.
Adjutant	1		- - -	225 12 -	C.
Quartermaster	1		- - -	225 12 -	C.
Doing duty officers	2		225 12 -	451 8 -	C.
Medical officer	1		- - -	600 - -	
		8			34,704 12 -
Subadars, 1st Class	2		100 - -	200 - -	
Ditto 2nd „	2		80 - -	160 - -	
Ditto 3rd „	4		67 - -	268 - -	
Jemadars, 1st Class	4		35 - -	140 - -	
Ditto 2nd „	4		30 - -	120 - -	
Havildars	40		14 - -	560 - -	
Naicks	40		12 - -	480 - -	
Drummers	16		7 - -	112 - -	
Sepoys	600		7 - -	4,200 - -	
		712			74,880 - -
TOTAL Number		720	And Pay per Annum		1,09,584 12 -
Command and Staff Allowances.					
Commandant			- - -	600 - -	
Second in Command and wing officer			- - -	270 - -	
Wing officer			- - -	230 - -	
Adjutant			- - -	200 - -	
Ditto for office			- - -	50 - -	
Quartermaster			- - -	150 - -	
Doing duty officers			100 - -	200 - -	
Subadar major			- - -	25 - -	
Drill havildar			- - -	5 - -	
Drill naick			- - -	2 8 -	
Colour havildars			2 - -	16 - -	
Pay havildars			5 - -	40 - -	
Drum major			- - -	5 - -	
Fife major			- - -	5 - -	
Mess allowance			- - -	100 - -	
Band allowance			- - -	100 - -	
					23,982 - -
Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishments.					
Native doctors	2		20 - -	40 - -	
Shop cooley	1		- - -	5 - -	
Bheesties	2		4 - -	8 - -	
Goorgah	1		- - -	4 - -	
Cooks	2		4 - -	8 - -	
Sweepers	2		4 - -	8 - -	
		10			876 - -
Native Followers.					
Moonshee	1		- - -	20 - -	
Moulvie	1		- - -	8 - -	
Pundit	1		- - -	8 - -	
Tindal	1		- - -	9 8 -	
Lascars	8		5 12 -	46 - -	
Bheesties	8		5 - -	40 - -	
Sweepers	8		4 - -	32 - -	
Bildars	2		3 8 -	7 - -	
Chowdry	1		- - -	11 - -	
Mutsuddy	1		- - -	5 - -	
Weighmen	2		4 - -	8 - -	
		34			2,334 - -
Contract Allowances.					
Allowance to wing officers for payment and repair of arms			80 - -	160 - -	
Allowances to quartermaster for repair of tents			- - -	25 - -	
Allowances for butts and targets			- - -	4 - -	
Allowances for school shed			- - -	5 - -	
					2,328 - -
Add—					
Good conduct allowance					4,208 5 4
Hutting money					772 8 -
TOTAL per Annum *Rs.*					144,085 9 4

A. If a major.
B. If a captain.
C. If a Lieutenant.

App. No. 13.

(B.)—STATEMENT showing the Detail of the Establishment and Cost of a Battery of Punjab Artillery.

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.		Total Pay per Annum.	
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*		*Rs. a. p.*	
Commandant	1		- - -	433 10 -	A.		
Doing duty officer	1		- - -	265 12 -			
		2			B	8,392 8 -	
Subadar	1		- - -	80 - -			
Jemadar	1		- - -	35 - -			
Havildars	6		14 - -	84 - -			
Naicks	6		12 - -	72 - -			
Buglers	2		8 - -	16 - -			
Privates	90		8 - -	720 - -			
Native farrier	1		- - -	8 8 -			
		107				12,186 - -	
TOTAL Number		109	And Pay per Annum			20,578 8 -	
Command Staff and Horse Allowances.							
Commandant				30 - -			
Commandant, horse allowance				60 - -			
Doing duty officer (including horse allowance)				150 - -			
Pay havildar				5 - -			
Drill naick				2 8 -			
						2,970 - -	
A. If a 1st captain. B. If a lieutenant.							
Native Artificers and Followers.							
Tindal	1		- - -	8 - -			
Tent lascars	1		- - -	5 12 -			
Store lascars	4		5 - -	20 - -			
Bheesties	2		5 - -	10 - -			
Sweeper	1		- - -	4 - -			
Saloobry	1		- - -	15 - -			
Jemadar syces	3		10 - -	30 - -			
Syces	80		5 - -	400 - -			
Grass cutters	95		4 8 -	427 8 -			
Bullock drivers	10		5 - -	50 - -			
Mistry smith	1		- - -	12 - -			
Filemen	2		7 - -	14 - -			
Firemen	2		7 - -	14 - -			
Hammer men	2		6 - -	12 - -			
Mistry carpenter	1		- - -	14 - -			
Carpenters	2		10 - -	20 - -			
Moochee	1		- - -	5 - -			
Mutsuddy	1		- - -	5 - -			
Weighman	1		- - -	4 - -			
Langrees	2		5 - -	10 - -			
		213				12,963 - -	
Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishment.							
Native doctor	1		- - -	20 - -			
Dresser	1		- - -	6 - -			
Cook	1		- - -	4 - -			
Sweeper	1		- - -	5 - -			
Bheesties	1		- - -	5 - -			
		5				480 - -	
Contract Allowance.							
Allowance for stationery and repair of arms			- - -	20 - -			
Allowance for four guns and waggons			15 - -	60 - -			
Allowance for one spare carriage			- - -	5 - -			
Allowance for one forge cart			- - -	5 - -			
Allowance for two store carts			5 - -	10 - -			
Allowance for shoeing 95 horses			2 - -	190 - -			
Allowance for shoeing 32 yaboos			2 - -	64 - -			
Allowance for repair of 88 sets of harness			1 8 -	132 - -			
Allowance for repair of saddles			1 - -	7 - -			
Allowance for repair of gram pots			- - -	15 - -			
Allowance for cavessons and cotton ropes			- - -	5 - -			
Allowance for eight sepoy's pauls			- 10 -	5 - -			
						6,216 - -	
Add— Good conduct allowance						1,228 - -	
				TOTAL per Annum	*Rs.*	44,435 8 -	

(C.)—Statement showing the Amount of Regimental Pay and Allowances of each Grade of Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File of the several Branches of the European Army serving in India.

	Horse Artillery.		Foot Artillery.		Cavalry.		Engineers.		Infantry.	
	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.	Garrison Rates per Mensem.	Field Rates per Mensem.
	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Colonel	1,478 7 –	1,478 7 –	1,295 5 –	1,295 5 –	1,478 7 –	1,478 7 –	1,295 5 –	1,295 5 –	1,295 5 –	1,295 5 –
Lieutenant Colonel	952 10 –	1,157 – –	827 14 –	1,032 4 –	952 10 –	1,157 – –	827 14 –	1,032 4 –	827 14 –	1,032 4 –
Ditto on Major's pay	781 1 10	929 6 4	640 14 6	789 3 –	—	—	—	—	—	—
Major	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	781 1 10	929 6 4	640 14 –	789 3 –	640 14 –	789 3 –
Captain	521 11 4	563 – 4	392 5 –	433 10 –	521 11 4	563 – 4	392 5 –	433 10 –	374 1 –	415 6 –
Second Captain	521 11 4	563 – 4	376 2 8	417 7 8	– – –	– – –	392 5 –	433 10 –	—	—
Lieutenant	334 6 –	365 4 –	284 14 –	265 12 –	334 6 –	365 4 –	234 14 –	265 12 –	225 12 –	256 10 –
Second Lieutenant	289 15 10	310 10 4	192 10 6	213 5 –	– – –	– – –	192 10 6	213 5 –	—	—
Cornet	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	289 15 10	310 10 4	—	—	—	—
Ensign	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	182 1 11	202 12 5
Paymaster:										
On appointment	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	464 8 –	535 13 –	– –	– –	404 8 –	445 13 –
After 5 years' service	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	524 15 –	566 4 –	– –	– –	434 15 –	476 4 –
After 10 years' service	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	555 6 –	596 11 –	– –	– –	465 6 –	506 11 –
After 15 years' service	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	585 13 –	627 2 –	– –	– –	495 13 –	537 2 –
After 20 years' service	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	616 4 –	657 9 –	– –	– –	526 4 –	567 9 –
Quartermaster:										
On appointment	356 12 4	387 10 4	290 3 11	321 1 11	328 5 10	359 3 10	– –	– –	244 – 3	274 14 3
After 10 years' service	362 13 9	393 11 9	308 8 2	339 6 2	352 11 5	383 9 5	– –	– –	268 5 9	299 3 9
After 15 years' service	370 15 7	401 13 7	316 10 –	347 8 –	370 15 7	401 13 7	– –	– –	286 10 –	317 8 –
Riding Master:										
Under 2 years' service	289 15 10	310 10 4	– – –	– – –	289 15 10	310 10 4	—	—	—	—
After 2 years' service	334 6 –	365 4 –	– – –	– – –	334 6 –	365 4 –	—	—	—	—
Regimental Serjeant Major	59 1 4	64 11 –	56 10 1	57 13 9	49 14 –	51 7 –	63 15 8	65 3 7	47 5 4	48 14 4
Bandmaster Serjeant	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	49 14 –	51 7 –	– –	– –	47 5 4	48 14 4
Quartermaster Serjeant	51 11 9	52 15 4	49 4 6	50 8 2	43 14 6	45 7 6	56 8 5	57 12 4	39 – 10	40 9 10
Troop Serjeant Major	51 11 9	52 15 4	49 4 6	50 8 2	41 1 10	42 10 10	—	—	—	—
Serjeant Instructor of Musketry, 2nd class.	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	38 – 2	39 4 11
Paymaster Serjeant:										
Under 3 years' service	– –	– –	– – –	– –	28 4 8	28 10 4	– –	– –	23 5 1	24 9 10
After 3 years' service	– –	– –	– – –	– –	35 10 3	36 – –	– –	– –	30 11 5	31 15 5
Armourer Serjeant	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	– –	– –	23 5 1	24 9 10
Schoolmaster Serjeant:										
Under 10 years' service	– –	– –	– – –	– –	28 4 8	28 10 4	– –	– –	23 5 1	24 9 10
After 10 years' service	– –	– –	– – –	– –	35 10 3	36 – –	– –	– –	30 11 5	31 15 5
Hospital Serjeant:										
On appointment	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	33 3 1	33 8 9	– –	– –	30 11 5	31 15 5
After 7 years' service	45 4 11	46 8 6	42 13 9	44 1 4	40 8 7	40 14 3	– –	– –	38 – 11	39 4 11
Orderly-room Clerk:										
Under 3 years' service	52 10 5	53 14 –	50 3 3	51 6 10	28 4 8	28 10 4	– –	– –	23 5 1	24 9 10
After 3 years' service					35 10 3	36 – –	– –	– –	30 11 5	31 15 5
Colour Serjeant	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– –	– –	30 11 5	31 15 5
Saddler Serjeant	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	28 4 8	28 10 4	—	—	—	—
Farrier Major	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	47 12 1	48 15 8	—	—	—	—
Serjeant Farrier Carriage Smith	43 12 5	45 – –	41 5 3	42 8 10	—	—	—	—	—	—
Shoeing and Carriage Smith	27 3 11	28 7 6	24 12 9	26 – 4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Farrier	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	30 9 10	31 13 5	—	—	—	—
Collar Maker	24 2 11	25 6 6	21 11 9	22 15 4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Wheeler	24 2 11	25 6 6	21 11 9	22 15 4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trumpet Major	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	—	—	—	—
Drum Major	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– –	– –	23 5 1	24 9 10
Trumpeter	25 11 5	26 15 –	23 4 3	24 7 10	14 14 8	16 7 8	—	—	—	—
Trumpeter on inferior pay	15 – –	16 3 7	12 8 10	13 12 5	—	—	—	—	—	—
Drummer	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– –	– –	11 8 2	13 1 2
Serjeant	37 15 4	39 2 11	35 8 2	36 11 9	28 4 8	28 10 4	36 10 5	37 14 3	23 5 1	24 9 10
Corporals	28 2 7	29 6 2	25 11 5	26 15 –	17 12 11	18 14 10	26 11 4	27 15 3	14 2 8	15 11 8
Second Corporals	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	22 – 10	23 4 8	—	—
Gunners	15 – –	16 3 7	12 8 10	13 12 5	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bombardiers	25 11 5	26 15 –	23 4 3	24 7 10	—	—	—	—	—	—
Drivers	12 8 10	13 12 5	12 8 10	13 12 –	—	—	—	—	—	—
Privates	– – –	– – –	– – –	– – –	12 9 11	14 2 11	11 12 10	13 – 9	10 1 –	11 10 –

Note.—The separate items which constitute the Garrison Allowance of Commissioned Officers are pay, batta, regimental house rent, tentage and horse allowance; but in the Foot Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, the last item is included for Field Officers only. The only difference as regards field rates is that extra batta forms a component item, but not regimental house rent. The Officers are thus required to provide their own quarters and tents, and to keep up the regulation number of chargers without any further assistance from Government.

(D.)—STATEMENT showing the Rates of Pay and Allowances of Medical Officers and of Subordinate Grades having Half and Full Batta Rates of Pay.

RANK.	Years' Service.	Relative Rank.	Half Batta Rates per Mensem.	Full Batta Rates per Mensem.	Horse Allowance when attached to Horse Artillery or Cavalry.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Surgeon Major	25	Lieutenant Colonel	888 12 –	1,093 2 –	90 – –
Ditto	20	Ditto	852 3 7	1,056 9 7	90 – –
Surgeon	15	Major	677 6 11	825 11 5	90 – –
Ditto	10	Ditto	640 14 6	789 3 –	90 – –
Assistant Surgeon	10	Captain	410 9 5	451 14 5	90 – –
Ditto	6	Ditto	392 5 2	433 10 2	90 – –
Ditto	5	Lieutenant	304 14 2	335 12 2	60 – –
Ditto	Under 5	Ditto	286 10 –	317 8 –	60 – –
Veterinary Surgeon	Under 10	2nd Lieutenant or Cornet.	229 15 10	250 10 4	—
Ditto	Above 10	Lieutenant	274 6 –	305 4 –	60 – –
Ditto	Above 20	Captain	431 11 4	473 – 4	90 – –
Ditto, appointed before 17th May 1851	Under 10	2nd Lieutenant or Cornet.	286 10 –	317 8 –	47 13 3
Ditto ditto	Above 10	Lieutenant	310 15 6	341 13 6	47 13 3
Apothecary	– –	– –	115 7 –	145 14 –	—
Second Apothecary and Steward	– –	– –	95 14 –	126 5 –	—
Assistant Apothecary	– –	– –	55 – –	70 – –	—

Arthur Broome, Colonel,
Controller General of Military Expenditure.

EUROPEAN ARMY.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the European Armies of the Three Presidencies.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	Cavalry, One Regiment.	Infantry, One Regiment.	One Battery Horse Artillery.	One Light Field Battery.	One Heavy Field Battery.	One Garrison Battery.
BENGAL PRESIDENCY:	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,96,162	3,81,208	98,056	81,170	58,233	38,970
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	85,972	1,53,438	24,142	24,142	12,873	12,516
Feed of horses and battery cattle	27,562	– –	13,444	10,462	18,902	—
Medical, including dieting patients	7,270	12,944	2,128	2,128	1,062	1,062
Clothing, average of two years*	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding	17,676	31,543	4,977	4,977	2,643	2,574
Ordnance charges*	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
TOTAL *Rs.*	6,92,305	8,45,408	1,88,973	1,69,151	1,19,210	77,540
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	—	—	—	—
Ditto for officers on staff employ*	5,005	7,808	—	—	—	—
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the civil and public works department.	– –	858	—	—	—	—
TOTAL *Rs.*	22,195	22,750	—	—	—	—
NET TOTAL *Rs.*	6,70,110	8,22,658	1,88,973	1,69,151	1,19,210	77,540

* Average for all India.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the European Armies, &c.—*continued.*

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	Cavalry, One Regiment.	Infantry, One Regiment.	One Battery Horse Artillery.	One Light Field Battery.	One Heavy Field Battery.	One Garrison Battery.
MADRAS PRESIDENCY:	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,91,017	3,67,620	1,03,311	81,864	62,436	42,619
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	86,142	1,53,743	24,184	24,184	12,899	12,541
Feed of horses and battery cattle	67,107	- - -	28,733	20,514	25,717	—
Medical, including dieting patients	10,031	17,860	2,691	2,691	1,468	1,468
Clothing average of two years *	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding	14,787	26,388	4,163	4,163	2,211	2,154
Ordnance charges*	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	7,26,747	8,31,886	2,09,308	1,79,688	1,30,222	81,200
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	—	—	—	—
Ditto for officers on staff employ*	5,005	7,808	—	—	—	—
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers in the civil and public works department.*	- -	858	—	—	—	—
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	22,195	22,750	—	—	—	—
NET TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	7,04,552	8,09,136	2,09,308	1,79,688	1,30,222	81,200
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical establishments and native followers, family allowances, and good conduct pay.	3,83,238	3,71,739	1,05,162	81,680	63,126	40,360
Commissariat charges, including victualling and loss on malt liquor.	86,806	1,54,928	24,374	24,374	12,998	12,637
Feed of horses and battery cattle	82,810	- -	39,598	30,446	47,327	—
Medical, including dieting patients	13,485	24,011	3,618	3,618	2,241	1,973
Clothing, average of two years *	18,973	22,010	4,804	4,712	2,380	2,307
Barrack, including bedding	13,800	24,626	3,885	3,885	2,063	2,010
Ordnance charges *	12,520	19,115	5,902	6,040	4,257	1,741
Miscellaneous, including carriage, proportion of sea transport to and from England after 10 years, bounty and kit money at 110 rupees per man.*	56,650	1,01,090	15,950	15,950	8,470	8,250
Capitation charges, effective and non-effective	69,520	1,24,060	19,570	19,570	10,390	10,120
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	7,37,802	8,41,579	22,863	1,90,275	1,53,252	79,398
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.*	17,190	14,084	—	—	—	—
Ditto for officers on staff employ*	5,005	7,808	—	—	—	—
Ditto for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the civil and public works department.*	- -	858	—	—	—	—
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	22,195	22,750	—	—	—	—
NET TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	7,15,607	8,18,829	2,22,863	1,90,275	1,53,252	79,398

* Average for all India.

Military Department, Accountant Branch,
1st May 1865.

Arthur Broome, Colonel,
Accountant General.

NATIVE ARMY.

STATEMENT showing the Total Annual Cost of the several Branches of the Native Armies of the Three Presidencies.

PARTICULARS OF CHARGES.	One Regiment of Cavalry.	One Regiment of Punjab Cavalry.	One Regiment of Infantry.	One Battery of Light Field Artillery.	One Garrison Company of Artillery.	One Company of Sappers and Miners.
BENGAL PRESIDENCY:	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,41,322	2,52,986	1,44,252	44,895	11,346	26,231
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	2,007	2,164	3,084	465	324	465
Feed of horses and battery cattle	- -	- -	- -	8,272	—	—
Medical, including dieting patients	1,253	1,525	1,961	272	218	272
Clothing charges	- -	- -	3,674	492	352	492
Barrack ditto	579	625	890	134	93	134
Ordnance ditto*	1,027	1,107	5,000	4,637	1,174	714
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	5,556	5,988	8,554	1,272	900	1,272
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	2,51,744	2,64,395	1,67,405	60,439	14,407	29,580
HYDERABAD CONTINGENT:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,87,028	- -	1,39,817	39,074	—	—
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	2,505	- -	4,070	516	—	—
Feed of horses and battery cattle	- -	- -	- -	6,039	—	—
Medical, including dieting patients	1,580	- -	2,561	272	—	—
Clothing charges	- -	- -	14,801	1,844	—	—
Barrack ditto	3,808	- -	6,187	777	—	—
Ordnance ditto	1,280	- -	6,594	4,637	—	—
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	2,96,201	- -	1,74,030	53,159	—	—
MADRAS PRESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,83,970	- -	2,24,744	- -	33,288	35,534
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	15,466	- -	28,227	- -	4,571	4,914
Feed of horses	53,469	—	—	—	—	—
Medical, including dieting patients	1,092	- -	1,976	- -	312	364
Clothing charges	4,497	- -	3,988	- -	794	967
Barrack ditto	597	- -	1,076	- -	176	169
Ordnance ditto*	1,107	- -	5,000	- -	1,174	714
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	5,148	- -	9,252	- -	1,512	1,704
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	3,65,346	- -	2,74,263	- -	41,827	44,366
Average deduction for difference between Indian and furlough pay of officers in Europe.	6,858	- -	5,542	—	—	—
Average deduction for officers on staff employ	10,643	- -	30,386	—	—	—
Average deduction for difference between full and net pay of officers employed in the Civil and Public Works Department.	3,456	- -	4,435	—	—	—
TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	20,957	- -	40,363	—	—	—
NET TOTAL - - - *Rs.*	3,44,389	- -	2,33,900	- -	41,827	44,366
BOMBAY PESIDENCY:						
Regimental pay and allowances, including medical and educational establishments, and native artificers and followers.	2,63,207	- -	1,48,035	- -	37,201	28,400
Commissariat charges, including victualling and compensation for dearness of provisions.	22,604	- -	32,284	- -	3,958	5,246
Medical, including dieting patients	2,085	- -	2,919	- -	334	560
Clothing charges	- -	- -	3,918	- -	534	763
Barrack ditto	750	- -	1,068	- -	132	177
Ordnance ditto*	1,107	- -	5,000	- -	1,174	714
Miscellaneous, including carriage at 12 rupees per man	6,000	- -	8,832	- -	1,068	1,452
TOTAL - - - £.	2,95,753	- -	2,02,056	- -	44,401	37,312

* Average for all India.

Military Department, Accountant Branch,
1st May 1865.

Arthur Broome, Colonel,
Accountant General.

Extract from Madras Military Budget Estimate 1865–66.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Head Quarters' Staff of the 17th, 20th, and 23rd Brigades, and Details of the 14th Brigade.

Details of the Establishment.

RANKS.	No.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Colonel Commandants.	–		—	—	
Colonels	6		1,265 5 –	7,591 14 –	
Lieutenant Colonels	9		1,002 4 –	9,020 4 –	
Lieutenant Colonels (of 14th Brigade).	2		1,002 4 –	2,004 8 –	
Lieutenant Colonels on Major's pay.	3		759 3 –	2,277 9 –	
Adjutants (Second Captains).	3		417 7 8	1,252 7 –	
Quartermasters	3		309 6 2	958 2 6	
Surgeons	3		789 3 –	2,367 9 –	
		29			3,05,668 2 –
Serjeant Majors	3		57 13 9	173 9 3	
Quartermaster Serjeants.	3		50 8 2	151 8 6	
Orderly-room Clerks	3		36 11 9	110 3 3	
Trumpet Majors	3		36 11 9	110 3 3	
Armourer Serjeant	1		– –	36 11 9	
Hospital Serjeants	3		36 11 9	110 3 3	
		16			8,309 7 –
Total Number		45	and Pay per Annum	–	3,13,977 9 –
Add—					
Five days' pay for non-commissioned officers and men				–	115 6 8
Command, Staff, and Horse Allowances:					
Brigade command allowance			400 – –	1,200 – –	
Adjutant's allowance			227 – –	681 – –	
Instructors of Gunnery			150 – –	450 – –	
Quartermasters			85 – –	255 – –	
Orderly-room Clerks			14 14 6	44 11 6	
Provost Serjeant			9 12 9	29 6 3	
Serjeant Instructors of Gunnery.			14 14 6	89 7 –	
Hospital Writers			10 – –	30 – –	
Horse Allowance			30 – –	690 – –	
					41,634 9 –
Carried forward				–	3,55,727 8 8

RANKS.	No.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Brought forward	–	–	– –	– –	3,55,727 8 8
Educational Establishment:					
Monshees	3		30 – –	90 – –	
Allowance to Librarian.	–		8 – –	24 – –	
		3			1,368 – –
Subordinate Medical and Fixed Hospital Establishment: (*See* Recapitulation of European Artillery).					
Native Followers:					
Chowdries	3		14 – –	42 – –	
Peons	6		6 – –	36 – –	
Horse-keepers	12		5 4 –	63 – –	
Grass-cutters	12		4 – –	48 – –	
		33			2,268 – –
		36			
Contract Allowances:					
Allowance for head and heel ropes.			2 – –	36 – –	
Allowance for repair of saddles			1 – –	18 – –	
					648 – –
Add— *For Spare Officers, including Officers' Batteries:*					
Captains	9		433 10 –	3,902 10 –	
Second Captains	9		417 7 8	3,757 5 –	
Lieutenants	18		265 12 –	4,783 8 –	
Ditto	9		43 5 –	389 13 –	
		45			1,53,999 – –
Additional pay for length of service to Surgeons				–	10,704 – –
Family allowance to women and children				–	975 – –
Total				– *Rs.*	5,25,689 8 8

Recapitulation.

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
Total of Head Quarter's Staff of Brigades	5,25,689	8	8
Eleven Light Field Batteries	8,90,072	15	4
One Heavy Battery	61,930	10	–
Ten Garrison Batteries	4,23,892	6	6
	19,01,585	8	6
Add—			
Pay and Allowances of two Veterinary Surgeons for Field Batteries	9,486	–	–
Ditto – ditto – of two Riding Masters for Field Brigades	8,293	–	–
Pay of Non-commissioned Officers of Local Detail	8,836	–	–
	19,28,200	8	6
Deduct— For Pay of Officers in Europe, &c.:—			
In Europe: 5 Colonels. 1 Lieutenant Colonel (as Major) 8 Captains. 10 Second Captains. 6 Lieutenants. 5 Lieutenants.			
On Staff Employ: 1 Colonel. 2 Lieutenant Colonels. 1 Captain. 4 Second Captains. 6 Lieutenants. 1 Lieutenant.			
In Civil Employ: 2 Lieutenant Colonels. 2 Captains. 3 Second Captains. 3 Lieutenants. 1 Lieutenant.	3,51,160	4	–
Total per Annum – *Rs.*	15,77,040	4	6

Royal Artillery—*continued.*

Ten Garrison Batteries.

Detail of the Establishment of One Battery.

Ranks.	Nos.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Captain	1		- -	433 10 -	
2nd Captain	1		- -	417 7 8	
Lieutenants	2		265 12 -	531 8 -	
Lieutenant	1		- -	213 5 -	
		5			19,151 - -
Staff Serjeant	1		- -	50 8 2	
Serjeants	4		36 11 9	146 15 -	
Trumpeter	1		- -	24 7 10	
Ditto	1		- -	13 12 5	
Corporals	4		26 15 -	107 12 -	
Bombardiers	4		24 7 10	97 15 4	
Gunners	60		13 12 5	826 9 -	
		75			15,215 13 -
Total Number		80	And Pay per Annum		34,366 13 -
Add—					
Five day's Pay for Non-Commissioned Officers and Men					211 5 3
Command and Staff Allowances:					
Battery command allowance			- -	30 - -	
Pay serjeant and savings' bank clerk.			- -	7 - -	
Mess allowance			- -	40 - -	
					924 - -
Native Followers:					
Tindal	1		- -	7 8 -	
Store Lascars	6		6 - -	36 - -	
Lascars	2		5 12 -	11 8 -	
Puckallies	2		2 9 -	18 - -	
Sweepers	2		4 - -	8 - -	
		13			972 - -
Contract Allowances:					
Allowance for repair of arms			- -	30 - -	
" " Petty stores			- -	- 12 -	
					369 - -
Total for One Battery per Annum - - - *Rs.*					36,843 - -
Total for Ten Batteries per Annum - - - *Rs.*					3,68,431 6 6
Add—					
Colonial allowance for officers					15,120 - -
Allowance for educational establishment					540 - -
Family allowance to women and children					23,905 - -
Good conduct allowance					13,200 - -
Good shooting allowance					560 - -
					4,21,756 6 6
For Mountain Train Battery at Tounghoo:					
Nineteen artificers and followers					1,848 - -
Contract allowances					288 - -
Total - - - *Rs.*					4,23,892 6 6

Royal Artillery Divisions.

Ranks.	Nos.		Rate of Staff Pay per Mensem.	Total Staff Pay per Mensem.	Total Staff Pay per Annum.
Command and Staff Allowances:			*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Commandant	1		- -	300 - -	
Ditto	1		- -	200 - -	
Adjutants	3		18 5 -	543 15 -	
Serjeant Majors	2		14 14 6	29 13 -	
Quartermaster serjeant.	1		- -	14 14 6	
Serjeants	5		10 - -	50 - -	
		13			13,663 14 -
Additional Staff Allowances (detail not available) - -					4,410 11 -
Total per Annum - - - *Rs.*					18,074 9 -

Recapitulation of Royal Artillery.

	Royal Horse Artillery.	Royal Artillery.	Royal Artillery Divisions.	Total.
	Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Pay of Officers	2,19,441 15 -	9,70,536 2 -	- - -	11,89,978 1 -
Deduct—				
For pay of officers in Europe, &c.	46,621 14 -	3,51,160 4 -	- - -	3,97,782 2 -
	1,72,820 1 -	6,19,375 14 -	- - -	7,92,195 15 -
Pay of non-commissioned officers, rank and file	1,43,226 4 6	5,13,816 10 6	- - -	6,57,042 15 -
Pay of Educational establishment	756 - -	5,208 - -	- - -	5,964 - -
Pay of Subordinate medical and fixed hospital establishments:—				
Pay of 4 Second apothecaries, at *Rs.* 126 5 - each per mensem				
18 Assistant ditto, at " 70 - - " "	- - -	- - -	- - -	2,503 - -
2 Second dressers, at " 24 8 - " "				
117 Servants, at various rates				
141				
Pay of native artificers and followers	74,600 4 10	1,70,691 3 -	- - -	2,45,291 7 10
Command, staff and horse allowances	49,799 7 -	1,01,682 9 -	18,074 9 -	1,69,556 9 -
Contract allowances	40,044 - -	81,426 - -	- - -	1,21,470 - -
Family allowances to women and children	12,960 - -	54,670 - -	- - -	67,630 - -
Good conduct allowance	7,320 - -	29,040 - -	- - -	36,360 - -
Good shooting allowance	370 - -	1,130 - -	- - -	1,500 - -
Total - - - *Rs.*	5,01,896 1 4	15,77,040 4 6	18,074 9 -	21,29,513 14 10

INFANTRY.

European Infantry (Ten Regiments).

Detail of Establishment of One Regiment of Ten Companies.

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Colonel	–		–	–	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		–	1,002 4 –	
Majors	2		759 3 –	1,518 6 –	
Captains	10		415 6 –	4,153 12 –	
Lieutenants	12		256 10 –	3,079 8 –	
Ensigns	8		202 12 5	1,622 3 4	
Paymaster	1		–	445 13 –	
Adjutant	1		–	256 10 –	
Quartermaster	1		–	274 14 3	
Surgeon	1		–	789 3 –	
Assistant Surgeon	2		317 8 –	635 – –	
		39			1,65,331 3 –
Serjeant Major	1		–	46 7 2	
Bandmaster Serjeant.	1		–	46 7 2	
Quartermaster Serjeant.	1		–	40 9 10	
Paymaster Serjeant	1		–	24 9 10	
Armourer Serjeant	1		–	67 5 7	
Hospital Serjeant	1		–	31 15 5	
Colour Serjeants	10		31 15 5	319 10 2	
Serjeants	30		24 9 10	738 7 –	
Serjeant instructor in musketry.	1		–	39 4 11	
Orderly room clerk	1		–	24 9 10	
Drum Major	1		–	24 9 10	
Drummers	20		13 1 2	261 7 4	
Corporals	40		15 11 8	629 2 8	
Privates	810		11 10 –	9,416 4 –	
		919			1,40,531 1 –
Total Number		958	And Pay per Annum *Rs.*		3,05,862 4 –
Add—					
Five days' pay of non-commissioned officers, rank and file.					1,951 12 9
Command, Staff, and Horse Allowance:					
Regimental Command			–	400 – –	
Company Allowance			30 – –	300 – –	
Adjutant's Allowance			–	257 – –	
Instructor of musketry (including horse allowance.			–	150 – –	
Paymaster's office allowance			–	78 10 8	
Quartermaster's office allowance.			–	85 – –	
Interpreter's allowance			–	100 – –	
Drill Serjeant			–	14 – –	
Drill Corporal			–	7 – –	
Savings Bank Clerk			–	20 – –	
Pay Serjeants			7 – –	70 – –	
Serjeant assistant instructor of musketry.			–	7 5 7	
Provost Serjeant			–	9 12 9	
Store Serjeants			3 8 –	35 – –	
Hospital Writers			–	10 – –	
Mess Allowance			–	150 – –	
Horse Allowance for field officers.			30 – –	90 – –	
					21,405 12 –
			Carried forward – *Rs.*		3,29,219 12 9

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	*Rs. a. p.*	*Rs. a. p.*
Brought forward	–	–	–	–	3,29,219 12 9
Educational Establishment:					
Trained Schoolmaster.	1		–	52 10 5	
Staff Allowance to ditto.	–		–	29 13 1	
Trained Schoolmistress.	1		–	25 – –	
Allowance to Assistants.	–		–	20 – –	
Moonshee	1		–	30 – –	
Allowance to Librarian.	–		–	8 – –	
		3			1,985 10 –
Subordinate Medical, and Fixed Hospital Establishment:					
Second Apothecary	1		–	126 5 –	
Assistant do.	1		–	70 – –	
Second Dresser	1		–	24 8 –	
Nurse	1		–	10 – –	
Cook	1		–		
Cook Mate	1		–		
Cooley Maistry	1		–		
Coolies, first class	3		–		
Do., second class	8		–		
Cooley	1		–	191 14 6	
Puckallies	2		–		
Sweepers	3		–		
Tailors	2		–		
Toty	3		–		
Washerwomen	2		–		
		31			5,072 – –
Native Followers:					
Chowdry	1		–	14 – –	
Puckallies	16		10 11 10	171 13 4	
Peons	2		6 – –	12 – –	
Bheesties	8		7 – –	56 – –	
		27			3,046 – –
Contract Allowance:					
For repair of arms			20 – –	200 – –	
For repair of butts and targets.			4 – –	4 – –	
					2,448 – –
Total for One Regiment per Annum				*Rs.*	3,41,772 – 9
Total for Ten Regiments				„	34,17,720 7 6

INFANTRY.

Native Infantry (Forty Regiments).

Detail of the Establishment of One Regiment of Eight Companies.

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Colonel	–		—	—	
Lieutenant Colonel	1		– –	1,002 4 –	
Major	1		– –	759 3 –	
Captains	7		415 6 –	2,907 10 –	
Lieutenants	11		256 10 –	2,822 14 –	
Ensigns	5		202 12 5	1,013 14 1	
Surgeon	1		– –	800 – –	
Assistant Surgeon	1		– –	450 – –	
		27			1,17,069 13 –
Surgeon Major	1		– –	64 – –	
Quartermaster Serjeant.	1		– –	57 15 11	
		2			1,463 15 –
Subadars, 1st Class	2		100 – –	200 – –	
Ditto, 2nd „	2		80 – –	160 – –	
Ditto, 3rd „	4		67 – –	268 – –	
Jemadars, 1st „	4		35 – –	140 – –	
Ditto, 2nd „	4		30 – –	120 – –	
Havildars	41		14 – –	574 – –	
Naicks	40		12 – –	480 – –	
Drummers	16		11 – –	176 – –	
Privates	600		7 – –	4,200 – –	
Recruit and pension boys.	56		3 8 –	196 – –	
		769			78,168 – –
Total Number		798	And Pay per Annum		1,96,701 12 –
Command, Staff, and Horse Allowance:					
Regimental Command			– –	400 – –	
Company Allowance			30 – –	240 – –	
Adjutant's ditto			– –	192 7 –	
Quartermaster and Interpreter			– –	132 – –	
Subadar Major			– –	25 – –	
Havildar Major			– –	10 – –	
Native Adjutants			– –	17 8 –	
Colour Havildars			2 – –	16 – –	
Orderly Havildars			1 13 10	14 14 8	
Drum Major			– –	5 13 4	
Fife Major			– –	5 13 4	
Drill Havildars			– –	5 4 –	
Drill Naiques			– –	3 8 –	
Mess Allowance			– –	120 – –	
Horse Allowance to Field Officers.			30 – –	60 – –	
					14,979 4 –
Educational Establishment:					
Moonshee	1		– –	30 – –	
Allowance for Regimental School.	–		– –	21 – –	
		1			612 – –
Subordinate Medical Establishments:					
Assistant Apothecary	1		– –	70 – –	
Second Dresser	1		– –	24 8 –	
		2			1,134 – –
			Carried forward		2,13,427 – –

RANKS.	Numbers.		Rate of Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Mensem.	Total Pay per Annum.
			Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
			Brought forward		2,13,427 – –
Native Followers:					
Chowdry	1		– – –	14 – –	
Puckallies	8		10 11 10	85 14 8	
Peons	2		6 – –	12 – –	
Second Tindal	1		– – –	7 – –	
Lascars	8		6 5 4	50 10 8	
Toties	2		7 – –	14 – –	
		22			2,203 – –
Contract Allowances:					
Allowance for repair of Arms			20 – –	160 – –	
					1,920 – –
Total for One Regiment per Annum					Rs. 2,17,550 – –
Total for Forty Regiments per Annum					Rs. 87,02,000 – –
Add—					
Pay, &c., of three additional Lieutenant Colonels					37,161 – –
Pay and Allowances of Officers doing duty:—					
From Staff Corps — 1 Lieutenant Colonel; 13 Captains; 12 Lieutenants					
From General List Infantry, and Cadres of old Corps. — 1 Lieutenant Colonel; 8 Majors; 28 Captains; 132 Lieutenants					7,34,895 – –
Additional pay for length of service of Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons.					36,600 – –
Colonial Allowance for Officers of two Regiments serving in the Straits Settlement.					38,760 – –
Additional Jemadar for carrying honorary colour of 20th Native Infantry.					420 – –
Batta for Men serving in the Pegu Division and Straits Settlement.					1,12,221 – –
Medical Establishment serving in ditto					1,180 – –
Batta to Native Followers for ditto					3,024 – –
Band Allowance for 36 regiments					43,200 – –
Family Allowance					21,354 – –
Good Conduct Allowance					3,08,712 – –
					100,39,527 – –
Deduct— For Pay of Officers in Europe, &c.:—					
In Europe: 6 Lt. Colonels; 5 Majors; 26 Captains; 30 Lieutenants. *In Staff Corps:* 19 Majors; 137 Captains; 65 Lieutenants. *In Staff Employ:* 5 Lt. Colonels; 1 Major; 7 Captains; 15 Lieutenants.					
In Civil Employ: 1 Lieutenant Colonel; 21 Captains; 40 Lieutenants. *Wanting to Complete:* 1 Lieutenant Colonel; 130 Lieutenants; 200 Ensigns; 19 Surgeons; 18 Assistant Surgeons.					36,83,727 – –
Total per Annum					Rs. 63,55,800 – –

ARMY AND GARRISON STAFF.

	Budget Estimate 1865–66.
	Rs. a. p.
Divisional and Brigade Staff:	
General Officer Commanding Division	44,500 5 4
Aide-de-Camp	5,918 15 –
Brigadier General, 1st Class	25,800 8 –
Ditto – 2nd „	24,439 – –
Assistant Adjutant General	11,557 12 10
Brigade Major	11,546 5 4
Office allowance to Assistant Adjutant General	2,040 – –
Office allowance to Brigade Major	2,040 – –
General Staff:	
Deputy Adjutant General	21,035 – –
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General	9,468 12 9
Garrison and Station Staff:	
Senior Officer in Command	6,000 – –
Fort and Town Adjutant	13,655 – –

Appendix (J.)

STATEMENTS put in by Mr. *De Fonblanque*.

SCHEDULE II.

App. No. 13. STATEMENT showing the Estimated Cost of Services and Supplies for Maintaining a Force in Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of 203 Royal Artillery, 800 European Infantry, 816 Native Infantry, and 89 Gun Lascars.

	£.
A. Upkeep and repair of Barracks -	5,000
B. Barrack furniture and equipment -	4,000
C. Hospital diets and equipment - -	3,000
D. Provisions, including rice to native troops - - - - -	16,000
E. Local transport - - - -	1,000
F. Ordnance charges - - - -	2,500
G. Native Pensions - - - -	8,000
H. Clothing - - - - -	4,770
I. Travelling and incidental . -	2,000
J. Depôts and recruiting - - -	5,667
K. Non-effectives - - - -	9,027
L. Sea Transport - - - -	9,027
M. Miscellaneous home charges - -	1,600
	71,591
See Schedule I. { Administrative - -	22,333
{ Regimental Charges -	66,070
	£. 159,994

(A.)

Repairs and Upkeep of Barrack. £. 5,000.

This charge is computed to cover all repairs to barracks, hospitals, and magazines, as well as existing works, to maintain them in proper condition, and to meet unforeseen charges for temporary engineer establishments.

£. 30,000 is already voted for new constructions, and this sum will probably not be absorbed within the next four years, by which time the proceeds of military land ceded to the colony will, it is believed, be more than sufficient to meet the expenses of further new works and buildings.

(B.)

Purchase and Repair of Barrack Furniture. £.4,000.

This sum is calculated on the scale of barrack equipment and furniture authorised by the War Office regulations, and includes freight of stores of this description sent from England; also cost of fuel and light for the troops.

(C.)

Hospital Diets and Equipments. £. 3,000.

This sum represents the cost of dieting the sick in Hospital and of cost and upkeep of Hospital furniture, equipment and clothing of all descriptions. The computation is based upon the actual expenditure of last year, and on the scale of equipment authorised by War Office regulations as far as it is applicable to this climate.

(D.)

Provisions. £. 16,000.

The average annual expenditure under this head for the last three years gave about 13*l.* 10*s.* for the provisioning of each European, and 2*l.* 10*s.* for the rice of each native soldier.

The contemplated reduction of the more remote outstations will lead to some saving in the expenditure for rice, and there should be some saving effected in the provisioning of the European troops by a better system of supply and distribution under an organised imperial commissariat. On the other hand there will be some additional cost incurred by the proposed improvement in the European soldier's rations, and it may be assumed that there will be a progressive increase rather than decrease in the cost of most provisions.

The estimated rates, namely 13*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.* for each European, and 2*l.* 5*s.* for each native soldier should be fully sufficient to cover these charges.

(E.)

Local Transport. £. 1,000.

The average annual cost of moving troops by land and sea within the command.

(F.)

Ordnance Charges. £. 2,500.

The cost and freight of military stores of all descriptions, including gunpowder, and upkeep of all stores in the custody of the military storekeepers.

(G.)

Native Pensions. £. 8,000.

This is quoted at nearly 1,000*l.* in excess of the present native pension list, in order to meet the amount of pensions and gratuities which will become payable in consequence of the discharge of Ceylon Riflemen to bring their numbers down to 800.

Should the scheme of two companies of Malays to garrison Singapore, with the view to forming a recruiting depôt be carried out, the number of discharges will be considerably less, but under any circumstances a large number of men in the Ceylon Rifles will very soon have to be pensioned.

I would not transfer the liability of the native pension list from the Colonial to the Imperial Government, since it is only through colonial agency that the identification and payment of pensioners who are scattered all over the island could be efficiently carried out. The sum of 8,000*l.* would not therefore form a part of the colonial contributions, but is included in my estimates in order to indicate the actual outlay to be incurred by the colony.

(H.)

Clothing. £. 4,770.

The average annual cost of clothing is computed at 2 *l.* 10 *s.* per man.

In the abstract of military expenditure in Ceylon, which accompanied the Colonial Office letter of October 1863, the colony is assessed at 13,000 *l.* a year, under the head of "arms, clothing, recruiting expenses, depôts, &c." This estimate is based on a force of 2,634 non-commissioned officers, and rank and file of European and native troops, of which 1,118 are European, and 1,516 are natives.

The cost of clothing for this force at the above rate would give 6,685 *l.*, leaving a balance of 6,315 *l.* for recruiting expenses, depôts, &c., which charge is carried forward under head J.

The charge for clothing of the proposed force at 2 *l.* 10 *s.* a man, gives a total of 4,770 *l.*

(I.)

Travelling Expenses, &c. £. 2,000.

This includes in addition to travelling expenses of officers, office contingencies, postage, stationery, printing, &c.

(J.)

Recruiting and Depôts. £ 5,667.

As shown under heading H., the sum of 6,315 *l.* appears as the charge due for recruiting and depôt expenses for an European force of 1,118 men, giving about 5 *l.* 13 *s.* per man.

This rate on the reduced European force proposed, gives a total of 5,667 *l.*

(K. and L.)

Non-effectives and Sea Transport. £18,054.

The sum of 10,000 *l.* is charged in the abstract referred to under each of these heads for the force quoted, and applies to European troops only, giving about 9 *l.* per man for each service, or for the force now proposed, a total of 9,027 *l.* under each head.

(M.)

Miscellaneous. £. 1,600.

The sum charged under this heading in the abstract referred to, was quoted at 2,000 *l.* for a force in excess, by 726 men, of that now proposed; and a reduction of 400 *l.* under this head would therefore appear reasonable.

Ceylon, November 1865.

Schedule III.

Statement showing the Total Estimated Cost and the Capitation Rates due under each Head of Service for the Maintenance of a Military Force of 1,908 Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File in Artillery, European Infantry, Native Infantry, and Gun Lascars.

Reference to detailed Statement.	Services or Supplies.	Charges.	Royal Artillery.	European Infantry	Native Infantry.	Gun Lascars
		£.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
For details *see* Schedule II.	Upkeep and repair of barracks	5,000	2 12 5	2 12 5	2 12 5	2 12 5
	Barrack furniture and equipment, and fuel and light	4,000	2 2 –	2 2 –	2 2 –	2 2 –
	Hospital diets and equipment	3,000	2 7 10	2 7 10	– 13 3	– 13 3
	Provisions, including rice to native troops	16,000	13 18 6	13 18 6	2 5 –	2 5 –
	Local transport	1,000	– 10 6	– 10 6	– 10 6	– 10 6
	Ordnance charges	2,500	1 6 3	1 6 3	1 6 3	1 6 3
	Native pensions	8,000	– –	– –	8 16 10	8 16 10
	Clothing	4,770	2 10 –	2 10 –	2 10 –	2 10 –
	Travelling and incidental	2,000	1 1 –	1 1 –	1 1 –	1 1 –
	Depôts and recruiting	5,667	5 13 –	5 13 –	—	—
	Non-effective services	9,027	9 – –	9 – –	—	—
	Sea transport	9,027	9 – –	9 – –	—	—
	Miscellaneous home charges	1,600	– 16 10	– 16 10	– 16 10	– 16 10
	Total for Services and Supplies £.	71,591	50 18 4	50 18 4	22 14 1	22 14 1
See Schedule I.	Staff and departments	22,333	11 14 1	11 14 1	11 14 1	11 14 1
	Regimental charges	66,070	51 9 6	36 14 3	30 1 7	19 2 –
	Total Expenditure £.	159,994	114 1 11	99 6 8	64 9 9	53 10 2

Recapitulation.

	£.
Royal Artillery, 203 at 114 *l.* 1 *s.* 11 *d.*	23,161
European Infantry, 800 at 99 *l.* 6 *s.* 8 *d.*	79,467
Native Infantry, 816 at 64 *l.* 9 *s.* 9 *d.*	52,622
Gun Lascars, 89 at 53 *l.* 10 *s.* 2 *d.*	4,762
Total for 1,908 { Non-Commissioned Officers / Rank and File } £.	160,012

It must be borne in mind that any increase in the numbers quoted will decrease the capitation charges under the head of Staff and Departments, while any reductions in the above numbers will increase those rates; the amount chargeable under those heads being invariable, and requiring to be spread over whatever number of troops are maintained. The capitation rate of Native Infantry and Gun Lascars will be reduced by 8 *l.* 16 *s.* 10 *d.* if the Colony undertakes the charge for native pensions.

Ceylon, November 1865. *E. B. de Fonblanque.*

App. No. 13.

Appendix (K.)

Statement put in by Mr. *De Fonblanque.*

Statement showing the Comparative Cost [under the Head of Regimental Pay and Allowances only] of a given Military Force in each of the Three Indian Presidencies, and in Ceylon.

Nos.	Description of Forces.	Ceylon.		Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
		Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.	Regimental Charges.	Capitation Rate.
		£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.
1,000	European Infantry - -	36,712	36 14 3	41,488	41 9 9	48,000	48 – –	40,450	40 9 –
200	Ditto Artillery - -	10,295	51 9 6	10,400	52 – –	11,360	56 16 –	10,880	54 8 –
1,000	Native Infantry - -	30,079	30 1 7	20,133	20 2 8	20,017	20 4 –	20,100	20 2 –
100	Gun Lascars or native sappers and miners.	1,900	19 2 –	2,500	25 – –	2,650	26 10 –	1,315	23 3 –
	Total Regimental Charges	78,986	- -	74,521	- -	91,027	- -	72,745	—

The foregoing calculations as regards Indian troops are based on the rates of pay and regimental allowances granted to them while serving in their own Presidencies. They would probably require a higher rate of pay if employed in Ceylon. Were the command of the forces in Ceylon placed under one of the Indian Presidencies, an officer below the rank of Major General might command on the spot and some reduction under the head of Staff and Departments could thus be contemplated, but, on the other hand, the staff allowances in India are very much higher than those in Ceylon, which would moreover have to bear its share of the general administration in India (*see* Table annexed). Under the head of services and supplies (Schedule II.) the same sums would be chargeable against an Indian as against the present force. A large saving could only be effected by the employment of an Indian force, on the supposition that a smaller number of troops would suffice to garrison Ceylon, if that colony were made a military dependency of one of the Indian Presidencies, and could therefore rely upon reinforcements being more speedily thrown into the island, on an emergency, than they would be, if required to be drawn from England. In the event of this scheme being carried out, a heavy charge would fall on the colony for the pensions to the Ceylon Rifle Regiment on its disbandment, unless arrangements could be made for transferring the services of that corps to some other command; but in the comparative statement the question of pensions has been left out of account.

E. B. De Fonblanque.

Annexure.

Comparative Statement of the Cost of Military Administrative Establishments maintained in the Three Indian Presidencies, and in Ceylon.

Departments.	Bengal Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 111,438.	Madras Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 48,940.	Bombay Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 39,685.	Ceylon proposed Military Force in Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, 1,908.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1 Military Staff - - - - - - - -	245,278	122,608	124,491	} 5,450
2 Administrative Staff - - - - - - -	98,652	50,352	49,236	
3 Commissariat - - - - - - - -	191,014	65,227	63,133	3,774
4 Clothing - - - - - - - - -	7,903	4,626	3,929	—
5 Barracks - - - - - - - - -	75,549	17,744	11,526	—
6 Military Law - - - - - - - -	19,342	14,393	8,700	—
7 Medical - - - - - - - - -	169,995	75,336	54,250	4,356
8 Ordnance - - - - - - - - -	108,183	81,614	75,222	3,696
9 Chaplains - - - - - - - - -	12,672	5,316	5,779	1,000
10 Educational - - - - - - - - -	24,570	7,135	4,418	—
Total - - -	953,158	444,351	400,684	18,276
Add for Royal Engineers - - -	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Total - - -	957,158	448,351	404,684	22,276
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Average rate per Man - - -	8 11 9	9 3 2	10 4 –	11 14 1

The Barrack Department is included under the head Ordnance.

Appendix, No. 14.

PAPER received from the INDIA OFFICE.

MEMORANDUM on the Employment of NATIVE TROOPS from INDIA in the COLONIES.

App. No. 14.

I DOUBT the expediency of employing, to any extent, native troops from India in the Colonies, except under urgent and exceptional circumstances; and, in speaking of the Colonies, I allude to Ceylon, China, the Mauritius, Aden, and the South Coast of Africa. Our other possessions are, on account of climate, the length of voyage which they involve, and for other and obvious reasons, utterly unsuited as places in which to locate natives of Hindustan, and need not be discussed.

Every one who is acquainted with the natives of India is aware of their dislike to any protracted period of service at such a distance from their homes as not to admit of their visiting them, from time to time, at no very lengthy intervals. Even a short service in Lower Bengal and Assam is to a native of Upper India exceedingly distasteful; and to a sea voyage the Hindoos have an almost insuperable objection. This is not so much the case with the Mahomedans, whose manner of living is different, and consequently, while on board ship, they avoid many of the privations which the religion of the Hindoo compels him to undergo.

In the last war in China, the experiment of sending native troops from India to take a part in it was a success. But we must not be led into the error of believing that this has established a safe precedent; on the contrary, the case was, I think, entirely exceptional. The troops were quite newly raised and organised, they had acquired none of the prejudices and vices of the old Bengal army; they had a firm belief in the power and absolute will of the officers commanding them, and had not then learnt to look beyond him for redress of their grievances; they had just seen the old mutinous Bengal army scattered to the winds by the persistent courage of the British, and they were ready to have eaten the obnoxious cartridges of 1857 had they been ordered to do so.

In such a frame of mind, they were invited to go to China; the wishes of their officers were in most cases their wishes; they volunteered, and went on remarkably liberal terms. They had, I believe, Indian pay, batta, and free rations, and in the case of the two cavalry regiments, their horses were exchanged for Government studbred and Colonial horses, which they were afterwards allowed to retain. While in China they were employed in a campaign where they met just such an enemy, and just as much opposition from him, as suited them, and they acquired a considerable amount of plunder.

They lived chiefly on the Government rations, saving most of their pay, and at the end of two years they returned to India, each with a considerable sum of money. Indeed, since the return of the troops so employed, so much have the tales of the wealth they brought been circulated and exaggerated among other regiments, that I believe, if another native force were now called for to proceed to China on similar terms, one-half of the Bengal army would volunteer for the service.

Very different would be the case of a regiment sent to a Colony in a time of peace. Devoid of all such continued change and excitement, without the opportunities of acquiring wealth; alone among foreigners, and confined to the dull routine of garrison duty for a lengthened period, they would, I think, be likely to become sullen and discontented, and, if not carefully managed, would probably proceed to some overt act which military discipline could not overlook; and on their relief and return to India would probably disseminate such reports as to their treatment as would induce others to decline to proceed on the same duty.

If, however, the experiment be tried, new regiments will have to be raised for the purpose, as the present native army is now probably at as low a strength as it is convenient to maintain it at; and though some consider that by arming the native soldier with a more effective weapon, such as a breech-loading rifle, that their number may be still further reduced. Yet I hold to a different opinion, and think that, for political reasons, they should never be entrusted with a better fire-arm than they now possess, which is sufficiently good for all ordinary purposes; and with reference to possible future events, it must be borne in mind that if we have to oppose Europeans in India, they must be met (to be met successfully) with a force in which the native army would form an extremely small proportion; perhaps the only exception it might be advisable to make in regard to arming them with a better class of fire-arm, would be in the case of some of the regiments or companies of the Punjab Frontier Force, who, from the peculiar kind of warfare in which it is occasionally employed, might be advantageously supplied with a better weapon.

It would not be necessary to give any regiment raised for the purpose of Colonial employ a larger proportion of European officers than corps on the irregular system now have; but they should be especially selected for the purpose. Indeed it would be essential to a prospect of success, that the English officers attached to such corps should be men thoroughly acquainted with

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the language, habits, customs, and prejudices of the men they are sent to command.

Probably the best method of forming such regiments would be by calling for volunteers from the commissioned and non-commissioned grades forming the present native army: each man so volunteering should receive a step in rank by promotion to a superior grade; the regiment should then be completed by recruiting; Belooches, Pathans, Afghans, Mussulmans, and Seikhs are best fitted for the purpose; Brahmins and Rajpoots I would exclude altogether.

Assuming that it is not intended that any native force should garrison or occupy any foreign station alone, but that they should be associated with and supplement British troops, I think that they should never be in a greater proportion than one-half to the number of Europeans. Circumstances might occur in which a large number would be likely to cause embarrassment.

As regards the length of time which they should remain on foreign service, I think that, with reference to the fact that while absent from India they could neither have the indulgence of furlough or leave, three years should not be exceeded.

In speaking of the European officers, I have omitted to observe that, if officers of the Indian army are employed on this duty, they will, I presume, draw Indian pay and allowances, in which case the anomaly will be presented of the officer attached to the native troops drawing a very superior rate of pay, while the officer belonging to one of Her Majesty's British regiments is confined to Colonial pay and allowances.

I have said that I doubt the success of the experiment of supplying the Colonies with native troops, and feel assured that it will be a duty that will never be popular; but if it is to be tried, it should at first be in a very small way, with a regiment raised for the purpose; and at the time of its formation, every care should be taken that the men thoroughly understand for what purpose, and on what terms, they are enlisted; their pay, pension, clothing, any extra allowances, or rations, duration of foreign service, arrangements for their family remittances; whether barracks provided, or hutting money in lieu thereof; all should be explained and made clear to them, and every possible contingency provided for as far as practicable.

It was, I believe, a neglect of such precautions that caused the passive mutiny and consequent disbandment of the Seikh corps which was raised and sent to Ceylon, either in 1862 or 1863. In that case the men believed they were enlisted to do the duty of soldiers, but, on arrival, their arms were taken from them, and they were set to work in gangs on the roads; they refused, and were disbanded, and sent back to Calcutta at a considerable cost to Government. The men's complaint was "that they enlisted to serve Government as soldiers, but that, when they arrived in Ceylon, they wanted to make coolies of them."

In conclusion, I would urge that the strictest faith be kept with a regiment, and that no exigencies should induce the Government to keep it longer on foreign service than the time assigned it at its departure from India, and that, on its return, it should be sent to a good up-country station, and a liberal allowance of furlough extended to it.

(signed) *T. F. Wilson*,
Lieut.-Col., 7th Bengal Cavalry.

11 June 1867.

Appendix, No. 15.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

LETTER addressed to the Secretary of the Government of India, in the Military Department, as to the Employment of NATIVE SOLDIERS on FOREIGN SERVICE on DUTIES which might be performed by POLICEMEN. App. No. 15.

(No. 566 A.)

From Colonel *Balfour*, Chief of the Military Finance Department of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir, Calcutta, 6 August 1861.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your docket, No. 191, dated 26th February 1861, forwarding, in original, a letter and its enclosure from the Government of Madras (as per margin), submitting various proposals connected with the rationing and dieting of native and European troops on duty in Pegu and the Straits of Malacca. These propositions I proceed to review seriatim; and I trust Government will excuse the length to which my remarks extend, in consideration of the important bearing of these points on the health, efficiency, and cost of troops employed on foreign service.

Herewith returned
From Government of Madras, No. 2022, dated 1st June 1860.
To Lieut. General Sir J. H. Grant, Commanding in China, No. 62, dated 3rd July 1860.
From Government of Madras, No. 400, dated 31st January 1861.

2. With regard to the proposition to sanction an establishment of cooks, for the hospital service of native regiments serving in Burmah and the Straits Settlement, I submit that I am opposed to any such addition to Government establishments; not only as entailing an increased, and I fear, unlimited expenditure on the State, but also as tending to obstruct the working of an efficient regimental system of control, which, whilst establishing a certain extent of supervision, yet leaves soldiers to act for themselves, thus encouraging in them that feeling of self-reliance so necessary to their complete efficiency.

3. I think it would be both more economical to Government and more advantageous to the soldiers, if, by means of a small grant from Government, to be laid out under regimental arrangements, convenient cooking places could be provided; so divided as to admit of separate rooms being given to different castes. This arrangement should be supplemented by a small allowance granted to each regiment, for maintaining cooks, to prepare under strict and economical regimental arrangements, food for men who are sick or absent on duty. The exact amount expended by the State on this account would be known, and the money would also, I think, be better applied than if Government provided an establishment of servants.

4. The great point is, however, to induce commanding and other officers to look carefully after the comforts of their men, when serving beyond seas. On such service, native soldiers need the greatest attention in respect to food, fully as much as European soldiers; and this attention invariably produces results highly favourable to the service. This is well known to those who have served beyond seas with natives; but the system prevailing in the continent of India, of abstaining from all interference in this respect, renders it difficult for officers, who have not had this experience, to realise the necessity for their looking to these arrangements for native soldiers when on foreign service.

5. One great difficulty connected with native troops on foreign service, is their propensity to sell the food provided for them by Government, and purchase inferior articles, as stated in the report of the Inspector General of Hospitals, forwarded to me; and it is well known that they often starve themselves, in order to hoard up money obtained by the sale of their rations.

6. This fact establishes the necessity of a reform in the present system of allowing native soldiers, on foreign service, to prepare their food without proper supervision. Great care is now taken by Government in respect to the food issued to native soldiers being of a good kind, and in proper quantities, and officers should always do their part to secure the good results that should follow on this liberal treatment, by taking care that the soldiers make a proper use of the articles supplied for keeping them in health and fit for duty. Regular hours should be established for native soldiers to cook; suitable places being provided for that purpose, and care taken to ascertain that the rations are properly cooked, and consumed by the men, not being otherwise disposed of, either before or after cooking.

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7. Attention to cooking, and care to prevent food being sold, would lessen disease and mortality; and any small additional expense that may be incurred by Government in aid of this object, in the way of providing cooking places, would be amply repaid by saving in the large sums at present paid for passage from the eastward, for sick native soldiers, and in the pensions, now granted to many who are sent to the coast as worn out, and to the heirs of those who die, mainly in consequence of this system of starvation, or use of inferior food.

8. I observe that the Madras Government have now ordered a diet for native soldiers in hospital on foreign service; and would suggest that the Government of India should call for a report on the advantages resulting therefrom, to be submitted as early as possible; the measures taken to see to the efficient application of the supplies, being also stated.

9. But whilst thus dwelling strongly on the necessity of preventing the selling of rations, as inducing sickness and death amongst native soldiers on foreign service, I would wish also to see other evils leading to the same results fully inquired into; such as the exposure and excessive amount of duty to which native soldiers beyond seas are very frequently, nay, generally subjected, which are a prolific source of disease and death, and induce dislike to foreign service.

10. The papers sent for report show, that guards are often posted at very considerable distances from the soldiers' lines. At Singapore, no less than three miles off, so that the men have to go a long way for their food; and it is even sometimes impossible to allow them to leave their guards from the time they mount, until relieved.

11. I believe further that it is the practice to employ the native soldiers at Singapore and other places beyond seas so constantly as to give them only every other night in bed; and sometimes not even that. The result is, their health is seriously affected, and their desire to remain in the service diminished, whilst their craving to return to their native country is naturally increased; and not only is expense constantly incurred in sending men backwards and forwards, but the pension list is constantly augmenting. In order to show the extent of this evil, I would advise returns being obtained from the Madras Government, showing the number of men who have, during any one year of the past few years, been sent back to Madras from a few regiments in the Straits, Pegu, and Tenasserim; stating the strength of each regiment on embarking, the additions subsequently made to it, distinguishing recruits and recovered men sent to rejoin the corps, as also the number of deaths, and the numbers invalided and pensioned.

12. It is, I believe, well understood that measures tending to increase the comfort of the soldier greatly increase the popularity of the service, whilst a proportionate distaste for the service is engendered by over-work; and of late, as Government are aware, the difficulties experienced in recruiting for the Madras army have greatly increased, owing to the heavy service beyond seas, imposed on the coast army. Whilst advocating on financial grounds a great reduction of the force at present located beyond seas, I think that every effort should be made still further to reduce the military expenditure of those provinces, by adopting measures calculated to diminish to the utmost, sickness and pensioning, among the native soldiers that must be retained there.

13. One obvious measure is to relieve them as far as possible from many fatiguing duties of distant guards, on which they are now employed. It is no doubt a wise economy to attend to the wants of the soldier so as to keep him as far as possible in health, and recover him as soon as possible from sickness; but at the same time care should be taken to avoid the exposure and overtasking which forces men into hospital, and leads to their being constantly 80 or 100 sick out of a regiment of 760, whilst, with due precautions, there need be only an average of about 20 sick.

14. I deferentially submit, as an opinion, that the Straits Government should be called on to maintain a police force in sufficient strength to allow of the native soldiers being freed from all the guard duties now universally recognised as properly belonging to police; and even when on duty as a military body, the soldiers should be entirely freed from duties of watch and ward. I do not think this police force would entail any unfair burden on the Straits Settlements, as Singapore possesses a flourishing local revenue; and the inhabitants have long boasted of this as sufficient to pay the cost of administration.

15. This relief from excessive duty,—combined with the erection of proper cook rooms, whereby the establishment of regimental supervision over the proper cooking of the rations supplied by Government, would be facilitated and misappropriation prevented, with the grant of a small regimental money allowance to ensure the supply of cooked food to men in hospital, who are too unwell to cook for themselves, and to men on guard, who are unable to leave their guards to cook their food, or are too distant from their lines to procure it,—would, in my opinion, be far more efficacious in keeping the men in health, than any Government establishment of cooks; whose salaries would considerably add to the fixed charges of the State, while the waste and peculation would be likely to entail endless and uncertain expense both on the Government and on the soldier, and would in all probability diminish, instead of increasing the comfort of the latter.

16. With

16. With the smaller number of sick that would have to be provided for, with greatly diminished exposure and fatigue, and improved arrangements for the preparation of food, there would be less objection to the grant of extra hospital supplies, to ensure the restoration of the sick to health. The Military Finance Department, whilst endeavouring to check undue profusion, have in all their reports advised the most efficient measures being taken to restore sick soldiers to health, and when the medical officers are actively employed as medical examiners, it will be safe to grant whatever they may consider necessary for the cure of the sick; but with the present large number of sick, the medical establishment have not, under the arrangements hitherto in force, had the means of exercising effective control over the supplies furnished for the sick, and too great liberality on the part of Government would lead to peculation and waste.

17. Whatever measures be adopted for adding to the comfort of the sick, should, in my opinion, be entirely carried out under regimental arrangements, and officers commanding corps and companies should be specially enjoined to see that the duties involved in such arrangements, are strictly and efficiently supervised; special instructions being issued to provide for this daily supervision.

18. With respect to the further question referred, namely, the proposed increase of rations to European troops (as noted in paras. 11 and 19 of the Report on the Straits from the Inspector General of Hospitals), I fully admit the correctness of the principle that the soldier should not be in any way stinted; but still, before increasing the rations already allowed by Government on a most liberal scale, I think that other measures should be adopted, to reduce sickness and mortality to the very lowest ratio.

19. I submit that a good and sufficient ration can always be provided, by means of a judicious substitution, according to circumstances, of other articles and equivalents, within the cost now incurred for the liberal scale of ration authorised for European soldiers. In the proceedings of the Government of Madras (referred to in para. 5 of the Order No. 399 of 31st January 1861), I observe 2 lbs. of suet are proposed to be granted to the European soldier as a part of the daily ration; but I presume this must be a clerical error. I believe 8 oz. of suet a week, or 1 oz. daily, would be an ample ration of that article.

20. A scale of equivalents, as noted in the margin, shows how much the soldier's rations may, from time to time, be varied, without increasing either cost or quantity; and at pages 71 and 72 of the English Commissariat Regulations, the following equivalents are laid down:

Bread 1¼ lbs. or Bread 1 lb. and Rice 4 oz. is equal to Rice 1 lb. or Flour 1 lb., Biscuit 1 lb.

Flour ¾ lb. is equal to Peas ½ pint, or Dholl ½ pint, or Beans ½ pint, or Vegetables ½ lb.

Beef 1 lb. is equal to Suet 1⅓ lbs. Fish about 2 lbs.

Tea ¼ oz. is equal to Coffee 1 oz. or Cocoa 1 oz. or Chocolate 1 oz.

"½ lb. of suet and ½ lb. of currants, or 1 lb. of raisins, is to be considered equal to 1 lb. of flour.

"1 lb. of biscuit, 1¼ lbs. of soft bread, 1 lb. of flour, 1 lb. of rice, 1 lb. of sago, 1 lb. of Scotch pot or pearl barley, are to be considered equal to each other.

"½ pint of wine, 1 quart of strong beer, ½ gill of spirits, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 lb. of rice, 1 pint of peas, 1 pint of dholl, 1 pint of calavances, 1 quart of oatmeal, 1½ pints of split peas, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 oz. of chocolate, 1 oz. of cocoa, 1 oz. of coffee, ¼ oz. of tea, are to be considered equal to each other.

"1 lb. of butter, 1 lb. of sugar, are to be considered equal to each other.

"2 lbs. of cheese, 1 lb. of chocolate, 1 lb. of cocoa, 1 lb. of coffee, are to be considered equal to each other.

"¼ lb. of onions or leeks, 1 lb. of other vegetables, are to be considered equal to each other."

21. At places situated on the sea coast, such as Singapore, Cananore, Madras, Bombay, and Kurrachee, fish might frequently be issued with advantage once or twice a week, instead of meat; and in the Straits and Pegu especially, the variations of diet might be numerous, by reason of the great variety of articles procurable there. Barley, potatoes, yams, sweet potatoes, peas, onions, garlic, and various other kinds of vegetables, would all be agreeable adjuncts; as also pepper, raisins, and currants. Salt meat would also be acceptable occasionally, if judiciously served out with pease pudding; and a supply of lime juice, vinegar, and mustard, might be attended with good results.

22. The issue of salt, butter, and cheese, as proposed for Singapore, may also be admitted in substitution of a portion of the other articles of the ration. Indeed, whenever these changes may be considered advisable, and the articles can be supplied within the existing charge for ration, I think it would be well to authorise the exchange being made; but, as such changes might, if made independently of the Commissariat, lead to that department being over-taxed, it is essential that all substitutes should be fixed by communication between the commanding officer and the commissariat officer. I am quite satisfied, that with a good understanding between these two officers, there can be no difficulty in deciding on suitable substitutes; but I deprecate an arbitrary power of making changes being exercised by the commanding officer.

23. The time that substitutes are to continue in force should be defined, as also the quantity of each substitute; so that definite arrangements may be made by the commis-

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sariat officer. It is also essential that the arrangement should be well understood by the men, and carefully attended to by the officers.

24. Under this view I do not feel justified, until further necessity for the measure be shown, in recommending Government to increase the rations in the manner stated, and to the extent proposed; which would considerably increase the cost. The Indian scale of rations is the most liberal fixed for any body of soldiers; and in support of this view I may refer Government to the remarks of the Commission on the sanitary condition of the army, and to Appendix XXVII. of that Report, on the scales of rations fixed for soldiers located in different Colonies.

25. As already observed, I fully admit that the articles to be supplied to soldiers should be of the most suitable description that can be obtained; but it is sometimes difficult to reconcile the opinions of medical officers as to what diets are best for health. In Appendix XXX., page 429 of the above Sanitary Report, I observe that soup made of head, shanks, and feet is suggested; as also hearts, fried liver, and tripe; and there can be no doubt that, with reference to the habits of the men before enlisting, these parts of the animal would be desired by some soldiers. It is also proposed that arrangements should be made for providing roast meat in all barracks; and no doubt some use might be made of all these suggestions.

26. I notice in the letter forwarded, that a better description of beef than that generally obtained by the commissariat in the Straits, can be procured from Java; I recommend that the Government of Madras be requested to call on the Commissary General, to ascertain whether this source of supply is one that can be resorted to. I am apprehensive that the source is too distant to be depended upon, or if resorted to, would only increase the already heavy charge for rationing European soldiers at Singapore; exceeding, when I last examined the accounts, 18 rupees per month, or nearly three times the cost of the ration at Secunderabad.

27. I am aware that it is exceedingly difficult for the commissariat to obtain supplies of beef at Singapore; but if further inquiries be instituted, and greater exertions made, some improvement might doubtless be effected in the rations of soldiers. I would point out that buffaloes, which are abundant in the Straits, might be made use of, for although the meat is generally too tough to be eaten, it is excellent for soup or stew, which might be served out in lieu of meat one or two days in the week; thus combining economy with a pleasing variety to the soldier, which is particularly recommended by the Commission at page 32 of the Sanitary Report.

28. Variety in the mode of cooking is also strongly urged by the Commission; and as there can be no doubt that such variety and good cooking of all kinds greatly conduces to the health of the soldiers, I recommend that greater attention be bestowed on these points. Convenient places for baking should be prepared in the European soldiers' cook-rooms, and attention should be given by the officers to the cooking being well done. The number of messes in each company may be sufficiently numerous to allow of the men having a choice; at the same time the mode of preparing the meals should not be so varied as to embarrass the cooking operations.

29. I would suggest that the Government of Madras be furnished with such parts of this Report as the Government of India may see proper to send; and be authorised to make such changes in the articles composing the soldiers' rations at Singapore, as they may see fit, as an experiment for 12 months. The changes thus authorised by the Government of Madras, or by the local authorities at Singapore, should be reported to the Government of India, showing the grounds for making them, and the results to be expected therefrom; the actual results on completion of the period being also fully stated, and the expenditure reviewed.

30. Before concluding, I would bring to the notice of Government, that the present is an instance of the incomplete way in which propositions for important changes are laid before Government. The suggestions I have here reviewed, although involving no little expense, and intimately concerning the Commissariat Department, are submitted without any report from the Commissary General and Commissariat officers, as to the departmental arrangements necessary to give effect thereto, or from the Controller of Military Finance as to the expense to be entailed by such changes; and I therefore strongly advise that it should be enjoined on all authorities, before bringing forward propositions for changes of any kind, to call for reports on points of this nature, from the heads of departments concerned on the measures proposed to be adopted. The responsibility of these officers for the outlay incurred for the services they control, should be respected; and their views should receive due consideration from Government, who will also be greatly assisted in the decision of the question by explanations of the bearing of the proposed measures.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. Balfour*, Colonel,
Chief of the Military Finance Department.

Appendix, No. 16.

PAPERS referred to by Major General *Balfour*, C. B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated 13th September 1854.

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WITHDRAWAL of EUROPEAN INFANTRY from INDIA.

(Signed) *D.*

1. SOME time since a Despatch from the Honourable Court informed the Government of India that Her Majesty's 22nd, 25th, 96th, and 98th Regiments would this year return to England, and that Her Majesty's 27th and 35th Regiments would relieve the 22nd and 96th. The Despatch did not state that other two regiments would be named to relieve the 25th and 98th, but neither did it state that they would not be named; and thus the Government has hitherto been left in a state of uncertainty as to whether or not it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw two regiments from India, without relief at the end of this year.

2. The Commander in Chief has now transmitted to the Government a letter from the General Commander in Chief, Viscount Hardinge, from which it appears that it is his desire that the 25th and 98th Regiments should return to England this year, without relief, on the understanding that they will be relieved next year by Her Majesty's 82nd and 90th Regiments. Lord Hardinge adds, "I have understood that a communication has been made by Her Majesty's Government to the Governor General, requesting that this measure may be carried into effect, if his Excellency should consider that the force in India might, without risk, be diminished by two regiments for that time. (5 July 1854.)

No communication of the nature alluded to by Lord Hardinge has been received by me personally, or by the Government of India. It is necessary, however, that an answer should be given to the Commander in Chief, for his Excellency's guidance in the course he is to take under the letter from the Horse Guards, which he has now submitted to the Government. I propose, therefore, to record the opinion which I should have felt it my duty to express, if the question of removing the 25th and 98th Regiments from India without relief, this year, had been referred to this Government by the Home authorities.

3. The natural impulse of my mind (springing from a long-settled and often-expressed conviction, that of European infantry soldiers the Government of India has now not a man too much,) was to inform the Commander in Chief at once that the Government entertained the strongest objection to the diminution of the European infantry arm at the present time, even as a temporary measure. But desirous of showing all deference to the declared wish of Her Majesty's Government, that with reference to "the demand for troops in Europe," two regiments might be sent home from India, without present relief, I have postponed our reply, in order that I might again most fully, and from every point of view, consider the practicability and prudence of complying with that wish.

4. The more I have considered this grave question, the more I have reflected upon our present position in India, the more closely I have calculated the chances and the risks of the times and the circumstances in which we are placed, the more I am confirmed in my first impression, that it is the duty of the Government to object to the withdrawal of two regiments of European infantry at this moment, and most earnestly to urge that such a measure may not be resolved upon by the Home authorities, unless under circumstances of much greater exigency than can as yet be alleged to exist.

5. The imprudence and impolicy of weakening our force of European infantry at the present time will be made evident, I think, by a brief review of the amount of that force which we actually possess, of the position in which we stand, and of the contingencies and risks to which we are liable.

6. The force of European infantry in India has been very inconsiderably augmented during the last seven years, notwithstanding the great changes which have occurred in the interval. In a Minute relative to the Punjaub, recorded last year, I showed that the European infantry force was larger then, by only two regiments, than it was in the year in which I was appointed to the Government of India, although a distant kingdom had since that time been added to our empire. The same may be said now. For, although authority has been given in the meantime to raise three new regiments of Company's infantry, those regiments are still in embryo, and cannot, for some time to come, be regarded as a portion of the effective force of the army.

The available force, therefore, of European infantry in India at the present time, exceeds the force employed upon the 1st January 1847, by only two battalions.

Yet how vast a mass of territory has been acquired in the interval. The annexation of the Punjaub in 1849, calling for the presence of an immense army, whose chief station is 1,560 miles distant from the capital; the unwelcome conquest of Pegu in 1852, a province separated by 1,000 miles of sea from the rest of India, and demanding, therefore, a self-sustaining force of all arms

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within itself; the recent lapse of Nagpore, where formerly a regiment of European infantry was always kept; these new possessions have added immense tracts of country to the British possessions, imposing upon us the duty both of defending and of controlling them.

It is true that in the acquisition of these territories one formidable enemy has been wholly crushed, and that the power of another enemy has been greatly shaken. But the advantage thus gained in the actual diminution of hostile force which could be arrayed against us, is in a great degree counterbalanced by the larger extent of space over which our own force is of necessity spread, and the consequent diminution to us of the power of combining and concentrating our European strength.

7. Thus, partly from this cause, and partly from the condemnation of the barracks at Cawnpore as no longer fit for human habitation, the Bengal army has at present but a single European battalion intermediate between Calcutta and Agra, a distance of 800 miles.

Thus, too, the Madras army, called upon to aid in the protection of Pegu, has left within itself a force of European infantry quite incommensurate with the great extent of territory which it is called upon to control, and inadequate for the purpose.

The establishment of European infantry regiments in Madras was reduced, in 1847, to four regiments of Her Majesty's and two of the Company's infantry. Since that time two regiments have been employed in Pegu. The new 3rd European regiment is not yet in existence. Thus, for the whole vast space which the Madras army garrisons, from Nagpore to Cape Comorin, it has but four battalions of European infantry. Fort St. George and Bangalore have long had each but a single wing, and the Ceded Districts have none at all.

8. Such is the amount of European infantry now at our command, and such is its scattered condition under a necessity imposed upon us by the enormous extent of the territories with whose defence we are charged, and by the remoteness from each other of the principal points at which our precautions must be taken.

9. I confidently submit to the candour of Her Majesty's Ministers that, placed as it is amidst distances so vast, amidst multitudes so innumerable, amidst people and sects various in many things, but all alike in this, that they are the lately conquered subjects of our race, alien to them in religion, in language, in colour, in habits, in all feelings and interests, the Government of India has had solid ground for the declaration more than once made of late years, that the European force at its command is not more than adequate for preserving the empire in security and tranquillity, even in ordinary times; much more, then, has the Government solid ground for declaring that the force on which it mainly depends cannot rightly or safely be weakened now, when the course of events has led the British nation into formidable war with a race, whose enormous power is not less known, and is even more largely estimated, in the East than it is in Europe itself.

10. The war with Russia does not at present directly affect the British dominions in the East. The navy of Russia in these seas is inconsiderable, both in numbers and force; and privateering by the universal consent of Europe and America appears to be most justly proscribed: by land, the invasion of a Russian army, most doubtful at all times, is I conceive at the present time a physical impossibility.

But although the war with Russia does not directly affect our Indian dominions, yet it is unquestionably exercising at this moment a most material influence upon the minds of the people over whom we rule, and upon the feelings of the nations by which we are surrounded, and thus it is tending indirectly to affect the strength and the stability of our power.

11. The authorities in England cannot, I think, be aware of the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India. I was myself unaware of it until the events of the past year have forced it upon my convictions. Letters from various parts of India have shown me that the present contest is regarded by them with the deepest interest, and that its issue is by no means considered so certain as we might desire. However mortifying to our pride it may be to know it, and however unaccountable such a belief may appear in people living amidst the visible evidences of our might, it is an unquestionable fact that it is widely believed in India, that Russia is pressing us hard, and that she will be more than a match for us at last.

12. We know by our correspondence in the East that the King of Ava has declaredly been acting on this feeling, and that influenced by it he has been delaying the despatch of the mission, which many months ago he spoke of sending to Calcutta.

The flood of reports with which we are inundated from the west, bearing along rumours of Russian embassies to Khiva, and Russian treaties with Bokhara, and Russian armies in Kokan, show the same notion prevailing of approaching danger to us from that quarter.

13. Simultaneously with the exhibition of this feeling regarding Russia to the east and west of us, Nepal has begun to arm. The preparations made are ostensibly for attack on a province of Thibet; there is every reason to believe that that is their real object; but at the same time we cannot fail to remark the significant fact that Nepal armed in a similar manner on the last occasion on which it was believed we were about to come into collision with Russia. I know privately from the Resident at Katmandoo, that great interest has been exhibited there of late in the events occurring in Europe; that there (as at Umeerapoora, and other native courts) the English newspapers are regularly translated for the durbar; that much speculation has been afoot as to the large military preparations in progress, and that there are not wanting those who hint that the army now assembling may ultimately have another destination than Lassa.

14. The Court of Directors are well aware, for the events of the last seven years have given them opportunity of judging, that I am very far from being an alarmist; they will therefore, I trust, be the more disposed to place reliance on my judgment when I say that in full knowledge of the state of affairs around us, and in the face

of

of that feeling which I have just described to exist, it would be culpable imprudence in this Government to permit the European infantry in India to be lessened at this time by even a single man, if by remonstrance or protest it can possibly avert the measure.

15. India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance. We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so; but if European troops shall be now withdrawn from India to Europe; if countenance shall thus be given to the belief already prevalent, that we have grappled with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal to overpower us; if, by consenting to withdrawal, we shall weaken that essential element of our military strength, which has already been declared to be no more than adequate for ordinary times, and if, further, we should be called upon to despatch an army to the Persian Gulf, an event which, unlooked for now, may any day be brought about by the thraldom in which Persia is held, and by the feeble and fickle character of the Shah; then, indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express, the same confidence as before, that the security and stability of our position in the east will remain unassailed.

16. Already on a recent occasion, I have acknowledged the obligation under which we lie, and have proclaimed the desire by which we are actuated, to aid the Imperial Government in the great contest on which it has entered. Already the Government of India has given proof that these were not empty words, by placing at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ministers the four regiments of dragoons now serving in India.

But it must be borne in mind, that India has to play her own part in this contest; that, unlike Canada, and the Colonies of the Crown, she is in close proximity to some of those powers over which the influence of Russia is supposed to extend; that, although the war does not directly affect her now, yet she is already affected indirectly by the feelings to which the war has given rise; and that it is at least possible that those feelings may be quickened into hostile action, which she will then be called upon to meet by force of arms.

If this be borne in mind, I entertain a confident conviction that Her Majesty's servants, and the Honourable Court of Directors, will feel that the Government of India will have duly borne its share of this great struggle, if while contributing the four regiments, which it has already offered to the army in the field, it shall preserve the Indian empire in security and tranquillity with the means which are now at its disposal. App. No. 16.

17. If it should be the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government to direct that the two regiments now required shall be withdrawn from India, without relief, the Government of India will of course at once obey the order, and accept whatever risks it may involve. But unalterably fixed in the belief that the European infantry force in India is not more than adequate for the ordinary purposes it has to serve, and keenly alive to the consideration that if the European force be weakened, the Government of India, unlike the Colonies of the Crown, has no element of national strength on which it can fall back, in a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers, I feel it to be a public duty to record that, in my deliberate judgment, the European infantry force in India ought in no case to be weakened by a single man, so long as England shall be engaged in her present struggle with the Russian powers.

18. I propose, if my honourable colleagues shall coincide in these views, that they should be laid before the Honourable Court of Directors by the ensuing mail.

19. If after consideration of the representations proceeding from the Government which is responsible for the safety of the Indian empire, Her Majesty's Ministers shall still require that the 25th and 98th Regiments shall be despatched to England this year without relief, orders can be received here in the month of December, so as to admit of the embarkation of both regiments at the usual season of the year.

20. The Commander in Chief should be informed of the resolution of the Government, and of the course it has proposed to take.

(signed) *Dalhousie.*

13 September 1854.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated 5th February 1856.

(No. 2.)

Military Department.—Military Establishment in India.—European Infantry in Her Majesty's Service.

1. WHEN, 50 years ago, the Governor General revised the European military establishment of India, he thus laid down the principle by which the amount of such establishment ought to be determined:—"The only safe mode," said Lord Wellesley, "of estimating the strength of European force in India is to exhibit a detailed statement of the distribution of every corps with reference to our wants, and to the different stations which it is indispensably necessary to occupy by European troops. Great errors would arise from fixing the European military establishment by any given proportion which may be supposed to exist generally between our European and native establishments; it would be impracticable, under the real state of the case, to devise any accurate principle by which such general proportion between our European and native troops should be regulated." * * * "The most safe principle of calculation which can be used for determining the strength of our European military establishments must be derived from a detailed examina-

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tion of the question, determining the number of European troops by a consideration of our detailed wants at every station of our armies."

I can conceive that the principle thus laid down by Lord Wellesley as the only one by which the amount of European force required for India could be safely and rightly determined, is as sound at the present day as it was half a century ago. The application of it now will differ widely from that which was given to it in 1805, but the rule itself is still one only sure and practical guide.

2. Following this guide, then, I shall endeavour to determine what are the wants of the Government of India in respect of European infantry throughout the territories for which it is responsible, and, thereafter, to show how those wants may best be supplied.

Before attempting to determine the necessary amount of European infantry, I referred to the Governors of Madras and Bombay in communication with the Commanders in Chief of those armies respectively. I have consulted also the Commander in Chief of the Army in India, his Excellency Sir W. Gomm. I believe that the proposals which I am about to make regarding European infantry in India will be substantially in accordance with the opinions which those officers held.

3. It may be assumed that it is the duty of the Governor General in council to maintain such a force of European infantry in India as shall be adequate to provide for the preservation of internal tranquillity, and, at the same time, to furnish for the field such army or armies as shall be sufficient for the effectual defence of British territory against every enemy to whose attacks it may be exposed.

4. In order to determine whether the present establishment is sufficient for these purposes, it will be necessary to examine in detail the means at the command of the Government in each of the three Presidencies, and the necessities which are to be met. In doing so, it will be convenient to treat the European infantry force, in the first instance, as a whole. The Royal infantry and the Honourable Company's infantry will afterwards be considered under separate heads.

5. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Bengal consists at the present time of 19 battalions, of which one battalion has, from temporary causes, been recalled to Europe. Those temporary causes have, in some small degree, altered the usual distribution of the several regiments; but in ordinary course the force would be distributed as follows:—

Peshawur	3*	Meerut	2
Rawul Pindee	1	Agra	1
Sealkote	1	Cawnpore	1
Lahore	1	Dinapore	1
Ferozepore	1	Calcutta	1
Jullunder	1	Pegu	2
Umballa	1		
The Hills	2	Regiments	19

6. Certain of these stations must be provided with a permanent force, which could not, at any time, be removed from it without imprudence and risk.

The province of Pegu, remote from the great body of the Bengal army, separated by a thousand miles of sea from the Presidency, recently conquered, and, as yet, liable to the risks of internal disturbance, and of hostilities from Burmah, cannot for the present be left without a force capable of sustaining itself under any circumstances which might arise.

Although Fort William and the capital are little exposed to the risks either of internal disturbance or of war, it will be universally admitted that the fort, the arsenal, the trade, and the many important establishments of Government which are collected round Calcutta, should always have the protection of one regiment of European infantry.

Dinapore, in the close vicinity of Patna, has long been, and is still, regarded as a station which requires the presence of a European regiment at all times, if possible.

The Doab could not prudently be altogether deprived of European infantry; if the operations of war should call the main force of the army to a distance, one regiment should always be retained in that tract of country.

The protected Sikh states, still enjoying a considerable measure of independence, and more likely perhaps than any other district within our bounds to show disaffection, if a fair opportunity for doing so should offer itself, undoubtedly require that a corps of European infantry should be kept between the Jumna and the Sutlej. Similar consideration and risks would indicate the prudence of reserving one European battalion also for the plains of the Punjaub.

Thus, there are seven points† at which a necessary regard for the preservation of internal tranquillity and for the general security of our interests, would require that regiments of European infantry should be reserved whenever an army may be called upon to take the field within the Presidency of Bengal.

7. There will therefore be 12 regiments available for active operations.

8. In order to determine whether 12 battalions free to take the field do certainly constitute a sufficient European force for the Bengal Presidency, it is requisite that we should consider the number and the strength of those powers by whose hostility we may be threatened.

9. Having regard to the description of the present condition of the native states, which was given in the first of this series of Minutes on the Military Establishments of India, it may, I think, be safely assumed that our present European force is amply sufficient to meet any danger which could possibly arise among the powers which are enclosed within the limits of the British empire in India.

10. The only external powers of sufficient magnitude and resources to engage in a war with the Indian Government in this part of our dominions, are the King of Ava, the Rajah of Nepal, Maharajah Gholab Sing, of Jummoo, and the Ameer of Cabool.

11. Since all reinforcements for Pegu, in the event of a renewal of war with the King of Ava, would probably be most conveniently drawn from the Madras and Bombay armies, a war with that power may be considered as not likely to affect the available strength of the Bengal army.

12. The extreme improbability of any attack by the rulers of Jummoo has already been pointed out on a former occasion. "The hostility," I then wrote, "the hostility of Maharajah Gholab Sing,

* Including the regiment which is to be at Nowshera when the barracks are finished.

† In Pegu, 2; Calcutta, 1; Dinapore, 1; Cawnpore or Agra, 1; Umballa, 1; Lahore or Sealkote, 1: Total, 7.

Sing, which has sometimes been anticipated, will assuredly never be exhibited, so long as he has life in himself or strength to prevent its exhibition in others. The interest of future rulers of Cashmere will hardly be less urgent than his own to induce them to cultivate friendly relations with the Government of India. If they should not be friendly, neither the wealth and power they hold, nor the character of the people they rule, are sufficient to make them formidable to us."*

The points, then, on which attack is most probable are the frontiers of Cabool and the borders of Nepal.

13. Whatever may be the feelings of the Affghans towards us at the present time, or whatever they may become hereafter, I think it highly improbable that they would ever venture to attempt an attack in force on the British territories, of their own motive or for their own purposes only; but such an attack, at the instigation of a European power, is not so an improbable an event; and, if it should be seconded by a rising among our own subjects on the borders, closely connected with the Affghans by many ties, and if it should be further swelled by any outbreak of the old Khalsa spirit among the Sikhs of the Manjha, the occasion would call for the full exercise of all our strength.

In such an event, after providing for the several points (para. 6) which it has been shown will always require a permanent protection or control, the Government of India would be able to bring 12 regiments of European infantry into the field for the western frontier; and, as there are already 11 regiments cantoned beyond the Jumna, comparatively little time would be consumed in the assembly of that force. Once assembled, I regard it as sufficient to destroy any army which is at all likely to be brought against us in that quarter.

14. An attack upon British territories by Nepal is, at least, as improbable as an Affghan invasion. Nearly 40 years have now passed since our war with Nepal was ended. During all that time the states have been in close contact along an extensive frontier, but the peace which was framed in 1817 has never been broken. There is nothing at the present day which renders a breach more probable than at any time since the treaty was signed.

Nevertheless, such an event is not impossible, and we ought never to be unprepared for its occurrence. The propriety of this prudent precaution received strong illustration not long since. For some months in 1854 Nepal was arming. A very large force was gathering; great stores were being prepared near our Darjeeling frontier, and Jung Bahadoor had intimated that it was his intention to march a considerable body of men along the Terai from Katmandoo eastward. The durbar had announced that all those preparations were intended for the attack of a province of Thibet. There was no reason to doubt that this was their real end; but we could not fail to see that they might at any time have been diverted suddenly from that end, and might have been employed in an attack on our lower provinces.

The ultimate result of so mad an outrage would have been beyond doubt. But it cannot be denied that at the present moment, and for many years past, the Government of India has been insufficiently prepared for promptly meeting such an attack.

Even so late as the time of Lord William Bentinck, little more than 20 years ago, after Bhurtpore had been taken, after the Burmese war had been long successfully concluded, and when our posts had already been pushed beyond the Jumna, it was thought prudent always to keep a strong force in these lower provinces. Six European infantry regiments were at that time stationed below Allahabad.* When I assumed the government of India, I found but two regiments within that space, and the means at my command have never yet enabled me to strengthen this very insufficient force, however sensible I may have long been of the prudence and propriety of doing so.

It must further be observed, that even of the inconsiderable European force which we have in the lower provinces, one-half, viz., the regiment in Fort William, is more than 400 miles distant from the spot which is most likely to be the first threatened by the Nepalese; while the position of the great mass of our European force, far removed to the westward, would render it impossible to collect even a small army upon the lower frontier until after a long and injurious delay.

15. These considerations alone must, I think, suffice to convince any one who may consider this question, that the European infantry in Bengal ought to be reinforced. The necessity of a greater force of that arm being permanently stationed in the lower provinces will become still more apparent when it is remembered that, although in these later times the native states in India have shown little aptitude for combination against a common enemy, still such a combination is never impossible in itself. We ought, therefore, to contemplate the contingency of our being attacked by both our border neighbours at once, and, inasmuch as in such case no aid could well be given from the more distant and more critically situated positions in the west, we ought so to strengthen ourselves in good time upon the frontier where we now are weak—in the east—as to be able to present a sufficiently strong front to both our antagonists at the same time.

16. The force which is detailed below, is the least which would enable the Government of India to assume the attitude I have just described.

	Battalions.		Battalions.
Peshawur	3	Meerut	2
Rawul Pindee	1	Agra	1
Sealkote	1	Cawnpore	1
Lahore	1	Dinapore	1
Ferozepore	1	Calcutta	1
Jullundur	1	Berhampore	1
Umballah	1	Hazareebaugh	1
The Hills	2	In all	19

I mention

* Minute, 20 April 1853, para. 19.

* Calcutta, 1; Chinsurah, ½; Berhampore, 1½; Bhaugulpore, 1; Dinapore, 1; Ghazepore, 1: Total, 6.

App. No. 16.

I mention 19 battalions as the mimimum force of European infantry which ought to be maintained upon the Bengal establishment. Twenty battalions would be better, and even more would not be superfluous. If, however, this force of 19 European infantry regiments shall be allotted to the stations which I have enumerated, the Governor General in Council, by bringing up a regiment from Madras as a temporary garrison for Fort William, would have it in his power to hold securely the several districts to which I have referred above; and, at the same time, to bring into the field two armies on the frontier of Cabool and Nepal, which should each contain* eight regiments of European infantry, or which should include† ten regiments in the one army, and six regiments in the other.

17. To maintain this force permanently would require three regiments more than are now present within the limits of the Presidency of Bengal. I proceed to state in what manner I propose that those regiments should be obtained.

18. The province of Pegu is now garrisoned jointly by the armies of Bengal and Madras. The general officer commanding the division may be selected from either army, and a Bengal and a Madras officer have already held it in succession. But considerable inconvenience seems to be involved in this permanent mingling under one general officer of the troops of two armies, differing from each other in many details of regulation and practice; obviously it would greatly simplify all arrangements and correspondence if the province were to be held by the troops of one army, the General reporting, of course, to the Supreme Government, as at present.

Accordingly, I propose that the Pegu division should be made over entirely to the Madras army. The details of the transfer will be explained when I come to consider the establishment of the Madras army in its several branches.

The transfer of Pegu will liberate two regiments of European infantry belonging to the Bengal army, which are now cantoned there, and, with the corps now temporarily withdrawn to Europe, but hereafter to be restored, will supply the three corps which are required for the proper occupation and adequate defence of the Bengal Presidency, in the manner described in paragraph 16, by an establishment of 19 battalions of European infantry.

19. I have only further to observe, with reference to the Bengal Presidency, that I have mentioned Hazareebaugh and Berhampore as the stations for the two additional regiments, because experience has proved the former to be exceedingly healthy for European troops, and because the latter already possesses excellent barracks, which appear to me to have been abandoned without any sufficient cause. The final selection of stations, however, may be made hereafter.

* Sealkote and Umballa	2	
In the Field	8	
		10
Agra	1	
In the Field	8	
		9
		19
† Sealkote and Umballa	2	
In the Field	10	
		12
Agra	1	
In the Field	6	
		7
		19

20. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Madras, including one battalion, which is temporarily withdrawn to Europe, consists of seven battalions, which are distributed thus:

Pegu	2
Secunderabad	1
Bellary	1
Fort St. George	1
Bangalore	1
Cannanore and the Hills	1
TOTAL	7

In the Presidency of Madras, as in that of Bengal, there are certain points which ought never to be left without the protection or control of European infantry.

So long as the Nizam retains in his service at Hyderabad the large bodies of Arabs whom he has long entertained, the presence of those formidable and lawless bands will continue to render it indispensably necessary that a regiment of European infantry should form part of the British subsidiary force which is maintained in the cantonment of Secunderabad.

For general reasons, which have been already given (para. 6), Fort St. George and the seat of Government of Madras will call for the services of one regiment; and one regiment should, in prudence, be kept to the southward, or on the western coast.

But if these points are held, as they undoubtedly ought to be, the Government of Madras could not place more that three regiments of European infantry in the field, whether in the north* or in the south.†

21. It will be apparent, I think, that this force is inadequate to provide security against all the contingencies which belong to a tract so wide as that which is held by the army of the Madras Presidency, and that the establishment ought to be restored to the scale on which it stood previous to the reduction ordered in 1847; while such proportionate additions should be made as may be required by the subsequent conquest of the province of Pegu.

22. I have already proposed, in a previous paragraph (p. 18), that Pegu should be made over entirely to the Madras army. The force which was originally suggested for that province, and which will be fully adequate for the purpose in time of peace, was three regiments.

Wherefore the force which is detailed below is the least which can be regarded as sufficient for the military want of the Presidency of Madras:—

Pegu	3
Secunderabad	1
Bellary	1
Madras	1
Bangalore	1
Trichinopoly	1
Cannanore	1
TOTAL	9

A 10th

* Pegu, 2; Madras, 1; Cannanore and Bangalore, 1; in the Field, north, 3: Total, 7.

† Pegu, 2; Madras, 1; Secunderabad, 1; in the Field, south, 3: Total, 7.

A 10th regiment, to be stationed also at Bangalore, would render the establishment more complete. If this establishment of nine infantry regiments should be conceded, the Government of Madras will have it in its power to hold securely the several points which need protection or control, and, at the same time, to place a force in the field sufficient for any necessity which we can contemplate as likely to arise.

23. If the King of Ava should renew the war, three European regiments could be sent from the Presidency of Madras to reinforce the European troops which are ordinarily to be kept in Pegu. This aggregate force will be amply sufficient for ever purpose in Pegu. For, if five regiments of European infantry were enough to conquer the province, six regiments will assuredly be more than enough to hold it.

24. In like manner, if hostilities should occur to the northward in the state of Hyderabad, or in the Mysore and the southern countries, the Government would be able to hold the requisite points, and to place in the field a force of four battalions of European infantry, which might at once be increased to five battalions, if the garrison of Fort St. George should be temporarily supplied from the Bengal army.

25. But, to accomplish these objects, two regiments of European infantry must be added to the present Madras establishment. I propose to obtain these regiments in the following manner:

I propose that a fourth European regiment should be raised for Madras. But, inasmuch as it is desirable to avoid, if possible, all augmentation of military expense, and as the Madras regular native infantry regiments are very numerous in proportion to those of the other two armies, I have to suggest that the 4th European Infantry Regiment should be raised on the same principle on which it has already been proposed to raise the European cavalry for the company's service.

The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 51st and 52nd regiments of native infantry should be disbanded with pensions and gratuities, or should be absorbed into the other 50 regiments of the line, and the European officers of those two regiments should be transferred to the 4th European infantry, the men of which corps must, of course, be sent from England.

Thus the first regiment will be supplied.

II. The second regiment may be formed by transferring from the Bengal to the Madras establishment one regiment of Queen's Infantry, thus restoring the Madras establishment of Royal regiments to its former scale.

26. The deficiency created by this withdrawal of one Queen's regiment from the Bengal establishment may be supplied by raising a fourth regiment of European infantry for that Presidency; also transferring the European officers of the 73rd and 74th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry to the new 4th European regiment, and disbanding or absorbing the native officers and Sepoys, as before described. If 20 regiments should be allowed to Bengal, I would pursue still further the principle above mentioned, by converting the 71st and 72nd Regiments Bengal Native Infantry into a fifth European regiment.

The proportions of European regiments in the three Presidencies would then be; five for Bengal, four for Madras, three for Bombay; while the proportions of native infantry regiments would be, 70 for Bengal, 50 for Madras, 30 for Bombay, including the Marine Battalion. App. No. 16.

27. The establishment of European infantry in the Presidency of Bombay consists of seven regiments, which are distributed thus:

Belgaum	1
Poona	2
Bombay	$\frac{1}{2}$
Aden	$\frac{1}{2}$
Deesa	1
Scinde	2
TOTAL	7

Of these stations, Bombay, the capital of the Presidency, and Aden, a fortified post of importance, could certainly never be left with smaller garrisons than the wing of a regiment by which each is now held.

One regiment, I apprehend, would be quite sufficient for the temporary control of the country above the Ghats; and Scinde would be perfectly safe with one European corps, now that Meer Ali Morad has been deprived of even the semblance of power, while the Punjab has become a British province.

Wherefore the Government of Bombay would have it in its power at any time to bring a force of five European infantry regiments into the field, in any part of the Presidency, or to detach a force of four such regiments beyond its bounds.

28. Under these circumstances, the European infantry force now in the Bombay Presidency does not seem to me to be inadequate for the purpose it has to serve.

29. Having thus considered the wants of the several Presidencies in succession, I am brought to the conclusion that the smallest amount of European infantry which can be relied upon as fully adequate for the defence of India, and for the preservation of internal tranquillity, is 35 battalions, of which 19 should be allotted to the Bengal Presidency, nine to Madras, and seven to Bombay.

30. The European infantry force, according to the establishment of the several Presidencies, is made up of Queen's and Company's troops, in the following proportions:

Presidencies.	Queen's Regiments.	Company's Regiments.	TOTAL.
Bengal	16	3	19
Madras	4	3	7
Bombay	4	3	7
In all India	24	9	33

The European infantry force which I propose

App. No. 16.

for the Indian military establishment in future will be distributed in the following proportions:

Presidencies.	Queen's Regiments.	Company's Regiments.	Total.
Bengal - - - -	15	4	19
Madras - - - -	5	4	9
Bombay - - - -	4	3	7
In all India - - -	24	11	35

Thus it will be seen that the establishment of Her Majesty's regiments of infantry to be employed in the Indian territories is proposed to consist hereafter of 24 battalions, as at the present time, including two battalions which are only temporarily withdrawn; no addition to the present establishment is immediately asked for, but it is my deliberate and decided opinion that no permanent diminution of it ought to be made.

31. When in the course of years railways shall have been constructed throughout the whole of Bengal and Hindoostan, when connecting lines shall have united the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay with that of Bengal, so that their three armies shall be rendered rapidly and almost equally available in every part of these dominions, great changes may, perhaps, be made. I purposely abstain from offering any suggestions regarding a future, over which I shall have no control, and with which I have no right to meddle; my proposals refer only to the circumstances of the present period, and are intended to provide only for the necessities and contingencies by which the Government of India is now, and will still for some time to come, be affected. These proposals will in no respect hamper the free action of those who may hereafter be charged with the administration of India. They are not framed on any ideal standard of fitness, but are limited to the very minimum of sufficiency; I trust, therefore, that the Honourable Court of Directors and Her Majesty's Government will be pleased to maintain the establishment of European infantry, which I now propose as not more than is adequate and necessary for the security and defence of the Indian empire.

32. I beg further respectfully to represent, that it is of great moment that the Government of India should have confidence not only in the sufficiency of this vitally important force, but also in its permanency.

At this time the only portion of the European infantry whose services the Governor General in Council can count upon without fail, are the nine battalions in the Honourable Company's service. There is no fixed establishment of Royal infantry; any portion of it might be at any moment recalled, and although the Government of India can feel no reasonable apprehension that Her Majesty's Government would ever act on the published suggestion of a distinguished officer lately deceased, and would suddenly withdraw the Royal infantry in India to meet troubles and dangers which might have arisen in Europe, yet serious evils may readily be seen in the uncertainty of the hold which the Indian Government has upon Royal troops, without supposing any resort to so extreme a measure as that to which I have just referred. For, since the establishment of European infantry in India is in its normal condition kept down at a minimum, even a partial and temporary reduction of it by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, must always cause great and well founded anxiety to the Indian Government, and might lead to very serious embarrassment. The supposition is by no means an imaginary one. The Government of India has already been placed in the very position I have represented.

33. I do not now propose, by way of remedy for this evil, either that the regiments of Royal infantry should be increased in number, so as to admit of some being withdrawn when they are needed, or that the European regiments in the Company's service should be largely and permanently increased, while the Royal regiments are diminished in number.

The remedy which I beg respectfully to propose is, that the number of 24 regiments of Her Majesty's infantry, already mentioned, shall be declared by Her Majesty's Government to be the establishment of Royal infantry for India, and that a formal assurance shall be given that no one of those regiments shall at any time be withdrawn without relief, unless with the full consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

34. I venture to think that there is nothing which is not reasonable in this proposal. The establishment named is that which was fixed five years since. Even half a century ago Her Majesty's army gave no less than 13 regiments of infantry to India. Having regard to the vast additions of territory which have since been made, bearing in mind that, although by conquests our enemies have been diminished in number, yet the extension of our limit has widely scattered our European troops, and has thus rendered the larger force which we now possess less compact and effectual, perhaps, than the lesser force of 50 years ago; keeping in mind that the whole maintenance of a very large proportion of the infantry of the Royal army is borne by the Indian Treasury; considering that the service in India gives to that army the richest command which it possesses, and that the chief of those commands has always been reserved hitherto exclusively for officers of the Royal army; lastly, above all, looking to the vast importance and value of these Indian possessions to the British Crown, in every point of view, military, political, and commercial, I venture to entertain a confident expectation that the suggestion which I have submitted regarding the permanency as well as the numerical amount of the Royal infantry which should be set apart for service in India, will be considered as no more than is reasonable and right.

35. If, for any reasons, it may seem good to Her Majesty's Government, or to the Honourable Court of Directors, to determine that the establishment of Royal infantry shall henceforth consist of less than 24 regiments, I would then propose that the Indian establishment should be made up to its full amount by converting a further number of regiments of native infantry of the Bengal and Madras armies into European regiments in the Company's service.

But still, and in every case, I beg permission to urge that whatever may be the number of Royal

Royal regiments attached to the Indian establishment, that number shall be fixed and unalterable, except with the consent of the Honourable Court.

36. If by thus, in many instances, converting two native regiments of infantry into one European corps, the number of native regiments should be diminished more than seemed expedient, irregular native regiments may be embodied in their room. These will serve every requisite purpose for the time, and may easily be got rid of when they are no longer needed.

37. In conclusion of this part of the question of military establishments in India, I have the honour to recommend—

1st. That the Indian establishment of European infantry shall consist, at the very least, of 35 battalions.

2nd. That the present establishment of 24 regiments of Royal infantry shall be continued.

3rd. That 15 Royal regiments shall be allotted to the Bengal Presidency, five to Madras, and four to Bombay.

4th. That the establishment of Royal regiments, whatever may be the number determined upon, shall be declared fixed, and shall not be altered without the consent of the Honourable Court of Directors.

5th. That a fourth regiment of European infantry shall be added to each of the armies of Bengal and Madras, by converting two regiments of native infantry into one of European infantry, in each respectively disbanding the native officers and sepoys, and transferring the European officers to the new European corps.

(signed) *Dalhousie.*

5 February 1856.

(True copy.)

(signed) *R. J. H. Birch,* Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

Appendix, No. 17.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

Fixed Strength, also Pay and Cost of Infantry of the Line for Service in India.

	Establishment in India According to the War Office Estimate of 1867–68.		Establishment in India according to the Military Estimates of India for 1865–66.				
	Regimental Establishment.	For 52 Regiments.	Regimental Establishment.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Number of Regiments	1	52	1	33	10	10	53
Number of Companies	10	520	10	330	100	100	530
Officers	39	2,028	39	1,287	390	390	2,067
Non-commissioned Officers	49	2,548	48	1,584	480	480	2,544
Drummers	21	1,092	21	693	210	210	1,113
Corporals	40	2,080	40	1,320	400	400	2,120
Privates	770	40,040	810	26,730	8,100	8,100	42,930
Total of all Ranks	919	47,788	958	31,614	9,580	9,580	50,774

DESIGNATIONS.	Pay of Regiments of Infantry of the Line in 1865–66.				
	Strength.	Bengal, 33 Regiments.	Madras, 10 Regiments.	Bombay, 10 Regiments.	Total, India, 53 Regiments.
		Rs.	*Rs.*	*Rs.*	*Rs.*
Officers	2,067	58,21,003	17,12,103	16,70,662	92,03,768
Non-commissioned Officers	2,544	6,12,856	1,86,260	1,92,659	9,91,775
Drum-Majors and Drummers	1,113	1,13,284	34,329	34,329	1,81,942
Corporals	2,120	2,49,150	75,500	75,500	4,00,150
Privates	42,930	37,28,835	11,29,950	11,29,950	59,88,735
Total Drummers, Corporals, and Privates	46,163	40,91,269	12,39,779	12,39,779	65,70,827
Total Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, Rank and File	48,707	47,04,125	14,26,039	14,32,438	75,62,602
Total all Ranks	50,774	105,25,128	31,38,142	31,03,100	167,66,370
Cost of Establishments for 53 Regiments:					
Educational		66,624	22,660	20,787	1,10,071
Subordinate Medical and fixed Hospital		3,27,170	55,562	90,142	4,72,874
Native Artificers and followers		2,08,059	32,008	70,740	3,10,807
Command, Staff, and Horse Allowances		7,10,975	2,20,257	2,07,494	11,38,726
Contract Allowances		82,278	24,480	24,660	1,31,418
Family Allowances		2,31,108	94,300	78,354	4,03,762
Good Conduct Allowances		3,96,075	84,000	1,17,119	5,97,194
Good Shooting Allowances		31,320	4,800	5,000	41,120
Hutting Money		1,122	- -	- -	1,122
Total Cost of Establishments *Rs.*		20,54,731	5,38,067	6,14,296	32,07,094
Grand Total for 53 Regiments *Rs.*		1,25,79,859	36,76,209	37,17,396	1,99,73,464
Deduct Pay of 336 Officers; viz., 230 in Europe, 89 on the Staff, 17 in the Public Works		8,75,776	3,28,614	4,36,050	16,40,440
Net Cost *Rs.*		1,17,04,083	33,47,595	32,81,346	1,83,33,024
The net Regular Estimate in 1864–65, was *Rs.*		1,18,00,000	33,50,000	32,00,000	1,83,50,000
The Establishments of Officers and Men being		34,003	9,580	9,586	53,169

The pay charge in 1867–68 for the established number of Privates of Infantry (40,040), at the rate of *Rs.* 11. 10*a.* per month, is 55,85,676 rupees for the year, against 59,88,735 rupees for 42,930 Privates, the establishment in 1865–66, according to the above statement.

The pay of the 2,890 Privates, diminished from the fixed strength in 1865–66, in the establishment of 1867–68, is 4,03,059 rupees, thereby reducing the charge for non-commissioned rank and file from 75,62,602 rupees, as above, to 71,59,543 rupees; but leaving the charge for officers and other establishments of the Regiments undiminished in amount.

The pay of 42,930 Privates included in the above 1,99,73,464 rupees being 59,88,735 rupees, there remains 1,39,84,729 rupees for all other ranks and charges, or nearly 2,63,865 rupees per Regiment, per annum.

The pay of 1,000 Privates may be stated at 1,40,250 rupees per annum, and the cost of 36,000 Privates, formed into 35 Regiments, would be about 51,00,000 rupees. The pay of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Drummers, and Corporals, and all the regimental establishments may be stated at 2,63,865 rupees for each of the 35 Regiments; Total 93,00,000 rupees, making for 35 Regiments a grand total of 1,44,00,000 rupees, or 54 lacs less than at present for the 52 Regiments, and with the advantage of seconding all officers absent. This saving does not include the reduction in charges for rations, barracks, arms, stores, hospital diets, and other departmental charges, which would largely increase the saving.

Appendix No. 18.

PAPERS handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

RETURN of NATIVE TROOPS on FOREIGN SERVICE, on 1 April 1857, Extracted from the Parliamentary Return, No. 56, of 1858.

	MADRAS NATIVE TROOPS.								
	Regular.	Irregular.	Regular.	Irregular.	Native Artillery.			Sappers.	Grand Total.
	Native Cavalry.	Native Cavalry, Irregular.	Native Infantry.	Native Infantry, Irregular.	Goludaz.	Gun Lascars.	Total.		
Rangoon	–	–	807	–	–	29	29	—	—
„	–	–	828	–	–	55	55	110	—
„	–	–	502	—	—	—	—	—	—
„	–	–	818	–	–	96	96	—	—
„	–	–	770	—	—	—	—	—	—
„	–	–	812	—	—	—	—	—	—
„	–	–	270	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total, Rangoon	–	–	4,807	–	–	180	180	110	5,097
Moulmein	–	–	793	–	–	21	21	—	—
„	–	–	414	—	—	—	—	—	—
„	–	–	13	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total, Moulmein	–	–	1,220	–	–	21	21	–	1,241
Sittang	–	–	278	–	–	10	10	–	288
Burmah	–	–	–	–	82	16	98	–	98
Tonghoo	–	–	825	—	—	—	—	—	—
„	–	–	764	–	–	21	21	115	—
Total Tonghoo	–	–	1,589	–	–	21	21	115	1,725
Thayetmyo	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	115	115
Padongmyo	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	109	109
Bassein	–	–	208	–	–	10	10	–	218
Thayghem	–	–	–	–	–	8	8	–	8
Henzadah	–	–	495	–	–	–	–	–	495
Menghee	–	–	162	–	–	–	–	–	162
Mergui	–	–	57	–	–	–	–	–	57
Tavoy	–	–	72	–	–	–	–	–	72
Beeling	–	–	73	–	–	–	–	–	73
Kyonkkee	–	–	91	–	–	–	–	–	91
Pegu	–	–	293	–	–	–	–	–	293
Grand Total in Burmah and Pegu	–	–	9,345	–	82	266	348	439	10,132
Penang	–	–	581	–	44	5	49	—	—
Malacca	–	–	214	–	28	6	34	—	—
Singapore	–	–	588	–	80	15	95	—	—
„	–	–	615	—	—	—	—	—	—
Labuan	–	–	115	–	25	14	39	—	—
Total in Straits	–	–	2,113	–	177	40	217	–	2,330
China	–	–	72	–	–	6	6	–	78
Hong Kong	–	–	326	–	–	17	17	–	343
China	–	–	167	–	–	–	–	–	167
Total in China	–	–	565	–	–	23	23	–	588
Persia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	122	122
Grand Total of Madras Troops	–	–	12,023	–	259	329	588	561	13,172

RETURN of Native Troops on Foreign Service, on 1 April 1857—*continued.*

	BOMBAY NATIVE TROOPS.								
	Native Cavalry.		Native Infantry.		Native Artillery.			Sappers.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Regular.	Irregular.	Regular.	Irregular.	Goludaz.	Gun Lascars.	TOTAL.		
Aden - - - - -	-	-	830	-	-	-	122	94	1,046
Sind - - - - -	-	-	1,683	-	-	-	232	-	1,915
Bushire - - - - -	462	86	867	768	-	-	119	238	—
„ - - - - -	-	60	782	—	—	—	—	—	—
„ - - - - -	-	802	—	—	—	—	—	—	-
„ - - - -	-	400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total at Bushire - -	462	1,348	1,649	768	-	-	119	238	4,584
Mohumra - - - -	-	-	803	-	-	-	72	—	—
„ - - - - -	-	-	827	-	-	-	25	—	—
„ - - - - -	-	-	918	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total at Mohumra - -	-	-	2,548	-	-	-	97	-	2,645
Persian Gulf - -	-	-	- -	-	-	-	269	-	269
TOTAL in Persia -	462	1,348	4,197	768	-	-	485	238	7,498
TOTAL ABROAD - -	462	1,348	6,710	768	-	-	839	332	10,459
Add— Madras Native Troops -	-	-	12,023	-	259	829	588	561	13,172
	462	1,348	18,733	768	259	829	1,427	893	23,631
	1,810		19,501						

Appendix, No. 19.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867.

Distribution Statement of the Infantry of the Line.

Rank and File.

DISTRIBUTION.	1. 1st January 1846.		2. 1st January 1847.		3. 1st January 1848.		4. 1st January 1849.		5. 1st January 1850.		6. 1st January 1851.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
In Great Britain - - - -	19,220	15,293	14,860	15,908	18,800	20,535	19,740	23,073	20,580	21,298	21,400	21,037
In Ireland - - - - -	22,540	17,544	24,010	21,819	24,250	23,048	21,640	25,767	19,420	19,636	18,580	18,225
Total in United Kingdom -	41,760	32,837	38,870	37,727	43,050	43,583	41,380	48,840	40,000	40,934	39,980	39,262
Depôts of Regiments serving:												
In Colonies and on Seas - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
In India - - - - -	120	1,620	120	1,620	95	1,100	110	1,078	120	1,150	120	1,348
In United Kingdom - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total in United Kingdom -	41,880	34,457	38,990	39,347	43,145	44,683	41,490	49,918	40,120	42,084	40,100	40,610
In Colonies, and at Sea -	29,000	28,384	28,130	28,465	27,740	27,890	28,820	29,243	26,680	28,870	26,320	27,281
Grand Total on British Establishment - -}	70,880	62,841	67,120	67,812	70,885	72,573	70,310	79,161	66,800	70,954	66,420	67,891
In India - - - -	23,880	23,425	23,880	21,834	18,905	19,645	21,890	23,078	23,880	24,549	23,880	23,693
Grand Total at Home and Abroad - -}	94,760	86,266	91,000	89,646	89,790	92,218	92,200	102,239	90,680	95,503	90,300	91,584
Grand Total Abroad -	52,880	51,809	52,010	50,299	46,645	47,535	50,710	52,321	50,560	53,419	50,200	50,974
Grand Total at Home -	41,880	34,457	38,990	39,347	43,145	44,683	41,490	49,918	40,120	42,084	41,100	40,610
Grand Total at Home and Abroad - -}	94,760	86,266	91,000	89,646	89,790	92,218	92,200	102,239	90,680	95,503	90,300	91,584

DISTRIBUTION.	7. 1st January 1852.		8. 1st January 1853.		9. 1st January 1854.		10. 1st January 1865.		11. 1st January 1866.		12. 1st June 1866.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
In Great Britain - - - -	22,890	21,003	22,860	22,237	33,800	29,144	17,780	17,283	18,150	17,141	17,360	17,241
In Ireland - - - - -	17,590	14,536	17,480	16,863	17,800	14,644	6,520	6,262	9,800	9,482	11,840	11,553
Total in United Kingdom -	40,480	35,539	40,340	39,100	51,600	43,788	24,300	23,545	27,950	26,623	29,200	28,794
Depôts of Regiments serving:												
In Colonies and on Seas - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	6,140	5,745	6,000	6,298	5,570	4,922
In India - - - - -	120	1,581	120	1,578	120	1,204	5,500	5,653	5,300	5,942	5,200	8,246
In United Kingdom - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	4,200	3,876	–	–	–	–
Total in Depôts - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	15,840	15,274	11,300	12,240	10,770	13,168
Total in United Kingdom -	40,600	37,120	40,460	40,678	51,720	44,992	40,140	38,819	39,250	38,863	39,970	41,962
In Colonies, or at Sea - -	29,720	30,364	29,860	29,995	27,800	26,034	38,020	35,935	35,785	33,879	30,720	31,892
Grand Total on British Establishments - -	70,320	67,484	70,320	70,693	79,520	71,026	78,160	74,754	75,035	72,742	70,690	73,854
In India - - - -	23,880	23,440	23,880	23,046	23,880	22,080	46,750	45,891	45,050	43,061	41,080	39,256
Grand Total at Home and Abroad - -}	94,200	90,924	94,200	93,719	103,400	93,106	124,910	120,645	120,085	115,803	111,770	113,110
Grand Total Abroad -	53,600	53,804	53,740	53,041	51,680	48,114	84,770	81,826	80,835	76,940	71,800	71,148
Grand Total at Home -	40,600	37,120	40,460	40,678	51,720	44,992	40,140	38,819	39,250	38,863	39,970	41,962
Grand Total at Home and Abroad - -}	94,200	90,924	94,200	93,719	103,400	93,106	124,910	120,645	120,085	115,803	111,770	113,110

App. No. 19. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT of the Infantry of the Line—*continued.*

ALL RANKS OF INFANTRY OF THE LINE.

DISTRIBUTION.	1st January 1865.		1st January 1866.		1st June 1866.	
	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.	Establishment.	Effectives.
Infantry in Regiments:						
In Great Britain	20,574	20,125	21,267	20,194	20,230	20,343
In Ireland	7,489	7,213	11,437	11,096	13,715	13,520
Total in United Kingdom	28,063	27,338	32,704	31,290	33,945	33,863
Depôts of Regiments serving:						
In Colonies and on Seas	7,189	6,794	7,029	7,351	6,532	5,878
In India	6,648	6,814	6,407	7,053	6,285	9,473
In United Kingdom	4,934	4,593	—	—	—	—
Total in Depôts in United Kingdom	18,771	18,201	13,436	14,404	12,817	15,341
Total in United Kingdom	46,834	45,539	46,140	45,694	46,762	49,214
In Colonies or at Sea	43,488	41,203	41,201	39,083	35,685	36,811
GRAND TOTAL, on British Establishment	90,322	86,742	87,341	84,777	82,447	86,025
In India	52,714	51,596	50,792	48,538	46,772	44,506
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD	143,036	138,338	138,133	133,315	129,219	130,531
GRAND TOTAL ABROAD	96,202	92,799	91,993	87,621	82,457	81,317
GRAND TOTAL at HOME	46,834	45,539	46,140	45,694	46,762	49,214
GRAND TOTAL at HOME and ABROAD	143,036	138,338	138,133	133,315	129,219	130,531
	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.
In United Kingdom	35	350	$37\frac{6}{10}$	438	42	436
Depôts in United Kingdom	-	282	-	206	-	198
In Colonies or at Sea	51	510	$50\frac{4}{10}$	504	47	470
In India	55	550	53	530	52	520
	141	1,692	141	1,678	141	1,624

Appendix, No. 20.

PAPER handed in by Major General *Balfour*, C.B., Royal Artillery, 26 July 1867. App. No. 20.

General Enlistment Orders.

(No. 1012.)

General Order by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.—Fort William, 25th July 1856.

Every recruit enlisting into a native regiment, is required to take an oath, that he "will never forsake or abandon his colours," and that he "will march wherever he is ordered, within or beyond the Company's territories."

It has been the practice of the Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond the sea; and therefore whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them, but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart.

It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the native artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of native infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th and 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited.

The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, whenever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India.

Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps, to serve beyond sea.

The readiness with which they have done this, is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government.

But it has become very inconvenient to Government, and it is hurtful to the State, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the State beyond sea; and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service.

For this reason, the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of Light Cavalry, of Irregular Cavalry, of Infantry of the Line, or for the Khelat-i-Ghilzie, Ferozepore, and Loodianah Regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not at the time of his enlistment distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the company or beyond them.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief will be requested to take the necessary measures to ensure the due fulfilment of this determination of the Governor General in Council, by enjoining officers commanding the regiments above mentioned, to be strictly careful that, from and after the 1st September next, no recruit shall be enlisted, except for general service, and that each recruit, on taking the prescribed oath, shall be made clearly to understand the conditions on which he is enlisted.

By the Commander in Chief.

2. The following rules are to be entered in the Military Regulations in substitution of the present Articles 31 and 32 of Section 31, with effect from the 1st September 1856; and the Commander in Chief will hold all officers responsible for the strictest observance of the same.

31. All recruits for Cavalry, regular or irregular, or for the Infantry of the Line, or for the corps named in the margin, are to be enlisted for general service; and no man is to be entertained for any of the above named corps who does not distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company, or beyond them.

Khelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.
Regiment of Ferozepore.
Regiment of Loodianah.

32. The liability to be sent on foreign service, and the peculiar obligations in this respect under which they voluntarily place themselves, is to be distinctly explained to all such recruits at the time of their being originally entertained, and also at the time of their being required to take the prescribed oath under the colours of their regiment, upon parade. The benefits and indulgences which are accorded by the Government to men who proceed on foreign service, as detailed in the Regulations, are also invariably to be fully made known to these recruits before they are sworn in.

Appendix, No. 21.

RETURN received from the ADMIRALTY. - - - - - - -

RETURN of the COST incurred in moving the following

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	£. s. d.
1	61st -	India - -	June 1859 -	Mauritius -	- -	Not performed under the directions of the Admiralty						- -
		Mauritius -	18 June 1860	England -	18 Sept. 1860	Donald Mackay -	93	26	659	29	35	15,744 - -
2	3rd - - (1st Batt.)	Calcutta -	13 Oct. 1859	Hong Kong -	11 Nov. 1859	Armenian, Steamer -	30	33	1,133	-	-	8,463 18 8
		„ -	15 Nov. „	„ -	18 Dec. „	Coromandel, I. N., Steamer.	34					
		„ -	15 „ „	„ -	- -	Tasmania, say - -	40					
		„ -	11 Jan. 1860	„ -	13 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	34					
		China - -	6 Dec. „	England -	24 Apr. 1861	Miles Barton, wrecked 8 Feb. 1861.	-	31	1,117	-	-	17,102 14 8
						Sir Wm. Peel, Steamer	-					
		„ - -	19 Nov. „	„ -	16 „ „	Tasmania - -	149					
		„ - -	9 Dec. „	„ -	16 „ „	Athletæ - - -	129					
		„ - -	8 Jan. 1861	„ -	4 „ „	Mauritius, Steamer -	87					
3	1st - - (2nd Batt.)	Gibraltar -	6 July 1858	China - -	25 Oct. 1858	Lord Raglan - -	112	32	805	50	84	12,331 10 -
		China - -	12 Dec. 1860	England -	27 April 1861	Cressy - - -	137	25	616	5	9	7,664 18 2
		„ - -	18 Dec. „	„ -	19 „ „	Macduff - - -	123					
4	2nd - - (1st Batt.)	England -	27 June 1851	Cape - -	4 Sept. 1851	Sumner - - -	70	29	667	39	45	628 17 8
		„ -	24 June „	„ - -	26 Aug. „	Her Majesty's Ship Birkenhead.	64					
		„ -	7 July „	„ - -	29 „ „	Her Majesty's Ship Cyclops.	54					
		Cape - -	— Mar. 1860	China - -	- -	Information defective.						
		China - -	15 Dec. „	England -	16 May 1861	Alfred - - -	153	24	678	6	4	14,446 7 1
		Hong Kong, Peiho.	15 Nov. „	„ -	7 „ „	Indomitable - -	174					
5	5th - - (1st Batt.)	England -	24 July 1847	Mauritius -	6 Nov. 1847	Her Majesty's Ship Resistance.	107	42	1,122	72	87	- -
		„ -	8 Sept. „	„ -	18 Dec. „	Her Majesty's Ship Apollo.	102					
		Mauritius -	23 May 1857	India *vid* Singapore.	5 July 1857	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	44	20	699	26	42	- -
		India - -	8 Mar. 1861	England -	8 July 1861	Walmer Castle -	122	20	556	11	18	- -
		„ - -	12 Mar. „	„ -	30 „ „	Cambodia - -	140					
6	37th - -	England -	18 Nov. 1846	Colombo -	9 Mar. 1847	Minerva - - -	112	32	1,066	68	113	9,335 7 5
		„ -	17 Nov. „	„ -	10 „ „	Castle Eden - -	114					
		„ -	- -	Trincomalee -	23 „ „		127					
		„ -	7 Nov. 1846	Colombo -	30 „ „	Sibella - - -	144					
		„ -	7 „ „	„ -	8 „ „	Romeo - - -	122					
		Ceylon - -	3 Nov. 1857	Calcutta -	18 Nov. 1857	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	16	2	76	3	6	- -
				The remainder of the regiment does not appear to have proceeded under orders from the Admiralty.								
		India - -	20 Mar. 1861	England -	10 July 1861	Matilda Atheling -	112	21	535	17	20	- -
		„ - -	7 „ „	„ -	12 „ „	Nimrod - - -	127					
7	59th - -	England -	11 June 1849	China - -	11 Feb. 1850	Her Majesty's Ship Apollo.	245	17	640	46	35	2,535 15 11
		„ -	22 „ „	„ -	22 Oct. 1849	Hugh Walker - -	123					
		Hong Kong -	19 Nov. 1858	Cape - -	18 Jan. 1859	Lord Raglan - -	61	26	645	12	21	8,555 15 -
		Cape - -	21 Oct 1861	England -	14 Dec. 1861	Indomitable - -	55	28	612	62	94	4,130 3 6
		„ - -	20 „ „	„ -	16 „ „	Boanerges - -	58					
8	60th - - (2nd Batt.)	England -	15 July 1851	East London -	3 Oct. 1851	Her Majesty's Ship Retribution.	81	25	651	41	47	- -
		„ -	15 „ „	„ -	3 „ „	Her Majesty's Ship Sidon.	81					
		Cape - -	— April 1858	India - -	- -	Information defective.						

Appendix, No. 21.

RETURN received from the ADMIRALTY.

REGIMENTS between ENGLAND, INDIA, and the COLONIES.

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				Total Cost.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	Net Cost.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	The whole.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	15,744 - -	1,955 6 6	13,788 13 6	20 18 6	Nil.
1,064 4 6	- -	518 7 -	915 16 2	566 10 -	11,528 16 4	1,222 3 -	10,306 13 4	9 1 11	Nil.
1,506 5 2	- -	3,185 12 -	6,279 16 -	712 10 -	28,786 17 10	4,484 - 6	24,302 17 4	21 15 2	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	12,331 10 -	2,881 4 -	9,450 6 -	11 14 9	Nil.
- -	- -	2,549 12 -	3,415 19 6	312 15 -	13,943 4 8	2,521 4 6	11,422 - 2	18 10 10	Nil.
2,749 18 1	39 2 6	450 - -	2,204 11 10	364 5 -	6,436 15 1	1,185 1 6	5,251 13 7	7 17 5	Nil.
- -	- -	3,122 8 -	4,981 15 11	343 - -	22,893 11 -	3,433 7 -	19,460 4 -	28 14 1	Nil.
- -	- -	877 16 -	6,024 12 11	618 15 -	7,521 3 11	3,101 1 3	4,420 2 8	3 18 9	Nil.
1,149 1 -	- -	330 - -	1,565 11 7	373 - -	3,417 12 7	922 18 -	2,494 14 7	3 11 5	Mess and victualling.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	15,055 3 -	not known	Exclusive of abatement for stoppages.	27 1 7	The whole.
- -	482 2 10	1,664 - -	6,877 18 10	595 5 -	18,954 14 1	4,148 7 -	14,806 7 1	13 17 10	Nil.
93 - -	- -	12 - -	62 8 5	24 12 -	192 - 5	36 - -	156 - 5	2 1 1	Mess and victualling.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	14,661 6 -	not known	Exclusive of abatement for stoppages.	27 8 1	The whole.
- -	- -	539 - -	5,882 - 10	266 15 -	9,223 11 9	3,695 15 3	5,527 16 6	8 12 9	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	8,555 15 -	1,261 3 6	7,294 11 6	11 6 2	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	1,879 5 11	360 10 -	6,369 19 5	1,143 15 6	5,226 3 11	8 10 9	Nil.
4,652 1 7	- -	405 - -	2,672 6 9	357 15 -	8,087 6 4	1,394 4 3	6,693 2 1	10 5 7	Nil.

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers.				Freight or Passage Money.
								Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	£. s. d.
8	60th (2nd Batt.) —*cont^d.*	Calcutta	29 Feb. 1860	China	28 April 1860	Alfred	60	32	904	–	–	8,953 10 4
		,,	29 ,, ,,	,,	20 ,, ,,	Indomitable	52					
		,,	29 ,, ,,	,,	28 ,, ,,	Hougomont	60					
		China	1 Nov. 1861	England	25 Feb. 1862	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	117	25	861	–	–	3,773 8 9
		,,	27 Dec. ,,	,,	19 April ,,	Flying Cloud	114					
9	85th	England	27 Jan. 1853	Mauritius	16 April 1853	Marion	80	23	604	38	61	5,800 5 6
		,,	28 ,, ,,	,,	23 ,, ,,	Roman Emperor	86					
		Mauritius	18 May 1856	Cape	7 June 1856	Her Majesty's Ship Penelope.	21	19	590	–	–	– –
		Cape	24 April 1863	England	8 June 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	46	24	649	41	87	– –
10	31st	Gibraltar	27 May 1858	Cape	4 July 1858	City of Manchester	39	34	863	63	119	13,152 – –
		East London	12 Oct. 1858	Bombay	2 Dec. 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Simoom.	52	33	833	14	15	– –
		Bombay	15 Feb. 1860	China	28 Mar. 1860	Earl of Clare	43	30	1,096	–	–	3,069 7 –
		,,	15 ,, ,,	,,	27 ,, ,,	Assaye, I. N., Steamer	42					
		,,	17 ,, ,,	,,	23 April ,,	Athletæ	67					
		,,	16 ,, ,,	Singapore	16 Mar. ,,	Victoria, I. N., Steamer	29					
		Singapore	17 Mar. ,,	China	16 April ,,	Athletæ	31					
		Shanghai	29 June 1863	England	20 Nov. 1863	West Derby	145	27	646	–	–	13,788 – –
		,,	11 July ,,	,,	30 ,, ,,	Caroline Coventry	143					
11	13th	Gibraltar	7 Aug. 1856	Cape	19 Sept. 1856	Imperatriz, Steamer	44	23	741	34	52	5,328 3 9
		Cape	7 Nov. 1857	India	19 Jan. 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Megæra.	74	9	252	–	–	– –
		The remainder of the regiment does not appear to have proceeded under orders from the Admiralty.										
12	70th	India	– July 1861	New Zealand	Not performed under the directions of the Admiralty		–	–	–	–	–	– –
		Auckland	2 Jan. 1866	England	28 Mar. 1866	Ida Ziegler	86	21	592	30	50	11,941 15 –
		,,	5 ,, ,,	,,	7 April ,,	Siam	93					
13	43rd	England	10 Oct. 1851	Cape	17 Dec. 1851	Her Majesty's Ship Vulcan.	69	25	652	40	65	– –
		Cape	– Dec. 1853	India	Does not appear to have been performed under the directions of the Admiralty.							
		India	– Oct. 1863	New Zealand	– – 1863	Lady Jocelyn, Steamer	–	25	699	56	60	33,177 12 –
		,,	– –	,,	– – ,,	Light Brigade	–					
		New Zealand	16 April 1866	England	4 July 1866	Silver Eagle	80	21	593	35	62	12,550 5 –
		,,	29 Mar. ,,	,,	7 ,, ,,	Maori	101					
14	40th	England	13 July 1852	Australia	5 Nov. 1852	Her Majesty's Ship Vulcan.	116	25	652	79	87	1,538 6 6
		,,	29 Aug. ,,	,,	18 Dec. ,,	Isabella Blyth	113					
		New Zealand	16 June 1866	England	10 Sept. 1866	Holmesdale	87	24	539	52	105	14,549 17 –
		,,	8 May ,,	,,	10 Aug. ,,	Mary Shepherd	95					
15	67th	Calcutta	23 Sept. 1859	China	26 Oct. 1859	Australian, Steamer	34	35	993	–	–	4,705 12 –
		,,	23 ,, ,,	,,	– –	Indomitable, say	40					
		,,	7 Jan. 1860	,,	12 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	37					
		China	1 Mar. 1865	Cape	15 April 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	46	27	792	25	27	– –
		,,	26 July ,,	,,	13 Sept. ,,	ditto	49					
		Cape	24 July 1866	England	23 Sept. 1866	Far East, Steamer	62	23	549	34	35	12,472 2 –
		,,	24 ,, ,,	,,	25 ,, ,,	White Adder	64					
16	57th	Malta	12 May 1858	Alexandria	18 May 1858	Her Majesty's Ship Princess Royal.	7	19	635	–	–	– –
		The remainder of the service to India was not performed under the directions of the Admiralty.										
		Bombay	– Nov. 1860	Auckland	– –	Star Queen	–	22	750	–	–	18,560 10 –
		,,	,, ,,	,,	– –	Castilian	–					
		Auckland	31 Mar. 1867	England	not arrived	Maori	say 90	22	555	54	76	14,656 – –
		,,	12 April ,,	,,		Electric						

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				Total Cost.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	Net Cost.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- -	- -	1,472 - -	2,205 2 3	452 - -	13,082 12 7	1,666 8 -	11,416 4 7	12 12 7	Nil.
4,648 14 2	- -	1,102 1 -	4,565 14 8	430 10 -	14,520 8 7	3,016 13 -	11,503 15 7	13 7 3	Nil.
- -	263 3 8	966 - -	2,508 1 4	336 5 -	9,873 15 6	1,587 3 -	8,286 12 6	13 14 4	Nil.
1,035 6 -	- -	79 16 -	627 9 3	295 - -	2,037 11 3	324 14 3	1,712 17 -	2 18 1	Nil.
3,139 11 3	- -	414 - -	1,591 - 4	366 15 -	5,511 6 7	939 11 -	4,571 15 7	7 - 11	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	13,152 - -	1,073 9 6	12,078 10 6	13 19 11	Nil.
1,063 7 -	- -	643 10 -	2,112 8 9	427 5 -	4,246 10 9	1,383 4 -	2,863 6 9	3 8 9	Mess and victualling.
4,358 9 2	- -	1,295 4 -	2,479 6 2	548 - -	11,750 6 4	1,783 13 -	9,966 13 4	9 1 10	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	4,546 19 5	323 - -	18,657 19 5	3,005 - 6	15,652 18 11	24 4 7	Nil.
1,116 - 10	- -	506 - -	1,700 11 3	400 10 -	9,051 5 10	992 4 -	8,059 1 10	10 17 6	Nil.
1,046 11 2	- -	249 15 -	905 4 1	126 - -	2,327 10 3	582 15 -	1,744 15 3	6 18 6	Mess and victualling.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	The whole.
- -	- -	- -	164 - 8	323 10 -	12,429 5 8	1,651 6 6	10,777 19 2	18 4 1	Nil.
849 1 3	- -	345 - -	2,326 9 -	362 5 -	3,882 15 3	1,189 7 9	2,693 7 6	4 2 7	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	335 18 8	532 15 -	34,046 5 8	not known	Exclusive of abatement for stoppages.	48 14 2	23,512 6 4
- -	- -	- -	164 6 2	329 10 -	13,044 1 2	1,617 - 6	11,427 - 8	19 5 5	Nil.
1,106 15 -	54 14 5	1,137 10 -	4,031 12 -	387 5 -	8,256 2 11	2,388 6 6	5,867 16 5	9 - -	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	149 6 11	321 15 -	15,020 18 11	1,619 18 6	13,401 - 5	24 17 3	Nil.
1,972 2 1	- -	516 16 -	805 19 1	496 10 -	8,496 19 2	1,191 - 6	7,305 18 8	7 7 2	Nil.
5,006 4 5	- -	486 - -	1,853 14 4	415 5 -	7,761 3 9	1,184 2 -	6,577 1 9	8 6 1	Nil.
- -	287 18 11	719 - -	2,410 1 11	300 5 -	16,189 7 10	1,113 19 -	15,075 8 10	27 9 2	Nil.
275 13 -	- -	79 16 -	217 9 1	- -	572 18 1	134 8 -	438 10 1	- 13 10	Mess and victualling.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	18,560 10 -	not known	Exclusive of abatement for stoppages.	24 14 11	The whole.
- -	- -	- -	153 15 7	323 10 -	15,133 5 7	1,595 5 -	13,538 - 7	24 7 10	Nil.

No.	Regiment.	Embarked.		Disembarked.		Ship.	No. of Days on Voyage.	Numbers. Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Freight or Passage Money.
												£. s.
17	77th	England	15 June 1857	Sydney	30 Sept. 1857	Palmerston	108	36	728	89	88	8,737 1
		,,	17 ,, ,,	,,	30 ,, ,,	Orwell	106					
		Sydney	28 April 1858	Calcutta	15 June 1858	Raby Castle	49	35	567	88	106	1,900 5
		,,	20 ,, ,,	,,	14 ,, ,,	Her Majesty's Ship Megæra.	56					
18	50th	England	30 June 1857	Colombo	19 Oct. 1857	Medina	112	33	713	45	49	10,789 11
		,,	2 July ,,	,,	11 ,, ,,	Captain Cook	102					
		Colombo	9 Oct. 1863	Auckland	15 Nov. 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	38	37	785	51	76	- -
		Auckland	3 Oct. 1866	Sydney	9 Oct. 1866	Auckland, Steamer	7	17	437	34	44	2,502 13
		,,	26 Sept. ,,	Brisbane	15 ,, ,,	Alice Cameron	20					
		Australia	- -	England	- -	Estimated	Head Quarter and one wing		400	Say 700 men, with officers and families		
		New Zealand	- -	,,			One wing		300			
19	5th (2nd Batt.)	England	11 Aug. 1858	Mauritius	8 Nov. 1858	Great Tasmania	90	30	787	57	65	9,365 1
		Mauritius	16 April 1863	Cape	27 April 1863	Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya.	12	25	791	25	42	- -
20	99th	Calcutta	11 Jan. 1860	China	12 Feb. 1860	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	33	34	1,030	-	-	7,028 16
		,,	3 Feb. ,,	,,	- -	Octavia	say 40					
		,,	3 ,, ,,	,,	- -	Walmer Castle						
		,,	4 ,, ,,	,,	- -	Mars						
		Hong Kong	1 Mar. 1865	Cape	13 April 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	44	28	801	36	32	- -
		,,	26 July ,,	,,	12 Sept. ,,	- ditto	49					
		Cape	- -	England	- -	Estimated	-	Say 700 men, with officers and families				
21	9th (2nd Batt.)	Gibraltar	3 Nov. 1864	China	8 Feb. 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	98	33	840	48	85	- -
		China	20 Mar. 1866	Japan	30 Mar. 1866	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	11	28	626	12	9	- -
		,,	28 April ,,	,,	9 May ,,	- ditto	12					
22	11th (2nd Batt.)	England	6 July 1861	Cape	8 Sept. 1861	Boanerges	65	34	877	67	77	5,418 3 7
		,,	16 ,, ,,	,,	19 ,, ,,	Indomitable	66					
		,,	6 ,, ,,	,,	30 Aug. ,,	Conflict	56					
		Cape	10 April 1865	China	31 May 1865	Her Majesty's Ship Tamar.	52	27	708	55	90	- -
		China	19 May 1866	Algoa Bay	17 July 1866	White Adder	60	26	459	27	42	8,985 8 10
		,,	29 ,, ,,	,,	16 ,, ,,	Far East, Steamer	49					
		Cape	- -	England	- -	Estimated	-	Say 450 men with officers and families				
23	20th (2nd Batt.)	England	20 July 1863	India	- -	St. Lawrence	say 116	35	820	86	98	12,930 10 8
		,,	24 ,, ,,	,,	- -	Conflict						
		,,	25 ,, ,,	,,	- -	Blenheim						
		Calcutta	21 Nov. 1863	China	9 Dec. 1863	Nubia, Steamer	19	36	820	84	95	25,368 5 3
		,,	28 Jan. 1864	,,	26 Mar. 1864	Holmsdale	58					
		China	28 June 1864	Japan	15 July 1864	Queen of England	18	27	611	-	-	4,730 12 10
		,,	28 ,, ,,	,,	14 ,, ,,	Chanticleer	17					
		Japan	17 May 1866	China	27 May 1866	Her Majesty's Ship Adventure.	11	30	663	27	34	- -
		,,	11 April ,,	,,	19 April ,,	- ditto	9					
		China	- -	England	- -	Estimated	-	Say 600 men, with officers and families				

Note.—The information inserted has been obtained, as far as possible, from the accounts of the actual expenses, and is exclusive of the cost of conveyance In the cases in which the ships were employed on continuous service, or in conveying other troops at the same time as those specified, the expense Majesty's ships and transports on monthly pay, it not being practicable to estimate the sum apportionable to each particular service during the

Admiralty,
25 July 1867.

Coals for Steamers.	Other Expenses when not included in Freight.				Total Cost.	Abate Mess and Ration Stoppages.	Net Cost.		Share of Expense paid by India.
	Fittings.	Mess of Officers.	Provisions and Medical Comforts.	Bedding.			Amount.	Per Soldier.	
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
- -	- -	1,923 - -	4,271 14 7	430 10 -	15,362 5 7	2,617 13 -	12,744 12 7	17 10 1	Nil.
1,795 14 5	- -	719 5 -	1,856 13 2	255 - -	6,526 17 7	1,119 11 6	5,407 6 1	9 10 9	The whole cost of Raby Castle and mess, and victualling of Her Majesty's Ship Megæra.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	10,789 11 1	2,531 14 -	8,257 17 1	11 14 5	Nil.
3,939 6 -	- -	527 5 -	1,553 13 5	437 - -	6,457 4 5	991 16 -	5,465 8 5	6 19 3	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2,502 13 4	135 - -	2,367 13 4	5 8 4	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	In Her Majesty's Ships - or In hired Ships - - -		5,964 11 8 or 15,863 15 -	8 10 5 or 22 13 3	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	9,365 1 1	2,243 5 -	7,121 16 1	9 1 -	Nil.
611 13 8	- -	112 10 -	465 5 7	418 10 -	1,607 19 3	289 16 -	1,318 3 3	1 13 4	Nil.
485 5 2	- -	950 12 6	1,706 3 9	515 - -	10,685 17 5	1,261 1 -	9,424 16 5	9 3 -	Nil.
3,028 12 8	- -	465 15 -	1,763 4 2	426 10 -	5,684 1 10	1,109 1 6	4,575 - 4	5 14 3	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	In Her Majesty's Ships - or In hired Ships - - -		5,652 10 - or 5,976 5 -	8 1 6 or 8 10 9	Nil.
5,720 4 7	- -	1,212 15 -	4,229 10 7	465 5 -	11,627 15 2	2,623 19 -	9,003 16 2	10 14 4	Nil.
1,731 - -	- -	122 5 -	474 5 4	192 15 -	2,520 5 4	237 14 -	2,282 11 4	3 12 11	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	2,922 7 9	491 5 -	8,831 16 4	1,812 5 6	7,019 10 10	8 - 1	Nil.
3,425 2 -	- -	526 10 -	1,984 10 1	404 - -	6,340 2 1	1,166 2 -	5,174 - 1	7 6 2	Nil.
- -	204 19 4	703 - -	1,789 7 6	253 10 -	11,936 5 8	878 3 6	11,058 2 2	24 1 10	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	In Her Majesty's Ships - or In hired Ships - - -		3,633 15 5 or 3,841 17 6	8 1 6 or 8 10 9	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	115 9 11	366 1 -	13,412 1 7	2,553 - -	10,859 1 7	13 4 10	Nil.
- -	- -	475 4 -	2,531 2 11	204 17 11	28,579 10 1	713 19 6	27,865 10 7	33 19 8	Nil.
- -	322 18 4	383 16 -	489 17 6	183 6 -	6,110 10 8	353 12 -	5,756 18 8	9 8 5	Nil.
1,301 8 10	- -	115 10 -	459 18 9	212 2 -	2,088 19 7	221 16 6	1,867 3 1	2 16 4	Nil.
- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	In Her Majesty's Ships - or In hired Ships - - -		11,797 10 - or 17,460 - -	19 13 3 or 29 2 -	Nil.

f small detachments, and the passage of officers proceeding to join the corps after the arrival of the regiments at the respective stations.
as been apportioned to the services with regard to the numbers conveyed and the periods of the voyages; but no charge has been inserted for fitting Her
mployment of the ship.

JOHN HENRY BRIGGS,
Chief Clerk.

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TO THE

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
26 *July* 1867.

(478—I.)

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2. *Evidence favourable to the Foreign and Colonial Service of Indian Troops under certain Conditions.*
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3. *Evidence opposed to Native Garrisons exclusively, though mixed Garrisons are not objected to:*

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9. *Considerations as to the Pay and Allowances of Native Troops on Colonial or Foreign Service:*

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2. *As to the Cost of European and Native Troops in India.*

1. *As to the relative Cost of European and Native Troops in the Colonies.*

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TO THE

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

ARMY (INDIA AND THE COLONIES).

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
26 *July* 1867.

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REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
22 *July* 1867.

Tuesday, 14*th May* 1867.

Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the Origin of the Military Reserve Funds, the Sources from which they are derived, and the Objects to which they are applied.

Wednesday, 19*th June* 1867.

Select Committee nominated of,—

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. O'Reilly.
Mr. Childers.	Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Goschen.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Hogg.	Sir John Trollope.
Marquis of Hartington.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel North.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Colonel Wilson Patten.	Lord Hotham.
General Peel.	

Ordered, That the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, That Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Monday, 22*nd July* 1867.

Ordered, That the Committee have power to Report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to the House.

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REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the Origin of the MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS, the Sources from which they are derived, and the Objects to which they are applied:——HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:

YOUR COMMITTEE have proceeded with the consideration of the question referred to them, but in consequence of the late period of the Session, and the great importance of the subject, are not in a position to complete the inquiry. They have therefore agreed to report the Evidence already taken, and to recommend to the House that the Committee be re-appointed in the next Session of Parliament.

22 *July* 1867.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Tuesday, 25*th June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Charles Russell.	General Peel.
Colonel North.	Lord Hotham.
Mr. Baxter.	

Lord HOTHAM was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned till To-morrow, at One o'clock.

Wednesday, 26*th June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

General Peel.	Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Baxter.	Sir John Trollope.
Colonel Hogg.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel North.	Mr. Percy Wyndham
Mr. O'Reilly.	

Sir *Edward Lugard* and Mr. *Thomas C. B. Cave*, were severally examined.

[Adjourned till Friday next, at One o'clock.

Friday, 28*th June* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

Colonel North.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.
General Peel.	Colonel Hogg.
Sir John Trollope.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir Charles Russell.	Marquis of Hartington.
Major O'Reilly.	Mr. Baxter.
Captain Vivian.	

General *Forster* examined.

[Adjourned till Wednesday next, at One o'clock.

Wednesday, 3*rd July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

Colonel North.	General Peel.
Sir Charles Russell.	Colonel Hogg.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Goschen.
Mr. Baxter.	

Major *Marvin* examined.

[Adjourned till Friday, 12th July, at 12 o'clock.

Friday, 12*th July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

Colonel North.	Mr. Goschen.
General Peel.	Sir John Trollope.
Mr. Trevelyan.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Childers.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Colonel Hogg.	Sir Charles Russell.

Colonel *Haliday* examined.

[Adjourned till Monday, 22nd July, at 12 o'clock.

Monday, 22*nd July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord HOTHAM in the Chair.

General Peel.	Sir Charles Russell.
Colonel North.	Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Percy Wyndham.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Sir John Trollope.	Captain Vivian.
Colonel Hogg.	

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report, proposed by the Chairman; read the first and second time, and *agreed to*.

Ordered, To Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence, and an Appendix.

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Wednesday, 26th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. O'Reilly.
Colonel Hogg.	Sir Charles Russell.
Lord Hotham.	Sir John Trollope.
Colonel North.	Captain Vivian.
General Peel.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant-General Sir EDWARD LUGARD, G.C.B., called in; and Examined.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir *E. Lugard*, G.C.

26 June 1867.

1. *Chairman.*] YOU fill the office of Permanent Under Secretary of State for the War Department?—Yes.

2. I believe, in that capacity, all matters relating to the Military Reserve Funds pass through your hands?—Yes.

3. Will you tell us the origin of the Military Reserve Fund?—Perhaps you will allow me to read a short memorandum which I wrote some years ago, chiefly compiled from evidence given to the Royal Commission of 1856–57, on purchase and sale of commissions:—"Prior to 1825 the Commander in Chief used to sell first commissions occasionally for the benefit of widows of deserving officers; this Half-pay or Reserve Fund, as it was called, was placed under public control by Lord Palmerston in 1826, and the amount accumulated (80,000 *l.*) was paid into the Exchequer. This balance arose partly from half-pay officers having been allowed to commute their half-pay, many of whom were only entitled to a portion of the full value of their commissions, the difference between the regulation price and the amount to which they were entitled being placed to the credit of the fund. In 1841 the Secretary at War assumed the direct control of the fund, paying the balance periodically to the Paymaster General in aid of the public service until 1851, when Lord Panmure, then Secretary at War, decided upon retaining the money for the purpose of extinguishing any supernumerary commissions that might exist. The first quarterly account, dated 31st March 1851, rendered by Messrs. Cox & Co., in whose hands the fund had been placed, showed a balance of 8,265 *l.* From that time the fund has been augmented by sums short of the full value of commissions deducted from officers selling out, whose service did not entitle them to the regulation price paid by their successors. 2nd. By the difference between a full and half-pay commission paid by officers restored to full pay who had received that amount on going to half-pay. 3rd. By the sale of cornetcies and ensigncies in succession to officers retiring upon full or half-pay, when the promotions were allowed without purchase, owing to long service, &c. 4th. By the sale of first commissions on the augmentation of the army in 1854, by Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Secretary at War, for the purpose of meeting and reducing the great increase to the half-pay list on the cessation of hostilities, and consequent reduction of the army." (This has never been done since 1859.) "The purposes to which the fund is applied are various, all most useful to the army and beneficial to the State: 1st. To reduce the half-pay list by purchasing the commissions of such half-pay officers as desire to realise the value thereof, thus conferring a great boon on many deserving officers, and saving the Exchequer the annuities payable to these officers. (In the year 1862," when this memorandum was drawn up, "there were 61 commissions purchased from half-pay officers at a saving of about 8,000 *l.* per annum to the half-pay vote.) 2nd. To reduce the prices paid for cavalry commissions, by paying to each officer on retirement from the cavalry the amount of difference to which he may be entitled between the old and new price of cavalry commissions, provided he entered prior to 1860, when the prices were reduced."

4. For how long did that system of selling commissions occasionally for the benefit of the families of deserving officers continue?—As far as I can learn from the evidence given before that Commission, it ceased in 1826.

5. From 1826 to the present time the operations of the fund have become gradually extended?—Quite so.

6. Before this system came into force, what commissions, according to the practice of the army, were sold, and what always went in their regiments?

Lieut.-Gen. Sir *E. Lugard*, G.C.B.

26 June 1867.

regiments? Was not it the case that no person could sell his commission who had not purchased it, except he were a very old officer whose length of service enabled him to get permission to do so?—I find in the Appendix to the Report on Naval and Military Promotion, 1840, this memorandum: "For more than 100 years it has been held that an officer who desired to retire by sale should be allowed to receive the value of those commissions he purchased, however short might be the period of his service; and by a regulation dating from the time of Queen Anne, the claim of an officer to retire by sale who had purchased none of his commissions is also recognised, on the condition only that he had rendered a certain period of service in the army. According to the last regulations on the subject, the periods of service required to give a title to this privilege were, in 1833, fixed at 20 years for a field officer or captain, 15 years for a lieutenant, and 12 years for an ensign, one-half of which was to have been passed on full-pay, or in the performance of military duties."

7. Then, up to a certain period, the only commissions that could be sold were commissions that had been purchased, and the commissions of officers who had entitled themselves to sell their commissions by a service of 30 years originally, and 20 years by subsequent limitation?—That was so.

8. I think vacancies occasioned by sentences of courts-martial were never allowed to go in the regiment?—No.

9. And I think, also, vacancies occasioned by misconduct in the regiment were not allowed to go in the regiment?—No, generally speaking, they were not.

10. But all death vacancies, all vacancies by the retirement of those who had not purchased, as a matter of course, went in the regiment?—Quite so; but very few officers retired; you could not get them to retire, because they would not give up their commissions for nothing.

11. But still if an officer did retire, his vacancy went, as a matter of course, in the regiment, without purchase?—I believe it did.

12. Will you be so good as to tell us exactly when the first sale of commissions on the more extended scale took place?—The memorandum from which I have just read proceeds as follows:—"In 1840 a practice was adopted of granting not only the officer who had purchased his commission the price he had paid, but also of allowing officers of shorter periods of service than those before laid down, who had not purchased, 100 *l.* for each year they had served, provided the amount did not exceed in the aggregate the value of the commission which they held at the time of sale. The principle of granting to an officer, after a certain period of service, the value of a commission he never purchased, the same as to an officer who had paid for his commission (thus, as it were, rewarding the one for his services, and not the other), was very carefully considered and reported upon by the Royal Commission presided over by the Duke of Wellington, from 1838 to 1840, and the following opinion recorded thereon:—'We are disposed to consider the earlier possession of rank and command a sufficient compensation to the purchasing officer, and that in selling, he who has purchased and he who has not should be treated alike.' But this equality was only to be acquired by the non-purchasing officer by means of service, according to the regulations of 1833."

13. You have told us that a large number of commissions were sold outright by Mr. Sidney Herbert when he was Secretary at War?—Yes; at the time of the Crimean war.

14. That continued a certain time, and then stopped?—Yes.

15. The system of allowing officers who are not entitled to sell their commissions to retire upon 100 *l.* for each year's service, has been very largely extended, has it not?—No, it has been rather contracted; because now the practice is to give every officer who wishes to retire, who has not purchased his commission, 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service, and only 50 *l.* for each year of home service.

16. That has had the effect of contracting the operation of the system of retirements rather than otherwise?—Yes; because an officer does not get so much, and therefore there are not so many who avail themselves of it.

17. Is not it the fact that very few commissions go without purchase now compared with what used to be the case?—Until the time when General Peel last came into office, it was the practice to credit the whole of the difference between the price received by the officer retiring, and the price paid by his successor, to the Reserve Fund; but General Peel laid down a rule which has been strictly observed since, that when that sum amounted to or exceeded 450 *l.*, the price of an ensigncy, that ensigncy should be given without purchase, instead of the sum being credited to the fund.

18. Has the Military Reserve Fund been devoted to any other purpose than those of reducing the Half-pay Fund and paying the difference between the old and the new price of cavalry commissions?—Yes, it has; it has been to a certain degree devoted to the purchasing out of gentlemen at arms and yeomen of the guard, for the purpose of replacing them by officers of long service in the army. Formerly the commissions in those two corps were trafficked in and were purchased for considerable sums, but Lord Herbert arranged that those gentlemen who wished to sell out of those corps should be paid a certain sum on the understanding that their places should be filled by old officers of the army.

19. Who has the appointment of old officers of the army to those corps?—They are appointed by Her Majesty on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief sends the name to the commander of the corps, who submits it to Her Majesty.

20. Colonel *Hogg.*] Have not the officers in command of those corps their own lists?—I do not know, but I do know that the Horse Guards send in their names.

21. Is the recommendation of the Horse Guards always attended to?—To the best of my belief.

22. Sir *John Trollope.*] None of those appointments are granted now to civilians?—No.

23. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you know what was paid to Sir T. Phillips to retire?—I think 8,000 *l.*; that was in 1862. He was not a gentleman at arms; he was lieutenant of the yeomen of the guard. In June 1861 there were six gentlemen at arms purchased out at 1,200 *l.* each. Captain M'Donald was paid 5,300 *l.*, as Exon of the yeomen of the guard. Those amounts were fixed by Lord Herbert.

24. Whatever may be the advantages of this system

system as it at present is worked, the funds necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Reserve Fund are all provided by officers who have to pay for their commissions, but who, under the former system, would have been entitled to their commissions without purchase? —The question is whether they would be entitled under the former system to get them without purchase. At present vacancies are all given without purchase.

25. I understand from you that formerly nobody could be obliged to pay for a commission except it was a commission that had been previously sold, or a commission which an officer was entitled to sell in virtue of 30 or 20 years' service?—Yes; that was previous to 1840.

26. But now in order to keep up this fund in a state sufficient for the purposes to which it is devoted, persons who otherwise would get commissions without purchase are obliged to pay for them?—Scarcely so, I think, to keep up the fund; it is to keep up the stream of promotion more than the fund. Officers would not retire unless they got the money, and therefore there would be a stagnation of promotion.

27. They would not retire so soon?—Nor in such numbers, and therefore there would not be the stream of promotion as at present.

28. General *Peel.*] With respect to the appointments to the Yeomen of the Guard, does not the Commander in Chief submit to the Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard a list of five officers from whom he selects anyone he pleases to recommend to the Queen?—I believe so.

29. Is not there a certain qualification with regard to the heights of those officers that are submitted to the Queen for promotion?—Yes.

30. Therefore if an officer did not come up to the requisite height by a certain number of inches he would be excluded from admission into the corps?—Yes.

31. Is any number of medals required to be possessed by the officer in order to entitle him to admission?—No; but I believe a preference is given to those officers who have distinguished themselves.

32. Captain *Vivian.*] The appointment is supposed to be an appointment without purchase?—Yes.

33. Therefore, formerly, any arrangement between the gentleman going out and the gentleman coming in, was simply an arrangement between themselves?—Yes.

34. And those gentlemen who have already been bought out by the Reserve Fund, and retired from the corps, have been private individuals who have consented to give up their place on condition of being paid a certain sum to recoup them for the money they have already paid for their own commissions?—On condition of being paid a certain sum; I can hardly say to "recoup them," because in certain cases they were bought out at half the sum they paid. They are not allowed, as formerly, to sell their commissions to any person in the market, but they are obliged to sell them to the fund, for a certain fixed sum.

35. Supposing an old soldier, who has been appointed to that corps, wishes to retire from it, is he allowed to sell out at a fixed amount?—No.

36. General *Peel.*] Was not it a purchasing corps up to a certain point?—Yes.

37. The object of paying for those commissions out of the Reserve Fund was, that the corps should cease to be a purchasing corps and become a non-purchasing corps?—Yes.

38. There being a certain number of civilians on that corps who were entitled to be paid for their commissions on retiring, the object was to purchase them out?—Yes.

39. How many are there in that corps now who are entitled to sell when they wish to retire?—Thirteen gentlemen-at-arms, besides the lieutenant and the standard bearer.

40. *Chairman.*] When an officer wishes to retire, and expresses that wish to the proper authority, what determines whether the succession consequent upon his retirement goes by purchase or without purchase?—It is determined by the manner in which he retires. If he retires on full pay, then the promotion goes without purchase always.

41. Supposing he retires on half-pay, how is it?—If he retires on half-pay after 25 years' service, which he is entitled to claim, the rule is that the commissions in succession shall be sold.

42. In all cases, if he retires on half-pay after 25 years' service, the commissions in succession are sold?—In all cases, except where the senior officers have had a very long and distinguished service; for instance, in the case of a lieutenant colonel going, when the major had 39 years' service of a very distinguished character, he was allowed to have the promotion without purchase.

43. Does the rule now exist that after two years' service a person is eligible to be a captain, and after six years' service he is eligible to be a field officer?—That rule exists now; those are rules more for the Horse Guards.

44. I have before me a number of cases of retirement, the first of which is this: a lieutenant colonel retires upon half-pay; the major has nineteen and a quarter years' service on full pay, five years and a-half as major, and five years as captain; should you not have thought that he was entitled to the succession without purchase. Then the captain who succeeds him has 17 years' service on full pay, and seven and three quarter years' service as captain, he is likewise made to purchase?—I should say that that was not a case deserving of special consideration; unless the lieutenant colonel retiring was within about two years of his promotion to major general; according to agreement with the Treasury, we could not allow the step to go without purchase.

45. General *Peel.*] You have said that the rules as to length of service, before an officer is entitled to purchase his company, are more for the Horse Guards than the War Office, but there must have been a regular fixed rule laid down between the Secretary of State for War and the Commander in Chief, must there not?—It is in the Regulations of the Army, page 70, paragraph 24, issued by the Adjutant General.

46. When the submission paper came to the War Office, supposing that the officer to be promoted had not served the fixed period, would not it be your duty to object to that?—Yes.

47. That is the control which the War Office has?—Yes.

48. You would be able to tell us that that rule had been enforced, that every officer should serve the fixed period before he could obtain his promotion?—For many years no officer has been promoted who has not far exceeded that period.

49. When the submission paper came to the

Lieut. Gen. Sir *E. Lugard*, G.C.B.

26 June 1867.

War Office before it was submitted to the Queen, if the officer had not served the number of years provided for by the regulation, it would be your duty to object to it?—Yes, the terms upon which they may retire are laid down in the Army Regulations.

50. Captain *Vivian.*] Who laid down that regulation?—It is now included in the Royal Warrant.

51. General *Peel.*] What is the date of that Royal Warrant?—3rd February 1866.

52. *Chairman.*] I have another case; where a lieutenant colonel retires upon half-pay after 30 years' service?—Though the major has served 17 years, and though he is told by the regulation that after having served six years he is eligible to be a lieutenant colonel, you make him, after 17 years' service, purchase. Though the captain is told that after six years' service he is eligible to be a major, you make him purchase though he has served 15 years; and as to the lieutenant, who is eligible to be a captain after three years, though he is a subaltern of nine years' service, he is made to purchase?—It was only on condition that the steps in succession were sold that the officer could go to half-pay. Formerly, before this regulation was made, that officer would have had to exchange. He would have had to find a half-pay officer to exchange with him, either to serve or to sell; and then, if he served, there would be no step in the regiment, and if he sold, the officers, instead of the regulation price, would have had to pay a certain excess to the officer who came in.

53. There was a question of age with regard to the person coming in, was there not?—He was required to be within five years of the age of the officer who went out,

54. Would they have taken him five years younger?—Yes; under certain circumstances a difference of five years was allowed; that is to say, he must not be five years older than the man who went on half-pay.

55. Then you consider that inasmuch as a person would not retire unless he was able to retire on those terms, it is beneficial to the regiment that those commissions should go by purchase in the way that I am describing?—It is beneficial to the regiment, and an improvement on the old system; it was considered a boon to the army for officers to be allowed to retire in this manner, the money going to the Reserve Fund, for the purpose of purchasing out other half-pay officers.

56. We are not here to enter at all upon the question of the purchase system, but still there is no doubt that whatever may be the advantages of the system into which we are inquiring, the purchase system prevails very much in the service?—Quite so.

57. And it leads to a considerable amount of supercession of officers (I mean going over the heads of others). There is a case, for instance, in the 60th Regiment, of a person purchasing a company passing over the heads of four persons, three of whom had 12 years' service, and the other 11; therefore, it leads to a vast deal of supercession in that way?—That is one of the effects of the purchase system.

58. There is another point upon which I wish to ask you a question or two, namely, as to the different footings upon which a purchasing officer and a non-purchasing officer are placed by the operation of this arrangement. Let us take the case of two officers who go into the army on the same day; their conduct is equally meritorious, but the one purchases all his commissions, and the other is fortunate enough to get all his commissions without purchase. At the end, we will say, of 10 years, both those officers who went into the army on the same day determined to leave it on the same day; is it not the fact that the officer who has purchased all his commissions merely gets back the money that he has paid, whereas the officer who has not purchased any of his commissions gets a bonus of 100 *l.* for each year that he has been on foreign service, thus putting him upon a so much better footing than his brother officer?—I can only reply to this in the words of the report of the Duke of Wellington's Commission, which I read before (*see* Question 12). From my experience in the army, I feel convinced that the non-purchasing officer gains a great advantage by the purchase of the purchasing officer; he is gradually brought up to the top, whereas by a system of seniority he would remain till a certain amount of money could be got to induce the seniors to retire.

59. Then in all those cases of retirement, whether the succession is by purchase or without purchase, depends upon whether the officer retires upon full pay, or whether he retires upon half pay?—Yes, except in the case of a lieutenant colonel within two years of his promotion to major general. A difference was made in that case, for this reason, that had that officer remained till he was promoted to be major general the step would have gone without purchase through the regiment, and therefore it was deemed advisable to allow the step still to go without purchase. In those cases that was allowed, and in some very exceptional cases of distinguished service.

60. He would be considered as if he had served the full time?—Yes.

61. General *Peel.*] Suppose that a lieutenant colonel wishes to retire upon half pay, you sell his commission?—No, we do not sell his commission; the commissions in succession are sold in the regiment.

62. And the price of it goes to the fund?—Yes.

63. Then the Government sell the lieutenant colonel's commission, and the price of it goes to the Reserve Fund?—Yes.

64. Supposing that an officer, having been placed upon half pay, wishes to realise his money, and says, "I want to sell," what do you do?—We pay him the regulation price from the fund; he sells under the circular prescribing the terms on which half-pay officers can sell.

65. Is not that circular for a certain period only?—It was issued in consequence of there being a large balance in the Reserve Fund, viz., 187,000 *l.* That was in February 1861, when the rule was first established for purchasing half-pay commissions, for one year, and subsequently the regulation was continued.

66. *Chairman.*] Have there been many orders published with reference to this fund?—Only that one order, which was published on the 15th of February 1861, for the purchase of half-pay commissions. Once we suspended it for a short time, in consequence of the fund having got very low, and then it was revived again.

67. Will you put in a copy of it?—Yes. (*The same was handed in.* Vide *Appendix.*)

68. General

68. General *Peel.*] You say that, prior to 1825, this was merely a charitable fund, in the hands of the Commander in Chief?—So I understand.

69. There was no control over it, and no return of it was made to Parliament; it being merely a charitable fund at the disposal of the Commander in Chief?—I find that the Duke of York did furnish an account in February 1820, to the House of Commons.

70. I find, in the evidence before the Commission on Purchase of Commissions, that it was not the custom to do so?—The evidence appears to be a little at variance with the returns.

71. In 1825 the system was altered, and the system introduced of half-pay officers being allowed to sell their half-pay commissions?—Yes, and full-pay officers bought them.

72. Was not the result of that that the men who purchased those half-pay commissions were so much junior in age to those who sold them that it was found to be so bad a bargain on the part of the country substituting so much younger lives for those who went out that it was put a stop to?—Yes.

73. That was the end of the second Reserve Fund?—Yes, so far as I can trace.

74. Then there arose the third arrangement under which the officer who had received the difference before he went upon half-pay, when he was allowed to be brought in to sell, paid back the difference?—Yes.

75. When did this system of giving 100 *l.* to the officers for each year's services originate?—In 1840.

76. Is there any record of it showing by whom it was done, or for what purpose it was done?—I presume it was upon the recommendation of the Duke of Wellington's commission already quoted.

77. You say that by allowing an officer who has not purchased 100 *l.* a-year for each year of his service, you place him upon an equality with an officer who has purchased his?—Yes.

78. That is all very well for an officer, who has not purchased, who retires from the service altogether, but an officer who remains in the army all his lifetime never gets this 100 *l.*?—No, but he gets rank and pay instead.

79. He is purchased over. The very ground upon which you allow an officer to retire, the 100 *l.* for each year's service, is, that he has been placed at a disadvantage by other people purchasing over his head?—Yes.

80. An officer who remains in the service till he becomes a major general, having been subjected to all this disadvantage of people purchasing over his head, receives no 100 *l.*, or 50 *l.*, or anything of the kind, therefore the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.*, is only an advantage to a non-purchasing officer who is about to retire; that is to say, you pay the man, who is about to retire, a reward, which you do not give either to the officer who has purchased his commission, or to the officer who remains in your service and who has gone through the whole ranks of the army?—No; but the man who remains in the service is so far benefitted, that by the retirement above him of men who would not have retired if they had not got such a sum as 100 *l.* for each year's service, he gains the advantage of earlier promotion.

81. In the case of a man who retires for this 100 *l.* for each year's service, his commission is sold, the consequence of which is, that a junior may purchase over the head of the old officers who remain?—It is not so, except in certain cases.

82. It is not the case, is it, that an officer who has purchased his commission has a right to sell it; though it is the custom, it is not the right of an officer who has purchased his commission to sell it?—There are different opinions given upon that, because in the report of the commission of 1840, which was presided over by the Duke of Wellington, they say that he has the right. Lieut.-Gen. Sir *E. Lugard*, G.C.B. 26 June 1867.

83. I see that Sir Charles Yorke in his second examination before the Commission, on purchase of commissions on the 4th of June 1856, says—"I should like to correct partially a statement that I made the other day. I was asked whether an officer who had purchased his commission had a right to sell it; I said that he had a right, but it is more proper that I should explain it in this way, that he has a claim to sell a commission which, except on account of misconduct on his part is never refused; but the right he certainly has not." Then in the examination of the Duke of Cambridge in 1859, he said that not only was there not the right, but during the Indian mutiny, when a great many officers applied to sell their commissions, it was positively refused?—That is to say, as I consider you refuse them permission to leave the army. My interpretation of the right is this, that if the authorities permit them to retire, they then have the right to the money for their commissions, but not that any officer can claim the right to quit the service when he pleases.

84. He cannot claim the right to sell his commission at any time he chooses?—He cannot claim the right to leave the service.

85. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you know that on many occasions an officer has been refused permission to leave the service on a regiment being ordered on foreign service?—Yes; such cases have occurred within my own knowledge; but that is the right to leave the service, not the right to sell. The permission must be first given to retire; when permission to retire is given, then the officer has the right to the money.

86. General *Peel.*] What is the rule with regard to officers who have not purchased their commissions, and who now apply to retire, receiving this 100 *l.* for each year of service; they are recommended, I take for granted, by the Commander in Chief to the Secretary of State for War?—Yes.

87. Is there any fixed number of years before they are allowed to retire?—The last regulation was that they should not get anything under three years' service.

88. Therefore, supposing two ensigns go in on the same day, one who has purchased his commission and the other who has not, if, at the end of three years both wish to retire, one gets 100 *l.* for each year of his service and the other only gets his own money back again?—It would depend upon the service performed by the one who entered without purchase. He would get 100 *l.* if he served abroad and only 50 *l.* if at home, but the purchaser would not have obtained a commission at all had he not purchased, whereas the other earned it by competitive examination.

89. When was the change as to the 50 *l.* for the home service made?—In May 1860.

90. What have you paid for the purchases of commissions during last year?—£. 73,400, relieving the State of an annual payment of 3,800 *l.*

91. So that you paid 73,400 *l.* for purchasing up merely a life annuity amounting to 3,800 *l.*?—That is looking at it in a mercantile point of

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view; but you must bear in mind the boon it was to those officers, many of whom were able by its means to emigrate, or provide otherwise for their families.

92. Do you know how many commissions were held out to the cadets at Sandhurst to be competed for without purchase, say two years ago?—I am not able to state that from memory.

93. Do not you imagine that if you could offer a certain number of first commissions for competition at Sandhurst it would be a great inducement to cadets to go to Sandhurst?—There is not the slightest doubt of it.

94. You admit that the number you have the power of offering is very much affected by this fund?—Yes, I think it is, but under the old system it would be almost the same, because, anstead of our taking the money on account of in officer going to half-pay, the money would go into the pocket of the half-pay officer, who exchanged with him and sold in the regiment.

95. The regulation is, that no officer is entitled to go upon half-pay till he has served 25 years?—Yes.

96. Therefore, it is not a question about half-pay?—Except that where an officer has served 25 years, we allow him to go direct to half-pay without any exchange, the promotion in the regiment going by purchase, and the money going to the fund. But it was so formerly, the only difference being that we now save the officer the bonus which he would have to give to the half-pay officer to exchange with him. It was in consequence of its coming to the knowledge of the Secretary of State that large sums were paid for that purpose, that he arranged with the Treasury to allow those officers to go direct to half-pay, on the condition that the money realised by the succession should be applied to the reduction of the half-pay list, thus increased by the officer being placed on it without an exchange.

97. Will you furnish the Committee with the numbers of first commissions without purchase during the course of last year?—Yes.

98. *Chairman.*] Whatever arrangement might have been made between the officer retiring and the officer coming in in his place, the first commission, at all events, would have been disposable without purchase, would it not?—No; it must be purchased in order to make up the 4,500 *l.*, which would be required in the case of a lieutenant colonel going out.

99. What makes the vacancy for the first commission which you now sell?—The senior ensign for purchase in the regiment obtains the lieutenancy, then some gentleman has to purchase the ensigny to make up the money for the higher commission.

100. Captain *Vivian.*] You say that this Reserve Fund is contributed to entirely by purchasing officers, that is to say, that the officers themselves contribute to it by the purchase of commissions?—Yes.

101. You say it is applied to three purposes, viz., reducing the half-pay list, paying the difference between the present and the old cost of cavalry commissions, and purchasing out gentlemen belonging to the corps of Yeomen of the Guard and Gentlemen-at-Arms?—Yes.

102. Are there any other purposes to which it is applied besides those three?—At times it is expended in absorbing supernumeraries. Supposing there is a supernumerary captain in a regiment, we would absorb him by means of the fund, that is, if the captain sold out, we should, instead of succeeding him, pay him his money from the fund, and bring the regiment down to its proper complement.

103. Would you do that with a second lieutenant colonel of a cavalry regiment coming from India?—No, unless he desired to sell.

104. What happens to him?—He would be placed upon half-pay.

105. And would lose his money?—He is not removed from the service.

106. If he is not brought again upon full pay, he has no chance of regaining the money he has paid for his commission?—No, unless he retire by sale; that is a consequence of all reductions in the army.

107. He has no claim upon the Reserve Fund?—No, except he be entitled to permanent half-pay, in which case he could sell to the Fund; but this reduction to half-pay does not take from him any previous claim he may have had upon the Fund.

108. General *Peel.*] If he wished to sell, you would pay him the regulation price?—Yes.

109. Captain *Vivian.*] The Royal Artillery is a non-purchasing corps?—Yes.

110. Do the colonels of the Royal Artillery ever get any benefit from the Reserve Fund?—That comes under the head of reducing the half-pay. If the fund is in a flourishing condition and an artillery officer on permanent half-pay applies to sell, we buy his commission in the same way as we do that of any other officer, but never to the detriment of the officers who contribute.

111. You pay him 4,500 *l.*?—Whatever the amount of his commission is.

112. A colonel or a captain of Royal Artillery who has contributed nothing to this Reserve Fund, and who belongs to a non-purchasing corps, nevertheless because he is on the half-pay list, can claim a sum of money which has been contributed only by purchasing officers?—No, he cannot claim it as a right, but when the Fund will bear it, artillery and engineer officers who are entitled to permanent half-pay, are allowed to sell to the Fund, in lieu of the privilege they had previously of selling their half-pay commission on condition of their settling in the colonies.

113. Do not you think that a fund which has been created entirely by purchasing officers, should be devoted entirely to the benefit of those who have contributed to it?—Many other officers who get the benefit of it have never contributed to it at all.

114. If that is so, does not that appear to you to be rather a misapplication of the fund?—It would be difficult to eliminate those officers from the others who have contributed to it.

115. Do not you think that the reduction of the half-pay list is a matter that ought to be undertaken by the State, and not by such a fund as the Reserve Fund?—I must tell you honestly that I consider the Reserve Fund a great advantage to the army.

116. If properly applied?—Yes.

117. Do you approve of all the purposes to which this Reserve Fund has been applied?—It is not for me to give an opinion contrary to decisions of Secretaries of State whom I have served under.

118. To what extent does the power of the Secretary of State for War go as regards this Reserve Fund?—He, in conjunction with the Treasury, is supreme.

119. Can he apply it to any purpose he likes?—No,

—No, he cannot; only to those purposes which are periodically shown to Parliament.

120. What is the limit to his power; under what regulation or warrant is his power controlled?—There is a Royal Warrant dated February 1866, which places the control in the hands of the Secretary of State for War.

121. Is there any regulation, or order, or warrant specifying to what purposes this fund shall be applied?—No.

122. Therefore the Secretary for War has, subject to Parliamentary criticism, absolute power over this Reserve Fund?—Subject to the control of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

123. General *Peel.*] Was any return ever made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to this fund previously to the year 1860?—No.

124. Captain *Vivian.*] Therefore the Secretary for War has absolute power over this Reserve Fund, subject only to the criticism of Parliament?—Subject to the audit, the accounts are all audited.

125. *Chairman.*] The audit is merely to see that the money is properly accounted for, is it not?—It is more than that; the decisions are questioned.

126. Captain *Vivian.*] Since when has this Reserve Fund come under Parliamentary control?—Since 1860.

127. Before then the Secretary for War might administer it, subject to no control whatever?—Quite so.

128. Mr. *Percy Wyndham.*] Assuming the fund to be beneficial to the service, do you think it would be more advantageous that the use of it should be laid down within a definite limit, than that the disposal of it should depend entirely upon the opinions of successive Secretaries of State?—I think certainly it would be an advantage to have definite rules laid down for its disposal.

129. Colonel *North.*] In what way is the Chancellor of the Exchequer mixed up with it?—As regards the audit.

130. Mr. *Baxter.*] I understood you to say, that the Secretary of State exercised a control over the fund in conjunction with the Treasury?—The regulations relative to the retirement to half-pay, and meeting that by the Reserve Fund, were all framed in concurrence with the Treasury.

131. Colonel *North.*] Does not it sometimes occur, that the wishes of the Secretary for War, with regard to particular things, are vetoed by the Treasury, and that they will not allow them to be carried out?—I submit that that is scarcely a question for me to answer.

132. The Treasury do exercise considerable power over the administration of the Secretary for War?—No doubt. The controlling power is in the Treasury, and you cannot always have either the executive or administrative power in accord with the controlling power.

133. General *Peel.*] That can only have been since 1860?—Since 1860, with regard to the Reserve Fund.

134. Colonel *North.*] Do not you think that this system has acted most injuriously to the interests of cadets at Sandhurst, and that those very commissions ought to have gone to them. Are not you aware that there have been many very hard cases of boys having been passed over, though they had passed first-rate examinations, because there were no commissions to give them?—The answer to that question is involved in the purchase system altogether. It is not harder upon Sandhurst than the former system; in short, quite the contrary. I think that more commissions are now given than were before.

135. Mr. *Baxter.*] What took place in 1860 enabling the Treasury to interfere in the management of this fund?—The whole question of the Reserve Fund was then brought before Parliament.

136. Colonel *Hogg.*] You say that you consider it a great convenience to officers of long service to be enabled to retire upon half-pay without having to seek out half-pay officers to exchange with them; and you consider that this system enables that to be carried out?—Yes.

137. And you consider it a benefit to the public as well as to the officers themselves?—Yes.

138. An officer could not go upon half-pay after 25 years' service unless a fund of this sort existed?—The going on half-pay after 25 years' service has nothing to do with the fund.

139. Supposing, after 25 years' service, a man goes upon half-pay, his commission is sold?—Yes.

140. That goes to the Reserve Fund?—Yes.

141. You might give these commissions for nothing, if you chose?—You might give them for nothing, but they are sold in order to recoup the State for the annuity to be given to the officer who comes upon half-pay.

142. It is not necessary to sell them?—That was the arrangement with the Treasury at the time.

143. Major *O'Reilly.*] An officer has the right to be paid by the State after 25 years' service, and he would have that right though there was no Reserve Fund?—No, he has not the right to retire upon half-pay; his right is to exchange to half-pay. Under this arrangement we allow him to go at once.

144. You say that the first use to which the Reserve Fund was applied was purchasing half-pay commissions; but in the case of Artillery officers the sum given is for the purchase of their commissions?—No, it is the purchase of their half-pay. We calculate it according to the price which a corresponding commission in the Line is worth.

145. You say that you purchase their half-pay, but you calculate the price which they are to pay for that half-pay, not according to what it is worth, which is the annuity, but according to what an analogous commission in the Line would be worth?—Yes.

146. On what principle do you do that?—I may repeat what I stated in reply to Question 112: "Prior to 1861, when Artillery and Engineer officers had the privilege of selling their half-pay commissions for the purpose of settling in the colonies, the price of their commissions was calculated according to what an analogous commission in the line would be worth."

147. You are purchasing an annuity, and in-

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stead of calculating the value of that annuity, and paying it down, you give a sum calculated on a matter which has no earthly relation to it, viz., the relative value of a purchase commission?—Quite so.

148. Do you think that a reasonable proceeding?—That is the regulation laid down by the Secretary of State at the time.

149. And so far you relieve the State of the obligation of paying half-pay to that Artillery officer for the remainder of his life?—Yes.

150. And you do that at the expense of the officers of the other branches of the army?—Yes, but you must remember that there is an advantage to the other officers of the army, because in doing that we are able to allow an officer of the line of 25 years' service to go direct to half-pay. The money that we get from the officers who purchase the step, goes to the general reduction of half-pay. We should not be able to allow a lieutenant colonel, or a major, to come upon half-pay and increase the Non-effective Vote, unless we had some means of relieving the Non-effective Vote by the fund. When the fund is in good condition, we relieve the Non-effective Vote indiscriminately by applying the fund to Artillery officers as well as the Line officers.

151. Why is it necessary to take an Artillery officer, for instance, off the half-pay list by purchasing him up by the reserve fund, in order to give an opportunity to another officer of 25 years' service to go on the half-pay list?—It is not exactly to give an opportunity for an officer of 25 years' service in the Line to go on half-pay; but in making the arrangement with the Treasury, it was provided that the money realised by permitting an officer of 25 years' service to go direct to half-pay without exchange, that is, without relieving the half-pay list of an officer of the same rank, should be appropriated towards the reduction of the half-pay list generally.

152. Do not you think it would be perfectly fair to an ordnance officer on half-pay, if you paid him the calculated value of the annuity which he would receive for his life by remaining on that half-pay list, without any reference to the value of a purchase commission in the other branches of the service?—It would, if he would take it; he would not take it; he would prefer remaining on his half-pay.

153. Do you purchase the commission of any officer on half-pay who applies?—No; only if he is on permanent half-pay, and under 60 years old.

154. What is the rule as to officers not on permanent half-pay?—An officer not on permanent half-pay may be brought to full pay at any time.

155. Another purpose to which the Reserve Fund is applied, is reducing the price of cavalry commissions?—Yes.

156. Are you aware whether the result of reducing the price of first cavalry commissions has been to augment the price paid (not the regulation price) in the subsequent steps?—At the time Mr. Sidney Herbert determined to reduce the price of cavalry commissions it was next to impossible to fill up the cornetcies; we had at that time 60 to 64 vacancies, and we could not get cornets to fill them; it was then decided by Mr. Sidney Herbert that he would make the cavalry commissions the same price as the infantry commissions, and we have never had any difficulty since.

157. My question is this: do you know whether or not the reducing the price of first cavalry commissions has been to increase largely the sum paid for the subsequent steps?—No, I do not.

158. You stated that last year you purchased up commissions to the value of 73,400 *l.*, and relieved the State of the annual payment of 3,800 *l.* That was the annuity which the State was paying. Supposing the value of that was calculated at 10 years' purchase, it would be something like 38,000 *l.*, or half the sum you paid for it. If you paid more than the value of that annuity, was not the State so far the loser?—The State was not the loser.

159. The State gained the value of the annuity, whatever it was, of 3,800 *l.* a-year, and the officers of the army paid the consideration for that at the rate of 73,000 *l.*?—Then you must take into consideration the great benefit which it was to officers who were able to realise the value of their commissions at once, and the saving to the State of the pensions to the widows and orphans.

160. You have enumerated four uses to which the Reserve Fund has been applied; has it ever been applied to any other use?—It has been applied to the gradual conversion of the Military Train to a non-purchase corps, which was originally a purchase corps.

161. All the first commissions in it were sold?—Originally they were.

162. To whom did the purchase-money go; was it to the State?—I think the officers, in a great measure, were transferred from other regiments.

163. I mean so far as the commissions were sold; to whom did the original purchase money of the first commissions in the Military Train go; did not it go to the State?—Mr. Cave, who was in the office when that corps was formed, says that no first commissions in the Military Train were sold at all. The officers were transferred from the army; the greater proportion of the junior officers were from the Land Transport Corps and non-commissioned officers of Artillery, and so on.

164. May I take it that, when the Military Train Corps was created, the commissions were granted as rewards to meritorious officers in other corps, the commissions being treated as purchased commissions?—Yes, they were looked upon as purchased commissions.

165. Which those officers could sell?—Yes.

166. Then the Government decided on making it a non-purchasing corps?—Yes, converting it.

167. And, in order to do so, they determined to pay those officers the regulation price of their commissions?—No.

168. Gradually, is not that what you are doing, in order to make it a non-purchasing corps?—Only as they leave the army.

169. You will gradually pay those officers the price of their commissions?—Yes.

170. The fund out of which that is proposed to be done is the Reserve Fund which is contributed to by purchase officers in other branches of the army?—And by officers of the Military Train also.

171. Sir *Charles Russell.*] You said just now that you considered that the Reserve Fund was a great

a great advantage to the army, and you pointed out as one of its advantages that at present if an officer who has served 25 years wishes to go, instead of his having to find an officer to exchange with him, you pay a sum of money from the Reserve Fund to enable that officer so to retire. Do not you think supposing there was a limited number of half-pay officers allowed upon the list, and all in excess of that number for meritorious service were to be provided for by the Treasury instead of out of the Reserve Fund, the fund would be more advantageously and justly applied?—There is no doubt if the Treasury would purchase out half-pay officers, there would be more money in the fund for other purposes, but I scarcely know to what purpose you would convert it.

172. At present, as far as I understand, this fund is in a great measure used in alleviation of the charge to the State, and is not applied solely and exclusively to the benefit of the army, who entirely provide the fund?—If I understand you rightly, you would propose that every officer, after 25 years' service, should go direct to half-pay, and the steps in succession should go without purchase. There is no doubt that could be done if the Treasury would find the money.

173. At present, as I understand, the fund is contributed to by officers serving in the army, or who have served in the army; and, practically, it is in alleviation of the charge to the State that this money is applied?—Yes, to a certain extent; but it enables an officer who goes direct to half-pay at once to sell his commission when he wants to do so. I do not think the State or the Treasury would ever consent to allow that officer to go direct to half-pay, giving the promotion entirely in the regiment, and then allow him to sell his half-pay afterwards.

174. General *Peel.*] Is not this the case, that you are doing now, by means of this fund, that which, when the Treasury did it on their own account in 1825, they found such a very bad bargain, that they put a stop to it at the end of a year?—But, in 1825, for every officer that you took off the list, another came on who was probably much younger; that is not the case now. From this fund we purchase the half-pay commission of any officer whatever. As far as the fund goes; we may purchase up the whole half-pay list without bringing a single other man upon the list, except those who applied to be put on it, having served their 25 years.

175. Is not it the fact that the State are dealers in commissions, and that they sell commissions which would not otherwise be for sale?—That is involved in the system of purchase.

176. With respect to the non-purchase regiments from 101 to 109, do you purchase up the half-pay of any of those officers?—No; all the old officers are still upon the Indian regulations as to half-pay.

177. But naturally those officers will be absorbed, and another class of men will come into those regiments which are now purchasing regiments; do you give them the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.* for their services if they wish to retire?—I do not think we have had any case; every officer of those regiments has retired upon the Indian regulations and the Indian pension.

178. A new regulation was laid down when those regiments were amalgamated with the British Army?—Every officer who belonged to those regiments was guaranteed the conditions upon which he entered the service; that is, he could claim from the Indian Government the pension or half-pay which he would be entitled to according to their regulations.

179. What I was asking you is this: supposing an officer who has been appointed to one of those regiments from Sandhurst, after a service of six years, wishes to retire, do you allow him to retire, receiving the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.*?—No, because he is in a non-purchase corps.

180. Then you have another class of officers, who do not obtain the advantage of the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.*?—They are in the same category as the Artillery and Engineers.

181. In fact, the difference between the old and the present price of commissions in the cavalry, the purchase of the Gentlemen-at-Arms, and the purchase of the half-pay officers of Artillery, and other non-purchasing corps, all fall upon the purchasing officers of the line?—Yes.

THOMAS C. B. CAVE, Esq., called in; and Examined.

182. General *Peel.*] YOU are a Clerk in the War Office?—I am.

183. Have you anything to add to what Sir Edward Lugard has stated, or any explanation to give?—Only as regards the question you asked about the limited number of non-purchase first commissions given to Sandhurst, I may mention that in January 1861, the Duke of Cambridge represented to Mr. Sidney Herbert the difficulty experienced in providing with commissions the 44 cadets who had obtained over 3,000 marks at the December 1860 examination. Non-purchase commissions had been promised to the 20 cadets who stood highest on the list, but the friends of the remaining 24 considered that they also were entitled to this reward, though there were not a sufficient number of vacancies at the time. The Secretary of State and his Royal Highness admitted the claim, and Mr. Herbert met the difficulty by allowing 24 ensigncies, which were vacant in succession to retirements, and which would have been filled by purchase, to be given to these 24 cadets without purchase, and the amount required by the retiring officer was paid from the Reserve Fund, on the understanding that the Council of Education would announce to competitors at future examinations, that all who obtain the minimum number of marks will not be entitled to gratis commissions, but that the number of non-purchase vacancies to be competed for will be duly announced beforehand.

184. Will you furnish the Committee with a return of the number of commissions given without purchase to Sandhurst, since the year 1860?—Yes. (*Vide* Appendix.)

Lieutenant General Sir EDWARD LUGARD, G.C.B.; further Examined.

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185. *Chairman* (to Sir *Edward Lugard*).] ARE officers of Artillery and Engineers allowed to go on half-pay after 25 years?—They have regulations of their own.

186. However beneficial in your opinion to the cavalry and infantry this system of retirement on the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.* may be, still I know many officers who belong to the purchasing branch of the service consider that the Artillery and Engineers, which are now purchase corps, ought not to benefit by that to which the officers of Infantry and Cavalry contribute; the Artillery and Engineers benefit by the system without contributing to it as the others do?—That is so, if they are on permanent half-pay; they are only purchased when doing so will not interfere with the purchase of the line.

187. Have you any idea how soon this arrangement of paying the difference between the old and the present price of cavalry commissions will cease?—It is almost impossible to calculate.

188. You have no knowledge how many there are who have a claim upon the fund?—No; every officer who entered the cavalry before 1860 has a claim.

189. What number of the Military Train will there be to benefit by this arrangement?—It is only some of the junior ranks that it would apply to.

190. It is not a numerous body, is it?—It has 24 captains, and I suppose 48 lieutenants.

191. Major *O'Reilly.*] You have purchased some?—Only the ensigncies; you can only commence with the first commissions.

Friday, 28th June 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Baxter.	Mr. O'Reilly.
Marquis of Hartington.	Sir Charles Russell.
Colonel Hogg.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Lord Hotham.	Sir John Trollope.
Colonel North.	Captain Vivian.
General Peel.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant General WILLIAM FREDERICK FORSTER, K.H., called in; and Examined.

Lieut.-Gen. *W. F. Forster*, K.H.
28 June 1867.

192. *Chairman.*] YOU are Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief?—Yes.

193. What is the rule under which officers can retire upon full pay?—They are allowed to retire on full pay after 30 years' full pay service, the promotion going in the regiment without purchase provided there are no supernumeraries.

194. Has not that 30 years been recently reduced?—No.

195. What is the regulation in reference to an officer going upon half pay?—He must have served 25 years on full pay, or he must get a medical certificate, if he has served under that period. If he goes upon half pay by what I should call his right, which cannot be disputed after 25 years' service, then the commission is sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund. But supposing a lieutenant colonel were retiring upon half pay, if the major were a man having great claims on account of long service, he would, with the concurrence of the Secretary for War, probably obtain the promotion without purchase; and the rest of the promotion, if the claims were not sufficiently great to warrant the Commander in Chief in recommending it to go without purchase, would go by purchase; so that really and truly if the lieutenant colonel were to sell his commission, the value of which is 4,500 *l.*, if the senior major were a man of great claim and good service, he would get the promotion (if approved of by the Secretary at War) without purchase; and the sum of money that would go to the Reserve Fund would be 4,500 *l.*, minus 1,300 *l.*

196. The major would get the benefit of his service?—He would get the benefit of his service without purchase.

197. General *Peel.*] That would go through all the ranks, would it not; supposing, for instance, the senior captain was an officer of very long service, and the Commander in Chief recommended the Secretary at War to allow him to have his promotion without purchase, he would have it, would he not?—It depends entirely upon the claim of the individuals; but it does not always follow that the whole of the officers are of sufficient standing, or of sufficient merit, to warrant their being recommended for promotion without purchase.

198. *Chairman.*] I presume there are not many captains and subalterns who seek to retire upon half pay, having served 25 years?—Very few.

199. I presume that everything connected with the reserved funds, with which the Horse Guards is concerned, passes through your hands?—Yes; that is to say, all the recommendations. I have nothing to do with the money. Every application of the Reserve Fund takes place upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief through the Military Secretary.

200. We have understood that the pecuniary advantages of this fund have been extended to the Artillery and Engineers, is that so?—Yes. I must make this remark upon that subject; there is this strange anomaly with respect to the Artillery and the Engineers: those two corps, being non-purchasing corps, do not receive any benefit from the fund as long as the officers are on full pay; but when they are placed on half-pay they are permitted in certain instances to sell their commissions, which they could not sell as long as they were on full pay.

201. Then they benefit pecuniarily by a fund to which they have, none of them, contributed anything?—Certainly; but then I think you must look upon it in a financial point of view. You must look upon it as an insurance. If you allow a man 120 *l.* a-year, at a certain age, you go to a notary and say, what is the annuity worth?

202. General *Peel.*] That is, in fact, what you do not do; you do not go to a notary and ask what is this annuity worth, but you give him the price of his commission?—That is so, but it is supposed, in most instances, to be a benefit to the country.

203. Sir *John Trollope.*] By way of reducing the annual charge of half pay?—That is another advantage; but what I am referring to is allowing these officers to go upon half pay, for the express purpose of selling their commissions.

204. *Chairman.*] Can you state the number of officers of artillery and engineers who have benefited by the Reserve Fund, in the way to which you have referred?—Twenty-one Artillery officers; 17 officers of Engineers.

205. Is not it the case that a large number of Engineer officers are frequently employed in civil situations?—Yes.

 206. Sometimes

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206. Sometimes more and sometimes less?—There are a considerable number so employed.

207. Do they receive their full pay during the time they are so employed?—No, I think not; I think there is a rule providing that if the civil emolument is so much greater (by three times, I think it is) than the amount of their pay, they are not to receive their pay. It is only where the civil emolument is of small amount that they receive their pay.

208. Is it the general rule that, when an officer of Engineers is employed in a civil situation, he is seconded?—For the most part. There are a number of appointments in which Engineers participated, which are called military-civil departments; and if such an officer was serving in any of those departments, to which anything of a military character can be attributed, he would be entitled to receive his pay; but where his employment was of a purely civil nature, he would then be seconded.

209. That officer taking rank in the same way as if he were serving with his corps?—Yes.

210. So that it not unfrequently happens that an officer goes away from his regiment as a captain, is away many years, and comes back as a colonel?—No doubt there are many instances of that sort.

211. That is a benefit which no other part of the army enjoys?—No.

212. Besides those two non-purchasing corps, are there also 12 Indian regiments, which now form part of our own army, which remain non-purchase corps?—Yes.

213. Am I right in my belief that all the officers of those regiments who got their commissions before the amalgamation, remain, as regards retirement and so forth, subject to the Indian rules?—Yes, they have all the advantages secured to them which formerly attached to the regiments when under the East India Company.

214. But all those officers who have entered since the amalgamation come upon the same footing as our own army?—Yes, with this difference; that they cannot sell their commissions whilst serving in those regiments.

215. If it is assumed to be right and proper that the non-purchase corps of Artillery and Engineers should profit by the advantages of the Reserve Fund, it may be also assumed that all the officers of those Indian regiments who have been appointed subsequently to the amalgamation ought to profit by those advantages also?—I presume that they would be considered as entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund. When the amalgamation took place, certain stipulations and certain rules which then subsisted were understood to remain in force. Their rules are not the same as our own. They have no half-pay, for instance.

216. Will not the officers of those 12 Indian regiments who have joined those regiments since the amalgamation be likely to consider that they have as much claim upon the Reserve Fund as the Artillery and Engineers have?—No doubt.

217. And therefore that will very much increase the large number of claims upon the fund, to which the claimants have made no contribution whatever?—Yes, just so; provided their claims be admitted.

218. General *Peel.*] Is there any difference between those non-purchasing Indian regiments and the Artillery and Engineers in this respect; supposing one of the officers of those non-purchasing regiments retires, do you give him the 100 *l.* a-year for each year of foreign service, and the 50 *l.* a-year for each year of home service?—No; being non-purchase regiments, sales are inadmissible.

219. Was not there a distinct regulation at the time of the amalgamation that those officers who went into those regiments should not be entitled to the 100 *l.* and the 50 *l.*?—Yes; such was and is the rule.

220. Will you turn to the examination of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief before the Select Committee on Military Organization, and read what he says as to the greater pecuniary advantages which an officer who has not purchased his commission receives as compared with an officer who has purchased his commission?—"Question 3905. The difference therefore is that the one officer who has purchased his commission receives only 72 *l.* a-year for his four years' service, and the officer to whom a commission is given receives 190 *l.* a-year?—Certainly; there is no doubt of that."

221. Supposing that to be a correct account of what the one officer receives as compared with the other, the officer who is obliged to purchase is at a disadvantage as compared with the officer who obtained his commission without purchase?—Yes, to a certain degree he is; but you must recollect that the man who purchases has a great advantage, because in the first place he gets the advantages of the senior rank, while the other man continues to serve in the junior rank, and he gets it at a much earlier date.

222. But if you refer to the questions preceding that to which I have called your attention, you will find that the two officers are supposed to have entered a regiment as ensigns on the same day, and to have left it on the same day, neither of them having obtained any promotion whatever?—If they have both served the same time, no doubt the officer who purchases receives less than the officer to whom the commission is given.

223. How are the officers appointed to the corps of gentlemen-at-arms?—There is a list kept of persons nominated to the corps, and certain stipulations are required; the candidate must have seen service; must be under 50 years of age, and must be five feet eight in height; I think officers who are decorated are preferred to others.

224. Are they recommended by the Commander in Chief, or how are they selected?—They are recommended by the Commander in Chief, that is to say, the Military Secretary is ordered by the Commander in Chief, when there is a vacancy, to send in certain names. Those names are sent to the captain of the corps, and he takes the Queen's pleasure.

225. Captain *Vivian.*] Are the gentlemen-at-arms and the yeomen of the guard two distinct corps?—Yes, I have here two memoranda regulating the admissions into those two corps. (*The same were handed in*, vide *Appendix.*)

226. General *Peel.*] What advantage do those officers who are appointed to those corps receive in addition to their half pay?—I think it is somewhere about 70 *l.* a year.

227. The way they are appointed is that a sum of money is paid out of the Reserve Fund to purchase out the persons whom they succeed?—That at present is the case. The gentlemen-at-arms purchased their commissions originally; but it has been lately decided that those gentlemen-

men-at-arms who so purchased their commissions and who wish to retire, should be paid back the money they gave for their commissions. That money has been paid out of the Reserve Fund, which has enabled the Commander in Chief to lay before the Queen certain meritorious officers for appointment to that corps, the purchase money being paid out of the Reserve Fund. It has afforded a great opportunity of rewarding old officers.

228. Then comes the question whether the benefit that the old officers so receive from this Reserve Fund, is equivalent to the burden thrown upon the army generally; we have had it in evidence that 8,000 *l.*, for instance, was paid out of the Reserve Fund for the retirement of one officer from this corps?—He was the chief officer, the lieutenant.

229. Sir *John Trollope.*] The lieutenant of the corps would be paid a higher rate than the privates?—Yes, there are privates and officers; the officers are paid more.

230. That is the reason why the amount given to the lieutenant was so high?—Yes; those who have purchased their commissions now sell them; but those who succeed them will never be able to sell their commissions.

231. Are there many civilians who originally purchased their commissions, still remaining in those corps?—I think there are some few remaining.

232. General *Peel.*] When a non-purchasing officer wishes to retire, receiving this 100*l.* a year for every year he has served abroad, or 50*l.* a year for every year he has served at home, is not a recommendation that he should be allowed so to retire, sent, in the first instance, from the Commander in Chief to the War Office?—We state what the officer's service is, and then we refer to the Secretary of State to know what he allows him; if the sum is short of the full price of his commission, the overplus is given to the Reserve Fund.

233. Is there any rule or regulation as to the period of service which entitles an officer to be recommended under those circumstances?—He cannot get anything under three years' service.

234. An ensign after three years' service, if you recommended him, might receive the 100*l.*?—I believe so; but there are certain considerations in particular cases, for instance, cadets who get commissions from the Military College, and also there are a certain number of officers who entered the line by bringing recruits from the militia. I think they are generally dealt with upon more favourable terms.

235. Is not the effect this, that it makes almost every retirement from the service, a retirement involving the purchase of a commission; if an officer has purchased his commission, and retires, he sells it as a matter of right?—Yes.

236. If a non-purchasing officer retires, his commission is sold in order to enable him to receive a certain amount for his services?—It has that effect.

237. Does not that reduce very much the number of first commissions without purchase in the army?—It must have that effect; but the probability is, if you did not give some encouragement to those officers to go out, they would remain.

238. After I came into office, I established a rule that when the amount required for the officer retiring exceeded by 450*l.* what he was to receive, the first commission should not be sold; the operation of that would be to give a great many more first commissions without purchase?—Yes; but, under existing rule, only to cadets from the Royal Military College.

239. Do not you think that very desirable?—It is very desirable.

240. It would be a great advantage, if you could offer a greater number of first commissions for competition at Sandhurst, to officers who had risen from the ranks, and to the sons of persons who had a claim upon the service?—Yes.

241. Were not you, a year or two ago, obliged to reduce the number of competitions at Sandhurst?—Yes; because we could not provide for the men.

242. Therefore, it would be a great advantage if there were a greater number of commissions to give?—Certainly.

243. The operation of this fund, by the sale of first commissions, is to reduce that number?—It must be, of course; but in some instances the money has been paid from the Reserve Fund to the retiring officers, and the commission has been given without purchase.

244. No doubt it is an advantage to a non-purchasing officer who retires from the service to receive this 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, or 50*l.* for every year of home service. But what is the effect on the non-purchasing officer who remains in the service; is not he more liable to be purchased over by the sale of these commissions than he would otherwise be?—I do not exactly see that.

245. Supposing a captain retires, receiving the price of his commission, and the commission is sold in order to reimburse the fund; and supposing the senior lieutenant does not purchase, a junior officer to him purchases over his head?—Yes.

246. *Chairman.*] In the case of a field officer of a regiment wanting to go upon half-pay, is it in the power of the senior officer to stop the promotion by refusing to purchase; or, if he refuses to purchase, is he compelled to see another person go over his head?—If he cannot purchase the next to him has the option. Everybody who has the means of purchasing has the right to say, I will take advantage of my position.

247. And go over any number of heads above him?—That is at the discretion of the Commander in Chief; he would not allow a very young officer to do so. It is considered advisable that promotion should go as far as possible in the regiment without bringing in other officers over their heads. If they are to be purchased over they would rather have an officer of their own corps put above them than an officer from another corps.

248. I have a case before me, of a senior captain of a regiment who has had nearly 25 years' service, and who has been 12 years a captain; reckoning upon living five years longer, when he might be able to retire upon full pay, he might prefer remaining as senior captain, taking the chance of the death of one of the three officers above him; would he be compelled to purchase, or to see a junior officer go over his head?—In such a case as that, the major wishing to sell, the probability is that the purchase-money would be provided by the fund, and the senior captain would be promoted without purchase. For instance, the other day, on Colonel Stuart,

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Stuart, of the 21st Regiment, wishing to retire, on half pay, Major Dalyell, an officer of 20 years' service, became lieutenant colonel without purchase, and the senior captain, Captain Collingwood, who was an officer of 20 years' service, obtained his majority without purchase.

249. General *Peel.*] Was not it one of the objects of the last warrant to compel an officer to retire after he had served a sufficient time to entitle him to his promotion as brevet colonel?—The Commander in Chief has the option of forcing an officer to retire when he has attained the age of 60, but in some instances a man at 60 may be as young as a man of 40; there are exceptions to all general rules; several officers have been compelled, from increasing years and ineligibility, altogether to retire upon retired full pay.

250. In those cases, where those officers are compelled to retire on account of age, the step goes in the regiment?—Yes; but there are many cases, where there are supernumeraries, where of course there is no promotion at all.

251. No promotion goes in the regiment in that case, because there is a supernumerary who would be absorbed?—Yes.

252. Marquis of *Hartington.*] You have stated that Major Dalyell and Captain Collingwood obtained their promotion without purchase; under what regulation or warrant was that?—There is no warrant regulating it. The Commander in Chief recommends it to the Secretary at War, and the Secretary at War approves of it, or not, as he thinks proper. The Commander in Chief could not do it without the concurrence of the Secretary at War; this was a special case.

253. You do not know of any warrant which defines the cases in which officers may be allowed to take their promotion without purchase?—Yes; the 54th clause of Warrant, 3rd February 1866.

254. If the major and senior captain had not had long and distinguished service they would both have had to pay for their commissions?—Yes, according to the ordinary rule.

255. But the Commander in Chief was able, with the consent of the Secretary of State, to allow the step to go, exceptionally, without purchase?—Yes, the sum being lost to the Reserve Fund.

256. General *Peel.*] How would it be in this case; supposing the lieutenant colonel went out and the senior major was not an officer of any long standing, or the senior captain an officer of any long standing, and the commission was sold for the purpose of the Reserve Fund. If the senior lieutenant was an officer of any length of service, would it be in the power of the Commander in Chief to recommend to the Secretary at War that that officer should go without purchase?—Yes.

257. Or the senior ensign in the same way?—Yes.

258. In fact, there is no rule about it?—No, it is left to the discretion of the Secretary at War to say whether the officer whom we recommend for promotion without purchase should obtain it or not.

259. Colonel *North.*] In 1861 and 1862 no less a sum than 20,500 *l.* was paid to purchase out six gentlemen-at-arms, 8,000 *l.* being given for the retirement of Sir Travers Phillips, and 5,300 *l.* being paid for the retirement of Captain M'Donald?—They were two officers.

260. In order to produce that amount, 45 first commissions must have been sold?—The amount would be equal to the price of 45 first commissions.

261. Do not you think it rather a hardship that a fund of this description should be taxed to that amount to buy out those six or eight gentlemen-at-arms, an amount which might have provided 45 commissions, which might have been offered to 45 boys at Sandhurst?—I can only say that the buying out of those gentlemen-at-arms was decided upon by the Secretary at War in 1861 or 1862.

262. With respect to the 100 *l.* a-year for each year of foreign service and 50 *l.* a-year for each year of home service, when was the change to 50 *l.* for home service made?—The alteration was made in 1862, and the regulation on the subject is included in Royal Warrant, 3rd February 1866, clause 84.

263. Considering that it is not a matter of choice with an officer to serve at home or abroad, do not you think it a hard thing to mulct him in 50 *l.* because he was ordered to serve at home instead of abroad?—I think it is very fair that an officer whose long period of service has been abroad should receive more than a man who has never been out of England. In the case of a man who serves abroad there are all the vicissitudes of the climate and the dangers of epidemic diseases to be considered. There is always a certain degree of sympathy shown to those who have been a long time abroad.

264. It is not a matter of choice with an officer whether he shall serve in England or abroad?—A great many officers say, I prefer going here or going there; some are very anxious to go abroad, and others, for their own objects, are glad to stay at home. I do not think there is any hardship in the difference of allowance.

265. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] What proportion of the Reserve Fund comes from the infantry, and what proportion from other branches of the service?—Practically, it all comes from the infantry.

266. Colonel *North.*] The Cavalry, the Artillery, the Engineers, the Indian regiments, and the Marines all benefit by the operations of the Reserve Fund, though they pay no share towards it?—They all benefit, with the exception of the non-purchase regiments of Cavalry and Infantry and Marines.

267. Mr. *Percy Wyndham.*] You stated that the Reserve Fund had not yet been applied to paying any officer of those Indian regiments the 100 *l.* a-year for each year of foreign service, and the 50 *l.* for each year of home service?—No; they are ineligible to receive it.

268. There is no regulation or warrant preventing the Secretary at War for the time being from applying the fund to the purpose of buying out the half pay commissions of officers of those 12 Indian regiments?—Those officers who entered those regiments previous to amalgamation can only go on half-pay on medical certificate under Indian regulations, which do not affect the Reserve Fund. Those who have entered subsequently come under the ordinary regulations for retirement on full or half-pay.

269. Do you think the fund is of use in quickening promotion?—Yes, certainly.

270. It is, I presume, in order to increase the fund that the amount per year given to an officer who has got his commission for nothing has been reduced

reduced from 100 *l.* to 50 *l.* for home service?—It has that effect.

271. But, practically, it is reduced?—Yes.

272. Is not that rather an inducement to that officer to stop on longer in the service, seeing that he has a commission that is worth a good lump, but which he is not allowed to sell; the less he gets a-year the more likely he is to stay on longer, is he not?—He only gets 50 *l.* a-year for home service, and 100 *l.* a-year for foreign service; therefore, to benefit to the greatest extent, he must go abroad.

273. Captain *Vivian.*] I understood you to say, with regard to the Royal Artillery and Engineers benefiting by this fund, that they benefit by it "in certain instances;" what did you refer to by that?—I referred to officers of Engineers who have civil situations. When an officer of Engineers has held a civil situation a certain number of years, he must either elect to join his corps or to give it up; he is to be seconded or to give up his corps, whether to be placed upon half pay or not I do not know. Then a great many of those officers who decide to remain in civil employment go upon half pay, and then sell their commissions, by which they get rid of the whole thing and retain their civil appointment, getting the benefit of whatever sum of money was awarded for their commissions.

274. That is one of the instances in which officers of Royal Engineers benefit by this reserve fund; but that does not apply to the Royal Artillery?—No.

275. Can you tell us whether the Royal Artillery, being a non-purchasing corps, do not, under certain circumstances, also benefit by this reserve fund?—I think there are a great many instances of officers of Artillery having sold their half-pay commissions.

276. That is to say, being on half pay, they have received the value of their commissions, whatever their rank may have been, from the Reserve Fund?—Yes. Then the Reserve Fund has been very useful, when it has been found necessary to make a reduction in the army, by the Reserve Fund purchasing those commissions. As regards the operations of the fund, one can hardly call this a fair year to judge from, because we have not carried out yet the reductions ordered last year; we are only absorbing officers at this instant, and therefore there are not so many commissions to give away.

277. Are you able to state how much the Horse Guards has spent in purchasing commissions of gentlemen-at-arms, in order to replace them by old soldiers?—I find the whole amount expended since 1860 has been 45,000 *l.*, which was for three appointments connected with the yeomen of the guard, and 21 connected with the gentlemen-at-arms; the whole making 24.

278. How long has this system of purchase of commissions of gentlemen-at-arms out of the Reserve Fund existed?—In 1861 it began.

279. Major *O'Reilly.*] You have stated that, in fact, the Reserve Fund is contributed to only by the infantry; practically, is not it the case that the cavalry never have contributed, and you do not see any prospect of their contributing?—The cavalry do contribute in some degree; and since the alteration in the prices of cavalry commissions, considerable sums have been paid from the Reserve Fund to remunerate cavalry officers on their retiring.

280. You said that you thought the giving of a sum, equivalent to the purchase value of his commission, to a half-pay officer of a non-purchase corps, was something analogous to buying up the value of an annuity?—I fancy that is the argument that is made use of.

281. If it was simply a matter of purchasing up an annuity, it might be done by the Commissioners of the National Debt, might it not?—I believe I have heard it advanced as an argument (it is not one I advance myself) that it is analogous to buying up an annuity.

282. If this annuity was to be purchased up, do you see any reason why it should be done by a fund contributed to, as you have said, by officers of Infantry of the Line?—The only thing is this: I am afraid if it was not done by some arrangement of that sort, it would not be done at all.

283. Do you think that the officers who contribute to this Reserve Fund gain any advantage by the paying of these sums of money to half-pay officers of non-purchasing corps?—No, I do not conceive that they do.

284. But the country does?—Yes.

285. Do you say that more consideration is shown to cadets who have obtained their commissions on retiring from the service than to other persons who have not purchased their commissions?—If a cadet has won his commission by passing through his examination at Sandhurst, and if he retired from the service after two years, he would receive the value of his ensigncy.

286. Do not you think that if a young man has got his education at Sandhurst free, or partly free, and then has got a commission in the Line free, and has received his pay while he held it, he has very little claim to receive a sum from the State on retiring from the service, probably to take advantage, in civil life, of the acquirements he has gained at Sandhurst?—We will not say that he has received his education gratuitously, because very many of those have paid 100 *l.* a-year.

287. I only put it "if;" take the case of the Queen's cadets; why should a man who has received his commission free, and received the pay of his rank whilst he served, be paid a sum of money on retiring from the service?—I can see no reason for it.

288. If the whole army were non-purchase, would you consider it just that the State, besides paying the regular rate of pay to officers whilst serving, should pay a sum of money down to any officer retiring (not founded on any system of retirement after serving his full time)?—That would be a consideration for the State, not for me; I cannot solve the question.

289. Sir *Charles Russell.*] You said just now that you could see no reason why a sum of money should be paid to an officer retiring who had paid nothing for the purchase of his commission; does not it very much quicken promotion, that is to say, does not it tend to induce men to retire?—I think it quickens promotion.

290. Sir *John Trollope.*] Do you keep the accounts of this fund?—Of whatever passes through my hands; when the fund arrives at any considerable sum of money it is always invested in Government securities.

291. Captain *Vivian.*] Your account of the fund is simply a second-hand account, is not it?—Yes; I keep an account, and Messrs. Cox keep an account.

292. Sir *John Trollope.*] What is the present amount of the fund?—The present amount is 68,365 *l.*

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293. There has been a rapid accumulation lately, has not there, there having been probably a small demand upon the fund?—That is so.

294. Can you state the number of operations that this Reserve Fund is subject to annually?—No.

295. Is it uncertain in the number?—Quite uncertain; say that 1,800 *l.* is paid for a commission, the officer is only allowed to receive 1,200 *l.*, and the 600*l.* is handed over by the agent to Messrs. Cox and Co., who are obliged to account for it.

296. You stated that when the sum amounted to a considerable amount it was invested?—Yes.

297. In what?—In Exchequer Bills.

298. And the interest carried to the account of the fund?—Yes.

299. Colonel *Hogg.*] Formerly was not it the case that where an officer got his commission for nothing, when he retired he got the money back from the officer who succeeded him, the State getting nothing?—No; in such an instance an officer could not have received the full value of his commission on retirement, until he had served 20 years; then he was allowed to sell.

300. Then he got the whole money?—Yes.

301. Now a portion of the money is taken away from him if he has not served the full time?—Yes.

302. The money going to the State for this Reserve Fund?—Yes.

303. *Chairman.*] Can you tell us what number of cavalry officers still continue who will be entitled to be reimbursed the difference between the old and the new price of commissions by the Reserve Fund?—We might endeavour to find it out, but it would be a very laborious affair; we will do it if it is practicable.

304. What is at present the time that an officer is required to remain in his particular grade before he can be promoted to a higher grade?—He must be two years a subaltern before he can become a captain, and he must be six years in the service before he can become a major or a lieutenant colonel.

305. You said that one officer belonging to the former Indian service had very recently applied to be allowed to go on half-pay?—Yes, it has only been within a short time settled that they were entitled to half-pay, on medical certificate, for they have no half-pay in the Indian service.

306. Assuming that his application should be granted, I presume he would not be allowed to take advantage of the Indian retirement and of the Reserve Fund likewise?—No; certainly not.

307. Sir *John Trollope.*] The Indian regiments are now upon the same footing as the Queen's army?—They retain the same privileges which they had in the Indian service.

308. Do they take the same tour of duty?—They will when they come home.

309. *Chairman.*] Those who entered prior to the amalgamation have the advantages of the Indian service, while all those who have joined since are dealt with according to the regulations of the Queen's service?—Yes.

310. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] Will you furnish a return of the number of first commissions given for two or three years past; distinguishing those given by purchase, those given by non-purchase at Sandhurst, those given by non-purchase elsewhere, and those given to non-commissioned officers?—I will furnish that return. I have here the number of commissions given by purchase and without purchase from 1st June 1866 to 31st May 1867: 298 to direct candidates, and 101 to cadets, Royal Military College, by purchase; 106 cadets, Royal Military College, without purchase; 14 commissions to other candidates.

311. *Chairman.*] To whom were the 14 non-purchase commissions given?—To non-commissioned officers, I presume.

312. General *Peel.*] That would include three examinations at Sandhurst?—No, only two (*see Appendix*).

313. Major *O'Reilly.*] Those 12 Indian regiments are entirely non-purchase corps, are they not?—Yes.

314. No officer in those corps would be able to sell his commission, even after any length of service?—No, not as at present arranged.

315. Then if the officers retiring from those 12 regiments are to be paid a sum of money on retiring, like other officers in other regiments who have obtained their commissions without purchase, will not it require a very large sum?—They are not entitled to receive a sum of money on retirement; but there must eventually, I presume, be some change in the present arrangement.

316. Those regiments having become Queen's regiments, if 20 years hence the officers of those 12 regiments do not get any sum of money on retirement, calculated at 100*l.* or 50*l.* per annum as the case may be, for their length of service, while officers of other non-purchase regiments in the service do receive those sums, will not it be considered a case of very great hardship?—I apprehend it will.

317. Am I right in concluding that when those 12 regiments come entirely upon the Queen's establishment, this difficulty will necessarily arise, either the Reserve Fund will be overstrained to pay all the officers who retire from those 12 Indian regiments, a sum of money on retirement to which they themselves have not at all contributed, or a case of great hardship will be established in that the officers of those 12 regiments will receive no sum of money on retirement, while the officers of other non-purchase regiments receive a sum on retirement?—In the way you put it, it seems to me to be a matter well worthy of consideration.

Wednesday, 3rd July 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Baxter.	Sir Charles Russell.
Mr. Goschen.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Hogg.	Captain Vivian.
Lord Hotham.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.
General Peel.	

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Major WILLIAM MARVIN, called in; and Examined.

Major *W. Marvin.* 3 July 1867.

318. Captain *Vivian.*] WHAT appointment do you hold in the War Department?—I am Examiner of Military Services.

319. Does the Reserve Fund come under your Department?—No; I have nothing to do with the working of the Reserve Fund; but in the course of my examination into military services, the operation of the fund sometimes comes under my notice.

320. You are intimately acquainted with the operation of the fund and the purposes to which it is applied?—I cannot say that I am intimately acquainted with it; I shall be glad to give the Committee any information I possess on the subject.

321. Will you state what you know with regard to the Reserve Fund, and the purposes to which it has been applied, both before 1860, when the fund came under Parliamentary control, and since that time?—Its accumulation arises from the difference between what an officer selling is entitled to receive, and the officer purchasing is required to pay, the balance going to the Reserve Fund. Before 1825, I believe, there was a practice, introduced by the Commander in Chief, of selling first commissions for the benefit of widows and orphans of deserving officers.

322. Do you know whether the Reserve Fund was frequently applied to that purpose before 1825?—No; I have merely ascertained by reference to official papers that that used to be done; to what extent I have no means of stating, not having given my attention specially to the subject.

323. Since the period to which you have referred, to what purposes has the Reserve Fund been applied?—It has been applied to buying up half-pay commissions of officers becoming settlers in the Colonies, and in some cases to the absorption of commissions of officers who become supernumerary by the reduction of the regimental establishment. The system of selling to settle in the Colonies was discontinued in 1861 or 1862; since then, officers on the half-pay list, who would otherwise have sold to settle in the Colonies, are allowed to realise the value of their commissions by payment from the Reserve Fund.

324. Before 1861 or 1862 I understand you to say officers desiring to settle in the Colonies received a sum of money out of the Reserve Fund, for the purpose of enabling them so to settle?—Quite so; their places in the half-pay list, I believe, were filled by promotions from the effective list to the unattached list; and therefore the money was realised from payment by the officers who got the promotion. In effect it is the same now as it was formerly.

325. To what other purposes has this Reserve Fund been applied?—It has, I believe, been applied to the purchase of the appointments of gentlemen-at-arms. It has also been applied to the purchase of the half-pay of artillery and engineer officers, but up to the time that the system of selling to settle in the Colonies was discontinued, officers of artillery and engineers were allowed to realise the value of their commissions for the purpose of settling in the Colonies, and when that system was discontinued they were allowed to sell their commissions to the fund. That is indirectly an advantage to officers of cavalry and infantry, who are the only contributors to the fund, inasmuch as the buying up of the half-pay of an artillery or an engineer officer enables an officer of the line to retire to the half-pay list, such officer taking the place of the artillery or engineer half-pay officer; promotion, by that means, being afforded to the line regiment by purchase.

326. There is no limit to the half-pay list, is there?—The Treasury will not allow you to exceed the half-pay by a single shilling, without their consent; but my opinion has always been that an officer who has acquired the right to retire upon half-pay after 25 years' service should do so; the promotion going in the regiment without purchase. In the artillery and engineers the steps are filled without purchase, and I see no reason why the promotion should not go in the same way in the line; at present the Treasury will not allow you to increase the half-past list; and therefore for every one you put upon the half-pay list you must take one off.

327. You think that the application of this Reserve Fund to the purpose of buying out officers of artillery on half-pay is, to a certain extent, justified by the fact, that it makes room for an officer, in a purchase corps, to go upon the half-pay list?—Quite so, and it is merely from

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continuing to the artillery and engineer officer the practice that has existed from my earliest recollection; a military officer was always allowed to realise the value of his commission to settle in the Colonies.

328. *Chairman.*] Was that always the case?—I remember an artillery officer being allowed to realise the value of his commission to settle in the Colonies, in 1825 or 1826.

329. When was it that the sale of unattached commissions first began?—I should think about the year 1825.

330. Was not it at that time that something was done for the artilléry in the way of allowing them to sell their commissions?—I cannot say whether anything was specially done for them at that time.

331. Captain *Vivian.*] Since what time has this Reserve Fund come under your cognizance, as connected with your department?—I have had a knowledge of the working of the fund to the extent stated in my answer to No. 319, since about the year 1855–56. If the services of an officer are in anyway connected with the Reserve Fund then I see the working of it.

332. The Reserve Fund came under Parliamentary control in 1860?—I believe so.

333. Before 1860 it was under the absolute control of the Secretary for War, was it not?—Quite so.

334. That is to say he could manage that fund exactly as he liked, and could apply it to any purposes he liked?—Yes.

335. Can you tell the Committee whether it was differently applied before it came under Parliamentary control?—I do not think there has been any difference in its application, except so far as regards the purchase of the appointment of the gentlemen-at-arms, and paying the difference between the old and new price of cavalry commissions of officers retiring. They are the only additional charges upon the fund that I am aware of.

336. Since 1861, when the price of cavalry commissions was altered, the difference between the old and the new price of those commissions has been borne by the fund?—Yes.

337. The placing of the fund under Parliamentary control has caused no difference, you say, in the application of it, so that the control has been neither a benefit nor a disadvantage to it?—I do not see any difference; Parliament knows now how the fund is being worked, which they did not know before.

338. Do you think the reserve fund is a benefit to the army generally?—I think it is; I think it enables the Commander in Chief sometimes to give first commissions without purchase. It enables him also to give commissions to officers of long standing, who, by the accidents of the service, have stood a long time in their grade, and who perhaps have not had the means of purchase. In cases where the retiring lieutenant colonel of the regiment is within a short period of becoming a general officer, the commission is given, as a rule, to the regiment, without purchase. In some cases some of the commissions are bought up, and others are given away without purchase, but the money for the officer who is selling must be made up.

339. You say that the Reserve Fund enables the Commander in Chief to give commissions to officers of long standing without purchase; but does not it also to a certain extent cripple and confine the power of the Commander in Chief of giving away first commissions, inasmuch as those commissions are very often sold for the purpose of paying the money to the Reserve Fund?—It is frequently the case, that they are sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund; but if you had no Reserve Fund you would have invariably to sell them to make up the money for the officer retiring.

340. Do you mean that if there were no Reserve Fund, there would be no first commissions to give away?—I should say so, except in death vacancies, and vacancies caused by retirements on full pay or by promotions to the rank of general officer, or by augmentation.

341. Are not first commissions, arising from death vacancies, very often now sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund?—That I cannot say; in some cases it may be so, but I cannot positively say that such is the case.

342. So far as death vacancies occur, if there were no Reserve Fund, all those first commissions might be given away?—Certainly.

343. They might be given to cadets at Sandhurst, for instance?—Quite so.

344. Is there any other information you can give the Committee with regard to the Reserve Fund which you think would assist them in their inquiry?—I am not aware of anything beyond the answers I have already given.

345. General *Peel.*] When an application comes from the Horse Guards to the War Department to allow an officer to retire, is it submitted to you to make inquiry whether his services entitle him to retire?—My duties are to investigate all special claims of officers and soldiers in respect of promotion, former service, &c., which may be referred to me by the War Office authorities. If it is a clear case, it is settled without coming to me; but if it is a special case, calling for investigation, I have to investigate the claim.

346. That has nothing to do with the application of the Reserve Fund?—No.

347. You say, that by purchasing up the half-pay of an engineer or artillery officer, it enables an officer of the line to go upon half-pay in his place?—It enables an officer of 25 years' service to go to half-pay.

348. Only an officer who has retired after 25 years' service?—Yes.

349. Supposing an officer wished to retire who had not served for 25 years, the Reserve Fund would sell that commission, would they not?—There are two lieutenant colonels, four majors, and two captains allowed to be promoted annually to the unattached list, and the money or the half-pay that is sold to the Reserve Fund enables those officers to go to half-pay without increasing the half-pay charge.

350. The purchasing up of their half-pay is a benefit to the country, and not to the officers, is it not?—It is a benefit to the country. If officers could go to the half-pay list, without the necessity of having any half-pay bought up, to make room for them, then it would be an advantage to the officers.

351. Are you aware of the rule I laid down when I was last in office, that when the difference between the price received by the officer retiring and the price paid by his successor amounted to 450 *l.*, the first commission should go without purchase?—Yes.

352. That of course materially increases the number

number of first commissions to be given away without purchase?—Yes.

353. Is not the effect of this Reserve Fund to make every retirement from the service a question of purchase. If an officer has purchased his commission he sells it in order to receive the price he has paid for it. If, on the other hand, he retires, not having purchased his commission, the commission is sold in order that he should receive that allowance of 100*l.* a year for every year of Foreign Service, or 50*l.* for every year of Home Service?—Yes.

354. Therefore, it makes every commission on retirement a commission by purchase?—Yes, except in the cases I have referred to.

355. Supposing there was no Reserve Fund at all, an officer after a certain number of years' service would be entitled to go upon half-pay?—He has an unqualified right to go upon half-pay after 25 years' service.

356. And the promotion would go in the regiment?—Yes.

357. Instead of that, the Treasury allow him to sell his commission for the benefit of the Reserve Fund?—His commission is sold in order to buy up a place on the half-pay list to which he can retire.

358. If there were no Reserve Fund, he would be equally entitled to go upon the half-pay list, and the promotion would go in the regiment?—Yes.

359. The fund therefore must interfere, necessarily, with the natural promotion in the regiment of the officers who do not purchase?—Certainly.

360. Colonel *North.*] I think from the evidence given before this Committee, it appears that though the Secretary of State for War, after having gone most minutely into the case of any officer that might be brought before him, may have decided upon a certain plan, that plan may be completely upset by the decision of the Treasury?—The Secretary of State endeavours to come to a conclusion in accordance with what has been done in former cases by the Treasury.

361. Supposing the Secretary of State has not succeeded in doing so, the Treasury may upset the decision of the Secretary of State for War?—Quite so, if it is at variance with the plan previously laid down by the Treasury.

362. They lay down plans, like that regulation, to meet their own views?—This regulation was established in 1861, upon the case of an officer of a regiment of cavalry who wanted to go to half-pay, and who said, "I want to retire upon half-pay, and I want to give the regiment the benefit of the promotion, and I cannot do that without finding an officer upon the half-pay list to come to full pay, and to whom I must pay a considerable bonus; therefore I would propose for the consideration of the Secretary of State, that I should be permitted to go to half-pay, and that the promotion should go in the regiment by purchase, and the purchase money go to the Reserve Fund to buy out some other half-pay officer. That was submitted to the Secretary of State, and by him referred to the Treasury, and this was the regulation founded upon that case. This is an extract from regulations to be observed with reference to retirements on half-pay, dated War Office, 10th September 1861: "1. Vacancies occasioned in regiments of cavalry and infantry by officers of 25 years' service retiring on half-pay under the provisions of clause 46 of the Royal Warrant of 14th October 1858, as amended by Royal Warrant of 20th March 1861, shall be filled up by purchase, and the purchase money carried to the credit of the Reserve Fund; except in cases where the officers retiring on half-pay will probably obtain the rank of major general within a period of two years, and where the officers next for promotion in the regiment have been, from various circumstances, placed in an unfavourable position as compared with other corps, but from the length and distinguished nature of their services have a claim to be favourably considered; when it will rest with the Secretary of State to decide upon the merits of each case to what extent the vacancies should be filled up by purchase or otherwise."

363. General *Peel.*] Supposing a lieutenant colonel applies to go on half-pay, and his commission is sold by the Reserve Fund, and the Horse Guards make a recommendation to the War Department, that in consequence of the long services of the senior major or the senior captain, they should be allowed to be promoted without purchase; are the services of that officer then submitted to you to report to the Secretary of State for War whether or not you consider his services sufficient to entitle him to obtain a commission without purchase?—I should be required to report on such a case to the Under Secretary of State so far as regards the officer's services, and any special circumstances connected therewith.

364. Then in fact you have nothing to do with the Reserve Fund as Examiner of Military Services?—No.

365. Colonel *North.*] Can you tell the Committee when the allowance of 100*l.*, for every year of service, to an officer if he had served at home, was reduced to 50*l.*?—I think four or five years ago.

366. Was that a War Office, or a Horse Guards regulation?—It was a regulation of the War Office; the old regulation was that the officers were allowed the 100*l.*, whether for service at home or abroad; then it was found that there was no positive authority for having given that sum, and it was reconsidered, and determined that 100*l.* should be given for each year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for each year of home service.

367. Considering that an officer cannot of himself choose whether he will stay at home, or serve abroad, do not you think that that is rather hard upon an officer who has been obliged to serve at home?—I am quite of opinion that you should give greater facilities for promotion in regiments, without purchase, than exist at present, but while the Treasury object to the increase of the half-pay list, you cannot do it by means of retirement to half-pay.

368. Mr. *Percy Wyndham.*] If an officer retires upon full pay, his promotion invariably goes without purchase?—Yes.

369. But it does not invariably go without purchase when he retires upon half-pay?—Certainly not; it goes invariably in the case of retirement upon full pay, because there is a fixed sum of 60,000*l.* a-year to provide for such retirement.

370. Do you think the necessity, real or assumed, of keeping up the Reserve Fund, leads to many of the steps caused by retirement on half-pay, to go by purchase, which, but for the existence of that fund, would be permitted to

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go without purchase?—If the State would sanction an addition to the half-pay list, there is no reason why every vacancy should not go without purchase.

371. If it was not for buying up those steps, would there be any necessity for the Reserve Fund at all?—If the State would allow an unlimited half-pay list, there would be no necessity for it.

372. If the steps caused by the retirement of an officer to half-pay do not go without purchase, an officer who does not purchase has a very small chance of promotion?—His chances of promotion are confined to death vacancies and other casualties mentioned in my reply to 340.

373. In the case of a major receiving an unattached lieutenant colonelcy after long service, would that step go without purchase through the regiment?—No; he would be replaced from the half-pay list, or his commission would be sold for the benefit of the Reserve Fund.

374. That leads very often to officers of long service being passed over, does it not?—Frequently; an officer who has not money to purchase is inevitably passed over.

375. Do augmentation steps go without purchase?—Yes, unless there are supernumeraries to absorb.

376. Invariably?—As a rule they go without purchase, except where there are supernumeraries to absorb. Sometimes an officer may be brought from the half-pay list to fill the augmentation vacancies.

377. I have a case before me in which, on two majors retiring to the unattached list, the two senior captains, who were men of long service, got their steps without purchase; but the two senior lieutenants (one of whom had served 13 years and the other 10 years, and one of whom had been purchased over 14 times, and had served during the whole of the Indian mutiny) were purchased over in order that the money might go to the Reserve Fund. If it were not for the necessity of keeping up the Reserve Fund, I suppose that the probability is that those steps would have gone without purchase?—In such a case, they must have gone without purchase. If the two senior captains got their promotion without purchase on account of long service, I am not prepared to say why the others should not have had theirs in the same way.

378. Is it in contemplation to allow the officers of Indian regiments to benefit by the Reserve Fund?—I should say not; they can have no claim to it.

379. What is the pay of a gentleman-at-arms and a yeoman of the guard?—I think the pay of the gentleman-at-arms is about 60*l.* or 70*l.* a year. The old members of the corps used to calculate that they got about five per cent. upon what they paid for their appointments.

380. *Chairman.*] There were advantages besides their pay; for instance, exemption from serving on juries, and so on?—Yes; the officers of the line who have contributed to this fund have, however, benefited indirectly by those purchases, inasmuch as the appointments are being filled from the half-pay men, who in their time contributed to the Reserve Fund.

381. Mr. *Percy Wyndham.*] The Reserve Fund is, in fact, taking money from A. to benefit B., C., and D., is it not?—Yes.

382. *Chairman.*] Do not those officers who are appointed to the corps of gentlemen-at-arms remain upon the half-pay list?—Yes.

383. How do the officers of the army benefit if they remain on the half-pay?—I mean that the officers on the half-pay list who get the appointments, and who formerly, (while on full pay) contributed to the fund are benefitted.

384. Mr. *Baxter.*] Have you known any instances in which the decision of the Secretary for War, with regard to the Reserve Fund, has been altered by the Treasury?—Not as regards the application of the fund; I do not think the Treasury could interfere with the application of the fund; they could interfere with any arrangement proposed by the Secretary of State, the effect of which would be to increase the half-pay list.

385-6. I understood you to say that you did not consider that the Treasury had anything at all to do with the Reserve Fund; they have no direct control over the Reserve Fund?—No.

387. Mr. *Goschen.*] To whom do you consider that the Reserve Fund equitably belongs?—It belongs to the officers of cavalry and infantry who contribute to it.

388. Captain *Vivian.*] The cavalry have not contributed to it, have they?—Yes, in precisely the same way that an infantry officer contributes to it. The cavalry officer retiring on half-pay, if he entered the cavalry before the 31st January 1860, gets the difference between the old and new price of his commission.

389. *Chairman.*] Have there been many instances of the fund being so contributed to in the case of cavalry officers?—Yes.

390. Mr. *Goschen.*] You have stated that, according to your view, the fund arises from the contributions of cavalry and infantry officers?—That is my opinion.

391. Does the fund arise from the contributions of officers in service and on full pay, or from the contributions of officers who are only on half-pay?—Half-pay officers do not contribute at all; it is the officers on full pay; in fact, it is the difference between what one officer receives on selling and what the other officer pays on purchasing his commission.

392. In what way can you say that it is contributed to by the officers; does it come out of their pockets?—An officer who buys, we will say, a company or a troop of cavalry, pays 1,100*l.*, the difference between his lieutenancy and his company or troop. The officer who sells has, perhaps, bought his company and paid 1,100*l.* for it, and, perhaps, he has had six years' home service, which would be 300*l.* more, making 1,400*l.*, which he would receive; whereas the officer who gets the company pays 1,100*l.* for it. Then the ensign who gets the lieutenancy pays 250*l.*, and the price of the first commission is 450*l.* in addition, making 1,800*l.* altogether; whereas the officer retiring would only get 1,400*l.*, the difference going to the Reserve Fund.

393. That difference does not come out of the pocket of the man who sells?—No, he has never paid it.

394. On the other hand, the retiring officer gets no advantage from the system of the Reserve Fund, does he?—An officer who retires gets the 100*l.* or the 50*l.* for each year's service.

395. *Chairman.*] That is, if he has not purchased?—If he has not purchased all his commissions. If an officer retiring has purchased only one of his commissions, he gets the 100*l.* or the 50*l.*

50*l.* to make up the full value of his commission, if he has served long enough to entitle him to the full value.

396. Mr. *Goschen.*] Is not the effect of the Reserve Fund to compel officers in a regiment to pay more during a given number of years for the purchase of steps than they would have to pay if the Reserve Fund did not exist. As I understand you, the Reserve Fund, in fact, gets the difference between the price paid and the money received, which difference is paid by the officer who retires?—That difference is paid by the promoted officer, because he pays more than the officer who retires receives.

397. The officers in a regiment really pay more than they would have to pay for promotion, if it were not for the action of the Reserve Fund, do they not?—No. In any case, the officer would pay the full value of his commission, unless you made the arrangement that the officer promoted should only pay what the officer retiring received; then you would do away with the regulation price of commissions.

398. The Reserve Fund gets the difference between the two prices for the commission; out of whose pocket does that difference come?—The difference comes out of the promoted officer's pocket; but he gets his value for it in the superior commission.

399. Then is it not a grievance upon the promoted officer?—No.

400. Therefore, as he gets the full value for what he pays, you can scarcely say that the fund belongs to him?—Certainly not; I merely meant that the fund arose from payments made by those officers.

401. The fund arises out of those differences, which are a grievance to nobody; therefore you cannot well say that it belongs to the officers, because they have not suffered, inasmuch as they have received full value for everything they have paid?—Quite so.

402. Instead of saying that the fund belonged to the officers of cavalry and infantry who have contributed to it, it would be more correct, would it not, to say that the Reserve Fund has accumulated from the right of the State to sell commissions?—In saying that it belonged to the officers, I simply meant to convey that the accumulation arose from the difference between what the one received and the other paid.

403. In the case of the sale of first commissions, the money goes to the fund also?—Yes, ordinarily.

404. Therefore the Reserve Fund might be described as the price which the State has received either by the sale of first commissions or by the sale of promotions?—It might be so described, but I do not consider that the State has any claim to the fund.

405. Consequently the Reserve Fund belongs rather to the State than to any particular branch of the service?—I scarcely know how to answer that; because, if there were no purchase of commissions there would be no Reserve Fund, and the State would have nothing to do with the question.

406. It depends upon whether it is right or wrong for the State to sell commissions at all?—It arises from that. If there were no such thing as the sale of commissions, there would be no Reserve Fund.

407. The fact that a portion of the Reserve Fund had been applied to relieve the ineffective vote, would afford some ground for regarding it as belonging to the State?—It serves the State, I admit.

408. The State has sold commissions on the one hand, and relieved itself of a certain amount of half-pay on the other?—Yes, the State has been so relieved by the fund.

409. Colonel *North.*] It was never State money in any way, was it?—No, never.

410. Mr. *Goschen.*] It is State money so far that it arises from the act of the State in selling a commission which it is entitled to sell, and which nobody else has a right to sell. If the Commander in Chief or the Secretary for War in the name of the State sells a certain number of commissions, the profits of those commissions belong to the State, whether the money is voted by Parliament or not?—In that sense, I suppose it might be taken to be so.

411. You admit that the purchasing officer gets the full value for his payment?—He gets the market value.

412. If the market price is paid for the commission, and that market price is divided between the Reserve Fund and the officer who is retiring, the officer retiring does not get the market value?—Quite so; the difference goes to the Reserve Fund, and though it may be at variance with what I said before, I cannot help viewing that difference as property belonging to the officers of cavalry and infantry.

413. If the purchaser pays the full market price, and if the State retains a portion of the price, the man who goes out does not get the full market value?—Just so; but the officer who retires is able, by means of the Reserve Fund, to get that which he would not have been able to get before.

414. It has been suggested that those officers suffer over whose heads you pass by this system, who, if there were no purchase, would get promotion, but who lose the step by the purchase taking place. Do you regard those officers as real sufferers by the system?—If there were no system of purchase no such vacancies would occur. An officer retires by the sale of his commission, and if there were no such thing as the sale of commissions, he would not retire at all, and the officer who, under the existing system is now passed over, would remain in his proper place.

415. Parliament require an audit of this fund, do they not?—They require a report to be made to them annually; I believe it is audited by the chief auditor of the War Office.

416. As I gather from the evidence which has been given, the Secretary of State for the War Department and the Horse Guards have dealt with this fund at their discretion, according to whether the fund was high or low?—Quite so; they have been guided by the state of the fund, in its application.

417. Sometimes they have relieved the State by buying up half-pay annuities, and sometimes they have not?—If they have not had the money, the transactions have been suspended.

418. Is it considered a grievance generally in the army that the money has been applied in that way?—I have not heard it spoken of as a grievance.

419. It is relieving the annual estimates of a certain amount of charge, is it not?—Quite so, because an officer of 25 years' service has an unqualified right to go to half pay, and if there were

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were no Reserve Fund to buy up half-pay to make room for the retiring officer, the State would have to bear the extra expense.

420. The relief to the State by this system is dependent upon the discretion of the Secretary for War; he has been able to relieve the estimates or not according to his discretion, and according to the state of the Reserve Fund?—He has been enabled to prevent an increase to the half-pay by its means.

421. It was not his duty to decrease the half-pay list by means of this Reserve Fund; it was within his discretion entirely?—The Treasury prevent his increasing the half-pay list. According to the existing arrangements, if an officer goes to half-pay, you make room for him by buying up some other officer's half-pay commission. You cannot incur any additional charge to the half-pay list without the special sanction of the Treasury.

422. As a matter of fact, without any vote of Parliament or any interference of Parliament, has it lain in the discretion of the Treasury and the War Office, whether the non-effective vote should be increased or decreased?—It has been ruled by the Treasury that the half-pay vote should not be increased without their special sanction.

423. Colonel *Hogg.*] Do you consider the general operation of the Reserve Fund beneficial to the army?—I do.

424. Does not the country benefit directly by the Reserve Fund, which has been entirely contributed to by officers of the army?—Yes.

425. You consider that the fund belongs to the army?—That is my impression.

426. The only persons who could possibly be said to be aggrieved by the operation of the Reserve Fund, would be officers going upon half-pay, and young officers in the regiment who would have to pay for their commissions on succession to their steps?—They would have to pay for their commissions, whether there were a Reserve Fund or not.

427. Supposing an officer went to half-pay after 25 years' service, if there were no Reserve Fund the step would go without purchase, would it not?—Yes.

428. Officers, by means of the Reserve Fund, are able to go on half-pay with more facility than they would if there were no Reserve Fund, so that they get a benefit directly from it, do they not?—I think it would come to the same thing if there were no Reserve Fund, because if they had served 25 years they would be entitled to go to half-pay; I consider that an officer would have a claim to half-pay after a service of 25 years, whether there was a Reserve Fund or not, and an officer in a non-purchase corps has the same claim.

429. This Reserve Fund is a benefit to the army, because formerly an officer who had not purchased his commission could not sell it except he had served for 20 years?—Yes.

430. Now, he gets 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for every year of home service?—Yes, and this, I think, is a very useful arrangement, as, without such an inducement, the officer would not retire, and in that case no promotion would occur.

431. General *Peel.*] Is not this the case that it is not the man who retires, nor the man who purchases, who suffers, but the man who is obliged to purchase the first commission which he might otherwise obtain without purchase?—Yes, it might be given to him without purchase.

432. By his having to purchase, he loses the interest of his money, because when he retires he merely gets his own money back again, and does not get the 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, or the 50*l.* for every year of home service?—Quite so, except in the case of an officer who has purchased some of his commissions. He gets the 100*l.*, and 50*l.* for every year of service, to make up a sum not exceeding the full value of his commission.

433. Therefore it is a hardship upon that class?—Yes.

434. *Chairman.*] You have said that this Reserve Fund is contributed to entirely by the infantry and cavalry; what is the effect upon those who contribute to the maintenance of this fund by letting in the artillery and the engineers who contribute nothing towards it?—It is a privilege continued to the artillery since the discontinuance of the privilege they enjoyed of selling their commissions to settle in the Colonies, and the purchase of their half-pay makes room for an infantry or cavalry officer to go to the half-pay list. By an officer of artillery retiring upon half-pay, on getting the value of his commission from the Reserve Fund, an opening is afforded for another officer retiring from the line to the half-pay list.

435. If an artillery officer who has contributed nothing to the fund is allowed to benefit by it, he must do so at the expense of those who have contributed to it, must he not?—If he were to benefit by it to the exclusion of a cavalry or an infantry officer who applied to sell his half-pay, then of course it would be an injustice; but I do not think in any case the application of an artillery officer to sell his half-pay has been granted to the exclusion of an infantry officer. No application from an infantry officer or a cavalry officer who has served 25 years, to commute his half-pay, has been rejected that I am aware of. If the fund is in a condition to admit of it, an artillery officer is allowed to do the same; and when that is the case, it is a benefit to the line, inasmuch as there is an opening for a half-pay retirement.

436. If the fund were at any time not sufficient in amount to enable the applications of both infantry officers and artillery officers to be granted, preference would be given to the infantry officers?—Yes, artillery officers are not allowed to avail themselves of the benefit of the fund, as a matter of course; it is only in special cases that they are permitted to sell their half-pay commissions; they cannot claim the right to sell.

437. Captain *Vivian.*] Is an artillery officer on half-pay allowed to sell his commission at whatever age he may be, or in whatever state of health he may be?—No, he must be under 60 years of age, and must have served 25 years, and be in good health.

438. If a lieutenant colonel of artillery of 59 years of age is on half-pay, he may sell his commission for 4,500*l.*?—If the fund will stand it, and the Secretary of State chooses to allow it, he is granted the privilege as a favour.

439. Mr. *Goschen.*] He can sell to nobody else than the Reserve Fund?—He must sell to the Reserve Fund.

440. Captain *Vivian.*] The State benefits to the extent that it buys up an annuity?—It buys up an annuity, but you create another annuity by sending an infantry officer to fill his place in the half-pay

half-pay list. The money with which you buy up the half-pay of the artillery officer makes room on the half-pay list for an infantry or cavalry officer. The state is in the same condition as before.

441. An officer of artillery on half-pay of 59 years of age who sells his commission, makes a very good bargain?—No doubt.

442. And he makes a very good bargain at the expense of a fund created by purchase officers?—Quite so; but you must keep in view the fact, that the cavalry and infantry derive the benefit of having those vacancies to go to.

443. General *Peel.*] The 4,500 *l.* which you pay to buy up the commission of a lieutenant colonel of artillery, would enable you to give without purchase 10 first commissions?—If you did not buy out the artillery officer, you would prevent a line officer going to half-pay of the corresponding rank to the artillery officer who sells, and no vacancy would be created.

444. Not if he is entitled to go upon half-pay?—The Treasury do not recognise his title if you increase the half-pay by it.

445. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] In your opinion, how is this 70,000 *l.* a year (or whatever the amount of the Reserve Fund may be) obtained; is it obtained without any loss to the infantry in general?—I should say it is.

446. And it benefits the cavalry, the artillery, and the yeomen of the guard?—It is benefit to those who wish to realise.

447. *Chairman.*] The operations of the fund extend also to the engineers and the marines, do they not?—Not to the marines.

448. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] If this fund is so beneficial to the service, why should not its operations be still further extended by selling all commissions in the line, instead of only a certain number?—It must be half-pay commissions simply, because commissions in the line are bought by officers who are promoted.

449. Is the system carried as far as it can be carried; is there any restriction upon the sale of half-pay commissions?—The only restrictions are that the officer shall be in a sound state of health; that he shall have served 25 years; that he is upon permanent half-pay by reason of such service, and that he is under 60 years of age.

450. This 70,000 *l.* comes from the infantry; they must suffer some sort of disadvantage in order to provide the 70,000 *l.*; is not that disadvantage the price of the first commissions; is not the effect of the Reserve Fund that there are a smaller number of first commissions to be given away?—I cannot see that. If it were not for the Reserve Fund, every first commission, except in death and augmentation vacancies, and other non-purchase vacancies I have already referred to, must be sold, to make up the sum due to the officer retiring by sale.

451. It enables a far smaller number of commissions by purchase to be given, does it not?—I do not see it at all.

452. Where does the money come from; what is the disadvantage to the infantry which is represented by this 70,000 *l.*, or whatever it is?—It is the difference between what one man pays and the other man receives.

453. Mr. *Goschen.*] With reference to the artillery, if they sell, they get too much?—A lieutenant colonel of artillery gets the same as a lieutenant colonel of infantry.

454. It is more than the value of the annuity, if calculated by an accountant?—It is more than an actuary would give; but then it must be taken into consideration that by buying out the officer you not only buy up his half-pay, but you buy up his widows' and orphans' pension; this would be taken into account by an actuary.

455. If you take all that into consideration, does he still get more than he would be likely to cost the State?—That is a question which only an actuary could answer.

456. Captain *Vivian.*] What is the half-pay of a lieutenant colonel of artillery?—Eleven shillings and eight pence a day; while that of an infantry lieutenant colonel is 11 *s.*

457. Mr. *Goschen.*] If the artillery officer gets too much, the State makes a bad bargain in buying him out at 4,500 *l.*?—It is the same in the case of the line officer; with merely this difference, that you give 4,500 *l.* for 11 *s.* a day, the infantry lieutenant colonel's half-pay, and the same sum for the artillery half-pay, which is 11 *s.* 8 *d.* a day.

458. The officer himself gets a bonus?—Quite so; he prefers the 4,500 *l.* to 11 *s.* 8 *d.* a day.

459. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] Is not it the case that on account of the Reserve Fund, there are fewer commissions to be given without purchase in the infantry?—I do not think that the Reserve Fund affects it in the slightest degree.

460. By the system of the Reserve Fund, officers are enabled to sell their commissions who otherwise would not be able to sell them, are they not?—If they were not able to sell their commissions by means of the Reserve Fund, they would remain in the service, and there would be no first commissions to give away.

461. *Chairman.*] It has been given in evidence that by the operation of the Reserve Fund the number of commissions appropriated to the Military College has been of late years considerably diminished?—I was not aware of that.

462. With respect to the engineers, there are many officers of engineers holding civil employment, are there not?—Yes.

463. And during the time that they hold that civil employment they are seconded, their rank going on in the meantime?—Yes.

464. Do you think that it ought to be open to those officers (after they have been in civil employment for a great many years, and after, perhaps, some of them have got good civil situations), through the means of this Reserve Fund, to sell their commissions, and put so much into their pockets from a fund to which they have never contributed a farthing?—It would be unfair if the infantry officers did not receive that indirect advantage to which I refer, namely, a vacancy on the half-pay list.

465. Do you give to the infantry officer any advantage at all to be compared with the advantage which those engineer officers can derive through the means of this Reserve Fund?—The advantage to the engineer officer is great, it is true, but I cannot see that the line officer loses anything by it, so long as the fund is capable of meeting all the line demands.

466. Do not you think that it must create a bad feeling in the minds of officers of infantry and cavalry who contribute towards this fund to see gentlemen, who have been civilians for perhaps many years, becoming soldiers again for the moment, and then selling their commissions and taking the money from the Reserve Fund?—I certainly

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I certainly consider that infantry and cavalry officers have the first claim upon the fund; no consideration should be extended to officers of artillery or engineers, that would infringe upon any advantage which officers of infantry or cavalry (the only contributors) might otherwise obtain from the fund.

467. There have been recently added a certain number of Indian regiments to our establishment?—Yes.

468. Those Indian corps are all non-purchase corps?—Yes.

469. I believe the arrangement is that all those officers who entered the Indian service before the amalgamation, are allowed to take advantage of the then existing Indian arrangements, but all who have come in since will be subject to the arrangements in our own army. Some years hence, when the officers of those Indian corps come under the new system, will they not have the same claim to come upon the Reserve Fund as the artillery and engineers?—They would be in precisely the same category as the artillery and engineers. If they come upon the Reserve Fund at all, it would only be in special and rare cases. It is only in rare cases that officers of artillery and engineers are allowed to sell. If it were done in the case of the officers of those Indian regiments it would only be in consideration of their making way on the half-pay list for an infantry or cavalry officer of a purchased corps.

470. That would be for the benefit of the State?—Yes.

471. But do not you think it will produce a bad feeling on the part of the officers of infantry and cavalry if they see that they have not only to provide for the retirement of artillery and engineers, but for those non-purchase Indian regiments?—All I can say to that is, that I think no concession would be made to non-purchasing corps that would in any way deprive the legitimate claimants on the fund of what they could possibly get.

472. That is to say, that no Indian officer should be allowed to benefit by this fund, so long as there was any English officer desirous of doing so?—Quite so.

473. Would it not be objectionable, as a military arrangement, if one year one officer was able to do that which another year another officer, in precisely the same service and with precisely the same claim, would be prevented from doing, merely because the fund happened to be in one year high and the other year low?—It would be objectionable if it were not that it would only be done in rare cases; and if it were not, as I have already said, that the purchasing up the commission of such an officer, is an indirect advantage to an infantry officer. If there were any reason for closing the door against a non-purchase regiment, the Secretary of State would be at liberty to do it, and would do it at once, no doubt.

474. The time for closing the door would be before anybody was allowed to go through it, would it not?—Each case is specially considered in the first instance, and if there is any ground to suppose that injustice would be done to others by granting the application, it would be refused.

475. I will now ask you one or two questions which would probably have been put to you by another Member of the Committee, if he had been here to-day. If the officers retiring from those Indian regiments are to be paid a sum of money on retiring, like other officers in other regiments who have obtained their commissions without purchase, will not it require a very large sum?—I do not think they should be taken into consideration at all till other claims were satisfied. If the fund has accumulated a large balance, and the fund can afford to buy out officers of non-purchase corps, then it might be done specially, but I do not consider that they have any claim, and the claim ought to be ignored.

476. Do not you think that it would be a dangerous military arrangement that a person should be allowed an advantage one year, and another person in the same position refused the next?—It is only contingent upon the state of the fund. Many artillery officers have applied to sell, and have been refused over and over again because the fund would not admit of it.

477. You consider that they have no legitimate claim to it?—I do.

478. Nor would the non-purchase regiments of the line have any claim; they would be in the same category as the artillery?—Yes.

479. Those Indian regiments having become Queen's regiments, if 20 years hence the officers of those regiments do not get any sum of money on retirement, calculated at 100*l.* or 50*l.* per annum, as the case may be, for their length of service, while officers of other non-purchase regiments in the service do receive those sums, will not it be considered a case of very great hardship?—The artillery and engineers do not get this 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for every year of home service; the artillery and engineers never get anything unless they have served 25 years, and then they get the full price of their commissions.

480. And yet officers of artillery and engineers have retired altogether?—Yes, those who have been bought out have retired after 25 years' service. We do not consider that an application from an artillery or engineer officer to be allowed to realise the value of his commission can be entertained at all unless he has served 25 years.

481. Am I right in concluding that when those Indian regiments come entirely upon the Queen's establishment this difficulty will necessarily arise: either the Reserve Fund will be over-strained to pay all the officers who retire from those Indian regiments a sum of money on retirement, to which they themselves have not at all contributed, or a case of great hardship will be established, in that the officers of those Indian regiments will receive no sum of money on retirement, while the officers of other non-purchase regiments receive a sum on retirement?—No provision can be made by means of the Reserve Fund for any of those officers of the Indian army.

482. They may be dealt with in the same way as the engineers and artillery?—Yes; which is very exceptionally. If numerous claims were to arise from those new regiments, you must close the door altogether not only upon them but upon the artillery as well.

483. Captain *Vivian.*] You have said that there have been very few instances in which the artillery and engineer officers have benefited by being allowed to sell their commissions?—A few only have benefitted.

484. And that a great many officers, both of artillery and engineers have been refused, who have made applications?—Yes; frequently an officer

officer of artillery or engineers, who wants to realise the value of his commission, has ascertained beforehand that he would not be allowed to do so, and therefore he has not applied.

485. Have those refusals been based upon the state of the fund only?—Yes; and the necessity for providing for other claims.

486. Not having regard to the services of the officer?—No application is entertained from an artillery officer, unless he has served 25 years.

487. If two officers of artillery applied to commute their half pay, both of whom had served 25 years, and both of them had that claim to sell, one of whom was a distinguished officer, and the other of whom had not had an opportunity of distinguishing himself, would any more consideration be paid to the one than the other?—The services of the officer would be taken into consideration. If two officers applied, who had both served 25 years, I believe the officer who had seen most service, and had been most useful to the country, would have the preference.

488. Who decides upon those claims?—The Secretary of State for War.

489. Not the Horse Guards?—The Horse Guards may recommend. The Commander in Chief may refuse applications that the Secretary of State for War never hears of, but if he represents a case to the Secretary of State the Secretary of State has the decision.

490. You have stated that, in the application of this fund, the preference is given to officers of the line?—Yes.

491. You hold that the line officer does not suffer really by the artillery officer being allowed to sell his commission for 4,500 *l.*, because it gives him a vacancy on the half-pay list, which he would not otherwise obtain?—That is an indirect advantage which is worth something to the line officer.

492. Is it worth 4,500 *l.* to him?—I do not know that it is worth that to him, but it affords promotion.

493. That is to say, it affords one vacancy on the half-pay list?—One vacancy on the half-pay list to which the officer of the line can retire.

494. If that 4,500 *l.* had not been applied to purchasing the commission of the lieutenant colonel of artillery on half pay, it would have allowed the State to give 10 first commissions without purchase?—Yes; and then, of course, you would have had the artillery officer remaining on half pay. The State would have had to continue his half pay.

495. The State does not pay him what the value of his half pay would be, according to the estimate of an actuary?—No; they pay him the value of an analogous commission.

496. Whether the lieutenant colonel was 40 years old, or within a month of 60 years old, he would be equally paid 4,500 *l.*?—That is the regulation.

497. Therefore his annuity is not purchased upon an estimate of its value?—No, it is the regulation value of his commission.

498. Mr. *Goschen.*] It would be correct to say, would it not, that the loss to the Reserve Fund, in buying his commission at the price of 4,500 *l.*, is not really the 4,500 *l.*, but the difference between that and the value of the annuity?—It loses the 4,500 *l.* altogether, and the public gets the benefit of the half pay, if the half pay is not taken up by a line officer.

499. When it has paid the 4,500 *l.*, is the half pay officer struck off the non-effective vote?—Yes.

500. Supposing the Reserve Fund merely acted as a banker, by giving on the one hand the purchase money in a lump to the officer, and on the other hand receiving the half pay, that would in the ordinary course accrue to the officer, the half pay being voted as usual; but being taken in cash by the Reserve Fund, there would not be the same hardship as now exists, would there?—No; the Reserve Fund would then, we may say, be recouped.

501. Would it, in your opinion, be advantageous to the army if a system like that were adopted, thereby extending further the system of buying half-pay commissions, the purchase-money being recouped to the Reserve Fund, by its being paid the half pay of the officers bought out?—It would require, perhaps, a good deal of machinery to work a thing of that sort, but it would, no doubt, be an advantage to the fund.

502. It is desirable to reduce the number of half-pay officers by buying them out at a lump sum, rather than continuing their half pay, is it not?—It is an advantage to the State to reduce the half-pay list.

503. And it is an advantage to the officer also, is not it, to receive the value of his annuity in cash?—Yes.

504. So that if the price were fairly adjusted, the officer getting the fair value of his half pay, it would be an advantage to the army, and also an advantage to the State?—Yes.

505. It would assist promotion?—Yes; and would be no loss to the Reserve Fund.

506. Captain *Vivian.*] But, then, under those circumstances, as a matter of course the value of every officer's half pay would have to be decided by an actuary?—In that case you would not pay so much as the 4,500 *l.*

507. It would depend upon his age?—Yes.

508. Mr. *Goschen.*] Is not it a defect in the present system that an officer gets the same price, whatever the proper value of the annuity might be, from this fund?—It has always been the regulation of the service.

509. Have there been many cases of the fund being so low that its operation has been stopped?—In the cases of artillery and engineer officers it has been frequently stopped.

510. Has it been stopped frequently in the cases of infantry officers?—I am not prepared to say, but I think the fund has met all the claims of the infantry and cavalry.

511. Could a return be made out of the number of cases, extending over a certain number of years, where the applications have been refused because the fund was not sufficient to enable them to be acceded to?—I do not think there is any record of all the refusals in the case of the artillery and the engineers, because an officer of artillery or engineers who intends to realise feels his way first. If he finds that there is no chance of getting his commission bought up, he remains in the service and does not go to half-pay. Any return you might call for would not give you all the information you required, except in the case of cavalry and infantry officers.

512. The system at present is not a fixed system, because it is uncertain whether an officer will be able to avail himself of the Reserve Fund or not, it being dependent upon the high or low state of the fund?—I do not think the fund has ever

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ever been so low as not to enable it to comply with the claims of cavalry and infantry officers.

513. Captain *Vivian.*] Was not it so low last year that its operation was stopped?—Perhaps so, I am not able to speak positively.

514. Mr. *Percy Windham.*] You stated that augmentation steps went without purchase?—Yes; supposing a second battalion were added to an existing regiment, all the promotion in the augmentation would go without purchase, either by promotion from the first battalion and other regiments, or by the absorption of supernumeraries, or by bringing officers in from the half-pay list.

515. In the case of a regiment being augmented by two companies, would promotion go without purchase?—As a rule, it would go without purchase; either by the transfer of supernumerary officers from another regiment, or by bringing in an officer on the half-pay list who had been reduced from some other regiment.

516. It would not go without purchase down the regiment itself?—Not in a case of augmentation; except under very special circumstances.

517. Captain *Vivian.*] Lieutenant colonels of cavalry regiments coming home from India are not so transferred to other regiments, are they?—No, they are not transferred; they go to half pay.

518. Mr. *Percy Windham.*] With regard to the Indian officers, must not one of two things result, either that the Reserve Fund will be charged with the burden of buying their half-pay commissions, or that they will very much encumber the half-pay list?—They must, as a rule, encumber the half-pay list. They would not be permitted to come upon the Reserve Fund unless the Reserve Fund were in a very good condition.

519. *Chairman.*] Is each of the various cases which come to the Secretary of State for War decided upon its own merits, or is there any warrant or regulation by which he is governed?—There is a warrant which prescribes the service necessary to entitle an officer to retirement on half pay, and then all special cases, all cases not strictly provided for by the regulation, come under the Secretary of State's notice, and are decided on their own merits.

520. If the case was an ordinary case within the rule laid down, there would be no necessity to apply to the Secretary of State?—It would come to the War Office, and would receive the sanction of the Under Secretary, if not the Secretary of State; but all special cases are considered and decided upon their own merits.

521. Will you furnish the Committee with a copy of all orders or warrants in reference to full and half-pay retirements in the line, and also in the corps of artillery and engineers?—I will do so.

Friday, 12*th July* 1867.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Childers.	General Peel.
Mr. Goschen.	Sir Charles Russell.
Marquis of Hartington.	Mr. Trevelyan.
Colonel Hogg.	Sir John Trollope.
Lord Hotham.	Mr. Percy Wyndham.
Colonel North.	

LORD HOTHAM, IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel WILLIAM ROBERT HALIDAY, called in; and Examined.

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522. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] WHAT post do you fill at present?—I am Commandant of the School of Musketry at Fleetwood.

523. I believe you have paid great attention to the question of purchase and retirement?—For some years past my attention has been a good deal turned both to the purchase question and also to the operation of the Military Reserve Fund.

524. Do you know from what sources the Military Reserve Fund is raised?—It is raised from two sources: the first is the purchase of commissions by regimental officers in succession to vacancies which are caused in regiments by officers retiring on half pay; I believe formerly, in a few instances, on full pay, and in a few instances, each year by officers being promoted by purchase out of their regiments to unattached commissions of superior rank, and the steps in succession to them being purchased; from these last, I think that about 25,000 *l.* per annum must have been received of late years. The other source from which the fund receives money is the difference between the prices of commissions purchased by officers in regiments in succession to vacancies caused by officers retiring who, from not having purchased, are not allowed to receive the full prices of their commissions. The difference between the price received by the retiring officer and that paid by the purchasing officer goes to the fund.

525. With respect to those two sources, do you consider that there is any ground for objecting to the first?—Yes; I conceive there are very strong grounds for objecting to the first. In the first place, it is objectionable on public grounds; I conceive it to be derogatory to the State, to sell commissions through the Secretary for War to its own public servants. The second objection to it is this, that when officers retire on half pay, in accordance with the provisions of the Royal warrants, the commissions which they hold, or rather the vacancies which they make by retiring in the regiment, ought to be filled up without purchase. The State permits those officers, after a due length of service, to retire upon a modified provision, and I think that the officers of the regiment ought to obtain the commissions in succession without purchase, just as much as in cases of retirement on full pay. These objections are distinct; the first is founded on the ground of public policy; the second on the consideration that it is a hardship upon officers who have done their duty in their respective ranks, to be debarred from the promotion that might be given to them, unless they consent to pay to the Secretary of State for War a large sum of money, the interest of which they lose, and which therefore is tantamount to a considerable deduction from their pay, that pay being already too small.

526. Do you see any valid objection to the second of these two sources, viz., the difference between the sum the retiring officer receives, and the sum that is paid by the purchasing officer?—I think, whatever objection exists, it is analogous to the general objection to the maintenance of purchase; but that, while the purchase system continues, it would not be equitable to deprive officers who have not purchased, of the right of selling their commissions, if not for the full price, at all events for a modified amount. Inasmuch as there is no adequate retirement for those officers, they would undoubtedly feel aggrieved if they were not allowed to obtain retirement for themselves by selling their commissions.

527. Supposing the first of these two sources were to be discontinued, do you think that the second could also be put an end to?—I do not think that while the purchase system is continued it could be put an end to; the money arising from this source must be held or applied in some way. If the retiring officers do not receive the full value of their commissions, which, as a matter of policy, I think they should not, the money must be retained or applied in some way. I believe that a mode of applying it could very easily be found. If I were at liberty to suggest, I should say that that money might very properly be kept in a public fund held by the Secretary for War, or in any other way, and invested, because looking forward to the possibility, at a future day, of the purchase system being abolished altogether, unquestionably one of the great difficulties which would attend its abolition would be the buying up of claims which officers would have who had invested their money in the purchase of their commissions. Against the very heavy sum which that would cost, this money might legitimately be kept to form the nucleus of a future fund, accumulating with whatever interest accrued upon it

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it. It is public money, and might be kept for that purpose.

528. In fact that it should be a sinking fund, to extinguish the purchase system eventually?—Yes.

529. Why should it not still be applied to buying up half-pay commissions, thereby reducing the annual charge thrown on the State?—Because it would not be equitable to the officers who have contributed that money; I think the State is bound to find the retiring allowances for those officers to whom they grant such allowances by a Royal warrant, founded, it may be presumed, on full consideration, and if therefore the State wishes to extinguish that annual charge, the State ought to pay for it, and not the working officers of the army.

530. It has been stated that the application of the fund to the purpose of purchasing half-pay commissions, is beneficial to officers of the line, by making room for officers of considerable length of service to retire on half pay; is that the case or not?—It is not at all beneficial to those officers, and cannot properly be said to make room for them, for their right to retire on half pay is not saddled with any avowed condition that they, as a class, are to provide the fund for their retirement at their own cost; and moreover the money taken from them to form this fund is applied not only to purchase up half-pay commissions for the benefit of the State, but also to a large extent to expedite and cheapen the promotion of officers of cavalry, from which the infantry derive no benefit whatever. It is in fact a tax levied on the officers of infantry, in other words, on the poorer class of officers of the army for the exclusive benefit of the richer class, the officers of cavalry; and I can show that a very large sum has been applied in that way within the last six years. Within that time upwards of 200,000 *l.* levied almost exclusively upon the infantry officers, has been paid to expedite the promotion of cavalry officers.

531. Colonel *North.*] Do you mean from this very fund?—Entirely.

532. Colonel *Hogg.*] Do you mean that no cavalry officers contribute to it?—Very few indeed; there are a few instances in which they do, but a very small proportion is contributed by cavalry officers, as compared with the large amount which has been contributed by infantry officers.

533. The cavalry officers are fewer than the infantry, and so of course they cannot contribute so much?—Yes; but then that proportion tells the other way; though they have contributed little, they have derived the exclusive benefit; if they have paid a few thousand pounds, they have received 204,000 *l.* since the 1st April 1861, and a further amount must have been similarly applied in the preceding year, of which no detailed account has been laid before Parliament.

534. Mr. *Trevelyan.*] Have you anything further to add upon that point?—I think it is a point of very great importance, because if the system is to continue, it constitutes a permanent tax to be levied upon infantry officers for the benefit of cavalry officers alone, a tax very inequitable.

535. Is such the opinion in the army?—I am convinced that such is the opinion of all officers who have turned their attention to the application of the Reserve Fund; such is the opinion I have heard invariably expressed by all officers with whom I have conversed upon the subject; but I do not believe that the majority of the officers of the army have paid much attention to the application of the Reserve Fund, or are at all aware of the sums that have been expended annually out of it.

536. Do you think that the light that has been thrown upon the subject by this Committee, will turn the attention of officers in the line to the question?—I am persuaded it will turn their attention to it very much.

537. It has also been stated that the Reserve Fund is of benefit to the officers of the line, by enabling the Commander in Chief to give commissions without purchase to deserving officers, and also first commissions without purchase (I presume since the alteration introduced by General Peel); does it appear to you that such is the case?—No, I cannot conceive that it can possibly be the case; had commissions to the value of the 204,000 *l.* thus expended entirely on purchased steps in the cavalry, been given as they might have been given, without purchase to the officers of the line, it is clear that this would have afforded a large amount of promotion without purchase, as well as of first commissions gratis, which has by this operation been absolutely stopped from them; and a still larger amount has been expended out of the fund in buying up half-pay commissions for the benefit of the State. This shows to what an extent the power of giving promotion to higher rank, and also first commissions without purchase, has been curtailed, and it appears to me obvious that so far from facilitating the giving of commissions without purchase, it has very seriously impeded it; it has greatly curtailed the power of giving such commissions.

538. Do you consider that there is any advantage whatever derived by officers of the line from the practice of purchasing, out of the Reserve Fund, commissions of officers of Artillery and Engineers, who have retired upon half pay?—Certainly none whatever. The officers of the scientific corps have never contributed anything whatever to the Reserve Fund, and therefore whatever money, raised from the pockets of the working officers of the line, is applied towards purchasing up their half pay, is solely a benefit to those corps and to the State. It is purchasing up annuities with which the State is chargeable; certainly not to the benefit of the officers of the line, but on the contrary that, as well as the purchase up of half-pay commissions generally, constitutes a tax permanently levied upon one branch of the service, in addition to the income tax which they already pay. They already contribute to the revenues of the State in the same way as other public servants, and this constitutes virtually an additional tax raised out of their pockets for the purpose of lightening the burthens of the State. It may be expedient that the half-pay list should be reduced, or partially extinguished, but it cannot be right that this should be done by taking the money from the officers of the line, the interest of which money is virtually a deduction from their pay or the remuneration assigned them for their services, and which pay so far from being excessive, is really insufficient in the junior ranks to defray the cost of living.

539. You regard this as a tax upon the infantry for the purpose of purchasing up half-pay commissions, and thereby relieving the State?—Yes, that tax is composed of two elements; the first, which arises from the purchase of commissions sold directly by the State, forms a large proportion

tion of the fund; the other, which is from the difference between the prices paid and those received by the retiring officers, forms a very much smaller proportion of the fund; but still in whatever way the tax is raised, that tax is raised out of the pockets of the working officers of the line.

540. The only way of preventing that tax being raised from their pockets would be by abolishing the fund altogether?—Abolishing I will not say the fund, but abolishing the compulsion upon officers to purchase commissions that might be given without purchase.

541. Do you consider that there is any other special objection to this system besides that which you have named?—I do; the source of income to the fund is so entirely dependent on the practice of selling commissions directly on behalf of the State, that it is objectionable on this ground: when the Secretary of State sells commissions direct on the part of the country, it is, I conceive, a very different thing from the original practice of permitting the sale and purchase of commissions in the army; and it has a tendency to establish as a precedent that it is a legitimate thing to sell an appointment in the public service; and the example thus set by the State, has a strong tendency to encourage a lax tone of morality among subordinate persons in the public offices, and may lead to corrupt practices. What the Secretary for War, as the authorised servant of the State, does for the public is likely to be imitated by some of its employés in an underhand way for their own individual profit, whenever they can get a consideration for their good offices. I conceive that, when the system of permitting the sale and purchase of commissions was first established, and until this mode of operating through the Reserve Fund was introduced, whatever one's ideas might be of the policy or propriety of it, it was, at all events, defensible; and I have myself, in former years, in talking with civilians upon the subject, defended it, explaining to them that they were mistaken in supposing that the State actually sold commissions; I have often had to explain to them that that was not the case, but that the operation of the purchase system was this: that when a regimental officer was admitted to be duly qualified for superior rank, he was permitted to succeed to that superior rank, if he was the senior officer so qualified, and had the means, regulated by a fixed price, to induce another officer to retire. That was, in point of fact, what he did; the State permitted him to hold out to another officer an inducement to retire, to make way for him to succeed to an appointment for which he was declared to be duly qualified. The State did not at that time itself purchase or sell any commission, but now that the Secretary for War sells commissions, which are not commissions that have been held by another officer, which are not commissions transferred by the retiring officer to another, but are directly and actually new appointments, the State sets the example of selling appointments to its own servants, which I conceive is a very different thing from the old system of purchase that existed so many years, and till this mode of dealing with the Reserved Fund came into practice.

542. Is it, in your opinion, beneficial to the officers of the line who have contributed to this fund that the commissions of officers on half pay, in general, should be bought up out of the Reserved Fund?—No; I am of opinion that it is not beneficial to them. I conceive that the right of retirement on half pay, which has been established by successive Royal Warrants, gives those officers an unqualified right to their retirement after a due period of service of the best years of their life given to the State, and that it is, therefore, not equitable to impose upon them any additional tax, which this system undoubtedly entails upon them, for the benefit of the State. I consider that the charge ought to fall upon the State alone, and not upon the officers, and that, consequently, the buying up of such commissions, where the money with which they are bought up is levied from the officers of the line, is injurious to them, and not beneficial in any way whatever.

543. Is it not, at all events, advantageous to the State that the fund, if still maintained, should be so applied?—I doubt whether it is beneficial to the State; my observation of the class of officers who sell half-pay commissions leads me to conclude that they are, generally speaking, men advanced in life, verging on, if they do not even often exceed, the 60 years laid down as the limit; and that, consequently, in obtaining the regulation prices of their commissions, they get much more than an assurance company would give for an annuity of that value. I do not believe that any established assurance company would purchase up the half pay of officers generally at the rates that they obtain in the regulated prices of those commissions; and I imagine that any actuary, taking the average ages, which of course could be furnished by the War Office, of those officers, would say that those prices considerably exceed the value of their annuities.

544. Do you conceive that there is any other special objection to the system, besides your impression that the regulated prices of half-pay commissions, thus paid, exceed the value of such half-pay commissions, calculated as an annuity?—The chief objection is, that it is difficult to restrict the application of it to that branch of the army from whose pockets the money has been obtained, and that the money is (as I have said) taken from the officers of the line, and constitutes *pro tanto* an additional tax levied upon them as a class, in addition to income tax and other taxes which they have to pay, in common with others, towards the revenues of the State.

545. I conclude, from one of your previous answers, that the application of part of the Reserve Fund to paying the difference between the old and the new price of commissions in the cavalry, appears to you to be open to objection, as being a tax upon the infantry for the benefit of the cavalry?—In the first place it is open to that great objection, that it is a heavy tax upon the infantry for the sole and exclusive benefit of a much wealthier class of officers; and it is, I conceive, also impolitic. I have no doubt whatever that the former difference between the regulated prices of commissions in the cavalry and commissions in the infantry, was founded simply upon the difference in the rates of pay in the two branches. The price of a commission of a lieutenant colonel of cavalry was formerly 6,175 *l.*; it is now reduced to 4,500 *l.*, constituting a difference of 1,675 *l.* to be paid out of the Reserve Fund whenever that lieutenant colonel of cavalry retires; and, moreover, each successive commission held in a cavalry regiment in the same way is subject to that difference. A major of cavalry formerly paid for his commission 4,475 *l.*, he now

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pays 3,200 *l.*, making a difference of 1,375 *l.* A captain paid formerly 3,225 *l.*, whereas he pays now 1,800 *l.*, making a difference of 1,425 *l.* A lieutenant paid 1,190 *l.*, whereas he now pays 700 *l.*, making a difference of 490 *l.* A cornet formerly paid 840 *l.*, whereas he now pays 450 *l.*, making a difference of 390 *l.* On the other hand, you find that those old rates were actually proportional to the rates of pay of the cavalry. A lieutenant colonel of cavalry receives 1 *l.* 3 *s.* per diem, but a lieutenant colonel of infantry receives only 17 *s.*; that is quite sufficient to account for the difference in the former regulated rate of the cavalry lieutenant colonel's commission as compared with that of the infantry. A major of cavalry receives 19 *s.* 3 *d.* (considerably more than a lieutenant colonel of infantry). A major of infantry receives only 16 *s.*; the difference, therefore, was proportionate to the different rate of pay. A captain of cavalry receives 14 *s.* 7 *d.* per day, but a captain of infantry only receives 11 *s.* 7 *d.*, a difference of 3 *s.* a day. The rate of pay of a cavalry captain (approximating to that of an infantry major) accounts to a great degree for the fact that the former regulated price of his commission differed by only 25 *l.* from the regulation price of a major's commission now. A lieutenant of cavalry receives 8 *s.* 6 *d.* a day, but a lieutenant of infantry only 6 *s.* 6 *d.* A cornet of cavalry receives 7 *s.* 3 *d.*, while an ensign of infantry receives only 5 *s.* 3 *d.*

546. Has the alteration of the regulation price of cavalry commissions had the effect of diminishing the prices actually given for cavalry commissions?—I speak only from information I have obtained from frequently conversing with cavalry officers; but I believe, from what I have heard from them, it has not had the slightest effect. I am told by them that cavalry commissions are sold now at as high prices as they ever were. If there be any difference, I am convinced that it does not amount to more than the difference between the former price of a cornetcy and the present, and that, you observe, is not paid by an officer of cavalry purchasing promotion. That difference is felt only by, I may say, the friends of the young officer who purchase his first commission in the cavalry.

547. If the regulation prices of commissions in cavalry regiments had not been assimilated to those in the infantry, how could the difficulty experienced in 1858 and 1859, in filling up the vacant cornetcies in cavalry regiments, have been met?—The difficulty of filling up those vacant cornetcies might have been met by simply reducing the price of the cornetcy, without going any further. It was the first commission that the friends of young gentlemen who desired to become cavalry officers, purchased for them, and to fill up the vacant cornetcies it was only necessary to reduce the price of the cornetcy. Any advantage which may have been contemplated by Lord Herbert, as to the general reduction of the prices of cavalry commissions, or which the friends of a young man wishing to join a cavalry regiment, might have been supposed to look forward to, was only prospective, and the prices of the subsequent commissioners would not operate, as I conceive, to prevent cornetcies being filled up.

548. We have been told that large sums of money have been paid out of the Reserve Fund in purchasing up the commissions of gentlemen-at-arms and yeomen of the guard; has that attracted attention in the army?—I do not think it has. I think it is very little known that the fund is applied to such purposes.

549. Do you think that great dissatisfaction would be created among officers of the line on their becoming acquainted with the fact, for instance, that Sir Travers Phillips was paid the large sum of 8,000 *l.* on retiring from the corps of gentlemen-at-arms?—I am disposed to think there would; for this reason: that I conceive commissions in the two corps of the yeomen of the guard and the gentlemen-at-arms, never will be available for the officers of the line generally, and especially for the poorer class of them. It appears to me inevitable that the appointments to those corps must always be, to a large extent, matters of patronage, and probably will always be accompanied with certain qualifications as to age, appearance, height, and so on; and therefore, whatever benefit may be derived from appointing old officers to those commissions, will be partial, and will never be applicable to the officers of the line generally, whereas the exaction of those sums from them, by compelling them to purchase so many commissions, which I conceive ought to be given without purchase, inflicts upon them as a class positive tax from which the majority of them will not derive any benefit.

550. I gather, from what you have said, that you think it is expedient to allow non-purchasing officers the privilege of selling their commissions, and receiving part of the sum realised?—I do. As matters stand at present, I think that while the system of the purchase of commissions exists generally, it would be felt as invidious, in the case of a poor officer, who by perhaps long service, or by faithful and good service as a non-commissioned officer, had obtained his commissions, to deprive him of the right of selling them. It would be like depriving him of so much capital. An officer, generally speaking, in all purchase corps, looks upon his commissions as so much capital, which, if you deprive him of the power of selling them, you virtually take from him. To that class of officers, who perhaps have risen from the ranks, or who by long service have obtained promotion, it is a matter of course of great moment to have some capital for their families if they be married.

551. Do you think that commissions ought to be sold at the full price?—Yes.

552. Suppose a gentleman sells his commission for 1,800 *l.*, what would you do with the 300 *l.* constituting the difference between the regulation price of his commission, and the 1,500 *l.* which he would be entitled to get?—I think it should go to a separate fund, to be kept in the hands of the Secretary for War, an account of which should be annually laid before Parliament; that it should form the nucleus of a fund which at some future time the country might deal with as they thought fit, but which I conceive might be most usefully applied to the extinction of the claims of officers who have purchased, if the country should at some future period come to the conclusion that it was judicious to abolish the purchase system.

553. Or it might be paid into the Exchequer without forming a separate fund?—Of course it might be paid into the Exchequer. To use it for the ordinary purposes of the State is open to the objection that it is virtually money taken out of the pockets of the officers, and therefore it would be levying a tax, and an arbitrary and capricious tax, upon the officers for the benefit of the

the country. I think I did not fully answer one question which you put to me with reference to whether the system of the Reserve Fund and its application, enabled the Commander in Chief to give commissions; I conceive that that point requires to be carefully considered. I am satisfied myself that it grievously curtails the power of giving such commissions; and I think that may be illustrated by the returns which have been given by the War Office, showing that commissions by purchase have been much more sparingly given of late years since the period of the Indian mutiny than previously. During the Crimean war, for two years the proportion of commissions given without purchase was very considerable; during the Indian mutiny also the proportion of the commissions given without purchase was very considerable, but from that time it has gradually declined, and the proportion of commissions given without purchase now, to those given with purchase, is very small. It impedes to a great degree the means of giving commissions to young gentlemen who have gone through the course at Sandhurst, and almost altogether shuts the door against deserving non-commissioned officers of the army, many of whom their commanding officers would be glad to recommend for commissions, and many of whom would fill those commissions extremely well, but who at present have no chance. A quartermastership is the only commission which a deserving serjeant major or quartermaster serjeant has now much chance of obtaining; possibly there are a few commissions in the West Indian corps available, but those are the only ones he can really look to.

554. Colonel *North.*] You mentioned that the sum of 204,000 *l.* had been expended in purchasing out cavalry officers; did you give that figure from any particular return?—I stated it from compiling the returns of the Reserve Fund laid before Parliament.

555. Since what time has that sum been so expended?—Since the commencement of 1861. You find the figures in the returns. (*The Witness handed in the following papers.* Vide *Appendix.*)

556. You referred to the difficulty that was experienced in getting cavalry commissions filled up in 1859; do you think that the price of those commissions had anything to do with the number of the vacancies at that time?—I am of opinion that the hesitation about paying large sums for commissions at that time among the class whose sons enter the service, arose partly from the fact that a very large number of commissions had been obtained without purchase during the Crimean war; and also subsequently during the Indian mutiny, owing to the augmentations of the army, and the many casualties from deaths and other causes, and people forgetting that those sources of vacancies for commissions without purchase would not continue, believed that that facility of getting them without purchase would still exist, and they were rather averse to expending large sums on commissions for that reason.

557. Your opinion is, that notwithstanding that the rate of commissions of cavalry is now on a par with that of infantry commissions, still the price of commissions in the cavalry is as high as it used to be?—Quite so.

558. And in many cases more is paid than formerly?—Yes; I have heard of 6,000 *l.* being paid for a troop, not unfrequently of late.

559. Colonel *Hogg.*] The following question was asked of Major Marvin the other day: "To whom do you consider that the Reserve Fund equitably belongs?" The answer was: "It belongs to the officers of the cavalry and infantry who contribute to it." Do you agree with that?—I can scarcely go so far as to say that it belongs to them; those officers were not compelled to purchase; they had the option of purchasing commissions or not; but I think that in justice they ought to be the parties to benefit by it.

560. You think that it belongs to one branch of the service as well as another; to the cavalry as well as the infantry?—Certainly, in the proportions to which they have contributed to it.

561. Do not you think that a cavalry officer ought to get more pay than an infantry officer, considering the expense he is put to?—I conceive that those expenses are chiefly arbitrary; that those expenses consist simply in the mode of living. I consider that they might live as cheaply as the infantry officers, with the sole exception of their first outfit, which costs them somewhat more.

562. Is not the cost of horses a serious item in the expenses of a cavalry officer?—An officer may purchase his horse for 50 *l.*; it is an addition undoubtedly to the expense of his outfit.

563. You would not put an infantry captain, who has no horse to provide, upon the same footing as a cavalry captain who has to find three chargers?—No.

564. Do not you think that he requires more pay, seeing that he has to keep three horses and two servants, than a man who has to keep no horses and only one servant?—Yes.

565. Are you not aware that the officers of cavalry have to pay 8 *d.* a day, or used to have, for forage, whereas an infantry field officer pays nothing?—Yes.

566. A cavalry officer, who cannot perform his duties without a horse, is obliged to pay so much a day for his horses' subsistence?—Yes. It amounts to 8 *d.* per diem, that is, 2 *s.* a day for three.

567. You allow that that man is put to greater expenses?—So far as that goes.

568. Ought not the State to furnish them with larger means?—Yes, and it does so.

569. I understood you to put it that it was rather an extraordinary thing, that a cavalry officer should have more pay than an infantry officer?—No, I did not at all mean to imply that it was an extraordinary thing that he should get more; I simply stated that the regulation price of his commission was founded on the higher rate of pay of the cavalry. I did not mean to say that he should not get a higher rate, or that it was extraordinary that he should get it; but simply that the regulation price of his commission was founded upon his receiving a larger rate of pay; and it should be borne in mind, that while his expenses from keeping horses and an additional servant are greater than those which an infantry officer is compelled to incur; these incidents of that arm of the service are in themselves sources of enjoyment. They are precisely what most young men like; and as the higher rates of pay enable them to have these advantages, the market value (if I may so call it) of their commissions is proportionally greater. When an infantry officer keeps horses, &c., he has to pay for his forage at a much higher rate, and to keep a private groom instead of a soldier,

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costing very much more, and generally, also, to hire his stabling.

570. How do you think that cavalry officers, retiring from the service, ought to be compensated, the price of their commissions having been reduced by legal authority?—By the State. If it is a matter of policy to reduce the prices, the State ought to bear it.

571. Do not you think that it is a great convenience for an officer to be able to go on half-pay at once, by means of the Reserve Fund, instead of having to seek out an officer on half pay to exchange with?—It is not by means of the Reserve Fund that an officer is enabled to go on half pay; he has an unqualified right, by Royal warrant, to go on half pay after a certain time; but if he applies to go on half pay before that time, he is obliged now to exchange with an officer on half pay. If an officer goes on temporary half pay, he is now obliged to exchange with an officer on half pay.

572. After 25 years' service now, an officer has almost a right to go upon half pay, without having to seek out another officer to exchange with him?—Yes.

573. The Reserve Fund benefits officers in this way, does it not: an officer who has not purchased his commission receives 100 *l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50 *l.* for every year of home service; whereas formerly he had to serve 20 years before he got anything?—No; he had to serve 20 years, as I understand, before he could sell all his commissions.

574. That is what I mean. He could not sell his commission until he had served 20 years?—Such, I believe, was the case.

575. It must be a benefit to a poor officer who receives his commission for nothing, to be able to sell it?—Yes, it is a benefit to the officer, of course.

576. You said just now that the Fund was not beneficial to the State, on account of the age of the officer retiring; if it is not beneficial to the State, it must be beneficial to officers of the army, must it not?—Certainly, it is beneficial to those who retire by selling their half-pay commissions.

577. Marquis of *Hartington.*] You have stated that you regard the Reserve Fund as a kind of tax upon infantry officers?—Yes, I conceive that it amounts to a tax upon infantry officers, if they are called upon to pay considerable sums for the purchase of commissions, which I think ought to be given without purchase.

578. That is to say commissions which arise from vacancies caused by officers going on half pay?—The vacancies arising from officers going on half pay; commissions are then sold, not the commissions held by those officers, but fresh commissions issued by the State.

579. *Chairman.*] First commissions?—Commissions throughout the regiment, whatever the rank is. Suppose a major retires on half pay, he does not vacate his own commissions, he simply retires from his regiment to half pay; there is then vacant in the regiment a majority, and, if the officers are promoted in succession, the price of that majority is paid by the officer who succeeds, the price of the company is paid by the lieutenant who succeeds, and the price of the lieutenancy is paid by the ensign who succeeds, and of a first commission as ensign by the person appointed; all those sums are paid to the State for the fresh commissions.

580. Is not it merely a question of a bargain between the State and the officer; does not the State tempt the officer out by the offer of half pay; that is a gift by the State to the officer?—That is a concession of the State to one officer who has done the State a certain amount of service.

581. If the State did not offer that half-pay the vacancies would never arise, and the officers of the regiment would never get promotion?—Just so; if the State afforded no means of retirement to its officers, there would be a great stagnation throughout the service. Some retirement, I conceive, is necessary for the military servants of the State as well as for the civil servants, otherwise the service could not be maintained in an efficient state.

582. Do you consider that there is any breach of any understanding entered into between the State and an officer, by the State asking the officer to pay for those commissions?—No; no breach of faith.

583. Nor a breach of any understanding?—No.

584. An officer gets a commission caused by a death vacancy for nothing, does he not?—As a general rule.

585. You would consider that there would be a breach of faith if the State were to ask an officer to pay for that commission?—No, I am not aware that it would be a breach of faith.

586. Does not an officer enter the army on the understanding that he will have to pay for his commissions as a general rule, but will have the benefit of death vacancies?—In reply to the first part of the question, I do not think that officers always enter the army with the expectation that they will have to purchase all their commissions. In answer to the last part of the question, I would say that officers expect that they will have the benefit of death vacancies, but I am not aware that the State has ever intimated in express terms that they are entitled to them; and I know instances have occurred from time to time where (if it were to be considered a breach of faith that they should not have them) that breach of faith has actually been committed, since the commissions of deceased officers are from time to time sold. I know of several instances where officers have died, and, subsequently to their death, their commissions have been sold.

587. It is the fact, is it not, that officers enter the army expecting that they will have to purchase all their commissions, except those which arise from death vacancies?—Not at all universally; many enter who do not expect to have the means of purchasing most of these commissions, and promotions in succession to full-pay retirements, promotion in succession to officers who attain the rank of major general are given without purchase, as also those in succession to officers seconded on being appointed to certain situations on the staff. There were also formerly many commissions given without purchase on the augmentation of regiments proceeding to India, a lieutenant colonelcy, two companies, and ten lieutenancies in each regiment.

588. Are not officers aware when they enter the army, or ought they not to be aware, that they will have to pay for commissions in succession to officers who retire upon half pay?—Not as an universal rule.

589. But as a general rule?—Officers entering the army who are prepared to purchase commissions, certainly expect that, in most instances, they

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they will have to purchase the commissions of officers retiring on half pay; but at all times within my recollection there were instances where officers succeeded to vacancies caused by officers going on half pay, without purchase.

590. Has the number of those cases diminished since the Reserve Fund was placed upon the footing upon which it now stands?—Yes, I am clearly of opinion that it has diminished; it is a very rare thing now for officers to obtain commissions in succession to officers retiring on half pay without purchasing the commissions.

591. What would be the effect upon the officers of the army, if the system of the Reserve Fund was done away with altogether?—I conceive that it would be beneficial.

592. The first result would be this, would it not, that officers would obtain their commissions in succession to officers going on half pay, without purchase; that is the benefit that would accrue?—Yes; I conceive that if the Reserve Fund were done away with things would revert to what was the case before the Reserve Fund, managed as it is at present, was instituted. It is only within a few years past that the Reserve Fund has operated in the way I have mentioned, namely, extracting very large sums from officers for the purchase of their commissions, and expending the money in the two modes, which I conceive to be open to objection; the one, that of expediting the promotion solely of one branch of the service (*i. e.*, the cavalry); and the other, that of relieving the State of the charge of retiring allowances for its military officers at the expense of the officers of the Line. They have to bear the tax, and the return which I have already handed in, which I compiled from those laid before Parliament, shows how large the sums raised in this way have been, and how they have been applied. I find, for instance, that there has been received on account of the Reserve Fund, since the 1st of April 1861 up to the end of last year, by the sales of commissions in succession to officers retiring upon half pay, or upon full pay, &c., 338,678 *l.* And I further find that the amount received from the difference between the sums paid for commissions purchased, and those received by officers retiring who had not purchased all their commissions during the same period, namely, from the 1st April 1861 to the 31st December 1866, was 109,379 *l.*, the total of those two amounting to very nearly 450,000 *l.* Then, as regards the application of that fund, from the same period, namely, from the 1st of April 1861 to the 31st of December 1866, 204,881 *l.* 13 *s.* 4 *d.* has been expended exclusively in paying to cavalry officers retiring the difference between the former prices of commissions and those established in 1860. The largest item of expenditure is the amount paid to buy up half-pay commissions (for the benefit of the public, relieving them from the annual charge) from the 1st of April 1861 to the 31st of December 1866, 311,559 *l.* 10 *s.*; the whole of the money so expended having been raised from the officers of the Line.

593. Is not the purchase of half-pay commissions an advantage to the officer as well as to the public, or a greater advantage to the officer than the public?—Clearly an advantage. I think I have adverted to that in saying that I conceive that an officer in most instances receives a larger sum as the value of his commission, than he would obtain from an assurance company for an annuity of equal value. With regard to the public, if the money with which they are purchased is to be looked on as the absolute property of the State, which it has a right to employ as it thinks fit, it is not, in my opinion, an advantage, since a larger sum is generally given for these half pay annuities than they are worth. But it cannot be denied that it is an advantage in a pecuniary sense, to extinguish part of the annual charge for half pay with money which has not been raised by general taxation, but obtained by the State, at the cost of one single branch of the servants of the State.

594. To that extent the officers in the army would suffer by the abolition of the Reserve Fund?—Those who are permitted to sell their half-pay commissions of course would be the losers, but the country is the loser at present. The question is between those two parties; I should like to add, also, to what I have said with reference to the advantage to the country of purchasing up those half-pay commissions, that there is one special objection applicable to the buying up of some of those half-pay commissions; I refer to the half-pay commissions of officers of the two scientific corps of Artillery and Engineers, who never purchase any commissions, and who never contribute in any way whatever to the Revenue Fund. Buying up their half-pay commissions out of the money raised in this way from the pockets of officers of the Line alone, is, I conceive, inequitable. And there are special cases, a small number certainly, but which it would not be difficult to point out, where officers, chiefly of the Engineers, holding lucrative appointments in the public service, and which, I believe, would preclude them from drawing their half-pay, have been permitted, almost immediately after receiving such appointments, to sell their half-pay commissions, thereby of course giving them a considerable benefit; but if they are not permitted to receive their half-pay while holding those lucrative appointments, it is clear that it is a bad bargain for the country, if it be considered the proprietor of the Reserve Fund, to pay those officers at once the price or the calculated value of an annuity which they are not drawing.

595. Do you consider that a very large increase to the half pay vote might be caused by the abolition of the Reserve Fund?—No, I do not conceive that it would be a large addition. I imagine that if you look to the returns laid before Parliament of the application of the Reserve Fund, it will be found that the number of half-pay commissions purchased up has been but small, and it would be quite possible to extract from those returns the amount of the relief to the public during those six years; because the form of the return is headed, I think, "To buying up half-pay commissions," thereby extinguishing such and such annual charge.

596. Mr. *Goschen.*] I understand you to object to the Reserve Fund both on account of the source from which it is derived, and on account of the way in which it is expended?—Yes; I think that there are objections both to the sources from which it is derived, and also to the mode in which it is applied. There are strong objections to both.

597–8. Do you consider that the object of the Reserve Fund would be properly described as a system to quicken promotion, and to hasten the retirement of the officers who desire to leave the service?—I should say that the largest amount of

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its expenditure has been to quicken promotion in cavalry regiments, and to relieve the public from a portion of the annual charge for half pay. By far the larger amounts have been expended on those two objects.

599. Is not the quickening of promotion, and an earlier retirement on half pay, beneficial to the army as well as to the public, and desired by the army?—The quickening of promotion by the operation of the Reserve Fund is a quickening of promotion of a particular branch of the service at the expense of another branch of the service; and an earlier retirement to half pay, I do not conceive to exist. In my opinion, so far from the operation of the Reserve Fund having enabled officers to retire earlier, it has been actually coexistent with (I will not say the cause of) their being precluded from retiring so soon. Until about the year 1860, 21 years was the period of full-pay service which was assigned, after which officers were to be allowed to retire on half pay; but about that time that period was extended from 21 to 25 years; and it is precisely during the period since 1860, that this operation of the Reserve Fund has been carried on; so that, so far from facilitating the retirement on half pay of officers who have devoted a number of the best years of their life to the service, the period of service required to give them that right has been extended.

600. Marquis of *Hartington.*] Before the Reserve Fund was organised, did there exist an unlimited right of retirement on half pay after 20 years' service?—I think there were warrants giving that right; I will not say previous to the existence of the Reserve Fund, because that dates very far back: I think the first existence of the Reserve Fund dates as far back as 1824, but I am referring principally to the operation of the Reserve Fund since 1860; that period during which it has been under the supervision of Parliament. I do not know how the fund was managed previously.

601. You do not connect the two things together of unlimited right of retirement on half pay after 25 years' service, and the operation of the Reserve Fund?—No, I do not think they have any legitimate connection; I conceive that the right of retirement on half pay after a period of 21 years at first, and subsequently 25 years, has been conceded as a reasonable and just thing to officers who have given so many years of their service to the public. There is naturally with most people a period of life at which repose is desirable; and it was conceded to them on those grounds, and that it tended to maintain the service in an efficient state, and not on the ground that the public were at the same time levying from that branch of the service a large amount of money; I do not conceive that it can be considered at all as a bargain; I look upon the Royal warrant giving a right of retirement on half pay as an absolute provision for officers so to retire; and I do not think it right that it should be read with a supposed secret understanding, that the State was at the same time to abstract from the pockets of the officers, a provision to form a fund for that retirement.

602. Mr. *Goschen.*] Supposing that the operations of the fund had been confined to infantry officers, would your objections to it have been as strong as they are now?—No, certainly not.

603. One of your main objections to it is the application to the cavalry of money which you consider to be contributed by the infantry?—That is one of the main objections to it. I object to the payment of such a large sum as 204,000*l.* to cavalry officers within less than six years, when the money has been taken almost entirely from infantry officers. Another objection is to the payments out of the fund to officers of artillery and engineers who have not in any way contributed to it.

604. Colonel *Hogg.*] I understood you to admit that the cavalry had subscribed to the fund?—Yes, I guarded myself by saying that the fund belonged to the cavalry and the infantry, in the proportions in which they have contributed to it. It would not be difficult to see how much the cavalry had contributed, but having looked at the Gazettes, I have found that it is a very small proportion; only a few thousand pounds.

605. Mr. *Goschen.*] That amount which you refer to as having been paid to cavalry officers is the difference between the present regulated prices of cavalry commissions and the former prices?—Yes.

606. When a sufficient period has elapsed for the vested interests under the old system to have passed away, there would not any longer exist that objection arising from the paying of the difference between the old and the present price of cavalry commissions?—The amount invested in cavalry commissions still is so large that, if the system be continued, I can only look upon it as a continued tax to be still levied from the infantry officers to expedite the promotion of cavalry officers. It is a very large amount that has yet to be extinguished in that way.

607. You call it a tax on the infantry officers; but the infantry officer who pays the full rate to the State for his promotion, or for the commission, gets full value for what he buys, does he not?—He gets the same value, undoubtedly, if he purchases the commission direct from the State, as if he purchased it from the officer retiring; but it is objectionable in point of general policy; and it diminishes the chances and the amount of promotion without purchase that would otherwise be available for the officers of the Line; and thereby compels them as a class to pay more than they otherwise would.

608. Then the grievance rests rather upon the other officers, who do not get the promotion, than upon the officer who actually pays the money; the officer who pays the money gets the full value, in the same way as if he bought it from another person?—He gets the full value, in the same way as if he had bought it from an officer receiving the regulated price.

609. Therefore he is not taxed?—No, he is not taxed in that individual instance, unless he should be the senior of his rank, and who would therefore succeed to the step without having to pay for it.

610. You infer that the other officers who do not purchase lose the opportunity of promotion which they would have if the State did not take the money from the officer who is promoted; how do the other officers suffer from one officer purchasing his commission at the fair market price?—They suffer if a junior officer is promoted over their heads by purchasing a commission, which they have not the means of buying; and I conceive that the system of making officers purchase their commissions always, while the State retains the price, deprives the officers of the Line as a class of the fair remuneration for their

their service; it is simply an extension of the purchase system; and the more universal the purchase system becomes, of course the more the interests of the non-purchasing officers are damaged.

611. It would be more correct, would it not, to say that the Reserve Fund deprived officers of the advantages of promotion without purchase, than to say that they are so much money out of pocket because the officer does not pay more than the full value?—The individual officer purchasing the commission does not pay more than if he obtained it from the retiring officer at the regulated price; but it is an extension of the purchase system, and in its general effect, therefore, is damaging to non-purchasing officers.

612. In fact, the system would rather stand or fall with the general system of purchase; if the system of purchase itself is condemned, then this system is to be condemned also; but if the purchase system is maintained, this is merely a system that belongs naturally to it?—Yes; I think in a former answer I stated that I did not think that one special source of the income of the Reserve Fund could be abolished; that while the right of purchase and sale of commissions exists, it would not be equitable to those officers who had obtained commissions without purchase not to be allowed to sell them; and that therefore the second source from which the Reserve Fund is formed must still exist.

613. If the system were abolished (assuming the paying of the difference of price between old and new cavalry commissions to be discontinued), would not the infantry then lose the advantage of an earlier retirement on half pay?—No, not in the least; that right of retirement on half pay rests simply on the Royal warrant, which says that an officer after 25 years' full pay service shall have an absolute unqualified right to retire on permanent half pay.

614. Do you think the case might be put in this way: if this system of the Reserve Fund were abolished, and if the same facilities were given without the payment of money for the same retirement on half pay as are given now, there would be practically a better position given to all the officers in the army; they would have more rapid promotion, and they would have it without payment?—Undoubtedly; I think, allowing the Royal warrant to remain as at present, which gives the full right of retirement on half pay under certain conditions, that there is no necessity whatever for maintaining the Reserve Fund.

615. Does the Reserve Fund quicken promotion in the infantry or not?—I do not believe that it does in the least quicken it.

616. Is not part of the effect of the Reserve Fund that you give a man an inducement to retire on half pay, who otherwise would not do so?—No; there is no inducement given by it to the officer to retire on half pay; the Royal warrant gives the right of retirement on certain prescribed conditions; and when an officer retires on half pay he does so for his own convenience; the Reserve Fund does not facilitate or induce it.

617. Is not it probable that an officer, if he were to get a sum of money on retiring which might enable him to employ that money in any way he thought fit, would be more likely to retire on half pay than if he were allowed so much a year; is not it a boon to an officer retiring to get a lump sum?—If an officer retires on half pay at present, he does not get any lump sum.

618. Under the present system of the Reserve Fund, does not the Reserve Fund give to certain officers, of whom the Reserve Fund buys their commissions, a lump sum instead of their annuity?—That is a different thing; after an officer has retired on half pay, supposing that at the end of several years he considers it would be more beneficial to his family to have his annuity capitalised, he then gets that lump sum from the Reserve Fund, but he does not do so in the first instance. If he were of that opinion when he was about to retire on half pay, he would, in place of retiring on half pay, sell his commission in his regiment, and get that capital sum from the officers of his regiment.

619. In most cases where the Reserve Fund buys the commission of a half-pay officer, it is bought some time after he has himself gone on half pay?—Always a considerable time after he has been on half pay, except in a few exceptional cases, such as those I have adverted to, where, perhaps, an officer of Engineers goes on half pay for the purpose of holding a lucrative appointment, and then converts his half pay into a capital sum; but in other instances as affecting the Line at large, when an officer goes on half pay, he does so with the intention of remaining on half pay in order to be able to succeed to higher rank at a future time. If he afterwards sells his half pay commission, it is from a change of circumstances, possibly from impaired health, possibly from marrying; at all events, with a different view from that with which he went on half pay in the first instance.

620. Then, you do not think that the Reserve Fund does quicken promotion?—I do not think it does at all.

621. But the sale of the half-pay commission of an officer sets a commission free, does it not?—No.

622. Is not it the fact, that by selling his commission when he is on half pay, he sets a commission free which somebody buys?—No; no other officer buys it; the country purchases it up, cancels it, and extinguishes his annuity.

623. You were a little time ago referring to a case where the purchaser pays 1,800 *l.*, and the seller receives 1,500 *l.*?—That is a case where an officer holding a commission in a regiment who has obtained his commission or some of his commissions without purchase, desires to sell his commissions in the regiment; in such cases he is permitted to sell them in the regiment, but the country step in and take from the purchase money a certain portion which they hold back from him, and which they put into the Reserve Fund.

624. That has nothing to do with the case of half-pay officers?—Nothing whatever.

625. You were asked whether you approved of the system of a non-purchasing officer being allowed to sell his commission, and I think you said you did not approve of it?—I said that I thought, while the purchase system continued in the army, it would be considered a hardship on officers who had obtained their commissions without purchase to be debarred from selling their commissions. It may be considered that an officer who has obtained a particular commission without purchase has generally been allowed to do so on account of good service in other ranks, or of meritorious or gallant conduct as a non-commissioned officer, and is entitled to a somewhat

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similar privilege to that of an officer who has purchased his commissions.

626. But that sale on his part of his commission would operate on the remainder of the regiment in the same way as if the State were to sell the commission? While it would be to his personal advantage, it would prevent the promotion going without purchase, and be in itself an extension of the purchase system?—It may be considered that it would prevent the promotion going without purchase if that officer was compelled to vacate his commission; but I presume that he would not leave at all, except for the inducement of selling his commission.

627. You say that under the system of the reserve fund, the abstracting of money from the pockets of officers of the Line, by making them purchase commissions which otherwise might be given without purchase, was a general tax on the officers of the Line?—Yes.

628. In the case of officers selling their commissions who themselves had got their commissions without purchase, that is likewise abstracting money from the pockets of the officers who buy their commissions, thereby increasing the amount which is paid altogether; the two are both extensions of the purchase system, are they not?—Yes; in that sense of course the purchase system itself may be considered a system of taxing the officers of the army; it is simply taxing the officers of the army to provide their own means of retirement. If the country provided adequate means of retirement to prevent stagnation in the army, there would be obviously no necessity for the purchase system. The purchase system was invented solely to afford a retirement for those who wished to leave the service, at the expense of the profession itself, in place of its being at the expense of the country.

629. So that it comes to this, that the protest against this Reserve Fund system is in one form a general protest against the purchase system; it is a protest against the army being taxed for buying commissions?—As I have said before, I think a part of the system of the Reserve Fund, the process of extracting money from the officers, is an extension of the purchase system, but if by "protest" I am to understand my own statement of objections to the Reserve Fund, I object more strongly to the application of the fund than to the sources from which it is raised. The objections apply to both, but more decidedly to the application of the fund, because I have admitted that the other part of the system, namely, the obtaining of money by the difference between the prices of commissions obtained by officers who have not purchased and those paid for them, must be maintained as long as the purchase system itself lasts.

630. But you hold that that money does not belong to the State which is selling its reserved rights of promotion, but that it belongs to the body who contribute to it; that though the individual has got his full value for his money, his colleagues retain a kind of interest in the money which he has paid for value received?—I think I abstained from saying that the fund belonged to any particular class; I said that I thought that that class of officers who had contributed to it had equitable rights over it more than other classes, but, of course, if officers with their eyes open choose to pay their money for the sake of the appointment, they may be said to have parted with their right in that money, and that the State has the power of keeping that money and applying it as it likes; but as a matter of equity I think the money so taken from a particular class should not be diverted to the benefit of a totally different class.

631. That is, that the taxation of any particular class ought to be spent upon that particular class?—In a general way; that is the fair way to view the question.

632. The whole title of any particular branch of the service to it would be merely an equitable title?—Certainly; it is not a legal title.

633. Of right it belongs to the State, in virtue of its right to sell commissions in general?—Yes; but I should rather say the practice than the right; for I cannot admit that is either proper or expedient that the State should do so.

634. Mr. *Percy Wyndham.*] Do you think before the existence of the Reserve Fund, or before it was applied to so many purposes as we hear it now is, more commissions were allowed to go without purchase than are now allowed to go without purchase?—More were available without purchase.

635. More commissions were allowed to go without purchase than are now allowed to go without purchase, within your knowledge?—It is difficult to say within one's knowledge; that would require reference to Gazettes, extending over a series of years, and so on. I can only give a general impression; but my impression is that more commissions were available formerly, and that it is more difficult now to give commissions without purchase to young men who have gone through the course at Sandhurst, or to deserving non-commissioned officers.

636. Do you think that the desire to keep up the Reserve Fund leads to steps being sold instead of being allowed to go without purchase?—Yes; I am of opinion that the Secretary for War, in the desire to save the heavy annual charge to the country, does require many commissions to be sold which the Commander in Chief would probably gladly have at his disposal without purchase.

637. So that this diminution of the number of commissions allowed to go without purchase can be directly traced to the existence of the Reserve Fund?—I do not know that I should say "directly traced" to it, but it would clearly have an indirect connection with it. If the Secretary for War brings any pressure to bear in the direction of requiring commissions to be sold rather than given away, of course that, *pro tanto,* limits the number of commissions available without purchase.

638. General *Peel.*] How long has this system of giving 100 *l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50 *l.* for home service, to officers on their retirement, been in operation?—As long as I can recollect, I think that officers who had not purchased their commissions were allowed to sell them after a certain length of service, which I think was then 20 years; the system of permitting them to sell their commissions at a modified rate, when they had served shorter periods than that, is of more recent origin, but I cannot state from memory at what date it was introduced.

639. It has nothing to do with the half pay, has it; because it comes into operation after an officer has served three years, at which period he would not be entitled to go to half pay?—It has no connection with half pay at all.

640. The

640. The rate of retirement on half pay is regulated by a warrant, is it not?—Clearly.

641. The right to this allowance is under no regulation whatever, is it?—It is under no regulation in the nature of a warrant, that I am aware of; there has been a rule or regulation or instruction with respect to it published; but I do not think it is in the nature of a Royal warrant.

642. There is no doubt that it is a great advantage to a non-purchase officer, who retires from your service, to receive this allowance?—Certainly.

643. From what fund would you pay him, supposing you did away with the Reserve Fund?—The money he receives at present is not paid out of the Reserve Fund, but by the officer who succeeds to the vacancy; that would be continued.

644. Supposing you did away with the Reserve Fund, how would you give the officer retiring the 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and the 50*l.* for every year of home service?—The money thus paid him is part of that which the officers who succeed to his commissions by purchase at the regulated prices pay. None of it comes out of the Reserve Fund, and a portion of it stopped from the retiring officer goes to the fund. I cannot contemplate the possibility of entirely doing away with the fund, as regards that source of revenue; for, as I remarked before, I thought as a matter of equity the officer who had not purchased his commissions ought to have the right of retiring, by the sale of his commission, receiving a modified amount; and I would propose that the difference between the price he receives and that paid by the officer who succeeds him, should remain in the hands of the Secretary for War, as a fund to be applied, at some future period, to the extinguishing of the purchase system.

645. Previous to the giving of this allowance of 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for every year of home service, the purchase of commissions was confined to those cases where the commissions had been purchased?—Entirely so.

646. And therefore the effect of this fund is materially to increase the operation of purchase in the army?—Certainly, such is the tendency of the fund.

647. You admit that it is an advantage to the non-purchasing officer who retires from the service; but you say that the bad effects of it are felt by the non-purchasing officer who remains in the service?—Yes.

648. If this fund could be applied to the benefit of the non-purchasing officer who remains in the service, instead of being applied to purchasing half pay and so on, that would of course much tend to do away with the objections to it?—I do not think it would do away with the objections to the chief source from which it is raised; it extracts large sums from officers, by rendering purchase almost compulsory in the cases where officers retire on half pay; that operation of the fund I think ought to be put a stop to at once, while the other operation, *i.e.*, receiving money in the form of the difference between the price received by the officer who has not purchased selling, and that which the other pays, might be retained.

649. Take, for instance, the case of a captain, who, after a certain number of years' service, retires, and to whom you give so much a year for his services; purchase would be rendered compulsory, unless you paid him the money out of some other fund?—Yes, in that class of cases; and it so at present.

650. Do not you think that if the difference between the amount paid to the retiring officer, and the price paid by the officer succeeding to his commission, were applied to giving promotion without purchase in the regiment, that would have a good effect?—Certainly.

651. The fund was applied to the benefit only of those from whom it was derived, that is, from the Line (and eventually the Cavalry); the system would not be open to so much objection as it is now, when the fund is applied by the State to different purposes?—There would be much less objection to it; but I think if the fund continued to be raised from both the sources from which it is raised at present, you would be doing an injury with one hand while conferring a benefit with the other. If you extract large sums on the one hand by rendering the purchase of commissions compulsory, you would barely compensate for that by giving a certain number of other commissions without purchase. If the fund continued to be raised only from the difference between the prices paid for commissions, and the prices received by officers retiring, that application of the fund to which you refer might be a judicious one.

652. You proposed that the fund should accumulate for the purpose, at some future day, of purchasing the commissions of officers who had purchased their commissions, and so doing away hereafter with purchase?—Yes.

653. That has been practically the way in which it has been employed, to a certain extent, with regard to cavalry commissions, is it not; the State have, in fact, purchased the difference between the old regulation prices and the new regulation prices of cavalry commissions, out of this fund?—Yes, but the object aimed at has not been attained, for the prices given for commissions in the cavalry have not been practically diminished, nor is there any probability of their being so while the purchase system continues, since the purchaser will naturally always give the market value of the commission he wishes to get: and, therefore, if at any future time it should be determined to abolish the system of sale and purchase of commissions, and to compensate officers for their vested interests in the actual value of their commissions, including the sums they have given over the regulation prices as well as the regulation prices, it would be found that the total amount of the claims to be so extinguished would be as large as if this expenditure to buy up the difference between the old and the present regulation prices of cavalry commissions had never been incurred.

654. You object very much to the fund being so applied in the case of cavalry commissions, but you do not appear to object to the accumulation of the fund for the purpose of applying it on a large scale to the purchase of commissions of officers in the army?—For the purpose of extinguishing purchase at a future date; but I quite admit that such sums as might arise from the difference between the prices of commissions paid and the prices received, might legitimately and usefully be applied to giving first commissions without purchase.

655. If no more commissions were sold than were absolutely necessary to give officers retiring the money that they would be entitled to for their services, this fund would very soon be diminished

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diminished to a very small amount? — Very soon.

656. Therefore, if it were confined to the purposes to which it ought, in your opinion, to be applied, there would very soon be an end to the fund itself?—If the plan of allowing officers who had not purchased all their commissions to receive only the modified rates alluded to on selling were still continued the fund would receive an annual amount, but that might be expended pretty nearly as fast as it was received in providing those first commissions.

657. *Chairman.*] You stated in a former part of your evidence that death vacancies do not always go without purchase; that you have heard of cases where such vacancies have been sold; have you known of many such cases?—No; the cases are exceptional, and in those cases, I believe, the commissions have been sold for the benefit of the widow or children of the deceased officers. The State has not, I fancy, in those instances taken any part of the money.

658. The cases were purely exceptional?—Yes.

659. Do you happen to know whether in any of those cases the standing of the officer who would succeed to the vacancy had anything to do with the commission going by purchase?—I do not think that in the exceptional cases to which I refer the disposal of the commissions was founded on that consideration. I think that it was founded solely on the circumstances of the deceased officer, or of his family; some of the instances have been where the resignation of the officer had been accepted, and where he had obtained permission to sell his commission, and then has died before the step was gazetted, notwithstanding which the sale has been allowed to be carried out.

660. Those cases were of a purely exceptional character?—Quite so.

661. I think that I must have misunderstood one of your answers, which I took down to the effect, that so long as the purchase system continued this Reserve Fund must continue?—I certainly meant, and I think I said, that as long as the purchase system continued the practice of permitting officers who had not purchased their commissions, or all their commissions, to sell them nevertheless at a modified rate, must be continued in equity to them. But I do not think the other source of supply of money to the Reserve Fund should continue; but the receipt of money into the Reserve Fund from that source above referred to, I think, must continue, as long as the purchase system in the army is maintained.

662. You stated that you thought that non-purchasing officers ought to be allowed to sell; under what circumstances would you give a non-purchasing officer that right?—In cases where he had served for a certain number of years, such as the 20 years already defined by the existing instruction, or order, and in cases where he had obtained his commission as a reward for very gallant or meritorious service in the ranks.

663. Where an officer has served a period entitling him to sell, whether he is a purchasing or a non-purchasing officer, he is equally entitled to do so when that period is completed?—Yes.

664. I presume you meant that there ought to be opportunities afforded for non-purchasing officers to sell who had not served sufficiently long to entitle them to do so under the existing regulations?—I was merely contemplating the continuation of the present system by which an officer is allowed to receive 100 *l.* for each year passed on foreign service, or 50 *l.* for each year that he has passed in home service. I do not think it would be equitable to abolish that system as long as the purchase system is maintained.

665. In one of your former answers you expressed an opinion that the system that we are now considering did not increase promotion in the service?—I do not conceive that it increases it at all.

666. Does it not very much promote the retirement of officers who are induced to retire by reason of this 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service, and who without it would be obliged to hold on till they had served the period entitling them to sell?—Its effect in that way I take to be very slight.

667. You do not think that it greatly increases promotion in the service?—No; I do not think that it at all increases promotion in the service.

668. Surely many officers must be induced to retire by reason of that allowance who otherwise would have no other alternative than to remain in the service till they had served the full time?—If the State did not give such officers the right of selling at those modified prices, it must necessarily introduce some system of retirement for them, because among those officers are a number of men who have served many years in the ranks, and, seeing that they get their commissions as a reward for such past service, it would not be equitable to treat them exactly like a young ensign first joining; some allowance must be made for their past service, and they must be allowed to retire sooner than a man who comes in at 18 years of age.

669. But as the system now stands, surely promotion is considerably accelerated by this system of retirement?—No; the cases of non-purchasing officers wishing to retire in that way are very few in comparison with the great number of cases of officers who have purchased all their steps retiring.

670. You have given a great deal of attention to this subject, and I dare say you have watched the Gazettes from time to time; do you not meet with a vast number more cases where officers purchase over the heads of their seniors, than would have occurred but for this Reserve Fund system?—No, I do not observe much effect produced in that direction by the system of permitting officers who have not purchased all their commissions, to sell at these modified rates.

671. Do not you think that there are more vacancies created by this system of retirement?—Very few more. The officers who sell their commissions at those modified rates are very few in number. I know that practically to be the case, because I have often heard of officers who have not purchased all their commissions saying, "I shall not sell at present; I shall wait till I have completed another year or two's service, so as to entitle me to get the full value of my commission." An officer dislikes selling his commission for less than he considers the full value of his commission.

672. Mr. *Goschen.*] Is the 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service which a non-purchasing officer gets on retirement allowed for the whole time of his service in the army, including the time he has served in the ranks, or only the time he has served

served as an officer?—I think it refers only to his service as an officer.

673. Supposing you allowed a non-purchasing officer the regulation price for his commission, in the same way as any other officer selling his commission, you would not want a Reserve Fund at all?—No, or rather I should say you would cease to have that source of supply to the fund.

674. But, after a certain period of service, you give that non-purchasing officer the right of selling, and the only thing the Reserve Fund does by stepping between the two, to take a portion of the money?—That is its operation; to stop a portion of the money before it reaches him, and to place it in the Reserve Fund.

675. So far from its supplying the funds to induce a man to leave the service, it retains a portion of the funds, which might otherwise have been wholly applied to that purpose?—Yes, that is its operation.

676. You might give a non-purchasing officer the power to sell at a certain rate to an officer below him, without the Reserve Fund?—Yes; it does not require the Reserve Fund for that purpose.

677. Therefore, you need not mix up the two questions, the establishment of the Reserve Fund and the right of a non-purchasing officer to sell?—No; that source of income of the Reserve Fund is founded on the restriction of the right to sell of that officer who has not purchased; it arises from the refusal to him of the right to sell his commission at its full value, compelling him, instead, to accept a sort of commuted value, and thereby stopping a portion of the money which he would otherwise receive.

678. The abolition of the system of purchase would be very much equivalent to an increase of pay in the army, would it not?—Clearly so.

679. Therefore, the abolition of any portion of the purchase system is an extension of pay to the army?—Yes; indirectly the abolition of any portion of the purchase system is beneficial in that respect.

680. The sale of the commissions by the State, out of the funds of the Reserve Fund, is preventing the increase to the pay of the army, which would result from their having the promotions gratis?—Yes; that is the ultimate effect of any extension of the purchase system.

681. So that the result is rather this, is it not; the necessity for officers to purchase their commissions is depriving them of an advantage rather than extracting a sum from their pockets as a tax? The case is rather this, that the State selling those commissions, instead of allowing them to go in the natural course of promotion without purchase?—Yes; the State compels them to pay for that promotion, which they would otherwise obtain whithout paying money for it.

682. The State compels them to pay for that promotion in the same way as they pay for all promotions, except by death vacancies?—In the same way as they pay for all commissions which they purchase.

683. You are opposed to the system of purchase altogether; you would be glad to see the system abolished?—I conceive that it would be beneficial to the service at large, and for the best interests of the country.

684. The abolition of the purchase system is an increase of pay in this sense, is it not; that the promotion comes without purchase to those who would have purchased, and therefore they save so much money; and it comes more rapidly to those who cannot afford to purchase, and they move up and get promotion?—The first part of the question I see clearly; if an officer receives his pay, and at the same time is not subject to the loss of the interest of the money which he has invested in his commission, he is better paid; he is therefore better paid if he has not purchased that commission. I cannot answer the latter part of the question with any confident opinion.

685. I mean this: those who cannot afford to purchase gain by the abolition of the purchase system, because they get promotion gratis, which otherwise they would not get at all?—They get their promotion gratis, and they also get it more equally with the rest of the service.

686. Take the case of an ensign who could not afford to purchase; under the purchase system he remains an ensign much longer than he would if he moved up according to seniority, because none would purchase over his head?—Yes; probably it would be so; but the purchase system undoubtedly quickens promotion at large, because it provides, out of the pockets of the officers themselves, a retirement which prevents a stagnation among the ranks; but the objection to it is, that that retirement is obtained solely at the expense of the officers themselves, in place of being provided by the country.

687. *Chairman.*] Under this system of the Reserve Fund, a non-purchasing officer has a considerable advantage over a purchasing one, in this respect has he not. Suppose the case of two officers entering the army on the same day and leaving it on the same day, one having purchased all his commissions, and the other having purchased none; the one who has purchased all his commissions merely gets his money back, while the other who has purchased none of his commissions, gets the 100 *l.* for each year of foreign service?—In the case supposed, no doubt the officer who has obtained his commissions without purchase, has a great advantage. He has made more out of the service; but it is to be observed that this does not arise from the existence or operation of the Reserve Fund, but entirely from the privilege accorded to him of selling his commissions, although he has not purchased them at these modified rates. We know that the existence of the Reserve Fund originated in great measure in that practice, not the practice from the existence of the fund.

688. Will you put in a return?—(*The Witness handed in the same.* Vide *Appendix.*)

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APPENDIX.

Appendix, No. 1.

PAPERS handed in by Lieutenant General *W. F. Forster*, 28 June 1867.

(General Number 106.)

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad. App. No. 1.

Horse Guards, S.W., 15 February 1861.

1. His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief has had under his consideration the necessity of recalling to Full Pay Service all Officers now on Half Pay who are able to serve, and wishing also to give to Officers on Half Pay the opportunity of retiring from the service by the sale of their Commissions: he hereby announces, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, that they will be permitted to do so, to a limited extent, in the manner and under the restrictions hereinafter specified.

2. This arrangement to include General Officers who may be in receipt of the Half Pay only of the regimental rank in which they retired.

3. The individuals disposed to avail themselves of this arrangement, shall make application to the General Commanding in Chief, through the Military Secretary, according to the Form annexed.

4. The sales to take place under the following restrictions, viz.:—

No person to be allowed to sell who has passed the age of 60 years, or who cannot produce a certificate from the Army Medical Department at Head Quarters, or, if in a colony, the certificate of a medical board, or if no medical board can be assembled, the certificate of the Senior Medical Officer, showing that his retirement does not result from impaired constitution threatening earlier dissolution than a person of his age may expect in the common course of nature.

5. The price of the Commissions to be paid to the Officers selling out shall be the regulation price of the rank in which they retired, or such portion as their services may entitle them to, less the difference received by them between Full and Half Pay.

6. It is to be understood that no Officer on the Half-Pay List, who may hold a garrison situation, will be permitted to retain it if he should sell under this arrangement.

7. The time allowed for the operation of this regulation shall be limited to six months for Officers at home, and to one year for Officers residing in the colonies.

8. Officers selling their Commissions under this Regulation will be granted the Brevet Rank to which they might be entitled had they been restored to Full Pay to sell in the usual manner, their names being retained as Retired Officers in the Army List accordingly.

9. As the funds at the disposal of the Secretary of State for War for this purpose are limited, the applications will be considered in the order in which they are received; and when the funds are expended no further sales will be allowed.

10. Officers of Artillery and Engineers on the Half-pay List who may be desirous of availing themselves of the benefit of this Regulation, so far as the provisions thereof can be made applicable to them, are at liberty to make application accordingly; but, as such Officers are not, under ordinary circumstances, eligible to dispose of their Commissions by sale, each application as received will be specially considered with reference to the previous service of the Officer.

By Command,
James Yorke Scarlett,
Adjutant General.

QUEEN'S BODY GUARD.

(General Number 146.)

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad.

Horse Guards, S.W., 6 August 1861.

Yeomen of the Guard.
1—1861.

THE Queen has been pleased to approve that the purchase of the officers' commissions in the corps of the Yeomen of the Guard should cease at the earliest possible moment, and to order that the future vacancies in the corps should be filled up by officers of the army of long and good service, to be selected from a list kept at the Horse

App. No. 1.

Guards by the General Commanding in Chief, the recommendation being made to Her Majesty in each case, as now, by the captain of the corps.

Any of the officers who acquired their commissions by purchase, and are desirous of retiring from the corps, upon communicating with the captain, will receive from the Secretary of State for War an amount in compensation thereof, and a successor will be appointed to the vacancy, who, however, it must be clearly understood, will not be allowed to sell his commission.

The Lieutenant in future to be appointed must have been a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel in the Army, or Royal Marines, or in the Indian Army.

The Ensign and the Clerk of the Cheque, a Lieutenant Colonel or Major in the Army or Royal Marines, or in the Indian Army.

The Exons, Captains in the Army, or Royal Marines, or Indian Army, according to the present regulations of the corps.

It is further Her Majesty's pleasure that no officer should be appointed to the corps above the age of 50.

Whenever an officer becomes, in the opinion of the captain, permanently incapacitated to perform the duties of the appointment, he will be required to resign it, or half his salary will be paid to a substitute selected as already described, and who will succeed to the next vacancy in the corps.

This order is not to be retrospective, or to apply to those officers of the army now in the corps, who have been appointed on the recommendation of the General Commanding in Chief.

It is to be clearly understood that officers who may be appointed for the future, under the above regulations, will be, as heretofore, entirely under the command of the captain of the corps.

Any officer who may possess the above qualifications, and is desirous of being a candidate for the corps, should address his application to the Military Secretary, Horse Guards, for the purpose of its being laid before his Royal Highness the General commanding in Chief, with a view to such officer, if duly qualified, being recommended, through the captain of the corps, to Her Majesty for appointment.

By Order,

James Yorke Scarlett,
Adjutant General.

Gentlemen-at-Arms.

(General Number 213.)

Circular Memorandum addressed to the Army at Home and Abroad.

Horse Guards, S.W., 15 July 1862.
Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms.
1—(1862.)

Her Majesty having been pleased to approve of a re-organization of the corps of Gentlemen-at-arms, and to order that future vacancies therein should be filled up by officers of the Army and Royal Marines of long or meritorious service, to be selected by Her Majesty from a list kept at the Horse Guards by the General Commanding in Chief, the following extract of the amended regulations in reference to appointments thereto, which will be adopted henceforth in lieu of those promulgated on the 25th May, 1861, is published for the information of officers of the Army.

The purchase of commissions is to cease, compensation being made to existing interests from the Reserve Fund, by the Secretary of State for War, and no officer who may be appointed to the corps henceforth will be allowed to sell his commission.

Officers wishing to become candidates for commissions in the corps should apply to the military secretary, at the Horse Guards, stating their qualifications according to the following regulations:—

The lieutenant must either be, or have been, a colonel or lieutenant colonel in the British Army, Indian Army, or the corps of Royal Marines.

The standard-bearer, the clerk of the cheque, and the harbinger, must either be or have been, lieutenant colonels or majors in the British Army, Indian Army, or the corps of Royal Marines.

The private gentlemen must either be, or have been, captains or subalterns in the British Army, Indian Army, or the corps of Royal Marines.

The officers and private gentlemen on half-pay are to enjoy the same together with their salaries.

No officer will be appointed to the corps under the height of 5 feet 8 inches.

No officer will be appointed to the corps above the age of 50.

By Command,

James Yorke Scarlett,
Adjutant General.

Appendix, No. 2.

PAPER handed in by Lieutenant General *Forster*.

RETURN giving the Number of CANDIDATES appointed to the ARMY from the 1st June 1864 to 31st May 1867. App. No. 2.

COMMISSIONS BY PURCHASE.

YEAR.	To Cadets.	To Direct Candidates.	To Non-Commissioned Officers.	TOTAL.
1864-65 - - - - - -	87	344	- -	431
1865-66 - - - - - -	104	313	- -	417
1866-67 - - - - - -	101	298	1	400
	292	955	1	1,248

COMMISSIONS WITHOUT PURCHASE.

YEAR.	Cadets from the Royal Military College who passed during the Years named and were appointed.				TOTAL.	Ensigncies to Non-Commissioned Officers.	To others, including appointments to Quarter Masterships.	GRAND TOTAL.
	Competed for.	To Queen's Cadets.	To India Cadets.	To Cadets in Colonial Corps.				
1864-65 - - -	82	3	17	8	110	13	8	131
1865-66 - - -	70	14	20	1	105	7	20	132
1866-67 - - -	65	12	23	6	106	11	26	143
	217	29	60	15	321	31	54	406

W. F. Forster, Military Secretary.

Horse Guards, 8 July 1867.

Appendix, No. 3.

PAPERS handed in by Major *William Marvin.*

(No. 334.)

VICTORIA R.

App. No. 3. WHEREAS we have judged it expedient to revise those parts of our Royal Warrants of the 6th day of October 1854, and 3rd day of November 1854, which regulate the promotion and retirement of Combatant Officers in our Army and Ordnance Corps: our will and pleasure is, that from the date of this our Royal Warrant, our Commander in Chief shall govern himself by these our rules in recommending Combatant Officers for promotions and retirement:—

PROMOTION.

1. That the rank of field marshal be given without reference to seniority.

2. That there shall be a fixed establishment of general officers, viz.:—

For the Guards and the Line - -	Generals - - -	50
	Lieutenant Generals -	80
	Major Generals - -	130
For the Artillery - - - -	Generals - - -	6
	Lieutenant Generals -	10
	Major Generals - -	16
For the Engineers - - - -	Generals - - -	3
	Lieutenant Generals -	5
	Major Generals - -	8

3. That colonels may be appointed, without regard to seniority, to commands as major generals, with temporary rank, and if they shall have conducted themselves to our satisfaction, such temporary rank, after having been held for five years in peace, or for any shorter period in war, may, upon the recommendation of our Commander in Chief, be made permanent. That the temporary rank of general and lieutenant general may also be given, whenever the convenience of the service requires it, and may be made permanent in a similar manner.

4. That every vacancy on the fixed establishment of general officers shall be filled by the promotion of the senior colonel qualified to succeed to the rank of major general, and to be placed on the fixed establishment, under the regulations now in force; or by a supernumerary major general, as provided in clause 6.

5. That, in addition to the colonels promoted by seniority to be major generals, and those promoted after having held temporary rank under the regulation in clause 3, colonels shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of major general, and major generals to the rank of lieutenant general, and lieutenant generals to the rank of general, for distinguished services in the field. In the case of officers promoted to the rank of general officers, as a reward for distinguished service in war, the recommendation, in which the service of the officer shall be detailed, shall be published in the general orders of the army, and in the "London Gazette."

6. That all colonels promoted to be major generals after five years' employment in responsible commands with the temporary rank of major general under the provisions in clause 3, and all colonels promoted to be major generals for distinguished service in the field, shall be placed on a supernumerary list of major generals, and shall not be reckoned as part of the fixed establishment until the time when they would have attained the rank of major general by seniority; that is to say, until the colonel who originally stood next senior on the colonels' list to the officer promoted out of his turn has become a major general, after which the next vacancy will be filled by the transfer of the supernumerary major general to the fixed establishment. The major generals who have already been promoted out of their turn, and would not yet have succeeded to that rank by seniority, shall be considered

sidered as coming under this rule, but they shall be specially allowed to retain the pay of 25 *s.* a day which they acquired on being originally placed on the fixed establishment. The supernumerary major generals, when absorbed into the fixed establishment, shall preserve the seniority which they acquired when, after a period of qualifying service with temporary rank, they were first confirmed as permanent major generals on the supernumerary list, and shall rise by that seniority to be lieutenant generals in succession. General officers promoted for distinguished service in the field will take their seniority from the date of their promotion, as stated in the "London Gazette."

7. That three separate lists of general officers be inserted in the Army List, the first containing the names of those on the fixed establishment; the second, those who, having been promoted out of their regular turn, are supernumerary to the fixed establishment; and the third, those on the half-pay of their former regimental commissions.

8. That the rank of colonel be given to officers, after serving for five years with the rank of lieutenant colonel, in the actual command of regiments, or for the same period as second lieutenant colonels of regiments, or as major and lieutenant colonel, or major in the household cavalry, or as mounted officers of the foot guards, or on the staff, in the following situations, viz.,—deputy adjutant general, deputy quartermaster general, assistant adjutant general, assistant quartermaster general, military secretary (or assistant military secretary where there shall be no military secretary) to such general officers alone as are exercising the supreme command on a station, commissioner to the head quarters of an allied army, inspector general of army schools, members of the council of military education, lieutenant governor or superintendent of studies at the Royal Military College, or commandant of the Staff College, or after serving for eight years with the rank of lieutenant colonel as equerry to the Sovereign, subject always to the approval of our Commander in Chief of the manner of which an officer has commanded his regiment, or discharged the duties of his appointment. The military superintendents of the manufacturing departments of the army will be eligible to be promoted from the rank of lieutenant colonel to that of colonel after five years' service in the former rank, subject to the approval of our Secretary of State for War.

9. That regimental majors, who are brevet lieutenant colonels, falling into the command of regiments in the absence of the lieutenant colonel, shall, on attaining the rank of regimental lieutenant colonel, reckon the period commencing from the completion of the first month of such temporary command, as part of the five years required to qualify for the rank of colonel.

10. That the rank of colonel be given to officers who obtain the rank of brevet lieutenant colonel for services in the field, after eight years of actual service with that rank.

11. That in cases where a regiment serving abroad may be so divided as to constitute two distinct commands, and one portion may be under the command of the regimental major, who is also a brevet lieutenant colonel, and in cases where a brevet lieutenant colonel may be in command of a mixed force of different corps, a discretionary power shall be vested in our Commander in Chief, subject to the approval of our Secretary of State for War, to allow such service, or portions of such service, to count as part of the qualifying period for promotion to the rank of colonel.

12. That lieutenant colonels appointed to civil situations under Government on or after the date of this our Royal Warrant shall be promoted to the rank of colonel after eight years' service in the former rank, provided the nature of the civil appointment be considered by our Secretary of State for War and Commander in Chief calculated to give the officer such practical experience as may afterwards prove advantageous to the corps or service to which he belongs.

13. That field officers, commissioned as such before the 20th June 1854, be allowed to rise by brevet as heretofore; but no officer promoted to the rank of field officer on or after that date, is hereafter to rise from the rank of lieutenant colonel to that of colonel otherwise than by five or eight years' service in the former rank, as provided in clause 8, or as a reward for distinguished service or by appointment to be Queen's aide de camp—except under the special provisions in clauses 9, 10, 11, and 12.

14. Lieutenant colonels who held that rank prior to the 20th June 1854 shall be promoted by a special brevet to the rank of colonel—commissions to bear date the 28th November 1854—and such of the said lieutenant colonels as have been passed over by officers who have attained the rank of colonel in conformity with the provisions of our Royal Warrants of the 6th October and 3rd November 1854, shall be restored to the respective places which they would have occupied as colonels had they been promoted in ordinary succession under the system of periodical brevets.

15. That promotions shall be made from captain to major, and from major to lieutenant colonel, in succession, as vacancies occur in the major generals' fixed establishment.

16. That any captain, major, or lieutenant colonel may be rewarded by brevet promosion for distinguished services in the field; but no officer receiving such brevet promotion shall be permitted to exchange brevet for substantive rank, except for conspicuously distinguished service in the field, and unless substantive rank could not at first, and at the time, have been awarded to him, and that for the interest of the service he shall have been allowed

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temporarily to take brevet rank instead; and in every case in which such exceptional promotions shall be given, the recommendation in which the service of the officer shall be detailed shall be published in the general orders of the army, and in the "London Gazette."

17. That no officer who held brevet rank, and was considered eligible, under the 13th clause of our Warrants of the 6th October and 3rd November 1854, to have that rank converted into substantive rank, can any longer retain that privilege; but a captain and brevet field officer, while continuing in the command of his company, shall receive the pay of major, *i. e.*, an increase of 2 *s.* 5 *d.* a day; and, if reduced to half-pay, shall receive 9 *s.* 6 *d.* a day, the half-pay of major.

A captain and brevet field officer of the same class commanding a troop of cavalry shall be allowed an addition of 2 *s.* 5 *d.* a day to the pay of captain, and, if reduced to half-pay, the half-pay of a major of infantry.

A regimental major who has attained the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel under similar circumstances shall, if he remain on full-pay, receive an addition of 1 *s.* a day to the pay of major, and, if reduced to half-pay, the half-pay of a lieutenant colonel of infantry, viz., 11 *s.* a day.

18. That the commands of general officers and other situations on the staff, both at home and abroad, shall not be held for more than five years, unless by re-appointment under special circumstances.

19. That the names of field officers permitted to retire from the Army by the sale of their commissions shall be retained in the Army List in Italics, with the permission of our Commander in Chief in each case.

20. That no officer shall be promoted to the rank of captain until he shall have been two years an effective subaltern, not to that of field officer until he shall have been six years in the service.

Unattached Pay, Retired Full-Pay, and Half-Pay.

21. It is our further will and pleasure that the grants of unattached pay, and other rates of pay to general officers, not being colonels of regiments, and of retired full-pay, and of half-pay, to officers of our army, shall be regulated by this our Royal Warrant, to be administered and interpreted by our Secretary of State for War, as the sole and standing authority for regulating such grants.

Unattached Pay.

22. Officers removed from their commissions as field officers in regiments of Foot Guards, in consequence of being promoted to be general officers, shall receive unattached pay according to the following scale; viz., lieutenant colonel, 600 *l.* a year; major, 550 *l.* a year.

23. Officers promoted to be general officers from full or half-pay commissions in the line, shall, if duly qualified to be placed on the fixed establishment, receive unattached pay of 1 *l.* 5 *s.* a day.

24. Regimental colonels of Artillery and Engineers, promoted to be general officers, shall receive the net full-pay of their former rank, and regimental field officers of those corps so promoted, shall receive the unattached pay of 1 *l.* 5 *s.* a day, until they shall be appointed colonels commandant of battalions.

25. A general officer being colonel of a regiment, in the event of his regiment being reduced, may be placed, in the first instance, as supernumerary upon the said establishment of unattached pay, at 1 *l.* 5 *s.* a day; but shall fall into the first vacancy that may occur therein, until re-appointed colonel of a regiment.

26. A colonel promoted to the rank of general officer, as a reward for distinguished service in war, or in consequence of having held a command with temporary rank as general officer, shall, while supernumerary to the fixed establishment, receive the unattached pay of 400 *l.* a year, until he shall fall into a vacancy on the fixed establishment of general officers.

27. To entitle an officer to the unattached pay of a general officer, such officer must have actually served six years with the rank of a regimental field officer, either in the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, or with a regiment of the guards or line, or in some other substantive military employment in the public service, or as mounted officer of the foot guards, or in either of the appointments detailed in clause 8 of this warrant, excepting that of equerry to the Sovereign, in which appointment eight years' service will be required, or having obtained the rank of regimental field officer, shall have been obliged to go upon half-pay on account of reduction, or in consequence of ill-health contracted in the service (as established by the report of a board of medical officers), or in consequence of wounds received in action before he had served the six or eight years prescribed in this our Royal Warrant.

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28. The benefit of unattached pay shall not be extended to any general officer who, when he last went upon half-pay, received the difference, unless he had previously paid it; nor to any officer who went upon half-pay at his own request in time of war, before he had completed an aggregate full-pay service of 30 years, of which period six years shall have been with the rank of regimental field officer; nor to any officer who went upon half-pay at his own request, in time of peace, before he had served six or eight years, as in the preceding article, with the rank of regimental field officer.

Officers thus situated, shall continue to receive the half-pay only of which they were in receipt at the time of their promotion to be general officers.

Retired Full-Pay.

29. The retired full-pay list of field officers and captains of the Guards and line, shall be fixed at 60,000 *l.* a year, and of the Artillery and Engineers at 48,000 *l.* a year; all officers who were on the full pay retirement previously to the Royal Warrant of 1840, being considered supernumerary to the establishment of 60,000 *l.* and 48,000 *l.* respectively.

30. *See* new clause 30, circular No. 675, page 7.

31. The retirement of officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers shall not be confined to the ranks of lieutenant-colonel, captain, and lieutenant, but may include a proportion of unattached general officers and regimental colonels who, relinquishing the prospect of succeeding to the command of battalions, shall be permitted to retire on 600 *l.* a year.

32. Lieutenant-colonels of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, with the rank of colonel, of not less than 30 years' service, will be permitted to retire on 400 *l.* a year; and lieutenant-colonels, of shorter periods of service, and officers of inferior rank, of Artillery and Engineers, on their regimental pay, subject to the provisions of clause 30, as to unfitness from ill-health and wounds received in action.

33. The retired pay of lieutenant-colonels shall be 20 *s.* a day.

34. Each officer placed on the retired full-pay list shall receive a step of honorary rank, together with the full-pay of the rank from which he retired (or the special rates applicable to officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers); but such officer cannot be further promoted.

35. The regimental field officers of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers who have been placed on the retired full-pay list, or who may have retired on half-pay as such, in consequence of wounds or ill-health contracted in the service anterior to our warrant of the 3rd November 1854, shall be promoted in succession up to the rank of colonel and general officer, when those who stood next below them on the effective establishment are so promoted. On attaining the rank of general officer, a number not exceeding eight of the Royal Artillery, and four of the Royal Engineers, shall be allowed to receive 400 *l.* a year each, and the two seniors of the Royal Artillery, and the senior officer of the Royal Engineers who shall have been promoted, shall each receive 50 *l.* a year, in addition to the before-mentioned sum of 400 *l.* per annum.

36. Officers appointed to veteran battalions shall not, on their reduction or retirement therefrom, acquire any claim to retired full-pay.

37. That officers commanding regiments shall be required to retire therefrom on attaining 60 years of age, unless it be reported to our Commander in Chief by the general officer inspecting a regiment, that its condition and discipline are such as to prove that it would be advantageous to the service for the commanding officer to continue in the command of his corps. Officers retiring under this provision will be allowed the rate of retired full-pay fixed by this our Royal Warrant, retaining their prospect of becoming general officers, and their right to unattached pay as general officers in lieu of retired full-pay, provided such officers shall at the period of their retirement hold the rank of colonel in the army, and have fulfilled the conditions of service required by Article 27.

Temporary Allowance in the nature of Half-Pay.

38. An officer having served less than three years will, if reduced, receive only a temporary allowance of half-pay, according to the following scale:— Service of less than three years.

Services on Full-pay.	Temporary Allowance.
Under 1 year	for 1 year.
1, and under 2 years	for 2 years.
2, and under 3 years	for 3 years.

The temporary allowance ceases at the termination of the above-recited periods, or sooner if the officer shall have been previously placed on full-pay.

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Re-appointment within five years.

39. An officer who has been placed on temporary half-pay is eligible to be appointed to a full-pay commission, either by exchange or otherwise, provided his appointment take place within five years after he has ceased to receive temporary half-pay, in which case his former service is allowed to reckon.

40. The exchange to full-pay, under the preceding article, may be made with a full-pay officer entitled to half-pay.

Sale of Commission.

41. An officer who has been reduced with only a temporary allowance, having purchased his commission, may receive the regulated price thereof from the public through our Secretary of State for War, and the public shall be reimbursed by the sale of a first full-pay commission, which would otherwise have been conferred without purchase; but these sales shall not be required in any greater proportion than one for every two such vacated commissions.

Half Pay.

Liability to forfeiture.

42. The half-pay of the army is granted as a remuneration for past military services, and also as imposing an obligation on the officer to return to his military duties whenever called upon; therefore, any officer not obeying the call is liable to forfeit his half-pay, if not incapacitated by illness.

Wounds received in action.

43. An officer shall be entitled to be placed on the half-pay establishment, if compelled to retire in consequence of wounds received in action.

Ill health contracted on duty.

44. An officer having served more than three years shall be entitled to be placed upon the half-pay establishment, if compelled to retire in consequence of ill-health contracted on duty, as certified by the medical board or medical officers to whom he has been referred for examination. Unless the result of such examination be received by our Commander in Chief and Secretary of State for War, he will be considered to have retired upon half-pay for his own convenience.

45, 46. *See* clauses 45 and 46, Circular No. 675, page 7.

Garrison appointments.

47. No garrison commission or appointment shall give an officer any claim to half-pay on retirement.

Residence of half-pay officer.

48. The residence of the half-pay officer is to be stated every quarter in his declaration, whether his half-pay be received by an agent or by himself.

No right to sell or commute.

49. No officer on half-pay shall, of right, have a claim to sell or commute his half-pay; the permission shall be governed by such consideration of the individual case as may induce our Secretary of State for War and Commander in Chief to recommend it.

Sale of commission by officers having a claim to half-pay.

50. If a subaltern officer, whose service confers a claim to half-pay, be desirous of retiring from the army by the sale of his commission, the following rules should be observed:—

1. If he purchased his commission, the regulated price may be granted (whether he should be receiving half-pay or a temporary allowance in the nature of half-pay).

* Now 100*l.* for each year of foreign service, and 50*l.* for each year of home service.

2. If he did not purchase his commission, and had served less than seven years on full-pay in the army, he may be allowed to receive 100*l.** for each year of service as a commissioned officer, not however exceeding the regulated price of the commission he held.

3. If a non-commissioned officer shall have been promoted to the rank of an ensign or cornet, or adjutant, he shall not have a claim to retire, by the sale of his commission, unless he shall have served in the army as an officer on full-pay upwards of one year, in which case he may be awarded the full price of the commission which he shall have received without purchase, or such proportion thereof as, with reference to the length of his actual service, shall be deemed proper by our Secretary of State for War and Commander in Chief.

Artillery and engineer officers retiring on half-pay at their own request.

51. The following number of officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers will be permitted to retire on permanent half-pay, at their own request:—

	Artillery.		Engineers.	
Lieutenant Colonels - - - - -	2	annually	1	annually.
Captains of not less than 24 years' service -	3	annually	3	every two years.
Lieutenants of not less than 20 years' service -	1	annually	1	every two years.

Officers who may have been previously on temporary half-pay, in consequence of reduction, will be allowed to reckon such time in making up the requisite number of years of service.

Officers retiring under this clause shall not be eligible for any further promotion.

Certain officers who have been permitted to retire for their own convenience.

52. An officer of any of the under-mentioned ranks, having entered the service since the termination of the war in 1815, and having been permitted to exchange to half-pay, not on account of ill health, but for his private convenience, before he had served seven years on full-pay,

full-pay, shall be allowed only the old rate of half-pay specified in the following Schedule:— App. No. 3.

	Cavalry.		Infantry.		Artillery and Engineers.	
	New Rate.	Old Rate.	New Rate.	Old Rate.	New Rate.	Old Rate.
	Per diem.	Per diem.	Per diem.	Per diem.	Per diem.	Per diem.
	s. d.	*s. d.*	*s. d.*	*s. d.*	*£. s. d.*	*£. s. d.*
Colonel Commandant	–	–	–	–	1 15 4	1 2 –
Colonel	15 6	13 –	14 6	12 –	– 16 9	– 12 –
Lieutenant Colonel	12 6	10 –	11 –	8 6	– 11 8	– 8 6
Lieutenant Colonel on Major's Pay	–	–	–	–	– 10 1	– 7 6
Major	10 –	8 –	9 6	7 6	—	—
Captain	7 6	5 6	7 –	5 –	– 7 4	– 5 –
Ditto of Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, having superior brevet rank, and provided he shall have served as Captain on full-pay for at least two years immediately before retirement to half-pay	–	–	8 –	–	– 8 4	—
Ditto of Cavalry, with brevet rank, exchanging to half-pay after two years' full-pay service, with a Captain of Infantry	–	–	7 6	–	—	—
Lieutenant	4 8	3 –	4 –	2 4	– 4 2	– 2 6
Ditto of Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry, if commissioned seven years as a Lieutenant in the regular army at the date of being placed upon half-pay	–	–	4 6	–	– 4 8	– 2 6
Ditto of Cavalry, of five years' standing, if entitled to reckon two years for the battle of Waterloo	5 2	–	–	–	—	—
Cornet	3 6	2 6	–	–	—	—
Junior Lieutenant of Artillery or Engineers	–	–	–	–	– 8 2	– 2 –
Ensign	–	–	3 –	1 10	—	—
Adjutant, if not commissioned as Lieutenant	4 –	4 –	4 –	4 –	—	—

If the retirement should be for the public convenience, by reduction or otherwise, or in consequence of ill-health certified by a Medical Board, the officer will be allowed the new rate of half-pay.

53. For every three vacancies occurring by death on the British half-pay list, in the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel, one major serving upon full-pay may be promoted to the unattached rank and half-pay of a lieutenant colonel, viz., 11 *s.* a day; in like manner, for every three vacancies in the rank of major, one captain may be promoted from the full-pay to the unattached rank and half-pay of a major; and for every three vacancies in the rank of captain, one lieutenant may be promoted to the unattached rank and half-pay of captain. Promotion to unattached rank and half pay.

The officers so promoted under this Regulation shall retain their claims to pensions for their widows at the rate accorded to their new ranks.

The vacancies which these promotions will create on the full-pay list shall be in all cases filled from the half-pay list.

54. Service on the Staff shall be considered as full-pay service.

Given at Our Court at St. James's, this fourteenth day of October 1858, in the Twenty-second Year of Our Reign.

By Her Majesty's Command,
J. Peel.

App. No. 3.

(Circular, No. 675.)

Home and Foreign.

Victoria R.

Whereas we have judged it expedient to revise certain parts of our Royal Warrant of the 14th October 1858, which regulate the full and half-pay retirements of officers of our army; it is our will and pleasure, that instead of the provisions contained in Clauses 30, 45, and 46 of the aforesaid Warrant, which are hereby cancelled, those contained in this our Royal Warrant shall be adopted.

New Clause 30. The colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains of the Guards and Line, allowed to retire upon full-pay, shall be selected and recommended to us by our Commander in Chief, with the concurrence of our Secretary of State for War, and appointed according to their regimental, and not according to their brevet rank.

But no officer shall be placed on the retired full-pay list until after a service of 30 years as a commissioned officer on full-pay of a regiment, or in a staff situation; or if promoted from the ranks, until after an aggregate period of not less than 30 years' service in all grades, of which at least 15 years shall have been as a commissioned officer on regimental full-pay, or on the staff; unless under special circumstances arising from ill health contracted in the service, or in consequence of wounds received in action, it shall be deemed expedient by our Secretary of State for War to reduce such service to any shorter period than 30 years.

New Clause 45. An officer having actually done duty in some regiment or corps, or in some other military capacity as a commissioned officer in the public service, for a period of at least three years, shall be entitled to be placed on the half-pay establishment on reduction from full-pay.

An officer who has been promoted from the ranks shall be entitled to the benefit of this provision after one year's service on full-pay as a commissioned officer, and at least five years' service as a non-commissioned officer.

New Clause 46. No officer shall be permitted to retire upon permanent half-pay until after a service of 25 years as a commissioned officer on full-pay of a regiment, or in a Staff situation; or if promoted from the ranks, until after an aggregate period of not less than 25 years' service in all grades, of which at least 10 years shall have been as a commissioned officer on regimental full-pay, or on the Staff; unless the retirement shall be occasioned by unfitness for service, resulting from wounds received in action, or from ill-health, certified to have been contracted in and by military service, or shall be in accordance with the provisions laid down for officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers in Clause 51 of our Royal Warrant of the 14th October 1858.

Additional Clause. The provisions in Clauses 30, 45, and 46, for officers of the Guards and Line promoted from the ranks, are also applicable to the same class of officers of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers.

Given at Our Court at St. James's, this 28th day of March 1861, in the Twenty-fourth Year of Our Reign.

By Her Majesty's Command,
Herbert.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS handed in by Colonel *Haliday*, 13 July 1867.

App. No. 4.

1.—SUMS received on account of RESERVE FUND by SALES of COMMISSIONS in Succession to OFFICERS retiring on Half-pay, or Full-pay, &c.

	£.	s.	d.
From 1 April 1861 to 31 March 1862	36,800	–	–
„ 1 April 1862 to 31 March 1863	89,250	–	–
„ 1 April 1863 to 31 March 1864	42,250	–	–
„ 1 April 1864 to 31 March 1865	56,065	–	–
	4,500	–	–
„ 1 April 1865 to 31 December 1865	50,000	–	–
„ 1 January 1866 to 31 December 1866	59,813	–	–
TOTAL £.	338,678	–	–

2.—AMOUNTS received by Difference between SUMS Paid for COMMISSIONS Purchased, and those RECEIVED by OFFICERS Retiring, who had not Purchased their COMMISSIONS.

	£.	s.	d.
From 1 April 1861 to 31 March 1862	16,827	–	–
„ 1 April 1862 to 31 March 1863	17,885	–	–
„ 1 April 1863 to 31 March 1864	21,576	–	–
„ 1 April 1864 to 31 March 1865	23,920	–	–
„ 1 April 1865 to 31 December 1865	16,635	–	–
„ 1 January 1866 to 31 December 1866	12,536	–	–
TOTAL £.	109,379	–	–

TOTAL £. 448,057.

AMOUNTS PAID to CAVALRY OFFICERS Retiring from that Branch of the Service, to make up the Difference between the former Regulation Price of COMMISSIONS, and those established in 1860.

	£.	s.	d.
From 1 April 1861 to 31 March 1862	44,641	13	4
„ 1 April 1862 to 31 March 1863	59,230	–	–
„ 1 April 1863 to 31 March 1864	30,560	–	–
„ 1 April 1864 to 31 March 1865	29,060	–	–
„ 1 April 1865 to 31 December 1865	19,460	–	–
„ 1 January 1866 to 31 December 1866	21,930	–	–
TOTAL £.	204,881	13	4

App. No. 4.

AMOUNTS Paid for the purpose of the CONVERSION of MILITARY TRAIN to a NON-PURCHASE CORPS.

	£.	s.	d.
From 1 April 1861 to 31 March 1862	Nil.		
„ 1 April 1862 to 31 March 1863	Nil.		
„ 1 April 1863 to 31 March 1864	925	–	–
„ 1 April 1864 to 31 March 1865	2,250	–	–
„ 1 April 1865 to 31 December 1865	450	–	–
„ 1 January 1866 to 31 December 1866	900	–	–
TOTAL £.	4,525	–	–

AMOUNTS Paid to Buy up HALF-PAY COMMISSIONS.

	£.	s.	d.
From 1 April 1861 to 31 March 1862	112,234	10	–
„ 1 April 1862 to 31 March 1863	35,325	–	–
„ 1 April 1863 to 31 March 1864	32,500	–	–
„ 1 April 1864 to 31 March 1865	30,489	–	–
„ 1 April 1865 to 31 December 1865	27,651	–	–
„ 1 January 1866 to 31 December 1866	73,400	–	–
TOTAL £.	311,599	10	–

AMOUNTS Paid to Buy up COMMISSIONS of GENTLEMEN AT ARMS and YEOMEN of the GUARD.

	£.	s.	d.
From 1 April 1861 to 31 March 1862	18,700	–	–
„ 1 April 1862 to 31 March 1863	2,400	–	–
„ 1 April 1863 to 31 March 1864	9,400	–	–
„ 1 April 1864 to 31 March 1865	7,200	–	–
„ 1 April 1865 to 31 December 1865	1,200	–	–
„ 1 January 1866 to 31 December 1866	3,200	–	–
TOTAL £.	42,100	–	–

Appendix, No. 5.

RETURN of First Commissions given between 1st January 1860 and 30th June 1867. App. No. 5.

Year.		Commissions given by Purchase to			Commissions given without Purchase to			Total.
		Cadets.	Private Gentlemen.	N. C. Officers.	Cadets.	Private Gentlemen.	N. C. Officers.	
1860	Cavalry	–	74	–	3	6	4	87
	Infantry	–	341	–	58	55	16	470
1861	Cavalry	–	75	–	1	4	–	80
	Infantry	8	320	–	63	48	3	442
1862	Cavalry	3	81	–	2	2	–	88
	Infantry	22	312	1	50	32	4	421
1863	Cavalry	3	86	–	–	1	–	90
	Infantry	80	241	1	79	47	4	452
1864	Cavalry	7	66	1	1	–	3	78
	Infantry	95	260	1	108	9	16	489
1865	Cavalry	4	66	–	2	1	2	75
	Infantry	96	260	–	83	–	6	445
1866	Cavalry	8	59	–	7	–	2	76
	Infantry	104	181	–	102	1	3	391
1867 (up to 30th June.)	Cavalry	–	40	1	3	–	1	45
	Infantry	40	170	–	57	1	6	274
Total		470	2,632	5	619	207	70	4,003

Horse Guards,
17 July 1867.

W. F. Forster,
Military Secretary.

Copy of Clause 84 of Royal Warrant of 3 February 1866, which provides for the Sale of Officers' Commissions, which have not been purchased by them:—

84. An Officer shall not be allowed to sell any Commission which he shall not have previously purchased, nor the Commission of a rank in which he shall not actually have served, unless with the sanction of Our Commander in Chief and Our Secretary of State for War, after service on full pay of 20 years or upwards. An Officer who shall have served less than 20 years and more than three years, and who shall have obtained any or all of his Commissions without purchase may be permitted to receive, on retiring from the service, the full value of such Commissions as he may have purchased, or of a first Commission granted without purchase for distinguished service in the field; and in respect of his other non-purchase Commissions, if he be compelled to retire by ill-health, misfortune, or other stringent cause, a sum not exceeding 50*l.* for every year of home service, and 100*l.* for every year of foreign service, foreign service being counted from the day of embarkation to the day of disembarkation in the United Kingdom. It shall, however, be competent for Our Secretary of State for War to award any larger sum, not exceeding the regulation value of the surrendered Commission, in consideration of special service.

Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER referred to the COMMITTEE by the HOUSE.

ARMY (ARTILLERY AND ENGINEERS).

RETURN of the Names of all OFFICERS of ARTILLERY or ENGINEERS who have RETIRED from the Service under the Operation of the MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS; distinguishing such as have held Civil Appointments, with the names of such Appointments, and the length of time they have been held by each Officer.

ROYAL ARTILLERY.

LIST of OFFICERS who have been permitted to RETIRE from the Service by the SALE of their respective COMMISSIONS, under the Operations of the MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS; distinguishing such as have held Civil Appointments, and the length of time they have been held by each Officer.

Rank.	Name.	Date.	Period in Civil Employ.	Rank.	Name.	Date.	Period in Civil Employ.
			Yrs. Mths.				*Yrs. Mths.*
Lieut. Colonel	J. M. Savage	9 Nov. 1855		Captain	Hon. F. Savile	6 Dec. 1850	
Ditto	C. L. Fitzgerald	17 Feb. 1857		Ditto	G. S. Robertson	24 June 1856	
Ditto	F. W. Haultain	12 June 1860		Ditto	R. S. Allen	23 April 1861	
Ditto	A. R. Wragge	19 Mar. 1861		Ditto	W. P. Pollock	23 April 1861	
Ditto	G. A. Maude	10 June 1861		Ditto	A. T. Blakeley	10 May 1861	
Ditto	P. R. Cocks	23 July 1861		Ditto	B. Bathurst	11 June 1861	
Ditto	W. R. Gilbert	23 Aug. 1861		Ditto	H. Murray	18 June 1861	
Ditto	H. J. Thomas	10 June 1862		Ditto	W. M. D. Willan	23 Aug. 1861	
Ditto	F. B. Ward	3 May 1864		Ditto	H. Lempriere	10 June 1862	
Ditto	J. Travers	28 Oct. 1864		Ditto	R. M. Mundy	15 Mar. 1864	
Ditto	F. J. Travers	13 Mar. 1866					

Horse Guards, S. W.
July 1867.

G. Gambier,
Deputy Adjutant General.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

LIST of OFFICERS who have been permitted to RETIRE from the Service by the SALE of their respective COMMISSIONS, under the Operations of the MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS, distinguishing such as have held Civil Appointments, and the length of time they have been held by each Officer.

Rank.	Name.	Date.	Period in Civil Employ.		REMARKS.
			Yrs.	*Mths.*	
Second Captain	R. Boteler	10 May - 1861	—		
Second Captain	C. Bailey	30 April - 1861	—		
Lieut. Colonel	M. Dill	4 June - 1861	—		
Lieut. Colonel	G. A. Leach	6 June - 1861	—		
Second Captain	H. Williams	2 July - 1861	—		
Second Captain	T. Webb	16 Aug. - 1861	3	6	Special Service in Shetland Islands, from 1st July 1847, to 30th December 1850.
Captain	D. Galton	2 Sept. - 1862	12	8	Inspector of Railways under Board of Trade, from 20th February 1847, to 24th October 1859.
Captain	Hon. J. Bury	8 July - 1862	—		
Lieut. Colonel and Colonel	W. Yolland	2 Oct. - 1863	9	3	Inspector of Railways under Board of Trade, from 17th July 1854, to 1st October 1863.
Lieut. Colonel	E. Y. W. Henderson	11 Oct. - 1864	14	1	Twelve years 10 months Comptroller of Convicts, Australia, from 10th February 1850, to 31st December 1862; one year three months Surveyor General of Prisons, from 29th July 1863, to 10th October 1864.
Lieut. Colonel and Colonel	J. G. McKerlie	26 May - 1865	9	8	Chairman, Board of Works, Ireland; from 8th August 1855, to 25th May 1865.
Lieut. Colonel and Colonel	G. C. Baillie	12 June - 1867	—		

Horse Guards, 10 July 1867.

J. Hane Keane,
Colonel, Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Engineers.

War Office,
18 July 1867.

JOHN S. PAKINGTON.

Appendix, No. 7.

PAPER received from the WAR OFFICE, 27 July 1867.

THE GUARDS' FUND.

Dr. *Cr.*

1860:		£. s. d.	1860:		£. s. d.
5 Nov. -	To Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills, purchased by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per Military Secretary's letter dated 2nd November 1860:		1 Jan. -	By Balance of account to 31st December 1859	1,406 13 2
	£. s. d.		13 March	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 1,600 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March 1860.	35 - 6
	Bills dated 12th March 1860 - - - 4,400 - -		May -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Harford for a commission in the Scots Fusilier Guards -	1,200 - -
	Interest 12th March to 3rd November - 65 9 -			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Colonel the Hon. J. J. Jocelyn of the Scots Fusilier Guards.	1,000 - -
	4,465 9 -				
	Less, 1 *s.* discount - 2 4 -		13 June -	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	65 12 8
	4,463 5 -				
	Broker's commission - 2 4 -				
		4,465 9 -	21 Aug. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, sum paid by Mr. Byam Martin for a commission in Grenadier Guards.	1,200 - -
				„ Cash charged Reserve Fund, sum lodged by Mr. Booth for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	450 - -
				„ Cash charged Reserve Fund, part of sum lodged by Mr. Burrell for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	350 - -
			5 Oct. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland for an ensigncy in Grenadier Guards for Mr. Herbert, Rifle Brigade.	750 - -
			1 Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade for Mr. A. Cope.	450 - -
1861:			1861:		
22 May -	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bill, purchased by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter 20th May 1861:		12 March	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 6,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 10th March.	130 17 1
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. A. E. Wilmot for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	450 - -
	£. s. d.				
	Bill dated 11th March 1861 - - - 1,000 - -		27 April -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland for an ensigncy in the Grenadier Guards for the Hon. C. F. Crighton.	1,200 - -
	Interest from 11th March to 21st May, 71 days at 2 *d.* per cent. per diem - 5 18 4		13 June -	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills, due the 11th June 1861.	70 3 -
	1,005 18 4				
	£. s.			„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Erskine, Scots Fusilier Guards.	250 - -
	Less, 2 *s.* discount - - 1 -				
	Broker's commission - - 10				
	- 10 -				
		1,005 8 4	27 July -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Murray, Grenadier Guards.	550 - -
23 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Campbell, Scots Fusilier Guards, per letter 15th October.	1,200 - -			
16 Nov. -	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills, purchased by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 14th November:			„ Cash lodged by Mr. James Dunn for an ensigncy in 41st Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Brevet Colonel Newton, Coldstream Guards.	4,500 - -
	£. s. d.				
	Bills dated 11th March 1861 - - - 6,800 - -				
	Interest 11th March to 16th November, 250 days at 2 *d.* per cent. per diem - - 141 13 4		16 Dec. -	„ Six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills, from 11th June to 11th December 1861.	54 2 10
	10 *s.* premium - - 34 - -				
	Broker's commission - 3 8 -			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant and Captain Egerton, Coldstream Guards.	350 - -
		6,979 1 4			

Dr. THE GUARDS' FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
1862:			1862:		
18 June -	To Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Ellison, Grenadier Guards, per letter 10th June.	250 - -	12 March	By Cash received for 365 days' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March.	403 17 10
25 July -	„ Cash credited Viscount Holmesdale, Coldstream Guards, per letter 18th July.	1,150 - -	14 June -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	43 6 3
			12 Sept. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills.	199 4 9
			Dec. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th December.	43 6 3
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. D. Thomas for a commission in the Coldstream Guards.	1,200 - -
			1863:		
			16 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to the 11th March.	166 - 7
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel J. Murray, Grenadier Guards.	150 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. J. Gascoigne for a commission in the Scots Fusilier Guards.	1,200 - -
			12 June -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	36 4 3
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant and Captain Cooper, Scots Fusilier Guards.	550 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the Hon. J. R. W. Vesey for a commission in the Coldstream Guards.	1,200 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the sale of the commission of Lieutenant and Captain Lord Sudeley, Grenadier Guards.	775 - -
			Sept. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lord E. G. Cecil, Coldstream Guards.	675 - -
			11 Sept. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th September.	167 5 4
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Colonel Viscount Hood, Grenadier Guards.	750 - -
			14 Dec. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to the 11th December 1863.	40 - 11
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant and Captain J. Paynter, Scots Fusilier Guards.	650 - -
1864:			1864:		
Oct. -	„ Cash credited Reserve Fund, sum paid by the officers who succeeded Brevet Colonel Newton on his retirement from the Coldstream Guards, per Military Secretary's letter 30th November 1864.	4,500 - -	14 March	" Cash received for six months' interest on 13,800*l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March 1864.	184 4 4
			14 June -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	43 15 2
			13 Sept. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th September 1864.	201 14 2
			Sept. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant and Captain Jarrett, Grenadier Guards.	475 - -
			Oct. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. R. Mostyn, Scots Fusilier Guards.	1,900 - -
			13 Dec. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th December.	51 3 9
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Farquharson, Scots Fusilier Guards.	125 - -

Dr. THE GUARDS' FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

		£.	s.	d.			£.	s.	d.
1865:					1865:				
24 August	To Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills, purchased by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per Military Secretary's letter dated 22nd August:				January	By Cash reserved from the commission of Captain G. H. Grey, Grenadier Guards.	1,425	–	–
	Bills dated 11th June 1861	3,200	–	–	14 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March.	269	2	–
	Interest, 11th June to 23rd August, 73 days at 3 per cent.	19	4	–	April	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. C. R. Hay, Scots Fusilier Guards.	150	–	–
	Broker's commission	1	12	–	15 June	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	58	13	8
		3,220	16	–	July	„ Cash reserved from commission of Lieutenant Colonel Jelf Sharp, Scots Fusilier Guards.	625	–	–
					13 Sept.	„ Cash received, six months' interest on 13,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th September 1865.	237	4	2
						„ Cash reserved from commission of Captain H. G. Fortescue, Coldstream Guards.	750	–	–
					October	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Brand, Coldstream Guards.	1,700	–	–
					12 Dec.	„ Cash received for six months' interest to 11th December on 6,200 *l.* Exchequer Bills.	91	9	–
1866:					1866:				
18 January	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills, purchased by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per letter of Military Secretary, 16th January 1866:				14 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest to 11th March 1866 on 18,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills.	277	6	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain H. A. Herbert, Coldstream Guards.	400	–	–
	Bills dated 11th March 1862	5,000	–	–	April	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel Rooke, who retires from the Scots Fusilier Guards.	525	–	–
	Interest, 11th September to 18th January, 129 days at 3 per cent.	53	–	3	12 June	„ Cash received for interest on 6,200 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June 1866.	91	9	–
		5,053	–	3	July	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel Gascoigne, Grenadier Guards.	25	–	–
	Less, 2 *s.* discount	5	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Cathcart, Coldstream Guards.	300	–	–
		5,048	–	3	13 Sept.	„ Cash received on 18,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th September 1866.	277	6	–
	Broker's commission	2	10	–	October	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Colonel the Hon. A. M. Cathcart, Grenadier Guards.	850	–	–
		5,050	10	3	12 Dec.	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 11,200 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th December 1866.	220	5	4
16 Nov.	„ Ditto, bills dated 11th June	5,000	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel Heneage, Coldstream Guards.	150	–	–
	Interest, 11th June to 16th November, 158 days at 4 per cent.	86	11	6		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel Tottenham, Scots Fusilier Guards.	50	–	–
	5 *s.* premium	12	10	–					
	Broker's commission	2	10	–	1867:				
		5,101	11	6	12 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 18,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills, due 11th March 1867.	369	14	8
					12 June	„ Cash received, six months' interest on 11,200 *l.* Exchequer Bills, due 11th June.	220	5	4
	Balance in hand	2,282	11	7					
	£.	35,205	8	–		£.	35,205	8	–

MEMORANDUM of EXCHEQUER BILLS held by Messrs. *Cox & Co.* on Account of the GUARDS' FUND.

	£.	s.	d.
BILLS dated 11th March 1867.			
13 of 1,000 *l.* each, Nos. 3,618 to 3,630	13,000	–	–
10 of 500 *l.* each, Nos. 1,879 to 1,888	5,000	–	–
2 of 200 *l.* each, Nos. 1,054 and 1,055	400	–	–
4 of 100 *l.* each, Nos. 3,913 to 3,916	400	–	–
BILLS dated 11th June 1866.			
10 of 1,000 *l.* each, Nos. 684 to 688, 1,698 and 1,699, 1,970 to 1,972	10,000	–	–
2 of 500 *l.* each, Nos. 292 and 293	1,000	–	–
1 of 200 *l.*, No. 177	200	–	–
£.	30,000	–	–

THE RESERVE FUND.

Dr. *Cr.*

1860:		£.	s.	d.	1860:		£.	s.	d.
17 Jan. -	To Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland to complete value of commission of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Small, 25th Foot, per letter 13th January 1860.	700	–	–	1 Jan. -	By Balance of account, to 31st December 1859.	55,571	11	8
					7 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lawrie, reserved from commission of Captain Rae, 91st Foot.	350	–	–
					10 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., reserved from commission of Lieutenant FitzGerald, 8th Foot.	40	–	–
	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland to complete value of commission of Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Wilton, Depôt Battalion, per letter 13th January.	3,200	–	–					
						„ Cash received of Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., part of sum lodged by Mr. Rushout, for a commission in the Royal Horse Guards.	840	–	–
23 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Blyth, 84th Foot, per letter 6th January.	50	–	–	17 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lawrie, reserved from commission of Lieutenant Chichester, 22nd Foot.	250	–	–
27 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Leatham, 3rd Foot, per letter 24th January.	450	–	–					
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lawrie, reserved from commission of Lieutenant Hunton, 92nd Foot.	200	–	–
	„ Cash credited Mr. H. C. Lane, of the 2nd Life Guards, per letter 24th January.	1,260	–	–	26 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Price and Boustead, reserved from commission of Captain Brooke, 95th Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Harris for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Hay for a cornetcy in 1st Dragoons.	840	–	–
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Robinson for an ensigncy in 15th Foot.	350	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Powell for an ensigncy in 57th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Mesham for a cornetcy in 1st Dragoons.	840	–	–
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Saunders for an ensigncy in 23rd Foot.	300	–	–
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Caulfield for an ensigncy in 3rd Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Poynter for a lieutenancy in 87th Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Tolson for an ensigncy in 35th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Phillips for an ensigncy in 40th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Ford for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	840	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Jordan for an ensigncy in 95th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Widdrington for an ensigncy in 87th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Knight for an ensigncy in 84th Foot.	450	–	–
2 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland to complete value of commission of Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, 25th Foot, per letter 31st January 1860.	450	–	–	2 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland for a majority for Captain Young, Depôt Battalion.	1,400	–	–
					6 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., for a lieutenancy for Ensign Knapp, 63rd Foot.	250	–	–
13 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain Seahouse, 31st Foot, per letter 31st January.	450	–	–					
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Coffin for an ensigncy in 16th Foot.	450	–	–
23 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son, for the credit of Lieutenant Ramsford, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 21st February.	700	–	–	8 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., for a company for Lieutenant Pye, 63rd Foot.	1,100	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland for an ensigncy in Cape Mounted Rifles for Mr. Pote.	450	–	–
	„ Cash paid E. S. Codd, Esq., for the credit of Colonel Wise, 11th Foot, per letter 21st February.	450	–	–					
					13 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Ridgway & Sons, reserved from commission of Lieutenant Peach, 77th Foot.	250	–	–
					24 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Dowling, Military Train.	450	–	–
						„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Major C. Murray, unattached.	249	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Humphreys for an ensigncy in 20th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Sadleir, 61st Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Hilliard for a lieutenancy in 86th Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Boulcott for an ensigncy in 86th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Cornet Hepburn for a lieutenancy in 6th Dragoon Guards.	350	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by the Hon. C. Legge for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Warren for a lieutenancy in 81st Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Poole for a lieutenancy in 18th Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Twyning for a lieutenancy in 18th Foot.	250	–	–

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1860:		£. s. d.	1860:		£. s. d.
10 March	To Cash paid Mr. Codd, for the credit of Cornet Maxwell, 3rd Dragoons, in return of sum paid in excess for cornetcy, per letter, 3rd March.	390 – –	2 March	By Cash lodged by Messrs. Downs, reserved from commission of Lieutenant Statham, 59th Foot.	250 – –
12 March	„ Cash credited Captain Barton, 7th Dragoon Guards, in return of sum paid in excess for promotion, per letter, 3rd March	935 – –	10 March	„ Cash lodged by A. Laurie, Esq., reserved from commission of Lieutenant Plunkett, 22nd Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Glyn, 1st Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –	12 March	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from commission of Cornet Higgins, 3rd Dragoons.	140 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Tonnochy, 8th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –	13 March	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 50,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills, to 11th March 1860.	1,096 – 10
	„ Cash credited Captain Goldie, 9th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	935 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Thomas Coates for a cornetcy in 8th Dragoons.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Tremayne, 13th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	300 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Ponsonby for a cornetcy in 10th Dragoons.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bentinck, 15th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Posnett for an ensigncy in 1st Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel White, 17th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	300 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Jorden for a lieutenancy in 34th Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Waymouth, 17th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	935 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. L. Lane for a cornetcy in 1st Dragoons.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Vandeleur, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. L. B. Coulson, for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Hepburn, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. O. Gage for an ensigncy in 34th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant O'Dowd, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –	24 March	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved commission of Lieutenant L'Estrange, 75th Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Hanbury, 8th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	935 – –	29 March	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Clack for a cornetcy, in 5th Dragoons, for Mr. M. P. Blake.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Crofton, 9th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Lambert, 41st Foot.	500 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Atkinson, 13th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	935 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Adams, for an ensigncy in 23rd Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Huddleston, 13th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Praed for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Cornet Humphreys, 15th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Colville for an ensigncy in 63rd Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Fraser, 17th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd March.	100 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Fryer for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoon Guards.	450 – –
15 March	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bayly, 55th Foot, per letter, 21st February.	450 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Jervis for an ensigncy in 47th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Mill, 6th Foot, per letter, 13th March.	450 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Craven for an ensigncy in 26th Foot.	450 – –
21 March	„ Cash credited Cornet Blackett, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter, 20th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lawson for an ensigncy in 18th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Dawson, 6th Dragoons, per letter, 20th March.	1,035 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Yeo, for an ensigncy in 31st Foot.	150 – –
	„ Cash credited Colonel Key, 15th Dragoons, per letter, 20th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. J. Clark for an ensigncy in 55th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Grove, 79th Foot, per letter, 16th March.	450 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Powys for an ensigncy in 52nd Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Babington, 7th Dragoons, per letter, 20th March.	1,235 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Burton for an ensigncy in 18th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Wright, 15th Dragoons, per letter, 20th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Irvine for an ensigncy in 19th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Grainger, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter, 20th March.	340 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gaubert for an ensigncy in 39th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Lewes, 10th Dragoons, per letter, 30th March.	150 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Moir for an ensigncy in 19th Foot.	150 – –
	„ Cash credited Colonel Wilkie, 10th Dragoons, per letter, 30th March.	1,225 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Clifton for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Payne, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter, 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign McCormick for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Graburn, 1st Dragoons, per letter, 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Law for an ensigncy in 46th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Dawson, 6th Dragoons, per letter 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Bevan for an ensigncy in 81st Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Babington, 7th Dragoons, per letter, 30th March.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Dawson for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Bull, unattached, per letter, 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Kirk, 73rd Foot.	150 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Head, 9th Dragoons, per letter 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Backhouse for an ensigncy in 22nd Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Coles, 9th Dragoons, per letter 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Warner for an ensigncy in 21st Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Holden, 13th Dragoons, per letter 30th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. P. Clarke for an ensigncy in 73rd Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Potts for an ensigncy in 77th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Morgan for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Knox for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Dickson for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Græme for an ensigncy in 6th Foot.	450 – –

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1860:		£. s. d.	1860:		£. s. d.
			29 March	By Cash lodged by Mr. Hutton for a cornetcy in 1st Dragoons.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Stanier for an ensigncy in 31st Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Busfield for an ensigncy in 79th Foot.	450 – –
30 March	To Cash credited Captain Macartney, 15th Dragoons, per letter 26th March.	450 – –	30 March	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., for an ensigncy in 11th Foot for W. Street.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., for an ensigncy in 11th Foot for Mr. Ball.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Corballis, 16th Dragoons, difference allowed him on exchanging to 17th Foot, per letter 30th March.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Ensign Tarby, 75th Foot.	300 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Marsland for a lieutenancy in 18th Foot.	250 – –
31 March	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Coles, 9th Dragoons, per letter 23rd March.	1,035 – –		„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from commission of Captain Keats, 83rd Foot.	61 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Percy Smith, 13th Dragoons, per letter 23rd March.	5 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Dowbiggin, 7th Dragoon Guards.	145 – –
9 April -	„ Cash credited Captain Dearden, 13th Dragoons, per Sir Charles Yorkes, letter 5th April.	1,425 – –	1 April -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Field, 76th Foot.	300 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Carthen for a cornetcy in 13th Dragoons.	450 – –
27 April -	„ Cash credited Captain Mayne, 13th Dragoons, per letter 25th April.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Pender for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Long for an ensigncy in 61st Foot.	450 – –
28 April -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of Colonel Campbell, Rifle Brigade, per letter 27 April.	450 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Stevenson for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoons.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Borrer for an ensigncy in 60th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major W. S. Cook, unattached, per letter 20th April.	700 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Twyning for an ensigncy in 3rd Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Ness for a lieutenancy in 61st Foot.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. T. Rogers for an ensigncy in 91st Foot.	450 – –
1 May -	„ Cash paid Mr. Laurie for the credit of Lieutenant Muttlebury, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 27th April.	390 – –	May -	„ Cash reserved from the Commission of Lieutenant Tyner, 30th Foot.	250 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Austin, 30th Foot.	50 – –
5 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Hay, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 27th April.	1,425 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Croft for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Major the Hon. J. Fiennes, 7th Dragoons, per letter 2nd April.	50 – –		„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Mansfield for an ensigncy in 69th Foot.	200 – –
	„ Cash credited Major Smith, 10th Dragoons, per letter 2nd April.	50 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Smith for a lieutenancy in 1st West India Regiment.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Bookey for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoon Guards.	450 – –
7 May -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of Colonel Low, 4th Dragoons, per letter 4th May.	1,675 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Henry for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Harris for an ensigncy in the Military Train.	450 – –
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of Colonel Aylmer, 4th Dragoons, per letter 4th May.	3,200 – –	21 May -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland part of sum paid by Mr. Herbert for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	200 – –
21 May -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Lieutenant Lowe, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 18th May.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Rowan for a lieutenancy in 13th Foot.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Arbuthnot for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	450 – –
26 May -	„ Cash credited Major Chetwode, 8th Dragoons, per letter 22nd May.	1,425 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Smyth for a cornetcy in 7th Dragoon Guards.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Trevelyan, unattached, per letter 25th May.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gwyther for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoons.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Hall for an ensigncy in 7th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Loveridge for a lieutenancy in 54th Foot.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lees for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Booth for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	450 – –
				„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Oakes for an ensigncy in 7th Foot.	200 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Sinclair for an ensigncy in 24th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Campbell for an ensigncy in 90th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Worswick for an ensigncy in 23rd Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Major Nasmyth, 4th Foot.	1,350 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Menteth for an ensigncy in 81st Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Hall for an ensigncy in 20th Foot.	450 – –

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1860:		£. s. d.	1860:		£. s. d.
			21 May -	By Cash lodged by Mr. Houghton for a cornetcy in 17th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Whidbourne for an ensigncy in 70th Foot.	300 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lascelles for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	450 - -
				" Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Gubbins, 30th Foot.	400 - -
4 June -	To Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Lieutenant St. George, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 1st June 1860.	490 - -	June -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Verschoyle for a cornetcy in 11th Dragoons.	450 - -
5 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bell, 15th Dragoons, per letter 25th May.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Cheape for a cornetcy in 11th Dragoons.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Weldon, 18th Dragoons, per letter 25th May.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Guinness for an ensigncy in 72nd Foot.	450 - -
9 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Wright, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 8th June.	390 - -		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Skill for an ensigncy in 11th Foot.	300 - -
15 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Bull, unattached, per letter 14th June.	450 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Baillie, 72nd Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Keane, 2nd Foot, per letter 12th June.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Holroyd for an ensigncy in 73rd Foot.	450 - -
20 June -	„ Cash credited Captain Welstead, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 15th June.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Dashwood for an ensigncy in 61st Foot.	450 - -
21 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Harris, 18th Dragoons, per letter 20th June.	100 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Tabb for an ensigncy in 44th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Colonel Walter Unett, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 12th June.	1,675 - -		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Burrell for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	350 - -
26 June -	„ Cash paid Mr. Clack for the credit of Brevet Major Hillier, 5th Dragoons.	1,425 - -	13 June -	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 50,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	1,093 19 -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant O'Neill, 6th Dragoons, per letter 1st June.	100 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Turner for an ensigncy in 19th Foot.	450 - -
29 June -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Colonel Hill, late 3rd Dragoons, per letter 26th June.	500 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lever for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Campbell for an ensigncy in 79th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Dobson for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Wason for an ensigncy in 33rd Foot.	450 - -
6 July -	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Captain Webb, 4th Dragoon Guards, per military secretary's letter 3rd July 1860.	1,425 - -		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Barry for an ensigncy in 2nd Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Jackson for an ensigncy in 81st Foot.	450 - -
7 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Bickerstaff, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 3rd July.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Cecil Foot for an ensigncy in 27th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Stewart, 11th Dragoons, per letter 3rd July.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. M. Spens for an ensigncy in 71st Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Parker, 15th Dragoons, per letter 3rd July.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. H. Bacchus for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	450 - -
13 July -	„ Cash paid H. T. Clack, Esq., for the credit of Captain Rendall, 5th Dragoons, per letter — July.	1,425 - -		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Kemp for an ensigncy in 4th Foot.	385 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Drewe for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	450 - -
19 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Mackay, 76th Foot, per letter 10th July.	450 - -		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Nugent for an ensigncy in 17th Foot.	200 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Monkland, 79th Foot, per letter 10th July.	700 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Watson, 34th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Bushman, 2nd Dragoon Guards, on exchanging to Military Train, per letter 10th July.	1,425 - -	1 July -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron and Smith, part of sum paid by Mr. John Nunn for an ensigncy in 16th Foot.	200 - -
21 July -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of Major the Hon. C. Keith Falconer, 4th Dragoons, per letter 17th July.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Magenis, 32nd Foot.	350 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. D. Harrison for an ensigncy in 3rd Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. S. Dugmore for an ensigncy in Canadian Rifles.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. H. Miers for an ensigncy in the Canadian Rifles.	450 - -
1 August	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of Captain Still, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 27th July.	390 - -		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. A. D. Currie for an ensigncy in 41st Foot.	250 - -
2 August	„ Cash credited Colonel the Hon. J. P. Maxwell, 97th Foot, per letter 31st July.	450 - -	8 August	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Hopkinson on account of the succession to Lieutenant Colonel Aylmer, 4th Dragoons.	2,700 - -
17 August	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Lord Seymour, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 14th August.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hart, 29th Foot.	200 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. S. Rudd for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
22 August	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Haultain, Royal Artillery, per letter 20th August 1860.	450 - -		„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of the Hon. N. Fiennes, 23rd Regiment.	850 - -
	„ Cash transferred to Guards Fund, sum lodged by Mr. Booth for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. Philips for a cornetcy in 8th Dragoons.	450 - -
	„ Cash transferred to Guards Fund, part of sum lodged by Mr. Burrell for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	350 - -		„ Cash lodged by W. H. Coke for a cornetcy in 4th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. L. B. Cole for a cornetcy in 11th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. E. Paget for a cornetcy in 7th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. S. C. Newton for a cornetcy in 4th Dragoons.	450 - -

THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.*

1860:		£.	s.	d.	1860:		£.	s.	d.
27 Aug. -	To Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of the legal representatives of the late Ensign Percival, Military Train, per letter 24th August.	450	-	-	8 August	By Cash reserved from the commission of Captain O'Shea, 20th Foot.	50	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Hincks for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450	-	-
28 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Jackson, 14th Dragoons, on exchanging to 78th Foot, per letter 25th August.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. B. Brown for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Beamish, 14th Dragoons, on exchanging to 21st Foot, per letter 25th August.	490	-	-		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Gibb for an ensigncy in 30th Foot.	200	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Leggett for an ensigncy in 4th Foot.	450	-	-
29 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Ainslie, 14th Dragoons, per letter 28th August.	1,675	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Montague for an ensigncy in the 2nd Foot.	450	-	-
30 Aug. -	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Lieutenant Muttlebury, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 27th August.	100	-	-		„ Cash lodged (part of sum) by Mr. Fryer for an ensigncy in 19th Foot.	350	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. Simeon for an ensigncy in 54th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Brymer for a lieutenancy in 83rd Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Long for an ensigncy in 46th Foot.	250	-	-
14 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Carnegy, 15th Dragoons, per letter 11th September.	40	-	-	Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by F. Fuller for a cornetcy in 18th Dragoons.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Davies for an ensigncy in 83rd Foot.	450	-	-
22 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Vaughan, 12th Dragoons, per letter 18th September.	390	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Baillie for a lieutenancy in 79th Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Darvall for an ensigncy in 74th Foot.	350	-	-
28 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of Ensign L'Estrange, Ceylon Rifles, per letter 25th September.	450	-	-					
					5 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Beck, 89th Foot.	150	-	-
29 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Still, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st September.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Terry for a lieutenancy in 60th Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Whiteside for a cornetcy in 18th Dragoons.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Stewart, 11th Dragoons, per letter 21st September.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. A. Ford for a cornetcy in 13th Dragoons.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. W. Hadden for an ensigncy in 23rd Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Cowtan, 16th Dragoons, per letter 21st September.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. P. H. Daly for a cornetcy in 3rd Dragoons.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. Lawrence for a cornetcy in 7th Dragoons.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Loftus, 18th Dragoons, per letter 21st September.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. A. Quin for a cornetcy in 1st Dragoon Guards.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Morley for an ensigncy in 79th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Beatty for an ensigncy in 48th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lynch for an ensigncy in 97th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Ferguson for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lart for a cornetcy in 18th Dragoons.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Brewer for an ensigncy in 88th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. B. Kesterman for an ensigncy in 100th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign O'Grady for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250	-	-
						„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Williams for a cornetcy in 13th Dragoons.	350	-	-
						„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Rutherford for an ensigncy in 21st Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Butler for an ensigncy in 21st Foot.	150	-	-
						„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Reeves for an ensigncy in 15th Foot.	200	-	-
						„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Bain for an ensigncy in 44th Foot.	100	-	-
						„ Cash part of sum lodged by Mr. Jones for an ensigncy in 94th Foot.	200	-	-
					26 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron and Smith for an ensigncy in 16th Foot for Mr. Bald.	450	-	-
					27 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland for an ensigncy in succession to Captain Beck, 89th Foot.	450	-	-
					28 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland reserved from the commission of Captain Saunders, Rifle Brigade.	1,200	-	-
					16 Oct. -	„ Cash remitted by Mr. Drewe for a cornetcy in 7th Dragoons.	450	-	-
22 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain Giffor of the 18th Dragoons, per letter 12th October.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Burmester for a lieutenant colonelcy in 59th Foot.	1,300	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Finicane, 1st Dragoons per letter 3rd October.	490	-	-					
	„ Cash credited Captain Anderson, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 3rd October.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Romer for a majority in 59th Foot.	1,400	-	-

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1860:		£. s. d.	1860:		£. s. d.
22 Oct. -	To Cash credited Major Stocks, 1st Dragoons, per letter 16th October.	1,425 - -	16 Oct. -	By Cash lodged by Lieutenant Crosse for a company in 59th Foot.	1,100 - -
	„ Cash credited Major Smith, 10th Dragoons, per letter 16th October.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Hutton for a lieutenancy in 59th Foot.	250 - -
	„ Cash credited Cornet Rathbone, 6th Dragoons, per letter 3rd October.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. Jessop for a cornetcy in 2nd Dragoons.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Colonel De Lacy, 39th Foot, per letter 23rd October.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. L. Smith for an ensigncy in 83rd Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain St. John, half pay, per letter 26th October.	400 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Moorson for a company in 100th Foot.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Lawrell for a lieutenancy in 100th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Corbett for a cornetcy in 17th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Major Forbes.	499 - -
1 Nov. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of Captain Blackett, 4th Dragoons, per letter 26th October.	735 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Burr for an ensigncy in 60th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel Learmouth, 17th Dragoons.	45 - -
3 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Captain Wyvill, 83rd Foot, per letter 30th October.	250 - -	1 Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland for a lieutenant colonelcy in Depôt Battalion for Brevet Lieutenant Colonel de Morel.	1,300 - -
	„ Cash credited Colonel Tyler, 12th Dragoons, per letter 29th October.	1,675 - -			
5 Nov. -	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills purchased by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per Military Secretary's letter 2nd November 1860:			„ Cash lodged by Ensign Home for a lieutenancy in 13th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. D. Cookson for an ensigncy in 76th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Dakin for a cornetcy in 7th Dragoon Guards.	450 - -
	£. s. d.			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Mullen, 46th Foot.	100 - -
	Bills dated 12 March 1860 - - - 2,000 - -		15 Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from commission of Lieutenant Suckling, Royal Canadian Rifles.	150 - -
	Interest 12 March to 3 November - - 29 15 -			„ Cash lodged by Major Weguelin for a majority in 100th Foot.	1,400 - -
	Bills dated 12 June 1860 - - -38,000 - -			„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Colonel Ramey for a lieutenant colonelcy in 61st Foot.	1,300 - -
	Interest 12 June to 3 November - - 346 15 -			„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Gordon for a majority in 61st Foot.	1,400 - -
	40,376 10 -			„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Young for a company in 61st Foot.	1,100 - -
	Less 2 *s.* discount on 10,000 *l.* 10 - -			„ Cash lodged by Ensign Atkinson for a lieutenancy in 61st Foot.	250 - -
	Less 1 *s.* discount on 30,000 *l.* - 15 - -			„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Watson for a lieutenant colonelcy in 82nd Foot.	1,300 - -
	25 - -			„ Cash lodged by Major Marriott for a majority in 82nd Foot.	1,400 - -
	40,351 10 -			„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Hand for a company in 82nd Foot.	1,100 - -
	Broker's Commission 20 - -			„ Cash lodged by Ensign Johnston for a lieutenancy in 82nd Foot.	250 - -
	40,371 10 -			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Russell, 58th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Broadley, unattached, to complete remaining third of commission, per letter 5th November.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Hall, 20th Foot, for a lieutenancy in 2nd West India Regiment.	250 - -
9 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Captain Reader, 12th Dragoons, per letter 6th November.	1,425 - -			
	„ Cash credited Captain Shells, 11th Dragoons, per letter 9th November.	390 - -			
29 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Metge, 96th Foot, per letter 22nd November.	450 - -			
5 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Murray, unattached, per letter 3rd December.	450 - -	Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Ensign Whab for a lieutenancy in 20th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. F. Harrison for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
7 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Cornet Morley, 15th Dragoons, per letter 30th November.	390 - -	19 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Curson, Rifle Brigade.	200 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Dawson, 6th Dragoons, per letter 30th November.	1,425 - -		„ Cash in return of sum over credited to Captain Stewart, 11th Dragoons, on 29th September 1860.	935 - -
			20 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant James, Military Train.	300 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Blake, Military Train.	100 - -
			21 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Codd, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Low, 3rd Dragoons.	290 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Codd in succession to Lieutenant S. C. Dixon, 11th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. J. Baker for an ensigncy in Ceylon Rifles.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. R. H. Rocke for an ensigncy in 96th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. J. E. Sinclair for an ensigncy in 4th Foot.	200 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Leeming for an ensigncy in 20th Foot.	450 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1860:		£.	s.	d.	1860:		£.	s.	d.
11 Dec. -	To Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of Captain Blackett, 4th Dragoons, per letter 8th December.	300	-	-	Dec. -	By Cash lodged by Mr. Mardon for an ensigncy in 20th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Rogerson for an ensigncy in 61st Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel G. C. Swan on retiring, by sale of an unattached majority, per letter 18th December.	783	6	8		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. S. P. Marjoribanks for an ensigncy in 15th Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. P. C. Browne for a cornetcy in 1st Dragoon Guards.	450	-	-
22 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Cornet Corbet, 16th Dragoons, per letter 18th December.	390	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Middleton for an ensigncy in 13th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Ritchie for an ensigncy in 100th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Cornet Salter, 16th Dragoons, per letter 18th December.	390	-	-		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. J. S. Greer for an ensigncy in 26th Foot.	250	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Jarvis, 18th Dragoons, per letter 18th December.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. G. G. Cuppage for an ensigncy in 70th Foot.	400	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. I. N. Tanner for an ensigncy in 82nd Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Sir G. Leith, Bart., 17th Dragoons, per letter 20th December.	390	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. F. Lefroy for an ensigncy in 45th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Triphook for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Major Phillips, 8th Dragoons, per letter 30th November.	50	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gwatkin for an ensigncy in 94th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Steel, 17th Dragoons, on promotion to an unattached majority, per letter 18th December.	25	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lanyon for an ensigncy in 6th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Chambers for a cornetcy in 8th Dragoons.	450	-	-
24 Dec. -	„ Cash paid H. T. Clack, Esq., for the credit of Captain E. E. Brown, 5th Dragoons, per letter 18th December.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Mure for an ensigncy in 34th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Peach for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment.	450	-	-
					24 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. T. Clack for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoons for Mr. R. M. Sadlier.	450	-	-
					26 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Wobrige, Military Train.	200	-	-
					29 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Bodkin, Military Train.	150	-	-
					31 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Webb, 11th Foot.	150	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Keith, 63rd Foot.	200	-	-
						„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Kenny, 94th Foot.	850	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Leigh for an ensigncy in 13th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Davidson for an ensigncy in 88th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Talbot for a cornetcy in 14th Dragoons.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. White for an ensigncy in 39th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gee for an ensigncy in 64th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Sharpe for an ensigncy in 30th Foot.	100	-	-
1861:					1861:				
9 January	„ Cash credited Colonel Spottiswoode, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 28th December.	490	-	-	7 January	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., sum reserved from the commission of Captain Crewes, 60th Rifles.	400	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant the Hon. W. O. Annesley, 6th Dragoons, per letter 4th January.	400	-	-	8 January	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, sum reserved from the commission of Captain Munro, Depôt Battalion.	200	-	-
11 January	„ Cash credited Captain Kinlock, 36th Foot, per letter 2nd January.	250	-	-	18 January	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, sum reserved from the commission of Captain Newall, 8th Foot.	150	-	-
12 January	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Barnes, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 4th January.	700	-	-					
	„ Cash credited Cornet Darley, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st December.	390	-	-	22 January	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland on account of Captain Blake, Military Train.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant M'Loughlin, 30th Foot, per letter 4th January.	450	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Nicholetts, 2nd Foot.	150	-	-
16 January	„ Cash paid Mr. Clack for the credit of Captain Dynon, 5th Dragoons, per letter 7th January.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Stevenson for an ensigncy in 67th Foot.	450	-	-
23 January	„ Cash credited Major Phillips, 8th Dragoons, per letter 8th January.	190	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Cox for an ensigncy in 2nd Foot.	450	-	-
28 January	„ Cash credited Captain Harford, 85th Foot, on exchanging from cavalry to infantry, per letter 23rd January.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Major Mackay, 17th Foot.	499	-	-
30 January	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Arney, 11th Dragoons, per letter 18th January.	500	-	-	1 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hughes, Cape Corps.	200	-	-
					7 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Hopkinson & Co., part of sum paid by Mr. C. Browne Cave for a cornetcy in 4th Dragoons.	300	-	-

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1861:		£.	s.	d.	1861:		£.	s.	d.
5 Feb. -	To Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Macpherson, 35th Foot, per letter 29th January.	150	-	-	7 Feb. -	By Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Gordon for a lieutenant colonelcy in 17th Foot.	1,300	-	-
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major M'Mahon, 14th Dragoons, per letter 29th January.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. T. Snell for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoons.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel B. Harrison, 11th Dragoons, per letter 18th January.	1,675	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Spencer for an ensigncy in 64th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gordon for a cornetcy in 2nd Dragoon Guards.	450	-	-
9 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., for the credit of Ensign Hart, 78th Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Cornet Greatorex for a lieutenancy in 2nd Dragoon Guards.	250	-	-
	„ Cash credited Major Massey, unattached, per letter 8th February.	100	-	-	18 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Denton, Ceylon Rifles.	350	-	-
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Tulloch, unattached, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Harnette for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250	-	-
13 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain Paulet, 9th Dragoons, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Ward, 85th Foot, for a sub-lieutenancy in 2nd Life Guards.	560	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Paulet, 9th Dragoons, per letter 5th February.	1,425	-	-					
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bolton, 58th Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-	March	„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton for a lieutenant colonelcy in 12th Foot.	1,300	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Hayworth, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 8th February.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Atkinson, for a majority in 12th Foot.	1,400	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Babington, 7th Dragoons, per letter 8th February.	400	-	-		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Frome for an ensigncy in 72nd Foot.	50	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Stuart, 2nd Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Henderson for a lieutenancy in 85th Foot.	250	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Ryan, 6th Foot, per letter 8th February.	512	10	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. R. Wickham for an ensigncy in 88th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Smyth, 10th Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Angelo, 74th Foot.	100	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Jarvis, 12th Foot, per letter 8th February.	250	-	-	12 March	„ Cash received for 364 days' interest on 52,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 10th March 1861.	1,134	1	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Robertson, 13th Foot, per letter 8th February.	50	-	-					
	„ Cash credited Captain Clancey, 15th Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-	13 March	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Handy, 25th Foot.	200	-	-
	„ Cash credited Ensign Farley, 22nd Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Grey, 15th Foot.	800	-	-
	„ Cash credited Ensign La Touche, 30th Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. J. Boyle for an ensigncy in 30th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Blair, 71st Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Maillard for a cornetcy in 16th Dragoons.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant the Hon. A. FitzMaurice, 72nd Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Davison for an ensigncy in 85th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Smith, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 8th February.	700	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. J. Thompson for an ensigncy in 99th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Stokes, 8th Foot, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Dudes, 30th Foot.	400	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. A. Clarke for an ensigncy in 70th Foot.	450	-	-
16 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Messrs. Downes & Son for the credit of Lieutenant Richardson, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 8th February.	350	-	-	28 March	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., sum reserved from the commission of Captain Martin, 11th Foot.	200	-	-
					30 March	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Downes & Son, sum reserved from the commission of Ensign Dobbs, 98th Foot.	150	-	-
Feb. -	„ Cash credited Colonel Yarborough, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 15th February.	450	-	-					
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. P. Maurice for an ensigncy in 91st Foot.	450	-	-
18 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain Wyvill, 83rd Foot, per letter 13th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. S. Mercer for an ensigncy in 94th Foot.	450	-	-
19 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Colonel Sir T. M'Mahon, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 15th February.	1,675	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. S. Duesbury for an ensigncy in 17th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Major Lynge, 1st West India Regiment, per letter 8th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. L. C. Singleton for an ensigncy in 18th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Colonel the Hon. A. G. Liddell, 6th Dragoons, per letter 15th February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. P. Massy for an ensigncy in 22nd Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. H. Hedges for an ensigncy in 90th Foot.	450	-	-
26 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Colonel Shute, 6th Dragoons, per letter 15th February.	1,675	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Nowlan, 1st West India Regiment.	250	-	-
2 March	„ Cash credited Captain Greetham, 15th Dragoons, per letter 22nd February.	1,040	-	-					
	„ Cash credited Captain Fisk, 12th Foot, per letter 22nd February.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Handcock for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Hanley, 94th Foot, per letter 22nd February.	100	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. Wise for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoons.	450	-	-
4 March	„ Cash credited Colonel the Hon. G. A. Liddell, 6th Dragoons, per letter 26th February.	300	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Regg for an ensigncy in 6th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Speedy of the 81st Foot.	50	-	-
	„ Cash credited Major Phillips, 8th Dragoons, per letter 21st February.	50	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. Patch for an ensigncy in 67th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Webster, 16th Dragoons, per letter 22nd February.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. P. Bury for an ensigncy in 15th Foot.	450	-	-
12 March	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bentinck, 15th Dragoons, per letter 5th March.	390	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. J. A. Smith for an ensigncy in 9th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash credited Colonel A. L. Cole, 17th Foot, per letter 5th March.	450	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. T. Duncan for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	450	-	-

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1861:		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
12 March	To Cash credited Colonel E. Pole, 12th Dragoons, per letter 5th March.	1,675 – –	12 March	By Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Miles for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	150 – –
	„ Cash credited Cornet Anthony, 16th Dragoons, per letter 12th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. Stephens for a cornetcy in 2nd Life Guards.	1,260 – –
15 March	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Lieutenant Royds, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 12th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Powys for a lieutenancy in 83rd Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Sons for the credit of Lieutenant Burroughes, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 12th March.	835 – –			
	„ Cash paid Mr. Clack for the credit of Brevet Colonel Sulivan, 5th Dragoons, per letter 12th March.	1,725 – –	10 April -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. St. George for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 – –
22 March	„ Cash credited Cornet Ford, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 12th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Kemmis for an ensigncy in 15th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Astley, 1st Dragoons, per letter 12th March.	1,235 – –			
28 March	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Carleton, 96th Foot, per letter 14th March.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. D. Chisholm for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Mitchell, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st March.	1,425 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. J. S. Brougham for an ensigncy in 10th Foot.	300 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Wetherall, 6th Dragoons, per letter 19th March.	1,425 – –			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Lee, 15th Dragoons, per letter 19th March.	75 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. A. B. Dowling for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	50 – –
30 March	„ Cash credited Captain Wake, half pay, Royal African Corps, per letter 29th March.	1,800 – –		„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Smith, unattached.	500 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain F. Pitts, unattached, per letter 29th March.	1,800 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Betson, 10th Foot.	400 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Coote, half pay, 18th Foot, per letter 29th March.	1,800 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. P. Gulby for an ensigncy in 22nd Foot.	200 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Mosley, 75th Foot, per letter 29th March.	450 – –			
4 April -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Wragge, Royal Artillery, per letter 3rd April.	1,750 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. W. Stanley for an ensigncy in 44th Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Colonel Colman, unattached, per letter 3rd April.	450 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. A. H. Brittain for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	50 – –
10 April -	„ Cash credited Major Dennis, unattached, per letter 9th April.	450 – –		„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. C. A. Carthen for an ensigncy in 33rd Foot.	100 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Lamb, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 9th April.	1,425 – –			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. Des Vaux, Bart., unattached, per letter 9th April.	1,800 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Jellicoe, 81st Foot.	200 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain MacQueen, unattached, per letter 9th April.	1,800 – –	25 April -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, sum reserved from the commission of Captain G. M. Innes, Royal Canadian Rifles.	200 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson, unattached, per letter 9th April.	1,800 – –			
17 April -	„ Cash credited Captain Macartney, 17th Dragoons, per letter 16th April.	1,425 – –	29 April -	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills sold by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 27 April 1861, viz.:	
19 April -	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Clarke, unattached, per letter 16th April.	3,200 – –		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Gold, unattached, per letter 16th April.	1,800 – –		40,000 *l.* Bills dated 12th June 1860 - 40,000 – –	
	„ Cash credited Captain Young, unattached, per letter 16th April.	1,800 – –		Interest 12th June to 25th March, 286 days, at 1 *s.* 2 *d.* per cent. per diem - 715 – –	
	„ Cash credited Captain Barclay, unattached, per letter 16th April.	1,800 – –		Interest 25th March to 29th April, 35 days, at 2 *d.* cent. per diem 116 13 4	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Moule, 15th Foot, per letter 9th April.	490 – –		40,831 13 4	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant McInnes, 44th Foot, per letter 9th April.	450 – –		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Bernard, unattached, per letter 9th April.	1,289 – –		20,000 *l.* at 3 *s.* discount - 30 – –	
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Brannan, unattached, per letter 9th April.	1,800 – –		20,000 *l.* at 4 *s.* discount - 40 – –	
	„ Cash credited Captain Clements, 13th Dragoons, per letter 9th April.	1,425 – –		70 – –	
27 April -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland, for the credit of Ensign Tasker, Military Train, per letter 23rd April.	450 – –		40,761 13 4	
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Lyon, unattached, per letter 30th April.	1,800 –		Broker's commission - 20 – –	
					40,741 13 4
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. G. Lowry for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 – –
				„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Young for an ensigncy in 70th Foot.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Cornet King for a lieutenancy in 6th Dragoons.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. H. Evans for an ensigncy in St. Helena Regiment.	450 – –

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1861:		£. s. d.	1861:		£. s. d.
May -	To Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel W. Butler, unattached, per letter 30th April.	1,800 - -	17 May -	By Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills sold by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 16th May 1861:	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Ormsby, 10th Foot, per letter 30th April.	133 5 -		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major T. Bernard, unattached, per letter 23rd April.	1,800 - -		48,000 *l.* Bills dated 12th June 1860 - 48,000 - -	
	„ Cash credited Captain the Hon. A. G. Stuart, unattached, per letter 23rd April.	1,800 - -		Interest 12th June to 25th March, 286 days at 1½ *d.* per cent. per diem - - 858 - -	
	„ Cash credited Captain Money Kyrle, unattached, per letter 23rd April.	1,800 - -		Interest 25th March to 17th May, 53 days at 2 *d.* per cent. per diem - - - 212 - -	
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Williamson, unattached, per letter 16th April.	1,800 - -		49,070 - -	
3 May -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Macdonald, Military Train, per letter 30th April.	450 - -		4 *s.* discount - - 96 - -	
	„ Cash credited Captain Bailey, half pay Royal Engineers, per letter 30th April.	1,750 - -		48,974 - -	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Hall, unattached, per letter 30th April.	1,800 - -		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Captain S. Calvert, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 30th April.	1,425 - -		2,000 *l.* dated 11th March 1861 - 2,000 - -	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Lord Royston, 11th Dragoons, per letter 30th April.	440 - -		Interest 11th March to 17th May, 67 days at 2 *d.* per cent. per diem - - 11 3 4	
	„ Cash credited Captain Pigott, 12th Dragoons, per letter 30th April.	1,425 - -		2,011 3 4	
7 May -	„ Cash credited Captain R. Allen, half pay Royal Artillery, per letter, 23rd April.	1,500 - -		6 *s.* discount - 6 - -	
	„ Cash credited Captain W. Pollock, half pay Royal Artillery, per letter 23rd April.	850 - -		2,005 3 4	
13 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Lomax, 10th Dragoons, per letter 10th May.	490 - -		50,979 3 4	
14 May -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Captain Oakes, Military Train, per letter 10th May.	1,800 - -		Broker's commission - 25 - -	
15 May -	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Davies, unattached, per letter 10th May.	1,800 - -			50,954 3 4
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Hon. A. Cathcart, unattached, per letter 10th May.	1,800 - -	21 May -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Macpherson, 8th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Beteler, Royal Engineers, per letter 10th May.	1,550 - -		„ Cash in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Blakely, half pay, Royal Artillery.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Hilyar, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 8th May.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. L. Kyle for an ensigncy in 45th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain A. H. Moore, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 8th May.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. S. Perry for a cornetcy in 12th Dragoons.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain F. S. Bentley, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 8th May.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. Mather for a cornetcy in 14th Dragoons.	450 - -
	" Cash credited Captain E. P. Deane, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 8th May.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. Beatty for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoons.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Sir C. H. Rich, Bart., Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 8th May.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. A. Davies for a cornetcy in 3rd Dragoons.	450 - -
21 May -	„ Cash credited Colonel Ricketts, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 10th May.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. A. Money for an ensigncy in 43rd Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Stapylton, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 10th May.	1,375 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Ditmas for an ensigncy in 38th Foot.	450 - -
23 May -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson, for the credit of Sir H. Marsh, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 17th May.	1,375 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Stockenshom for an ensigncy in 61st Foot.	450 - -
27 May -	„ Cash credited Major Clifton, 12th Dragoons, per letter 17th May.	1,040 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Lonsdale for an ensigncy in 17th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Maitland, unattached, per letter 17th May.	1,800 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Langland for an ensigncy in 43rd Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Veitch, unattached, per letter 17th May.	1,800 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. T. Hicks for an ensigncy in 42nd Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Glegg, unattached, per letter 17th May.	1,289 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. T. Rynd for an ensigncy in 22nd Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Heard, unattached, per letter 17th May.	1,800 - -		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale for a lieutenant colonelcy in 9th Dragoons.	1,300 - -
	„ Cash credited Sir H. Marsh, account with Messrs. Hopkinson, per letter 24th May.	50 - -		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Johnson for a majority in 9th Dragoons.	1,350 - -
28 May -	„ Cash paid E. S. Codd, Esq., for the credit of Captain Dymond, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 17th May.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Thursby for a troop in 9th Dragoons.	1,100 - -
	„ Cash paid Cornet J. Wood, half pay, Land Transport Corps, per letter 24th May.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Cornet Floyd for a lieutenancy in 9th Dragoons.	250 - -
	„ Cash paid Captain W. W. Bond, unattached, per letter 24th May.	1,800 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Marchant, 82nd Foot.	150 - -
30 May -	„ Cash paid Cornet J. Cooper, late Land Transport Corps, per letter 10th May.	450 - -			

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1861:		£. s. d.	1861:		£. s. d.
31 May -	To Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Tremayne, 13th Dragoons, per letter 24th May.	1,425 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant S. Adams, 15th Foot, per letter 24th May.	490 - -			
	„ Cash credited Captain Lamotte, unattached, per letter 24th May.	1,800 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Adams, unattached, per letter 10th May.	3,200 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nicholson, unattached, per letter 17th May.	1,800 - -			
			June -	By Cash to complete sum reserved from the commission of Captain Blakeley, half pay, Royal Artillery.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Cuddy, unattached, per letter 17th May.	1,289 - -			
4 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Leggie, 1st Foot, per letter 3rd June.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. B. Ferris for an ensigncy in 12th Foot.	450 - -
7 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel M. Dill, Royal Engineers, per letter 4th June.	4,500 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Stoddart, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 4th June.	500 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Harrison, 62nd Foot.	100 - -
8 June -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor and Co. for the credit of Lieutenant R. S. Doyne, 60th Foot, per letter 4th June.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Carnegie, 21st Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Colonel G. C. Swan, unattached, per letter 12th June.	616 13 4		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Townshend for a cornetcy in 2nd Life Guards.	1,260 - -
17 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel the Duke of Beaufort, unattached, per letter 11th June.	3,200 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Vardon, 13th Foot.	300 - -
21 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Leach, Royal Engineers, per letter 18th June.	4,500 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant St. George, 3rd Dragoons.	200 - -
	„ Cash credited Major Bathurst, Royal Artillery, per letter 11th June.	1,400 - -			
	„ Cash credited Captain G. M. Knipe, unattached, per letter 4th June.	1,800 - -			
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel H. Murray, half pay, Royal Artillery, per letter 18th June.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Seymour for an ensigncy in 10th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Horne, 12th Dragoons, per letter 18th June.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Barnett for an ensigncy in 4th Foot.	450 - -
26 June -	„ Cash paid E. S. Codd, Esq., for credit of Captain Bunford, 63rd Foot, per letter 25th June.	1,800 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Robinson for an ensigncy in 9th Foot.	450 - -
27 June -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of Captain R. de Czaykowski, per letter 25th June.	1,100 - -			
				„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Tarleton for an ensigncy in 39th Foot.	150 - -
28 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Maude, Royal Artillery, per letter 25th June.	4,500 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by purchaser in succession to Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, 14th Dragoons.	4,000 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Reade, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 25th June.	500 - -			
29 June -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes for the credit of Lieutenant Mahon, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 25th June.	300 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Borlean for an ensigncy in 90th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Davis for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoons.	450 - -
11 July -	„ Cash credited Major Stapylton, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per military secretary's letter 4th July 1861.	50 - -		„ Cash lodged by Sir A. A. Campbell, Bart., for an ensigncy in 74th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain W. J. Cross, half pay unattached, per letter 2nd July.	1,800 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. C. Dunscombe for an ensigncy in 2nd Foot.	450 - -
13 July -	„ Cash credited Captain H. Williams, Royal Engineers, per letter 2nd July.	1,200 - -			
18 July -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of Captain Balfe, 19th Foot, per letter 16th July.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Hincks for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250 - -
22 July -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland for the credit of Ensign Cotter, 8th Foot, per letter 16th July.	300 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. Low for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
24 July -	„ Cash credited Captain Welch, half pay, unattached, per letter 16th July.	1,050 - -			
29 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Lautour, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 23rd July.	100 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Gifford, 21st Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Blunt, 12th Dragoons, per letter 23rd July.	490 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Harrison, 17th Dragoons, per letter 23rd July.	490 - -	28 June -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor, reserved from the commission of Ensign Ingle, 78th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel de Rottenburg, 100th Foot, per letter 23rd July.	450 - -			
			1 July -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Ball, 15th Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash paid Captain Graiger, half pay, Land Transfer Corps, per letter 23rd July.	1,000 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Oliver, 11th Foot.	150 - -
30 July -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Ford, half pay, Turkish Contingent, per letter 23rd July.	450 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Biddle, 36th Foot.	50 - -
31 July -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Cocks, Biddulph, & Co. for the credit of Colonel P. R. Cocks, half pay, Royal Artillery, per letter 23rd July.	4,500 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Dickinson, 99th Foot.	250 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1861:		£. s. d.	1861:		£. s. d.
31 July -	To Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel G. Packe, half pay, 21st Dragoons, per letter 23rd July.	1,170 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel C. Hawker, half pay unattached, per letter 23rd July.	1,800 - -			
August	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Carter, half pay unattached, per letter 6th August.	1,800 - -	August	By Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Mitchell, 17th Foot.	200 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel F. Sealey, half pay, 97th Foot, per letter 6th August.	1,800 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Leckie for an ensigncy in 78th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash paid Sir C. M'Gregor & Co. for the credit of Captain F. A. Hartle, unattached, per letter 6th August.	1,800 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Wardell, 83rd Foot.	150 - -
8 August	„ Cash credited Mr. H. S. Smythe, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 20th July.	1,200 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Roger, 2nd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
12 August	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Captain Broadhurst, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 6th August.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Harrison, 3rd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Shiel, Ceylon Rifles, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
19 August	„ Cash credited Brevet Major T. Webb, half pay, Royal Engineers, per letter 16th August.	1,550 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. E. Collins for an ensigncy in Ceylon Rifles.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Wrench, 17th Foot.	400 - -
20 August	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Forster, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 16th August.	1,190 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fox, 20th Foot.	100 - -
23 August	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son for the credit of Major Robinson, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 21st August.	700 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Carlisle, 5th Foot.	350 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hardinge, 22nd Foot.	100 - -
26 August	„ Cash credited Captain Wingfield, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 24th August.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Stoddart, 7th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Major Dickson, 13th Dragoons, per letter 24th August.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Colquhoun for a cornetcy in 16th Dragoons.	450 - -
27 August	„ Cash credited Captain Willan, half pay, Royal Artillery, per letter 23rd August.	1,500 - -		„ Cash lodged by purchasers in succession to Major Dennis, 76th Foot.	3,200 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel W. Gilbert, half pay, Royal Artillery, per letter 23rd August.	4,500 - -		„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Studdert, 25th Foot.	400 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Souter, half pay unattached, per letter 23rd August.	700 - -	24 August	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., to complete sum reserved from the commission of Captain Petrie, 11th Foot.	100 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Cootes, 10th Dragoons, per letter 23rd August.	440 - -		„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Browne, 19th Foot.	50 - -
3 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Captain J. Sullivan, half pay unattached, per letter 23rd August.	1,800 - -	Sept. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Packe, 23rd Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Reade, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 2nd September.	50 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Moore, 8th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Dodgin, 88th Foot.	100 - -
7 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland, for the credit of Ensign Laughton, Military Train, per letter, 6th September.	450 - -	9 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Tottenham, Rifle Brigade.	1,150 - -
18 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Ridgway & Sons, for the credit of Brevet Colonel A. Campbell, 35th Foot, per letter, 18th September.	1,800 - -	11 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, amount paid by Mr. Vincent for an ensigncy in 25th Foot.	450 - -
26 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Lovell, 6th Dragoons, per letter, 17th September.	1,425 - -	30 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Price and Boustead, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Willan, 95th Foot.	100 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Swinney, 15th Dragoons, per letter, 17th September.	940 - -		„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Lewis, 11th Foot.	150 - -
30 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Blyth, 14th Dragoons, per letter, 27th September.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Little, 3rd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant W. Talbot, half pay, unattached, per letter, 27th September.	700 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Gibb, 3rd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. W. Cooper for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. J. Thompson for a cornetcy in 14th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Barden for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. P. Tighe, for an ensigncy in 11th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Keith, 15th Foot.	100 - -
12 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Sykes, 10th Foot, per letter, dated 8th October.	700 - -	4 Oct. -	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills sold by order of His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief:	
23 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Whish, 14th Dragoons, per letter, 15th October.	490 - -			
25 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son, to complete value of commission of Major Clarke, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter, 22nd October.	700 - -		Nos. 5,751 to 5,755, Five Bills at 1,000 *l.* each - £. 5,000 -	
				Interest, 11th March to 4th October, 207 days at 2 *d.* per diem. - 86 5	
26 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland, for the credit of Lieutenant Adams, Military Train, per letter, 22nd October.	700 - -		5,086 5	
				Brokers' commission 2 10	
					5,083 15 -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1861:		£. s. d.	1861:		£. s. d.
			9 Oct. -	By Cash lodged by Messrs. Ridgway & Son for a company for Lieutenant Tedlie, 35th Foot.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Ridgway & Son for a lieutenancy for Ensign Poste, 35th Foot.	250 - -
			10 O -	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Allen, 6th Foot.	295 11 -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Kinlock, 2nd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Keene for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Brydon, 74th Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Collins, 9th Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Fellowes, 24th Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Dent, 47th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. H. Larkin for an ensigncy in 47th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. O. McDermott for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. M. Farington for a cornetcy in 15th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. S. G. Raymond for an ensigncy in Cape Mounted Rifles.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. A. Dohnage for an ensigncy in 87th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Whitla, 10th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lempriere for an Ensigncy in 67th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. C. Erskine for a cornetcy in 9th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by purchasers in succession to Colonel Percival, C.B., 12th Foot.	4,500 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Cornet Maker, 8th Dragoons.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Law, 23rd Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from sale of a majority by Lieutenant General Lord Howden.	800 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Browne, 33rd Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Brown, 8th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Southey, 28th Foot, for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Tyler, 4th Foot.	200 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Evans, 2nd West India Regiment.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Nevile, 22nd Foot.	150 - -
8 Nov. -	To Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson for the credit of the estate of the late Lieutenant Gould, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter, 5th November 1861.	250 - -	Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Demmy for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Nicholl for an ensigncy in 43rd Foot.	450 - -
16 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Cornet Drake, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter, 8th November.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gumbleton for an ensigncy in 60th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. O. James for an ensigncy in 28th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain R. E. Roe, 12th Dragoons, per letter, 8th November.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Halahan, 24th Foot.	100 - -
18 Nov. -	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Captain Fisher, 4th Dragoons, per letter, 15th November.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the Commission of Lieutenant Morgan, 55th Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Onslow, 83rd Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Eckersall, 29th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Aitken for an ensigncy in 42nd Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Mansergh for a lieutenancy in 1st West India Regiment.	250 - -
Dec. -	„ Cash credited Major Cowell, 6th Dragoons, per letter, 3rd December.	1,375 - -	20 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Evans, 19th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Hunt, 6th Dragoons, per letter, 31st December.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant J. Blake, 18th Foot.	950 - -
			21 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Cornet Ashton, 4th Dragoon Guards.	150 - -

THE RESERVE FUND—*continued*.

		£. s. d.			£. s. d.
			1862:		
			21 Dec. -	By Cash lodged by Mr. H. Golding for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. A. Kemble for an ensigncy in 11th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Chalmers, Rifle Brigade.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Crease, 8th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Campbell, 79th Foot.	300 - -
				„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. T. C. Foster for an ensigncy in the 1st West India Regiment.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Smith, 15th Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Major Alison, 19th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 - -
1862:					
16 Jan. -	To Cash credited Cornet Batty, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per Military Secretary's letter 7th January.	390 - -	Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Gore Browne, 25th Foot, for unattached company.	1,100 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Blenkhorn, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 7th January.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Stone, 24th Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Trevor, 4th Foot, for unattached majority.	1,400 - -
18 Jan. -	„ Cash paid P. Hay Patterson, Esq., sum allowed for the commission of Captain David Balfour Hay, half pay, 26th Dragoons, per letter 7th January.	2,782 10 -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Fitzgerald, 97th Foot, for unattached company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by purchasers in succession to Lieutenant Gore Browne, 25th Foot.	700 -
	„ Cash credited Captain R. Norman, late half pay, Land Transport Corps, per letter 28th January.	1,000 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Sir S. Hayes, Bart., for a cornetcy and lieutenancy in 2nd Life Guards.	560 -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Awdry, 3rd Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Coryton, 10th Foot.	50 -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Moffatt, 19th Foot, for a company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by purchasers in succession to Major Cureton, 12th Foot.	2,700 - -
				„ Cash lodged by purchasers in succession to Lieutenant FitzGerald, 97th Foot.	700 -
3 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain Gordon, 6th Dragoons, per letter 28th January.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant La Touche, 12th Foot.	50 - -
7 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland, for the credit of Captain Edward Jervis, late Military Train, per letter 4th February.	1,800 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Channer, 21st Foot.	100 - -
10 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Sir B. T. Phillips, sum allowed for his commission as Lieutenant of the Yeomen of the Guard, per letter 23rd November 1861.	8,000 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Dickinson, 10th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Blake for an ensigncy, in 10th Foot.	450 - -
11 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Major Cureton, 12th Dragoons, per letter 4th February.	75 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Mainwaring, 21st Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Cornet Glass, half pay, Land Transport Corps, per letter 4th February.	450 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Webb, 34th Foot.	50 -
13 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant the Hon. A. Herbert, 7th Dragoons, per letter 11th February.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hearn, 3rd Foot.	300 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Harrison, 3rd Foot.	100 -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Clowes, 8th Dragoons, per letter 11th February.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Reade, 3rd Foot.	500 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major H. Scott, 18th Dragoons, per letter 11th February.	740 - -		„ Cash lodged by purchasers in succession to Captain Trevor, 4th Foot.	1,800 -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant W. Brisco, 11th Dragoons, per letter 11th February.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Skinner, 19th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
21 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain G. V. Macdonald, sum allowed for his commission as Exon of the Yeomen of the Guard, per letter 23rd November 1861.	3,500 - -	March	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Griffith for an ensigncy in 19th Foot.	450 - -
			5 March	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., reserved from the commission of Ensign Prior, 60th Foot.	100
	„ Cash credited Captain Lumley, 2nd Life Guards, per letter 20th February.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain A. Davis, 80th Foot.	511 - -
	„ Cash credited Major Cowell, 6th Dragoons, per letter 20th February.	50 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Sawyer, 4th Foot.	300 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Hunter, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 18th February.	90 - -	12 March	„ Cash received for 365 days' interest on 45,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March.	1,317 4
	„ Cash credited Cornet Hay, 1st Dragoons, per letter 18th February.	390 - -			
7 March	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Captain C. B. Wynne, late Military Train, per letter 4th March.	700 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Gatacre, 7th Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. M. Dowdeswell for a cornetcy in 12th Dragoons.	450 - -
22 March -	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Rosser, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 18th March.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Hereford, 73rd Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant O'Neil Segrove, half pay unattached, per letter 18th March.	335 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Ford, 83rd Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant D. C. S. FitzWilliams, late Cape Mounted Riflemen, per letter 25th March.	700 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Cornet Cruise, 12th Dragoons.	150 - -
			27 March	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Downes for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment for Mr. J. F. Lynch.	450 - -
31 March	„ Cash credited Captain Bingham, 11th Dragoons, per letter 27th March.	1,425 - -	29 March	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., for a company for Lieutenant Treacher, 90th Foot.	1,100 - -
	„ Cash credited Ensign Webb, 45th Foot, per letter 20th March.	390 - -			

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1862:		£. s. d.	1862:		£. s. d.
4 April -	To Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith for the credit of Captain Anderson, 54th Foot.	1,425 - -	14 April -	By Cash lodged by Messrs. Downes & Son for a lieutenancy for Ensign Low, 3rd West India Regiment.	250 - -
11 April -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Scott, 83rd Foot, per letter 9th April.	100 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Toulmin for an ensigncy in 65th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Gatacre, 7th Foot, per letter 7th April.	50 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. F. E. Green for an ensigncy in 64th Foot.	450 - -
19 April -	„ Cash credited Captain Cookney, late Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 11th April.	1,200 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Gillmoore, 1st Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash paid H. T. Clack, Esq., for the credit of Captain Bouchier, 5th Dragoons, per letter 17th April.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Walken, 50th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Cooper, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 11th April.	1,425 - -	28 April -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland in aid of sum reserved from the commission of Captain Layard, 25th Foot.	700 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fletcher, 100th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Jackson, 2nd Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Hancock, 45th Foot.	150 - -
19 May -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. for the credit of Captain Peach, Royal Horse Guards, per letter 16th May.	490 - -	2 May -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Downes for a company unattached for Lieutenant Drage, 59th Foot.	1,100 - -
23 May -	„ Cash credited Captain E. H. Crewe, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 16th May.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Battiscombe, 58th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant De Burgh, 11th Dragoons, per letter 16th May.	50 - -	17 May -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, sum reserved from the commission of Captain Winmett, 24th Foot.	600 - -
			19 May -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland for Ensign Rudd and Mr. Miller appointed in succession to Lieutenant Drage, 59th Foot.	700 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Leslie, 5th Foot.	100 - -
			31 May -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, value of ensigncy in succession to Lieutenant Tudor, 48th Foot.	450 - -
13 June -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Colonel H. J. Thomas, half pay, Royal Artillery, per letter 10th June.	3,200 - -	June -	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., for a lieutenancy for Ensign Campbell, 90th Foot.	250 - -
18 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Manning, 1st Dragoons, per letter 10th June.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. F. Wilson for an ensigncy in 90th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Benson, 17th Dragoons, per letter 10th June.	1,675 - -	16 June -	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills sold by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 14th June :	
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Atkinson, 17th Dragoons, per letter 10th June.	500 - -		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Captain T. J. Francis, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 10th June.	1,425 - -		Nos. 5,088 to 5,095; eight of 1,000*l.* - 8,000 - -	
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel E. C. Wilford, late of School of Musketry, per letter 10th June.	1,300 - -		Interest 11th March to 16th June, 97 days, at 3 per cent. - - 63 15 8	
	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. H. M. Monckton, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 10th June.	1,725 - -		Premium 3*s.* - - 12 - -	
				8,075 15 8	
				Deduct broker's commission - - - 4 - -	
					8,071 15 8
	„ Cash credited Captain Lempriere, Royal Artillery, per letter 10th June.	1,550 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. Blair for a cornetcy in 17th Dragoons.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Upton, 9th Dragoons, per letter 24th June.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Hughes, 13th Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Harding, 17th Dragoons, per letter 24th June.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Grahame, 10th Foot.	100 - -
30 June -	„ Cash credited Captain Baumgarten, 7th Dragoons, per letter 24th June.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Duchesnay, 25th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland to complete sum reserved from the commission of Captain Layard, 25th Foot.	250 - -
5 July -	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Colonel Bentinck, half pay, 4th Dragoon Guards, per Military Secretary's letter 3rd July.	1,675 - -	11 July -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, difference paid by Captain Clark, 24th Foot, for a majority.	1,400 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, difference paid by Lieutenant Hallowes, of the 24th Foot, for a company.	1,100 - -
14 July -	„ Cash paid A. Lawrie, Esq., for the credit of Lieutenant Marriott, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 8th July.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the sale of the commission of Lieutenant Scott, of the 24th Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Bunbury, 24th Foot, per letter 8th July.	3,200 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Giles, 14th Dragoons, per letter 8th July.	490 - -	19 July -	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant B. Rogers, 19th Foot.	50 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Fortescue, unattached, per letter 8th July.	1,750 - -	21 July -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Downes & Son, sum paid by Mr. Keene for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain the Hon. J. Bury, half pay, Royal Engineers, per letter 8th July.	1,400 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Day, 26th Foot.	200 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Dixon, 27th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Mahon, 36th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Ingham, 44th Foot.	250 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1862:		£. s. d.	1862:		£. s. d.
22 July -	To Cash credited Captain Morant, 58th Foot, per letter 18th July.	490 – –	22 July -	By Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills, sold by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 19th July 1862:	
25 July -	„ Cash credited Major Rawlinson, 12th Dragoons, per letter 18th July.	1,425 – –		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Captain Hardy, 18th Dragoons, per letter 18th July.	490 – –		Nos. 5,096 to 5,107, 12 at 1,000 *l.* - - 12,000 – –	
29 July -	„ Cash credited Captain Coryton, 10th Foot, per letter 25th July.	50 – –		Interest from 11 March to 22 July, 133 days at 3 per cent. - 131 3 6	
	„ Cash credited Captain Levett, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 29th July.	490 – –		Premium, 19 *s.* - - 114 – –	
	„ Cash credited Captain Stewart, 16th Dragoons, per letter 29th July.	1,425 – –		12,245 3 6	
	„ Cash credited Captain Travers, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 29th July.	350 – –		Deduct broker's commission - - 6 – –	12,239 3 6
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Kindersley, 29th Foot.	100 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hook, Rifle Brigade.	100 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Sir C. Burdett, 54th Foot.	100 – –
				„ Cash to complete sum lodged in succession to Colonel Bunbury, 24th Foot.	700 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Arnott for an ensigncy in Royal Newfoundland Companies.	450 – –
			5 August	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., purchase money of an ensigncy in 78th Foot for Mr. Stopney.	450 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Daly, 46th Foot.	50 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Storey, 87th Foot.	300 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Austin, 88th Foot.	50 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Elmes, 9th Foot.	50 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Booth for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Temple for an ensigncy in 49th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. S. Bond for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 – –
			21 August	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., for an ensigncy in 65th Foot for Mr. Oliver.	450 – –
2 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Harmer, 16th Dragoons on exchange to 38th Foot, per letter 30th August.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant O'Brien, 75th Foot.	50 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Burder, 4th Dragoons, on exchange to 58th Foot, per letter 30th August.	490 – –	22 August	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Dunn, 24th Foot.	50 – –
3 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel A. H. P. Stewart Wortley, half pay unattached, per letter 2nd September.	3,225 – –	30 August	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills, sold by order of his Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 28th August:	
	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. for the credit of Major Wilton, late 60th Foot, per letter 2nd September.	1,800 – –		£. s. d.	
4 Sept. -	„ Cash paid E. S. Codd, Esq., for the credit of Captain Cleland, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 2nd September.	1,425 – –		Nos. 2,350 to 2,359, 10 at 500 *l.* each - 5,000 – –	
	„ Cash paid A. Laurie, Esq., for the credit of Captain Gunter, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 2nd September.	1,425 – –		Interest 11th March to 29th August, 171 days, at 3 per cent. 70 5 5	
5 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Captain D. Galton, half pay, Royal Engineers, per letter 2nd September.	1,800 – –		Premium - - - 42 10 –	
	„ Cash credited Captain J. W. Birch, 30th Foot, on exchange from 5th Dragoons, per letter 2nd September.	490 – –		5,112 15 5	
				Deduct broker's commission - - - 2 10 –	5,110 5 5
6 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. for the credit of Lieutenant Craven, late Royal Horse Guards, per letter 5th September.	390 – –	Sept. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Saunders, 34th Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain McNeill, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 2nd September.	1,425 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Martin, 15th Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Barron, 16th Dragoons, per letter 2nd September.	390 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Nicholls, 1st Dragoons.	10 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain W. Miller, half pay 2nd Dragoons, per letter 2nd September.	1,425 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Denny, 3rd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Turnbull for an ensigncy in 70th Foot.	450 – –
25 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain P. C. Webster, late 8th Dragoons, on exchange from the 25th Foot, per letter 23rd September.	1,425 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Humphrys for an ensigncy in 8th Foot.	450 – –
			12 Sept. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 20,000 *l.* Exchequer bills to 11th September.	288 15 –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Osborne, 1st Dragoons, per letter 23rd September.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. H. Potts for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 – –
26 Sept. -	„ Cash paid A. Laurie, Esq., for the credit of Mr. Bond, whose appointment to 1st West India Regiment has been cancelled, per letter 24th September.	450 – –			

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1862:		£. s. d.	1862:		£. s. d.
9 Oct. -	To Cash credited Captain Munn, 13th Dragoons, per Military Secretary's letter 3rd October.	1,325 - -	11 Oct. -	By Cash lodged by Messrs. Downes & Son, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Grey, 3rd West India Regiment.	250 - -
				„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Mr. Fetherstonhaugh for a cornetcy in the 13th Dragoons.	400 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Foster, 16th Dragoons, per letter 3rd October.	1,675 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Jacob, 99th Foot.	50 - -
13 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Stewart, retired list, Bombay Army, per order dated 7th October 1862.	250 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Inglis, 15th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Blanchard, 9th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash in aid of sum lodged by purchasers in succession to Colonel Forster, 16th Dragoons.	4,000 - -
	„ Cash paid Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel A. Houston, unattached, per letter 21st October.	3,200 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Dallas, 46th Foot, for unattached majority.	1,400 - -
27 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Duffield, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st October.	490 - -	Oct. -	„ Cash lodged by Ensign Sargeant, 37th Foot, for lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Blackett, Rifle Brigade, for unattached majority.	1,400 - -
	„ Cash credited Colonel H. R. Jones, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st October.	1,675 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. G. Elliott, Rifle Brigade, for unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. M. Street for an ensigncy in 37th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major H. C. Wood, 17th Dragoons, per letter 21st October.	100 - -		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Bott, 6th Dragoon Guards, for a majority.	1,350 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Pereira, 6th Dragoon Guards, for a troop.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Cornet Bookey, 6th Dragoon Guards, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer, 6th Dragoon Guards, for a lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
				„ Cash lodged out of the money in succession to Lieutenant Colonel Percy, Grenadier Guards.	4,500 - -
14 Nov. -	„ Cash paid A. Laurie, Esq., for the credit of Captain Ponsford, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 7th November.	490 - -	13 Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Ridgway & Son, reserved from the commission of Ensign M'Carthy, 35th Foot.	50 - -
26 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Sir A. C. Stirling, per letter 21st November.	4,500 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Hayes, 5th Dragoon Guards.	200 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Gower for an ensigncy in 59th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel G. L. Dickson, half pay unattached, per letter 21st November.	2,950 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Bigger for a cornetcy in 6th Dragoon Guards.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Dick for a majority in 29th Foot.	1,400 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Townshend for a company in 46th Foot.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Clarke for a lieutenancy in 46th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Cobden for an ensigncy in 46th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major Nixon, Rifle Brigade, for a majority.	1,400 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Cragg, Rifle Brigade, for a company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Blundell, Rifle Brigade, for a company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Dunlop, Rifle Brigade, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
5 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Colonel Little, late 9th Dragoons, former difference, per letter 2nd December.	1,675 - -	Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Ensign Lord A. P. Cecil, Rifle Brigade, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Hudson for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Colonel Stewart, 14th Dragoons, former difference, per letter 2nd December.	1,675 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. A. Dillon for an ensigncy in Rifle Brigade.	450 - -
6 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Captain Horne, 22nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 2nd December.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Black for a company in 29th Foot.	1,100 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Lever, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 2nd December.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Douglas, 29th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Carrington for an ensigncy in 29th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Gisborne, 17th Dragoons, per letter 2nd December.	100 - -		„ Cash lodged by Captain Adair, 5th Foot, for unattached majority.	1,400 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Need, 14th Dragoons, per letter 2nd December.	25 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Ewing, 80th Foot.	250 - -
11 Dec. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Hardy, Military Train, per letter 9th December.	700 - -		„ Cash lodged by Captain Ellison, 47th Foot, for unattached majority.	1,400 - -
12 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Captain Crewe, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 9th December.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Stanley, 47th Foot, for a company.	1,100 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Smith, 1st Dragoons, per letter 9th December.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Atty, 47th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Layard, 9th Foot, per letter 9th December.	400 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. G. C. Gambier for an ensigncy in 47th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Maycock, 5th Foot, for a company.	1,100 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1862:		£. s. d.	1862:		£. s. d.
13 Dec. -	To Cash credited Captain Parkin, half pay Royal Artillery, per letter 9th December.	900 - -	Dec. -	By Cash lodged by Ensign Beasley, 5th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Newman for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	450 - -
29 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Captain Hartshorn, half pay list, per letter 19th December.	1,800 - -		„ Cash lodged by Major Watson for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Hardy, 84th Foot, for a majority.	1,400 - -
31 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Burton, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 30th December.	1,375 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Hely, 84th Foot, for a company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Kemmis, 84th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. Cookson for an ensigncy in 84th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Major Duncan Campbell, unattached.	949 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Maule, 4th Foot.	900 - -
			29 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fawcett, 92nd Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Trench for a commission in 12th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Affleck, 42nd Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Major Watson, 7th Foot.	3,200 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Captain Reid, 23rd Foot.	1,800 - -
			11 Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Gorman, Ceylon Rifles.	250 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Birch, 45th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Woodmap, 37th Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Colonel Scovell, 96th Foot.	4,500 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Couper, 64th Foot, for unattached majority.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Bishop, 22nd Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Captain Hall, 58th Foot.	1,800 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Couper, 64th Foot.	700 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Major Green, 6th Foot.	1,800 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Colonel Mauleverer, 30th Foot.	4,500 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Need, 14th Dragoons.	1,350 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Peacocke, 94th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. M. Jones for a cornetcy in 16th Dragoons.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Colonel Farrer, 84th Foot, for unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
1863:			1863:		
22 Jan. -	„ Cash paid H. T. Clack, Esq., for the credit of Captain Vallance, 5th Dragoons, per Military Secretary's letter 9th January.	935 - -	14 Jan. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Sweeney, 19th Foot.	400 - -
			29 Jan. -	„ Cash in return of sum allowed Captain Parkin, Royal Artillery, for his commission, per Military Secretary's letter 23rd January.	900 - -
	„ Cash credited Major Levett, 10th Dragoons, per letter 16th January.	1,375 - -			
	„ Cash credited Captain Moseley, 11th Dragoons, per letter 16th January.	490 - -	Feb. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Budgen, 95th Foot.	550 - -
30 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Captain Murphy, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 23rd January.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Lee, 35th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain G. J. B. Bruce, 14th Dragoons, per letter 23rd January.	390 - -		„ Cash received for an ensigncy in 75th Foot for Mr. Vernede.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Portal, 41st Foot, per letter 23rd January.	1,375 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Hogg, 96th Foot.	200 - -
26 Jan. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Ensign Campbell, late Military Train.	150 - -	16 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 20,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March.	240 12 6
	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. for Lieutenant Colonel Lewes, unattached.	3,200 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Chute, 8th Foot.	100 - -
	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland on account of Lieutenant Colonel Russell, being the amount allowed for unattached majority.	3,200 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fishbourne, 15th Foot.	125 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Hill, 97th Foot, for an unattached company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Martin, 97th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
25 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Mr. Lawrie on account of Major T. Jones, late 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 20th February.	1,375 - -		„ Cash lodged for an ensigncy in 37th Foot for Mr. W. L. Beattie.	450 - -
	„ Cash paid to complete sum due to Lieutenant Nassau Clark, 2nd Life Guards, per letter 30th January.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Leech, residue of sum required for a company in 24th Foot.	50 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1863:		£.	s.	d.	1863:		£.	s.	d.
12 March	To Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Todd, 14th Dragoons, per letter 20th February.	1,425	–	–	March –	By Cash lodged by Mr. W. S. Mills for an ensigncy in the 75th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Johnstone, 8th Foot.	175	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Bradbury, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 3rd March.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash lodged for an ensigncy in the 83rd Foot for Mr. J. M. Lyall.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hilliard, 86th Foot.	200	–	–
21 March	„ Cash paid Cornet J. Packwood's draft, late Land Transport Corps, amount allowed for commission, per letter 17th March 1863.	450	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Cornet Wright, 18th Hussars.	300	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Innes, 4th Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash received for an ensigncy for Mr. Chamley in the 65th Foot.	450	–	–
25 March	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland to complete sum allowed Captain Gounan, late Ceylon Rifles, for the sale of his commission, per letter 21st March.	50	–	–		„ Cash received for an unattached company for Lieutenant Knowles, 77th Foot.	1,100	–	–
						„ Cash received for an ensigncy in the 3rd West India Regiment for Mr. J. Sheil.	450	–	–
	„ Cash paid Mr. C. J. Cox on retiring from the Hon. Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letter 28th March.	1,200	–	–		„ Cash received for a cornetcy in the 4th Hussars for Mr. W. Birkett.	450	–	–
						„ Cash received for a troop for Lieutenant Mather in 14th Hussars.	1,100	–	–
	„ Cash paid for the credit of Colonel Mountjoy Martyn, 2nd Life Guards, the difference on retiring to half pay, per letter 24th March.	2,750	–	–		„ Cash received for a lieutenancy for Cornet Thompson, 14th Hussars.	250	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Best, 72nd Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Milsom, 62nd Foot.	250	–	–
	„ Cash paid for the credit of Major Javy, 12th Dragoons, per letter 31st March.	1,375	–	–		„ Cash received for an ensigncy for Mr. J. H. Bourne in 77th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash received for a cornetcy in the 14th Hussars for Mr. J. L. White.	450	–	–
31 March	„ Cash credited Captain C. F. Holder, 3rd Foot, late 6th Dragoon Guards, old difference between cavalry and infantry, per letter 24th March.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Williams, 56th Foot.	500	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Colonel Kelly, 47th Foot.	4,500	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for an ensigncy for Mr. Symons, 24th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for a cornetcy for Mr. T. K. Baker in 14th Hussars.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Johnston, 96th Foot.	300	–	–
						„ Cash received, balance of sum paid by Mr. Stevenson for a cornetcy in 3rd Hussars.	100	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Anderson, 78th Foot.	350	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Marsh, 89th Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Tisdall, 15th Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Birch, 44th Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Campbell, 30th Foot.	150	–	–
						„ Cash part of sum lodged for a cornetcy for Mr. W. H. Langley, 5th Dragoon Guards.	100	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Horan, 84th Foot.	300	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Moseley, 42nd Foot.	700	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Gosset, 22nd Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant the Hon. A. J. Pennington, Rifle Brigade.	50	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Colonel Mounjoy Martin, 2nd Life Guards.	5,990	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for a cornetcy in the 6th Dragoon Guards for Mr. P. R. Gray.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for a lieutenancy for Ensign White, 77th Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash, part of sum lodged by Lieutenant Hincks, 3rd West India Regiment, for a company.	400	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Poole, 10th Foot.	475	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Ward, 22nd Foot.	150	–	–
13 April –	„ Cash paid Mr. Lawrie for the credit of Captain Robertson, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 7th April.	1,425	–	–	22 April –	„ Cash received of Mr. Lawrie, amount reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Gray, 96th Foot.	200	–	–
	„ Cash paid Lieutenant G. H. Courtenay, half pay 6th foot, per letter 7th April.	700	–	–	23 April	„ Cash received of Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., amount reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Lees, 60th Foot.	100	–	–
25 April –	„ Cash credited Colonel Maitland, Grenadier Guards, per letter 14th April.	300	–	–					
29 April –	„ Cash credited Captain W. D. Pereira, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st April.	490	–	–	30 April	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barrow & Smith for a lieutenancy for Ensign Gordon, 24th Foot.	250	–	–

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1863:		£. s. d.	1863:		£. s. d.
1 May -	To Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Colonel de Morel, Grenadier Guards, per letter 28th April.	4,000 - -	1 May -	By Cash received from Sir J. Kirkland, amount reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Davies, 16th Foot.	400 - -
7 May -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Colonel Donovan, Cape Mounted Rifles.	4,500 - -	23 May -	„ Cash received of Mr. Lawrie, amount reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Wright, 4th Dragoon Guards.	100 - -
9 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Buchanan, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 28th April.	140 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Tragett for an ensigncy in the 55th Foot.	450 - -
11 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Moodie, 60th Foot, late 2nd Dragoons, old difference between cavalry and infantry, per letter 4th May.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Irving for an ensigncy in 18th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Enys, 20th Foot.	100 - -
13 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Goldsmith, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 5th May.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Capel, 85th Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Holmes, 49th Foot.	200 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain F. Ellis, 9th Dragoons, per letter 5th May.	400 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant R. W. Caldwell, 1st Dragoons, per letter 5th May	490 - -		„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Colonel Maitland, Grenadier Guards, who retires on half pay.	4,800 - -
14 May -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. on account of Cpatain Anderson, late 78th Highlanders, per letter 12th May.	50 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Singer, Rifle Brigade.	400 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign H. A. Jones, 100th Foot.	175 - -
21 May -	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills purchased by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 19th May:			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Richards, 40th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel de Morel, half pay, late 42nd Foot.	500 - -
	Bills dated 11th March 1862 - - £. 26,800 - -				
	Interest from 11th March to 21st May 1863, 71 days at 2½ per cent. - 130 6 4			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Milles, 58th Foot.	115 - -
	Bills dated 11th June 1861 - - - 3,000 - -			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fraser, 73rd Foot.	150 - -
	Interest from 11th December to 21st May, 161 days at 2½ per cent. - - 33 1 8			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Denton, 43rd Foot.	300 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Thomas, 83rd Foot.	350 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain H. A. Atchison, half pay unattached.	511 - -
		29,963 8 -			
	Less 2 *s.* discount on 5,000 *l.* - £. 5 - -		12 June -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	36 4 3
	1 *s.* ditto on 24,800 *l.* - 12 8 -			„ Cash received of Sir J. Kirkland in succession to Lieutenant Pender, 16th Foot, placed on half pay.	700 - -
		17 8 -	15 June -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Cummin, Military Train.	250 - -
		29,946 - -	16 June -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, reserved from the commission of Captain Gibson, 24th Foot.	50 - -
	Brokers' commission	14 18 -			
		29,960 18 -			
23 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Aytoun, 7th Dragoons, per letter 12th May.	1,425 - -	18 June -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Grigor & Co., being in succession to Lieutenant Watson, 60th Foot seconded.	700 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Peacocke, 94th Foot, per letter 12th May.	50 - -			
	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Kenny, half pay, late 73rd Foot, per letter 28th April.	3,200 - -	22 June -	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills, sold by orders of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per letter dated 20th June:	
	„ Cash credited Mr. W. Cargill, late Clerk of the Cheque in the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letter 27th May.	3,500 - -		£. s. d.	
				Nos. 5108–18=11 at 1,000 *l.*, and 2,360–74 at 1,000 *l.* - 15,000 - -	
	„ Cash credited Major J. C. Mansergh, half pay, late 15th Foot, per letter 5th May.	3,200 - -		Interest from 11th March, 103 days at 2½ per cent. - 105 16 3	
	„ Cash credited Captain Gillespie, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 22nd May.	50 - -		15,105 16 3	
				2 *s.* discount on 5,000 *l.*; 3 *s.* ditto on 10,000 *l.* - - 20 - -	
				15,085 16 3	
				Brokers' commission 7 10 -	
					15,078 6 3
1 June -	„ Cash credited Major Cornwallis, 4th Hussars, per letter 22nd May.	1,375 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain E. S. T. Berkeley, 2nd Life Guards.	1,250 - -
24 June -	„ Cash credited Major T. Nisbitt, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 12th June.	1,375 - -			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Maunder, 10th Dragoons, per letter 12th June.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Colonel Aldworth, 7th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Blair, 8th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Brougham, 10th Dragoons, per letter 12th June.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Coghlan, 2nd Foot.	300 - -
30 June -	„ Cash credited Captain E. L. Lovell, 8th Dragoons, per letter 23rd June.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. Roger for an ensigncy in 2nd Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain J. C. Hicks, 18th Dragoons, per letter 23rd June.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Mitford, 27th Foot.	550 - -
	„ Cash credited Major and Brevet Colonel J. Ramsay, half pay, per letter 23rd June.	3,200 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Travers, Rifle Brigade.	200 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1863:		£.	s.	d.	1863:		£.	s.	d.
30 June -	To Cash credited Lieutenant C. H. Baillie, 7th Hussars, per letter 30th June.	490	–	–	June -	By Cash lodged by Ensign Barne, 49th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain A. Neave, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 23rd June.	40	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Bury, 15th Hussars.	100	–	–
6 July -	„ Cash paid Mr. Lawrie for the credit of the legal representatives of the late Ensign Troup, 92nd Foot, per military secretary's letter 1st July 1863.	450	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. B. Williams, for an ensigncy in 49th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain D. Ellis, 22nd Foot.	550	–	–
20 July -	„ Cash credited Captain Prator, 9th Dragoons, per letter 10th July.	390	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Robert C. Nicholetts for an ensigncy in the 8th Foot.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Barclay, 16th Dragoons, per letter 10th July.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Houghton, 20th Foot.	250	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Hotham, half pay list, per letter 10th July.	1,800	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Corfield, 8th Foot.	75	–	–
	„ Cash credited Major Nisbet, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 10th July.	50	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Breedon, 21st Foot.	300	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Liebert, 18th Dragoons, per letter 10th July.	390	–	–	2 July -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. M'Gregor & Co., reserved from the sale of the commission of Captain Cookworthy, 60th Regiment.	200	–	–
25 July -	„ Cash credited Captain Beattie, 52nd Foot, per letter 17th July.	450	–	–					
	„ Cash credited Captain Mackenzie, 83rd Foot, per letter 17th July.	390	–	–	9 July -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, in succession to Colonel Bradford, Royal Canadian Rifles.	4,500	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Park Yates, 1st Dragoons, per letter 21st July.	390	–	–					
	„ Cash credited Captain R. D. Stewart, 7th Dragoons, per letter 21st July.	490	–	–	20 July -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Gibsone, 19th Foot.	525	–	–
30 July -	„ Cash credited Captain W. Travers, Rifle Brigade, per letter 13th July.	100	–	–					
						„ Cash erroneously charged per contra on 1st May 1863, on account of Lieutenant Colonel de Morel, Grenadier Guards.	4,000	–	–
5 August	„ Cash paid Mr. Black on account of Major Beswick, late 5th Dragoons, per letter 28th July.	450	–	–					
					1 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Butts, Military Train.	300	–	–
7 August	„ Cash credited Major Peters, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 3rd August.	1,200	–	–					
	„ Cash credited Captain Girdley, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 3rd August.	1,200	–	–	11 Sept. -	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 31,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th September.	385	9	5
12 August	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson & Co. for the credit of Lieutenant Colonel Barron, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 4th August.	1,675	–	–	16 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. M'Gregor & Co., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Baillie, 78th Foot.	200	–	–
18 August	„ Cash credited Captain Mullings, 15th Dragoons, per letter 11th August.	490	–	–	21 Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Codd on account of Captain Barton, 65th Foot.	150	–	–
31 August	„ Cash credited Captain Wallis King, 13th Dragoons, per letter 4th August.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Codd, amount of Cornet Halifax's commission in the 3rd Hussars.	450	–	–
4 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson & Co. on account of Major Miller, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 31st August.	50	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. C. Duke for a cornetcy in 16th Lancers.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Pott, 11th Dragoons, per letter 8th September.	390	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. T. Edgcumbe for an ensigncy in 37th Foot.	450	–	–
15 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Stoodley, 16th Dragoons, per letter 11th September.	390	–	–		„ Cash lodged in succession to Colonel Seymour, Scots Fusilier Guards.	4,500	–	–
21 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Machell, 59th Foot, per letter 18th September.	200	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Stopford, 52nd Foot.	200	–	–
24 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain G. Bridge, half pay, 51st Foot, per letter 22nd September.	1,800	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain W. B. Burke, 18th Foot.	750	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet H. H. A. Arthur for a cornetcy in the 18th Dragoons.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Halton, 16th Dragoons, per letter 22nd September.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Chapman for a cornetcy in the 18th Dragoons.	450	–	–
9 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel W. Yolland, Royal Engineers, per letter 2nd October 1863.	4,500	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain O'Dowd, 7th Dragoon Guards.	50	–	–
21 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Colonel Ouvry, half pay, the former difference between the value of a lieutenant colonelcy of cavalry and infantry, per letter 9th October 1863.	1,675	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Pigott, 36th Foot.	225	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant H. Burnett, 17th Foot.	100	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Evered, 4th West India Regiment.	400	–	–
24 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Sir John Kirkland on account of Major Hill, Military Train.	50	–	–					
21 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain Morrison, 18th Dragoons, per letter 9th October.	490	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Brevet Major Granville, 23rd Foot.	250	–	–
22 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain Phillipson, 7th Dragoons, per letter 16th October.	100	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Cornet Pritchard, 17th Dragoons.	100	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Sadler, 23rd Foot.	75	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Baddeley, 40th Foot.	300	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Gore, 13th Hussars.	125	–	–
7 Nov. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Ensign Winkworth, Military Train, per letter 6th November.	450	–	–	25 Nov. -	„ Cash received of Sir J. Kirkland reserved from the commission of Captain Fletcher, Military Train.	850	–	–
20 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Captain W. O'Bird, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 17th November.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hartford, 21st Foot.	150	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant C. Hill, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 17th November.	390	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fraser, 37th Foot.	100	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Sir F. L. Arthur, 18th Dragoons, per letter 17th November.	50	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Massey, 30th Foot.	100	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Lieutenant S. E. Orr, 10th Foot.	700	–	–
	„ Cash credited Major Brett, 18th Dragoons, per letter 17th November.	1,375	–	–					

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1863:		£.	s.	d.	1863:		£.	s.	d.
20 Nov. -	To Cash credited Lieutenant Little, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 17th November.	450	–	–	25 Nov. -	By Cash reserved from the sale of the commission of Captain F. Dickinson, 83rd Foot.	100	–	–
26 Nov. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Fursdon, Military Train, per letter 24th November.	425	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Stewart for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250	–	–
27 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Captain J. Gore, 82nd Foot, per letter 24th November.	1,325	–	–		„ Cash received, six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th December 1863.	40	–	11
5 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Captain R. Shaw, 7th Dragoons, per letter 1st December.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Hobbs, 55th Foot.	150	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Strother, 17th Foot, per letter 1st December.	390	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Trench, 55th Foot.	150	–	–
24 Dec. -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor on account of Lieutenant Colonel J. Tobin.	1,800	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. D. Barker for a cornetcy in the 16th Dragoons.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Ross, 8th Dragoons, per letter 18th December.	490	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant D. F. Murray, 3rd West India Regiment.	200	–	–
	„ Cash credited the Duke of Wellington, half pay list, per letter 18th December.	4,500	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant J. G. Gun, 12th Foot.	175	–	–
29 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Major C. H. Leslie, half pay list, per letter 22nd December.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Dickson, 77th Foot.	550	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Smith, 22nd Foot.	525	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Steele, Coldstream Guards.	4,500	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Atkinson, 94th Foot.	950	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign G. Alexander for a lieutenancy in 76th Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Hood for an ensigncy in the 10th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Bacon, 23rd Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant F. W. Woods, 17th Foot.	350	–	–
					Dec. -	„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Lieutenant Colonel Loftus, 38th Foot.	4,500	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Boyce, 4th Foot.	100	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by A. Laurie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Captain Fenwick, 93rd Foot.	825	–	–
1864:					1864:				
20 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Captain W. H. Davis, 4th Dragoons, per letter 8th January.	490	–	–	Jan. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Vivian, 3rd Foot.	125	–	–
26 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain Barron, late Exon of the Yeomen of the Guard, per letter 11th February.	3,500	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Sheppard, 4th Foot.	350	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Nicholson, 1st West India Regiment, per letter 15th January.	450	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Walsh, 78th Foot.	75	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Kerr, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 2nd February.	350	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Conor, 21st Foot.	100	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bluett, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 16th February.	700	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Bruce, 2nd Foot.	4,500	–	–
2 March	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Lieutenant Willes, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 26th February.	390	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Drummond Hay, 78th Foot.	1,800	–	–
3 March	„ Cash credited Captain Dynon, 16th Dragoons, per letter 26th February.	1,425	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Worthy, 82nd Foot.	150	–	–
	„ Cash credited Ensign Hughes, 26th Foot, per letter 26th February.	450	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Cairnes, 4th West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250	–	–
4 March	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Major D'Arcy, Cape Mounted Rifles, per letter 1st March.	3,200	–	–	11 March	„ Cash received of Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Bayley, 19th Foot.	100	–	–
	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Brevet Major Campbell, Cape Mounted Rifles, per letter 1st March.	1,800	–	–	14 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 31,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th March.	424	9	11
	„ Cash credited Captain Edwardes, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 1st March.	775	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Pering, 15th Hussars.	500	–	–
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major R. M. Mundy, half pay, Royal Artillery, amount allowed for his commission, per letter 15th March.	1,400	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Conway, Grenadier Guards.	4,500	–	–
	„ Cash paid Brevet Colonel J. T. Du Vernet (through his half pay agent), per letter 22nd March.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Lord A. Leveson Gower for a cornetcy in the 2nd Life Guards.	1,260	–	–
31 March	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith for the credit of Colonel T. H. Smith, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 29th March.	4,500	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Blaksly, 1st West India Regiment, for a company in the 4th West India Regiment.	1,100	–	–
	„ Cash paid Brevet Major Leith, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 29th March.	350	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Gall, 14th Hussars.	3,200	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Spaight, 9th Foot.	200	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. Moore for an ensigncy in 13th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Potts for a lieutenancy in 1st West India Regiment.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. H. W. Lock for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Blake, 2nd Foot.	125	–	–

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1864:		£. s. d.	1864:		£. s. d.
14 April -	To Cash credited Major Bott, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 5th April.	1,425 – –	March	By Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant W. S. Browne, 17th Dragoons.	25 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain King, 13th Dragoons, per letter 5th April.	390 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Graves, 52nd Foot.	100 – –
16 April -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland for the credit of Lieutenant Pettigrew, late Military Train, per letter 12th April.	450 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Ximines, 8th Foot.	125 – –
21 April -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. for the credit of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel G. E. Hillier, per letter 19th April.	1,800 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Constable, 4th Foot.	375 – –
23 April -	„ Cash paid R. S. H. Vivyan, Esq., Honourable Corps of Gentlemen at Arms, per letter 13th April.	1,200 – –	April -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Lee, 100th Foot.	75 – –
	„ Cash paid S. R. Dampier, Esq., Honourable Corps of Gentlemen at Arms, per letter 13th April.	1,200 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Aked for an ensigncy in 4th West India Regiment.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Gair, 2nd Foot, per letter 9th April.	100 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Courtenay for an ensigncy in the 23rd Foot.	450 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Bacon, 23rd Foot, per letter 11th April.	50 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Terry for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 – –
25 April -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Captain Unett, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 19th April.	490 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Bunbury, 50th Foot.	225 – –
	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd for the credit of Lieutenant Turner, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 19th April.	25 – –		„ Cash lodged by Major Dunlop for a lieutenant colonelcy in 2nd West India Regiment.	1,300 – –
27 April -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant FitzSimon, 6th Dragoons, per letter 19th April.	390 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Montgomery, 5th Dragoon Guards.	185 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Bushe, 7th Dragoons, per letter 19th April.	1,150 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Whaite, 10th Foot.	400 – –
29 April -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Captain Lynar, Cape Mounted Rifles, per letter 26th April.	450 – –		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Last for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 – –
2 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Blake, 9th Dragoons, per letter 26th April.	490 – –	5 May -	„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Close for a company in 3rd West India Regiment.	1,100 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Floyd, 9th Dragoons, per letter 26th April.	390 – –	18 May -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith from the commission of Lieutenant Story, 24th Foot.	275 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain O'Shea, 18th Dragoons, per letter 26th April.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Captain Patrickson, 6th Foot.	200 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Atkinson, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 3rd May.	700 – –	11 May -	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills, sold by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per letter 10th May 1864:	
14 May -	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 10th May.	1,375 – –		£. s. d.	
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Wilkinson, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 10th May.	490 – –		Bills dated 11th March 1861 - 10,000 – –	
	„ Cash credited Captain Hanbury, 10th Dragoons, per letter 10th May.	390 – –		Interest 11th March to 11th May 1861, 61 days at 3 per cent. - - - - 50 2 8	
17 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel F. B. Ward, Royal Artillery, per letter 3rd May.	4,500 – –		10,050 2 8	
21 May -	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., on account of Colonel A. Cockburn, per letter 20th May.	1,289 – –		18 *s.* discount - 90 – –	
26 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Sidney, 12th Dragoons, per letter 20th May.	390 – –		9,960 2 8	
				Brokers' commission 5 – –	9,955 2 8
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Horwood, 2nd Foot.	150 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Parry, 37th Foot.	100 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain O'Grady, 64th Foot.	75 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Agg, 16th Dragoons.	75 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Cairnes, 3rd Foot.	250 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Willis, 15th Foot.	100 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Horner, 58th Foot.	400 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain A. O. Richards, 9th Foot.	100 – –
4 June -	„ Cash credited Captain Teevan, 94th Foot, per letter 31st May.	100 – –	14 June -	„ Cash received for six months on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June.	43 15 1
	„ Cash credited Captain Wilkin, 7th Dragoons, per letter 10th May.	100 – –	20 June -	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Captain Kelson, 6th Foot.	1,250 – –
7 June -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith on account of Lieutenant W. V. Rolleston, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 3rd June.	450 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Kenny, 23rd Foot.	100 – –
22 June -	„ Cash credited Captain Price, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 11th June.	1,325 – –		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Colonel Blenkinsopp, 45th Foot.	1,800 – –
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Holford, 10th Dragoons, per letter 14th June.	390 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Henshaw, Rifle Brigade.	175 – –
25 June -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Captain Bass, late Military Train, per letter 21st June.	1,800 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Muirhead, 80th Foot.	225 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. F. Arthur for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Legge, 3rd Foot.	325 – –

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1864:		£. s. d.	1864:		£. s. d.
			June -	By Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Wade, 58th Foot.	75 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. O'Brien for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Colonel Longden, 10th Foot.	1,800 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Tuckey for an ensigncy in the 87th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. Havelock, 18th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Bates, 65th Foot, for an unattached company.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Brett, 76th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Major Garratt, 16th Foot, for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Harley, 3rd West India Regiment, for a majority.	1,400 - -
27 July -	To Cash credited Captain Parr, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 19th July.	490 - -	July -	„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. W. J. Colville, Rifle Brigade, for an unattached majority.	1,400 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain C. Brooke, 4th Dragoons, per letter 19th July.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Day, 11th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Major Mayne, 3rd Dragoon Guards, for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Sir W. Gordon, 17th Lancers, per letter 19th July.	465 - -		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Sir H. Havelock, Bart., 18th Foot.	1,800 - -
29 July -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith on account of Lieutenant Edwards, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 26th July.	450 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Messiter, 84th Foot.	75 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Turnbull, 80th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Benthall, 59th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith on account of Lieutenant Eyre, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 26th July.	525 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. D. Moore for an ensigncy in 59th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. H. Smith for an ensigncy in 80th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Thomson, 65th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
5 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant J. F. Wightman, half pay, 67th Foot, per letter 19th July.	700 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. C. Maltby for an ensigncy in 9th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Captain Brett, 76th Foot.	1,800 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Chichester, 12th Dragoons, per letter 26th July.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Colonel the Hon. W. J. Colville, Rifle Brigade.	1,800 - -
15 Aug. -	To Cash paid Mr. C. H. Pender, half pay, 16th Foot, per letter 5th August.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by the purchaser in succession to Major Mayne, 3rd Dragoon Guards.	2,700 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major H. R. White, 25th Foot.	800 - -
17 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Mr. Lawrie for the credit of Lieutenant J. H. Child, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 9th August.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain J. J. Wood, 45th Foot.	475 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Wyatt, Cape Mounted Rifles, for an unattached company.	1,100 - -
19 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Captain Thursby, 9th Dragoons, per letter 9th August.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Hardy, Rifle Brigade.	150 - -
26 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Captain R. Mather, 14th Dragoons, per letter 23rd August.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. J. Lees for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Francis, 100th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 - -
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Belcher, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 26th July.	475 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain W. S. Davies, 78th Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant C. L. Oliver, 5th Foot.	225
	„ Cash credited Ensign S. Porter, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 26th July.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged in succession to Major A. R. Garrett, 16th Foot.	3,200 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant A. Taylor, 36th Foot.	350 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant W. J. Hall, 58th Foot.	425 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign H. W. Thompson, 16th Foot, for a lieutenancy in the 3rd West India Regiment.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Cameron for an ensigncy in 16th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Wesley, 91st Foot	375 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign B. H. Vidal, 2nd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
2 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Captain Fane, 5th West India Regiment, per letter 30th August.	1,800 - -	Sept. -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Dolan for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment.	450 - -
10 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd on account of Lieutenant Colonel Brooke, half pay, 75th Foot, per letter 30th August.	3,200 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain L. H. Thomas, 63rd Foot.	150 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant F. Wheatley, 84th Foot.	400 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1864:		£. s. d.	1864:		£. s. d.
12 Sept. -	To Cash credited Captain Gratrex, 13th Dragoons, per letter 9th September.	1,035 - -	Sept. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain J. J. Windham, Rifle Brigade.	550 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Captain Francis, 100th Foot.	1,800 - -
19 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson & Co. on account of Captain Elliott, Military Train, per letter 14th September.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant A. Mc N. Caird, 17th Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash received for six months' interest on 21,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th September 1864.	318 13 1
23 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Winthorp, 15th Dragoons, per letter 20th September.	390 - -			
				„ Cash received from Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain G. D. Harris, 19th Foot.	150 - -
24 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Ensign Evans, 5th West India Regiment, per letter 20th September.	450 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain H. J. Le M. Baynes, 88th Foot.	75 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant E. Roberts, 1st West India Regiment, for a company in 5th West India Regiment.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Niven, 1st West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fosbroke, 2nd Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. G. A. Wray for an ensigncy in 84th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Colonel W. D. P. Patton, 74th Foot.	4,050 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain C. H. Ricketts, 32nd Foot.	175 - -
10 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant de Montmorency, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 4th October.	390 - -	22 Oct. -	„ Cash received of Sir C. R. McGregor & Co., reserved from the commission of Captain Cheese, 60th Foot.	550 - -
14 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Colonel Gahen, 5th West India Regiment, per letter 10th October.	4,500 - -		„ Cash received of Sir C. R. McGregor & Co. for an ensigncy in 60th Foot, for Mr. H. A. H. Ward.	450 - -
20 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel E. Y. W. Henderson, Royal Engineers, per letter 11th October.	4,500 - -	2 Nov. -	„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Atherley, 60th Foot.	300 - -
			7 Nov. -	„ Cash received of Messrs. Hopkinson & Co., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Shawe, 97th Foot.	75 - -
27 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd on account of Lieutenant Colonel Williams, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 24th October.	1,425 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Lieutenant A. H. Haldane, 2nd Foot.	700 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain Bowyer, 10th Dragoons, per letter 18th October.	1,425 - -			
28 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain Wintworth, 4th Dragoons, per letter 24th October.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant W. P. Stephenson, 1st Dragoon Guards.	125 - -
7 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Gall, 14th Dragoons, per letter 31st October.	1,035 - -		„ Cash lodged by Captain Palliser, 18th Hussars, for an unattached majority.	915 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain H. R. Vigors, 10th Foot.	75 - -
8 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel J. Travers, half pay, Royal Artillery, per letter 28th October.	4,500 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain C. Crawley, 15th Foot.	300 - -
19 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Captain Atkinson, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 11th November.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain H. H. Smart, 17th Foot.	550 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign St. George, 3rd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
30 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Hepburn, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 19th November.	390 - -			
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Major Lyons, 5th Foot, promoted in 5th West India Regiment.	4,500 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Armstrong, 49th Foot.	425 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Eyre, 53rd Foot.	1,200 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Irvine, 69th Foot.	75 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain the Hon. S. R. H. Ward, 8th Foot.	125 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Brevet Major Poore, 8th Hussars.	160 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Ewart, 78th Foot.	1,800 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Fraser, 70th Foot.	250 -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Sir R. D. Kelly, 34th Foot.	4,500 -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Williams, 13th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Major Edgar, 69th Foot.	3,200 -
1 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Major D. P. Brown, 7th Dragoons, per letter 26th November.	1,375 - -	13 Dec. -	„ Cash received six months' interest on 3,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th December.	51 3 9
23 Dec. -	„ Cash credited M. Barnard, Esq., late Gentleman at Arms, per letter 7th December.	1,200 - -	17 Dec. -	„ Cash received of Sir C. R. McGregor & Co. part of the proceeds of the commission of Captain Burslem, 60th Foot.	975 - -
	„ Cash credited Mr. C. J. Sawyer, late Gentleman at Arms, per letter 7th December.	1,200 - -			
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Burroughs, 52nd Foot.	150 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1864:		£. s. d.	1864:		£. s. d.
23 Dec. -	To Cash credited Brevet Colonel R. L. Phipps, half pay unattached, per letter 14th December.	3,200 - -	17 Dec. -	By Cash lodged by the officers in succession to Brevet Colonel Newton on retirement to half pay from the Coldstream Guards in 1861.	4,500 - -
27 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Captain F. G. Powell, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 21st December.	1,325 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain E. M. Armstrong, 55th Foot.	75 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Sir W. Russell, 14th Dragoons, per letter 22nd December.	1,675 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. L. R. J. Thomas for an ensigncy in the 2nd Foot.	450 - -
29 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Fergus Mc Kenzie, 1st West India Regiment, per letter 24th December.	700 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain A. H. Waldy, 46th Foot.	150 - -
	„ Cash credited Ensign C. H. W. Lock, 1st West India Regiment, per letter 21st December.	450 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Cockrell, 8th Foot.	475 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel McCall, 3rd Foot.	1,250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. C. H. Littledale for an ensigncy in the 29th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant M. E. Leadbitter, 86th Foot.	125 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. V. Biron for an ensigncy in 5th West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain S. H. Dyer, 8th Foot.	175 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. W. R. Backas for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Cornet P. Dodgson, 14th Hussars.	50 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign T. W. Burt, 2nd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain W. Collum, 94th Foot.	75 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Dalrymple, Scots Fusilier Guards.	4,500 - -
1865:			1865:		
5 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Major St. Leger, late half pay, York Chasseurs, per Military Secretary's letter, dated 30th December 1864.	1,800 - -	2 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor, Bart., reserved from the commission of Captain Eaton, 60th Rifles.	225 - -
	„ Cash paid Brevet Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Vaughan, half pay, 57th Foot, per letter 3rd January.	1,800 - -	27 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Gipps, 35th Foot.	100 - -
11 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Major Clapcott, 53rd Foot, per letter 3rd January.	1,800 - -	1 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain O'Callaghan, 16th Foot.	25 - -
12 Jan. -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland on account of Major Hare, late Cape Mounted Rifles, per letter, 9th January.	1,800 - -	3 Feb. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Durweddie, 24th Foot.	450 - -
26 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel T. Le Marchant, per letter 24th January.	3,200 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain R. Rorke, 11th Foot.	750 - -
27 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Captain Cuninghame, 12th Dragoons, per letter 20th January.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant R. Fenton, 9th Foot.	175 - -
1 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith for the credit of Lieutenant T. M. Fogo, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 24th January.	700 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain P. Beale, 100th Foot.	400 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain A. T. Tuke, 7th Foot.	275 -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Major Clapcott, 53rd Foot.	1,800
15 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Gall, half pay, 14th Dragoons, per letter 6th February.	340 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign T. H. Davies, 3rd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy in 2nd West India Regiment.	250 - -
20 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Nelson, 1st West India Regiment, per letter 14th February.	450 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign M'Clellan, 49th Foot.	275 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign T. M. Campbell, 85th Foot.	300 - -
24 Feb. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith, for the credit of Lieutenant M. Lynch, per letter 21st February.	700 - -	1 March	„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland, in part repayment of 1,800 *l.* by Captain T. R. Stack, half pay, 65th Foot.	100 -
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith for the credit of Captain J. S. Clark, 2nd West India Regiment, per letter 21st February.	425 - -	14 March	„ Cash received for six months' interest on 21,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills, to 11th March.	425 2 -
27 Feb. -	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills purchased by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per Military Secretary's letter, 20th February 1865 :—		17 March	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lawrie, reserved from the commission of Captain H. Ware, 51st Foot.	575 - -
	Bills dated 11th June 1861 - - - 20,000 - -		25 March	„ Cash lodged by Mr. Lawrie, in succession to Colonel Lockhart, 92nd Foot, placed on half pay.	1,800 -
	Interest, 11th December to 25th February, 76 days at 4 per Cent. - - 166 11 6			„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel de Salis, 8th Dragoons.	4,450
	Premium : 10,000 *l.* at 5 *s.* - } 55 - - 10,000 *l.* at 6 *s.* - }			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Maule, 11th Foot.	400 -
	Commission - 10 - -			„ Cash lodged by Mr. Furse for an ensigncy in 2nd West India Regiment.	450 -
		20,231 11 6		„ Cash lodged by Mr. Crum for an ensigncy in the 4th West India Regiment.	450 - -
28 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain Wadman, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 25th February.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fulford, 29th Foot.	75
	„ Cash credited Captain Topham, 7th Dragoons, per letter 25th February.	100 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign W. H. Hill, 4th West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1865:		£. s. d.	1865:		£. s. d.
1 March	To Cash credited Captain Felgate, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 18th February.	390 – –	25 March	To Cash lodged by Mr. Sheppard for an ensigncy in 4th West India Regiment.	450 – –
9 March	„ Cash credited Captain Coen, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 3rd March.	575 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Bramley, 42nd Foot.	175 – –
13 March	„ Cash paid F. J. Robinson, Esq., Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 28th February.	1,200 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Roe, 10th Foot.	125 – –
14 March	„ Cash paid Captain J. R. Harris, Gentleman-at-Arms, per letter 28th February.	1,200 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commmission of Captain T. D. Lee, 50th Foot.	725 – –
17 March	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland, on account of Captain Humphreys, late Cape Mounted Rifles, per letter 14th March.	700 – –			
31 March	„ Cash paid Colonel de Salis, 8th Hussars, per letter 27th March.	1,675 – –			
18 April -	„ Cash credited Brevet Colonel Blenkinsopp, half pay lieutenant, per letter 7th April.	3,200 – –	11 April -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, as a further instalment on account of the purchase money of Captain Stokes, Company 65th Foot.	200 – –
20 April -	„ Cash credited Captain Robertson, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 11th April.	1,325 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign White, 4th West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Boyce, 16th Dragoons, per letter 11th April.	1,425 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Aked, 4th West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 – –
26 April -	„ Cash credited Captain Mawe, 1st West India Regiment, per letter 18th April.	700 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Golding, 32nd Foot.	125 – –
	„ Cash credited on account of the representatives of the late Brevet Major T. Smith, unattached Staff Officer of Pensioners, per letter 18th April.	1,800 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Clarke, 41st Foot.	150 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Walshe, 32nd Foot.	350 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Last, 3rd West India Regiment, in succession to Lieutenant M. Lynch, 2nd West India Regiment.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. H. Gilbert for an ensigncy in the 1st West India Regiment.	450 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Sargent, 43rd Foot.	550 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the Commission of Captain Duberg, 84th Foot.	325 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Major M. Barnet, 79th Foot, for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Page, 41st Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Bailie, 82nd Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Aytoun, 85th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Captain Bogle, 10th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Goldsmith, 50th Foot, for an unattached company.	1,100 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Mirehouse, 64th Foot, for an unattached company.	1,100 – –
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Page, 41st Foot.	1,800 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Campbell, 50th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. Soote, 50th Foot, for an ensigncy.	450 – –
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Captain Aytoun, 85th Foot.	1,800 – –
2 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Buchanan, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 22nd April.	490 – –	4 May -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Price & Boustead, amount reserved from the commission of Captain Bycroft, 31st Foot.	700 – –
10 May -	„ Cash credited Captain G. W. Roe, 4th West India Regiment, per letter 2nd May.	1,800 – –	25 May -	„ Cash lodged by A. Lawrie, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Franklin, 6th Foot.	150 – –
12 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant D. Wale, 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 6th May.	490 – –		„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, reserved from the commission of Captain Good, 24th Foot.	150 – –
13 May -	„ Cash paid Brevet Colonel Bradshawe, half pay Lieutenant, per letter 9th May.	3,200 – –		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Major M. C. Barnet, 79th Foot.	3,200 – –
18 May -	„ Cash paid F. V. Mills, Esq., Honourable Corps Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letter 12th April.	1,200 – –		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Lieutenant Mirehouse, 64th Foot.	700 – –
20 May -	„ Cash paid Captain W. C. Chichester, 7th Dragoon Guards, per letter 9th May.	1,425 – –		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel E. G. Bulwer, 23rd Foot, for a half-pay lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 – –
22 May -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. G. Elliot, half pay Lieutenant, per letter 16th May.	4,500 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain E. Armstrong, 23rd Foot.	650 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain H. J. R. Maxwell, 15th Dragoons, per letter 9th May.	390 – –		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Captain Bogle, 10th Foot.	1,800 – –
25 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant FitzGerald, 1st West India Regiment per letter 16th May.	700 – –		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Captain W. A. Bailie, 82nd Foot.	1,800 – –
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Wynyard, Grenadier Guards.	4,500 – –

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1865:		£. s. d.	1865:		£. s. d.
5 June -	To Cash credited Brevet Colonel J. G. McKerlie, half pay Royal Engineers, per letter 26th May.	4,500 - -	June -	By Cash received for six months' interest on 23,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills, to 11th June 1865.	449 18 3
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant J. Grieve, 2nd Dragoons, per letter 26th May.	425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. Humfrey for an ensigncy in the 45th Foot.	450 - -
30 June -	„ Cash credited Captain A. J. Armstrong, 16th Dragoons, per letter 23rd June.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Colonel Butler, 28th Foot.	4,500 - -
	„ Cash credited Brevet Major Wilkinson, 7th Dragoons, per letter 21st June.	250 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant G. A. Eliot, 11th Foot.	225 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Bulwer, 23rd Foot.	3,200 - -
10 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Weir, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 8th July 1865.	150 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain L. R. Parry, 52nd Foot.	50 - -
18 July -	„ Cash paid Major Creagh, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 12th July 1865.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain E. J. Storey, 66th Foot.	375 - -
25 July -	„ Cash credited Captain Bragge, 4th Dragoon Guards, per letter 19th July.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Ensign E. R. Gibb, 4th West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy in the 1st West India Regiment.	250 - -
26 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Saunders, 13th Dragoons, per letter 21st July.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant F. Bond, 29th Foot.	175 - -
27 July -	„ Cash credited Major Wilkin, 48th Foot, per letter 21st July.	390 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant A. Shaw, 9th Foot.	75 - -
3 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Captain J. Mould, 7th Hussars, per letter 28th July.	490 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. H. Forjett for a commission in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
9 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Colonel Beauchamp Walker, 2nd Dragoon Guards, per letter 26th July 1865.	1,675 - -		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Major R. Dillon, 30th Foot.	3,200 - -
18 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel W. R. B. Smith, half pay, per letter 12th August.	2,251 - -		„ Cash lodged by Major Marten, 7th Foot, for a lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain G. M. Robertson, 1st Dragoons, per letter 10th August.	100 - -		„ Cash reserved from the amount lodged by Mr. Hargreave for a commission in the 5th Foot.	175 - -
30 Aug. -	„ Cash credited Captain D. Sullivan, 13th Foot, per letter 26th August.	100 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Swindley, 73rd Foot.	50 - -
24 Aug. -	„ Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills purchased by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, per Military Secretary's letter, 22nd August 1865:			„ Cash lodged by Mr. Edgcumbe for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
	£. s. d.			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain D. Sullivan, 13th Foot.	600 - -
	Bills dated 11th March 1862 - - 13,000 - -			„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. R. F. Jenkins for a commission in 4th West India Regiment.	450 - -
	Interest from 11th March to 23rd August, 165 days, at 3½ per cent. - - 205 13 8			„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. F. Fenwick for a commission in the 75th Foot.	450 - -
	Broker's commission - 6 10 -			„ Cash reserved from the commission of the Hon. M. Wingfield, 1st Life Guards.	1,085 - -
	13,212 3 8			„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. W. Hodges for a commission in 4th West India Regiment.	450 - -
	£. s. d.			„ Cash lodged by Ensign T. M. Dolan, 2nd West India Regiment, for a lieutenancy.	250 - -
	Bills dated 11th June 1861 - 7,200 - -		July -	„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. W. S. Grant for a commission in the 2nd West India Regiment.	450 - -
	Interest 11th June to 23rd August, 73 days, at 3 per cent. - 43 4 -			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Borton, 61st Foot.	75 - -
	Broker's commission - 3 12 -			„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant J. Hely, 15th Foot.	700 - -
	7,246 16 -			„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Carey, 26th Foot.	4,050 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet Twyne for an ensigncy in the 13th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet Gilchrist for an ensigncy in the 26th Foot.	450 - -
		20,458 19 8		„ Cash lodged by Major W. Campbell, 100th Foot, for a lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300 - -
	„ Cash paid to Sir John Kirkland on account of Major G. King, Rifle Brigade, per letter 8th August.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Captain Clery, 100th Foot, for a majority.	1,400 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Cunninghame, 2nd Life Guards.	425 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain the Hon. F. A. Chichester, 7th Hussars.	350 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the Commission of Lieutenant Macaulay, 20th Foot.	225 - -
9 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Garrard, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 31st August.	1,425 - -	13 Sept. -	„ Cash received for interest on 34,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills to the 11th September 1865.	598 4 -
15 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain H. E. Hall, 5th Dragoon Guards, per letter 6th September 1865.	450 - -		„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet W. Musgrave for an ensigncy in the 70th Foot.	450 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain A. E. Maunsel, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 6th September.	1,425 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Coombs for an ensigncy in the 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fuller, 83rd Foot.	125 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Jenkins, 13th Foot.	50 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain C. E. Goddard, 87th Foot.	400 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1865:		£.	s.	d.	1865:		£.	s.	d.
21 Sept. -	To Cash credited R. Piffard, 3rd Dragoons, per letter 6th September.	490	–	–	13 Sept. -	By Cash lodged by Lieutenant Herring, 30th Regiment, for a company in the 100th Foot.	1,100	–	–
22 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain L. S. Rooke, 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 14th September 1865.	700	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Lieutenant Herring, 100th Regiment.	700	–	–
26 Sept. -	„ Cash paid Major T. Brownell, late 5th West India Regiment, per letter 25th September 1865.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the sale of the commission of Lieutenant the Hon. J. W. Hewitt, 3rd Foot.	175	–	–
29 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Giffard, 6th Dragoon Guards, per letter 14th September.	450	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the sale of the commission of Captain Green, 21st Foot.	725	–	–
30 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Captain Starkie, 9th Lancers, per letter 25th September.	490	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Paulet, 5th Dragoon Guards.	100	–	–
16 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant E. D. Jones, late 3rd West India Regiment, value of his commission, per letter 5th October 1865.	700	–	–	21 Oct. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co., part of the proceeds of the sale of the commission of Lieutenant Doherty, 60th Rifles.	250	–	–
19 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Captain F. H. Powell's receipt, 16th October, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 3rd October.	100	–	–	24 Oct. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, being the amount reserved from the commission of Captain J. Clarke, Royal Canadian Rifles.	25	–	–
24 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Somerset Saunderson, 11th Dragoons, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 14th October.	390	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Hopkins, 49th Foot.	200	–	–
31 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain G. Rosser, late 17th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 23rd October.	390	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hale, 61st Foot.	300	–	–
16 Nov. -	„ Cash paid Captain H. D. Wentworth, late Military Train, receipt 16th November 1865, to complete value of his commission, per letter 10th November 1865.	450	–	–	10 Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Davies, 16th Foot.	300	–	–
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant J. Dooley, late 3rd West India Regiment, per letter 4th December 1865.	700	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Brett, 98th Foot.	900	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Inge, Rifle Brigade.	75	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Grant, 64th Foot.	300	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Riley, promoted to 3rd West India Regiment.	700	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. E. Lindor for an ensigncy in 4th West India Regiment.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain E. R. Hill, 30th Foot.	400	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant de Lousada, 98th Foot.	175	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Howarth, 4th West India Regiment.	250	–	–
8 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Cornet Robert Masters, amount allowed him on retiring on half pay from 7th Hussars, per letter 29th November.	390	–	–	12 Dec. -	„ Cash received, six months' interest to 11th December 1865 on 30,200 *l.* Exchequer Bills.	445	9	–
19 Dec. -	„ Cash paid receipt of Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Fanshaw of 16th December, value of his commission as Major, unattached, per letter dated 14th December 1865.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of the late Captain J. T. Gray, 4th West India Regiment.	425	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. Ford for an ensigncy in 56th Foot.	450	–	–
26 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Colonel H. C. Wade, authorised to be paid to him as the value of his commission, per letter dated 19th December 1865.	1,800	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. Walpole for an ensigncy in the 81st Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant J. H. Allaire, Rifle Brigade.	50	–	–
	„ Cash credited Captain A. G. Bell Martin, 7th Dragoon Guards, former difference between cavalry and infantry, per letter 11th October 1865.	490	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain J. Mathew, 5th Foot.	775	–	–
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant E. O. Van Holdane, on retirement from 42nd Foot, per letter 10th November 1865.	490	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. L. Trafford for an ensigncy in 5th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. Adderley for a cornetcy in 5th Dragoon Guards.	450	–	–
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant W. V. King, late 6th Dragoons, per letter 14th December 1865.	175	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Ensign S. T. A. Dunn for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign W. Roberts for a lieutenancy in 3rd West India Regiment.	250	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant R. W. Ormerod, Rifle Brigade.	175	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign C. N. M. Hamilton for a lieutenancy in 39th Foot.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. W. Paterson for an ensigncy in 4th West India Regiment.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign H. J. H. de Visines for a lieutenancy in 1st West India Regiment.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Mitchell, 65th Foot.	150	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Wookey, late 19th Foot.	250	–	–

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1866:		£. s. d.	1866:		£. s. d.
15 Jan. -	To Cash paid receipt of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel H. Russell, dated 12th January, amount authorised to be paid as the value of his commission, per letter 8th January.	3,000 - -	Jan. -	By Cash lodged by Mr. W. Hill for an ensigncy in the 39th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. S. D. Crookendon for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450 - -
4 April -	„ Cash paid receipt of Rev. G. W. Robinson and H. E. Russell, Esq., dated 2nd April, executors to Lieutenant Colonel H. Russell.	200 - -		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Mark Kerr.	1,800 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Heywood, 14th Foot.	75 - -
19 Jan. -	„ Cash paid receipt of Captain White, late 3rd Dragoon Guards, amount authorised to be paid to him to complete the value of his commission, per letter 13th January 1866.	490 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain A. C. H. Tovey, 70th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain R. D. Hare, 9th Foot.	175 - -
31 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant C. R. Gibb, late 1st West India Regiment, amount authorised to be paid to him, per letter 27th January 1866.	700 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. R. Boddon, for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. Des Barres for an ensigncy in 3rd West India Regiment.	450 - -
5 Feb. -	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Captain McNeill, late 13th Dragoons, to complete value of his commission.	25 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Colonel J. Campbell, 8th Foot.	511 - -
	„ Cash paid Captain Snow's receipt 2nd February, late 96th Foot, amount authorised to be paid to him as the value of his commission, per letter 27th January 1866.	1,800 - -	14 March	„ Cash received, six months' interest on 34,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills due 11th March 1866.	513 6 -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant C. Reeves, 78th Foot.	250 6 -
7 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Captain R. Topham, Bengal Staff Corps, late 88th Foot, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 31st January.	39 - -	23 March	„ Cash received of A. Lawrie, Esq., for the promotion of Lieutenant Colquhoun and Cornet Douglas, 4th Dragoon Guards.	1,350 - -
26 Feb. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant de Lousada, late 98th Foot, to complete the amount allowed for his commission, per letter 19th February 1866.	50 - -		„ Cash received, Admiralty passage money, per War Office letter 17th March 1866, No. 13–65 Foot–129.	63 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain G. A. Harrison, late 79th Foot, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 19th February 1866.	700 - -		„ Cash received for 20,000 *l.* Exchequer Bills of 11th June 1861 - - - 20,000 - -	
12 March	„ Cash credited Colonel Viscount Combemere to complete the value of his commission as major, per letter 6th March 1866.	50 - -		Interest, 11th December to 24th March, 103 days, at 3 per cent. - - 169 6 3	
				20,169 6 3	
13 March	„ Cash credited Captain Stapleton, late 33rd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 9th March 1866.	1,800 - -		Premium 10,000 *l.*, at 4 *s.* discount, 10,000 *l.* at 5 *s.* discount. - - - 45 - -	
	„ Cash credited Captain J. M'Crea, value of his commission as captain 45th Foot, per letter 23rd February 1866.	1,800 - -			
15 March	„ Cash credited Captain Edwyn Walker, late 15th Hussars, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 9th March 1866.	1,425 - -		20,124 6 3	
				Broker's commission - 10 - -	
					20,114 6 3
20 March	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Colonel F. J. Travers (late R.A.), receipt 20th March 1866, value of his commission, per letter 14th March 1866.	4,500 - -		„ Cash lodged by Mr. M. C. S. Tynte for a cornetcy in the 4th Dragoon Guards.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel L. H. Hamilton, 87th Foot.	3,200 - -
21 March	„ Cash credited Captain P. Metcalfe, 32nd Foot, amount authorised to be paid to him on exchanging from 7th Hussars, per letter 9th March.	390 - -		„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet E. R. Cooper, 35th Foot (for an ensigncy in).	450 - -
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Captain C. J. W. Allen, late 2nd Dragoons, per letter 14th March.	1,425 - -		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Maitland, 38th Foot.	150 - -
9 April -	„ Cash credited Colonel C. A. Denison, late 52nd Foot, being the value of his commission, per letter 5th April.	4,500 - -		„ Cash charged Lieutenant Street, late 37th Foot, part of amount overpaid to him and ordered to be refunded on his retirement from the service.	246 9 6
16 April -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel B. Granville Layard, being the value of his commission as captain, per letter 12th April.	1,800 - -	5 April -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Price & Boustead in succession to Lieutenant Jellicoe, 99th Foot.	250 - -
			19 April -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor & Co. in succession to Captain A. Morgan, 60th Rifles.	525 - -
	„ Cash credited Captain G. Cleghorn, late 2nd Dragoons, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 3rd April 1866.	490 - -	21 April -	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland, part of the amount lodged in succession to Captain S. Forbes, late 19th Foot.	125 -
27 April	„ Cash paid the receipt of Colonel S. Wilson, 27th April, being the value of his commission as harbinger of the Hon. Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letters 1st August 1865 and 24th April 1866.	2,000 - -		„ Amount lodged by Ensign Gilbert for a lieutenancy in 1st West India Regiment.	250
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. W. Cooper for an ensigncy in the 86th Foot.	450 -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain T. Morris, 32nd Foot.	300 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. W. Humpoge for an ensigncy in 94th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. B. Coleman for an ensigncy in 13th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash lodged in succession to Colonel W. Drysdale, C.B., who retires on half pay from 9th Lancers.	4,450 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. G. Macdonald for an ensigncy in the 1st West India Regiment.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain J. J. Bowness, 86th Foot.	50 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1866:		£.	s.	d.	1866:		£.	s.	d.
2 May -	To Cash credited Captain Pigott, late 73rd Foot, to complete the amount allowed for his commission, per letter 23rd April 1866.	400	-	-	21 April -	By Cash lodged by Ensign Broderick for a lieutenancy in the 2nd Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. C. D. Hay for an ensigncy in the 2nd Regiment.	450	-	-
5 May -	„ Cash credited Major Dudley Hill, late 40th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 1st May.	3,200	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Major R. England, 55th Foot, for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300	-	-
7 April -	„ Cash paid the receipt of Lieutenant Colonel F. R. Foster, late 4th Dragoon Guards, amount authorised to be paid to him on being placed on half pay, per letter 3rd April.	1,425	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Captain G. Clay, 19th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Brevet Major J. H. Wade, 53rd Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400	-	-
5 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Pumfrett, late 17th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 2nd May 1866.	175	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Captain E. D. Smith, 95th Foot, for an unattached majority.	1,400	-	-
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hudson, 55th Foot.	100	-	-
7 May -	„ Cash paid the receipt of Lieutenant S. Granville, authorised to be paid to him on retirement from 6th Foot, per letter 1st May 1866.	250	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain M'Barnet, 9th Foot.	425	-	-
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Sangster, 53rd Foot.	100	-	-
8 May -	„ Cash credited Sir K. G. Jackson, 83rd Regiment, value of his commission, per letter 2nd May 1866.	700	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. S. Langlands for an ensigncy in the 79th Foot.	450	-	-
14 May -	„ Cash credited Colonel Drysdale, late 9th Lancers, being the difference between a cavalry and infantry majority, per letter 1st May 1866.	1,375	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Robertson Ross, 25th Foot, for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Captain Hume for a majority in 55th Foot.	1,400	-	-
18 May -	„ Cash credited Captain de Bourbel, 6th Dragoon Guards, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 15th May 1866.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Harrison for a company in 55th Foot.	1,100	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Braddon for a lieutenancy in 55th Foot.	250	-	-
19 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Dowdeswell, late 89th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 15th May.	700	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Talbot for an unattached lieutenant colonelcy.	1,300	-	-
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant W. H. Hill, late 1st West India Regiment, amount allowed for his commission, per letter 18th May 1866.	650	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Vesey for a company in 19th Foot.	1,100	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Emerson for a lieutenancy in the 19th Foot.	250	-	-
22 May -	„ Cash credited Major General Edward Bagot, value of his commission as Major unattached, per letter 18th April 1866.	3,200	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. T. H. Barnard for an ensigncy in the 19th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Captain Rowland for a majority in 25th Foot.	1,400	-	-
26 May -	„ Cash paid the order of Lieutenant Colonel Young, late 65th Foot, dated 25th May, proceeds of sale of commission per letter 15th May.	4,500	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Scriven for a company in the 25th Foot.	1,100	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign Turner for a lieutenancy in the 25th Foot.	250	-	-
28 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant F. W. Garnett, late 85th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 22nd May 1866.	700	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Sayer, 46th Foot.	450	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Pagan for a company in 65th Foot.	1,100	-	-
	„ Cash credited Captain Gooch, late 16th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 22nd May 1866.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Prince for a company in 53rd Foot.	1,100	-	-
5 June -	„ Cash credited Captain Gower, late 12th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 31st May 1866.	490	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Hitchcock for a lieutenancy in the 53rd Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. G. Fife for an ensigncy in the 53rd Foot.	450	-	-
9 June -	„ Cash paid the receipt of Sir C. R. M'Gregor, Bart., & Co., on account of the proceeds of the commission of Lord G. J. Manners, Royal Horse Guards, per letter 7th June 1866.	2,150	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Ethelston for a company in the 3rd Regiment.	1,100	-	-
						„ Cash charged Lieutenant Street, late 37th Foot, overpaid him on his retirement from the service, balance of sum due by him per letter 13th March.	3	10	6
	„ Cash paid the receipt of Sir C. R. M'Gregor, Bart., & Co., on account of the proceeds of the commission of Captain Irving, 60th Foot, per letter 7th June 1866.	700	-	-					
					May -	„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Wood, Coldstream Guards.	4,500	-	-
14 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant C. Rochfort, late 39th Regiment, value of his commission, per letter 22nd May.	700	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. Welch for an ensigncy in the 25th Foot.	450	-	-
20 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant C. E. Palmer, late 13th Foot, amount allowed for his commission, per letter 18th June 1866.	675	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Davies, 4th West India Regiment.	350	-	-
26 June -	„ Cash credited Colonel H. A. Owry, value of his commission, per letter 19th June 1866.	4,500	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Marshall, 3rd West India Regiment.	25	-	-
27 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant C. W. Brown, 62nd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 26th June.	700	-	-		„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet Smith, for an ensigncy in the 55th Foot.	450	-	-
	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. M'Gregor, Bart., & Co., receipt to complete the value of the commission of Lieutenant Barlow, 60th Rifles, per letter 26th June.	450	-	-		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Collum, 37th Foot.	75	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Ensign B. N. Franks for a lieutenancy in 3rd Foot.	250	-	-
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. Alexander Innes, for an ensigncy in 3rd Foot.	450	-	-
					4 June -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barrow & Smith out of the sale of the commission of Lieutenant A. H. Duthie, 2nd West India Regiment.	125	-	-
					6 June -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Price & Boustead to complete the sum reserved from the commission of Captain Bacon, 95th Foot.	25	-	-

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1866:		£.	s.	d.	1866:		£.	s.	d.
29 June -	To Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel M. S. T. Dennis, late half pay 76th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 9th May 1866.	3,200	–	–	6 June -	By Cash lodged by Messrs. Hopkinson & Co., amount reserved from the commission of Lieutenant R. Webster, late 97th Foot.	25	–	–
30 June -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son's receipt, authorised to be paid to Lieutenant R. Langtry, 2/14th Foot, as the value of his commission, per letter 26th June 1866.	700	–	–	12 June -	„ Cash received on 10,200 *l.* Exchequer Bills to 11th June 1866.	150	9	–
	„ Cash credited Captain Thursby, late 9th Lancers, per letter 28th June.	100	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Ensign R. O. Cotton for a lieutenancy in 95th Foot.	450	–	–
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant R. W. Tudor, 48th Foot, on retiring from the service, per letter 15th May 1866.	700	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Fleming for a company in 95th Foot.	1,100	–	–
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Captain A. G. Smith, 6th Dragoon Guards, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 15th May 1866.	75	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Seagram for a lieutenancy in 95th Foot.	250	–	–
	Amount authorised to be paid to Captain G. W. Cosens, late 85th Foot, per letter 18th June 1866.	1,800	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Lindoe for a lieutenancy in 1st West India Regiment.	250	–	–
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Ensign Vibart, on retirement from 70th Foot, per letter 26th June.	450	–	–	16 June -	„ Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor, being part of the sum lodged in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Lord George J. Manners, Royal Horse Guards, who retires on half pay.	4,150	–	–
	„ Amount credited Brevet Major Alfred E. Wilkinson, late 7th Hussars, per letter 10th April.	100	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Congreve, 4th Foot.	325	–	–
5 July -	„ Cash credited Ensign Bosanquet, value of his commission, per letter 2nd July.	450	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. L. M. H. Kennedy for an ensigncy in 1st West India Regiment.	450	–	–
11 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Erskine, late 54th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 2nd July 1866.	700	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fremantle, 2nd Life Guards.	50	–	–
10 July -	„ Cash paid the receipt of Captain H. B. B. Leveson Gower, late 65th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 2nd July.	450	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Lieutenant Colonel Romer, 59th Regiment.	4,050	–	–
12 July -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant V. U. Langworthy, 73rd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 9th July 1866.	700	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. A. W. Sheringham for an ensigncy in the 1st Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Letts, 3rd Regiment.	25	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Sir John Kirkland on account of Captain and Brevet Major Jones, Depôt Battalion.	1,400	–	–
					July -	„ Cash lodged for a company in the 15th Foot for Lieutenant Riall.	1,100	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Lord Ruthven, Rifle Brigade.	975	–	–
18 July -	„ Cash credited G. Winchester, Esq., being the sum authorised to be paid to him for his commission in the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letter 6th July.	1,200	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Quicke, 53rd Foot.	575	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant England, 1st West India Regiment.	75	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Robert White, late 17th Lancers, amount authorised to be paid to him on retiring to infantry half pay, per letter 10th July 1866.	1,275	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain the Hon. T. W. O. Plunkett, 1st Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for a lieutenancy in the 15th Foot for Ensign Dundas.	250	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for a commission in 15th Foot for Gentleman Cadet W. A. Cathell.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Colonel W. R. Custance, authorised to be paid on retiring to half pay, per letter 13th July 1866.	1,675	–	–		„ Cash lodged for a commission in the 61st Foot for Gentleman Cadet A. E. Wilby.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Holmes, late 43rd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 20th July 1866.	4,500	–	–		„ Cash lodged for a company in the 85th Foot for Lieutenant Doughty.	1,100	–	–
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Price & Boustead, authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Stamer, 31st Regiment, per letter 17th July 1866.	700	–	–		„ Cash lodged for a lieutenancy in the 85th Foot for Ensign Jervis.	250	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Brevet Major Basset, 94th Foot.	250	–	–
	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland, authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Vibart, Military Train, per letter 23rd July 1866.	450	–	–					
26 July -	„ Cash paid Sir J. Kirkland, authorised to be paid to Captain Curgenven, Military Train, per letter 23rd July.	450	–	–					
3 Jul -	„ Cash credited Colonel J. B. Mann, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 28th July 1866.	1,800	–	–					
	„ Cash credited Captain Congreve, late 4th Foot, to complete amount allowed for his commission, per letter 18th July.	25	–	–					
1 August	„ Cash credited Captain F. G. F. Grant, late 3rd Hussars, to complete value of his commission, per letter 28th July.	490	–	–	9 August	„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland to complete the succession to Captain Onslow, 19th Foot.	275	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Powell, amount authorised to be paid to him as the value of his commission, per letter 19th July 1866.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Stepney, Coldstream Guards.	4,500	–	–
7 August	„ Cash paid Messrs. Barron & Smith, authorised to be paid to Lieutenant de R. Barclay, 24th Foot, for his commission, per letter 3rd August 1866.	700	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Fairfield, Rifle Brigade.	200	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Powell, 7th Regiment.	150	–	–
	„ Cash paid by Messrs. Price & Boustead, authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Brakspear, 31st Foot, for his commission, per letter 3rd August 1866.	450	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant de Stackpoole, 20th Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash lodged for a cornetcy in the Royal Horse Guards for Mr. L. Dundas.	1,200	–	–

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1866:		£. s. d.	866:		£. s. d.
7 August	To Cash credited Ensign the Hon. Alfred Hood, late 52nd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 3rd August 1866.	450 – –	9 August	By Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Douglas, 9th Foot.	100 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Hampton, late 5th Dragoon Guards, to complete value of his commission, per letter 3rd August 1866.	1,425 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Kerans, 84th Foot.	150 – –
9 August	„ Cash credited Captain Messenger, 40th Foot, value of his commission, per 3rd August 1866.	1,800 – –			
	„ Cash credited Captain F. D. Allen, 17th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 3rd August 1866.	1,800 – –			
10 August	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel F. P. Cassidy, late 34th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 3rd August 1866.	3,200 – –			
	„ Cash credited Captain M. S. Blyth to complete the value of his commission, per letter 10th August 1866.	700 – –			
15 August	„ Cash credited Captain Johnes, 18th Foot (late 7th Hussars), former difference between cavalry and infantry, per Horse Guards letter dated 10th August 1866.	390 – –			
16 August	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. McGregor, Bart., & Co., to complete the value of the commission of Lieutenant Gumbleton, 60th Foot, per letter 15th August 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. McGregor, Bart., & Co., value of the commission of Lieutenant Meade, 60th Rifles, per letter 15th August.	700 – –			
18 August	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son, due to Captain Heywood, 14th Foot, per letter 4th August 1866.	75 – –			
21 August	„ Cash credited Captain Oakley, late 68th Foot, to complete value of his commission, per letter 28th July 1866.	325 – –			
23 August	„ Cash credited Lieutenant J. R. Woodhouse, 13th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 15th August 1866.	700 – –			
25 August	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. McGregor, Bart., & Co., to complete the value of the commission of Lieutenant Rhodes, 60th Rifles, per letter 24th August 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Cash credited Major W. H. Fitzgerald, late 68th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 24th August 1866.	3,200 – –			
27 August	„ Cash paid E. S. Codd, Esq., due to Captain Every, 17th Foot, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 24th August 1866.	100 – –			
4 Sept. -	„ Cash paid E. S. Codd, Esq., due Lieutenant T. Forster, 63rd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 3rd September 1866.	700 – –	13 Sept. -	„ Cash received, interest on 34,800 *l.* Exchequer Bills, to 11th September.	513 6 –
18 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Williams, late 92nd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 3rd September 1866.	700 – –		„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, reserved from the commission of Captain Campbell, 24th Foot.	125 – –
20 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Ibbetson, value of his commission, per letter 17th September.	1,800 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Hoey, 6th Dragoon Guards.	250 – –
26 Sept. -	„ Cash credited Ensign W. G. Anstruther, 85th Foot, authorised to be paid him, per letter 17th September 1866.	450 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Henry, 9th Lancers.	100 – –
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Bird on retiring from the 33rd Foot, per letter 2nd July 1866.	100 – –			
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Ensign Rowan on retiring from the 43rd Foot, per letter 11th July 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Ensign Loring on retiring from the 17th Foot, per letter 23rd July 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Campbell on retiring from the 74th Foot, per letter 17th September 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Ensign Pycroft on retiring from 89th Foot, per letter 11th July 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Chapman on retiring from the 54th Foot, per letter 17th September 1866.	450 – –			

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1866:		£. s. d.	1866:		£. s. d.
Sept. -	To Cash credited Lieutenant Jackson, late 11th Hussars, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 17th September.	300 – –			
10 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Codd, being the amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Sir John Clarke, late 75th Foot, per letter 4th October 1866.	225 – –	11 Oct. -	By Amount reserved from the commission of Captain Palliser, late 7th Hussars.	125 – –
	„ Ditto on account of Lieutenant J. P. M. Burton, late 63rd Foot, being the value of his commission, per letter 4th October.	450 – –		„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills sold by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief: £. s. d. Bills dated 11th March, at par - - - 20,000 – – Interest, 28 days, at 4 per cent. - - 61 7 5 20,061 7 5 Broker's commission 10 – –	20,051 7 5
12 Oct. -	„ Cash paid the order of Colonel Thomson, 82nd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 4th October.	4,500 – –			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant F. H. P. Duncan, 28th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 4th October 1866.	700 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain DuCane, 2nd Dragoons.	50 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Durrant, 8th Hussars.	500 –
	„ Cash credited Colonel J. Wegg, authorised to be paid as the value of his commission, per letter 4th October 1866.	3,200 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Cornet Kennett, 18th Hussars.	175 –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Newall, 8th Foot.	1,000 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Grove, 61st Foot.	425 – –
	„ Cash credited Captain Vesey, late 3rd Foot, value of his commission, per letter 4th October 1866.	1,800 – –		„ Cash lodged by Sir J. Kirkland to complete the purchase money in succession to Captain Wells, Ceylon Rifles.	150 – –
			13 Nov. -	„ Cash received for the following Exchequer Bills sold by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief: £. s. d. Bills dated 11th March 1862 - - - 14,800 – – Interest, 11th September to 9th November, 59 days, at 4 per cent. - - 95 13 10 1 s. premium - - 7 8 – 14,903 1 10 Broker's commission 7 8 – 14,895 13 10	
20 Oct. -	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son to complete the value of the commission of Captain Armstrong, 14th Foot, per letter 18th October 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Ditto, value of the commission of Lieutenant Laverton, 14th Foot, per letter 18th October 1866.	700 – –			
22 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain A. Worthington, late 3rd Foot, to complete the amount allowed for his commission, per letter 4th October 1866.	675 – –			
25 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Burton, late 18th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 18th October 1866.	700 – –		£. s. d. Bills dated 11th June 1866 - 10,200 – – Interest, 11th June to 9th November, 15 days, at 4 per cent. - 168 15 9 1 s. premium - 5 2 – 10,373 17 9 Broker's commission - 5 2 – 10,368 15 9	
31 Oct. -	„ Cash credited Captain C. J. Travers, late 14th Hussars, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 4th October 1866.	490 – –			
1 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Colonel R. S. Sayer, authorised to be paid to him on reduction to half pay from 1st Dragoon Guards, per letter 25th October 1866.	1,675 – –			
6 Nov.	„ Cash credited Captain Spearman, 66th Foot, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 1st November 1866.	450 – –			
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel Farrer, late Coldstream Guards, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 1st November 1866.	700 – –			25,264 9 7
			14 Nov. -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Barron & Smith, being the amount reserved from the commission of Captain Drouet, 2nd West India Regiment.	200 – –
8 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Ensign H. P. Hobson, 12th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 1st November 1866.	450 – –		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Blair, 45th Foot.	275 –
16 Nov. -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd's receipt, 15th November, value of the commission of Captain E. J. Hunt, 63rd Foot, per letter 13th November 1866.	700 – –		„ Cash lodged by Ensign Jackson, 9th Foot, for a lieutenancy.	250 – –
				„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet Mortimer for a commission in 9th Foot.	450 – –
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Wynne, 52nd Foot.	250 – –
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Downes & Son's receipt, 15th November, value of the commission of Ensign H. J. Smith, 14th Foot, per letter 13th November.	450 – –			
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Hopkinson's receipt, 16th November, value of the commission of Captain Van Cortland, 3rd Dragoon Guards, per letter 13th November 1866.	490 – –			

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1866:		£. s. d.	1866:		£. s. d.
16 Nov. -	To Cash credited Major J. W. Adair, amount authorised to be paid to him to complete the sum allowed for his commission, per letter 15th November 1866.	350 - -			
17 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Colonel W. C. Master, late 28th Foot, to complete value of his commission, per letter 13th November 1866.	1,800 - -			
20 Nov. -	„ Cash credited Major Crombie, 72nd Foot, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 15th November.	450 - -			
7 Dec. -	„ Cash paid Mr. Lawrie, authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Colonel M. M'Gregor, per letter 6th December 1866.	1,800 - -	21 Dec. -	By Cash lodged by Sir C. R. M'Gregor, Bart., & Co., amount reserved from the commission of Captain Davenport, 60th Rifles.	700 - -
14 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel F. Van Straubenzie, value of his commission, per letter 12th December 1866.	4,500 - -			
	„ Cash credited Major J. Stillman, late 9th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 12th December.	3,200 - -			
	„ Cash paid Messrs. Price & Boustead, receipt amount allowed for the commission of the late Captain Mitchell, 31st Foot.	1,675 - -			
15 Dec. -	„ Cash paid Mr. Codd's receipt, value of the commission of Major H. F. Turner, late 65th Foot, per letter 13th December 1866.	3,200 - -			
21 Dec. -	„ Cash credited Captain Pretor, late 9th Lancers, per letter 18th December 1866.	100 - -			
	„ Amounts authorised to be paid to the undermentioned officers :—				
	Lieutenant D. N. Lucas, late 40th Foot, per letter 1st November 1866.	700 - -			
	Captain C. J. Clark, 57th Foot, per letter 6th November 1866.	450 - -			
	Lieutenant Thomas, late 12th Foot, per letter 13th November 1866.	450 - -			
	Lieutenant J. J. R. Russell, 18th Foot, per letter 17th November 1866.	325 - -			
	Lieutenant Colonel Hutchins, late 12th Foot, per letter 18th December 1866.	4,500 - -			
	Major M. J. B. Dyne, late 9th Lancers, per letter 31st December 1866.	1,375 - -			
	Captain J. A. Clark, late 15th Hussars, per letter 31st December 1866.	190 - -			
1867:			1867:		
21 Jan. -	„ Cash credited Major Dyne, 9th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission per letter 16th January.	50 - -	19 Jan. -	„ Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Captain Dyer, 75th Foot.	100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Montfort for a company in 10th Foot.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Southey for a lieutenancy in 10th Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Mr. R. G. Warton for a commission in 10th Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Plumridge, 3rd West India Regiment.	350 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Gordon for a company in 73rd Foot.	1,100 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Ensign Sherlock for a lieutenancy in 73rd Foot.	250 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Cadet Auchinleck for an ensigncy in 73rd Foot.	450 - -
				„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Jackson, 25th Foot.	25 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the successors to Captain Webb, 8th Regiment.	1,800 - -
				„ Cash lodged by the purchasers in succession to Colonel Wodehouse, 24th Foot.	4,500 - -
				„ Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet T. S. Hesketh for a commission in the 24th Foot.	450 - -

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1867:		£. s. d.	1867:		£. s. d.
1 Feb. -	To Cash credited Captain Fitzhardinge Jones, late 1st Dragoon Guards, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 23rd January 1867.	490 - -	19 Jan. -	By Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Ord, 37th Foot.	175 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the commission of Major Clery, 100th Foot.	175 - -
22 Feb. -	,, Cash credited Captain R. A. L. Grews, 1st Dragoon Guards, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 21st February 1867.	490 - -		,, Cash lodged by Lieutenant Dickinson, Ensign Parker, and Gentleman Cadet Roberts, 10th Foot.	1,800 - -
				,, Cash lodged by Ensign Davidson and Gentleman Cadet J. Roberts, 73rd Foot.	700 - -
				,, Cash lodged by Gentleman Cadet Harrison for an ensigncy in 73rd Foot.	450 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Barwell, 90th Foot.	175 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Kingscote, Rifle Brigade.	425 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the commission of Major Sir J. Hill, Bart., 17th Lancers.	350 - -
				,, Cash lodged by Ensign Moffatt and Gentleman Cadet Oslear, 24th Foot.	700 - -
				,, Cash lodged by Lieutenant Mason, Ensign Lloyd, and Gentleman Cadet Bayly, 82nd Foot.	1,800 - -
				,, Cash lodged by Ensign Thackwell and Mr. E. Lethbridge, 90th Foot.	700 - -
				,, Cash lodged by Sir C. R. McGregor, Bart., & Co., on account of officers in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Ward, 60th Regiment.	1,800 - -
12 Mar.	,, Cash credited Captain Cartwright Enery, 15th Hussars, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 1st March 1867.	490 - -	7 March	,, Cash lodged by E. S. Codd, Esq., reserved from the commission of Captain Hume, 75th Foot.	75 - -
				,, Cash lodged in succession to Captain Lake, 24th Foot.	1,800 - -
14 Mar. -	,, Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel L. H. Hamilton, late 87th Foot, value of his commission, per letter 8th March.	3,200 - -		,, Cash lodged in succession to Captain Battersby, 60th Foot.	1,800 - -
	,, Amount authorised to be paid to Lieut. R. T. Goldsworthy, 9th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 16th March 1867.	490 - -		,, Cash lodged in succession to Captain Puget, 34th Foot.	1,800 - -
				,, Cash lodged in succession to Major Dudgeon, 61st Foot.	1,800 - -
	,, Amount authorised to be paid to Lieutenant Billing, 17th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 23rd March.	375 - -		,, Cash lodged by Major the Honourable C. W. St. Clair, 57th Regiment.	1,400 - -
				,, Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Colonel Strong, Coldstream Guards.	4,500 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the sale of the commission of Captain Benwell, 66th Foot.	225 - -
				,, Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Major the Honourable C. W. St. Clair, 57th Regiment.	1,800 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the commission of Ensign Fonblanque, 8th Foot.	150 - -
				,, Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Barry, 84th Foot.	100 - -
1 April -	,, Cash paid for the following Exchequer Bills, purchased by order of his Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief:			,, Cash lodged by Mr. A. C. Newman for a commission in Royal Canadian Rifles.	450 - -
	Bills dated 11th June 1866 - - - - £. 10,000 - -		1 April -	,, Cash lodged by Messrs. Price & Boustead, reserved from the commission of Brevet Major Forbes, 31st Foot.	250 - -
	Interest, 11th December to 1st April, 111 days, at 3 per cent. 121 12 11		22 April -	,, Cash received of Sir J. Kirkland, reserved from the commission of Captain Henri Campbell, 19th Regiment.	400 - -
	18 *s.* premium - - 90 - -			,, Cash lodged by Cadet F. G. Girardot for a commission in 19th Foot.	450 - -
	Broker's commission 5 - -	10,216 12 11		,, Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Browne, 83rd Foot.	700 - -
April -	Bills dated 11th March 1867 - 4,500 - -			,, Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant S. K. G. Jackson, 83rd Foot.	700 - -
	Interest, 11th March to 3rd April, 23 days, at 3 per cent. 8 10 2			,, Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Major Collingwood, 21st Foot.	1,350 - -
	20 *s.* premium - - 45 - -			,, Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Dwyer, 1st West India Regiment.	175 - -
	Broker's commission 2 5 -	4,555 15 2		,, Cash lodged in succession to Major J. A. Gore, 71st Foot.	3,250 - -
April -	Bills dated 11th March 1867 - 3,000 - -			,, Cash lodged by Mr. H. G. Kelly, 73rd Foot (for a commission in).	450 - -
	Interest, from 11th March, at 3 per cent. 5 18 4			,, Cash reserved from the commission of Captain the Honourable C. Duncombe, 1st Life Guards.	625 - -
	20 *s.* premium - - 30 - -			,, Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Colonel Wardlaw, 1st Dragoons.	4,500 - -
	Broker's commission 1 10 -	3,037 8 4		,, Cash lodged in succession to Captain Muriel, 75th Foot.	1,800 - -
5 April -	Bills dated 11th June 2,000 - -			,, Cash lodged in succession to Captain Allfrey, 75th Foot.	700 - -
	Interest, 11th December to 5th April - 25 4 2			,, Cash lodged by Mr. Phipson for an ensigncy in 75th Foot.	450 - -
	Premium, 20 *s.* - 20 - -			,, Cash lodged by Mr. Deming for an ensigncy in 75th Foot.	450 - -
	Broker's commission 1 - -	2,046 4 2		,, Cash lodged by Mr. Harrison for an ensigncy in 75th Foot.	450 - -
16 April -	One bill, dated 11th March 1867 - 500 - -				
	Interest, 11th March to 15th April, 35 days, at 3 per cent. 1 8 9				
	Premium 23 *s.* - - 5 15 -				
	Broker's commission - 5 -	507 8 9			

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1867:		£.	s.	d.	1867:		£.	s.	d.
17 April -	To Cash paid the receipt of J. Hanning, Esq., authorised to be paid to him as the value of his commission in the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letter 12th April 1867.	1,200	–	–	22 April -	By Cash lodged in succession to Major Brown, 14th Hussars.	2,750	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Mahon, 23rd Foot.	350	–	–
18 April -	„ Cash credited Captain J. Killery value of his commission in the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, per letter 12th April.	1,200	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Colonel Maunsell, 75th Foot.	1,300	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Major McDonnell, Cape Mounted Rifles.	1,300	–	–
25 April -	„ Cash paid receipt of Mr. Lawrie, amount authorised to be paid to Captain Kintoul, 4th Dragoon Guards.	490	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Mr. H. A. Wilson, for an ensigncy in the 59th Foot.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant St. Hill, 65th Foot.	700	–	–
4 May -	„ Cash paid Captain Morrough, late 9th Lancers, to complete value of his commission, per letter 20th April 1867.	490	–	–					
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Heron, 71st Foot.	50	–	–
9 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Wardlaw, 1st Dragoons, difference on going on half pay, per letter 8th May.	1,675	–	–		„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Colonel Maunsell, 75th Foot.	3,200	–	–
10 May -	„ Cash paid receipt of T. Stilwell, Esq., being the amount due on account of the sale of Captain F. D. Lunley's commission.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash lodged in succession to Major J. McDonnell, Cape Mounted Rifles.	3,200	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant Mackenzie for a company in 93rd Foot.	1,100	–	–
11 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Romer, value of his commission, per letter 8th May 1867.	4,500	–	–		„ Cash lodged by Lieutenant W. H. St. Hill for a company in 65th Foot.	1,100	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. J. F. Forster for a cornetcy in 13th Hussars.	450	–	–
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant M. Clarke, 59th Foot, amount authorised to be paid to him on his exchange from the 8th Hussars, per letter 30th April.	390	–	–					
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. F. Ryly for an ensigncy in 16th Foot.	450	–	–
13 May -	„ Cash authorised to be paid to Sir John Kirkland on account of the commission of Major Prenderville, late half pay 5th West India Regiment.	3,200	–	–		„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel McNeill, 48th Foot.	1,800	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Captain Cotton, 63rd Foot.	1,800	–	–
17 May -	„ Cash credited Lieutenat Colonel R. J. Brown, late half pay 14th Hussars, being the sum authorised to be paid to him on his promotion to an unattached lieutenant colonelcy, per letter 16th May 1867.	75	–	–		„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain Dickinson, 10th Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Captain Mitchell, 31st Foot.	700	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Stanier, 31st Foot.	700	–	–
18 May -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant R. Forrest's receipt, authorised to be paid to him as the value of his commission, per letter 16th May.	700	–	–		„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Gardiner, 31st Foot.	700	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Mr. E. S. Vidal, for an ensigncy.	450	–	–
20 May -	„ Cash credited Captain Beacker, late 12th Lancers, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 16th May 1867.	390	–	–		„ Cash reserved out of the commission of Captain Worthington, 33rd Foot.	375	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Major Hunter, 67th Foot.	50	–	–
						„ Cash reserved from the commission of Lieutenant Whitehead, 66th Foot.	75	–	–
						„ Cash lodged by Lord W. L. De la Poer Beresford for a cornetcy in 14th Hussars.	450	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Captain Teesdale, 11th Foot.	1,800	–	–
						„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Colonel A. Leslie, 40th Foot.	4,050	–	–
4 June -	„ Cash credited Captain Doering, late 6th Dragoon Guards, to complete the value of his commission, per letter 30th May 1867.	490	–	–	12 June -	„ Cash received, six months' interest on 12,000*l.* Exchequer Bills, to 11th June 1867.	236	–	–
10 June -	„ Cash credited Ensign P. Curry, late 81st Foot, value of his commission, per letter	450	–	–	14 June -	„ Cash lodged by Messrs. Hopkinson, reserved from the commission of Captain Gould, 97th Foot.	150	–	–
15 June -	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Holmes, 79th Foot, difference in exchanging from 7th Hussars, per letter 10th June 1867.	390	–	–					
	„ Cash credited Lieutenant Colonel McBean, late 1st West India Regiment, difference for lieutenant colonelcy in succession, per letter 10th June.	1,300	–	–					
20 June -	„ Cash credited Colonel G. C. Baillie, late Royal Engineers, value of his commission, per letter 14th June.	4,500	–	–					
21 June -	„ Cash paid Lieutenant Colonel Duchesnay, Brigade Major of Militia in Canada, to complete the amount allowed for his commission on retiring from 25th Foot in the year 1862, per letter 18th May 1867.	250	–	–					

Dr. THE RESERVE FUND—*continued.* *Cr.*

1867:		£. s. d.	£. s. d.	1867:		£. s. d.
22 June -	To Cash paid for Exchequer Bills dated 11th June -	5,000 – –		24 June -	By Cash lodged by Sir C. R. McGregor, Bart., & Co., reserved from the commission of Captain Fraser, 64th Foot.	150 – –
	Interest, 11th June to 22nd June, 11 days, at 2½ per cent. - - - - -	3 15 4			„ Cash reserved from the commission of Captain M. S. Smith, 44th Foot.	125 – –
	Premium, 23 *s.* - -	57 10 –			„ Cash lodged in succession to Lieutenant Mackenzie, 93rd Foot.	700 – –
	Broker's commission -	2 10 –				
			5,063 15 4		„ Cash lodged in succession to Brevet Major Orme, 85th Foot.	1,350 – –
25 June -	„ Cash paid for Exchequer Bills dated 11th March 1866 - - - - -	5,000 – –			„ Cash lodged by Captain and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel McNeill, 48th Foot.	1,400 – –
	Interest, 11th March to 25th June, 106 days, at 3 per cent. - - - - -	43 11 3			„ Cash lodged by Captain and Brevet Major Orme, 85th Foot.	1,400 – –
	Premium, 26 *s.* - -	65 – –				
	Broker's commission -	2 10 –			„ Cash lodged by Captain Cotton, 63rd Foot.	1,400 – –
			5,111 1 3			
	„ Cash paid Sir C. R. McGregor, Bart., & Co., to complete the value of the commission of Captain Robertson, 88th Foot, per letter 22nd June 1867.		450 – –			
	„ Cash authorised to be paid to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel M. Casson, half pay, late 57th Foot, per letter 10th June 1867.		3,200 – –			
	„ Cash authorised to be paid to Captain North, late 3rd Hussars, per letter 24th June 1867.		490 – –			
	„ Cash authorised to be paid to Colonel W. Campbell, half pay, late 7th Foot, per letter 27th June 1867.		3,200 – –			
	To Balance in hand - -		25,980 – 4			
	TOTAL - - - £.		1,022,876 10 5		TOTAL - - - £.	1,022,876 10 5

MEMORANDUM of EXCHEQUER BILLS held by Messrs. *Cox & Co.* on Account of the RESERVE FUND.

BILLS dated 11th June 1866.

	£. s. d.
13 of 1,000 *l.* each, Nos. 65, 725 and 726, 790, 1,155 to 1,159, and 1,946, 2,098 and 2,099 - -	13,000 – –
8 of 500 *l.* each, Nos. 435, 1,106, 1,134 and 1,135, 1,151 and 1,152, 918, 1,142 - - - -	4,000 – –

BILLS dated 11th March 1867.

10 of 1,000 *l.* each, Nos. 2,528 and 2,529, 3,372 to 3,375, 3,290 to 3,292, 3,376 - - - -	10,000 – –
6 of 500 *l.* each, Nos. 1,691, 1,796 and 1,797, 1,954 and 1,795, 1752 - - - - - -	3,000 – –
£.	30,000 – –

REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

MILITARY RESERVE FUNDS;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

AND APPENDIX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
22 *July* 1867.

[*Price* 1 *s.* 1 *d.*]

453.

Under 12 *oz.*